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The role of Allen Dulles in the destabilization of Indonesia based on insider knowledge of the gold deposit is also discussed by historian [[Aaron Good]] on [[Geopolitical Economy Report]], in an episode titled "How Western empires meddled to exploit Indonesia's huge gold reserves." Good states that Dulles and other corporate lawyers had a role in establishing the 60% US-owned and 40% Dutch-owned [[Netherlands New Guinea Petroleum Company]], which, in 1936, sent out an exploration expedition which ended up discovering a deposit of ore consisting of very high [[copper]] and gold concentration. Good states that "this information [was] like dynamite, but it was kept secret" and that in the report made by the expedition they misleadingly obscured the value of the gold, apparently intending to keep it largely unknown for several years until they were in a position to mine it. Adding on to Good's explanation, a co-host of the episode describes the affair as a "one to two trillion dollar heist over the course of 20 years" and said that looking at events in Indonesia this way, it explains one of the motivations for stirring up the conditions for such a large scale attack against communists (and people accused as communists) in the country, because the few people who had inside corporate knowledge of the ore deposit "stood to gain everything, an unimaginable amount of wealth, bigger than most countries' economies."<ref>[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xYLGNw-GZ8w "How Western empires meddled to exploit Indonesia's huge gold reserves (with historian Aaron Good)."] [[Geopolitical Economy Report]]. Jan 29, 2023. [[YouTube]].</ref>
The role of Allen Dulles in the destabilization of Indonesia based on insider knowledge of the gold deposit is also discussed by historian [[Aaron Good]] on [[Geopolitical Economy Report]], in an episode titled "How Western empires meddled to exploit Indonesia's huge gold reserves." Good states that Dulles and other corporate lawyers had a role in establishing the 60% US-owned and 40% Dutch-owned [[Netherlands New Guinea Petroleum Company]], which, in 1936, sent out an exploration expedition which ended up discovering a deposit of ore consisting of very high [[copper]] and gold concentration. Good states that "this information [was] like dynamite, but it was kept secret" and that in the report made by the expedition they misleadingly obscured the value of the gold, apparently intending to keep it largely unknown for several years until they were in a position to mine it. Adding on to Good's explanation, a co-host of the episode describes the affair as a "one to two trillion dollar heist over the course of 20 years" and said that looking at events in Indonesia this way, it explains one of the motivations for stirring up the conditions for such a large scale attack against communists (and people accused as communists) in the country, because the few people who had inside corporate knowledge of the ore deposit "stood to gain everything, an unimaginable amount of wealth, bigger than most countries' economies."<ref>[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xYLGNw-GZ8w "How Western empires meddled to exploit Indonesia's huge gold reserves (with historian Aaron Good)."] [[Geopolitical Economy Report]]. Jan 29, 2023. [[YouTube]].</ref>


== 1960s Congo operations ==
== Operations in the Congo ==
An August 27, 1960 telegram drafted by Allen Dulles from the CIA to the Station in the Congo discusses how the removal of leadership (although the name "Lumumba" is noted as being "garbled" in the record of the telegram) in Congo "must be an urgent and prime objective" and a "high priority of our covert action":<blockquote>In high quarters here it is the clear-cut conclusion that if [garble—Lumumba?] continues to hold high office, the inevitable result will at best be chaos and at worst pave the way to Communist takeover of the Congo with disastrous consequences for the prestige of [[United Nations|UN]] and for the interests of the [[Imperial core|free world]] generally. Consequently we conclude that his removal must be an urgent and prime objective and that under existing conditions this should be a high priority of our covert action. Hence we wish to give you wider authority along lines Leop 07723 and Leop 07854 and Dir 461155 including even more aggressive action if it can remain covert.<ref>Dulles, Allen W. "14. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the Station in the Congo." Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIII, Congo, 1960–1968, Document 14. Office of the Historian, [[United States Department of State]]. [https://web.archive.org/web/20220810144615/https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v23/d14 Archived] 2022-08-10.</ref></blockquote>A different document prepared in the CIA, titled "Operations in the Congo" which was noted (in handwriting) as being prepared for [[Richard Nixon|Nixon]] (who was Vice President at the time) on September 7, 1960, summarizes some of the CIA's activities in Congo aimed at ousting Lumumba up to that point:<blockquote>In the period immediately preceding Congo independence, CIA efforts in the Belgian Congo concentrated on establishing direct contact with as many responsible political figures as possible and influencing their actions. [...] In the immediate post-independence period, CIA continued to maintain contact with the assets it had been developing and to be on the lookout for new ones for whatever contingencies might arise. [...] CIA concentrated on developing contact with [less than 1 line not declassified] assets who were in active opposition to Lumumba or appeared to have that potential. These were developed with the long-range view of possible active use against Lumumba and on a day to day basis in tactical opposition to increasing signs of [[Soviet Bloc]] influence in the Lumumba Government [...] To accomplish this and to implement operations to this end, CIA has been steadily reinforcing the Leopoldville station with additional personnel and funds, and the Director of Central Intelligence has given the station authority to take decisions on the spot [...] CIA has been coordinating an effort to have the Senate assemble and pass a vote of no confidence in the Lumumba Government. [...] On the basis of what information we have so far received it would appear that Kasavubu’s precipitate action has at least seriously jeopardized the plan for ousting Lumumba by constitutional means.<ref>[https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v23/d16 "16. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency."] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIII, Congo, 1960–1968. Document 16. Office of the Historian, United States Department of State. [https://web.archive.org/web/20230405132307/https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v23/d16 Archived] 2023-04-05.</ref></blockquote>An editorial note by the U.S. Department of State's Office of the Historian mentions that a September 21 telegram to the CIA reports the station chief "urged arrest or other more permanent disposal of Lumumba" in a meeting with Colonel [[Mobutu Sese Seko|Mobutu]], warning against potential reconciliation between Lumumba and [[Joseph Kasavubu|Kasavubu]].<ref>[https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v23/d25 "25. Editorial Note."] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIII, Congo, 1960–1968 - Office of the Historian. State.gov. 2023. (Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 78–00435R, DDO/ISS Files, Box 1, Folder 3, [cryptonym not declassified] Ops). [https://web.archive.org/web/20221002154513/https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v23/d25 Archived] 2022-10-02.</ref>
An August 27, 1960 telegram drafted by Allen Dulles from the CIA to the Station in the Congo discusses how the removal of leadership (although the name "Lumumba" is noted as being "garbled" in the record of the telegram) in Congo "must be an urgent and prime objective" and a "high priority of our covert action":<blockquote>In high quarters here it is the clear-cut conclusion that if [garble—Lumumba?] continues to hold high office, the inevitable result will at best be chaos and at worst pave the way to Communist takeover of the Congo with disastrous consequences for the prestige of [[United Nations|UN]] and for the interests of the [[Imperial core|free world]] generally. Consequently we conclude that his removal must be an urgent and prime objective and that under existing conditions this should be a high priority of our covert action. Hence we wish to give you wider authority along lines Leop 07723 and Leop 07854 and Dir 461155 including even more aggressive action if it can remain covert.<ref>Dulles, Allen W. "14. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the Station in the Congo." Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIII, Congo, 1960–1968, Document 14. Office of the Historian, [[United States Department of State]]. [https://web.archive.org/web/20220810144615/https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v23/d14 Archived] 2022-08-10.</ref></blockquote>A different document prepared in the CIA, titled "Operations in the Congo" which was noted (in handwriting) as being prepared for [[Richard Nixon|Nixon]] (who was Vice President at the time) on September 7, 1960, summarizes some of the CIA's activities in Congo aimed at ousting Lumumba up to that point:<blockquote>In the period immediately preceding Congo independence, CIA efforts in the Belgian Congo concentrated on establishing direct contact with as many responsible political figures as possible and influencing their actions. [...] In the immediate post-independence period, CIA continued to maintain contact with the assets it had been developing and to be on the lookout for new ones for whatever contingencies might arise. [...] CIA concentrated on developing contact with [less than 1 line not declassified] assets who were in active opposition to Lumumba or appeared to have that potential. These were developed with the long-range view of possible active use against Lumumba and on a day to day basis in tactical opposition to increasing signs of [[Soviet Bloc]] influence in the Lumumba Government [...] To accomplish this and to implement operations to this end, CIA has been steadily reinforcing the Leopoldville station with additional personnel and funds, and the Director of Central Intelligence has given the station authority to take decisions on the spot [...] CIA has been coordinating an effort to have the Senate assemble and pass a vote of no confidence in the Lumumba Government. [...] On the basis of what information we have so far received it would appear that Kasavubu’s precipitate action has at least seriously jeopardized the plan for ousting Lumumba by constitutional means.<ref>[https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v23/d16 "16. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency."] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIII, Congo, 1960–1968. Document 16. Office of the Historian, United States Department of State. [https://web.archive.org/web/20230405132307/https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v23/d16 Archived] 2023-04-05.</ref></blockquote>An editorial note by the U.S. Department of State's Office of the Historian mentions that a September 21 telegram to the CIA reports the station chief "urged arrest or other more permanent disposal of Lumumba" in a meeting with Colonel [[Mobutu Sese Seko|Mobutu]], warning against potential reconciliation between Lumumba and [[Joseph Kasavubu|Kasavubu]].<ref>[https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v23/d25 "25. Editorial Note."] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIII, Congo, 1960–1968 - Office of the Historian. State.gov. 2023. (Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 78–00435R, DDO/ISS Files, Box 1, Folder 3, [cryptonym not declassified] Ops). [https://web.archive.org/web/20221002154513/https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v23/d25 Archived] 2022-10-02.</ref>


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