Library:World Affairs and the U.S.S.R.

World Affairs and the U.S.S.R.
Author	W. P. Coates, Zelda Coates
Publisher	Lawrence & Wishart
First published	1939 London

World Affairs and the U.S.S.R. is a book about Soviet foreign policy written by William Peyton and Zelda Coates, published by Lawrence & Wishart in 1939 on the eve of the Second World War. It includes a preface by Arthur Greenwood.

Preface

In 1934, at the Annual Conference of the Labour Party at Southport, a resolution was passed in the following terms:

"This Conference expresses its deep satisfaction at the entry of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics into the League of Nations, believing that this historic event will greatly strengthen the League, improve the relationship between neighbour States, render the Collective Peace System more effective, hasten a world agreement for progressive disarmament, thereby creating new opportunities for effective international co-operation both in economic questions and in other fields, and assist in a general advance of the peoples of the world towards a Co-operative World Commonwealth."

It is no fault of the U.S.S.R. that since its entry into the League of Nations the League has lost immeasurably in power and influence. From the day the Soviet Government became a member it has on every possible occasion proved its loyalty to decisions of the League and to the principles on which the League is based.

Unfortunately, certain States have left Geneva, whilst Britain and France, in particular, have allowed the League's position to be gravely weakened and its authority undermined.

It can be said with truth that had all the States' members of the League of Nations been as loyal to it and as active in its service as the U.S.S.R. the present deplorable and tragic situation in Europe and Asia would not have arisen.

Mr. and Mrs. Coates have performed a great service in setting out in clear and straight-forward terms the story of the part the U.S.S.R. has played in the changing international scene.

Special importance attaches to more recent events. I am glad that Mr. and Mrs. Coates have explained the attitude which the U.S.S.R. took during the Czecho-Slovakian crisis. There can be no doubt that attempts were made to mislead both the British and French Governments and that these Governments in their turn tried to mislead public opinion as to the part the U.S.S.R. was prepared to play in the event of war.

It is equally clear that both Governments deliberately turned their backs on Russia in the vain hope that they could strike up a permanent friendship with Germany and Italy. That policy of so-called "appeasement", and the idea of some four-power pact between Britain, France, Germany, and Italy, which might in fact have become an anti-Comintern League, or rather an anti-Soviet League, have now been exploded.

The culmination of "Munich" on 15 March 1939, when German troops marched as conquerors into Prague, finally killed "appeasement". It is now buried deep, never to be resurrected. Britain is now fumbling its way back to some form of collective security. A complete change has come over the situation. The U.S.S.R., once spurned and contemptuously ignored, is now being wooed as a potential ally of great value should there be a call to resist aggression.

The course of events in recent years, in the Far East, Abyssinia, Spain, Austria, Czecho-Slovakia, and now Memel and Albania, shows conclusively that the policy of "appeasement" through capitulation and acquiescence in aggression is futile and fraught with tragedy and ever deepening danger. One adventure is but the prelude to another. Europe is now in greater turmoil than it was before "Munich". There is a feeling of growing apprehension abroad, arising from fear of swift action by one or both the Fascist Dictators.

The only way in which these fears can be allayed and confidence in the maintenance of peace restored is by an effective grouping of all peace-loving nations under the banner of collective security.

This book will, I believe, help powerfully in concentrating attention on the need for a sane determined policy, which will make aggression forever impossible.

Arthur Greenwood.

Introduction

The present book does not, of course, pretend to be an exhaustive study of Soviet foreign policy. Our aim has been to give a short and as objective as possible an outline of the policy pursued by the Soviet Government in the various important questions which have occupied world attention during the last four years.

We have been impelled to deal with this subject because just as the condition of affairs within the U.S.S.R. has been continuously distorted, so the activities of the Soviet Government on the international field have been misrepresented time after time.

When in 1934, the Soviet Government decided to join the League of Nations, it was of course welcomed by every sincere lover of peace in this and other countries, but there were also two lines of attack or criticism. On the one hand, the "Die-hard" opponents of the U.S.S.R. saw in this step a sinister move to undermine the stability of all the other League members. Energetic efforts were made to prevent the entry of the U.S.S.R. into the League not only by individual reactionaries but by members of the League, like Switzerland, Holland, and Portugal and by Powers which had left the League—Nazi Germany and Japan.

It was also freely asserted at the time that the reason for the entry of the U.S.S.R. into the League was purely selfish, that she hoped for League help in the inevitable war with Japan she saw looming ahead in the very near future.

On the other hand, the cry also went up both from some friends and foes of the U.S.S.R. that the Soviet Government had made a complete break with its former foreign policy. Having for many years denounced the League as a body organised for maintaining the peace of Versailles and the imperialist interests of its members, having denounced it as an organisation contrived for united action against the U.S.S.R., how could the Soviet Government now make this volte face and join the League?

Such reasoning showed, of course, a fundamental misconception both of Soviet policy and the change in the international situation which had occurred since the League was first established.

The policy of the Soviet Government has been consistently based on the maintenance and promotion of peace since it first came into power in 1917.

So long as the League was largely used by France to establish her own hegemony in Europe, for the enforcement of the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles and as a nucleus for the possible organisation of war against the U.S.S.R., the Soviet Government steadily opposed the League and refused to participate in its activities.

At the same time, it never refused to take part in such work of the League which promoted or might tend to promote international peace, thus the Soviet Government participated very actively in the League Disarmament Commission, in various economic activities of the League, etc.

The Soviet Government was never in principle, against a League of Nations. On the contrary, as a Socialist Government it necessarily stood for peace and co-operation between all peoples. If it opposed the League of Nations as then constituted, it was precisely because it looked upon this League as not a real League of peoples but as a hot-bed of imperialist intrigues.

However, the world never stands still. By 1934, the rise of Nazi Germany with its naked aggressiveness, vile racial theories and glorification of militarism, had brought about a new international orientation in Europe. Side by side with this, Japan was threatening the peace of the world by her growing aggression in the Far East.

At the same time, the U.S.S.R. was becoming daily stronger both economically and in a military sense, and she became a definite and growing factor making for peace.

Under these circumstances, France which was directly threatened by Nazi Germany and to a less extent also Britain (whose interests in the Far East were threatened by Japan) and other Powers renounced, at any rate for the time being, their anti-Soviet policy and drew closer to the U.S.S.R., endeavouring to enlist her aid in the preservation of world peace.

The two mad dogs of war of that time, Japan and Nazi Germany, had withdrawn from the League in so far as the latter was to some extent hampering their freedom of action. In view of all this the Soviet Government, although by no means laying very great hopes on the possibility of the League (made up as it was of mainly capitalist Powers) really assuring peace, nevertheless decided to pull its weight in favour of world peace and collective security by joining the League.

Pursuing a realistic and consistent policy the Soviet Government always suited the, as it were, day-to-day details of its policy to the changing circumstances whilst maintaining intact its fundamental principles, one of which was the preservation of peace in so far as that was possible without yielding its own fundamental rights or territories or the betrayal of its treaty obligations with other countries.

The criticisms of and attacks on the U.S.S.R. when she joined the League is one example of the misrepresentation of Soviet policy. Two more examples we take from more recent history.

In the great betrayal of Czechoslovakia, persistent rumours were spread that the U.S.S.R. too, was not prepared to honour her mutual assistance pact with Czechoslovakia. This was an absolutely baseless slander. M. Litvinov has made it perfectly clear that the Soviet Government was not only ready to fulfil all its obligations under this Treaty, but that the Soviet War Department was ready to discuss the necessary measures with representatives of the French and Czechoslovak War Departments.

From the first, the Soviet Government was against the efforts made by Britain and France to persuade Czechoslovakia to capitulate to Nazi threats. The Soviet Press denounced the Lord Runciman mission to Czechoslovakia for they saw where it was leading to. Similarly, they denounced Mr. Chamberlain's visit to Berchtesgaden and all that followed this fatal flight to Hitler's stronghold.

Later it was represented that the U.S.S.R. had supported the Munich "Agreement". This, too, was a shameless lie repudiated alike by the behaviour of the Soviet Government throughout the crisis and officially by the Soviet authorities.

Later, too, we find from time to time echoes of this distortion of the real facts: for instance, the Diplomatic Correspondent of The Manchester Guardian in the course of an article on "Hitler's Ukrainian Aims" remarked casually as though it was a known and generally accepted fact that "the weakness of the Soviet Union was demonstrated during the recent crisis." [The Manchester Guardian, 12 December 1938.]

In what way was this "weakness" demonstrated? Was it by the readiness of the Soviet Government to stand by its treaty obligations? Or did this Diplomatic Correspondent really expect the U.S.S.R. to attack Germany on behalf of Czechoslovakia when the latter followed the advice, or it would be more correct to say the peremptory order of Great Britain and France to capitulate to the naked German aggression? Did he expect the U.S.S.R., not in fulfilment of Treaty obligations (for she had none when France refused to come to the aid of Czechoslovakia) but as an act of chivalry, to precipitate a general European conflagration in which she would have stood alone against Germany, Poland, Italy, Japan, with France and Britain at best neutral and perhaps not even too friendly neutral seeing that they had made their "peace" with German aggression and throughout the crisis had cold-shouldered the U.S.S.R.?

We think that such strictures of Soviet "inactivity" arise largely from a misconception of Soviet peace aims. The U.S.S.R. has always stood against the provocation of war, she stands for collective security against aggression with a view to avoiding war. The Soviet Government holds that if all the peace-minded countries, i.e., the countries which at the present stage of world affairs are vitally interested in the preservation of peace, stand together against the would-be aggressors, the forces ranged against the latter would be so great that the aggressor countries would in all probability desist from their plans. A bold, combined front by Britain, France, and the USSR with the U.S.A. at the very least a friendly neutral, would rally most if not all the smaller European countries. If in spite of this an aggressor country, drunk with its previous effortless successes and in a megalomania of self-importance, or for other reasons, did carry out its threats of war, then it would be speedily crushed by the huge combination ranged against her even if her Fascist allies did come to her aid, which is by no means certain in such a struggle.

It is this same failure to comprehend the basis of Soviet foreign policy—where the misrepresentation is not deliberate—that has led certain critics of the Soviets to wonder why the U.S.S.R. "is not doing more to help China" against Japanese aggression. What would they have the Soviets do? The latter, unlike the French Government, has made no apologies for supplying China with arms and war materials to the best of her ability. But, say the critics, the most effective way of helping China would be for the U.S.S.R. to attack Japan and the reason she does not do so is because of her military weakness. This is just nonsense. The U.S.S.R. by general consent has one of the finest air forces in the world. She now has a first-class highly mechanised army of which the manpower is second to none in number, training, equipment, skill, and intelligence. From its highest commander to its newest rank and filer, they are fully conscious of what the Red Army stands for and in any war in which they might be called on to participate would understand fully what it is they were fighting for.

If the Soviet authorities have not made war against Japan it is certainly not because they are afraid of the military might of the latter, but because it is a fundamental principle of their policy that their armed forces are to be used only for the defence of their own territory or in defence of their treaty obligations. The U.S.S.R. has no mutual assistance pact with China. Under such circumstances, an attack by the U.S.S.R. on Japan would be entirely contrary to Soviet principles. On the other hand, when Japan hoping no doubt for an easy victory and for a gain of prestige made an aggressive attempt on Soviet territory, she met with a resistance which soon illustrated the effectiveness of the Soviet forces, and Japan was compelled to withdraw.

The above few examples, which are dealt with more fully in the various chapters of the book, are sufficient to illustrate the kind of misconceptions if not worse to which Soviet policy has been subjected.

The history of the past few years has been one of almost consistent retreat of the bourgeois democracies before the Fascist Powers. If the former are to survive they must, sooner rather than later (for later may perhaps be too late), make a bold stand against the Fascists. In this stand, if it is a really determined and honest stand, the U.S.S.R. is ready at all times to lend its powerful aid.

Unfortunately the Governments of the bourgeois democracies in their dislike of Socialism, in their fear of its successes in the U.S.S.R., in their fear of the rise of a really independent democratic China are prepared even to sacrifice their own imperial interests rather than make common cause with the U.S.S.R. to defeat Fascism. They may—most of them certainly do—prefer their own bourgeois democratic régimes, but if it is to be a choice between Socialism and Fascism they will in most cases plump for the latter. If Fascism in Germany or Italy were to fall, as there can be little doubt, it would fall if their Governments were to meet with military or a number of serious diplomatic and economic defeats, the probability is that a Socialist régime would take its place—this the present British and French Governments are not prepared to contemplate, hence one reason for their complacency in the face of Fascist attacks on and triumphs at the expense of British and French interests.

But the peoples of Britain and France, above all the workers by hand and brain, also have a say in the matter, and it is to them that this book is addressed. If they compel their Governments to resist the further encroachments of Fascism, then as the pages of this booklet demonstrate the U.S.S.R. will be ready to back up this resistance with all its military and economic might.

In conclusion, a few words as to the arrangement of this booklet. It will be seen that the opening chapter does not deal with Soviet policy at all, but consists of a discussion of Nazi policy illustrated by extracts from Hitler's Mein Kampf and from speeches by Hitler and other Nazi leaders. This has been done advisedly because the European and indeed the international situation has been largely dominated by the blustering assertiveness of Nazi aggression and racial bestiality. A comparison of Mein Kampf with Nazi policy since its accession to power shows how in all the main essentials Hitler has followed the course prescribed in that book.

One of the most important of Hitler's aims was an alliance between Germany, Great Britain, and Italy, with a view to isolating France and thus putting her completely at Germany's mercy.

Unsuccessful so far in driving a wedge between France and Great Britain Hitler has, we must concede, quite cleverly manoeuvred Great Britain into forcing France herself to weaken her position on one front after another. The latest "Agreement" between France and Germany arising out of the "Munich Agreement" weakens the French international position still more.

Definitely, and the German Press so far from making a secret of it emphasises the point, France is now regarded as no longer interested in what is happening in Central or Eastern Europe. The frontier between Germany and France is fixed finally for all time, but as regards France's other frontiers—the frontiers of France with Italy, Switzerland, Spain—Germany is still interested in all these and can strike there through an ally or a victim at any time. And when France, so the calculation goes, in one way or another has been made completely helpless, then will come the final reckoning with as Mein Kampf puts it, Germany's mortal enemy—France.

The new agreement will then share the fate of other agreements and will become a mere scrap of paper.

The two points in which Nazi policy differs from that of Mein Kampf are: Nazi Germany has not yet attempted an attack upon the U.S.S.R.—the reason for this is obvious, the Nazis realise that the U.S.S.R. is stronger than Hitler had imagined it would be when he wrote Mein Kampf in 1923. Secondly, they have brought forward the question of German Colonies much sooner than contemplated in Mein Kampf. The reason for this is also obvious. Britain and France have proved far more complacent to his aggression than Hitler had thought would be the case and he therefore now feels that he may safely make any demands it pleases him without any great risk.

The coming to power of Hitler has necessarily influenced as we have already stated, the day-to-day foreign policy of the U.S.S.R. It has just as necessarily changed the Labour and Socialist attitude towards Germany, towards the foreign policy of their own countries, towards armaments, etc. Present-day Germany is not the German Republic of the Weimar Constitution whatever the faults of the latter, and this fact must always be borne in mind when discussing Socialist foreign policy. Hence any discussion of the international question must be preceded by an examination of the true import of the Nazi philosophy (if we may use such an expression without insulting the whole conception of philosophy) and this explains the reason for our opening chapter.

As far as possible we have treated the various subjects in chronological order, but for the sake of clarity we have dealt with the different countries in separate chapters and where in any given chapter clearness would have been sacrificed by a strict adherence to chronology, we have chosen clearness in preference to chronology.

Finally, whilst dealing with the subject matter historically, we have neither attempted nor intended to write anything in the nature of a thorough history of these subjects but rather to give a series of rapid historical sketches as a background for discussing the policy pursued by the various countries, more particularly by the U.S.S.R. in each case.

In compiling the subject matter of this booklet, we have used many reports of the British press. Our task has been made very much easier by having at our disposal the excellent chronology of events given in the Bulletin of International News issued by the Royal Institute of International Affairs to which we would express our profound gratitude.