World Affairs and the U.S.S.R. (W. P. Coates, Zelda Coates)

World Affairs and the U.S.S.R.
Author	W. P. Coates, Zelda Coates
Publisher	Lawrence & Wishart
First published	1939 London

World Affairs and the U.S.S.R. is a book about Soviet foreign policy written by William Peyton and Zelda Coates, published by Lawrence & Wishart in 1939 on the eve of the Second World War. It includes a preface by Arthur Greenwood.

Preface

In 1934, at the Annual Conference of the Labour Party at Southport, a resolution was passed in the following terms:

"This Conference expresses its deep satisfaction at the entry of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics into the League of Nations, believing that this historic event will greatly strengthen the League, improve the relationship between neighbour States, render the Collective Peace System more effective, hasten a world agreement for progressive disarmament, thereby creating new opportunities for effective international co-operation both in economic questions and in other fields, and assist in a general advance of the peoples of the world towards a Co-operative World Commonwealth."

It is no fault of the U.S.S.R. that since its entry into the League of Nations the League has lost immeasurably in power and influence. From the day the Soviet Government became a member it has on every possible occasion proved its loyalty to decisions of the League and to the principles on which the League is based.

Unfortunately, certain States have left Geneva, whilst Britain and France, in particular, have allowed the League's position to be gravely weakened and its authority undermined.

It can be said with truth that had all the States' members of the League of Nations been as loyal to it and as active in its service as the U.S.S.R. the present deplorable and tragic situation in Europe and Asia would not have arisen.

Mr. and Mrs. Coates have performed a great service in setting out in clear and straight-forward terms the story of the part the U.S.S.R. has played in the changing international scene.

Special importance attaches to more recent events. I am glad that Mr. and Mrs. Coates have explained the attitude which the U.S.S.R. took during the Czecho-Slovakian crisis. There can be no doubt that attempts were made to mislead both the British and French Governments and that these Governments in their turn tried to mislead public opinion as to the part the U.S.S.R. was prepared to play in the event of war.

It is equally clear that both Governments deliberately turned their backs on Russia in the vain hope that they could strike up a permanent friendship with Germany and Italy. That policy of so-called "appeasement", and the idea of some four-power pact between Britain, France, Germany, and Italy, which might in fact have become an anti-Comintern League, or rather an anti-Soviet League, have now been exploded.

The culmination of "Munich" on 15 March 1939, when German troops marched as conquerors into Prague, finally killed "appeasement". It is now buried deep, never to be resurrected. Britain is now fumbling its way back to some form of collective security. A complete change has come over the situation. The U.S.S.R., once spurned and contemptuously ignored, is now being wooed as a potential ally of great value should there be a call to resist aggression.

The course of events in recent years, in the Far East, Abyssinia, Spain, Austria, Czecho-Slovakia, and now Memel and Albania, shows conclusively that the policy of "appeasement" through capitulation and acquiescence in aggression is futile and fraught with tragedy and ever deepening danger. One adventure is but the prelude to another. Europe is now in greater turmoil than it was before "Munich". There is a feeling of growing apprehension abroad, arising from fear of swift action by one or both the Fascist Dictators.

The only way in which these fears can be allayed and confidence in the maintenance of peace restored is by an effective grouping of all peace-loving nations under the banner of collective security.

This book will, I believe, help powerfully in concentrating attention on the need for a sane determined policy, which will make aggression forever impossible.

Arthur Greenwood.

Introduction

The present book does not, of course, pretend to be an exhaustive study of Soviet foreign policy. Our aim has been to give a short and as objective as possible an outline of the policy pursued by the Soviet Government in the various important questions which have occupied world attention during the last four years.

We have been impelled to deal with this subject because just as the condition of affairs within the U.S.S.R. has been continuously distorted, so the activities of the Soviet Government on the international field have been misrepresented time after time.

When in 1934, the Soviet Government decided to join the League of Nations, it was of course welcomed by every sincere lover of peace in this and other countries, but there were also two lines of attack or criticism. On the one hand, the "Die-hard" opponents of the U.S.S.R. saw in this step a sinister move to undermine the stability of all the other League members. Energetic efforts were made to prevent the entry of the U.S.S.R. into the League not only by individual reactionaries but by members of the League, like Switzerland, Holland, and Portugal and by Powers which had left the League—Nazi Germany and Japan.

It was also freely asserted at the time that the reason for the entry of the U.S.S.R. into the League was purely selfish, that she hoped for League help in the inevitable war with Japan she saw looming ahead in the very near future.

On the other hand, the cry also went up both from some friends and foes of the U.S.S.R. that the Soviet Government had made a complete break with its former foreign policy. Having for many years denounced the League as a body organised for maintaining the peace of Versailles and the imperialist interests of its members, having denounced it as an organisation contrived for united action against the U.S.S.R., how could the Soviet Government now make this volte face and join the League?

Such reasoning showed, of course, a fundamental misconception both of Soviet policy and the change in the international situation which had occurred since the League was first established.

The policy of the Soviet Government has been consistently based on the maintenance and promotion of peace since it first came into power in 1917.

So long as the League was largely used by France to establish her own hegemony in Europe, for the enforcement of the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles and as a nucleus for the possible organisation of war against the U.S.S.R., the Soviet Government steadily opposed the League and refused to participate in its activities.

At the same time, it never refused to take part in such work of the League which promoted or might tend to promote international peace, thus the Soviet Government participated very actively in the League Disarmament Commission, in various economic activities of the League, etc.

The Soviet Government was never in principle, against a League of Nations. On the contrary, as a Socialist Government it necessarily stood for peace and co-operation between all peoples. If it opposed the League of Nations as then constituted, it was precisely because it looked upon this League as not a real League of peoples but as a hot-bed of imperialist intrigues.

However, the world never stands still. By 1934, the rise of Nazi Germany with its naked aggressiveness, vile racial theories and glorification of militarism, had brought about a new international orientation in Europe. Side by side with this, Japan was threatening the peace of the world by her growing aggression in the Far East.

At the same time, the U.S.S.R. was becoming daily stronger both economically and in a military sense, and she became a definite and growing factor making for peace.

Under these circumstances, France which was directly threatened by Nazi Germany and to a less extent also Britain (whose interests in the Far East were threatened by Japan) and other Powers renounced, at any rate for the time being, their anti-Soviet policy and drew closer to the U.S.S.R., endeavouring to enlist her aid in the preservation of world peace.

The two mad dogs of war of that time, Japan and Nazi Germany, had withdrawn from the League in so far as the latter was to some extent hampering their freedom of action. In view of all this the Soviet Government, although by no means laying very great hopes on the possibility of the League (made up as it was of mainly capitalist Powers) really assuring peace, nevertheless decided to pull its weight in favour of world peace and collective security by joining the League.

Pursuing a realistic and consistent policy the Soviet Government always suited the, as it were, day-to-day details of its policy to the changing circumstances whilst maintaining intact its fundamental principles, one of which was the preservation of peace in so far as that was possible without yielding its own fundamental rights or territories or the betrayal of its treaty obligations with other countries.

The criticisms of and attacks on the U.S.S.R. when she joined the League is one example of the misrepresentation of Soviet policy. Two more examples we take from more recent history.

In the great betrayal of Czechoslovakia, persistent rumours were spread that the U.S.S.R. too, was not prepared to honour her mutual assistance pact with Czechoslovakia. This was an absolutely baseless slander. M. Litvinov has made it perfectly clear that the Soviet Government was not only ready to fulfil all its obligations under this Treaty, but that the Soviet War Department was ready to discuss the necessary measures with representatives of the French and Czechoslovak War Departments.

From the first, the Soviet Government was against the efforts made by Britain and France to persuade Czechoslovakia to capitulate to Nazi threats. The Soviet Press denounced the Lord Runciman mission to Czechoslovakia for they saw where it was leading to. Similarly, they denounced Mr. Chamberlain's visit to Berchtesgaden and all that followed this fatal flight to Hitler's stronghold.

Later it was represented that the U.S.S.R. had supported the Munich "Agreement". This, too, was a shameless lie repudiated alike by the behaviour of the Soviet Government throughout the crisis and officially by the Soviet authorities.

Later, too, we find from time to time echoes of this distortion of the real facts: for instance, the Diplomatic Correspondent of The Manchester Guardian in the course of an article on "Hitler's Ukrainian Aims" remarked casually as though it was a known and generally accepted fact that "the weakness of the Soviet Union was demonstrated during the recent crisis." [The Manchester Guardian, 12 December 1938.]

In what way was this "weakness" demonstrated? Was it by the readiness of the Soviet Government to stand by its treaty obligations? Or did this Diplomatic Correspondent really expect the U.S.S.R. to attack Germany on behalf of Czechoslovakia when the latter followed the advice, or it would be more correct to say the peremptory order of Great Britain and France to capitulate to the naked German aggression? Did he expect the U.S.S.R., not in fulfilment of Treaty obligations (for she had none when France refused to come to the aid of Czechoslovakia) but as an act of chivalry, to precipitate a general European conflagration in which she would have stood alone against Germany, Poland, Italy, Japan, with France and Britain at best neutral and perhaps not even too friendly neutral seeing that they had made their "peace" with German aggression and throughout the crisis had cold-shouldered the U.S.S.R.?

We think that such strictures of Soviet "inactivity" arise largely from a misconception of Soviet peace aims. The U.S.S.R. has always stood against the provocation of war, she stands for collective security against aggression with a view to avoiding war. The Soviet Government holds that if all the peace-minded countries, i.e., the countries which at the present stage of world affairs are vitally interested in the preservation of peace, stand together against the would-be aggressors, the forces ranged against the latter would be so great that the aggressor countries would in all probability desist from their plans. A bold, combined front by Britain, France, and the USSR with the U.S.A. at the very least a friendly neutral, would rally most if not all the smaller European countries. If in spite of this an aggressor country, drunk with its previous effortless successes and in a megalomania of self-importance, or for other reasons, did carry out its threats of war, then it would be speedily crushed by the huge combination ranged against her even if her Fascist allies did come to her aid, which is by no means certain in such a struggle.

It is this same failure to comprehend the basis of Soviet foreign policy—where the misrepresentation is not deliberate—that has led certain critics of the Soviets to wonder why the U.S.S.R. "is not doing more to help China" against Japanese aggression. What would they have the Soviets do? The latter, unlike the French Government, has made no apologies for supplying China with arms and war materials to the best of her ability. But, say the critics, the most effective way of helping China would be for the U.S.S.R. to attack Japan and the reason she does not do so is because of her military weakness. This is just nonsense. The U.S.S.R. by general consent has one of the finest air forces in the world. She now has a first-class highly mechanised army of which the manpower is second to none in number, training, equipment, skill, and intelligence. From its highest commander to its newest rank and filer, they are fully conscious of what the Red Army stands for and in any war in which they might be called on to participate would understand fully what it is they were fighting for.

If the Soviet authorities have not made war against Japan it is certainly not because they are afraid of the military might of the latter, but because it is a fundamental principle of their policy that their armed forces are to be used only for the defence of their own territory or in defence of their treaty obligations. The U.S.S.R. has no mutual assistance pact with China. Under such circumstances, an attack by the U.S.S.R. on Japan would be entirely contrary to Soviet principles. On the other hand, when Japan hoping no doubt for an easy victory and for a gain of prestige made an aggressive attempt on Soviet territory, she met with a resistance which soon illustrated the effectiveness of the Soviet forces, and Japan was compelled to withdraw.

The above few examples, which are dealt with more fully in the various chapters of the book, are sufficient to illustrate the kind of misconceptions if not worse to which Soviet policy has been subjected.

The history of the past few years has been one of almost consistent retreat of the bourgeois democracies before the Fascist Powers. If the former are to survive they must, sooner rather than later (for later may perhaps be too late), make a bold stand against the Fascists. In this stand, if it is a really determined and honest stand, the U.S.S.R. is ready at all times to lend its powerful aid.

Unfortunately the Governments of the bourgeois democracies in their dislike of Socialism, in their fear of its successes in the U.S.S.R., in their fear of the rise of a really independent democratic China are prepared even to sacrifice their own imperial interests rather than make common cause with the U.S.S.R. to defeat Fascism. They may—most of them certainly do—prefer their own bourgeois democratic régimes, but if it is to be a choice between Socialism and Fascism they will in most cases plump for the latter. If Fascism in Germany or Italy were to fall, as there can be little doubt, it would fall if their Governments were to meet with military or a number of serious diplomatic and economic defeats, the probability is that a Socialist régime would take its place—this the present British and French Governments are not prepared to contemplate, hence one reason for their complacency in the face of Fascist attacks on and triumphs at the expense of British and French interests.

But the peoples of Britain and France, above all the workers by hand and brain, also have a say in the matter, and it is to them that this book is addressed. If they compel their Governments to resist the further encroachments of Fascism, then as the pages of this booklet demonstrate the U.S.S.R. will be ready to back up this resistance with all its military and economic might.

In conclusion, a few words as to the arrangement of this booklet. It will be seen that the opening chapter does not deal with Soviet policy at all, but consists of a discussion of Nazi policy illustrated by extracts from Hitler's Mein Kampf and from speeches by Hitler and other Nazi leaders. This has been done advisedly because the European and indeed the international situation has been largely dominated by the blustering assertiveness of Nazi aggression and racial bestiality. A comparison of Mein Kampf with Nazi policy since its accession to power shows how in all the main essentials Hitler has followed the course prescribed in that book.

One of the most important of Hitler's aims was an alliance between Germany, Great Britain, and Italy, with a view to isolating France and thus putting her completely at Germany's mercy.

Unsuccessful so far in driving a wedge between France and Great Britain Hitler has, we must concede, quite cleverly manoeuvred Great Britain into forcing France herself to weaken her position on one front after another. The latest "Agreement" between France and Germany arising out of the "Munich Agreement" weakens the French international position still more.

Definitely, and the German Press so far from making a secret of it emphasises the point, France is now regarded as no longer interested in what is happening in Central or Eastern Europe. The frontier between Germany and France is fixed finally for all time, but as regards France's other frontiers—the frontiers of France with Italy, Switzerland, Spain—Germany is still interested in all these and can strike there through an ally or a victim at any time. And when France, so the calculation goes, in one way or another has been made completely helpless, then will come the final reckoning with as Mein Kampf puts it, Germany's mortal enemy—France.

The new agreement will then share the fate of other agreements and will become a mere scrap of paper.

The two points in which Nazi policy differs from that of Mein Kampf are: Nazi Germany has not yet attempted an attack upon the U.S.S.R.—the reason for this is obvious, the Nazis realise that the U.S.S.R. is stronger than Hitler had imagined it would be when he wrote Mein Kampf in 1923. Secondly, they have brought forward the question of German Colonies much sooner than contemplated in Mein Kampf. The reason for this is also obvious. Britain and France have proved far more complacent to his aggression than Hitler had thought would be the case and he therefore now feels that he may safely make any demands it pleases him without any great risk.

The coming to power of Hitler has necessarily influenced as we have already stated, the day-to-day foreign policy of the U.S.S.R. It has just as necessarily changed the Labour and Socialist attitude towards Germany, towards the foreign policy of their own countries, towards armaments, etc. Present-day Germany is not the German Republic of the Weimar Constitution whatever the faults of the latter, and this fact must always be borne in mind when discussing Socialist foreign policy. Hence any discussion of the international question must be preceded by an examination of the true import of the Nazi philosophy (if we may use such an expression without insulting the whole conception of philosophy) and this explains the reason for our opening chapter.

As far as possible we have treated the various subjects in chronological order, but for the sake of clarity we have dealt with the different countries in separate chapters and where in any given chapter clearness would have been sacrificed by a strict adherence to chronology, we have chosen clearness in preference to chronology.

Finally, whilst dealing with the subject matter historically, we have neither attempted nor intended to write anything in the nature of a thorough history of these subjects but rather to give a series of rapid historical sketches as a background for discussing the policy pursued by the various countries, more particularly by the U.S.S.R. in each case.

In compiling the subject matter of this booklet, we have used many reports of the British press. Our task has been made very much easier by having at our disposal the excellent chronology of events given in the Bulletin of International News issued by the Royal Institute of International Affairs to which we would express our profound gratitude.

Chapter I - Hitler's Aims as Set Out in "Mein Kampf"

BRITISH and other statesmen were apparently surprised by the European crisis of September 1938,caused by Hitler's threat to Czechoslovakia, yet that crisis was the inevitable outcome of policies and aims laid down by Hitler in his book Mein Kampf, the Bible of the Nazi Movement.

A copy of this book is given at the expense of the State to every newly-married couple in Germany. Here are a few relevant extracts from that delectable wedding present.

Hitler made it daylight clear that he does not consider the mere restoration of Germany's pre-war frontiers as sufficient. He wrote:

"The demand for a restoration of the boundaries of the year 1914 is political nonsense so colossal and grave in its consequences that it appears criminal. Quite apart from the fact that the boundaries of the Reich in the year 1914 were anything but logical. For in reality they were neither complete from the point of view of comprising all people of German nationality, nor rational from the point of view of military geographical utility. They were not the result of conscious political action, but temporary boundaries in a political struggle in no way terminated. Yes, in part they were purely accidental...." [Page 736].

Perhaps the Fuehrer did not think that was sufficiently downright, at any rate he emphasised these ideas in other paragraphs:

"But if one is convinced that the German future, whatever its course, demands the highest sacrifice, one must, quite apart from all considerations of political wisdom in itself, find and fight for an aim worthy of that sacrifice. The boundaries of the year 1914 have not the slightest significance for the future of the German nation. They neither provided protection in the past nor could they provide power in the future.
"The German people will neither obtain internal cohesion through them, nor will its food supply be guaranteed, nor are these boundaries effective or even adequate from the military point of view, nor, finally, can they improve on our present relations with the other world Powers or, more correctly, with the real world Powers." [Pages 738–9.]

Hitler apparently envisaged the future of Europe as one continuous series of wars and revision of frontiers until German hegemony was established:

"In contrast to this aim [the restoration of the 1914 frontiers], we National Socialists must steadfastly maintain our aim in foreign policy, namely, to secure for the German people the soil that is due to them on this earth. And this action is the only one that can justify a sacrifice of blood before God and our German posterity....

"The soil on which in times to come peasant families will give birth to strong sons will justify the sacrifice of the sons of today, and will absolve the statesmen responsible, even if they are persecuted today, from all guilt for the sacrifice of the people....

"A thoughtless imbecile may regard the division of the earth as fixed for all eternity, but in reality each temporary division is only an apparent point of rest in the current development, created in constant change by the mighty forces of nature, only perhaps to be destroyed and re-modelled by stronger forces tomorrow—and the same is true in human history of the boundaries of national living spaces.

"Boundaries are made by men and altered by men." [Pages 739–40.]

Hitler's first aim was to secure Germany's objects in Eastern Europe and then turn on France:

"We have finished with the eternal Germanic crusades towards the south and west of Europe, and turn our eyes towards the land in the east. We make a final break with the colonial and trade policy of the pre-war period and take up the territorial policy of the future.

"But when we speak today of new soil in Europe we can in the first instance only think of Russia and the border States subordinate to her." [Pages 741–2.]

"The giant empire in the east is ripe for collapse. And the end of the Jewish rule in Russia will also be the end of Russia as a State. We are chosen by fate to become the witnesses of a catastrophe which will be the most powerful proof of the correctness of the national race theory." [Page 743.]

As to Germany's future attitude towards France, Hitler wrote:

"The political testament of the German nation for its foreign policy must always of necessity be:—
"Never tolerate the rise of two continental Powers in Europe. Regard any attempt to organise a second military Power on the German frontier, even if only in the form of a State capable of becoming a military Power, as an attack on Germany, and should such an attempt be made, regard it not only as your right but also as your duty to prevent the creation of such a State by every means, including the use of armed force, and to shatter it should it already have arisen!" [Page 754.]

Hitler looked round for Allies, he came to the conclusion that Britain and Italy would suit his purposes. He therefore strongly advocated a German-English-Italian Alliance:

"The only Power that would oppose such an alliance, France, would not be able to do so. And so this alliance would make it possible for Germany to take, without interference, all the steps that, within the framework of such a coalition, will have to be taken, in one way or another, for our reckoning with France.

"For the significant feature of such an alliance is that Germany is not immediately upon its conclusion laid open to an enemy invasion, but that, on the contrary, the enemy alliance itself is broken up, that the Entente which has brought such misfortune upon us is dissolved and that thus the mortal enemy of our people, France, is left in isolation." [Page 755.]

"Even if this success at first were only a moral one it would suffice to give Germany a freedom of movement that can today scarcely be conceived, for the law of action would be in the hands of the new European Anglo-German-Italian Alliance, and no longer in those of France." [Page 756.]

Well might Sir Archibald Sinclair, speaking in the House of Commons, 3 October 1938, respecting Hitler's aims, say:

"Two sources of enlightenment I enjoy about Herr Hitler's intentions. One source is his public speeches and the expression of his opinions and intentions in public and in private, and the other is Mein Kampf. I prefer Mein Kampf, because it has never yet let me down, and I commend it to the Prime Minister." [Hansard, 3 October 1938. Col. 76.]

We shall have no difficulty in demonstrating that Hitler ever since he attained office has relentlessly pursued his Mein Kampf policy and that any pacts, promises, or agreements which he has made which seemed to run counter to that policy have been scrapped without the slightest compunction as soon as he has been in a position to do so. A short chronological statement of his promises and his acts prove this beyond doubt.

The Nazi Government came into power in Germany in March 1933. Hitler at first apparently wished to give the world the impression that responsibility had sobered him.

17 May 1933. Speaking in the Reichstag and referring to the Treaty of Versailles, the Kellogg Pact, the Locarno Treaty, etc., he said:

"Germany will tread no other path than that laid down by the treaties. The German Government will discuss all political and economic questions only within the framework of and through the treaties. She understands too well that a military attack of any kind, if it were successful, must lead to disaster. The German people will not let itself be forced into anything that might prolong its disqualification. It has no thought of invading any country.
"The German Government wishes to settle all difficult questions with other Governments by peaceful methods. It knows that any military action in Europe, even if completely successful, would, in view of the sacrifice, bear no relation to the profit to be obtained." [The Times, 18 May 1933.]

Since that date, as we shall see, Hitler's Government has violated the Kellogg Pact and repudiated the Treaties of Versailles and Locarno.

30 January 1934. Hitler in the Reichstag referring to the Saar, declared:

"This question is the only one concerning territory which is still open between the two nations. After it has been settled the German Government is ready to accept not only the letter but also the spirit of the Locarno Pact, for then there will be no other territorial question at stake between France and Germany." [The Times, 31 January 1934.]

Although the Saar question was settled some time later, the Reich Government nevertheless subsequently repudiated the Treaty of Locarno.

10 March 1935. General Göring announced in Berlin, without consultation, with the signatories of the Versailles Treaty, the existence of a German Air Force. This was a violation of the Versailles Treaty. Article 198 lays down: "The armed forces of Germany must not include any military or naval air forces."

16 March 1935. Hitler, in a proclamation to the German people announced the introduction of conscription, thus again violating the Versailles Treaty. However, apparently with the object of placating public opinion abroad, he declared:

"In this hour, the German Government renews before the German people and the whole world the assurance of its determination never to go beyond the protection of German honour and the freedom of the Reich, and, especially, not to create in the German national armaments an instrument of warlike aggression, but rather one of defence and of the maintenance of peace." [The Times, 18 March 1935.]

The British Ambassador in Berlin strongly protested against these violations of the Versailles Treaty.

7 March 1936. Hitler announced to the Allied Ambassadors in Berlin and in the Reichstag, his Government's denunciation of the Treaty of Locarno and the simultaneous reoccupation by German troops of the demilitarised zone.

[Note.—The demilitarised zone, which was reoccupied by German troops on 7 March, was set up by Articles 42–3 of the Treaty of Versailles. These articles forbid Germany to maintain troops or construct fortifications anywhere to the west of the Rhine or within 50 kilometres to the east of the river. These articles were reaffirmed in the Locarno Treaty. This treaty was not forced upon Germany, but freely negotiated and concluded by Dr. Streseman, with M. Briand, Sir Austen Chamberlain, and Signor Mussolini, on 16 October 1925, and subsequently also accepted by Hitler.]

In his Reichstag speech Hitler also said:

"After three years I believe that I can regard the struggle for German equality as concluded today. I believe, moreover, that thereby the first and foremost reason for our withdrawal from European collective collaboration has ceased to exist. We have no territorial demands to make in Europe. We know that all the tensions which arise from wrong territorial provisions or the disproportion between the sizes of national populations and their living room cannot be solved in Europe by war." [The Times, 9 March 1936.]

11 July 1936. An Austrian-German Pact was concluded under which it was provided:

"1. In accordance with statements of the Führer and Reich Chancellor of 21 May 1935, the German Reich Government recognises the full sovereignty of the Federal State of Austria.
"2. Each of the two Governments considers the inner political developments existing in the other country, including the question of Austrian National Socialism, as an internal affair of the other country in which they will not interfere either directly or indirectly."

The terms of this pact were announced simultaneously in Berlin and Vienna by Dr. Goebbels and Dr. Schuschnigg respectively.

12 February 1938. Hitler and Dr. Schuschnigg after prolonged conversations reached an agreement which, according to the official communiqué contained the following clause:

"All questions affecting the relations between Austria and the German Reich were submitted to a detailed examination in the discussion on 12 February between Herr von Schuschnigg and Herr Hitler. The aim of this discussion was to clarify the difficulties which have arisen in the working of the Austro-German agreement of 11 July 1936. It was agreed that both parties are resolved to keep to the principles of that agreement and regard it as the starting point for a satisfactory development of their relations."

11 March 1938. Germany annexed Austria.
12 March 1936. Hitler in a speech at Karlsruhe said:

"If the rest of the world treats Germany as an equal it will have no better and truer friend. Germany has no intention of attacking France, Czechoslovakia, or Poland." [The Times, 13 March 1936.]

14 March 1938. Mr. Chamberlain stated in the House of Commons:

"The Czech Government have officially informed His Majesty's Government that though it is their earnest desire to live on the best possible neighbourly relations with the German Reich, they have followed with the greatest attention the development of events in Austria between the date of the Austro-German Agreement of July 1936, up to the present day.
"I am informed that Field-Marshal Goering on 11th March gave a general assurance to the Czech Minister in Berlin—an assurance which he expressly renewed later on behalf of Herr Hitler—that it would be the earnest endeavour of the German Government to improve German-Czech relations. In particular, on 12th March, Field-Marshal Goering informed the Czech Minister that German troops marching into Austria had received the strictest orders to keep at least 15 kilometres from the Czech frontier. On the same day the Czechoslovak Minister in Berlin was assured by Baron von Neurath that Germany considered herself bound by the German-Czechoslovak Arbitration Convention of October 1925." [Hansard, 14 March 1938. Cols. 50/51.]

24 September 1938. Germany sent a seven-day ultimatum to Czechoslovakia.
26 September 1938. Hitler, speaking in the Reichstag and referring to Czechoslovakia, said:

"And now the last problem which must be solved, and which will be solved, confronts us. It is the last territorial claim which I have to make in Europe, but it is the claim from which I do not recede and which I shall fulfill, God willing.
"I have further assured him [Mr. Chamberlain], and I stress it now, that when this problem is solved Germany has no more territorial problems in Europe." [The Manchester Guardian, 27 September 1938.]

28 September 1938. Mr. Chamberlain, speaking in the House of Commons and referring to his Berchtesgaden visit to Hitler, said:

"Herr Hitler made it plain that he had made up his mind that the Sudeten-Germans must have the right of self-determination, and of returning, if they wished, to the Reich. If they could not achieve this by their own efforts, he said, he would assist them to do so, and he declared categorically that rather than wait he would be prepared to risk a world war." [The Hansard, 28 September 1938. Col. 14.]

15 September 1938. In the course of Berchtesgaden conversations Herr Hitler informed Mr. Chamberlain "that he was glad to leave the Memelland as it was so long as the Memel Statute was observed by the Lithuanian Government." [The Hansard, 22 December 1938.]

21 March 1939. Nazi Germans invaded and annexed Memel. No accusation was even made that Lithuania had in any way violated the Memel Statute.

30 September 1938. A declaration was signed by Herr Hitler and Mr. Neville Chamberlain, stating:

"We are resolved that the method of consultation shall be the method adopted to deal with any other questions that may concern our two countries, and we are determined to continue our efforts to remove possible sources of difference and thus to contribute to assure the peace of Europe." [The Times, 1 October 1938.]

In view of Hitler's declared policy as outlined in Mein Kampf and his series of broken promises as detailed above, what is his promise worth? Are there any reasons for thinking that Hitler will consider his promise to Chamberlain any more binding than his promises in connection with the treaties with Austria, Czechoslovakia, Memel, etc.

It is only necessary to add that, on 1 October 1938, German troops, in accordance with the Munich Agreement of 29 September 1938, began occupation of Sudeten-Deutsche territory. Further, well before the end of November, Hitler had broken the Munich Agreement and occupied far more of Czechoslovakia than he had even demanded at Godesberg, demands which even Mr. Chamberlain had said that he was not prepared to concede, and on 15 March 1939, Germany completely annexed Czechoslovakia.

Chapter II - The Baltic States, the U.S.S.R., and Germany

THE Nazi Government's intentions vis-à-vis the Baltic States, as outlined in Mein Kampf, have been quoted on an earlier page. Unfortunately, the refusal of Germany, in April 1934, to guarantee jointly with the U.S.S.R. the independence of these States, gives an additional and sinister significance to these declared intentions.

On 28 March 1934, M. Litvinov, the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, offered the German Government through its Moscow Ambassador, M. Nadolny, to sign a joint Protocol wherein the two Governments always undertook to take into account in their foreign policy the obligation of the Baltic States and to refrain from any acts which might directly or indirectly violate this independence. This Protocol was to remain open for signature by any other country interested in the matter.

M. Litvinov, in making this proposal, stated that the Soviet Government was actuated by the desire to strengthen world peace in general and peace in Eastern Europe in particular and also to promote an improvement in the relations between the U.S.S.R. and Germany.

Whilst waiting for the German reply the Soviet Government gave further additional proof of its own peaceful intentions regarding these States. On 4 April 1934, it signed a Protocol prolonging for a period of 10 years the Non-Aggression Pacts which it had concluded with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, for a peaceful solution of any conflicts that might arise between the signatories.

After the signature of this Protocol, in the Conference Hall of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in Moscow, M. Litvinov declared:

"Today we have been concerned with the fate of the Pacts, the duration of which runs for another year and a half. The paying of a bill before the date on which it is due is a sign both of goodwill and of the excellent financial position of the drawer....

"The act we have carried out together was undertaken and completed at a time when the international position was becoming more acute daily. Day by day the menace of war threatening all the continents of the world is discussed in speech and writing. But there is hardly a murmur regarding the possibility of, and means for, averting this coming catastrophe.... The only thing of which they seem to be able to think is merely a universal rearmament and that race for armaments which in the past not only did not prevent war, but actually stimulated its outbreak....

"Political anxiety and threats of war in Europe are caused at the present time by disputes between neighbouring States arising from the transference of given provinces or sections of territory from one State to another, the formation of new political entities from these territories and from the dissatisfaction with treaties formulating these territorial redistributions.

"The Soviet Union does not know such disputes. She never demanded the revision of existing agreements and has no intention of demanding this. The Soviet State, to whom the ideas of chauvinism, nationalism, racial, or national prejudices are completely alien, desires no conquests, no expansion, no extension of territory. She does not regard the honour of the nation as consisting in the inculcation into its people of the spirit of militarism or blood-thirstiness.

"She regards as the highest duty the realisation of that ideal for which the Soviet Union arose and which she regards as the whole significance of her existence, namely, the construction of a socialist society. It is to this work which the U.S.S.R., if only not interfered with, intends to devote all her State strength and this is the inexhaustible source of her policy of peace.

"When a roll call is made of States interested in the preservation and consolidation of peace, the Soviet Union will always reply, 'Here'. The readiness with which the States represented by you have replied to our proposals realised in the Protocol signed today, gives the assurance that in similar international roll calls they, too, in unison with the Soviet Government will always be ready to reply, 'Here'."

In reply to M. Litvinov's speech, the oldest of the diplomats represented at the Conference, J. Baltrušaitis, the Lithuanian Minister in Moscow, expressed the views of himself and his colleagues as follows:

"First of all I should like to stress how important and dear to our hearts is the fact that this act of prolonging the pacts, so modest but so significant for our peoples and for the whole of humanity, has been carried out with your personal participation, Monsieur People's Commissar, i.e., with the participation of a person whom all countries now consider the foremost and greatest fighter for peace. I not only hope, but I am quite convinced that all the Baltic States will adhere without wavering and fully to those great and vital ideas which you have just expressed on behalf of the Soviet Union.

"The prolongation of our Pacts of Non-Aggression is, I repeat, a modest act, but it is a deeply important one, for it has been carried out in circumstances when special significance attaches to every effort for the consolidation of universal peace.

"You noted, Monsieur People's Commissar, that in the roll call of States for the preservation and consolidation of peace your country will always reply, 'Here'. I am certain that on that day when the U.S.S.R. will again address herself to the Baltic States with a call for the consolidation of peace, our peoples will be as quick to reply with a decisive, 'Here'. Permit me to conclude with best wishes for the prosperity and growth of the strength of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."

Three days later, 7 April 1934, a similar Protocol was signed by the U.S.S.R. and Finland.
However, on 14 April 1934, R. Nadolny, on behalf of his own Government, informed M. Litvinov that the German Government had decided not to sign the proposed German-Soviet Protocol. R. Nadolny, in the course of his explanation, among other things, stated:

"If Germany and the Soviet Government, in order to improve relations between them, must take upon themselves a special treaty obligation in regards to the independence and integrity of the Baltic States, it naturally follows that the independence and integrity of these countries is threatened from one side or the other in the absence of such a positive obligation.

"The German Government does not consider that Soviet Russia in any way threatens the Baltic States and naturally still less can Germany admit any such intention or possibility so far as she is concerned. The fundamental line of German policy in the East has been outlined by the Reich Chancellor on various occasions, publicly and very clearly, and we must categorically denounce any attempt to cast doubt upon the sincerity of this policy.

"Thus, if there is no possibility of a threat to the Baltic States either on the part of Germany or the Soviet Union, then the only positive reason for the proposed pact would be the possibility of a threat to the independence and integrity of these States on the part of third Powers. It is the opinion of the German Government that this supposed position is also entirely without foundation. The German Government cannot, therefore, see any reason why Germany and the Soviet Union should take upon themselves the role of protectors of the Baltic States.

"Consequently, since the independence and integrity of the Baltic States are, in the opinion of the German Government, in no way threatened, it sees no reason whatever for the conclusion with the Soviet Government of any special treaty for the protection of these States.

"If the Soviet Government will examine dispassionately this point of view, it will undoubtedly come to the conclusion that its proposal is unsuitable for improving German-Soviet relations. If, as I hope, the Soviet Government will maintain firmly its desire to restore mutual confidence, then some other way must be sought and can be found. It seems to us, however, that no new political treaty is required for this purpose, since all political questions which might be regulated by way of a formal treaty would seem to be provided for by existing treaties, particularly the Berlin treaty.

"At the same time, it should not be forgotten that it was precisely the new German Government which ratified the prolongation of the Berlin Treaty and thereby formally declared itself as a supporter of this treaty and its political basis....

"This Treaty anticipates that both Governments will maintain friendly contact so that agreement may be assured on all political and economic questions concerning the two countries. The German Government would be very willing to discuss with the Soviet Government in accordance with this agreement the question of the restoration of relations of confidence so necessary for both countries."

M. Litvinov, on behalf of the Soviet Government, in his reply, stated:

"My Government and I have received with sincere regret the German Government to accept the proposal of a Baltic Protocol. Particularly important is the very fact of the refusal of our proposal, the more so, since the explanation given by the German Government for its refusal in no way weakens the significance of this fact....

"One can only deny the menace to the security of certain small States at the present time if one ignores the reality of the international position and public opinion in the whole world. Least of all can one regard as free from such menace those countries which the Soviet proposal had in view and which are undoubtedly experiencing at the present moment considerable anxiety as to their fate and as to their independence. The violation of peace will be the prelude to the outbreak of a new world war....

"Of course, every measure for the consolidation of peace is directed against those countries which intend to violate this peace, but no country should regard it as directed against itself if it has no such intention.

"The German Government quite rightly indicates in their declaration that there is no need to fear any threat from the U.S.S.R. to the independence of the Baltic States. The Soviet Government has given sufficient proof of this, including the recent prolongation of the Non-Aggression Pacts with these countries to over ten years. A still more convincing proof is its proposal to conclude a Soviet-German Protocol for the non-violation of the independence and integrity of the Baltic countries....

"There can be no doubt whatever the adoption of the Soviet proposition could not be interpreted otherwise than as a serious strengthening of peace in Eastern Europe. It is also impossible to deny that it would have strengthened the feeling of security of the Baltic States who, it goes without saying, would have been previously informed and who would undoubtedly have regarded the proposition most favourably.

"At the same time, the protocol would not have, of course, in the least violated the interests of its participants in so far as they really had no aggressive intention in relation to the Baltic countries. The Soviet Government cannot find in the declaration of the German Government a single convincing motive or reason against the signature of the Protocol regarding the non-violation of the independence and integrity of the Baltic countries....

"The Berlin Agreement, although it is most important and valuable, does not cover those questions concerning the Soviet Union which have arisen as a result of the new international situation and of the policy the new German Government has brought into being. I can assure you that we shall always be ready to consider favourably any concrete proposals made by the German Government which could in fact bring about an improvement in our relations and strengthen the mutual confidence between our two countries."

Immediately when it became known that Germany had refused to sign the Pact, there was widespread disappointment both in the Baltic States and beyond their frontiers.

Thus, the Latvian "Sociāldemokrats" in the course of a leading article pointed out that the Soviet proposals formed a good means for the complete exposure of Germany's aggressive intentions.

Other Latvian journals, with the exception of the Fascist press, spoke similarly of the German menace against the Baltic States made evident by the refusal of Germany to sign the proposed protocol.

The Lithuanian Lietuvos žinios pointed out that Germany had put off an attack on Poland for ten years, but her refusal to sign the Soviet Protocol shows that she was preparing as soon as possible for an attack on the Baltic States and through them on the U.S.S.R.

The press of the other Baltic States and many of their leading statesmen were no less outspoken.

The foreign press was, of course, unanimous in its condemnation of the German refusal, and it was interesting to note that in other countries too, Germany's refusal had been interpreted as a proof of her aggressive intentions.

Thus the Stockholm Social-Demokraten says: "The U.S.S.R. wants peace. What does Germany want? The National Socialists have given a groundless refusal to the Soviet far-sighted note."

The Neue Zürcher Zeitung said: "Litvinov endeavoured to probe German Eastern policy. One might almost say that he laid a trap for Germany in which the latter was caught immediately. Germany is thus placed in an unfavourable light and the French thesis... that German rearmament will not serve merely purposes of defence is thus confirmed."

One could not but agree with M. Litvinov that the most disturbing cause for anxiety lay in "the very fact of the German refusal to sign" the protocol to respect the independence and integrity of the Baltic States. The feeble attempt to explain this refusal only accentuated the fear of Germany's real intentions and plans with respect to the Baltic States and the U.S.S.R.

No doubt at that time many observers thought—despite Hitler's declared intentions against the Baltic States in Mein Kampf—that the Soviet Government was quite unduly apprehensive regarding Nazi Germany's aims in this part of Europe.

Unfortunately the sequel proved that these fears were only too well founded. Hitler having invaded and annexed Austria and the Sudeten districts prepared for his next pounce. Who would be the next victim? In Kaunas uneasiness grew in Government circles, which was clearly revealed in an interview given to a representative of The Daily Telegraph by the Premier of Lithuania, Father Vladas Mironas, 5 January 1939. He said:

"We feel that Germany recognises the essential interdependence of Memel and the Lithuanian hinterland. She knows that Lithuanian trade and commerce have built up the port of Memel, and that Lithuania is as necessary for Memel's prosperity as Memel is for Lithuania's.
"We remember, too Herr Hitler's declaration during the discussions on the Czech issue last September that he had no further territorial claims in Europe, and in view of our 100 per cent fulfilment of the autonomy terms of the Memel Statute we trust this pronouncement will hold for us. Herr Hitler had also stated that a chief concern of his for German populations in other lands is that they shall have full freedom of culture and to express their German ideas, and our liberal interpretation of the Statute has given this to our Memel Germans. [The Daily Telegraph, 9 January 1939.]

These words did not deceive any capable observer. They were too reminiscent of the many optimistic speeches made by Dr. Beneš before the Munich "settlement". They expressed wistful hopes rather than convictions. It is no exaggeration to say that when these words were being spoken in Kaunas, the next blows, one of which was to fall on Lithuania, were being prepared in Berlin. When the stroke came immediately after the annexation of Czechoslovakia it was swift and sudden.
The Foreign Minister of the little Baltic country was ordered to present himself to Herr von Ribbentrop in Berlin, 20 March 1939, to "discuss" the question of Memel. What passed at that interview was thus summed up ironically by the Berlin correspondent of The Manchester Guardian:

"If and when the Memellanders make known their desire to 'return to the Reich' Germany is ready to receive them with open arms, and Lithuania will consider herself rid of unnecessary ballast.

"That appears to be the outcome of today's conversations between the Lithuanian Foreign Minister, Herr Urbšys, and Herr von Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Minister.

"The Memel Parliament will probably raise the familiar cry of 'self-determination' and Lithuania will find that cry most reasonable. Hitler's marching columns will enter Memel as liberators, and Lithuania will be offered attractive terms for selling her produce—chiefly geese, butter, eggs, and timber—to Germany." [The Manchester Guardian, 21 March 1939.]

The Nazis were not thinking alone of Memel, it was to be a stepping-stone to something much bigger. On the same day The Daily Telegraph's Warsaw correspondent cabled:

"Diplomatic and military observers are now paying very close attention to Lithuania. The Polish Government, I understand, strongly deprecates the possibility of Memel being annexed to the Reich. The consequences, it is felt, would quickly follow the Sudeten pattern, with Lithuania becoming, like Czechoslovakia, a German 'protectorate'.
"In that case, Germany would be separated from Soviet Russia only by the Vilna 'corridor'. It would then become strategically difficult, if not indeed impossible, for Poland effectively to assist Rumania if the Polish-Rumanian alliance required her to do so."

However, events moved even more rapidly than the Correspondent of The Manchester Guardian in Berlin anticipated. In the early hours of 22 March, The Daily Telegraph's representative cabled from Kaunas:

"The Lithuanian Government has agreed in principle to unconditional demands made by Germany for the transfer of the Memel territory to the Reich. The Lithuanian Parliament will meet in public today to ratify this decision.

"This decision was reached by the Cabinet this morning after a nine-hour session under A. Smetona, the President.

"The Government was faced with an ultimatum handed by Herr von Ribbentrop, German Foreign Minister, to J. Urbšys, Lithuanian Foreign Secretary, in Berlin. Germany threatened military occupation of Lithuania unless Memel was ceded within 48 hours."

The Lithuanian Government in the course of an official declaration pitifully remarked: "According to Article 15 of the Convention, sovereignty over the Memel territory, as well as the exercise of rights of sovereignty over the territory, could not be relinquished without the consent of the signatories Great Britain, Japan, Italy, and France (The Daily Telegraph, 22 March 1939).

Legally the statement was quite accurate, but by this date Nazi Germany knew that Italy and Japan would endorse what she had done, and as for Britain and France——

The Lithuanian Parliament ratified the "Agreement" with Germany, 22 March, and on the following day Nazi troops entered the district and administration passed into German hands. Next day, 23 March 1939, Herr Hitler made a ceremonial entry into Memel and calmly told his fellow countrymen: "We do not intend to harm the outside world, but we had to make good the harm which it has done us, and I believe we have already reached substantially the conclusion of this unique reparation" (The Manchester Guardian, 24 March 1939).

What next? At present we refrain from prophecy. Much will depend on whether Britain and France have learnt their lesson. In conclusion we would only add that the suspicions of the Soviet Government respecting Germany's intentions unfortunately have again been justified by the march of events.

Chapter III - The Proposed Eastern Locarno Pact

THE proposed Eastern Locarno (Eastern Pact of Mutual Guarantee) was first mooted in the Spring of 1934, after prolonged discussions between M. Litvinov and M. Barthou, but authoritative details of the proposed plan were first revealed to the British public by Sir John Simon (then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs) on 13 July 1934, after M. Barthou had paid a visit to London. Sir John explained the objectives thus:

"The plan in contemplation is one which would involve, in the first place, a pact of mutual assistance between the five elements (counting the Baltic States as one)—that is to say, between Soviet Russia, the Baltic States, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Germany. That is the project which was put before us. The nature of the relation created by such a pact, if it could be negotiated and brought about, would be, as I have already described it, a pact of mutual assistance, and it would therefore follow the analogy of Locarno. In addition to that there is a further feature which I am right in saying that M. Barthou described as a condition, which would in a certain way connect Russia with the existing Locarno Treaty, in a form which may have to be considered by the statesmen of Europe if this matter is pursued; and it will take the form of a guarantee on the part of Russia to France on the one hand and Germany on the other, in the event of conditions arising which bring the provisions of the Locarno Treaty into operation....
"Also, reciprocally, there would be an assurance offered by France in respect of the boundaries of Russia and the boundaries of Germany on Germany's Eastern side. That is the bare bone of what is no doubt a very ambitious and elaborate scheme." [Hansard, 18 July 1934. Col. 694.]

As regards the British Government's appraisal of the proposed pact, the Foreign Secretary said:

"If, therefore, Russia is prepared to offer the same guarantee to Germany as she has now offered to France, and if France is prepared to offer the same guarantee to Germany as she has offered to Russia, then it does appear to me that any objection on the score that what is contemplated is not in the true sense a mutual guarantee, is entirely met. That point, so far as discussion between M. Barthou and myself are concerned, is completely established." [ibid. Col. 695.]

The proposed pact, which conformed to the League Covenant and was to be registered with the League of Nations, was hailed from all sides of the House of Commons.

However, it was violently attacked in Germany because, as was known then and has since become clear to all, the Reich Government was determined to establish a military-economic hegemony over Eastern, Central, and South-Eastern Europe. Here we can only give a few examples of the Nazi attitude.

An official statement issued in Berlin, 10 September 1934, declared:

"The German Government believe that other methods of ensuing peace would hold out more prospects of success. In general, Germany would prefer two-sided treaties. She does not, however, rejects multi-pacts, but the principle of these must be the obligation to refrain from attack and for the parties interested in a conflict to enter into consultation, rather than automatic obligation to intervene militarily in case of war." [The Times, 11 September 1934.]

In other words, Germany had no obligation to multilateral pacts provided they were without teeth.
Poland followed suit. The Times Correspondent cabled from Warsaw two days later:

"The Government's dislike of the Eastern Pact is, according to the semi-official newspapers, because of its 'nebulous, vague, and complicated character', and because, moreover, it conflicts with the line of policy which Poland has consistently and successfully followed for several years—that is, the policy of bilateral pacts as exemplified in the non-aggression agreements with Soviet Russia and Germany." [The Times, 13 September 1934.]

Discouraging though these reactions were, the French and Soviet Governments continued their efforts to win the adhesion of Germany and Poland to the proposed Eastern Pact, but without avail.

A semi-official statement issued in Berlin, 13 March 1935, declared: "Germany had to reject this scheme because she could only regard it as the screen behind which an alliance, planned—or even directed—against Germany, though not perhaps immediately, was to be hidden." [The Times, 1 April 1935.]

This of course was pure nonsense. Germany under the Pact would have received the same guarantees as all the other signatories.

Mr. Eden (then Lord Privy Seal) had a lengthy conversation with Marshal Piłsudski and J. Beck (Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs) in Warsaw, on 3 April 1935, in the course of which the Marshal and the Minister reiterated Poland's refusal to sign the Eastern Pact. Commenting on this refusal The Times Warsaw Correspondent cabled that Poland's "opposition to the Eastern Pact is, in the last resort, dictated by fear of antagonising Germany, with whom she is on good terms after many years of violent recrimination. The Poles see that Germany is getting stronger every day; overnight she has become the military equal of, if not the military superior to, her strongest neighbours. The smaller countries of Europe will think long before they offend a country whose inflexible policy and extraordinary efficiency in secret rearmament have so much impressed them." [The Times, 4 April 1935.]

The correspondent added: "Poland, of course, would sign the Eastern Pact if the Great Powers which have raised the proposal would guarantee her frontiers. But without such guarantees hopes of concluding the pact are remote." [ibid.]

Poland's decision was hailed in Germany. The officially inspired "Diplomatic Correspondence," 4 April 1935, declared "that Mr. Eden's Warsaw visit has only confirmed that Poland for good reasons regards the proposed Eastern Pact at any rate as superfluous. The writer fully agrees with Poland's attitude not to accept a 'system which in fact would be a coalition directed against a certain country'—meaning Germany." [The Manchester Guardian, 5 April 1935.]

Germany affected to believe that the Eastern Pact was directed against her, and Poland held aloof from the Pact because she feared to anger Germany. The question which remains to be answered is, had Germany any grounds for her alleged uneasiness? To answer this we cannot do better than quote from a speech in the House of Commons by Viscount Cranbourne, who had accompanied Mr. Eden to Berlin, Warsaw, and Moscow. He said:

"Therefore, the conclusion to which I personally came, and it is the conclusion to which I believe most independent observers come, is that the German idea of a military Russian peril is an absolute myth, and I find the greatest difficulty in believing that the German General Staff really believe it themselves.

"If Germany's neighbours have great armaments, and some of them have, one cannot help feeling that the reason is not they are hostile to, or that they want to go to war with Germany. It is because they are anxious. That is obvious to anyone who goes through Europe now. The neighbours of Germany are nervous of the present trend of their policy. They see all the young people of Germany brought up in a frame of mind of fanatical militarism and nationalism. They read speeches like that of Dr. Goebbels at Danzig, or General Ludendorff on his seventieth birthday.

"The Committee will remember the latter's speech, in which he put down the failure of Germany in 1918 to Christianity, the degrading effects of Christianity, and said she was now free from Christianity, and implied, therefore, that she might be expected to win the next war.

"All Germany's neighbours read these things and hear these things, and it is widely thought in neighbouring countries that she has definitely decided on a policy based on force, a policy of facing Europe with faits accomplis, of holding a pistol to the heads of her neighbours and saying: 'Your money or your life.'" [Hansard, 2 May 1935. Cols. 628–9.]

It is not necessary to add anything to this lucid statement. The French and Soviet Governments did everything humanly possible to bring the Eastern Pact into force. Their efforts were defeated by Germany and Poland, the latter because she feared the Reich. When Paris and Moscow were convinced that their efforts had failed then and only then as a second best did they conclude the Franco-Soviet Pact of Non-Aggression and Mutual Assistance, which was signed on 2 May 1935.
On this signature the Daily Herald aptly commented:

"The Franco-Soviet Treaty of mutual assistance against aggression is a bull-point for peace.
"It is within the League. The two countries invite others, including Germany, to join the system. Like all security commitments of similar kind, it makes war less likely by the simple but essential process of increasing the forces which will be thrown against aggression." [Daily Herald, 6 May 1935.]

This pact was supplemented by the Soviet-Czechoslovak Pact of Non-Aggression and Mutual Assistance, signed 16 May 1935. The Daily Herald's comments respecting the Franco-Soviet Pact were equally applicable to the Soviet-Czechoslovak Pact.

Chapter IV - The Soviet Union and the League of Nations

The U.S.S.R. joined the League of Nations, September 1934.

In the course of his speech at the League Assembly, 18 September 1934, M. Litvinov said:

"In order to make our position quite clear I should like further to state that the idea in itself of an association of nations contains nothing theoretically inacceptable for the Soviet State and its ideology. "The Soviet Union is itself a league of nations in the best sense of the word, uniting over 200 nationalities, thirteen of which have a population of not less than one million each, and others, such as Russia and the Ukraine, a population running into scores of millions."

Commenting on the entry of the U.S.S.R. into the League, the Izvestia, 20 September 1934, declared:

"The Soviet Government is entering into the League of Nations in order to support those Powers which will struggle for the preservation and the consolidation of peace.... Comrade Litvinov, in his splendid speech... frankly declared that the Soviet Union in the League of Nations would struggle for more effective means against the war danger than those hitherto used by the League of Nations."

The Pravda of the same date, commented:

"The Soviet Union enters into the League of Nations as a country of the victorious working class and gives up none of the characteristics of such a State, remaining true to its aims and ideals. She enters the League of Nations after the circumstances and the repeated assurances of the majority of the members of the League of Nations have given us reasons to consider that the present form of international cooperation will make it possible for the Soviet Government to struggle even more actively, more energetically to attain the aim which it desires, namely, the organisation of peace, an active and real struggle for guarantees of security against the menace of war which now represents the greatest danger for all peoples and which cannot be avoided by exhortations and prayers."

Since her entry into the League, the U.S.S.R. more than any other nation has striven to uphold and apply the principles of collective security.

Here it is only possible to quote a few of the many instances in which the Soviet representatives endeavoured to strengthen the League Covenant.

On 16 April 1935, a resolution was submitted to the League Council jointly by Sir John Simon, P. Laval, and Baron Aloisi, stating that Germany had "failed in her duty to respect her undertakings", denouncing "any unilateral repudiation of international obligations", and proposing the setting up of a Committee to formulate measures "to render the Covenant more effective in the organisation of collective security, and to define in particular the economic and financial measures which might be applied should, in the future, a State, whether a member of the League of Nations or not, endanger peace by the unilateral repudiation of its international obligations."

It was not clear from the wording whether the resolution referred to States outside Europe.

M. Litvinov stated that "before giving his vote he would like to be clear about the end of the resolution, which proposed certain measures against the violation of international treaties. From the wording it would seem that these measures should be limited only to the violation of treaties in Europe, from which it might be deduced that violations outside Europe were quite justified and could always pass unpunished. He would like to have some explanation or interpretation of the resolution in the sense that the Committee would be free to propose measures not only for Europe but also for other countries, otherwise he was afraid that he would have to make a reservation with regard to this part of the resolution." [The Manchester Guardian, 18 April 1935.]

At the meeting of the League Assembly, 15 September 1935, M. Litvinov made two important proposals respecting, to quote his own words, "the unfinished and even uncommenced work of the League." As regards the definition of an aggressor, he said: "A universal recognition of the definition of aggression would on more than one occasion have helped the League out of most regrettable difficulties. If they had had before them from Italy a formal and well-founded complaint of the acts of aggression committed by Abyssinia the representative of Italy would have obtained full justice from the League."

Respecting attacks on the Covenant, he declared: "If they left this Assembly with the certainty that the States whose representatives had addressed them had formally and solemnly pledged their Governments to allow no new attempts on the Covenant as an instrument of peace and to make use of it in all cases of aggression, irrespective of their origin or their object, this Assembly would become a landmark in the new history of the League."

And for his own Government's policy, he added: "Soviet Russia would be second to none in the loyal discharge of the international obligations she had assumed."

On 13 October 1935, when the League Sanctions Committee had under discussion the application of sanctions against Italy, and the refusal of certain countries within the League to participate in these measures, the delegate of the U.S.S.R. raised the question of extending the economic pressure to these countries, such as Austria, Hungary, and Albania, and to non-members of the League. In regards to League members he advocated a restriction of credit and for the non-members a restriction on exports such as would make reexportation to Italy impossible.

Commenting on this proposal, the Diplomatic Correspondent of The Daily Telegraph wrote: "So far the Committee have felt that it would be unwise to attempt thus to widen the area of economic conflict. But there is sympathy with the Russian motive—namely, the desire to make the League 100 per cent effective." [The Daily Telegraph, 14 October 1935.]

On 1 July 1936, the League Assembly had before it the question of raising sanctions against Italy on the grounds that they could not at that date "reverse the order of events in Abyssinia."

Both Mr. Eden and L. Blum spoke of "rebuilding the authority of the League" and making the League universal. As usual, M. Litvinov was more downright. He declared:

"We are asked at all costs to restore to the League States which have left if only because they saw obstacles to the fulfilment of their aggressive intentions in the Covenant in Articles 10 and 16. "The suggestion, therefore, is, 'Let us make the League safe for aggressors.' I say that we do not need such a League with all its universalities, since such a League from an instrument of peace will turn into its very opposite. At best, by depriving the League of the functions of collective defence we should be turning it into a debating society or a charitable institution unworthy of the name of the League of Nations, unworthy of resources spent on it, and not answering to those hopes and anticipations built on it. It is not the Covenant which we have to degrade, but people whom we have to educate and bring up to the level of its lofty ideals. We must strive for the universality of the League, but not make it safe for the aggressor for the sake of that universality. On the contrary, every new member and every old member wishing to return to it must read over its doorway: 'Abandon all hope of aggression with impunity ye who enter here.'"

The League members had been asked to submit that body measures for strengthening the application of the Covenant. While some members were timid and hesitant, the Soviet Government was bold and courageous.

Here, for considerations of space, we can only quote four of the Soviet proposals:

• (1) In the event of a war against a member of the League, the Council shall be summoned not later than three days after the notification thereof to the Secretary-General.
• (2) Within three days of its convocation, the Council shall reach a decision about the existence of circumstances calling for the application of Article XVI of the Covenant. Such decision shall be recognised to have been taken if at least three-quarters of the members present (not including the representatives of the attacked State and the State denounced) vote in favour of it.
• (5) Failure on the part of the Council to reach a decision shall not prejudice the immediate execution, by States' parties to the mutual assistance agreement, of their obligation to afford assistance.
• (11) Mutual assistance agreements between States concerned in the maintenance of security in specific areas shall be recognised as constituting a supplementary guarantee of security within the framework of the Covenant.

Who will question today that had these proposals been heartily accepted by Great Britain and France then the League would have become a really effective instrument for the maintenance of peace?

The Soviet leaders were realists, not pessimists. They were convinced that joint action by and determination on the part of the peace-loving States could abolish the spectre of war. Speaking in a general discussion at the League Assembly, 28 September 1936, M. Litvinov declared:

"The aggressor was accessible only to the voice of a policy no less firm than his own, concessions merely producing on him an impression of weakness and encouraging him to further illegalities. Yet the aggregate power of the peace-loving countries in both the economic and the military sense considerably surpassed the strength of any possible combination of countries the aggressor might rally round him. There was no need for new blocs. They had in the League a bloc of countries that wanted peace. This bloc should draw up its plan of action well ahead and organisation of war should be answered by effective action for the organisation of collective resistance."

On 21 September 1937, the League Assembly discussed the Secretary-General's report on League reform. The question of universality dominated the debate. M. Litvinov left no doubt as to the attitude of the Soviets. He declared:

'What is wanted is not universality, but that those who take part in any international organisation or conference, whatever the difference between their national interests, should be united by a common universal idea binding them together, such as the idea of peace, the idea of respecting the integrity and independence of all peoples, the idea of outlawing force as an instrument of national policy, the idea which lies at the foundation of the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Briand-Kellogg Pact. "We know three States which have drawn apart from these ideas and in recent years have made attacks on other States. With all the difference between the régimes, ideologies, material and cultural levels of the objects of attack, all three States justify their aggression by one and the same motive: the struggle against Communism. The rulers of these States naïvely think, or rather pretend to think, that it is sufficient for them to utter the words 'anti-Communism', and all their international felonies and crimes will be forgiven."

M. Litvinov had no illusions as to the real objectives of these States. He continued:

"However, the founders of this ideology sometimes begin themselves to doubt whether it is convincing and acceptable enough as a guiding international principle. They then descend from their ideological heights and give us a more prosaic interpretation of their anti-Communist slogans. we then learn, what we could never find in a single encyclopaedia, that anti-Communism has also a geological meaning, and signifies a yearning for tin, zinc, mercury, copper, and other minerals. When this explanation, too, proves insufficient, anti-Communism is then explained to be a thirst for profitable trade. I doubt, however, whether these are the last and only interpretations of anti-Communism."

Then came a crushing retort to these States. The Soviet Commissar declared:

"Surely we know already the example of one Communist State, with great mineral wealth, which has never refused to export its minerals to other countries, and to carry on very extensive trade with them, whatever the régimes prevailing in those countries, be they even Fascist or National-Socialist. Furthermore, these same countries have always very willingly received minerals and other raw materials from the Communist State, not only not renouncing trade with it, but striving—and still striving today—to extend that trade to the maximum, offering most advantageous terms."

On 27 January 1938, the League Council discussed the attachment of their various Governments to League principles.

Mr. Eden was somewhat pessimistic. He argued that the defection of some important members meant "that the area of cooperation was restricted," the League could not at that moment fulfil the hopes of its founders, and that "for the present we must recognise realities, and our best course would seem to be that we should continue to use the instrument that lies ready to our hand for all the purposes for which it is fitted, and thus show our faith in the essential principles on which the League was founded." [The Times, 28 January 1938.]

Y. Delbos was somewhat more cheerful. After stressing that the League was passing through difficult times, that war could not be localised, that collective methods were more necessary than ever, he concluded: "How can we doubt our possibilities since the nations grouped at Geneva constitute, if they have the will, a material and moral force that is greater than any other?" [The Manchester Guardian, 28 January 1938.]

Not for the first time it was left to M. Litvinov to strike a bold and challenging note. He stressed that the Soviets had joined the League after two members had left it and after one of them had openly proclaimed the chief aim of its foreign policy to be the annexation of other people's territory, while the other had in fact invaded the territory of another State. This had not frightened the U.S.S.R. On the contrary, it became convinced that the League of Nations might really be a hindrance to the forces of aggression.

M. Litvinov continued:

"Moreover, the intrigues that the aggressive States and their agents carried on against the League showed that they believed in the strength of the League and in its capacity to impede their aggressive aims more than did some pusillanimous League members."

He then turned to the "bogies of ideological blocs" and said:

"If it was a question of ideology underlying the internal constitution of this or that State there was no danger of the League becoming an ideological bloc in that sense, for within the League there were representatives of a vast diversity of ideologies beginning with the Communist and ending with the semi-Fascist—and until recently even the wholly Fascist régimes."

The Soviet Commissar proceeded: "There was, however, another kind of ideology, the essential principles of which were respect for the integrity and independence of all existing States, inviolability of their frontiers, renunciation of war as an instrument for settling international disputes, recognition of the equal rights of all peoples great and small. If the League of Nations wished to be true to its aims it must be a bloc of that kind of ideology." He ended on a firm note: "As long as the least hope subsisted that the League of Nations would remain a bloc or axis of peaceful States, prepared loyally to apply the League Covenant, the Soviet Union saw no reason for revising its attitude to the League."

The debate on League reform in the Council concluded on 1 February 1938, with the acceptance of a proposal by Viscount Cranborne that a report of the debates be sent to League members for subsequent consideration by the Assembly.

In the course of the discussion at the last session of the Council, Britain, France, and the U.S.S.R. opposed any weakening of the Covenant.

Viscount Cranborne declared that:

"The views expressed by the various nations were divergent, and they required time to consider and reflect upon them. The situation could not be regarded as discouraging. On all sides there had been evidence of continued attachment to the principles of the Covenant and convinced belief in the importance of maintaining the collective system. The British Government had not weakened, and did not intend to weaken their support of the League. Mr. Eden had made the position of the British Government abundantly clear at the opening of the Council." [The Times, 2 February 1938.]

Mr. Paul Boncour stated that he did not agree at all with those who suggested that in order to secure the adhesion or the return of certain States, they must abandon or weaken the principles which constituted the raison d'étre of the League. There was no State whose return was worth the weakening of the Covenant.

M. Litvinov (to quote The Times) "brought a more combative spirit into the debate by making a destructive analysis of the arguments of those who would abolish 'sanctions'."

The Soviet Commissar went on:

"The opponents of Article 16 would evidently like to see the League transformed into a universal non-intervention committee, with full freedom of action for any aggressor in any circumstances, a League which was something between a diplomatic academy and a charitable society. He asked those who had expressed the wish to regain absolute neutrality whether they expected the League to safeguard their neutrality, or to remain neutral if it were violated; and whether, in freeing themselves from the obligations of Article 16, they still intended to take part in the discussions upon its application." [The Times, 2 February 1938.]

The report was adopted and sent to the Assembly for consideration by that body. When the Assembly met, 16 September 1938, the British Government, through its representative Lord De La Warr, showed signs of a desire to retreat from the position which it had taken up in January. Under Article 16 all member States are expected automatically to apply economic and military sanctions against any country declared by the League to be guilty of an unprovoked attack. Great Britain now wished to tone down this article. Lord De La Warr said:

"The circumstances for international action and the possibility and nature of that action cannot be determined in advance. Each case must be considered on its merits. There can be no automatic obligation to apply economic or military sanctions.

"There is a general obligation to consider whether and how far Article 16 [Application of Sanctions] can be applied, and what common steps could be taken to render aid to the victim of a breach of the Covenant.

"Each State must be the judge of the extent to which it can participate, and will be influenced by the extent to which others are prepared to act." [The Times, 17 September 1938.]

However, he added: "Aggression against a member of the League must be a matter of concern to all members and not one on which they are entitled to adopt an attitude of indifference." [ibid.] M. Litvinov, speaking 23 September 1938, vigourously combatted Lord De La Warr's point of view. He declared that:

"Certain smaller States had feared the anger of international highwayment o whom sanctions might be applied. They had at least had some excuse in the compulsory nature of sanctions, and could plead that they were bound to do their duty before the League. They must now lose that excuse, since it was to be a matter of voluntary decision, which meant that they would be subjected to even greater pressure and terrorisation at the hands of the aggressor.

"Article 16 ceased to be a restraining factor or a reason for hesitation on the part of the aggressor. Being able now to come to an understanding with some members of the League and to terrorise others, the aggressor was enabled beforehand to avert any possibility of sanctions being applied to him.

"The enunciation of the principle that every Member of the League could give its own arbitrary interpretation of Article 16—contrary perhaps to the sense and recognised formal significance of that article—opened up the possibility of acting in the same way with other articles of the Covenant."

It is a pleasure to be able to record that Mr. Campbell, on behalf of New Zealand, "objected to any weakening of the Covenant" and Mr. Paul Boncour said "that the obligations of Article 16 ought to be understood in the sense that every State member should collaborate effectively to oppose aggression and enforce the Covenant." [The Manchester Guardian, 24 September 1938.] Finally, on 29 September 1938, a draft resolution was agreed to by the Political Committee of the League Assembly in which it was stated that:

"With regard to Article XVI (Sanctions) it had been found that the members were agreed that the principles of the Covenant should remain unaltered, and that the military measures contemplated in the Article were not compulsory. As for the economic and financial measures, many members were agreed that they could not, in the present conditions, be considered automatically bound to apply them, but some took the opposite view. It was accordingly decided to recommend only that the report, which expressed no opinion, should be sent to all members of the League." [The Times, 30 September 1938.]

There the matter stands at the moment of writing. One conclusion stands out clearly from the foregoing, viz., that the Soviet representatives strove, as no others, to strengthen in every way and render more effective the League Covenant.

Subsequently the Soviet Delegation supported every measure tending in the direction of collective security as well as to minimise the brutalities of present-day warfare.

At the session of the League Council, 18 January 1939, during a discussion on aerial bombardment in Spain, the Soviet Delegate J. Suritz stressed that "his Government was prepared for any international action for the protection of civilian populations and for the prevention of the use of those inhuman methods of warfare." [The Manchester Guardian, 19 January 1939.]

Again, at the session of the Council, 20 January, when a resolution on the question of aid for China was discussed, the Soviet Delegate fought hard to get the League to adopt a firm attitude and again expressed his Government's willingness to participate in any measure of collective action. The resolution actually adopted, although better than nothing, was very weak and was denounced as such both by the Soviet and New Zealand Delegates.