THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF WALMART (Original by Leigh Phillips and Michal Rozworski. Revised Edition by Comrade Milly Graha)

THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF WALMART
Author	Original by Leigh Phillips and Michal Rozworski. Revised Edition by Comrade Milly Graha
Written in	5, March, 2019. Revised 3, August, 2023
Publisher	Verso Books. Revised by USU
Type	Book
Source	https://clarion.unity-struggle-unity.org/peoples-republic-of-walmart-a-salvageable-trainwreck/

Foreword by ProleWiki

Below is an abridged version of "The People's Republic of Walmart" referred to as "The Abridged People's Republic of Walmart". Prolewiki will add original the book in time but have added the Abridged version so that people can disern the essential points of the book without needing to be bogged down in the Liberalism of the original authors, of whom, Leigh Phillips is a Zionist.

Included here also is a critique of the original book by Rachel Nagant.

https://clarion.unity-struggle-unity.org/peoples-republic-of-walmart-a-salvageable-trainwreck/

AN INTRODUCTION to ECONOMIC PLANNING, HOLD THE LIBERALISM.

By Leigh Phillips and Michal Rozworski

Revised by Comrade Milly Graham

Note From the Editor

The People’s Republic of Walmart, as originally published by Jakkkobin and Verso Books, was a text rife with internal contradiction. The information about the use of planning in capitalist firms — planning as a subordinate social form within a market economy — is well researched, highly enlightening, and, I believe, imminently important for contemporary revolutionaries to understand. At the same time, however, I could not in good conscience recommend the book to anyone as it was, because its social and political commentary was — pardon my language — quite shit. Kautskyism, Bernsteinism, Lassalleanism, Narodnikism, Proudhonism — the book had it all like a bingo card of revisionism. Writing an entirely new book would be a waste of effort (and a missed opportunity to annoy the authors), so, instead, I have liberated what I believe to be a worthwhile read, particularly for developing Marxists or for a Marxist study group. I won’t claim to have perfectly picked clean every morsel off the bones of the original text, but I think you’ll find this revised edition much more valuable nonetheless. For the most part, edits of the remaining text are stylistic rather than changes to the content, but for the sake of transparency, any sections I have added or substantively altered will be marked with a red asterisk: *

Hugs and kisses,

- Comrade Milly Graham

WHY PLANNING?

There is certainly overlap between the set of all goods and services that are useful to humanity, on the one hand, and the set of all goods and services that are profitable, on the other. You likely find underwear to be a useful product (though for commandos, this is no certainty); The Gap, meanwhile, finds it profitable to produce such a product—a happy coincidence, of which there are many. But the set of all useful things and the set of all profitable things are not in perfect correspondence. If something is profitable, even if it is not useful or is even harmful, someone will continue producing it so long as the market is left to its own devices.

Fossil fuels are a contemporary example of this irremediable, critical flaw. Wonderful though they have been due to their energy density and portability, we now know that the greenhouse gasses emitted by fossil fuel combustion will rapidly shift the planet away from an average temperature that has remained optimal for human flourishing since the last ice age. Yet, so long as governments do not intervene to curtail the use of fossil fuels and build out the clean electricity infrastructure needed to replace them, the market will continue to produce them. Likewise, it was not the market that ended production of the chlorofluorocarbons that were destroying the ozone layer; instead it was regulatory intervention—planning of a sort—that forced us to use other chemicals for our fridges and cans of hairspray, allowing that part of the stratosphere that is home to high concentrations of ultraviolet ray—deflecting tripartite oxygen molecules to largely mend itself. We could recount similar tales about how the problems of urban air pollution in most Western cities or of acid rain over the Great Lakes were solved, or how car accident mortality rates or airline crashes have declined: through active state intervention in the market to curb or transform the production of harmful—but profitable—goods and services. The impressive health and safety standards of most modern mining operations in Western countries were achieved not as a result of any noblesse oblige on the part of the owners of the companies, but rather begrudgingly, as a concession following their defeat by militant trade unions.

Conversely, if something is useful but unprofitable, it will not be produced. In the United States, for instance, there is no universal public healthcare system, though healthcare for all would certainly be wonderfully useful. But because it is not profitable, it is not produced. High-speed internet in rural areas is also not profitable, so private telecommunications companies are loath to provide it there, preferring instead to cherry-pick profitable population-dense neighborhoods. And amid a growing global crisis of antimicrobial resistance, in which microbial evolution is defeating antibiotic after antibiotic and patients are increasingly dying from routine infections, pharmaceutical companies have all but given up research into new families of the life-saving drugs, simply because they are not profitable enough.

That amputation or surgery to scrape out infected areas might return as common medical responses is not a pleasant thought. But this course of action was the only one left to the doctors of nineteen-year-old David Ricci of Seattle when they surgically removed part of his leg, following repeated infections from drug-resistant bacteria—acquired in a train accident in India—that could not be treated, even with highly toxic last resort antibiotics. Each time the infection returned, more and more of the leg had to be cut off. Although Ricci has since recovered, he has lived in perpetual fear of the reappearance of the bugs that can’t be fought. As a 2008 “call to arms” paper from the Infectious Diseases Society of America (IDSA) put it, “[Antibiotics] are less desirable to drug companies and venture capitalists because they are more successful than other drugs.” Antibiotics are successful if they kill off an infection, at which point—days or weeks, or at most months, later—the patient stops taking the drug. For chronic diseases, however, patients may have to take their medicine every day, sometimes for the rest of their lives. Thus, the paper concluded, it is long-term therapy—not cures—that drives interest in drug development. Policy proposals from the likes of the IDSA, the World Health Organization and the European Union amount to begging and bribing the pharmaceutical companies to lift a finger; but even here, however unambitious the approach, it is still external to the market. (Nationalization of the pharmaceutical industry would be cheaper, and a much more rapid and effective approach, but most pundits deem it too “radical,” giving off too much of a whiff of socialism).

Beyond this one sector, we might note that basic blue-sky research in any field simply cannot be done by the private sector, because it is extremely expensive but makes no guarantee of any return on investment. Thus research is almost entirely a phenomenon characteristic of public institutions (or at least public funding). Similarly, it was not the market that got us to the moon, but rather a little ol’ public sector enterprise called NASA. Maybe you’ve heard of it?

*Besides determining what kinds of things are produced, there is another irresolvable, fundamental problem with the market: the propensity towards crisis. The “anarchy of production,” that is, the market system, compels every capitalist, as a compulsory law, to improve his means of production, to drive down the price of his commodities with the development of labor-saving technologies. But the expansion of production inevitably grows faster than the market which must absorb its products for the capitalist to realize his investment. Try as the capitalist might to expand his markets, to expand the sphere of circulation or to drive up consumption with advertising, he will forever be stuck in a tragic “boom and bust” cycle. The forces of production created by society thus overwhelm the form of exchange of society, creating a crisis, not of scarcity, but, absurdly, of overproduction. For the biggest of capitalists, these crises are merely another opportunity to improve their accumulated horde of wealth, to buy out the failing businesses. For the rest of us in society, crisis means losing one's business, one’s job, one’s home, and all the other elements of one’s means of subsistence. It means the destruction of the means of production, or the surplus commodities, resetting the cycle back to the start. This contradiction between the forces of production and the relations of production — the systems of exchange and ownership — cannot be resolved without social revolution, without abolishing the market!

In general, criticisms of the current way of doing things propose that the market be replaced, or at least reined in. But if allocation does not proceed via the market, then it will occur via economic planning, also known as “direct allocation”—made not by the “invisible hand” but by very visible humans. Indeed, this form of planned allocation already takes place widely in our current system, on the part of elected and unelected individuals alike, by both states and private enterprises, and in centralized and decentralized forms. Even arch-capitalist America is home not only to Walmart and Amazon, but also to the Pentagon: in spite of being incredibly destructive, the US Department of Defense is the single-largest employer in the world, and a centrally planned public sector operation. In fact, almost all countries are, to varying degrees, “mixed” economies, making use of both markets and planning.

Indeed, planning has accompanied human societies as long as they have existed. Thousands of years ago, the civilizations of ancient Mesopotamia created a nexus of economic institutions that connected the workshops and temples of the cities to peasant agricultural production in the countryside. The Third Dynasty of Ur (Ur III), which flourished around the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers near the end of the third millennium BCE, was among the first to make the breakthrough to widespread permanent record keeping. Clay tablets from Ur III include predictions of crop yields based on averages of soil quality, themselves derived from years of record keeping. Even though the economy was still at the mercy of uncontrollable weather, it could be managed at a rudimentary level. With the advent of detailed accounts, expectations and approximations—both crucial to planning— became features of economic life. Unlike the localized gift-exchange economy of prehistory, ancient Mesopotamia saw systems of centralized redistribution that mimic today’s welfare states: taxes and levies in, transfers of goods and services out.

Increasingly complex economic record-keeping, accounting and social institutions all point to early ancient civilizations producing something that cannot but be described as economic calculation and planning. This is not to say there was some Arcadia of central planning at this time, any more than it is accurate to describe hunter-gatherer society as some peaceful egalitarian Eden. The planning of the ancients was not only rudimentary and partial; it was also far from being a rational way of securing the shared benefit of all. Indeed, ancient planning was at the service of an economic system created for the benefit of a small coterie of elites who were motivated to maintain their wealth and power. Sound familiar?

There is not only a crying need for us to talk about what an alternative to the market would be, but also a great deal of confusion about what planning is and its history. To take one example: China appears to be the last man standing in the global economy; its growth rates, even if they have declined recently from eye popping to merely gobsmacking, have been achieved through an admixture of free market mechanisms and very heavy shepherding by central planners and party-state managers. It seems even some members of the ascendant bourgeoisie in that country believe that Mao’s economic planning was less mistaken than premature. A 2018 Financial Times feature describes Jack Ma, founder of the Chinese e-commerce colossus Alibaba Group, as part of a growing movement in the People’s Republic who argue that “the fatal flaw of state planning was simply that planners did not have enough information to make good decisions.” He and his co-thinkers believe that “big data” can solve this problem. Could he be right?

In such volatile times, it cannot be ruled out that a socialist revolution might, within our lifetimes, burst forth even within the capitalist heartlands, within the belly of world imperialism. If we do not take pains to sketch out ahead of time what an alternative to the market might look like, those involved will inevitably fall back on versions of what they already know. The capitalist-realist earworm, like the Ceti eel in Star Trek II: The Wrath of Khan, remains wrapped around our cerebral cortex, foreclosing the possibility of transformation even at the moment of its realization.

The time, then, is as ripe as browning avocados on toast to uncover a very old conversation: a long-standing but largely forgotten argument over the question of planning. Our aim is not to offer a comprehensive, definitive survey of this almost century-long discussion, which economists refer to as the “economic calculation debate” (or “socialist calculation debate”)—whether it is mathematically and physically possible to plan an economy, and whether this is desirable—but to provide a plain-language, hopefully even enjoyable, introduction for the uninitiated. In the main, we aim here to bring together and make more easily comprehensible ideas and findings that have been forgotten or are otherwise jargon filled, mathematical, or computer science-oriented, or which lie buried in the pages of little-read operations research or business-management journals. Thus, we lean heavily on the work of economic historians, computer scientists and scholars of commerce. In writing a primer on planning, and on the challenge of logistics and economic calculation, we hope to take this vital debate down from moldering academy shelves and reintroduce it into the field of live political combat.

Above all, our goal with this brief text is simply to flag a rarely recognized, yet obvious, fact that in some sense makes the “calculation debate” anachronistic: it is already the case that great swaths of the global economy are planned. Walmart is a prime example. Thus the question as to whether planning can exist at large scales without crippling economic inefficiencies could be moot. There might be no single machine that we can simply take over, run them with new operators but otherwise leave them unchanged; but there is a foundation of planning that a more just society could surely take up and make its own.

This is not so much a book about a future society, but one about our own. We plan. And it works.

COULD WALMART BE A SECRET SOCIALIST PLOT?

Could Walmart be a secret socialist plot? This is, in effect, the question that Fredric Jameson, American literary critic, Marxist political theorist, and cheeky devil, all too briefly poses in a footnote to his 2005 volume Archaeologies of the Future, a discussion of the nature of utopia in the age of globalization. Mr Jameson, gleefully poking at the progressive consensus that regards Walmart as a globe-barnacling chain of retail hypermarkets, the Galactus of capitalism, the beau idéal—perhaps more so even than Goldman Sachs—of everything that is wrong with everything that is wrong, Jameson wonders whether we might in fact be missing a trick about this transcontinental marvel of planning and logistics:

The literary utopists have scarcely kept pace with the businessmen in the process of imagination and construction…ignoring a global infrastructural deployment in which, from this quite different perspective, the Walmart celebrated by Friedman becomes the very anticipatory prototype of some new form of socialism for which the reproach of centralization now proves historically misplaced and irrelevant. It is in any case certainly a revolutionary reorganization of capitalist production, and some acknowledgment such as “Waltonism” or “Walmartification” would be a more appropriate name for this new stage.

But beyond these comments, the provocation is not fully developed. He lets the suggestion just hang there until the publication five years later of an essay on the subject: “Walmart as Utopia.” Here, he insists more full-throatedly that Walmart is not merely a useful institution from which, “after the revolution,” progressives could (per Lenin) “lop off what capitalistically mutilates this excellent apparatus.” It is not residual of the old society, he says, but rather something truly emergent of the new one yet to be born. Walmart is “the shape of a Utopian future looming through the mist, which we must seize as an opportunity to exercise the Utopian imagination more fully, rather than an occasion for moralizing judgments or regressive nostalgia.” *Jameson could be right in all but one way: if the seeds of a future social form are truly growing within the soil of the biggest capitalist firms, then this is no “utopia,” no arbitrary pipedream, but a very concrete sneak peak at the “real movement” of history.

Jameson compares the emergence of this novel entity to the discovery of a new species of organism, or of a new strain of virus. He delights at the apparent contradiction of how the largest company in the world, even in its full-spectrum dominance—indeed precisely because of this omnipotence—is described by admiring, horrified business writers as a boa constrictor slowly but inexorably strangling market capitalism. But even here, Jameson is still mostly interested in using Walmart as a thought experiment—a demonstration of “the dialectical character of the new reality,” and an example of the notion within dialectics of the unity of opposites: the firm as “the purest expression of that dynamic of capitalism which devours itself, which abolishes the market by means of the market itself.”

Such philosophical flourishes are more than worthwhile, but we are curious about something perhaps a measure more concrete. We want to take Jameson’s provocation beyond a footnote or a thought experiment and, in the light of what we know about Walmart’s operations, revisit a nearly century-old argument between those who favored socialism and those who asserted that capitalism offered the best of all possible worlds. For beneath the threadbare cliché of the maxim that socialism is “fine in theory, but impossible in practice,” there in fact lie claims about economic planning, and about how to calculate an egalitarian distribution of goods and services without need for markets.

Furthermore, the appearance that these claims have been settled by the defeat of the Communist bloc is merely superficial. And counterintuitive as it may seem at first, the infamously undemocratic Walmart, and a handful of other examples we will consider, offer powerful encouragement to the socialist hypothesis that a planned economy—democratically coordinated by ordinary working people, no less—is not merely feasible, but more efficient than the market.

But before we begin to explain how Walmart is the answer, we first have to ask: What is the question?

The Socialist Calculation Debate

Since the neoliberal revolution of the 1970s and its acceleration following the end of the Cold War, economic planning at scale has been widely derided from right to center-left, and planned endeavors such as public healthcare have been under attack from marketization in most countries. In most jurisdictions, the electricity systems that were once in public hands have long since been privatized; therefore governments committed to efforts to decarbonize electricity companies have had little choice but to employ market mechanisms such as emissions trading or carbon taxation, rather than reducing greenhouse gas emissions via democratic fiat—that is, simply ordering the electricity provider to switch to non-emitting fuel sources. Almost everywhere, transportation, communication, education, prisons, policing and even emergency services are being spun off wholly or in part from the public sector and provided instead by market actors. Only the armed forces remain a state monopoly, and here only up to a point, given the rise of private security multinationals such as the notorious G4S and Blackwater (rebranded as Academi since 2011). The handful of social democratic and liberal parties that still defend public healthcare and public education do so while making vague assertions that “government has a role to play” or that “government can be a force for good,” but they don’t really say why. Social democrats today will argue for a mixed economy, or for a mixture of state planning and the market—but again, they do so without saying why. If planning is superior, then why not plan everything? But if some goods and services are better produced by the market than by planning, then what are the attributes of these particular goods and services that make them so? All this activity and argument empty of actual argument reflects a set of policies enacting surrender to an unchangeable status quo, the architects of which only retroactively attempt to transform such capitulation into a coherent ideology. For much of social democracy in the twenty-first century, beliefs follow from policies, rather than policies from beliefs. And while those centrists and conservatives who cheerlead the market stop short of advocating a world where everything is allocated via markets, they still do not offer arguments explaining why their preferred admixture of market and planning is superior. When challenged, they simply describe the current state of affairs: “No economy is completely planned or completely market-based.”

Well, plainly this is true. But again, this gives no explanation as to why their favored configuration is optimal.

Perhaps this is understandable. It seems, at first glance, almost manifest that the market won the Cold War and that planning lost. Yet if the market is conclusively, unassailably, incontestably the optimal mechanism for the allocation of goods and services, then why have the economies of Western nations continued to experience mismatches between what is produced and what is required—mismatches that have led to severe recessions and near-catastrophic economic crises since 1991? Why was the global economy barely (and likely temporarily) saved from a Depression-scale collapse in investment in 2008, not by market mechanisms, but as a result of (modest) Keynesian pump priming? What is the source of economic stagnation since the Great Recession? Why, after three decades of steady decreases in inequality in the West in the post-war period leading up to the 1970s, has inequality in the developed countries grown over the last forty years, triggering an explosion in popular anger, along with hard-right reaction, in country after country? And why can’t the market, left to its own devices, meet the civilizationally existential challenge of climate change? So the question of market versus planning should appear as unresolved as ever.

In the early decades of the last century, the question of whether the market or planning is the optimal mechanism for the allocation of goods and services was widely accepted as unanswered. In the 1920s and 1930s, left-wing economists influenced by Marxism, on the one hand, and rightwing economists of the neoclassical Austrian School, on the other, were engaged in a vigorous discussion—subsequently known as the “economic calculation problem”—over whether economic planning at scale was feasible. At the time, neoclassicals were not arguing from a position of ideological hegemony. The Soviet Union had recently been established, and the war efforts of both the Allies and the Central Powers were expansive exercises in central planning. By the 1930s, the Bolsheviks had rapidly launched a feudal Russia into electrified, industrial modernity, meaning economists who would criticize planning would have to counter what appeared to be substantial evidence in its favor. As a result, partisans on both sides took the idea of planning seriously, and the Austrians had to work hard to try to prove their point, to show how economic planning was an impossibility.

Ludwig von Mises, Austrian School economist and hero of latter-day neoliberals, launched the first counter-volley against the advocates of planning. In his seminal 1920 essay “Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth,” Mises posed the following questions: In any economy larger than the primitive family level, how could socialist planning boards know which products to produce, how much of each should be produced at each stage, and which raw materials should be used and how much of them? Where should production be located, and which production process was most efficient? How would they gather and calculate this vast array of information, and how could it then be retransmitted back to all actors in the economy? The answer, he said, is that the mammoth scale of information needed—for producers, consumers and every actor in between, and for every stage and location of production of the multitude of products needed in society—is beyond the capacity of such planning boards. No human process could possibly gather all the necessary data, assess it in real time, and produce plans that accurately describe supply and demand across all sectors. Therefore, any economy the size of an entire country that tried to replace the myriad decisions from the multitude of sovereign consumers with the plans of bureaucrats working from incorrigibly flawed data would regularly produce vast, chasm-like mismatches between what is demanded and what is supplied.

These inefficiencies would result in such social and economic barbarities—shortages, starvation, frustration and chaos—that even if one accepts the inevitability of inequalities and attendant myriad other horrors of capitalism, the market will still appear benign by comparison.

Meanwhile, Mises argued that the extraordinarily simple mechanism of prices in the market, reflecting the supply and demand of resources, already contains all this information. Every aspect of production—from the cost of all inputs at all times, to the locations of inputs and products, and the changing demands and taste of purchasers—is implicitly captured by price.

There is much more to the calculation debate, and we’ll briefly outline some of the additional mathematical and computational aspects later on, but for now this theoretical standoff should suffice. It is enough to know that as a result of this impasse, depending on our political persuasions, we have opted either for the information imperfections of the market, or for the information imperfections of planning, without ever resolving the debate. The stalemate could even be tweeted in less than 140 characters: “What about data imperfections leading to shortages?” “Oh yeah? Well what about data imperfections leading to injustices?”

Thus we are stuck. Or so it has seemed for a long time.

Planning in Practice

Walmart is perhaps the best evidence we have that while planning appears not to work in Mises’s theory, it certainly does in practice. And then some. Founder Sam Walton opened his first store, Wal-Mart Discount City, on July 2, 1962, in the non-city of Rogers, Arkansas, population 5,700. From that clichédly humble, East Bumphuck beginning, Walmart has gone on to become the largest company in the world, enjoying eye-watering, People’s Republic of China–sized cumulative average growth rates of 8 percent during its five and a half decades. Today, it employs more workers than any other private firm; if we include state enterprises in our ranking, it is the world’s third-largest employer after the US Department of Defense and the People’s Liberation Army. If it were a country—let’s call it the People’s Republic of Walmart—its economy would be roughly the size of a Sweden or a Switzerland. Using the 2015 World Bank country-by-country comparison of purchasing-power parity GDP, we could place it as the 38th largest economy in the world.

Yet while the company operates within the market, internally, as in any other firm, everything is planned. There is no internal market. The different departments, stores, trucks and suppliers do not compete against each other in a market; everything is coordinated. Walmart is not merely a planned economy, but a planned economy on the scale of the USSR smack in the middle of the Cold War. (In 1970, Soviet GDP clocked in at about $800 billion in today’s money, then the second-largest economy in the world; Walmart’s 2017 revenue was $485 billion.)

As we will see, Walmart’s suppliers cannot really be considered external entities, so the full extent of its planned economy is larger still. According to Supply Chain Digest, Walmart stocks products from more than seventy nations, operating some 11,000 stores in twenty-seven countries. TradeGecko, an inventory-management software firm, describes the Walmart system as “one of history’s greatest logistical and operational triumphs.” They’re not wrong. As a planned economy, it’s beating the Soviet Union at its height before stagnation set in.

Yet if Mises and friends were right, then Walmart should not exist. The firm should long since have hit their wall of too many calculations to make. Moreover, Walmart is not unique; there are hundreds of multinational companies whose size is on the same order of magnitude as Sam Walton’s behemoth, and they too are all, at least internally, planned economies.

In 1970, Walmart opened its first distribution center, and five years later, the company leased an IBM 370/135 computer system to coordinate stock control, making it one of the first retailers to electronically link up store and warehouse inventories. It may seem strange now, but prior to this time, stores were largely stocked directly by vendors and wholesalers, rather than using distributors. Large retailers sell thousands of products from thousands of vendors. But direct stockage—sending each product directly to each store—was profoundly inefficient, leading to regular over- or understocks. Even smaller retailers, who cannot afford their own distribution centers, today find it more efficient to outsource distribution center functions to a logistics firm that provides this service for multiple companies.

Logistical outsourcing happens because it would be far too expensive in terms of labor costs for one tiny store to be able to maintain a commercial relationship with thousands of record labels, and vice versa; but that store can have a relationship with, say, five distributors, each of whom have a relationship with, say, a hundred labels. The use of distributors also minimizes inventory costs while maximizing the variety that a store can offer, at the same time offering everyone along the supply chain a more accurate knowledge of demand. So while your local shop may not carry albums from Hello Kitty Pencil Case Records, via the magic of distributors, your tiny local shop will have a relationship with more record labels than they otherwise could.

In 1988, Procter & Gamble, the detergents and toiletries giant, introduced the stocking technique of continuous replenishment, partnering first with Schnuck Markets, a chain of St. Louis grocery stores. Their next step was to find a large firm to adopt the idea, and they initially shopped it to Kmart, which was not convinced. Walmart, however, embraced the concept, and thus it was that the company’s path to global domination truly began.

“Continuous replenishment” is a bit of a misnomer, as the system actually provides merely very frequent restocking (from the supplier to the distributor and thence the retailer), in which the decision on the amount and the timing of replenishment lies with the supplier, not the retailer. The technique, a type of vendor-managed inventory, works to minimize what businesses call the “bullwhip effect.” First identified in 1961, the bullwhip effect describes the phenomenon of increasingly wild swings in mismatched inventories against product demand the further one moves along the supply chain toward the producer, ultimately extending to the company’s extraction of raw materials. Therein, any slight change in customer demand reveals a discord between what the store has and what the customers want, meaning there is either too much stock or too little.

To illustrate the bullwhip effect, let’s consider the “too-little” case. The store readjusts its orders from the distributor to meet the increase in customer demand. But by this time, the distributor has already bought a certain amount of supply from the wholesaler, and so it has to readjust its own orders from the wholesaler—and so on, through to the manufacturer and the producer of the raw materials. Because customer demand is often fickle and its prediction involves some inaccuracy, businesses will carry an inventory buffer called “safety stock.” Moving up the chain, each node will observe greater fluctuations, and thus greater requirements for safety stock. One analysis performed in the 1990s assessed the scale of the problem to be considerable: a fluctuation at the customer end of just 5 percent (up or down) will be interpreted by other supply chain participants as a shift in demand of up to 40 percent.

Just like the wave that travels along an actual bullwhip following a small flick of the wrist, a small change in behavior at one end results in massive swings at the other. Data in the system loses its fidelity to realworld demand, and the further you move away from the consumer, the more unpredictable demand appears to be. This unpredictability in either direction is a major contributing factor to economic crisis as companies struggle (or fail) to cope with situations of overproduction, having produced much more than they predicted would be demanded and being unable to sell what they have produced above its cost. Insufficient stock can be just as disruptive as overstock, leading to panic buying, reduced trustworthiness by customers, contractual penalties, increased costs resulting from training and layoffs (due to unnecessary hiring and firing), and ultimately loss of contracts, which can sink a company. While there is of course a great deal more to economic crisis than the bullwhip effect, the inefficiencies and failures produced by the bullwhip effect can be key causes, rippling throughout the system and producing instability in other sectors. Even with modest cases of the bullwhip effect, preventing such distortions can allow reduced inventory, reduced administration costs, and improved customer service and customer loyalty, ultimately delivering greater profits.

But there’s a catch—a big one for those who defend the market as the optimal mechanism for allocation of resources: the bullwhip effect is, in principle, eliminated if all orders match demand perfectly for any period. And the greater the transparency of information throughout the supply chain, the closer this result comes to being achieved. Thus, planning, and above all trust, openness and cooperation along the supply chain—rather than competition—are fundamental to continuous replacement. This is not the “kumbaya” analysis of two utopian writers; even the most hard-hearted commerce researchers and company directors argue that a prerequisite of successful supply chain management is that all participants in the chain recognize that they all will gain more by cooperating as a trusting, information-sharing whole than they will as competitors.

The seller, for example, is in effect telling the buyer how much he will buy. The retailer has to trust the supplier with restocking decisions. Manufacturers are responsible for managing inventories in Walmart’s warehouses. Walmart and its suppliers have to agree when promotions will happen and by how much, so that increased sales are recognized as an effect of a sale or marketing effort, and not necessarily as a big boost in demand. And all supply chain participants have to implement data-sharing technologies that allow for real-time flow of sales data, distribution center withdrawals and other logistical information so that everyone in the chain can rapidly make adjustments.

*In short, one of the pitfalls of a perfectly competitive market is that information about the rest of the economy is unavailable to each link in a chain of mutually dependent firms. There’s an analogous pitfall in computer science known as “greedy algorithms.” In a greedy algorithm, one assumes that if they always pick the locally optimal choice at each intermediate branch in a tree of possibilities, then one will eventually reach the globally optimal value. Say, for example, I want to get home in the shortest distance possible, but I have several streets I can go down. If I always take the shortest road that I can see in front of me without ever looking ahead to see if I might reach a dead end or a detour, I am likely to actually extend my trip home. On the other hand, if I had knowledge about the relationships and distances between all the roads, I could plan the shortest trip home even if it meant, at particular steps, choosing the longer of two roads. Like a mature adult capable of delaying gratification, I am able to make a short term sacrifice now to yield a bigger reward later. But, by contrast, our acquaintance the market is rather like a child that keeps failing the marshmallow test; it is a “greedy algorithm” in that it might produce locally optimal solutions (say, for a particular firm), but it will never produce the globally optimal solution (the solution that maximizes utility and minimizes costs for all of society). But market actors are not merely naive, without knowledge about the rest of the “map,” they simply have no choice but to pick the greedy method.

We hear a lot about how Walmart crushes suppliers into delivering at a particular price point, as the company is so vast that it is worth it from the supplier’s perspective to have the product stocked by the store. And this is true: Walmart engages in what it calls “strategic sourcing” to identify who can supply the behemoth at the volume and price needed. But once a supplier is in the club, there are significant advantages. (Or perhaps “in the club” is the wrong phrasing; “once a supplier is assimilated by the WalmartBorg” might be better.) One is that the company sets in place long-term, high-volume strategic partnerships with most suppliers. The resulting data transparency and cross–supply chain planning decrease expenditures on merchandising, inventory, logistics, and transportation for all participants in the supply chain, not just for Walmart. While there are indeed financial transactions within the supply chain, resource allocation among Walmart’s vast network of global suppliers, warehouses and retail stores is regularly described by business analysts as more akin to behaving like a single firm.

Flipping all this around, Hau Lee, a Stanford engineering and management science professor, describes how the reverse can happen within a single firm, to deleterious effect. Volvo at one point was stuck with a glut of green cars. So the marketing department came up with an advertising and sales wheeze that was successful in provoking more purchases by consumers and reducing the inventory surplus. But they never told manufacturing, and so seeing the boost in sales, manufacturing thought there had been an increase in demand for green cars and cranked up production of the very thing that sales had been trying to offload.

The same phenomenon occurs in retail as much as it does manufacturing (and manufacturing is merely another link within the retail supply chain anyway), with Toyota being one of the first firms to implement intra- and inter-firm information visibility through its Walmartlike “Kanban” system, although the origin of this strategy dates as far back as the 1940s. While Walmart was pivotal in development of supply chain management, there are few large companies that have not copied its practices via some form of cross–supply chain visibility and planning, extending the planning that happens within a firm very widely throughout the capitalist “marketplace.”

Nevertheless, Walmart may just be the most dedicated follower of this “firmification” of supply chains. In the 1980s, the company began dealing directly with manufacturers to reduce the number of links within, and to more efficiently oversee, the supply chain. In 1995, Walmart further ramped up its cooperative supply chain approach under the moniker Collaborative Planning, Forecasting and Replenishment (CPFR), in which all nodes in the chain collaboratively synchronize their forecasts and activities. As technology has advanced, the company has used CPFR to further enhance supply chain cooperation, from being the first to implement company-wide use of universal product bar codes to its more troubled relationship with radio-frequency ID tagging. Its gargantuan, satellite-connected Retail Link database connects demand forecasts with suppliers and distributes real-time sales data from cash registers all along the supply chain. Analysts describe how stockage and manufacture is “pulled,” almost moment-to-moment, by the consumer, rather than “pushed” by the company onto shelves. All of this hints at how economic planning on a massive scale is being realized in practice with the assistance of technological advance, even as the wrangling of its infinities of data—according to Mises and his co-thinkers in the calculation debate—are supposed to be impossible to overcome.

Sears’s Randian Dystopia

It is no small irony that one of Walmart’s main competitors, the venerable, 120-plus-year-old Sears, Roebuck & Company, destroyed itself by embracing the exact opposite of Walmart’s galloping socialization of production and distribution: by instituting an internal market.

The Sears Holdings Corporation reported losses of some $2 billion in 2016, and some $10.4 billion in total since 2011, the last year that the business turned a profit. In the spring of 2017, it was in the midst of closing another 150 stores, in addition to the 2,125 already shuttered since 2010— more than half its operation—and had publicly acknowledged “substantial doubt” that it would be able to keep any of its doors open for much longer. The stores that remain open, often behind boarded-up windows, have the doleful air of late-Soviet retail desolation: leaking ceilings, inoperative escalators, acres of empty shelves, and aisles shambolically strewn with abandoned cardboard boxes half-filled with merchandise. A solitary brand new size-9 black sneaker lies lonesome and boxless on the ground, its partner neither on a shelf nor in a storeroom. Such employees as remain have taken to hanging bedsheets as screens to hide derelict sections from customers.

The company has certainly suffered in the way that many other brick-and-mortar outlets have in the face of the challenge from discounters such as Walmart and from online retailers like Amazon. But the consensus among the business press and dozens of very bitter former executives is that the overriding cause of Sears’s malaise is the disastrous decision by the company’s chairman and CEO, Edward Lampert, to disaggregate the company’s different divisions into competing units: to create an internal market.

From a capitalist perspective, the move appears to make sense. As business leaders never tire of telling us, the free market is the fount of all wealth in modern society. Competition between private companies is the primary driver of innovation, productivity and growth. Greed is good, per Gordon Gekko’s oft-quoted imperative from Wall Street. So one can be excused for wondering why it is, if the market is indeed as powerfully efficient and productive as they say, that all companies did not long ago adopt the market as an internal model.

Lampert, libertarian and fan of the laissez-faire egotism of Russian American novelist Ayn Rand, had made his way from working in warehouses as a teenager, via a spell with Goldman Sachs, to managing a $15 billion hedge fund by the age of 41. The wunderkind was hailed as the Steve Jobs of the investment world. In 2003, the fund he managed, ESL Investments, took over the bankrupt discount retail chain Kmart (launched the same year as Walmart). A year later, he parlayed this into a $12 billion buyout of a stagnating (but by no means troubled) Sears.

At first, the familiar strategy of merciless, life-destroying post-acquisition cost cutting and layoffs did manage to turn around the fortunes of the merged Kmart-Sears, now operating as Sears Holdings. But Lampert’s big wheeze went well beyond the usual corporate raider tales of asset stripping, consolidation and chopping-block use of operations as a vehicle to generate cash for investments elsewhere. Lampert intended to use Sears as a grand free market experiment to show that the invisible hand would outperform the central planning typical of any firm.

He radically restructured operations, splitting the company into thirty, and later forty, different units that were to compete against each other. Instead of cooperating, as in a normal firm, divisions such as apparel, tools, appliances, human resources, IT and branding were now in essence to operate as autonomous businesses, each with their own president, board of directors, chief marketing officer and statement of profit or loss. An eye-popping 2013 series of interviews by Bloomberg Businessweek investigative journalist Mina Kimes with some forty former executives described Lampert’s Randian calculus: “If the company’s leaders were told to act selfishly, he argued, they would run their divisions in a rational manner, boosting overall performance.”

He also believed that the new structure, called Sears Holdings Organization, Actions, and Responsibilities, or SOAR, would improve the quality of internal data, and in so doing that it would give the company an edge akin to statistician Paul Podesta’s use of unconventional metrics at the Oakland Athletics baseball team (made famous by the book, and later film starring Brad Pitt, Moneyball). Lampert would go on to place Podesta on Sears’s board of directors and hire Steven Levitt, coauthor of the pop neoliberal economics bestseller Freakonomics, as a consultant. Lampert was a laissez-faire true believer. He never seems to have got the memo that the story about the omnipotence of the free market was only ever supposed to be a tale told to frighten young children, and not to be taken seriously by any corporate executive.

And so if the apparel division wanted to use the services of IT or human resources, they had to sign contracts with them, or alternately to use outside contractors if it would improve the financial performance of the unit— regardless of whether it would improve the performance of the company as a whole. Kimes tells the story of how Sears’s widely trusted appliance brand, Kenmore, was divided between the appliance division and the branding division. The former had to pay fees to the latter for any transaction. But selling non-Sears-branded appliances was more profitable to the appliances division, so they began to offer more prominent in-store placement to rivals of Kenmore products, undermining overall profitability. Its in-house tool brand, Craftsman—so ubiquitous an American trademark that it plays a pivotal role in a Neal Stephenson science fiction bestseller, Seveneves, 5,000 years in the future—refused to pay extra royalties to the in-house battery brand DieHard, so they went with an external provider, again indifferent to what this meant for the company’s bottom line as a whole.

Executives would attach screen protectors to their laptops at meetings to prevent their colleagues from finding out what they were up to. Units would scrap over floor and shelf space for their products. Screaming matches between the chief marketing officers of the different divisions were common at meetings intended to agree on the content of the crucial weekly circular advertising specials. They would fight over key positioning, aiming to optimize their own unit’s profits, even at another unit’s expense, sometimes with grimly hilarious results. Kimes describes screwdrivers being advertised next to lingerie, and how the sporting goods division succeeded in getting the Doodle Bug mini-bike for young boys placed on the cover of the Mothers’ Day edition of the circular. As for different divisions swallowing lower profits, or losses, on discounted goods in order to attract customers for other items, forget about it. One executive quoted in the Bloomberg investigation described the situation as “dysfunctionality at the highest level.”

As profits collapsed, the divisions grew increasingly vicious toward each other, scrapping over what cash reserves remained. Squeezing profits still further was the duplication in labor, particularly with an increasingly top-heavy repetition of executive function by the now-competing units, which no longer had an interest in sharing costs for shared operations. With no company-wide interest in maintaining store infrastructure, something instead viewed as an externally imposed cost by each division, Sears’s capital expenditure dwindled to less than 1 percent of revenue, a proportion much lower than that of most other retailers.

Ultimately, the different units decided to simply take care of their own profits, the company as a whole be damned. One former executive, Shaunak Dave, described a culture of “warring tribes,” and an elimination of cooperation and collaboration. One business press wag described Lampert’s regime as “running Sears like the Coliseum.” Kimes, for her part, wrote that if there were any book to which the model conformed, it was less Atlas Shrugged than it was The Hunger Games.

Thus, many who have abandoned ship describe the harebrained free market shenanigans of the man they call “Crazy Eddie” as a failed experiment for one reason above all else: the model kills cooperation.

“Organizations need a holistic strategy,” according to the former head of the DieHard battery unit, Erik Rosenstrauch. Indeed they do. And, after all, what is society if not one big organization? Is this lesson any less true for the global economy than it is for Sears? To take just one example: the continued combustion of coal, oil and gas may be a disaster for our species as a whole, but so long as it remains profitable for some of Eddie’s “divisions,” those responsible for extracting and processing fossil fuels, these will continue to act in a way that serves their particular interests, the rest of the company—or in this case the rest of society—be damned.

In the face of all this evidence, Lampert is, however, unrepentant, proclaiming, “Decentralised systems and structures work better than centralised ones because they produce better information over time.” For him, the battles between divisions within Sears can only be a good thing. According to spokesman Steve Braithwaite, “Clashes for resources are a product of competition and advocacy, things that were sorely lacking before and are lacking in socialist economies.”

He and those who are sticking with the plan seem to believe that the conventional model of the firm via planning amounts to communism. They might not be entirely wrong.

Interestingly, the creation of SOAR was not the first time the company had played around with an internal market. Under an earlier leadership, the company had for a short time experimented along similar lines in the 1990s, but it quickly abandoned the disastrous approach after it produced only infighting and consumer confusion. There are a handful of other companies that also favor some version of an internal market, but in general, according to former vice president of Sears, Gary Schettino, it “isn’t a management strategy that’s employed in a lot of places.” Thus, the most ardent advocates of the free market—the captains of industry—prefer not to employ market-based allocation within their own organizations.

Just why this is so is a paradox that conservative economics has attempted to account for since the 1930s—an explanation that its adherents feel is watertight. But as we shall see in the next chapter, taken to its logical conclusion, their explanation of this phenomenon that lies at the very heart of capitalism once again provides an argument for planning the whole of the economy.