Editing Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

[[File:WW2 pacts.png|thumb|Treaties and non-aggression pacts between Nazi Germany and other countries before the start of the [[Second World War]]]]
The '''Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics''', better known as the '''Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact''', the '''Hitler–Stalin Pact''', or the '''Nazi–Soviet Pact''', was a non-aggression agreement between [[German Reich (1933–1945)|Nazi Germany]] and the [[Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (1922–1991)|Soviet Union]], signed in [[Moscow]] on the eve of the [[Second World War]] on 23 August 1939. The agreement stipulated that neither party would attack the other, nor lend its support to a power which was at war with the other. It also divided [[Europe]] into German and Soviet spheres of influence and laid the groundwork for future German-Soviet cooperation. However, the Soviet Union did not agree to "invade" [[Republic of Poland (1918–1939)|Poland]] in the treaty, nor was it an alliance as many [[Anti-communism|anti-communists]] claim. The agreement was set to expire ten years after it was signed,<ref name=":7">https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Molotov%E2%80%93Ribbentrop_Pact</ref> but was terminated prematurely on 22 June 1941, when Nazi Germany [[Operation Barbarossa|invaded the Soviet Union]].

Throughout most of the 1930s, the Soviet government, recognising the threat that the [[National Socialist German Workers' Party|Nazis]] posed as well as the fact that the USSR couldn't afford to fight a war with Germany on its own, pursued a policy of [[collective security]], trying to contain Germany & [[Kingdom of Italy (1861–1946)|Italy]] and build an [[Anti-war movement|anti-war]] alliance. However, all of these attempts fell through, with the [[Capitalism|capitalist]] European powers favouring a policy of [[appeasement]], and in 1939, when war was on the horizon, the Soviets reluctantly signed the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, hoping to buy time to prepare for the inevitable German–Soviet War as well as secure a buffer between it and Germany/Germany's potential allies. 

The [[Baltic Way]], a [[Nationalism|nationalist]] demonstration in the [[Baltic states]] (at the time part of the Soviet Union) marked the 50th anniversary of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact. [[European Day of Remembrance for Victims of Stalinism and Nazism|Black Ribbon Day]], a day of remembrance for "victims" of "[[Totalitarianism|totalitarian]]" regimes, is also observed on 23 August to commemorate the signing of the treaty.  

==Background==
By January 1933 [[Adolf Hitler]] had risen to power in Germany, increasing the already tense environment in Europe. The German ambassador to the Soviet Union noted that “…the Soviet Government is concerned with the attitude and development of German policy;” With the UK, France, Italy and Germany signing the Four-Power Pact, the Soviets' concerns was not unfounded. Maxim Litvinov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs issued an invitation brought back to France by their Minister for Air, Pierre Cot for a non-aggression and mutual-aid pact. The invitation was ignored by the French government. With Germany's departure from the League of Nations and Disarmament Conference further increasing tensions the French reconsidered the proposal. French Foreign Minister Joseph Paul-Boncour and Litvinov met in Paris on 31 October to establish the principles of an alliance based on the premise that the Soviet Union would join the [[League of Nations]]. The written draft for this alliance, presented by Litvinov to Paul-Boncour on 28 December, would go on to form the basis of the Eastern Pact.

===Eastern Pact===
{{Main article|Eastern Pact}}
The draft of the Eastern Pact proposed extending the mutual assistance agreement to Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Baltic States. By January 1934 however, the French government had destabilised. Far-right nationalists and rioting resulting from the Stavisky affair – a financial scandal and alleged government cover-up – resulted in the liberal Prime Minister Camille Chautemps's retirement. Discussions of any pact with France were cut short. Stability within France was not seen until February with the formation of a new government. Along with the new government, a new Foreign Minister – a conservative and nationalist – Jean-Louis Barthou was employed. By the end of February the Soviets had informed France that they would agree to join the League of Nations, and were prepared to form a regional mutual security agreement.

April saw negotiations continue in Paris.<ref>{{Web citation|author=P. J. Philip|newspaper=[[The New York Times]]|title=FRENCH DISCLAIM ENCIRCLING POLICY;|date=1934-04-30|url=https://www.nytimes.com/1934/04/30/archives/french-disclaim-encircling-policy-say-barthou-trip-to-warsaw-and.html|retrieved=2023-02-19}}</ref> As Barthou was preoccupied with negotiations in Warsaw, Alexis Leger, General Secretary of the Quai d-Orsay suggested to the Soviets the inclusion of Germany. Until this point Barthou had not mentioned the Pact to the Polish Józef Piłsudski nor the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Józef Beck. From 22-25 April the French diplomat met in Warsaw with the Polish statemen, who expressed their issues with the matter.<ref name=":4">{{Web citation|newspaper=Institute of National Remembrance|title=Why did Poland reject the draft of the Eastern Pact?|date=2021-03-04|url=https://ipn.gov.pl/en/digital-resources/articles/7162,Why-did-Poland-reject-the-draft-of-the-Eastern-Pact.html|retrieved=2023-02-20|author=Sebastian Pilarski, Ph.D}}</ref> The Polish described it as an "Eastern Locarno" accusing the alliance of being an attempt to divide territories between powers.<ref group="lower-alpha">It is unclear whether this was the actual position of the Polish government at the time, or whether this is (historial revisionism) by the modern Polish state.</ref> The inclusion of Czechoslovakia and Lithuania concerned the Polish, who were fearful that disputed territories would be given to the neighbouring countries.<ref name=":4" /> In addition Poland had just signed the German-Polish Declaration of Non-Aggression and felt secure enough not to "resort" to Soviet alliances. Rather than reject the proposal, Poland added the condition that they would join if Germany also accepted.

Earlier in May, the Soviets continued try to form peace in Europe. With the resuming of the Disarmament Conference in Geneva encroaching, Litvinov proposed to [[Joseph Stalin]] on 9 May with copies to [[Vyacheslav Molotov]] and Kliment Voroshilov, that he be granted permission “…to make a proposal to turn the Conference on Disarmament into a permanent Conference of Peace.”
{{Quote|Moreover, I would ask for permission to make a proposal to turn the Conference on Disarmament into a permanent Conference of Peace. Until now, peace conferences have been convened only after bloody wars to divide the spoils or impose humiliating conditions on the defeated. We will not propose the creation of a permanent peace conference to prevent wars.|Litvinov|4=9 May, 1934|<ref>{{Citation|author=M. M. Litvinov|year=1934|title=Memoranda from Soviet People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs M. Litvinov to J. Stalin with instructions for talks with France on signing the Eastern Pact and the admission of the USSR to the League of Nations, talks with Romania on Soviet-Romanian relations, the conference on disarmament and other matters|title-url=https://www.prlib.ru/en/node/1297017|section=3. Disarmament|page=54-58}}</ref>}}

A revised draft presented on 24 May through the French Ambassador to Poland, Jules Laroche, agreed to the inclusion of Germany, but insisted Czechoslovakia and Lithuania remain members. Poland suggested the participation of Romania in place of the two border countries. Barthou continued to seek approval from Poland and now also from the British.<ref name=":3">{{Citation|author=Lisanne Radice|year=1977|title=The Eastern Pact, 1933-1935: A Last Attempt at European Co-operation|title-url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/4207386|page=45-64|pdf=https://sci-hub.ru/http://www.jstor.org/stable/4207386|publisher=Modern Humanities Research Association|doi=10.2307/4207386|series=The Slavonic and East European Review|volume=55}}</ref>{{Quote|The first public acknowledgement of the negotiations came in May 1934, when Barthou and Litvinov met in Geneva for the Disarmament Conference. Rumours having preceded them, Barthou thought it expedient to discuss the subject of the negotiations with his allies, especially the British and the Poles. He sought the opinion of the latter in particular, as Poland's signature was considered vital to the proposed treaty.|Lisanne Radice|<ref name=":3" />|(1977). pp. 49}}

French Ambassador to Germany, André François-Poncet approached the German Reichsminister of Foreign Affairs, Konstantin von Neurath with this proposition in June. [Documents on German foreign policy, 1918-1945, from the archives of the German Foreign Ministry. Series D (1937-1945). Volume IV - The aftermath of Munich October 1938-March 1939.]

Again in July France presented another revised Pact agreement to Poland. A letter on 7 July from the Soviet Plenipotentiary Representative in Poland, Yakov Davydov to the Soviet People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs describes the presented proposal by Laroche to Beck.<ref>{{Web citation|author=Yakov Davydov|newspaper=Boris Yeltsin Presidental Library|title=Cipher letter from Soviet Plenipotentiary Representative in Poland Y. Davtyan to the Soviet People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs on the version of the Eastern Pact proposed by France. Certified copy.|date=1934-07-07|url=https://www.prlib.ru/en/item/1296723|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200502080746/https://www.prlib.ru/en/item/1296723|archive-date=2020-05-02|retrieved=2023-03-01}}</ref> Poland continued to remain indecisive towards the pact. A telegram from 19 July shreds some light on the Soviet need for an answer from Poland. Litvinov asks the Soviet representative in Poland if he could inquire Beck when a decision would be made by Poland on the pact. The same telegram also expresses the surprise from the Soviets about Poland's position with Germany “…we are all the more surprised by the identity of the Polish position with the German one”<ref>{{Web citation|author=Maxim Litvinov|newspaper=Boris Yeltsin Presidential Library|title=Cipher telegram from Soviet People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs M. Litvinov to Soviet Plenipotentiary Representative in Poland Y. Davtyan regarding the attitude of Germany and Poland to the idea of signing the Eastern Pact.|date=9134-07-19|url=https://www.prlib.ru/en/item/1296372|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230304072933/https://www.prlib.ru/en/item/1296372|archive-date=2023-03-04|retrieved=2023-03-02|quote=Your 9462. You can tell Beck the contents of my 6964 and ask him when you can expect to receive a final answer regarding the pact. We know that Germany's long-standing position is mainly explained by its unwillingness to re-recognize the status quo of its borders, in other words, the German-Polish border, and that we are all the more surprised by the identity of the Polish position with the German one}}</ref>

With the inclusion of Germany the [[Communist Party of the Soviet Union|CPSU(b)]] held a vote within the Politburo on whether to go forward with the “…Tripartite Agreement with France and Germany, guaranteeing the Eastern Regional Pact.” The resolution was signed by ... on 14 July.<ref>{{Web citation|author=Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b)|newspaper=Boris Yeltsin Presidential Library|title=Resolution of the Politburo of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee on the consent to sign the Tripartite Agreement with France and Germany, guaranteeing the Eastern Regional Pact.|date=14 July 1934|url=https://www.prlib.ru/en/node/1297098|archive-url=https://archive.is/QTtuL|archive-date=2023-03-01|retrieved=2023-03-01}}</ref>

During this time Britain remained hostile to the Soviet Union, and it was not until late July that the Soviets considered themselves and Britain to have diplomatic relations:
{{Quote|For the first time since recognition by Great Britain we now have actual diplomatic relations. Until the present time neither myself nor Tchitcherin [Former Commissar for Foreign Affairs] has ever discussed any diplomatic question of any importance with [the British Embassy here] and our Ambassador in London has in reality been nothing more than a consul and has never discussed major questions with the British Secretaries for Foreign Affairs. Both in London and in Moscow we are now discussing all the problems of the world freely and in the most friendly manner.|William C. Bullitt [ambassador to the Soviet Union] quoting Litvinov|4=30 July, 1934|<ref name=":1">{{Citation|author=Office of the Historian|year=1934|title=Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers|title-url=https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1934v03/d183|chapter=The Far East|section=The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State|page=741.61/428|volume=III}}</ref>}}
This development had uplifted the Soviets who believed, “…that the next step of Soviet diplomacy would be to sign a non-aggression pact with Great Britain…”  <ref name=":1" /> The British, however were most unfriendly with the Soviets and sought to put an end to one of the "most difficult problems" – the Eastern Pact.<ref name=":2">{{Citation |author=Adam Richardson |year=2022 |title=Sir Orme Sargent and British Policy Towards Europe, 1926–1949 |quote=[Sargent's] dislike of the Pact had not abated and he considered it one of the ‘most difficult problems’ facing the [Anglo-Franco discussions].
…[Sargent] believed the French liked the [Eastern Pact] as they felt it finally solved their long-running problem of security, and that they had only turned to the USSR because Britain had failed to supply the security they craved. Moveover, [Sargent] felt that the pact could have been averted by a ‘whispered assurance’ from Britain which the French would have attached more importance to than the ‘most substantial promises and pledges’ from the USSR. |city=London |publisher=Routledge |isbn=9780367201203, 9781032394923, 9780429259678 |lg=http://gen.lib.rus.ec/book/index.php?md5=123E8B76144728A47910BA6E936A74F7 |series=British Politics and Society|page=69}}</ref> They saw the Pact as an indication of lost influence over France, along with their opposing opinions on the rearmament of Germany.<ref name=":2" /><ref group="lower-alpha">The disagreements ultimately came to a head on 31 May with British Foreign Secretary, Sir John Simon and French Foreign Minister, Louis Barthou engaging in heated speeches, discussions and letters at the Disarmament Conference in Geneva. The French were concerned about security, while the British were set on rearmament and disarmament talks.</ref><ref>{{Web citation |newspaper=[[The New York Times]] |title=BARTHOU'S ATTACK AROUSES BRITISH; |date=1934-06-01 |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1934/04/30/archives/french-disclaim-encircling-policy-say-barthou-trip-to-warsaw-and.html |retrieved=2023-02-20 }}</ref> The French approached the British in July with discussions to join the pact. Instead, the British were more concerned about the French position on German rearmament. “The British government, [had] come to the conclusion that Germany might be appeased if equality of rights were granted to her,” and sought to convince France on their position.<ref name=":3" /> While France and Britain continued conversations the Soviets had received agreements to the Pact from Czechoslovakia on 2 July, Latvia and Estonia on 29 July, and Lithuania on 3 August.<ref name=":3" /><ref name=":5">{{Web citation|newspaper=Great Soviet Encyclopedia|title=«Восточный пакт»|url=http://bse.sci-lib.com/article006863.html|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211027112955/http://bse.sci-lib.com/article006863.html|archive-date=2021-10-27|retrieved=2023-02-20}}</ref>

Germany was reluctant to agree to the Pact. The British deputy under-secretary of the Foreign Office Sir Harold Orme Garton Sargent “…saw that the Germans were trying to make it appear that they were being ‘bullied’ into making a big concession with the agreement, he felt that the real reason behind Germen reluctance was a desire to keep a ‘free hand to intervene in Russia’ if an opportunity arose due to a war in the Far East.”<ref>{{Citation |author=Adam Richardson |year=2022 |title=Sir Orme Sargent and British Policy Towards Europe, 1926–1949 |quote=While Sargent saw that the Germans were trying to make it appear that they were being ‘bullied’ into making a big concession with the agreement, he felt that the real reason behind Germen reluctance was a desire to keep a ‘free hand to intervene in Russia’ if an opportunity arose due to a war in the Far East. |city=London |publisher=Routledge |isbn=9780367201203, 9781032394923, 9780429259678 |lg=http://gen.lib.rus.ec/book/index.php?md5=123E8B76144728A47910BA6E936A74F7 |series=British Politics and Society}}</ref> Finally, on 7 (10 or 11) September “…the Germans rejected the possibility of joining the Eastern Pact.”<ref>{{Citation|author=Keith Neilson|year=2010|title=Orme Sargent, Appeasement and British Policy in Europe, 1933–39|title-url=https://academic.oup.com/tcbh/article-abstract/21/1/1/1655202|page=1–28|quote=In September 1934, the Germans rejected the possibility of joining the Eastern Pact.|pdf=https://sci-hub.ru/10.1093/tcbh/hwp059|city=Oxford|publisher=Oxford University Press|doi=10.1093/tcbh/hwp059|series=Twentieth Century British History|volume=21}}</ref><ref name=":3" /> This came as positive news to Britain. They had hoped that France would not continue pursuing the Pact instead believing that given a choice between the USSR and Italy, the French would choose the latter.<ref>{{Citation|author=Adam Richardson|year=2022|title=Sir Orme Sargent and British Policy Towards Europe, 1926–1949|quote=…‘once France has a choice between co-operating with Russia and co-operating with Italy, there can be little doubt that she will infinitely prefer co-operation with Italy’. For these reasons, [Sargent] believed that the French would ‘not shed any unnecessary tears’ over the rejected plan and that the idea would quietly disappear.|city=London|publisher=Routledge|isbn=9780367201203, 9781032394923, 9780429259678|lg=http://gen.lib.rus.ec/book/index.php?md5=123E8B76144728A47910BA6E936A74F7|series=British Politics and Society}}</ref> The news came positively to Poland as well, who on 27 September also  declined joining the Pact.<ref name=":5" /> The US Ambassador to Japan, Joseph Grew's memorandum sheds light on the Soviet understanding of the environment in Europe.<ref name=":6">{{Citation|author=John G. Reid (Ed.), Louis E. Gates (Ed.), Edwin S. Costrell (Ed.), E. R. Perkins (G.Ed.), Gustave A. Nuermberger (G.Ed.)|year=1950|title=Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1934, The Far East, Volume III|title-url=https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1934v03|chapter=Chapter III: July 1–September 30, 1934|chapter-url=https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1934v03/ch3|section=Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan|page=271|quote=The Ambassador then turned to the situation in Europe and said that the Eastern Locarno Pact would undoubtedly go through but that it was not at all sure that Germany and Poland would participate therein. He thought that Poland was playing a very dangerous game and that her political intrigues might land her in a most embarrassing position especially if war should eventually break out between France and Germany. He felt that Poland was steering a very nebulous course and that her intentions was far from clear.|city=Washington|publisher=United States Government Printing Office|volume=III}}</ref> Grew recalls asking the Soviet Ambassador to Japan, Konstantin Yurenev about the Pact:
{{Quote|The Ambassador then turned to the situation in Europe and said that the Eastern Locarno Pact would undoubtedly go through but that it was not at all sure that Germany and Poland would participate therein. He thought that Poland was playing a very dangerous game and that her political intrigues might land her in a most embarrassing position especially if war should eventually break out between France and Germany. He felt that Poland was steering a very nebulous course and that her intentions was far from clear.|Joseph Grew|<ref name=":6" />|Toyko, (1934-09-07), p. 271}}

Despite the setback France did not want the Pact to die, and in November resumed negotiations with Poland.

Throughout the lead up to the war Poland continued to remain hostile to the Soviet Union, despite the increasing danger Germany presented towards it. The French Ambassador in Poland, Léon Noël wrote to French Foreign Minister commenting on the hostility;{{Quote|If, in reality, the most serious danger for Poland is Germany, "the Russian", whatever the regime to which he is subject, always appears to the Poles as "enemy n° 1": if the German remains an adversary, he is no less a European and a man of order; the Russian is, for the Pole, a barbarian, an Asian, a dissolving and corrupting element, with whom any contact would be perilous, any compromise fatal.|Léon Noël|4=1938-06-31, Warsaw, p. 975-976|<ref>{{Citation|author=Commission de publication des documents relatifs aux origines de la guerre 1939-1945|year=1974|title=Documents diplomatiques français (1932-1939)|title-url=https://bibliotheque-numerique.diplomatie.gouv.fr/ark%3A/12148/bd6t5327048d|chapter=495|chapter-url=https://bibliotheque-numerique.diplomatie.gouv.fr/ark:/12148/bd6t5327048d/f1027|page=975-976|quote=Si, dans la réalité des choses, le danger le plus sérieux pour la Pologne est constitué par l’Allemagne, « le Russe » quel que soit, du reste, le régime auquel il est soumis, apparaît toujours aux Polonais comme « l’ennemi n° 1 » : si l’Allemand reste un adversaire, il n’en est pas moins un Européen et un homme d’ordre; le Russe est, pour le Polonais, un barbare, un Asiatique, un élément dissolvant et corrupteur, avec lequel tout contact serait périlleux, toute compromission mortelle.|city=Paris|publisher=Imprimerie Nationale|series=2ème série (1936-3 sept. 1939)|volume=Tome IX (21 mars-9 juin 1938)|trans-title=Documents diplomatiques français (1932-1939)|trans-lang=French}}</ref>}}

===Anglo-Franco-Soviet Alliance===
In late March the Soviet Union began the Moscow Negotiations of 1939 proposing the formation of an Anglo-Franco-Soviet Alliance.<ref>{{Citation|author=Michael Jabara Carley|year=2019|title=Fiasco: The Anglo-Franco-Soviet Alliance That Never Was and the Unpublished British White Paper, 1939–1940|title-url=https://sci-hub.ru/https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2018.1458043|page=701-728|publisher=Routledge|doi=10.1080/07075332.2018.1458043|series=The International History Review|volume=41}}</ref><ref name=":0">{{Web citation|author=Nikos Mottas|newspaper=[[In Defense of Communism]]|title=The Truth about the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the Imperialist Propaganda|date=2016-07-21|url=http://www.idcommunism.com/2016/07/the-truth-about-molotov-ribbentrop-pact.html|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211018034318/http://www.idcommunism.com/2016/07/the-truth-about-molotov-ribbentrop-pact.html|archive-date=2021-10-18|retrieved=2022-08-30}}</ref> This alliance was rejected by the UK and France.<ref name=":0" />

===Signing the Treaty===
The threat of war in Europe – particularly against the Soviet Union – was growing. “In March 1938, Germany carried out the Anschluss of Austria, in September 1938, as a result of the Munich agreement, Czechoslovakia was divided, in April 1939, Hitler set September 1, 1939 as the date of the attack on Poland. In the East, Japan conducted military operations against the USSR and Mongolia in the area of the Khalkhin-Gol River.”<ref>{{Web citation|newspaper=Историко Документальный Департамент МИД России|title=О «ПАКТЕ МОЛОТОВА-РИББЕНТРОПА»|url=https://idd.mid.ru/ru_RU/informacionno-spravocnye-materialy/-/asset_publisher/WsjViuPpk1am/content/o-pakte-molotova-ribbentropa-|retrieved=2023-02-18|quote=В марте 1938 г. Германия осуществила аншлюс Австрии, в сентябре 1938 г. в результате Мюнхенского сговора была разделена Чехословакия, в апреле 1939 г. Гитлер определил 1 сентября 1939 г. в качестве даты нападения на Польшу. На Востоке Япония вела военные действия против СССР и Монголии в районе реки Халхин-Гол.}}</ref> Ultimately the treaty was the result of a desire by the European powers “…to turn the wolf towards other prey,” namely the Soviet Union.<ref>{{Web citation|author=Michael Jabara Carley|newspaper=Strategic Culture Foundation|title=What Poland Has to Hide About the Origins of World War II|date=2020-01-12|url=https://strategic-culture.org/news/2020/01/12/what-poland-has-to-hide-about-the-origins-of-world-war-ii/|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230126111057/https://strategic-culture.org/news/2020/01/12/what-poland-has-to-hide-about-the-origins-of-world-war-ii/|archive-date=2023-01-26|retrieved=2023-02-26}}</ref>

==Myths surrounding the treaty==

===Partition of Poland===
One of the most common myths surrounding the treaty is that the Nazis and the Soviets split Poland in two to be shared between themselves. Evidence for this, proponents claim, can be found in the so-called "secret protocols" of the treaty. According to [[Grover Furr]] however, who translated and studied the original document in Russian himself, the mention about a "partition" was actually establishing "spheres of influence" over Poland, which were not clearly defined in the document and thus were open to interpretation. These spheres of influence never came to fruition as Germany invaded Poland in 1939 regardless.

Furthermore, other evidence uncovered by Furr suggests that the Soviet Union signed the pact not to partition Poland, but rather on the premise that if the Polish Army was defeated and they and their government retreated beyond a line that the USSR and Nazi Germany agreed upon, then the Nazis would not pursue them further beyond that line.<ref>{{Web citation|author=Grover Furr|title=Did the Soviet Union Invade Poland in September 1939?|url=https://msuweb.montclair.edu/~furrg/research/mlg09/did_ussr_invade_poland.html|quote=The point here was that, if the Polish army were beaten, it and the Polish government could retreat beyond the line of Soviet interest, and so find shelter, since Hitler had agreed not to penetrate further into Poland than that line.}}</ref>

When Poland fell and its government fled (effectively rendering Poland a non-state and unable to organise a defence), the Nazis would have had free reign to position their army right to the border with the USSR. This would have not only compromised the national security of the Soviet Union, but also may have resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands if not millions more Polish Jews.<ref>{{Web citation |date=1943 |title=Russia Helped 1,750,000 Jews to Escape Nazis, Says James N. Rosenberg |newspaper=Jewish Telegraphic Agency |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210821160119/https://www.jta.org/archive/russia-helped-1750000-jews-to-escape-nazis-says-james-n-rosenberg |url=https://www.jta.org/archive/russia-helped-1750000-jews-to-escape-nazis-says-james-n-rosenberg |archive-date=2021-08-21 |retrieved=2022-10-02}}</ref> Therefore the [[Workers' and Peasants' Red Army|Red Army]] moved in to secure a buffer area as well as help evacuate civilians from the Nazis.

===Invasion of Poland===
Another common myth is that the Soviet Union invaded Poland, despite no evidence showing that Poland declared war with the Soviet Union (and vice versa), and neither the League of Nations nor any state declared that the Soviet Union invaded a member state.<ref>{{Web citation|author=Grover Furr|title=Did the Soviet Union Invade Poland in September 1939?|url=https://msuweb.montclair.edu/~furrg/research/mlg09/did_ussr_invade_poland.html|quote=The Polish government declared war on Germany when Germany invaded on September 1, 1939. It did not declare war on the USSR. […] Article 16 of the League of Nations Covenant required members to take trade and economic sanctions against any member who "resorted to war". No country took any sanctions against the USSR. No country broke diplomatic relations with the USSR over this action.}}</ref>

At the time the event was seen as necessary to prevent further German military gains, with local newspapers reporting, "Not only did cabinet spokesmen of Britain yesterday make statements implicitly justifying Russia's invasion of Poland as a necessary measure to offset German expansionism, but Britain is even now negotiating an important trade agreement with Russia, designed in part to diminish any flow of Russian exports to Germany."<ref>{{Web citation|newspaper=Times-Union|title=Turkish Pact Stirs Fresh Conferences|date=1939-10-27|url=https://fultonhistory.com/Newspaper%2024/Rochester%20NY%20Times%20Union/Rochester%20NY%20Times%20Union%201939/Rochester%20NY%20Times%20Union%201939%20a%20-%200232.pdf|retrieved=2023-02-15|quote=Not only did cabinet spokesmen of Britain yesterday make statements implicitly justifying Russia's invasion of Poland as a necessary measure to offset German expansionism, but Britain is even now negotiating an important trade agreement with Russia, designed in part to diminish any flow of Russian exports to Germany.}}</ref>

==Timeline==
Leading up to World War II, a number of European countries formed non-aggression pacts or outright military alliances with Germany in an attempt to quell invasion.
{| class="wikitable"
|+List of Non-Aggression Pacts/Military Alliances with Nazi Germany
!Signatories
!Treaty
!Date Signed
|-
|United Kingdom<br>France<br>Italy<br>Germany
|Four-Power Pact
|15 July 1933
|-
|Poland<br>Germany
|German-Polish Declaration of Non-Aggression
|26 January 1934
|-
|France<br>Germany
|Franco-German Declaration
|6 December 1938
|-
|Italy
Germany
|Pact of Steel
|22 May 1939
|-
|Denmark<br>Germany
|German-Danish Non-Aggression Pact
|31 May 1939
|-
|Estonia<br>Germany
|German-Estonian Non-Aggression Pact
|7 June 1939
|-
|Latvia<br>Germany
|German-Latvian Non-Aggression Pact
|7 June 1939
|-
|USSR<br>Germany
|Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact
|23 August 1939
|}

==References==
<references />

===Notes===
<references group="lower-alpha" />

[[Category:Debunking myths]]