Editing Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

The '''Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics''', better known as the '''Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact''', the '''Hitler–Stalin Pact''', or the '''Nazi–Soviet Pact''', was a non-aggression agreement between [[German Reich (1933–1945)|Nazi Germany]] and the [[Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (1922–1991)|Soviet Union]], signed in [[Moscow]] on the eve of the [[Second World War]] on 23 August 1939. The agreement stipulated that neither party would attack the other, nor lend its support to a power which was at war with the other. It also divided [[Europe]] into German and Soviet spheres of influence and laid the groundwork for future German-Soviet cooperation. However, the Soviet Union did not agree to "invade" [[Republic of Poland (1918–1939)|Poland]] in the treaty, nor was it an alliance as many [[Anti-communism|anti-communists]] claim. The agreement was set to expire ten years after it was signed,<ref name=":7">https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Molotov%E2%80%93Ribbentrop_Pact</ref> but was terminated prematurely on 22 June 1941, when Nazi Germany [[Operation Barbarossa|invaded the Soviet Union]].

 

Throughout most of the 1930s, the Soviet government, recognising the threat that the [[National Socialist German Workers' Party|Nazis]] posed as well as the fact that the USSR couldn't afford to fight a war with Germany on its own, pursued a policy of [[collective security]], trying to contain Germany & [[Kingdom of Italy (1861–1946)|Italy]] and build an [[Anti-war movement|anti-war]] alliance. However, all of these attempts fell through, with the [[Capitalism|capitalist]] European powers favouring a policy of [[appeasement]], and in 1939, when war was on the horizon, the Soviets reluctantly signed the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, hoping to buy time to prepare for the inevitable German–Soviet War as well as secure a buffer between it and Germany/Germany's potential allies.  

 

The [[Baltic Way]], a [[Nationalism|nationalist]] demonstration in the [[Baltic states]] (at the time part of the Soviet Union) marked the 50th anniversary of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact. [[European Day of Remembrance for Victims of Stalinism and Nazism|Black Ribbon Day]], a day of remembrance for "victims" of "[[Totalitarianism|totalitarian]]" regimes, is also observed on 23 August to commemorate the signing of the treaty. 

By January 1933 [[Adolf Hitler]] had risen to power in Germany, increasing the already tense environment in Europe. The German ambassador to the Soviet Union noted that “…the Soviet Government is concerned with the attitude and development of German policy;” With the UK, France, Italy and Germany signing the Four-Power Pact, the Soviets' concerns was not unfounded. Maxim Litvinov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs issued an invitation brought back to France by their Minister for Air, Pierre Cot for a non-aggression and mutual-aid pact. The invitation was ignored by the French government. With Germany's departure from the League of Nations and Disarmament Conference further increasing tensions the French reconsidered the proposal. French Foreign Minister Joseph Paul-Boncour and Litvinov met in Paris on 31 October to establish the principles of an alliance based on the premise that the Soviet Union would join the [[League of Nations]]. The written draft for this alliance, presented by Litvinov to Paul-Boncour on 28 December, would go on to form the basis of the Eastern Pact.

The draft of the Eastern Pact proposed extending the mutual assistance agreement to Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Baltic States. By January 1934 however, the French government had destabilised. Far-right nationalists and rioting resulting from the Stavisky affair – a financial scandal and alleged government cover-up – resulted in the liberal Prime Minister Camille Chautemps's retirement. Discussions of any pact with France were cut short. Stability within France was not seen until February with the formation of a new government. Along with the new government, a new Foreign Minister – a conservative and nationalist – Jean-Louis Barthou was employed. By the end of February the Soviets had informed France that they would agree to join the League of Nations, and were prepared to form a regional mutual security agreement.

April saw negotiations continue in Paris.<ref>{{Web citation|author=P. J. Philip|newspaper=[[The New York Times]]|title=FRENCH DISCLAIM ENCIRCLING POLICY;|date=1934-04-30|url=https://www.nytimes.com/1934/04/30/archives/french-disclaim-encircling-policy-say-barthou-trip-to-warsaw-and.html|retrieved=2023-02-19}}</ref> As Barthou was preoccupied with negotiations in Warsaw, Alexis Leger, General Secretary of the Quai d-Orsay suggested to the Soviets the inclusion of Germany. Until this point Barthou had not mentioned the Pact to the Polish Józef Piłsudski nor the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Józef Beck. From 22-25 April the French diplomat met in Warsaw with the Polish statemen, who expressed their issues with the matter.<ref name=":4">{{Web citation|newspaper=Institute of National Remembrance|title=Why did Poland reject the draft of the Eastern Pact?|date=2021-03-04|url=https://ipn.gov.pl/en/digital-resources/articles/7162,Why-did-Poland-reject-the-draft-of-the-Eastern-Pact.html|retrieved=2023-02-20|author=Sebastian Pilarski, Ph.D}}</ref> The Polish described it as an "Eastern Locarno" accusing the alliance of being an attempt to divide territories between powers.<ref group="lower-alpha">It is unclear whether this was the actual position of the Polish government at the time, or whether this is (historial revisionism) by the modern Polish state.</ref> The inclusion of Czechoslovakia and Lithuania concerned the Polish, who were fearful that disputed territories would be given to the neighbouring countries.<ref name=":4" /> In addition Poland had just signed the German-Polish Declaration of Non-Aggression and felt secure enough not to "resort" to Soviet alliances. Rather than reject the proposal, Poland added the condition that they would join if Germany also accepted.

Earlier in May, the Soviets continued try to form peace in Europe. With the resuming of the Disarmament Conference in Geneva encroaching, Litvinov proposed to [[Joseph Stalin]] on 9 May with copies to [[Vyacheslav Molotov]] and Kliment Voroshilov, that he be granted permission “…to make a proposal to turn the Conference on Disarmament into a permanent Conference of Peace.”

French Ambassador to Germany, André François-Poncet approached the German Reichsminister of Foreign Affairs, Konstantin von Neurath with this proposition in June. [Documents on German foreign policy, 1918-1945, from the archives of the German Foreign Ministry. Series D (1937-1945). Volume IV - The aftermath of Munich October 1938-March 1939.]

Again in July France presented another revised Pact agreement to Poland. A letter on 7 July from the Soviet Plenipotentiary Representative in Poland, Yakov Davydov to the Soviet People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs describes the presented proposal by Laroche to Beck.<ref>{{Web citation|author=Yakov Davydov|newspaper=Boris Yeltsin Presidental Library|title=Cipher letter from Soviet Plenipotentiary Representative in Poland Y. Davtyan to the Soviet People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs on the version of the Eastern Pact proposed by France. Certified copy.|date=1934-07-07|url=https://www.prlib.ru/en/item/1296723|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200502080746/https://www.prlib.ru/en/item/1296723|archive-date=2020-05-02|retrieved=2023-03-01}}</ref> Poland continued to remain indecisive towards the pact. A telegram from 19 July shreds some light on the Soviet need for an answer from Poland. Litvinov asks the Soviet representative in Poland if he could inquire Beck when a decision would be made by Poland on the pact. The same telegram also expresses the surprise from the Soviets about Poland's position with Germany “…we are all the more surprised by the identity of the Polish position with the German one”<ref>{{Web citation|author=Maxim Litvinov|newspaper=Boris Yeltsin Presidential Library|title=Cipher telegram from Soviet People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs M. Litvinov to Soviet Plenipotentiary Representative in Poland Y. Davtyan regarding the attitude of Germany and Poland to the idea of signing the Eastern Pact.|date=9134-07-19|url=https://www.prlib.ru/en/item/1296372|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230304072933/https://www.prlib.ru/en/item/1296372|archive-date=2023-03-04|retrieved=2023-03-02|quote=Your 9462. You can tell Beck the contents of my 6964 and ask him when you can expect to receive a final answer regarding the pact. We know that Germany's long-standing position is mainly explained by its unwillingness to re-recognize the status quo of its borders, in other words, the German-Polish border, and that we are all the more surprised by the identity of the Polish position with the German one}}</ref>

…[Sargent] believed the French liked the [Eastern Pact] as they felt it finally solved their long-running problem of security, and that they had only turned to the USSR because Britain had failed to supply the security they craved. Moveover, [Sargent] felt that the pact could have been averted by a ‘whispered assurance’ from Britain which the French would have attached more importance to than the ‘most substantial promises and pledges’ from the USSR. |city=London |publisher=Routledge |isbn=9780367201203, 9781032394923, 9780429259678 |lg=http://gen.lib.rus.ec/book/index.php?md5=123E8B76144728A47910BA6E936A74F7 |series=British Politics and Society|page=69}}</ref> They saw the Pact as an indication of lost influence over France, along with their opposing opinions on the rearmament of Germany.<ref name=":2" /><ref group="lower-alpha">The disagreements ultimately came to a head on 31 May with British Foreign Secretary, Sir John Simon and French Foreign Minister, Louis Barthou engaging in heated speeches, discussions and letters at the Disarmament Conference in Geneva. The French were concerned about security, while the British were set on rearmament and disarmament talks.</ref><ref>{{Web citation |newspaper=[[The New York Times]] |title=BARTHOU'S ATTACK AROUSES BRITISH; |date=1934-06-01 |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1934/04/30/archives/french-disclaim-encircling-policy-say-barthou-trip-to-warsaw-and.html |retrieved=2023-02-20 }}</ref> The French approached the British in July with discussions to join the pact. Instead, the British were more concerned about the French position on German rearmament. “The British government, [had] come to the conclusion that Germany might be appeased if equality of rights were granted to her,” and sought to convince France on their position.<ref name=":3" /> While France and Britain continued conversations the Soviets had received agreements to the Pact from Czechoslovakia on 2 July, Latvia and Estonia on 29 July, and Lithuania on 3 August.<ref name=":3" /><ref name=":5">{{Web citation|newspaper=Great Soviet Encyclopedia|title=«Восточный пакт»|url=http://bse.sci-lib.com/article006863.html|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211027112955/http://bse.sci-lib.com/article006863.html|archive-date=2021-10-27|retrieved=2023-02-20}}</ref>

Germany was reluctant to agree to the Pact. The British deputy under-secretary of the Foreign Office Sir Harold Orme Garton Sargent “…saw that the Germans were trying to make it appear that they were being ‘bullied’ into making a big concession with the agreement, he felt that the real reason behind Germen reluctance was a desire to keep a ‘free hand to intervene in Russia’ if an opportunity arose due to a war in the Far East.”<ref>{{Citation |author=Adam Richardson |year=2022 |title=Sir Orme Sargent and British Policy Towards Europe, 1926–1949 |quote=While Sargent saw that the Germans were trying to make it appear that they were being ‘bullied’ into making a big concession with the agreement, he felt that the real reason behind Germen reluctance was a desire to keep a ‘free hand to intervene in Russia’ if an opportunity arose due to a war in the Far East. |city=London |publisher=Routledge |isbn=9780367201203, 9781032394923, 9780429259678 |lg=http://gen.lib.rus.ec/book/index.php?md5=123E8B76144728A47910BA6E936A74F7 |series=British Politics and Society}}</ref> Finally, on 7 (10 or 11) September “…the Germans rejected the possibility of joining the Eastern Pact.”<ref>{{Citation|author=Keith Neilson|year=2010|title=Orme Sargent, Appeasement and British Policy in Europe, 1933–39|title-url=https://academic.oup.com/tcbh/article-abstract/21/1/1/1655202|page=1–28|quote=In September 1934, the Germans rejected the possibility of joining the Eastern Pact.|pdf=https://sci-hub.ru/10.1093/tcbh/hwp059|city=Oxford|publisher=Oxford University Press|doi=10.1093/tcbh/hwp059|series=Twentieth Century British History|volume=21}}</ref><ref name=":3" /> This came as positive news to Britain. They had hoped that France would not continue pursuing the Pact instead believing that given a choice between the USSR and Italy, the French would choose the latter.<ref>{{Citation|author=Adam Richardson|year=2022|title=Sir Orme Sargent and British Policy Towards Europe, 1926–1949|quote=…‘once France has a choice between co-operating with Russia and co-operating with Italy, there can be little doubt that she will infinitely prefer co-operation with Italy’. For these reasons, [Sargent] believed that the French would ‘not shed any unnecessary tears’ over the rejected plan and that the idea would quietly disappear.|city=London|publisher=Routledge|isbn=9780367201203, 9781032394923, 9780429259678|lg=http://gen.lib.rus.ec/book/index.php?md5=123E8B76144728A47910BA6E936A74F7|series=British Politics and Society}}</ref> The news came positively to Poland as well, who on 27 September also  declined joining the Pact.<ref name=":5" /> The US Ambassador to Japan, Joseph Grew's memorandum sheds light on the Soviet understanding of the environment in Europe.<ref name=":6">{{Citation|author=John G. Reid (Ed.), Louis E. Gates (Ed.), Edwin S. Costrell (Ed.), E. R. Perkins (G.Ed.), Gustave A. Nuermberger (G.Ed.)|year=1950|title=Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1934, The Far East, Volume III|title-url=https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1934v03|chapter=Chapter III: July 1–September 30, 1934|chapter-url=https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1934v03/ch3|section=Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan|page=271|quote=The Ambassador then turned to the situation in Europe and said that the Eastern Locarno Pact would undoubtedly go through but that it was not at all sure that Germany and Poland would participate therein. He thought that Poland was playing a very dangerous game and that her political intrigues might land her in a most embarrassing position especially if war should eventually break out between France and Germany. He felt that Poland was steering a very nebulous course and that her intentions was far from clear.|city=Washington|publisher=United States Government Printing Office|volume=III}}</ref> Grew recalls asking the Soviet Ambassador to Japan, Konstantin Yurenev about the Pact:

The threat of war in Europe – particularly against the Soviet Union – was growing. In March 1938, [[Anschluss|Austria was forcibly integrated into Germany]].  In September 1938, as a result of the [[Munich Agreement]], Czechoslovakia was forced to cede [[Sudetenland|some of its territory]] to Germany, and in March 1939 [[German invasion of Czechoslovakia|German troops occupied the rest of Czechoslovakia]] (with the exception of [[Slovak Republic (1939–1945)|Slovakia]], which became a German [[satellite state]]). In the East, Japan conducted military operations against the USSR and Mongolia in the area of the Khalkhin-Gol River. Ultimately the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact was the result of a desire by the [[Western Allies]] “to turn the wolf toward[s] other prey,” namely the Soviet Union.<ref>{{Web citation|author=Michael Jabara Carley|newspaper=Strategic Culture Foundation|title=What Poland Has to Hide About the Origins of World War II|date=2020-01-12|url=https://strategic-culture.org/news/2020/01/12/what-poland-has-to-hide-about-the-origins-of-world-war-ii/|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230126111057/https://strategic-culture.org/news/2020/01/12/what-poland-has-to-hide-about-the-origins-of-world-war-ii/|archive-date=2023-01-26|retrieved=2023-02-26}}</ref>

When Poland fell and its government fled (effectively rendering Poland a non-state and unable to organise a defence), the Nazis would have had free reign to position their army right to the border with the USSR. This would have not only compromised the national security of the Soviet Union, but also may have resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands if not millions more Polish Jews.<ref>{{Web citation |date=1943 |title=Russia Helped 1,750,000 Jews to Escape Nazis, Says James N. Rosenberg |newspaper=Jewish Telegraphic Agency |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210821160119/https://www.jta.org/archive/russia-helped-1750000-jews-to-escape-nazis-says-james-n-rosenberg |url=https://www.jta.org/archive/russia-helped-1750000-jews-to-escape-nazis-says-james-n-rosenberg |archive-date=2021-08-21 |retrieved=2022-10-02}}</ref> Therefore the [[Workers' and Peasants' Red Army|Red Army]] moved in to secure a buffer area as well as help evacuate civilians from the Nazis.