View source for Library:Critique of Hegel's philosophy of right

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{{Library work
| title = Critique of Hegel's philosophy of right
| author = Karl Marx
| written in = 1843
|published_date=1927| type = Book
| source = [https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1843/critique-hpr/ Marxists Internet Archive]
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| summary= Marx highlights Hegel's philosophy's ideological underpinnings and its failure to address the material conditions of society. Marx contends that true freedom and justice can only be achieved through the abolition of the capitalist system and the establishment of a classless society based on collective ownership of the means of production.
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== Introduction ==
For Germany, the ''criticism of religion'' has been essentially completed, and the criticism of religion is the prerequisite of all criticism.

The ''profane'' existence of error is compromised as soon as its ''heavenly oratio pro aris et focis''<ref>“speech for the altars and hearths”</ref> has been refuted. Man, who has found only the ''reflection'' of himself in the fantastic reality of heaven, where he sought a superman, will no longer feel disposed to find the ''mere appearance'' of himself, the non-man [''Unmensch''], where he seeks and must seek his true reality.

The foundation of irreligious criticism is: ''Man makes religion'', religion does not make man.  Religion is, indeed, the self-consciousness and self-esteem of man who has either not yet won through to himself, or has already lost himself again. But ''man'' is no abstract being squatting outside the world. Man is ''the world of man'' – state, society. This state and this society produce religion, which is an ''inverted consciousness of the world'', because they are an ''inverted world''. Religion is the general theory of this world, its encyclopaedic compendium, its logic in popular form, its spiritual ''point d’honneur'', its enthusiasm, its moral sanction, its solemn complement, and its universal basis of consolation and justification. It is the ''fantastic realization'' of the human essence since the ''human essence'' has not acquired any true reality. The struggle against religion is, therefore, indirectly the struggle ''against that world'' whose spiritual ''aroma'' is religion.

''Religious'' suffering is, at one and the same time, the ''expression'' of real suffering and a ''protest'' against real suffering. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the ''opium'' of the people.

The abolition of religion as the ''illusory'' happiness of the people is the demand for their ''real'' happiness. To call on them to give up their illusions about their condition is to call on them to ''give up a condition that requires illusions''. The criticism of religion is, therefore, ''in embryo, the criticism of that vale of tears'' of which religion is the ''halo''.

Criticism has plucked the imaginary flowers on the chain not in order that man shall continue to bear that chain without fantasy or consolation, but so that he shall throw off the chain and pluck the living flower. The criticism of religion disillusions man, so that he will think, act, and fashion his reality like a man who has discarded his illusions and regained his senses, so that he will move around himself as his own true Sun. Religion is only the illusory Sun which revolves around man as long as he does not revolve around himself.

It is, therefore, the ''task of history'', once the ''other-world of truth'' has vanished, to establish the ''truth of this world''. It is the immediate ''task of philosophy'', which is in the service of history, to unmask self-estrangement in its ''unholy forms'' once the ''holy form'' of human self-estrangement has been unmasked. Thus, the criticism of Heaven turns into the criticism of Earth, the ''criticism of religion'' into the ''criticism of law'', and the ''criticism of theology'' into the ''criticism of politics''.

The following exposition [a full-scale critical study of Hegel’s ''Philosophy of Right'' was supposed to follow this introduction] – a contribution to this undertaking – concerns itself not directly with the original but with a copy, with the German ''philosophy'' of the state and of law. The only reason for this is that it is concerned with ''Germany''.

If we were to begin with the German ''status quo'' itself, the result – even if we were to do it in the only appropriate way, i.e., negatively – would still be an ''anachronism''. Even the negation of our present political situation is a dusty fact in the historical junk room of modern nations. If I negate powdered pigtails, I am still left with unpowdered pigtails. If I negate the situation in Germany in 1843, then according to the French calendar I have barely reached 1789, much less the vital centre of our present age.

Indeed, German history prides itself on having travelled a road which no other nation in the whole of history has ever travelled before, or ever will again. We have shared the restorations of modern nations without ever having shared their revolutions. We have been restored, firstly, because other nations dared to make revolutions, and, secondly, because other nations suffered counter-revolutions; on the one hand, because our masters were afraid, and, on the other, because they were not afraid. With our shepherds to the fore, we only once kept company with freedom, on the day of its internment.

One school of thought that legitimizes the infamy of today with the infamy of yesterday, a school that stigmatizes every cry of the serf against the knout as mere rebelliousness once the knout has aged a little and acquired a hereditary significance and a history, a school to which history shows nothing but its ''a posteriori'', as did the God of Israel to his servant Moses, the ''historical school of law'' – this school would have invented German history were it not itself an invention of that history. A Shylock, but a cringing Shylock, that swears by its bond, its historical bond, its Christian-Germanic bond, for every pound of flesh cut from the heart of the people.

Good-natured enthusiasts, Germanomaniacs by extraction and free-thinkers by reflexion, on the contrary, seek our history of freedom beyond our history in the ancient Teutonic forests. But, what difference is there between the history of our freedom and the history of the boar’s freedom if it can be found only in the forests? Besides, it is common knowledge that the forest echoes back what you shout into it. So peace to the ancient Teutonic forests!

War on the German state of affairs! By all means! They are ''below the level of history, they are beneath any criticism'', but they are still an object of criticism like the criminal who is below the level of humanity but still an object for the ''executioner''. In the struggle against that state of affairs, criticism is no passion of the head, it is the head of passion. It is not a lancet, it is a weapon. Its object is its ''enemy'', which it wants not to refute but to ''exterminate''. For the spirit of that state of affairs is refuted. In itself, it is no object ''worthy of thought'', it is an existence which is as despicable as it is despised. Criticism does not need to make things clear to itself as regards this object, for it has already settled accounts with it. It no longer assumes the quality of an ''end-in-itself'', but only of a ''means''. Its essential pathos is ''indignation'', its essential work is ''denunciation''.

It is a case of describing the dull reciprocal pressure of all social spheres one on another, a general inactive ill-humor, a limitedness which recognizes itself as much as it mistakes itself, within the frame of government system which, living on the preservation of all wretchedness, is itself nothing but ''wretchedness in office''.

What a sight! This infinitely proceeding division of society into the most manifold races opposed to one another by petty antipathies, uneasy consciences, and brutal mediocrity, and which, precisely because of their reciprocal ambiguous and distrustful attitude, are all, without exception although with various formalities, treated by their ''rulers'' as ''conceded existences''. And they must recognize and acknowledge as a concession of heaven the very fact that they are ''mastered, ruled, possessed''! And, on the other side, are the rulers themselves, whose greatness is in inverse proportion to their number!

Criticism dealing with this content is criticism in a ''hand-to-hand'' fight, and in such a fight the point is not whether the opponent is a noble, equal, ''interesting'' opponent, the point is to ''strike'' him. The point is not to let the Germans have a minute for self-deception and resignation. The actual pressure must be made more pressing by adding to it consciousness of pressure, the shame must be made more shameful by publicizing it. Every sphere of German society must be shown as the ''partie honteuse'' of German society: these petrified relations must be forced to dance by singing their own tune to them! The people must be taught to be ''terrified'' at itself in order to give it ''courage''. This will be fulfilling an imperative need of the German nation, and the needs of the nations are in themselves the ultimate reason for their satisfaction.

This struggle against the limited content of the German ''status quo'' cannot be without interest even for the ''modern'' nations, for the German ''status quo'' is the ''open completion of the ancien régime'' and the ''ancien régime'' is the ''concealed deficiency of the modern state''. The struggle against the German political present is the struggle against the past of the modern nations, and they are still burdened with reminders of that past. It is instructive for them to see the ''ancien régime'', which has been through its ''tragedy'' with them, playing its ''comedy'' as a German revenant. ''Tragic'' indeed was the pre-existing power of the world, and freedom, on the other hand, was a personal notion; in short, as long as it believed and had to believe in its own justification. As long as the ''ancien régime'', as an existing world order, struggled against a world that was only coming into being, there was on its side a historical error, not a personal one. That is why its downfall was tragic.

On the other hand, the present German regime, an anachronism, a flagrant contradiction of generally recognized axioms, the nothingness of the ''ancien régime'' exhibited to the world, only imagines that it believes in itself and demands that the world should imagine the same thing. If it believed in its own ''essence'', would it try to hide that essence under the ''semblance'' of an alien essence and seek refuge in hypocrisy and sophism? The modern ''ancien régime'' is rather only the ''comedian'' of a world order whose ''true heroes'' are dead. History is thorough and goes through many phases when carrying an old form to the grave. The last phases of a world-historical form is its ''comedy''. The gods of Greece, already tragically wounded to death in Aeschylus’s tragedy ''Prometheus Bound'', had to re-die a comic death in Lucian’s ''Dialogues''. Why this course of history? So that humanity should part with its past ''cheerfully''. This ''cheerful'' historical destiny is what we vindicate for the political authorities of Germany.

Meanwhile, once ''modern'' politico-social reality itself is subjected to criticism, once criticism rises to truly human problems, it finds itself outside the German ''status quo'', or else it would reach out for its object ''below'' its object. An example. The relation of industry, of the world of wealth generally, to the political world is one of the major problems of modern times. In what form is this problem beginning to engage the attention of the Germans? In the form of ''protective duties'', of the ''prohibitive system'', of ''national economy''. Germanomania has passed out of man into matter, and thus one morning our cotton barons and iron heroes saw themselves turned into patriots. People are, therefore, beginning in Germany to acknowledge the sovereignty of monopoly on the inside through lending it ''sovereignty on the outside''. People are, therefore, now about to begin, in Germany, what people in France and England are about to end. The old corrupt condition against which these countries are revolting in theory, and which they only bear as one bears chains, is greeted in Germany as the dawn of a beautiful future which still hardly dares to pass from ''crafty'' theory to the most ruthless practice. Whereas the problem in France and England is: ''Political economy'', or the ''rule of society over wealth''; in Germany, it is: National economy, or the ''mastery of private property over nationality''. In France and England, then, it is a case of abolishing monopoly that has proceeded to its last consequences; in Germany, it is a case of proceeding to the last consequences of monopoly. There it is a case of solution, here as yet a case of collision. This is an adequate example of the ''German'' form of modern problems, an example of how our history, like a clumsy recruit, still has to do extra drill on things that are old and hackneyed in history.

If, therefore, the ''whole'' German development did not exceed the German ''political'' development, a German could at the most have the share in the problems-of-the-present that a Russian has. But, when the separate individual is not bound by the limitations of the nation, the nation as a whole is still less liberated by the liberation of one individual. The fact that Greece had a Scythian among its philosophers did not help the Scythians to make a single step towards Greek culture. [An allusion to Anacharsis.]

Luckily, we Germans are not Scythians.

As the ancient peoples went through their pre-history in imagination, in ''mythology'', so we Germans have gone through our post-history in thought, in ''philosophy''. We are philosophical contemporaries of the present without being its historical contemporaries. German philosophy is the ''ideal prolongation'' of German history. If therefore, instead of the ''oeuvres incompletes'' of our real history, we criticize the ''oeuvres posthumes'' of our ideal history, ''philosophy'', our criticism is in the midst of the questions of which the present says: ''that is the question''. What, in progressive nations, is a ''practical'' break with modern state conditions, is, in Germany, where even those conditions do not yet exist, at first a critical break with the philosophical reflexion of those conditions.

''German philosophy of right and state'' is the only ''German history'' which is ''al pari'' [“on a level”] with the ''official'' modern present. The German nation must therefore join this, its dream-history, to its present conditions and subject to criticism not only these existing conditions, but at the same time their abstract continuation. Its future cannot be ''limited'' either to the immediate negation of its real conditions of state and right, or to the immediate implementation of its ideal state and right conditions, for it has the immediate negation of its real conditions in its ideal conditions, and it has almost ''outlived'' the immediate implementation of its ideal conditions in the contemplation of neighboring nations.   Hence, it is with good reason that the ''practical'' political party in Germany demands the ''negation of philosophy''.

It is wrong, not in its demand but in stopping at the demand, which it neither seriously implements nor can implement. It believes that it implements that negation by turning its back to philosophy and its head away from it and muttering a few trite and angry phrases about it. Owing to the limitation of its outlook, it does not include philosophy in the circle of ''German'' reality or it even fancies it is ''beneath'' German practice and the theories that serve it. You demand that real life embryos be made the starting-point, but you forget that the real life embryo of the German nation has grown so far only inside its ''cranium''. In a word – ''You cannot abolish'' [''aufheben''] ''philosophy without making it a reality''.

The same mistake, but with the factors ''reversed'', was made by the ''theoretical'' party originating from philosophy.

In the present struggle it saw ''only the critical struggle of philosophy against the German world''; it did not give a thought to the fact that ''philosophy up to the present'' itself belongs to this world and is its completion, although an ideal one. Critical towards its counterpart, it was uncritical towards itself when, proceeding from the ''premises'' of philosophy, it either stopped at the results given by philosophy or passed off demands and results from somewhere else as immediate demands and results of philosophy – although these, provided they are justified, can be obtained only by the ''negation of philosophy up to the present'', of philosophy as such. We reserve ourselves the right to a more detailed description of this section: ''It thought it could make philosophy a reality without abolishing'' [''aufzuheben''] ''it''.

The criticism of the ''German philosophy of state and right'', which attained its most consistent, richest, and last formulation through ''Hegel'', is both a critical analysis of the modern state and of the reality connected with it, and the resolute negation of the whole manner of the ''German consciousness in politics and right'' as ''practiced'' hereto, the most distinguished, most universal expression of which, raised to the level of ''science'', is the ''speculative philosophy'' of right itself. If the speculative philosophy of right, that abstract extravagant ''thinking'' on the modern state, the reality of which remains a thing of the beyond, if only beyond the Rhine, was possible only in Germany, inversely the German thought-image of the modern state which makes abstraction of ''real man'' was possible only because and insofar as the modern state itself makes abstraction of ''real man'', or satisfies the whole of man only in imagination. In politics, the Germans ''thought'' what other nations ''did''. Germany was their ''theoretical conscience''. The abstraction and presumption of its thought was always in step with the one-sidedness and lowliness of its reality. If, therefore, the ''status quo of German statehood'' expresses the ''completion'' of the ''ancien régime'', the completion of the thorn in the flesh of the modern state, the ''status quo'' of German state science expresses the ''incompletion of the modern state'', the defectiveness of its flesh itself.

Already as the resolute opponent of the previous form of ''German'' political consciousness the criticism of speculative philosophy of right strays, not into itself, but into ''problems'' which there is only one means of solving – ''practice''.

It is asked: can Germany attain a practice ''à la hauteur des principes'' – i.e., a ''revolution'' which will raise it not only to the ''official level'' of modern nations, but to the ''height of humanity'' which will be the near future of those nations?

The weapon of criticism cannot, of course, replace criticism of the weapon, material force must be overthrown by material force; but theory also becomes a material force as soon as it has gripped the masses. Theory is capable of gripping the masses as soon as it demonstrates ''ad hominem'', and it demonstrates ''ad hominem'' as soon as it becomes radical. To be radical is to grasp the root of the matter. But, for man, the root is man himself. The evident proof of the radicalism of German theory, and hence of its practical energy, is that is proceeds from a resolute ''positive'' abolition of religion. The criticism of religion ends with the teaching that ''man is the highest essence for man'' – hence, with the ''categoric imperative to overthrow all relations'' in which man is a debased, enslaved, abandoned, despicable essence, relations which cannot be better described than by the cry of a Frenchman when it was planned to introduce a tax on dogs: Poor dogs! They want to treat you as human beings!

Even historically, theoretical emancipation has specific practical significance for Germany. For Germany’s ''revolutionary'' past is theoretical, it is the ''Reformation''. As the revolution then began in the brain of the ''monk'', so now it begins in the brain of the ''philosopher''.

''Luther'', we grant, overcame bondage out of ''devotion'' by replacing it by bondage out of ''conviction''. He shattered faith in authority because he restored the authority of faith. He turned priests into laymen because he turned laymen into priests. He freed man from outer religiosity because he made religiosity the inner man. He freed the body from chains because he enchained the heart.

But, if Protestantism was not the true solution of the problem, it was at least the true setting of it. It was no longer a case of the layman’s struggle against the ''priest outside himself'' but of his struggle against his ''own priest inside himself'', his priestly nature. And if the Protestant transformation of the German layman into priests emancipated the lay popes, the ''princes'', with the whole of their priestly clique, the privileged and philistines, the philosophical transformation of priestly Germans into men will emancipate the ''people''. But, ''secularization'' will not stop at the ''confiscation of church estates'' set in motion mainly by hypocritical Prussia any more than emancipation stops at princes. The Peasant War, the most radical fact of German history, came to grief because of theology. Today, when theology itself has come to grief, the most unfree fact of German history, our ''status quo'', will be shattered against philosophy. On the eve of the Reformation, official Germany was the most unconditional slave of Rome. On the eve of its revolution, it is the unconditional slave of less than Rome, of Prussia and Austria, of country junkers and philistines.

Meanwhile, a major difficulty seems to stand in the way of a ''radical'' German revolution.

For revolutions require a ''passive'' element, a material basis. Theory is fulfilled in a people only insofar as it is the fulfilment of the needs of that people. But will the monstrous discrepancy between the demands of German thought and the answers of German reality find a corresponding discrepancy between civil society and the state, and between civil society and itself? Will the theoretical needs be immediate practical needs? It is not enough for thought to strive for realization, reality must itself strive towards thought.

But Germany did not rise to the intermediary stage of political emancipation at the same time as the modern nations. It has not yet reached in practice the stages which it has surpassed in theory. How can it do a ''somersault'', not only over its own limitations, but at the same time over the limitations of the modern nations, over limitations which it must in reality feel and strive for as for emancipation from its real limitations? Only a revolution of radical needs can be a radical revolution and it seems that precisely the preconditions and ground for such needs are lacking.

If Germany has accompanied the development of the modern nations only with the abstract activity of thought without taking an effective share in the real struggle of that development, it has, on the other hand, shared the ''sufferings'' of that development, without sharing in its enjoyment, or its partial satisfaction. To the abstract activity on the one hand corresponds the abstract suffering on the other. That is why Germany will one day find itself on the level of European decadence before ever having been on the level of European emancipation. It will be comparable to a ''fetish worshipper'' pining away with the diseases of Christianity.

If we now consider the ''German governments'', we find that because of the circumstances of the time, because of Germany’s condition, because of the standpoint of German education, and, finally, under the impulse of its own fortunate instinct, they are driven to combine the ''civilized shortcomings of the modern state world'', the advantages of which we do not enjoy, with the ''barbaric deficiencies of the ancien régime'', which we enjoy in full; hence, Germany must share more and more, if not in the reasonableness, at least in the unreasonableness of those state formations which are beyond the bounds of its ''status quo''. Is there in the world, for example, a country which shares so naively in all the illusions of constitutional statehood without sharing in its realities as so-called constitutional Germany? And was it not perforce the notion of a German government to combine the tortures of censorship with the tortures of the French September laws [1835 anti-press laws] which provide for freedom of the press? As you could find the gods of all nations in the Roman Pantheon, so you will find in the Germans’ Holy Roman Empire all the sins of all state forms. That this eclecticism will reach a so far unprecedented height is guaranteed in particular by the ''political-aesthetic gourmanderie'' of a German king [Frederick William IV] who intended to play all the roles of monarchy, whether feudal or democratic, if not in the person of the people, at least in his ''own'' person, and if not for the people, at least for ''himself''. ''Germany, as the deficiency of the political present constituted a world of its ow''n, will not be able to throw down the specific German limitations without throwing down the general limitation of the political present.

It is not the ''radical'' revolution, not the ''general human'' emancipation which is a utopian dream for Germany, but rather the partial, the ''merely'' political revolution, the revolution which leaves the pillars of the house standing. On what is a partial, a merely political revolution based? On ''part of civil society'' emancipating itself and attaining ''general'' domination; on a definite class, proceeding from its ''particular situation''; undertaking the general emancipation of society. This class emancipates the whole of society, but only provided the whole of society is in the same situation as this class – e.g., possesses money and education or can acquire them at will.

No class of civil society can play this role without arousing a moment of enthusiasm in itself and in the masses, a moment in which it fraternizes and merges with society in general, becomes confused with it and is perceived and acknowledged as its ''general representative'', a moment in which its claims and rights are truly the claims and rights of society itself, a moment in which it is truly the social head and the social heart. Only in the name of the general rights of society can a particular class vindicate for itself general domination. For the storming of this emancipatory position, and hence for the political exploitation of all sections of society in the interests of its own section, revolutionary energy and spiritual self-feeling alone are not sufficient. For the ''revolution of a nation'', and the ''emancipation of a particular class'' of civil society to coincide, for one estate to be acknowledged as the estate of the whole society, all the defects of society must conversely be concentrated in another class, a particular estate must be the estate of the general stumbling-block, the incorporation of the general limitation, a particular social sphere must be recognized as the notorious crime of the whole of society, so that liberation from that sphere appears as general self-liberation. For one estate to be ''par excellence'' the estate of liberation, another estate must conversely be the obvious estate of oppression. The negative general significance of the French nobility and the French clergy determined the positive general significance of the nearest neighboring and opposed class of the ''bourgeoisie''.

But no particular class in Germany has the constituency, the penetration, the courage, or the ruthlessness that could mark it out as the negative representative of society. No more has any estate the breadth of soul that identifies itself, even for a moment, with the soul of the nation, the geniality that inspires material might to political violence, or that revolutionary daring which flings at the adversary the defiant words: ''I am nothing but I must be everything''. The main stem of German morals and honesty, of the classes as well as of individuals, is rather that ''modest egoism'' which asserts its limitedness and allows it to be asserted against itself. The relation of the various sections of German society is therefore not dramatic but epic. Each of them begins to be aware of itself and begins to camp beside the others with all its particular claims not as soon as it is oppressed, but as soon as the circumstances of the time, without the section’s own participation, creates a social substratum on which it can in turn exert pressure. Even the ''moral self-feeling of the German middle class'' rests only on the consciousness that it is the common representative of the philistine mediocrity of all the other classes. It is therefore not only the German kings who accede to the throne ''mal à propos'', it is every section of civil society which goes through a defeat before it celebrates victory and develops its own limitations before it overcomes the limitations facing it, asserts its narrow-hearted essence before it has been able to assert its magnanimous essence; thus the very opportunity of a great role has passed away before it is to hand, and every class, once it begins the struggle against the class opposed to it, is involved in the struggle against the class below it. Hence, the higher nobility is struggling against the monarchy, the bureaucrat against the nobility, and the bourgeois against them all, while the proletariat is already beginning to find itself struggling against the bourgeoisie. The middle class hardly dares to grasp the thought of emancipation from its own standpoint when the development of the social conditions and the progress of political theory already declare that standpoint antiquated or at least problematic.

In France, it is enough for somebody to be something for him to want to be everything; in Germany, nobody can be anything if he is not prepared to renounce everything. In France, partial emancipation is the basis of universal emancipation; in Germany, universal emancipation is the ''conditio sine qua non'' of any partial emancipation. In France, it is the reality of gradual liberation that must give birth to complete freedom, in Germany, the impossibility of gradual liberation. In France, every class of the nation is a ''political idealist'' and becomes aware of itself at first not as a particular class but as a representative of social requirements generally. The role of ''emancipator'' therefore passes in dramatic motion to the various classes of the French nation one after the other until it finally comes to the class which implements social freedom no longer with the provision of certain conditions lying outside man and yet created by human society, but rather organizes all conditions of human existence on the premises of social freedom. On the contrary, in Germany, where practical life is as spiritless as spiritual life is unpractical, no class in civil society has any need or capacity for general emancipation until it is forced by its ''immediate'' condition, by ''material'' necessity, by its ''very chains''.

Where, then, is the ''positive'' possibility of a German emancipation?

''Answer'': In the formulation of a class with ''radical chains'', a class of civil society which is not a class of civil society, an estate which is the dissolution of all estates, a sphere which has a universal character by its universal suffering and claims no ''particular right'' because no ''particular wrong'', but ''wrong generally'', is perpetuated against it; which can invoke no ''historical'', but only ''human'', title; which does not stand in any one-sided antithesis to the consequences but in all-round antithesis to the premises of German statehood; a sphere, finally, which cannot emancipate itself without emancipating itself from all other spheres of society and thereby emancipating all other spheres of society, which, in a word, is the ''complete loss'' of man and hence can win itself only through the ''complete re-winning of man''. This dissolution of society as a particular estate is the ''proletariat''.

The proletariat is beginning to appear in Germany as a result of the rising ''industrial'' movement. For, it is not the ''naturally arising'' poor but the ''artificially impoverished'', not the human masses mechanically oppressed by the gravity of society, but the masses resulting from the ''drastic dissolution'' of society, mainly of the middle estate, that form the proletariat, although, as is easily understood, the naturally arising poor and the Christian-Germanic serfs gradually join its ranks.

By heralding the ''dissolution of the hereto existing world order'', the proletariat merely proclaims the ''secret of its own existence'', for it is the factual dissolution of that world order. By demanding the ''negation of private property'', the proletariat merely raises to the rank of a principle of society what society has raised to the rank of ''its'' principle, what is already incorporated in ''it'' as the negative result of society without its own participation. The proletarian then finds himself possessing the same right in regard to the world which is coming into being as the ''German king'' in regard to the world which has come into being when he calls the people ''his'' people, as he calls the horse ''his'' horse. By declaring the people his private property, the king merely proclaims that the owner of property is king.

As philosophy finds its material weapon in the proletariat, so the proletariat finds its ''spiritual'' weapon in philosophy. And once the lightning of thought has squarely struck this ingenuous soil of the people, the emancipation of the ''Germans'' into ''men'' will be accomplished.

Let us sum up the result:

The only liberation of Germany which is ''practically'' possible is liberation from the point of view of ''that'' theory which declares man to be the supreme being for man. Germany can emancipate itself from the Middle Ages only if it emancipates itself at the same time from the ''partial'' victories over the ''Middle Ages''. In Germany, ''no'' form of bondage can be broken without breaking ''all'' forms of bondage. Germany, which is renowned for its ''thoroughness'', cannot make a revolution unless it is a ''thorough'' one. The ''emancipation of the German'' is the ''emancipation of man''. The ''head'' of this emancipation is ''philosophy'', its ''heart'' the ''proletariat''. Philosophy cannot realize itself without the transcendence [''Aufhebung''] of the proletariat, and the proletariat cannot transcend itself without the realization [''Verwirklichung''] of philosophy.

When all the inner conditions are met, the ''day of the German resurrection'' will be heralded by the ''crowing of the cock of Gaul''.

== References and notes ==
<references />
[[Category:Library works by Karl Marx]]
{{Marx/Engels works}}