Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Treaties and non-aggression pacts between Nazi Germany and other countries before the start of the Second World War

The Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, better known as the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, the Hitler–Stalin Pact, or the Nazi–Soviet Pact, was a non-aggression agreement between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, signed in Moscow on the eve of the Second World War on 23 August 1939. The agreement stipulated that neither party would attack the other, nor lend its support to a power which was at war with the other. It also divided Europe into German and Soviet spheres of influence and laid the groundwork for future German-Soviet cooperation. However, the Soviet Union did not agree to "invade" Poland in the treaty, nor was it an alliance as many anti-communists claim. The agreement was set to expire ten years after it was signed, but was terminated prematurely on 22 June 1941, when Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union.

Throughout most of the 1930s, the Soviet government, recognising the threat that the Nazis posed as well as the fact that the USSR couldn't afford to fight a war with Germany on its own, pursued a policy of collective security, trying to contain Germany & Italy and build an anti-war alliance. However, all of these attempts fell through, with the capitalist European powers favouring a policy of appeasement, and in 1939, when war was on the horizon, the Soviets reluctantly signed the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, hoping to buy time to prepare for the inevitable German–Soviet War as well as secure a buffer between it and Germany/Germany's potential allies.

The Baltic Way, a nationalist demonstration in the Baltic states (at the time part of the Soviet Union) marked the 50th anniversary of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact. Black Ribbon Day, a day of remembrance for "victims" of "totalitarian" regimes, is also observed on 23 August to commemorate the signing of the treaty.

Background

By January 1933 Adolf Hitler had risen to power in Germany, increasing the already tense environment in Europe. The German ambassador to the Soviet Union noted that “…the Soviet Government is concerned with the attitude and development of German policy;” With the UK, France, Italy and Germany signing the Four-Power Pact, the Soviets' concerns was not unfounded. Maxim Litvinov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs issued an invitation brought back to France by their Minister for Air, Pierre Cot for a non-aggression and mutual-aid pact. The invitation was ignored by the French government. With Germany's departure from the League of Nations and Disarmament Conference further increasing tensions the French reconsidered the proposal. French Foreign Minister Joseph Paul-Boncour and Litvinov met in Paris on 31 October to establish the principles of an alliance based on the premise that the Soviet Union would join the League of Nations. The written draft for this alliance, presented by Litvinov to Paul-Boncour on 28 December, would go on to form the basis of the Eastern Pact.

Eastern Pact

See main article: Eastern Pact

The draft of the Eastern Pact proposed extending the mutual assistance agreement to Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Baltic States. By January 1934 however, the French government had destabilised. Far-right nationalists and rioting resulting from the Stavisky affair – a financial scandal and alleged government cover-up – resulted in the liberal Prime Minister Camille Chautemps's retirement. Discussions of any pact with France were cut short. Stability within France was not seen until February with the formation of a new government. Along with the new government, a new Foreign Minister – a conservative and nationalist – Jean-Louis Barthou was employed. By the end of February the Soviets had informed France that they would agree to join the League of Nations, and were prepared to form a regional mutual security agreement.

April saw negotiations continue in Paris. As Barthou was preoccupied with negotiations in Warsaw, Alexis Leger, General Secretary of the Quai d-Orsay suggested to the Soviets the inclusion of Germany. Until this point Barthou had not mentioned the Pact to the Polish Józef Piłsudski nor the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Józef Beck. From 22-25 April the French diplomat met in Warsaw with the Polish statemen, who expressed their issues with the matter. The Polish described it as an "Eastern Locarno" accusing the alliance of being an attempt to divide territories between powers. The inclusion of Czechoslovakia and Lithuania concerned the Polish, who were fearful that disputed territories would be given to the neighbouring countries. In addition Poland had just signed the German-Polish Declaration of Non-Aggression and felt secure enough not to "resort" to Soviet alliances. Rather than reject the proposal, Poland added the condition that they would join if Germany also accepted.

Earlier in May, the Soviets continued try to form peace in Europe. With the resuming of the Disarmament Conference in Geneva encroaching, Litvinov proposed to Joseph Stalin on 9 May with copies to Vyacheslav Molotov and Kliment Voroshilov, that he be granted permission “…to make a proposal to turn the Conference on Disarmament into a permanent Conference of Peace.”

Moreover, I would ask for permission to make a proposal to turn the Conference on Disarmament into a permanent Conference of Peace. Until now, peace conferences have been convened only after bloody wars to divide the spoils or impose humiliating conditions on the defeated. We will not propose the creation of a permanent peace conference to prevent wars.

— Litvinov, , 9 May, 1934

A revised draft presented on 24 May through the French Ambassador to Poland, Jules Laroche, agreed to the inclusion of Germany, but insisted Czechoslovakia and Lithuania remain members. Poland suggested the participation of Romania in place of the two border countries. Barthou continued to seek approval from Poland and now also from the British.

The first public acknowledgement of the negotiations came in May 1934, when Barthou and Litvinov met in Geneva for the Disarmament Conference. Rumours having preceded them, Barthou thought it expedient to discuss the subject of the negotiations with his allies, especially the British and the Poles. He sought the opinion of the latter in particular, as Poland's signature was considered vital to the proposed treaty.

— Lisanne Radice, , (1977). pp. 49

French Ambassador to Germany, André François-Poncet approached the German Reichsminister of Foreign Affairs, Konstantin von Neurath with this proposition in June. [Documents on German foreign policy, 1918-1945, from the archives of the German Foreign Ministry. Series D (1937-1945). Volume IV - The aftermath of Munich October 1938-March 1939.]

Again in July France presented another revised Pact agreement to Poland. A letter on 7 July from the Soviet Plenipotentiary Representative in Poland, Yakov Davydov to the Soviet People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs describes the presented proposal by Laroche to Beck. Poland continued to remain indecisive towards the pact. A telegram from 19 July shreds some light on the Soviet need for an answer from Poland. Litvinov asks the Soviet representative in Poland if he could inquire Beck when a decision would be made by Poland on the pact. The same telegram also expresses the surprise from the Soviets about Poland's position with Germany “…we are all the more surprised by the identity of the Polish position with the German one”

With the inclusion of Germany the CPSU(b) held a vote within the Politburo on whether to go forward with the “…Tripartite Agreement with France and Germany, guaranteeing the Eastern Regional Pact.” The resolution was signed by ... on 14 July.

During this time Britain remained hostile to the Soviet Union, and it was not until late July that the Soviets considered themselves and Britain to have diplomatic relations:

For the first time since recognition by Great Britain we now have actual diplomatic relations. Until the present time neither myself nor Tchitcherin [Former Commissar for Foreign Affairs] has ever discussed any diplomatic question of any importance with [the British Embassy here] and our Ambassador in London has in reality been nothing more than a consul and has never discussed major questions with the British Secretaries for Foreign Affairs. Both in London and in Moscow we are now discussing all the problems of the world freely and in the most friendly manner.

— William C. Bullitt [ambassador to the Soviet Union] quoting Litvinov, , 30 July, 1934

This development had uplifted the Soviets who believed, “…that the next step of Soviet diplomacy would be to sign a non-aggression pact with Great Britain…” The British, however were most unfriendly with the Soviets and sought to put an end to one of the "most difficult problems" – the Eastern Pact. They saw the Pact as an indication of lost influence over France, along with their opposing opinions on the rearmament of Germany. The French approached the British in July with discussions to join the pact. Instead, the British were more concerned about the French position on German rearmament. “The British government, [had] come to the conclusion that Germany might be appeased if equality of rights were granted to her,” and sought to convince France on their position. While France and Britain continued conversations the Soviets had received agreements to the Pact from Czechoslovakia on 2 July, Latvia and Estonia on 29 July, and Lithuania on 3 August.

Germany was reluctant to agree to the Pact. The British deputy under-secretary of the Foreign Office Sir Harold Orme Garton Sargent “…saw that the Germans were trying to make it appear that they were being ‘bullied’ into making a big concession with the agreement, he felt that the real reason behind Germen reluctance was a desire to keep a ‘free hand to intervene in Russia’ if an opportunity arose due to a war in the Far East.” Finally, on 7 (10 or 11) September “…the Germans rejected the possibility of joining the Eastern Pact.” This came as positive news to Britain. They had hoped that France would not continue pursuing the Pact instead believing that given a choice between the USSR and Italy, the French would choose the latter. The news came positively to Poland as well, who on 27 September also declined joining the Pact. The US Ambassador to Japan, Joseph Grew's memorandum sheds light on the Soviet understanding of the environment in Europe. Grew recalls asking the Soviet Ambassador to Japan, Konstantin Yurenev about the Pact:

The Ambassador then turned to the situation in Europe and said that the Eastern Locarno Pact would undoubtedly go through but that it was not at all sure that Germany and Poland would participate therein. He thought that Poland was playing a very dangerous game and that her political intrigues might land her in a most embarrassing position especially if war should eventually break out between France and Germany. He felt that Poland was steering a very nebulous course and that her intentions was far from clear.

— Joseph Grew, , Toyko, (1934-09-07), p. 271

Despite the setback France did not want the Pact to die, and in November resumed negotiations with Poland.

Throughout the lead up to the war Poland continued to remain hostile to the Soviet Union, despite the increasing danger Germany presented towards it. The French Ambassador in Poland, Léon Noël wrote to French Foreign Minister commenting on the hostility;

If, in reality, the most serious danger for Poland is Germany, "the Russian", whatever the regime to which he is subject, always appears to the Poles as "enemy n° 1": if the German remains an adversary, he is no less a European and a man of order; the Russian is, for the Pole, a barbarian, an Asian, a dissolving and corrupting element, with whom any contact would be perilous, any compromise fatal.

— Léon Noël, , 1938-06-31, Warsaw, p. 975-976

Anglo-Franco-Soviet Alliance

In late March the Soviet Union began the Moscow Negotiations of 1939 proposing the formation of an Anglo-Franco-Soviet Alliance. This alliance was rejected by the UK and France.

Signing the Treaty

The threat of war in Europe – particularly against the Soviet Union – was growing. In March 1938, Austria was forcibly integrated into Germany. In September 1938, as a result of the Munich Agreement, Czechoslovakia was forced to cede some of its territory to Germany, and in March 1939 German troops occupied the rest of Czechoslovakia (with the exception of Slovakia, which became a German satellite state). In the East, Japan conducted military operations against the USSR and Mongolia in the area of the Khalkhin-Gol River. Ultimately the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact was the result of a desire by the Western Allies “to turn the wolf toward[s] other prey,” namely the Soviet Union.

Myths surrounding the treaty

Partition of Poland

One of the most common myths surrounding the treaty is that the Nazis and the Soviets split Poland in two to be shared between themselves. Evidence for this, proponents claim, can be found in the so-called "secret protocols" of the treaty. According to Grover Furr however, who translated and studied the original document in Russian himself, the mention about a "partition" was actually establishing "spheres of influence" over Poland, which were not clearly defined in the document and thus were open to interpretation. These spheres of influence never came to fruition as Germany invaded Poland in 1939 regardless.

Furthermore, other evidence uncovered by Furr suggests that the Soviet Union signed the pact not to partition Poland, but rather on the premise that if the Polish Army was defeated and they and their government retreated beyond a line that the USSR and Nazi Germany agreed upon, then the Nazis would not pursue them further beyond that line.

When Poland fell and its government fled (effectively rendering Poland a non-state and unable to organise a defence), the Nazis would have had free reign to position their army right to the border with the USSR. This would have not only compromised the national security of the Soviet Union, but also may have resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands if not millions more Polish Jews. Therefore the Red Army moved in to secure a buffer area as well as help evacuate civilians from the Nazis.

Invasion of Poland

Another common myth is that the Soviet Union invaded Poland, despite no evidence showing that Poland declared war with the Soviet Union (and vice versa), and neither the League of Nations nor any state declared that the Soviet Union invaded a member state.

At the time the event was seen as necessary to prevent further German military gains, with local newspapers reporting, "Not only did cabinet spokesmen of Britain yesterday make statements implicitly justifying Russia's invasion of Poland as a necessary measure to offset German expansionism, but Britain is even now negotiating an important trade agreement with Russia, designed in part to diminish any flow of Russian exports to Germany."

Timeline

Leading up to World War II, a number of European countries formed non-aggression pacts or outright military alliances with Germany in an attempt to quell invasion.

List of Non-Aggression Pacts/Military Alliances with Nazi Germany

Signatories	Treaty	Date Signed
United Kingdom France Italy Germany	Four-Power Pact	15 July 1933
Poland Germany	German-Polish Declaration of Non-Aggression	26 January 1934
France Germany	Franco-German Declaration	6 December 1938
Italy Germany	Pact of Steel	22 May 1939
Denmark Germany	German-Danish Non-Aggression Pact	31 May 1939
Estonia Germany	German-Estonian Non-Aggression Pact	7 June 1939
Latvia Germany	German-Latvian Non-Aggression Pact	7 June 1939
USSR Germany	Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact	23 August 1939

References