In the Roundtable Discussion about the Assault on the Moncada Barracks (Fidel Castro)

In the Roundtable Discussion about the Assault on the Moncada Barracks
Author	Fidel Castro
Spoken on	2000-07-24
Type	Speech
Source	Translated from Spanish

Foreword by ProleWiki

This speech from Fidel Castro was translated by ProleWiki, from the original transcription, in April 2024.

Our translation is released under CC-BY-SA 4.0.

Speech

The problem is that I was listening to the Roundtable like everyone else on television, but I didn't know you were going to address these topics, and suddenly I see you asking a question; one person interprets it one way, another person another way, and then I'm left thinking, darn it, if I'm still here, I can say something, I can mention some of the things that happened or some of the ideas, some conceptions. That's why I came quickly, I was listening to the program on the radio, just a little bit here I didn't hear when I had to take the elevator to get here. I felt the desire to have been here from the beginning, but I didn't know you were going to cover these topics and details.

I decided to come, I sat there, and then when you took a break, I came over here. From what I heard, it seems like some elements are missing.

Pedro knows more details than I do about the Sierra Maestra, and he has also studied all of this, knows the names and such. The strategic conception you laid out here, that's a point where I think I'm quite familiar.

There's something that hasn't been mentioned, for example, that all of us were dressed in military attire, did someone mention that? (...) that's the part I didn't hear. Because the conception is closely associated with the idea we had of using total surprise factor.

It was truly difficult, extremely difficult for us to do what we did without a single failure occurring; that is to say, from the moment we organized the Movement, from the moment we acquired the weapons, from the moment we transported them, within 24 hours we transported the bulk of the weapons, and Melba and Haydee were the main responsible ones. Because the weapons were carried in suitcases, mainly by train. They coordinated everything there with Renato, but there was a moment, some suitcases that were so heavy, that's where the anecdote or the story comes in that some soldiers at the Santiago de Cuba terminal helped Yeye and Melba carry a very heavy suitcase, did you know that? But as Pedro says, there's no time to tell things, that detail is very important to us, we were going to give a total surprise, and everything was done, you could say, for months for the total surprise.

They were asking about the conception: when the Coup d'état occurred, we thought that everyone would unite to fight against Batista, it seemed logical, it seemed elementary, and so we began to prepare. I had a few friends, and I started working with them within the orthodox youth, where I knew quite a few people. I started organizing, let's say, combat groups, combat cells, thinking that one day there would be unity. The idea was to participate with others in the overthrow of Batista, more than from the first day, we had already had a plan, we started organizing and organizing and organizing. And over time, as months of intense work passed, we had organized and trained twelve hundred men.

I used to meet at the office at Prado 109 because everyone came and went there - the police feared Batista and company -, Aureliano too; because they had connections. Prío had money for weapons, relations with some military chiefs, and they started organizing supplies. They didn't want anything to do with me because of the complaints I had made in the newspaper Alerta in the weeks before the coup, they even wanted to accuse me or tried to accuse me as responsible for the coup; and after Chibas died, who committed suicide in a moment of depression because he had made accusations about some farms in Guatemala to a political leader, that day Aureliano entered, a skilled man in debate, and demanded proof from him and well undoubtedly Chibás did not have the evidence. He received that information, someone gave him that information, and in his radio hour at 8 o'clock at night, he accused them, he accused him and prove it, prove it. He couldn't provide the evidence, consequently they ridiculed him, he was already appearing in cartoons and when one has a moment of depression and in his Radio hour ending the program, he shot himself, he was very seriously injured, he died a few weeks later.

Later on, I said darn it, we have to go to Guatemala and I dedicated myself to look for all the farms. I was already graduated, in the property registries and in the notaries, I started looking for all the evidence of all the farms and all the businesses that these people had done; but with all the data, it wasn't a way to refute it. Around there, I believe that the journalists distributed it once and on the day of the coup, early Sunday morning, the fourth article came out where I had all the data of how Prío and Paco Prío and all those people had bought the lands where today the Plaza de la Revolución stands. Around there is the neighborhood of La Pelusa; thousands of people came to me one day for me to defend them, and I defended them. I arrived at the Ministry of Public Works at the moment when they were about to sign, they were going to give like $50 pesos; nobody signed and a struggle began.

That was interrupted by the March 10th Coup; that day all the lands they had bought where the Palace of the Revolution stands and all that, for what they had bought them, displacing people and the value of those lands. were tens of millions of pesos if I didn't denounce it, they then tried to blame me for undermining the authority of the place, they didn't even want to hear about me, that's why there's no time, the history of that period is long.

Meanwhile, we were preparing people for a possible union of all forces and participation. No one else within the Orthodox Party dedicated themselves to organizing people, but if there's something I can tell you, it's the following: I had a car, it was a Chevrolet that I had bought on installments and well, it was often seized because I was behind on payments, but I traveled 50,000 kilometers in that car and it broke down like 3 days before heading to Santiago for the Moncada.

The work was detailed, intense; we chose the one hundred and sixty men from the cells we knew best, trained them, joined shooting clubs, practiced shooting with those clay shotguns. Those shotguns had pellets, 9 pellets, terrible for close combat, better than a machine gun, they weren't cut down and we all bought them at the gun stores. We prepared people to buy weapons, others who presented themselves as bourgeois there at the shooting ranges, other places where we practiced with rifles were already places we chose with the movement's comrades, many activities but almost all the government's attention was focused on the real ones.

Those who came and went had many weapons and had the resources, they had the funds, and we were able to work normally within legality and organize that. We achieved total surprise, that was the plan. In my opinion, it was perfect; in my opinion, if we had to do that again today, we would make exactly the same plan, the factor, as you mentioned, the Cosaca outpost was a fatal element and that outpost you say around the perimeter, no that outpost moved from the street where it bends, Which one? (Garzón) from Garzón to the bend. It was Carnival, we had no news of that outpost, and we had observed everything well, let me tell you that it coincided with Carnival, or in a certain way we made the date coincide when many people were traveling there, there was nothing strange about how we made the trip, that would be another long story, it's the date, but I think Carnival was the origin of the Cosaca outpost which we didn't count on.

You explained, I heard you, what happened with that group, those weren't ten fighters from our movement, they were actually some guests because... I don't want to mention where they came from, the University had very good and excellent fighters, it had José Antonio and many others who fought with the police and with everyone with extraordinary courage, but there were some, well, who seemed very brave, always talking and all that, that group we brought, that group, was the one that regretted it. They weren't really the people recruited and trained by us, it was a certain commitment that existed since we trained all the people in the Martyrs' Hall, the twelve hundred, and Pedro Miret trained them, which was the first recruitment we did, very valuable because he was in charge with a Springfield rifle, an M1, and a Thompson machine gun.

Around there, the twelve hundred passed, dry training, we recruited him because he was an enthusiastic student, he got excited, he believed that the more disciplined people who went there, there were more than 30 groups. When did we decide to make a plan on our own? When we came to the conclusion that no one would do anything. The last case was Bárcena's, who had some connections in Columbia and then he spoke to me to bring them. I said to him, "you have connections, do you think you can super facilitate that, facilitate the entry," he says, "yes, friend," and then I suggest the following, don't talk about this absolutely with anyone because we have all the men to carry out that operation, then within 3 days, he had spoken to like 30 or 40 groups, that's the truth, I don't know if he had family members, I'm not trying to say anything to diminish him but that was his method, he spoke with all the groups and there were people who belonged to 3 or 4 different groups, there were people who were in several groups.

Our people were well organized. One fundamental element, nobody knew the leaders. We had problems with some acquaintances, they betrayed us, weakened us, we had to learn to conspire, we had a mimeograph, we lost it, because it had a little newspaper, we tried to make a radio station and we lost it, we were betrayed, so we had to adopt anti-betrayal measures, total compartmentalization. And only 3 people knew the Moncada plan, we had a group of 10, but they had an executive, they had an executive of 3 and they really granted me all the trust so that I could act. I talked with each group, with the twelve hundred, and I knew them more or less when we made the selection.

When we sent the Torchlight Parade, were three hundred sent? Yes, it seemed like there was a crowd, 300 with torches; that was a kind of, not a show of force, we wanted to, take the fire trucks, the ones that crushed the crowd.

We gave command classes, we got a guy who taught command to the people, he shot well, those weapons were enough, I don't remember the exact number of 12-gauge shotguns with pellets, but there were more than enough, if people don't follow behind, with what was behind me we took the Barracks and the thing was quite simple, you have the map there. Look, 3 points, the Hospital because it was at the back, the Courthouse because it was an elevated place and we had to take the command post, it was my mission to take the command post, but dressed as a sergeant arriving by surprise, the others took the barracks where the soldiers were sleeping, they had to push them into the courtyard so they would be prisoners between the Hospital, the back of the Hospital where Abel would be with 20 men.

Raúl's group was at the Palace of Justice, my group, I had about 90 men, what was supposed to enter, but with 60 we would take it, the problem was the surprise, the confusion was general, we were all Sergeants because initially we were going to create colossal confusion, making all the other units believe it was a movement of Sergeants. We planned to take a few prisoners there and use their names to send messages in 2 directions.

As you say, we didn't recruit anyone from Santiago to keep the secret. We had made the decision when Bárcenas, as I said, already the whole of Havana knew, and that day long before they were arrested, I told my comrades there was no other choice but for us to make the decision to start the war against Batista, with how many men, twelve hundred. We searched with millions of work for weapons and we were able to do what we did.

I was the only professional because Abel and Montané supported me, I had a salary, I don't know, of $300.00, I don't know how much, relatively high, they paid for expenses. I was the first revolutionary professional; they paid for the gasoline, took out the car, gave me the money to pay for rent and food, and that's why I dedicated myself full-time to work, that's the story.

And then when we decided to act, since there was no unity, since there was no agreement to act together, then we devised what the form of struggle would be. For me it was very clear: that Barracks in the city couldn't be taken with motorized radio it was very difficult to move around and irregular warfare was needed, but a number of weapons were needed to start, and there were like 2 or 3 thousand there and we went to occupy the weapons, raise the city of Santiago de Cuba as you explained.

The attack on Bayamo, as you said, was to have a vanguard and take the Cauto bridge. There was the possibility that they would counterattack by rail but it was easier to defend there because it was under a bridge over there, that outpost. I won't say here what I've said in other places, today we would make another plan, but that was the one that seemed best to us, and it wasn't badly conceived, it was well conceived, and I assure you Batista falls.

The first hours were going to be of general confusion, to surrender all the battalions that were in the rest of the province from the barracks, and giving orders to a supposed Sergeant there for real, that was going to create chaos but in the meantime we planned to collect the weapons and immediately remove them from the barracks because the aviation would come, in half an hour there shouldn't be a single weapon left inside the barracks, we were going to distribute them in different buildings in the city to avoid the attack, and we would regroup in the barracks, arm the people because we had absolute and total confidence in the people of Santiago but if you start making a combination or organization there is no time.

We organized the forces of the west, they were fighters from Havana and Pinar del Río. Artemisa contributed the largest number of fighters, there are three minutes left and if you want I can tell you on the map what happened.

(...)

What really happened, I'll tell you about the Cosaca outpost that we didn't count on. Ramirito, as he explained and I listened to on the radio, had the mission to take the volunteers that I asked for to take the outpost and remove the chains, I understand that they managed to remove the chains, when he spoke now he said that there was gunfire, no. They go, they get off, the first car goes about a hundred meters ahead of mine, the time for them to take the chains and cross with the men behind me. They arrive, the Cosaca outpost at the moment they pass is near the hospital, very close to the hospital, and then they observe something strange for some reason there, nothing had sounded yet. So they were going with two Thompsons, and they turn towards there in the direction of the group that takes the outpost. I have two feelings: one, the impression that they are going to shoot at those who have taken the outpost, and the second, the ambition to take the two machine guns, that was a mistake, because later I read many books about wars and command and I realized what would have happened.

I was driving the car, I have my shotgun here and a pistol, when I see that those are aiming, and when it occurs to me to stop, open the door and arrest the two who were there, but before I finish opening the door, the guys realize something and turn the guns towards where we are already up, from here to there, so it's not that I rammed them with the car, when they apparently were going to shoot at us, I steer towards them, someone gets out on this side, the others get off, why? Because the instructions they had, only Abel and I knew the plan, exactly, and Renato, the only one from Santiago, no one else knew the plan, they had instructions, this squad is going to take that and must dominate and that's it, they knew we were going to take the barracks. Abel is here, I'm going to tell you why Abel is there, because Abel was the second in command of the movement and since I had the mission to take the command post inside the barracks with the rest of the people, Abel would have liked to go here, but he was very disciplined, I told him to go to the hospital, because it was the place with, in my opinion, the least risk, since their mission was to aim at the soldiers that we threw into the courtyard, that's the reason why Abel goes there.

So when the car stops, everyone behind gets off because they had instructions to get off when the car stopped and take the barracks, I was going to take the command post with the group that was with me and it was easy, there was no one there, dressed as a soldier, the surprise, the confusion, and it was taken, and at that time those outposts remained, they couldn't do anything when everyone was there, they wouldn't have anyone to shoot at, nor would they know who to shoot at. And what happens when the incident with the Cosaca outpost occurs, everyone gets off and those next to it are taken. This hospital looks like a barracks and people get off. One of those who gets off fires a shot because it seems that someone is peeking out one of the doors, when that man fires the shot everyone starts shooting and the sirens start blaring, sounding the alarm, that siren was terrible, the soldiers consequently wake up with that siren blaring. People have gotten in, I don't know how many, at least two or three cars inside the hospital, I get off, go up the stairs, enter the hospital, in the lobby and get all those people out, what was still my intention? That they could get into the cars and continue, we already have a micro-caravan organized, four or five to continue amidst the sirens and everything, and what do they do, a car, I don't know which one, moves forward, I don't know if it was the one that was there or it moved forward, it could be the one that was there, it reverses and crashes into my car. So I get off, I'm still talking to Fleita about what could be done, and at that time nothing could be done, because all the soldiers were in position, our people were completely outside, tanks and cannons were needed to take them now, tanks and cannons, but our weapons, which were excellent for the operation we had to surprise them, couldn't do anything, and we give the order to retreat, a general retreat order.

I remember an episode, the 50 caliber machine gun that was up there, the man comes and stands there. When all this was happening, people were withdrawing, I'm in the middle of the street, and two or three times I have to shoot at the man who was trying to take the 50 caliber machine gun, he looked like a puppet there, bang a shot was fired and he would come back again, bang and he would shoot again, I was already getting into the last car and no one was in sight. All the stories come afterwards, from those who entered the first barracks where Ramirito was, which was the people who took the outpost, I went in there. I don't know where Pedrito went, because he stayed with a rifle fighting but no one saw him, there was nothing but gunfire and empty streets, I was already in the last car, when there was a man who was injured, I don't know what, a man who stayed behind, I got out and gave him my place, I was lucky that one of the cars there reversed, it was a boy from Pinar del Río, Santana I remember, and he picked me up and I left. What was the idea? I'm thinking about those from Bayamo, who took Bayamo, and I say with this group of people we have to attack a barracks and I think of the Caney barracks, get there and take it, I'm almost in the last car that picks me up, but the other cars turn, that's the story, it didn't last long, very short time, what I least imagined is that Abel; it's not that an order was sent to Abel, the order to retreat was given to all those who were there in that place, at that moment when he is up there, and I'm going to say something, Raúl wasn't the leader of that squad, another was the leader of the squad, and he goes because, well, he was interested in that fight, he was and had been outside, he had traveled, I told him about the plan and with great enthusiasm he accepted, he went with the squad led by the leader who was going to take that, historically he must be considered the leader of that squad because he saved the squad. That squad arrives, goes up, then they see that it hasn't happened, that the plan has failed, that it hasn't been taken, so, that was the order, they retreat.

When they retreat, they are taken prisoner, then Raúl has one of those outbursts, he takes the revolver from the man who had taken him prisoner and takes those people prisoner, then they leave, he saves the squad, because if those people had taken him prisoner they would have killed him on the spot, like they did to everyone who was taken prisoner in the early moments. Those in the hospital don't realize what has happened, Abel doesn't realize what has happened, undoubtedly, I'm with the idea, I'm thinking about Bayamo and the idea of ​​going so they wouldn't be alone, in the midst of a terrible bitterness that you have to conceive, right? We've passed it twice, more than once we've passed it, we passed it there, when the work of so much time is ruined in a matter of minutes, that's why I say what I'm not going to say, that we would have made another plan much more logical, much more tactical, but I'm not going to say it, because when I've told some people they stay somewhat dissatisfied and you have to discuss, but there is a much better plan, we learned that later, but not at that moment.

Well, we would have looked for a safer plan, with those six hundred and sixty we could have made a much safer plan, this plan was ambitious, it was bold, but it had this type of risks, but we could carry out a plan without risks. Let's say, starting from the Sierra Maestra with those six hundred and sixty, I said it right away, and then if we had reconstructed the fight with seven weapons, with those people, and we would have explored the territory where we arrived after the landing and where we had never been, that's the real story, and with sixty, Pedro, it could have been taken, so much wasn't needed, if Ramirito's group takes it.

And something I want to say, I was already a Marxist-Leninist for at least four years. I'll say something more, Abel was also a Marxist-Leninist, Montané, Ñico... I was actually the commissar, the instructor for them. After the coup d'état and amidst all this activity, we had a Marxism course, in a house they lent us there in Guanabo, and there they gave some courses based on a biography of Marx. I... I had already read all the books...

By the way, when we arrived at Moncada, she must remember [(Marta Rojas)], when they interrogated me they asked: "the intellectual author?"; it occurred to me and I said: "Martí is the intellectual author"; and they asked me: "well, there was a book of Marxism by Lenin"; I said: "Yes, there was a book by Lenin, we read Lenin and whoever doesn't read it is ignorant"; those are the two answers I gave.

But that nucleus was already... There was one who wasn't, it was the one from Bayamo which was the third, Martín Arara: a hardworking, active guy, he was intelligent, but what he liked was action, he didn't care about ideological matters, what he wanted was action. And he didn't join anymore afterwards. He had the mission to take Bayamo, the Bayamo barracks, to have an outpost for the counterattack.

We were planning to call for general strikes already armed, once we identified ourselves, and the program was the Moncada program, which I had already thought about before March 10th, because before March 10th, especially after Chivás' death, I knew that the party was going to win those elections, but it was going to be the same unfortunately or worse than what had happened with the authentics, because except for Havana, which was always the most faithful to a line, the rest of the provinces were already in the hands of the landowners, of the leadership, and those people really, they were given a brush-up, they were dusted off and put into the orthodoxy which was a party that was going to win. That didn't lead to anything anymore and I already had a revolutionary plan before the coup d'état, it was the elections and I decided to start with the chamber, then it was going to be proposed. At that time, we even defended the soldiers who were working on the colonels' farms, the soldiers not the colonels. We already had the conception of the Moncada program, we were going to proclaim that, it wasn't a socialist program but it was the precursor to socialism, and there in "History Will Absolve Me" there are a few things about the golden calves, and there are a few things said between the lines, that need to be read between the lines and I knew what it meant.

Socialism wasn't proclaimed with us, we were socialists and Marxists, Abel was enthusiastic, Montane was enthusiastic, and Ñico was enthusiastic. There was this group of ten which was the general direction but an executive group of three, and they gave me all the powers, let's say, they kept me in two words and I devoted myself to work, full-time.

Anything else can be left to the judgment of the president of this panel, the strategy we're employing in prison now, is the one of war in the Sierra Maestra. We thought of coming with three hundred automatic rifles, with weapons, illusions, but no automatic rifles arrived, take away one machine gun, take away ten semi-automatic Remingtons and nothing more, what we did have were around fifty-something telescopic sights that were fearsome, that's what I can say about what we brought, 82 men came as is known and nothing more. There we studied, they separated me and I was alone, until finally they sent Raúl and we were both together.

You, who are the president of the Round Table, you want to know something and I will briefly answer you.

I had already defended myself when in Cienfuegos, during a student protest, I was arrested for supporting some students from Cienfuegos and they sent me to the hearing in Santiago de Cuba and I was judged and I defended myself. That was always the case, why would I look for others, it's better to defend oneself and as Marta says, I became the accuser. It's a pity that nothing remains, only the memory, not even that was recorded or anything; because I started to interrogate and that's when they took me out, because I started to interrogate those witnesses and I started to show them that they had killed people. They killed a few, those who were murdered were the prisoners.

The Sarría incident is a longer story. They caught us off guard while we were sleeping and that is terrible, we were about to leave three to cross the bay on the other side and reach the Sierra Maestra in the direction of Turquino, with three, we had wounded, we had exhausted people, a certain truce had been achieved, that's when Archbishop Pérez Serantes suggests - he later had differences with the Revolution - but it's true that he suggests there, makes efforts, well but, also what had occurred; the first few days absolute terror, after five or six days astonishment, alarm, indignation in the population because they had learned about all the murders, those people couldn't continue killing many more people with a few exceptions. Whenever they arrived there, nothing, they didn't last even five seconds. The weapons of a group that was going to adhere to that truce because they couldn't continue, they had stayed nearby, we accompanied them to the place of the house where Leisán was going to stay.

They stayed there, we left, we walked a few kilometers where the weapons had been left nearby, we made the mistake of sleeping in a bar on land, which we should never have done, we should have slept under the trees, on the rocks, anywhere, a foolishness, we let our guard down; if we had crossed because I knew how to cross, take a boat across the bay and reach the Sierra Maestra, in that direction, towards there, towards the real Sierra Maestra not the one that went towards Guantanamo, we would have ended up at Guantanamo base, to the Sierra Maestra where we were going. When they caught us, they woke us up with those rifles, and that's when this man - that was really an extraordinary thing - starts to say softly, calming the soldiers who were look, their arteries were swollen with rage, the thirst for blood and then he says to them: "calm down, ideas cannot be killed," but softly; he said it, he didn't say it to the soldiers, otherwise they would have been capable of killing him too, he said it softly, murmured that "ideas cannot be killed" Sarría, Lieutenant Sarría.

There's a critical moment when they find the group of weapons, and it was hellish, they had the rifles loaded and tied up, they had us like that, with our backs turned, and he managed to pacify them at that moment, not only at the first moment, but at that moment when the weapons appeared, the veins swelled even more in each of those guys, they were kind of chubby, and there are more episodes, I won't tell more because I think it's enough.

I managed to get some books because I was... I even went on a hunger strike there and really because they put me incommunicado, I did it for a few days, they had left me there, they made up that, a certificate that I was sick; I took advantage and I was able to pass a letter to Melba and Yeyé denouncing that I was not sick that I was fine and that they were taking me to trial, of course they didn't pay any attention to me, they left me and later they took me out to the little room there.

I had books there, I could bring them because I had those authors of social doctrines or political doctrines. It was a subject that I studied because I studied about three careers, I had two left to finish Social Sciences, as I devoted myself to the Revolution I didn't finish, from before, I studied a lot after I came back from the Cayo Confites expedition and after Bogotá, I devoted myself to studying because I went my own way, I didn't want to be a student - something we criticized a lot - one of those students who perpetuate themselves there, I couldn't pass the course because I couldn't take the exams because of the Cayo Confites expedition and when I arrived I couldn't take the exams, I had to choose between enrolling for the second year or going my own way, I became a student on my own, but I continued a lot in political activity until I put myself - I think it was after Bogotá - in a year and a half I passed forty-seven subjects which were the ones I needed to get the three degrees, because I wanted a scholarship because I wanted to study economics, but with revolutionary ideas, but I saw that events here were accelerating and I decided to do something else already, I lost my opportunity because I didn't have a competitor, since no one had passed the three courses of that year. I had two subjects left which were the ones I knew best and then I entered and that's it; and Martí, whom I had read a lot, and I wanted to base the defense on the principle of the right to rebellion.

There's one thing, a few days after the coup d'état, I presented myself at the Court and accused Batista with all the codes and then I said: "one day they will accuse us and I want to have in my hand this file of how we went to court and accused that bandit of all the laws he had violated." And indeed the day came when I had to defend myself and that precedent was there. So, I did have a good memory, then I made the defense and then - but there was Marta there - I had to reconstruct it because there was no microphone or anything there and I reconstructed it in prison, needless to say - as I do with my speeches, these that I improvise - I review them, if something is missing I add it or remove it, I say it, it could be the most common thing, I copied it in lemon - that's the Indian's task - with lemon juice in letters that I sent to Lidia, my sister, Irmita some little pieces and then the whole sheet and then writing in lemon is difficult and there not to have been a single mistake requires the concentration of an ant there, patient and I had my techniques of how to do it because for a few seconds you still see the humidity, then you put it on a plate, put it in an oven and it comes out complete, that's how "History Will Absolve Me" was disseminated.

It's true that many years have passed, but possibly neither you nor those who were judging me nor I could imagine that one day you would be making history and I would be sitting in front of a television watching it. There are some details that were not explained and details are very important.

Of course, a setback produces a devilish demoralization, it's not surprising that people let go a lot, but there was a group that continued to the mountains, there we would have needed rifles with greater range because we saw a patrol of soldiers here, another one there, and our shotguns didn't reach there; our .22 rifles didn't reach there, that's the thing, but now that it happened, I say I'm going to go over there and I'm going to sit down and see if they need any little help that I gave, especially to clarify some details.

It must be taken into account that many people who make history, I myself have seen history made by others and it's incredible and on the other hand they demand that one write something, but when, one always has a certain duty to tell things, but buddy, there are many things that one has to be doing every day.

When I was left alone, they put me with the common prisoners. They put Lázaro Peña there because they imprisoned a bunch of people who had nothing to do with this, because they wanted to paint it as a coup connected with the authentic ones who are very discredited and they painted it as an authentic communist coup, and a great slander, Marta, is that they said that our people had slaughtered the soldiers in the hospital, look what they made them believe, they made them believe that, those soldiers believed that and if maybe a shot that left me almost deaf from someone who appeared by a window that someone made next to me almost in the first moments, they may have been wounded, because they didn't know where they were; and nobody had a knife, and when I entered and took out the people they hadn't entered any patient rooms or anything, but they used that and made the soldiers believe that, really, that we had slaughtered the patients in the hospital.

Honestly, how long they believed it, it wasn't long until that day when I met with two thousand elite soldiers in Bayamo, and in few places have I been received with as much enthusiasm as they received me. Because in the war they learned what the revolutionaries really were, that there was never a murdered prisoner, never a man beaten and that they were with us for 48 hours and we set them free, we gave the officers their weapons, only the Jigüe battalion remained because they were going to try to blame them and they had really fought very well and very intelligently and in a certain way to protect them we didn't set them free, they would have been blamed entirely and then it was very useful because they joined us and provided important services.

Ah! the battles, when we liberated them, that troop from Bayamo with one hundred and eighty men, we started the battles and the vehicles and tanks arrived by paved road, they had Sherman tanks and tanks of the other type as well, lighter ones, they had five thousand, only we started the battles in Guisa with one hundred and eighty men and then a troop of recruits was added behind that army. Ten days of combat, we stayed in Guisa, they captured Pupo, we sent him to reach a place and he advanced so much that a troop coming... we set many traps for them and in the subsequent combat they took measures against those traps while we set another one in retreat, and they made him a prisoner, we had a group of prisoners and we told them: "you have to give me assurance that they won't murder Pupo," otherwise they would have murdered Pupo. Then came all the battles of Baire, Jiguaní, Maffo, Palma Soriano until Cantillo came to talk to me and recognize that they had lost the war. That story, well nobody, many people don't know it because it was talked about in the beginning, he was the chief of the operations troops and in the offensive the war almost ended.