Library:World Affairs and the U.S.S.R.

World Affairs and the U.S.S.R.
Author	W. P. Coates, Zelda Coates
Publisher	Lawrence & Wishart
First published	1939 London

World Affairs and the U.S.S.R. is a book about Soviet foreign policy written by William Peyton and Zelda Coates, published by Lawrence & Wishart in 1939 on the eve of the Second World War. It includes a preface by Arthur Greenwood.

Preface

In 1934, at the Annual Conference of the Labour Party at Southport, a resolution was passed in the following terms:

"This Conference expresses its deep satisfaction at the entry of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics into the League of Nations, believing that this historic event will greatly strengthen the League, improve the relationship between neighbour States, render the Collective Peace System more effective, hasten a world agreement for progressive disarmament, thereby creating new opportunities for effective international co-operation both in economic questions and in other fields, and assist in a general advance of the peoples of the world towards a Co-operative World Commonwealth."

It is no fault of the U.S.S.R. that since its entry into the League of Nations the League has lost immeasurably in power and influence. From the day the Soviet Government became a member it has on every possible occasion proved its loyalty to decisions of the League and to the principles on which the League is based.

Unfortunately, certain States have left Geneva, whilst Britain and France, in particular, have allowed the League's position to be gravely weakened and its authority undermined.

It can be said with truth that had all the States' members of the League of Nations been as loyal to it and as active in its service as the U.S.S.R. the present deplorable and tragic situation in Europe and Asia would not have arisen.

Mr. and Mrs. Coates have performed a great service in setting out in clear and straight-forward terms the story of the part the U.S.S.R. has played in the changing international scene.

Special importance attaches to more recent events. I am glad that Mr. and Mrs. Coates have explained the attitude which the U.S.S.R. took during the Czecho-Slovakian crisis. There can be no doubt that attempts were made to mislead both the British and French Governments and that these Governments in their turn tried to mislead public opinion as to the part the U.S.S.R. was prepared to play in the event of war.

It is equally clear that both Governments deliberately turned their backs on Russia in the vain hope that they could strike up a permanent friendship with Germany and Italy. That policy of so-called "appeasement", and the idea of some four-power pact between Britain, France, Germany, and Italy, which might in fact have become an anti-Comintern League, or rather an anti-Soviet League, have now been exploded.

The culmination of "Munich" on 15 March 1939, when German troops marched as conquerors into Prague, finally killed "appeasement". It is now buried deep, never to be resurrected. Britain is now fumbling its way back to some form of collective security. A complete change has come over the situation. The U.S.S.R., once spurned and contemptuously ignored, is now being wooed as a potential ally of great value should there be a call to resist aggression.

The course of events in recent years, in the Far East, Abyssinia, Spain, Austria, Czecho-Slovakia, and now Memel and Albania, shows conclusively that the policy of "appeasement" through capitulation and acquiescence in aggression is futile and fraught with tragedy and ever deepening danger. One adventure is but the prelude to another. Europe is now in greater turmoil than it was before "Munich". There is a feeling of growing apprehension abroad, arising from fear of swift action by one or both the Fascist Dictators.

The only way in which these fears can be allayed and confidence in the maintenance of peace restored is by an effective grouping of all peace-loving nations under the banner of collective security.

This book will, I believe, help powerfully in concentrating attention on the need for a sane determined policy, which will make aggression forever impossible.

Arthur Greenwood.

Introduction

The present book does not, of course, pretend to be an exhaustive study of Soviet foreign policy. Our aim has been to give a short and as objective as possible an outline of the policy pursued by the Soviet Government in the various important questions which have occupied world attention during the last four years.

We have been impelled to deal with this subject because just as the condition of affairs within the U.S.S.R. has been continuously distorted, so the activities of the Soviet Government on the international field have been misrepresented time after time.

When in 1934, the Soviet Government decided to join the League of Nations, it was of course welcomed by every sincere lover of peace in this and other countries, but there were also two lines of attack or criticism. On the one hand, the "Die-hard" opponents of the U.S.S.R. saw in this step a sinister move to undermine the stability of all the other League members. Energetic efforts were made to prevent the entry of the U.S.S.R. into the League not only by individual reactionaries but by members of the League, like Switzerland, Holland, and Portugal and by Powers which had left the League—Nazi Germany and Japan.

It was also freely asserted at the time that the reason for the entry of the U.S.S.R. into the League was purely selfish, that she hoped for League help in the inevitable war with Japan she saw looming ahead in the very near future.

On the other hand, the cry also went up both from some friends and foes of the U.S.S.R. that the Soviet Government had made a complete break with its former foreign policy. Having for many years denounced the League as a body organised for maintaining the peace of Versailles and the imperialist interests of its members, having denounced it as an organisation contrived for united action against the U.S.S.R., how could the Soviet Government now make this volte face and join the League?

Such reasoning showed, of course, a fundamental misconception both of Soviet policy and the change in the international situation which had occurred since the League was first established.

The policy of the Soviet Government has been consistently based on the maintenance and promotion of peace since it first came into power in 1917.

So long as the League was largely used by France to establish her own hegemony in Europe, for the enforcement of the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles and as a nucleus for the possible organisation of war against the U.S.S.R., the Soviet Government steadily opposed the League and refused to participate in its activities.

At the same time, it never refused to take part in such work of the League which promoted or might tend to promote international peace, thus the Soviet Government participated very actively in the League Disarmament Commission, in various economic activities of the League, etc.

The Soviet Government was never in principle, against a League of Nations. On the contrary, as a Socialist Government it necessarily stood for peace and co-operation between all peoples. If it opposed the League of Nations as then constituted, it was precisely because it looked upon this League as not a real League of peoples but as a hot-bed of imperialist intrigues.

However, the world never stands still. By 1934, the rise of Nazi Germany with its naked aggressiveness, vile racial theories and glorification of militarism, had brought about a new international orientation in Europe. Side by side with this, Japan was threatening the peace of the world by her growing aggression in the Far East.

At the same time, the U.S.S.R. was becoming daily stronger both economically and in a military sense, and she became a definite and growing factor making for peace.

Under these circumstances, France which was directly threatened by Nazi Germany and to a less extent also Britain (whose interests in the Far East were threatened by Japan) and other Powers renounced, at any rate for the time being, their anti-Soviet policy and drew closer to the U.S.S.R., endeavouring to enlist her aid in the preservation of world peace.

The two mad dogs of war of that time, Japan and Nazi Germany, had withdrawn from the League in so far as the latter was to some extent hampering their freedom of action. In view of all this the Soviet Government, although by no means laying very great hopes on the possibility of the League (made up as it was of mainly capitalist Powers) really assuring peace, nevertheless decided to pull its weight in favour of world peace and collective security by joining the League.

Pursuing a realistic and consistent policy the Soviet Government always suited the, as it were, day-to-day details of its policy to the changing circumstances whilst maintaining intact its fundamental principles, one of which was the preservation of peace in so far as that was possible without yielding its own fundamental rights or territories or the betrayal of its treaty obligations with other countries.

The criticisms of and attacks on the U.S.S.R. when she joined the League is one example of the misrepresentation of Soviet policy. Two more examples we take from more recent history.

In the great betrayal of Czechoslovakia, persistent rumours were spread that the U.S.S.R. too, was not prepared to honour her mutual assistance pact with Czechoslovakia. This was an absolutely baseless slander. M. Litvinov has made it perfectly clear that the Soviet Government was not only ready to fulfil all its obligations under this Treaty, but that the Soviet War Department was ready to discuss the necessary measures with representatives of the French and Czechoslovak War Departments.

From the first, the Soviet Government was against the efforts made by Britain and France to persuade Czechoslovakia to capitulate to Nazi threats. The Soviet Press denounced the Lord Runciman mission to Czechoslovakia for they saw where it was leading to. Similarly, they denounced Mr. Chamberlain's visit to Berchtesgaden and all that followed this fatal flight to Hitler's stronghold.

Later it was represented that the U.S.S.R. had supported the Munich "Agreement". This, too, was a shameless lie repudiated alike by the behaviour of the Soviet Government throughout the crisis and officially by the Soviet authorities.

Later, too, we find from time to time echoes of this distortion of the real facts: for instance, the Diplomatic Correspondent of The Manchester Guardian in the course of an article on "Hitler's Ukrainian Aims" remarked casually as though it was a known and generally accepted fact that "the weakness of the Soviet Union was demonstrated during the recent crisis." [The Manchester Guardian, 12 December 1938.]

In what way was this "weakness" demonstrated? Was it by the readiness of the Soviet Government to stand by its treaty obligations? Or did this Diplomatic Correspondent really expect the U.S.S.R. to attack Germany on behalf of Czechoslovakia when the latter followed the advice, or it would be more correct to say the peremptory order of Great Britain and France to capitulate to the naked German aggression? Did he expect the U.S.S.R., not in fulfilment of Treaty obligations (for she had none when France refused to come to the aid of Czechoslovakia) but as an act of chivalry, to precipitate a general European conflagration in which she would have stood alone against Germany, Poland, Italy, Japan, with France and Britain at best neutral and perhaps not even too friendly neutral seeing that they had made their "peace" with German aggression and throughout the crisis had cold-shouldered the U.S.S.R.?

We think that such strictures of Soviet "inactivity" arise largely from a misconception of Soviet peace aims. The U.S.S.R. has always stood against the provocation of war, she stands for collective security against aggression with a view to avoiding war. The Soviet Government holds that if all the peace-minded countries, i.e., the countries which at the present stage of world affairs are vitally interested in the preservation of peace, stand together against the would-be aggressors, the forces ranged against the latter would be so great that the aggressor countries would in all probability desist from their plans. A bold, combined front by Britain, France, and the USSR with the U.S.A. at the very least a friendly neutral, would rally most if not all the smaller European countries. If in spite of this an aggressor country, drunk with its previous effortless successes and in a megalomania of self-importance, or for other reasons, did carry out its threats of war, then it would be speedily crushed by the huge combination ranged against her even if her Fascist allies did come to her aid, which is by no means certain in such a struggle.

It is this same failure to comprehend the basis of Soviet foreign policy—where the misrepresentation is not deliberate—that has led certain critics of the Soviets to wonder why the U.S.S.R. "is not doing more to help China" against Japanese aggression. What would they have the Soviets do? The latter, unlike the French Government, has made no apologies for supplying China with arms and war materials to the best of her ability. But, say the critics, the most effective way of helping China would be for the U.S.S.R. to attack Japan and the reason she does not do so is because of her military weakness. This is just nonsense. The U.S.S.R. by general consent has one of the finest air forces in the world. She now has a first-class highly mechanised army of which the manpower is second to none in number, training, equipment, skill, and intelligence. From its highest commander to its newest rank and filer, they are fully conscious of what the Red Army stands for and in any war in which they might be called on to participate would understand fully what it is they were fighting for.

If the Soviet authorities have not made war against Japan it is certainly not because they are afraid of the military might of the latter, but because it is a fundamental principle of their policy that their armed forces are to be used only for the defence of their own territory or in defence of their treaty obligations. The U.S.S.R. has no mutual assistance pact with China. Under such circumstances, an attack by the U.S.S.R. on Japan would be entirely contrary to Soviet principles. On the other hand, when Japan hoping no doubt for an easy victory and for a gain of prestige made an aggressive attempt on Soviet territory, she met with a resistance which soon illustrated the effectiveness of the Soviet forces, and Japan was compelled to withdraw.

The above few examples, which are dealt with more fully in the various chapters of the book, are sufficient to illustrate the kind of misconceptions if not worse to which Soviet policy has been subjected.

The history of the past few years has been one of almost consistent retreat of the bourgeois democracies before the Fascist Powers. If the former are to survive they must, sooner rather than later (for later may perhaps be too late), make a bold stand against the Fascists. In this stand, if it is a really determined and honest stand, the U.S.S.R. is ready at all times to lend its powerful aid.

Unfortunately the Governments of the bourgeois democracies in their dislike of Socialism, in their fear of its successes in the U.S.S.R., in their fear of the rise of a really independent democratic China are prepared even to sacrifice their own imperial interests rather than make common cause with the U.S.S.R. to defeat Fascism. They may—most of them certainly do—prefer their own bourgeois democratic régimes, but if it is to be a choice between Socialism and Fascism they will in most cases plump for the latter. If Fascism in Germany or Italy were to fall, as there can be little doubt, it would fall if their Governments were to meet with military or a number of serious diplomatic and economic defeats, the probability is that a Socialist régime would take its place—this the present British and French Governments are not prepared to contemplate, hence one reason for their complacency in the face of Fascist attacks on and triumphs at the expense of British and French interests.

But the peoples of Britain and France, above all the workers by hand and brain, also have a say in the matter, and it is to them that this book is addressed. If they compel their Governments to resist the further encroachments of Fascism, then as the pages of this booklet demonstrate the U.S.S.R. will be ready to back up this resistance with all its military and economic might.

In conclusion, a few words as to the arrangement of this booklet. It will be seen that the opening chapter does not deal with Soviet policy at all, but consists of a discussion of Nazi policy illustrated by extracts from Hitler's Mein Kampf and from speeches by Hitler and other Nazi leaders. This has been done advisedly because the European and indeed the international situation has been largely dominated by the blustering assertiveness of Nazi aggression and racial bestiality. A comparison of Mein Kampf with Nazi policy since its accession to power shows how in all the main essentials Hitler has followed the course prescribed in that book.

One of the most important of Hitler's aims was an alliance between Germany, Great Britain, and Italy, with a view to isolating France and thus putting her completely at Germany's mercy.

Unsuccessful so far in driving a wedge between France and Great Britain Hitler has, we must concede, quite cleverly manoeuvred Great Britain into forcing France herself to weaken her position on one front after another. The latest "Agreement" between France and Germany arising out of the "Munich Agreement" weakens the French international position still more.

Definitely, and the German Press so far from making a secret of it emphasises the point, France is now regarded as no longer interested in what is happening in Central or Eastern Europe. The frontier between Germany and France is fixed finally for all time, but as regards France's other frontiers—the frontiers of France with Italy, Switzerland, Spain—Germany is still interested in all these and can strike there through an ally or a victim at any time. And when France, so the calculation goes, in one way or another has been made completely helpless, then will come the final reckoning with as Mein Kampf puts it, Germany's mortal enemy—France.

The new agreement will then share the fate of other agreements and will become a mere scrap of paper.

The two points in which Nazi policy differs from that of Mein Kampf are: Nazi Germany has not yet attempted an attack upon the U.S.S.R.—the reason for this is obvious, the Nazis realise that the U.S.S.R. is stronger than Hitler had imagined it would be when he wrote Mein Kampf in 1923. Secondly, they have brought forward the question of German Colonies much sooner than contemplated in Mein Kampf. The reason for this is also obvious. Britain and France have proved far more complacent to his aggression than Hitler had thought would be the case and he therefore now feels that he may safely make any demands it pleases him without any great risk.

The coming to power of Hitler has necessarily influenced as we have already stated, the day-to-day foreign policy of the U.S.S.R. It has just as necessarily changed the Labour and Socialist attitude towards Germany, towards the foreign policy of their own countries, towards armaments, etc. Present-day Germany is not the German Republic of the Weimar Constitution whatever the faults of the latter, and this fact must always be borne in mind when discussing Socialist foreign policy. Hence any discussion of the international question must be preceded by an examination of the true import of the Nazi philosophy (if we may use such an expression without insulting the whole conception of philosophy) and this explains the reason for our opening chapter.

As far as possible we have treated the various subjects in chronological order, but for the sake of clarity we have dealt with the different countries in separate chapters and where in any given chapter clearness would have been sacrificed by a strict adherence to chronology, we have chosen clearness in preference to chronology.

Finally, whilst dealing with the subject matter historically, we have neither attempted nor intended to write anything in the nature of a thorough history of these subjects but rather to give a series of rapid historical sketches as a background for discussing the policy pursued by the various countries, more particularly by the U.S.S.R. in each case.

In compiling the subject matter of this booklet, we have used many reports of the British press. Our task has been made very much easier by having at our disposal the excellent chronology of events given in the Bulletin of International News issued by the Royal Institute of International Affairs to which we would express our profound gratitude.

Chapter I - Hitler's Aims as Set Out in "Mein Kampf"

BRITISH and other statesmen were apparently surprised by the European crisis of September 1938,caused by Hitler's threat to Czechoslovakia, yet that crisis was the inevitable outcome of policies and aims laid down by Hitler in his book Mein Kampf, the Bible of the Nazi Movement.

A copy of this book is given at the expense of the State to every newly-married couple in Germany. Here are a few relevant extracts from that delectable wedding present.

Hitler made it daylight clear that he does not consider the mere restoration of Germany's pre-war frontiers as sufficient. He wrote:

"The demand for a restoration of the boundaries of the year 1914 is political nonsense so colossal and grave in its consequences that it appears criminal. Quite apart from the fact that the boundaries of the Reich in the year 1914 were anything but logical. For in reality they were neither complete from the point of view of comprising all people of German nationality, nor rational from the point of view of military geographical utility. They were not the result of conscious political action, but temporary boundaries in a political struggle in no way terminated. Yes, in part they were purely accidental...." [Page 736].

Perhaps the Fuehrer did not think that was sufficiently downright, at any rate he emphasised these ideas in other paragraphs:

"But if one is convinced that the German future, whatever its course, demands the highest sacrifice, one must, quite apart from all considerations of political wisdom in itself, find and fight for an aim worthy of that sacrifice. The boundaries of the year 1914 have not the slightest significance for the future of the German nation. They neither provided protection in the past nor could they provide power in the future. "The German people will neither obtain internal cohesion through them, nor will its food supply be guaranteed, nor are these boundaries effective or even adequate from the military point of view, nor, finally, can they improve on our present relations with the other world Powers or, more correctly, with the real world Powers." [Pages 738–9.]

Hitler apparently envisaged the future of Europe as one continuous series of wars and revision of frontiers until German hegemony was established:

"In contrast to this aim [the restoration of the 1914 frontiers], we National Socialists must steadfastly maintain our aim in foreign policy, namely, to secure for the German people the soil that is due to them on this earth. And this action is the only one that can justify a sacrifice of blood before God and our German posterity....

"The soil on which in times to come peasant families will give birth to strong sons will justify the sacrifice of the sons of today, and will absolve the statesmen responsible, even if they are persecuted today, from all guilt for the sacrifice of the people....

"A thoughtless imbecile may regard the division of the earth as fixed for all eternity, but in reality each temporary division is only an apparent point of rest in the current development, created in constant change by the mighty forces of nature, only perhaps to be destroyed and re-modelled by stronger forces tomorrow—and the same is true in human history of the boundaries of national living spaces.

"Boundaries are made by men and altered by men." [Pages 739–40.]

Hitler's first aim was to secure Germany's objects in Eastern Europe and then turn on France:

"We have finished with the eternal Germanic crusades towards the south and west of Europe, and turn our eyes towards the land in the east. We make a final break with the colonial and trade policy of the pre-war period and take up the territorial policy of the future.

"But when we speak today of new soil in Europe we can in the first instance only think of Russia and the border States subordinate to her." [Pages 741–2.]

"The giant empire in the east is ripe for collapse. And the end of the Jewish rule in Russia will also be the end of Russia as a State. We are chosen by fate to become the witnesses of a catastrophe which will be the most powerful proof of the correctness of the national race theory." [Page 743.]

As to Germany's future attitude towards France, Hitler wrote:

"The political testament of the German nation for its foreign policy must always of necessity be:— "Never tolerate the rise of two continental Powers in Europe. Regard any attempt to organise a second military Power on the German frontier, even if only in the form of a State capable of becoming a military Power, as an attack on Germany, and should such an attempt be made, regard it not only as your right but also as your duty to prevent the creation of such a State by every means, including the use of armed force, and to shatter it should it already have arisen!" [Page 754.]

Hitler looked round for Allies, he came to the conclusion that Britain and Italy would suit his purposes. He therefore strongly advocated a German-English-Italian Alliance:

"The only Power that would oppose such an alliance, France, would not be able to do so. And so this alliance would make it possible for Germany to take, without interference, all the steps that, within the framework of such a coalition, will have to be taken, in one way or another, for our reckoning with France.

"For the significant feature of such an alliance is that Germany is not immediately upon its conclusion laid open to an enemy invasion, but that, on the contrary, the enemy alliance itself is broken up, that the Entente which has brought such misfortune upon us is dissolved and that thus the mortal enemy of our people, France, is left in isolation." [Page 755.]

"Even if this success at first were only a moral one it would suffice to give Germany a freedom of movement that can today scarcely be conceived, for the law of action would be in the hands of the new European Anglo-German-Italian Alliance, and no longer in those of France." [Page 756.]

Well might Sir Archibald Sinclair, speaking in the House of Commons, 3 October 1938, respecting Hitler's aims, say:

"Two sources of enlightenment I enjoy about Herr Hitler's intentions. One source is his public speeches and the expression of his opinions and intentions in public and in private, and the other is Mein Kampf. I prefer Mein Kampf, because it has never yet let me down, and I commend it to the Prime Minister." [Hansard, 3 October 1938. Col. 76.]

We shall have no difficulty in demonstrating that Hitler ever since he attained office has relentlessly pursued his Mein Kampf policy and that any pacts, promises, or agreements which he has made which seemed to run counter to that policy have been scrapped without the slightest compunction as soon as he has been in a position to do so. A short chronological statement of his promises and his acts prove this beyond doubt.

The Nazi Government came into power in Germany in March 1933. Hitler at first apparently wished to give the world the impression that responsibility had sobered him.

17 May 1933. Speaking in the Reichstag and referring to the Treaty of Versailles, the Kellogg Pact, the Locarno Treaty, etc., he said:

"Germany will tread no other path than that laid down by the treaties. The German Government will discuss all political and economic questions only within the framework of and through the treaties. She understands too well that a military attack of any kind, if it were successful, must lead to disaster. The German people will not let itself be forced into anything that might prolong its disqualification. It has no thought of invading any country. "The German Government wishes to settle all difficult questions with other Governments by peaceful methods. It knows that any military action in Europe, even if completely successful, would, in view of the sacrifice, bear no relation to the profit to be obtained." [The Times, 18 May 1933.]

Since that date, as we shall see, Hitler's Government has violated the Kellogg Pact and repudiated the Treaties of Versailles and Locarno. 30 January 1934. Hitler in the Reichstag referring to the Saar, declared:

"This question is the only one concerning territory which is still open between the two nations. After it has been settled the German Government is ready to accept not only the letter but also the spirit of the Locarno Pact, for then there will be no other territorial question at stake between France and Germany." [The Times, 31 January 1934.]

Although the Saar question was settled some time later, the Reich Government nevertheless subsequently repudiated the Treaty of Locarno.

10 March 1935. General Göring announced in Berlin, without consultation, with the signatories of the Versailles Treaty, the existence of a German Air Force. This was a violation of the Versailles Treaty. Article 198 lays down: "The armed forces of Germany must not include any military or naval air forces."

16 March 1935. Hitler, in a proclamation to the German people announced the introduction of conscription, thus again violating the Versailles Treaty. However, apparently with the object of placating public opinion abroad, he declared:

"In this hour, the German Government renews before the German people and the whole world the assurance of its determination never to go beyond the protection of German honour and the freedom of the Reich, and, especially, not to create in the German national armaments an instrument of warlike aggression, but rather one of defence and of the maintenance of peace." [The Times, 18 March 1935.]

The British Ambassador in Berlin strongly protested against these violations of the Versailles Treaty.

7 March 1936. Hitler announced to the Allied Ambassadors in Berlin and in the Reichstag, his Government's denunciation of the Treaty of Locarno and the simultaneous reoccupation by German troops of the demilitarised zone.

[Note.—The demilitarised zone, which was reoccupied by German troops on 7 March, was set up by Articles 42–3 of the Treaty of Versailles. These articles forbid Germany to maintain troops or construct fortifications anywhere to the west of the Rhine or within 50 kilometres to the east of the river. These articles were reaffirmed in the Locarno Treaty. This treaty was not forced upon Germany, but freely negotiated and concluded by Dr. Streseman, with M. Briand, Sir Austen Chamberlain, and Signor Mussolini, on 16 October 1925, and subsequently also accepted by Hitler.]

In his Reichstag speech Hitler also said:

"After three years I believe that I can regard the struggle for German equality as concluded today. I believe, moreover, that thereby the first and foremost reason for our withdrawal from European collective collaboration has ceased to exist. We have no territorial demands to make in Europe. We know that all the tensions which arise from wrong territorial provisions or the disproportion between the sizes of national populations and their living room cannot be solved in Europe by war." [The Times, 9 March 1936.]

11 July 1936. An Austrian-German Pact was concluded under which it was provided:

"1. In accordance with statements of the Führer and Reich Chancellor of 21 May 1935, the German Reich Government recognises the full sovereignty of the Federal State of Austria. "2. Each of the two Governments considers the inner political developments existing in the other country, including the question of Austrian National Socialism, as an internal affair of the other country in which they will not interfere either directly or indirectly."

The terms of this pact were announced simultaneously in Berlin and Vienna by Dr. Goebbels and Dr. Schuschnigg respectively. 12 February 1938. Hitler and Dr. Schuschnigg after prolonged conversations reached an agreement which, according to the official communiqué contained the following clause:

"All questions affecting the relations between Austria and the German Reich were submitted to a detailed examination in the discussion on 12 February between Herr von Schuschnigg and Herr Hitler. The aim of this discussion was to clarify the difficulties which have arisen in the working of the Austro-German agreement of 11 July 1936. It was agreed that both parties are resolved to keep to the principles of that agreement and regard it as the starting point for a satisfactory development of their relations."

11 March 1938. Germany annexed Austria. 12 March 1936. Hitler in a speech at Karlsruhe said:

"If the rest of the world treats Germany as an equal it will have no better and truer friend. Germany has no intention of attacking France, Czechoslovakia, or Poland." [The Times, 13 March 1936.]

14 March 1938. Mr. Chamberlain stated in the House of Commons:

"The Czech Government have officially informed His Majesty's Government that though it is their earnest desire to live on the best possible neighbourly relations with the German Reich, they have followed with the greatest attention the development of events in Austria between the date of the Austro-German Agreement of July 1936, up to the present day. "I am informed that Field-Marshal Goering on 11th March gave a general assurance to the Czech Minister in Berlin—an assurance which he expressly renewed later on behalf of Herr Hitler—that it would be the earnest endeavour of the German Government to improve German-Czech relations. In particular, on 12th March, Field-Marshal Goering informed the Czech Minister that German troops marching into Austria had received the strictest orders to keep at least 15 kilometres from the Czech frontier. On the same day the Czechoslovak Minister in Berlin was assured by Baron von Neurath that Germany considered herself bound by the German-Czechoslovak Arbitration Convention of October 1925." [Hansard, 14 March 1938. Cols. 50/51.]

24 September 1938. Germany sent a seven-day ultimatum to Czechoslovakia. 26 September 1938. Hitler, speaking in the Reichstag and referring to Czechoslovakia, said:

"And now the last problem which must be solved, and which will be solved, confronts us. It is the last territorial claim which I have to make in Europe, but it is the claim from which I do not recede and which I shall fulfill, God willing. "I have further assured him [Mr. Chamberlain], and I stress it now, that when this problem is solved Germany has no more territorial problems in Europe." [The Manchester Guardian, 27 September 1938.]

28 September 1938. Mr. Chamberlain, speaking in the House of Commons and referring to his Berchtesgaden visit to Hitler, said:

"Herr Hitler made it plain that he had made up his mind that the Sudeten-Germans must have the right of self-determination, and of returning, if they wished, to the Reich. If they could not achieve this by their own efforts, he said, he would assist them to do so, and he declared categorically that rather than wait he would be prepared to risk a world war." [The Hansard, 28 September 1938. Col. 14.]

15 September 1938. In the course of Berchtesgaden conversations Herr Hitler informed Mr. Chamberlain "that he was glad to leave the Memelland as it was so long as the Memel Statute was observed by the Lithuanian Government." [The Hansard, 22 December 1938.]

21 March 1939. Nazi Germans invaded and annexed Memel. No accusation was even made that Lithuania had in any way violated the Memel Statute.

30 September 1938. A declaration was signed by Herr Hitler and Mr. Neville Chamberlain, stating:

"We are resolved that the method of consultation shall be the method adopted to deal with any other questions that may concern our two countries, and we are determined to continue our efforts to remove possible sources of difference and thus to contribute to assure the peace of Europe." [The Times, 1 October 1938.]

In view of Hitler's declared policy as outlined in Mein Kampf and his series of broken promises as detailed above, what is his promise worth? Are there any reasons for thinking that Hitler will consider his promise to Chamberlain any more binding than his promises in connection with the treaties with Austria, Czechoslovakia, Memel, etc.

It is only necessary to add that, on 1 October 1938, German troops, in accordance with the Munich Agreement of 29 September 1938, began occupation of Sudeten-Deutsche territory. Further, well before the end of November, Hitler had broken the Munich Agreement and occupied far more of Czechoslovakia than he had even demanded at Godesberg, demands which even Mr. Chamberlain had said that he was not prepared to concede, and on 15 March 1939, Germany completely annexed Czechoslovakia.