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A Concise History of the Communist Party of China
Author	Hu Sheng
Written in	1994
Publisher	Foreign Languages Press
Type	Book
Source	Internet Archive

Seventy years have passed since the Communist Party of China came into being. Over these seventy years, the Party has rallied the Chinese people around it and waged an unremitting and heroic struggle for national liberation, social progress and the people’s well-being. The struggle has never been easy. To make a victorious revolution and build a new society in a poor and backward country comprising a quarter of the earth’s population, the Communist Party of China performed feats that astonished the world, encountering seemingly overwhelming difficulties and at times suffering major setbacks. But difficulties or setbacks of any kind could never hold back its advance; they only made the Party more steadfast and more mature. The Chinese people have gained historic victories in revolution and socialist construction under the leadership of the Communist Parly, and today they are forging confidently ahead towards the great goal of socialist modernization. The record of the past shows that the Party serves the people heart and soul and that it can provide the leadership that will enable them to master their own destiny and to make the country strong and prosperous. Looking back over the past seventy years, the Chinese people are more convinced than ever that their choice of socialism as their goal and of the Communist Party to lead them there has been correct. Indeed, it is the inevitable product of China’s modern historical development. The rich store of experience embodied in these last seventy years of history was accumulated by pioneers who sought the truth under the most difficult circumstances with no precedent to guide them, and it was paid for in the blood of innumerable martyers. They deserve our ever enduring remembrance.

The Founding of the Communist Party of China

The Success and Failure of the Revolution of 1911

In the middle of the 19th century, China was plunged in untold suffering and humiliation under the oppression of foreign capitalist and imperialist powers and of domestic feudal forces. The country was deprived of its sovereignty, and its economic lifelines were in the hands of foreigners. Faced with aggression by the Western powers, the feudal and autocratic Qing Dynasty, which had reigned over China for two hundred years, took no effective measures to defend the country. On the contrary, it suppressed all trends towards political and social' progress and let the imperialist powers carve the country up at will. The Qing regime at its final stage, traitorous and corrupt, was detested by the people, because it strangled the country’s vitality and kept them in misery. The Chinese entered the 20th century with the national humiliation of seeing their capital city, Beijing, occupied by the Eight-Power Allied Forces sent by Britain, the United States, Germany, France, Russia, Japan, Italy and Austria. The Chinese nation seemed to be on the verge of extinction. The Chinese people, who had created a glorious and ancient civilization, could not endure such humiliation for long. In 1902, when the great writer Lu Xun was studying in Japan, he wrote these lines expressing the grief and indignation that filled the hearts of a great many Chinese patriots: “My heart cannot evade the arrow of the god of love. “A great storm is sweeping over my homeland in the darkness standmeCe ^ ^ ^ ^ stars’ but d° not nnder I offer my heart’s blood to my dear homeland ” It was the double oppression of imperialism and feudalism that misery ofThern SUffT"8 of lhe Cllinese nation and The mtsery of the Chinese people. That is what hindered all social development and political progress. How could the country commnld fhg" aggressi011 and wi" "“(“"a! independence’ How ed bv ; efe’ Td f0m *he darkness and France perpetuated by the feudal, autocratic regime? How could it be lifted out of poverty and backwardness and made prosperous and strong’ These were the principal questions that confronted semi-colonial semi-feudal China, the principal questions that the Chinese progressives kept turning over in their minds. Many brave men and women devoted themselves to the cause of b °rC thC foUnding of the Communist Party 1118 fhlnese bad ^ver ceased trying to change the destiny of then motherland. However, their repeated struggles the wars of resistance against foreign aggression the peasants’ Klngdom in middle of the TV . century the Reform Movement of 18981 and the Boxer Upnsmg (the Yi He Juan Movement) at the turn of the century which started from the lower strata of society and grew into a large-scale anti-imperialist patriotic movement — had all ended Sufd not bfattaiPnedn0tS that ,he" ideats Nevertheless, the wheel of history rolled on, constantly bringing new developments. As the national crisis deepened and new social forces, especially modern capitalist industry, began to grow in Chinese society, a new revolutionary movement was started Chfn^ eadership ot Sun Yat-sen, the forerunner of the Chinese democratic revolution. wn™uYat:S“,WaS .f great Patriot as well as a great democrat When he established the small revolutionary group Society for he Revival of China (Xing Zhong Hui) in Honolulu in 1894 he issued a clarion call for “the revival of China.” In 1905’ he sponsored the founding of the Chinese Revolutionary League (Zhongguo Tong Men Hui). The League put forward a comprehensive political programme for the establishment of a bourgeois democratic republic and worked hard to carry it out by revolutionary means. It pledged to “drive out the Tartars, revive the Chinese nation, establish a republic and equalize ownership of land.” The immediate objective of the revolution was to overthrow the government of the Qing Dynasty, which had already become a tool of the imperialist powers for the domination of China. Thus, the revolution was essentially anti-imperialist It called for the overthrow of the feudal monarchy that had reigned in China for two thousand years. Before this time, some people had been so influenced by European and American ideas that they questioned the monarchy, but they had never dared envisage its overthrow and the dismantling of the social system it represented. Sun Yat-sen, however, held up the ideal of a democratic republic and set a new objective for the Chinese people. From then on, they began to struggle consciously for the establishment ol an independent, democratic state. In Mao Zedong’s words Strictly speaking, China’s bourgeois-democratic revolution against imperialism and feudalism was begun by Dr. Sun YatRecalling it in 1924, the Manifesto of the 1st National Congress ot the Kuomintang of China stated: “The objective of the revoluuon was not merely to overthrow the Manchus, but to carry out the transformation of China after their overthrow,” that is, “to achieve in the political domain the transition from an autocractic system to a democratic system and in the economic domain the transition from handicraft production to capitalist production.”3 t is important to note that while many Chinese were eager to learn from the West, Sun Yat-sen had become aware of certain drawbacks in the capitalist system of the Western countries. His conclusion was that “Europe and America are strong, but their people are impoverished” and that “a social revolution will take place before long.” Influenced by the socialist movement rising in the West, Sun Yat-sen tried to add some colour of socialism to his programme, but whatever his intent, his proposal to “equalize "He"” ^ “ the dCTCl°pme"1 «PiFor several years following its establishment, the Chinese Revoluuonary League, together with other organizations under its influence, earned out revolutionary propaganda and agitation. Wi ifa8u? alhe]d Itself Wlth secret societies (especially the Triad Society and similar organizations in southern China ) and with the New Army (a modernized force organized by the government of 894095?and'!aSty IT ^ ddeat *" the Sin°-JaPancse War of 4 95) and launched a series of armed uprisings. The failure of each uprising expanded the influence of revolutionary ideas hatred ,hr0ughout the »nd deepened their hatred of the Qmg government. A revolutionary situation was taking shape across the country. The outbreak of the Revolution of 1911 and the success it attamed proved that the imperialist powers could not arb Si* control the destiny of China after all. The revolution was signifT cant not only because it overthrew the Qing Dynasty, but because t put an end to the autocracy that had reigned in China for “dtS of years and awakened the people to the concept of a democratic repubhe. One should never underestimate the role Chimf byithe ^V0lutI0n of 191 1 in Promoting social progress in China and in liberating the thinking of the Chinese people The Qing Dynasty had been not only the chief representative of the domestic feudal forces but also a tool employed by the foreign imperiahsts to dominate China. The people’s triumph over this teudal monarchy that had betrayed them destroyed the old reactionary order and paved the way for revolutionary struggles in the days to come. In this sense, the victory achieved in the Revolution of 1911 was tremendous. However, the Revolution of 191 1 also had obvious weaknesses, it 1 ailed to set forth an explicit and comprehensive political programme to combat foreign imperialist aggression and the weUreaihe0Cr! ? arouse lhe lab°uring masses who h t r ^ maJ°nty °f the Chinese Population; and it failed to form a strong revolutionary party that could success fully lead it to its logical conclusion. This was because the bourgeoisie in China was too feeble. It had ties with the imperialist and feudal forces that could not be completely severed, and it was almost totally divorced from the labouring masses. The bourgeois revolutionaries therefore had neither the courage nor the strength to carry the struggle against imperialism and feudalism to the end. The Revolution of 1911 ended in a compromise with the old forces. The imperialist forces in China were as strong as ever, and there was no great social upheaval in the countryside. The Republic of China was founded, but the fruit of revolution fell into the hands of the Northern warlords headed by Yuan Shikai, who was favoured by the imperialists. China was still a semi-colonial, semi-feudal society, still a country of dire poverty and backwardness. Sun Yat-sen said bitterly, “The political and social darkness and the corruption of every description are even worse than in the Qing Dynasty, and the people are becoming increasingly impoverished.”4 The revolution had not attained its desired goal, so in that sense it was a failure. Nevertheless, the Revolution of 1911 holds an honoured place in modern Chinese history. As historical materialists who uphold Marxism, members of the Communist Party of China will never torget the contributions made by all the revolutionary pioneers before the founding of the Party and as a matter of fact, the Revolution of 1911 was the most important revolution preceding the people’s revolution led by the CPC. Looking back over the entire course of China’s modern revolutionary history, we can see that the Revolution of 1911 did bear fruit after all. The success of that revolution encouraged the Chinese people to keep up their struggle. On the other hand, its failure taught the progressives among them that it was impossible to build a bourgeois republic under the historical conditions of the time. They came to realize that to win the independence and prosperity of the country and the freedom and happiness of the people, they had to explore a new path. Mao Zedong made clear the importance of the Revolution of 191 1 when he said, “While studying the history of the Communist Party of China, wc should study materials concerning the Revolution of 1911 and the May 4lh Movement before the founding of history1”^ °thcrwise’ we cannot understand the development It was only ten years between the outbreak of the Revolution ot 1911 and the founding of the Communist Party of China A most all of the first generation of CPC revolutionaries had taken part in the Revolution of 1911 or been deeply influenced y it. These veteran Communists and many democrats who later cooperated with the Communist Party took that revolution as their point of departure. Recalling his own ideological evolution the Communist Lin Boqu wrote: Before the Revolution of 1911, 1 believed that there would be peace and tranquillity across the land if only we overthrew the monarchy. But after I took part in the revolution and experienced setbacks over and over again, the goal of democracy I had been trying to attain was still far away. It was through bitter experience that I gradually came to realize I was in a blind alley and that I finally chose communism. This is not the experience of only one PerSL°n4?uany Pte0pie like me can be fouild in the revolutionary ranks. Thus, the victories of the new-democratic revolution and , socialism in China can be regarded as the continuation and development of the Revolution of 1911

The Early Stage of the New Cultural Movement and the Initial Dissemination of Marxism

After the failure of the Revolution of 1911, Chinese progressives were in despair, at a loss what to do. Their dreams were shattered, because the founding of the Republic of China did not ring about the desired national independence, democracy and social progress. In 1915, when World War I was at its height Japan seized the opportunity to put forward “Twenty-One Demands” in a bid to obtain exclusive control of China. Yuan Shikai, the chief of the Northern warlords, restored the monarchy and proclaimed himself emperor. Zhang Xun, a former senior official of the Qing Dynasty, supported an attempt by the dethroned Emperor Xuantong to stage a comeback. While the imperialist powers were in bitter rivalry in China, the domestic warlords were intensifying their internecine warfare to set up separatist regimes. Going against the trend of the times, certain intellectuals advocated the worship of Confucius and the study of the Confucian canon. One after another, dramatic events succeeded each other on the Chinese stage. Describing the circumstances of the time in broad outline, Mao Zedong wrote: “Their repeated struggles, including such a country-wide movement as the Revolution of 191 1, all ended in failure. Day by day, conditions in the country got worse, and life was made impossible. Doubts arose, increased and deepened.”7 The reality was grim. The people carried out hard struggles and made great sacrifices, but they did not obtain what they had anticipated. A bourgeois democratic republic was not a panacea for all the ills of China. Multiple political parties, the parliamentary system and other institutions copied from the West were tried out in the early years of the Republic of China, but they failed to solve any practical problems and only became instruments employed by different factions of warlords, bureaucrats and politicians in their scramble for power and profit. Utter despair replaced the previous hopes. Yet this bitter experience had its positive side for the progressives. Since they found the old road impassable, they began to look for a new way out. A greater revolutionary storm was brewing and would soon descend upon the land. The early stage of the new cultural movement — the period before the May 4th Movement of 1919 — presaged the coming storm. In September 1915 Chen Duxiu, who had participated in the Revolution of 1911, founded the magazine Youth (later renamed New Youth ) in Shanghai, touching off a new cultural movement. In January 1917 Cai Yuanpei became the President of Beijing University. He advocated the assimilation of all schools of thought, engaged Chen Duxiu as the Dean of Liberal Arts and invited many scholars with new ideas to join the faculty. The editorial board of New Youth moved to Beijing, and Li Dazhao, Lu Xun, Hu Shi, Qian Xuantong and Liu Bannong became members of the board and principal contributors. Thus Beijing University and New Youth became the main bastions of the new cultural movement. The ideologists active at the beginning of the movement summed up the experience of the Revolution of 191 1 and reflected on its failure. They came to the conclusion that the struggles tor national salvation waged by earlier revolutionaries had all ended in failure simply because the Chinese people, as the saying goes, had looked on indifferently as the house across the river went up in flames. Accordingly, they believed that to establish a republic worthy of the name, it was necessary to thoroughly remould the national character, and that if problems of ethics were not solved, politics and academic learning would be of no avail hey put forward the slogan, “Do away with superstitions!”, calling on the people to “break through the net of history,” “cast off the yoke of outworn doctrines” and “emancipate their thinking.” The ideologists of those days directed their main attack against the doctrines of Confucius, which had been the orthodox beliefs of feudalism. Rallying around New Youth and using the theories of evolution and individual emancipation as their major weapons, they mounted an assault on the “sages of the past,” represented by Confucius, and vigorously advocated a new ethics and a new literature. Since the leaders of the Reform Movement of 1898 had departed from the classics and ’rebelled against orthodoxy under the cloak of Confucianism, and the revolutionaries of 1911 had never struck a direct blow against it, the ideologists of the new cultural movement were the first to consciously challenge feudal ethics. They had their own weaknesses. For instance, they believed that it was possible to thoroughly remould the national character through struggle in the ideological and cultural fields alone, without transforming the social environment that engendered feudal ideas. They failed to reveal the social roots of Confucianism and the necessity of transforming China’s basic social system. They did not express genuine sympathy for the misery of the workers and peasants who were the overwhelming majority of the population or wait patiently until they had been aroused to revolutionary action. And they followed a formalistic methodology that led them to affirm or negate everything absolutely. Nevertheless, their criticism of Confucianism shook the dominant position of the orthodox feudal ideas. It lifted the sluice gate that had checked the current of new ideas, releasing a tide of mental emancipation in Chinese society. This tide was vigorous, progressive and revolutionary. The cardinal slogan of the new cultural movement was, “Democracy and science.” At a time when feudalism was dominant in society, it was historically progressive to advocate democracy as opposed to dictatorship and science as opposed to blind faith. However, according to Chen Duxiu, the proponent of the slogan, democracy referred to the bourgeois democratic system and bourgeois democratic ideas, and science referred to “natural sciences in a narrow sense and social sciences in a broad sense.”8 He emphasized the need to study society with the same scientific spirit and methodology applied to the study of the natural sciences. However, he also regarded as science the ideological system of idealism (with certain borrowings from the natural sciences), including William James’s pragmatism, Henri Bergson’s theory of creative evolution and Bertrand Russell’s new realism.9 He advocated democracy and science because he believed that “in order to survive in the present world,” China had to “build a new state of the Western type and organize a new society of the Western type” — that is, to build a bourgeois republic and develop capitalism.10 This showed that during its first stage the new cultural movement was essentially a struggle of the new culture of the bourgeoisie against the old culture of the feudal class. The proponents of the movement emphasized the “independent personality” and “equal human rights,” striving only for the liberation of the individual instead of for the liberation of the working people as a whole. They were therefore unable 12 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC to show the Chinese people the real way out of their misery. In fact, the defects of capitalist civilization were becoming increasingly apparent. Shortly after the outbreak of World War I, Chen Duxiu wrote that when capitalism had replaced feudalism, “political inequality turned into social inequality, and monarchical and aristocratic repression turned into capitalist repression.” There was no denying these defects of modern Western civilization.11 World War I disclosed the inherent contradictions of capitalism in an incisive way. The unprecedented brutality of the war and the social chaos that followed shocked the world and cast doubts on the value of Western civilization. It was the first time that the general public felt that the capitalist system no longer had bright prospects and had lost its original attraction. Towards the end of the war, Li Dazhao said, “The war threw much doubt on the authority of European civilization, and the Europeans themselves have to reflect on its true value.”12 In May 1916 he said: “Representative government is still the subject of experiments. It is difficult to ascertain whether it is good or not and to predict whether it will survive or change.”13 In August 1917 Mao Zedong also said it was true that Oriental ideas did not conform to reality, but that Western ideas did not necessarily do so either. He concluded that most Western ideas should be remoulded along with Oriental ideas.14 These doubts on the part of Left-wingers in the new cultural movement led them to seek a new means of national salvation and prepared the ground for their acceptance of Marxism. Why did the October Revolution that broke out in Russia in 1917 call forth such vigorous response in China? Basically, it was because of the changes taking place in Chinese society. At a time when the Chinese people were groping desperately in the dark, the Russian revolution illuminated a path for them, furnishing new and reasonable replies to the questions they were so anxiously studying. Earlier, even before the Revolution of 1911, certain Chinese intellectuals had begun to talk about socialism. However, some of them only indulged in empty talk about anarchism, talk that even CHAPTER ONE THE FOUNDING OF THE CPC 13 they themselves did not believe had any connection with reality. Others held that the theory of socialism was of no practical significance outside the developed capitalist countries. They were of the view that certain “socialist” measures could be adopted in the course of developing capitalism in China so as to “prevent” a socialist revolution. At the same time, there were also people who introduced Marxism into China as a school of socialist thought. After a British missionary made the first mention of Marx and his theories in the Globe Magazine in Shanghai in 1899, both bourgeois reformists like Liang Qichao and revolutionaries like Zhu Zhixin wrote about them. However, until the October Revolution, Marxism was not correctly interpreted in China, and it was not considered important. Conditions were not yet ripe for Chinese society to embrace Marxism, and its influence was negligible. It was the October Revolution that for the first time turned the theories of socialism in books into a living reality. The Russian revolution held particular interest for the Chinese people because it had taken place in a country where conditions were very similar to those in China: severe feudal oppression combined with economic and cultural backwardness. This demonstrated that “a low level of material civilization could in no way hold back the progress of socialism,”15 and that when capitalism offered no solution, one could turn to socialism. The October Revolution was also a call to resist imperialism, a call that sounded “especially penetrating and especially significant”16 to the Chinese people, who had been so bullied and humiliated by the imperialist powers. This gave a powerful impetus to those Chinese progressives who were inclined towards socialism, encouraging them to make a serious study of the theories of Marxism that had guided the revolution. Furthermore, the mobilization of the Russian worker and peasant masses under the banner of socialism and the historic victory they had gained inspired the Chinese progressives to try new methods of revolution. In short, the October Revolution aroused a new hope of national liberation in China. Under these circumstances, a group of intellectuals who supported the Russian revolution and embraced the rudiments of communist ideas came14 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC into prominence in China. ,hf.Lo^ahha°DWaS,the firSt *° hold aloft in China 'he banner of he October Revolutjon. In 1918 he became professor and chief librarian at Beijing University and emerged as a prominent be! lTlTaftlr .t* T h"'"1™1 m0vement' In July and Novem1 18, after shrewd observation of the October Revolution and careful reflection upon it, he published a series of articles whh such titles as A Comparative Study of the French and Rushan Revolutions, The Victory of the Common People” and “The ODments°h ^ W"h keen insight int0 historical develpments he declared that the victory of the October Revolution a revolution based on socialism, a social revolution known to the world tor its revolutionary colours, was a triumph for the labour movement a harbinger of world revolution in the 20th century and a new dawn for all mankind. He predicted that the tide set in motion by the October Revolution was irresistible and that the future would surely see “a world of red flags ” In an article entitled “The New Era,” published on New Year’s Day 1919 he wrote that the October Revolution had opened a new era in uman history, that it would bring forth a new life a new take TheT ^ the Chinese should take the same road as the Russians. While radica1 changes were taking place in the thinking of the hinese ideologists, profound changes were also quietly taking place in China s social structure. During World War I the country s national capitalist economy developed rapidly, because the estern imperialist countries, busy fighting at close quarters on e European battlefield, had temporarily slackened their economic aggression against China. (Japan and the United States were exceptions, continuing to expand their economic influence 1919 antao*°l In the six years froi" 1914 through 1919 a total of 379 factories and mines were built, or an average of 63 a year. In connection with this development, the Chinese working dass and national bourgeoisie grew in strength On the nib 7 £y 4th M°Vement °f ,919' the Industrial workers numbered about two million and were becoming an increasingly important social force. All sorts of social problems incTudh'g CHAPTER ONE THE FOUNDING OF THE CPC 15 contradictions between labour and capital, caused ever greater popular concern, providing an objective basis for the acceptance of Marxism. The rapid increase in the number of students enrolled in various new types of schools and the emergence of many teachers in such schools and of journalists helped to form a larger contingent of intellectuals than there had been in the period of the Revolution of 1911. The anti-imperialist and anti-feudal democratic revolution of the bourgeoisie had a new and much stronger body of supporters. The rise of a great new people’s revolution was inevitable.

The May 4th Movement and the Rise of Socialist Ideas

It was China’s diplomatic failure at the “peace conference” in Paris that touched off the May 4th Movement. In the first half of 1919, the Allied countries held a “peace conference in Paris. Actually, the conference was manipulated by a few powers that had emerged victorious from World War I. Since China had joined the Allies during the war, it too sent delegates. However, the conference rejected its seven demands (including the liquidation of the foreign spheres of influence in China and the withdrawal of foreign troops) and its call for the annulment of Japan’s “Twenty-One Demands” and of the related notes exchanged between the two countries. Moreover, the conference ruled that Germany should transfer to Japan all the privileges it had obtained in Shandong Province. The “peace conference gave China nothing but some astronomical instruments that had been seized by Germany when the Eight-Power Allied Forces had stormed into Beijing in 1900. Nevertheless, the delegates from China’s Northern warlord government were prepared to sign the “peace treaty.” When the news reached home, it aroused the indignation of people of all social strata. The patriotic May 4th Movement, pioneered by the students, erupted like a volcano. On May 3 students from Beijing University, together with16 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC representatives of students from other universities and secondary schools in Beijing, held a rally and decided to send a telegram to the special envoys in Paris, demanding that they refuse to sign the “peace treaty.” One of the students cut his finger and wrote in blood the four Chinese characters Huan Wo Qing Dao (Return Qingdao to China).17 On May 4 more than 3,000 students from a dozen universities and schools assembled in front of the Tian’anmen gate-tower and held a demonstration. They shouted such slogans as “Annul the Twenty-One Demands!”, “Return Qingdao to China!” and “Punish the traitors Cao Rulin, Zhang Zongxiang and Lu Zongyu!” (three pro- Japanese bureaucrats in the Northern warlord government). They wrote in a declaration: “The land of China may be conquered, but it must not be forfeited! The people of China may be killed, but they must not bow their heads! The country has been subjugated! Compatriots, arise!” When the demonstrators reached the west entrance of the foreign embassy quarter their way was blocked, so they changed course, marching towards the residence of Cao Rulin. There they found Zhang Zongxiang and beat him black and blue. Unable to find Cao Rulin, they set his house on fire. The government called out troops and police to suppress the students, thirty-two of whom were arrested. Closing ranks in the struggle, the university and middle-school students established a federation. Twenty-five thousand of them staged a general strike. They also made patriotic speeches in the streets, calling on the public to boycott Japanese merchandise and buy Chinese-made goods. Under the brutal repression of the reactionary authorities, the students’ struggle ebbed for a time. Then on June 3, as the government openly commended Cao Rulin and once again strictly banned any patriotic movement, they resumed their campaign in the streets. The students spoke tearfully, while the audiences sobbed, their hands covering their faces. Some 170 students were arrested on the first day, and some 700 on the second. On the third day, when more than 2,000 students turned out into the streets, they were attacked by mounted troops and police. It was at this juncture that an important event took place: the CHAPTER ONE THE FOUNDING OF THE CPC 17 Chinese working class entered the political arena as an independent force. On June 5 in Shanghai, while students were kneeling down along the streets to appeal to the shopkeepers to go on strike, about 70,000 workers spontaneously began a sympathy strike. They were followed by workers in Beijing, l'angshan, Hankou, Nanjing, Changsha and other places. Shopkeepers in many large and medium-sized cities joined the strikers. Like a prairie fire, the struggle spread to more than twenty provinces and over a hundred cities across the country. Ihe May 4th Movement was no longer restricted within the narrow limits of the intelligentsia: it had turned into a nationwide revolutionary movement with the participation of the working class, the petty bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie. The focus of the struggle shifted from Beijing to Shanghai, and the workers gradually replaced the students as the main force. On June 10, under the pressure from the people, the Northern warlords were compelled to release the arrested students and to announce the dismissal of Cao, Zhang and Lu. On June 27 in Paris hundreds of Chinese — workers, students and other residents — went to the hospital where Lu Zhengxiang, the chief Chinese delegate, was staying for medical treatment and demanded that he refuse to sign the “peace treaty.” The following day, the Chinese delegation did not attend the ceremony for the signing of the Treaty of Versailles. The May 4th Movement was an epoch-making event in the history of the Chinese revolution, marking the great beginning of the new-democratic revolution. Looking back on it, Mao Zedong wrote, “Its outstanding historical significance is to be seen in a feature which was absent from the Revolution of 1911, namely, its thorough and uncompromising opposition to imperialism as well as to feudalism.”18 And according to Zhang Wentian, another prominent leader of the CPC, “The greatest merit of the May 4th Movement lay in arousing the political consciousness of the masses and achieving the unity of the revolutionary forces.”19 In the beginning of the movement, the students emerged in the vanguard of the struggle, while at a later stage the working class18 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC became the main force, displaying its special sense of organization and discipline and its staunch revolutionary spirit. In the words of Deng Zhongxia, an outstanding leader of the workers’ movement, “Thus the Chinese working class began a political strike. Later, it managed to develop independent strength and an independent struggle of its own, on which this strike obviously exercised a great influence.”20 As they witnessed the great strength displayed by the working class in the struggle, “some of the student leaders in the May 4th Movement set out to ‘join the public ,’ running schools for workers and organizing trade unions. Later they became the backbone of the newly founded Communist Party of China. Around the time of the May 4th Movement, the Chinese progressives came to realize from the experience of the Paris “peace conference” that the imperialist forces had joined together to oppress the Chinese people. This was the main cause of the further dissemination of socialist ideas in China. Qu Qiubai a prominent Communist and writer, wrote, “The cutting pain of imperialist oppression awakened the public from the nightmare of vague democracy.... Therefore, the students’ movement swiftly turned to socialism.”22 The study and propagation of socialism gradually became the main concern of the progressives. This was a salient feature ol the new cultural movement after the May 4th Movement. It took time for people to understand socialism. At first they felt an obscure yearning for it, as if, Qu Qiubai continued, “they viewed the morning mist through a screened window. The different schools of socialism were confusing and its meaning was not clear.”23 For the time being, people could hardly distinguish between scientific socialism and other schools of socialism. Magazine articles reflected every variety of socialist thinking — anarchism, utopian socialism, cooperativism, pan-labourism, guild socialism, social democracy and so on. It was only after repeated comparison and judgement that the Chinese progressives chose Marxist scientific socialism. Li Dazhao played a major role in the early stage of the Marxist movement in China. He was the chief editor of a special issue of CHAPTER ONE THE FOUNDING OF THE CPC 19 New Youth devoted to Marxism in May 1919. In his own article, “My Marxist Outlook,” he gave a comprehensive and systematic introduction to Marxism. Marxism, he wrote, was the integration of the study of history, economics and politics; that is, historical materialism, economic theory and socialist doctrine, and “class struggle [ran] through all three, like a gold thread.” Unlike the vague and fragmentary explanations of Marxist theories that had appeared earlier, Li Dazhao’s introduction to Marxism was relatively precise and complete. Certain young people who had come into contact with Marxist theories while they had been studying in Japan also played an important role in the early propagation of Marxism in China. For example, in November and December 1919, Yang Pao’an published in New China Daily in Guangdong Province a series of articles entitled “Marxism (Also Known as Scientific Socialism)” in which he gave a systematic account of Marxist historical materialism, economic theory and scientific socialism. Li Da, another student back from Japan, published his translations of such books as Explanations of Historical Materialism, A General Survey of Social Problems, and Marxist Economic Theory. He also wrote articles for the press, including “What is Socialism?” and “The Objectives of Socialism.” Before the May 4th Movement, many intellectuals of different ideological persuasions had participated in the new cultural movement, but since they concentrated their criticism on Confucianism and promoted science and democracy, their differences of opinion were not very evident. Now that Marxism was being widely disseminated, however, distinct splits began to appear in the movement. Hu Shi, for example, had a passion for the bourgeois civilization of the West, believed in pragmatism and advocated reformism. He had declared his determination “not to talk about politics for twenty years.” At this juncture, however, he felt he “could no longer keep his eyes closed and hold his tongue.” In an article entitled “More Discussions on Questions, Less Talk about ‘Doctrines’!” published in July 1919, he stated that “every doctrine is a remedy applied by men of high ideals at a given time and place for a society at that time and place,”20 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC ^!Zin! tkf !*ai?iSm WaS applicable t0 China. Instead, he advod gradual reform and maintained that the search for “a ^ anient3! solution” was “absolute proof of the bankruptcy of logical circles in China.” He asserted that he had “tried to -how people the correct path so that they would not be misled” nd to prevent them from being “led by the nose” by Marx and Lenin.24 In other words, he did his utmost to discourage the Chinese from embracing Marxism-Leninism and from trying to make a revolution. y s Jo meet the challenge from Hu Shi, the following month Li Doctrine, He ied an article entitled “More on Questions and Doctrines. He pointed out that socialism was a banner of the hmes and that the propagation of doctrines and the study of prac ical questions were not conflicting endeavours but rather upplemented each other. On the one hand, he said, the study of practical questions must be guided by a doctrine. On the other hand a socialist, if his doctrine is to have some influence in the world must study how to apply his ideal, insofar as possible to hi real surroundings.*’ “As long as we apply a doctrine as a toS or an actual movement, ’ he continued, “it will bring about changes that will be suited to the surroundings in accordance with the time, the place and the nature of the matter.” In this wav Li 3 prellminary “Position of the idea that the general tenets of Marxism must be integrated with the actual conditions of the country and developed in the course of this integration He also rebutted Hu Shi’s arguments for reformism. In view of the would65 °! Ch T 3t the tlme’ hC declared’ Piecemeal reform ° d work and fundamental social problems had to be solved before specific issues could be addressed. The debate on “questions and doctrines” had tremendous retrCUv.SSi°uS' Many y°Ung people in different parts of the country who had begun to embrace Marxist ideas wrote magazine articles expressing their support for Li Dazhao’s views. m„ThM f°vlctR.f 1 sian Government issued a declaration renouncng al! the privileges formerly enjoyed by Czarist Russia within the borders of China. During March and April of 1920, The East and other journals made this declaration known to the Chinese CHAPTER ONE THE FOUNDING OF THE CPC 21 public, breaking the news blockade imposed by the reactionaries. When the Chinese people, who had been bullied by the capitalist powers for so long, learned the content of the declaration, they were overjoyed. New Youth carried comments from its readers and stated that the declaration embodied the spirit of the Constitution of Russia, that it demonstrated the will to eradicate capitalist aggressiveness and that the Chinese should study and uphold the doctrines of the worker-peasant government in Russia. The Soviet declaration gave a fresh and powerful impetus to the further dissemination of Marxism in China. Under these circumstances, many progressive intellectuals of different backgrounds came to Marxism by different routes, after careful consideration of the alternatives. As an ideological leader during the initial stage of the new cultural movement, Chen Duxiu declared after the May 4th Movement that since militarism and money-worship had caused endless crimes, it was high time to discard them. He said he had come to realize that republican politics was manipulated by the bourgeoisie, which was in the minority, and that it was an illusion to think it could be used to achieve happiness for the majority. He warned that China should not take the path followed by Europe, the United Sates and Japan. In his article “On Politics” published in September 1920, Chen stated explicitly that it was the prime necessity for a modern society to establish a stale of the labouring classes (the productive classes), by means of revolution, and to institute politics and laws that would prohibit plundering at home and abroad. At this juncture, a group of prominent young Left-wingers who had emerged from the May 4th Movement also began to turn towards Marxism. In the Xiangjiang Review, of which he was the editor-in-chief, Mao Zedong, then a well-known leader of the student movement in Hunan Province, enthusiastically praised the victory of the October Revolution, declaring that it would spread worldwide and that the Chinese should follow its example. After he came to Beijing for the second time, he eagerly sought out books about communism and about conditions in Russia and these helped to establish his faith in Marxism. Many years ’later22 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC he recalled, “By the summer of 1920 I had become, in theory and to some extent in action, a Marxist.”25 Other noted student leaders, such as Deng Zhongxia, Cai Hesen and Zhou Enlai, one after another, set out on the same road. As has been said above, some veteran members of the Chinese Revolutionary League also began to turn to proletarian socialism. Many years later, Dong Biwu recalled how he and others had joined Sun Yat-sen in the revolution. “The revolution forged ahead, but Sun Yat-sen failed to get hold of it and, as a result, it was snatched by others. We therefore began to study the Russian pattern” and to read Marxism.26 Wu Yuzhang, another veteran revolutionary, said that at that time, from what he had experienced since the Revolution of 1911, he had come to realize that “the old methods of revolution used in the past must be changed.” “In the light shed by the October Revolution and the May 4th Movement,” he added, “the idea that we must rely on the people of the lower social strata and take the path of the Russians became increasingly clear in my mind.”27 That these men with different experiences came to Marxism by different routes indicates that it was the historic choice of a considerable number of Chinese progressives to abandon the capitalist programme for national construction and to take the road illuminated by Marxist scientific socialism. This was the most essential feature of the new cultural movement after the May 4th Movement. It is important to note that the first group of Marxists in China had been fervent fighters for bourgeois democracy. They forsook their faith in bourgeois democracy and turned to Marxism. They made this choice of their own accord, in light of their own experiences and after careful consideration. This was because Marxism, as a well-knit scientific theory, was more convincing to them than any other doctrine and because, as Shi Cuntong put it, “it can solve our problems and bring us benefits.”28 After they accepted Marxism, the Chinese progressives did not discard the respect for science and democracy fostered by the May 4th Movement. On the contrary, under the guidance of Marxism they infused those concepts with fresh and more proCHAPTER ONE THE FOUNDING OF THE CPC 23 found content. Democracy no longer meant narrow bourgeois democracy but democracy for the majority; that is, for the labouring classes. For this reason they stressed the need to root out the class privileges of the minority and, in the words of Chen Duxiu, to change the state of “the majority of proletarian labourers, who live in hardship, without freedom,” which did not conform to democracy.29 Science includes both natural and social sciences, but the Chinese Marxists believed that the study of society could become a true science only when it was based on historical materialism. As far as science was concerned, therefore, prime importance should be given to the Marxist scientific world outlook, methodology and theory of social revolution. The dissemination of Marxism did not negate the ideological struggle against feudalism. On the contrary, it provided an even sharper weapon for that struggle. Applying historical materialism, the first group of Marxists in China revealed the social causes of feudal ideology and culture. They set a higher goal for their struggle against feudalism, elevating the struggle for liberation of the individual to a struggle for liberation of the masses. As for the form of the struggle, propagation of the new ideas by a small number of people changed into revolutionary practice by the masses, thus deepening their ideological liberation. From the very beginning, the Chinese progressives looked upon Marxism not simply as a doctrine but as an instrument for studying the destiny of the country. Although they were not adequately prepared theoretically, they took the basic principles of Marxism as their guide and participated enthusiastically in the mass struggle. At the beginning of 1920, a number of revolutionary intellectuals in Beijing, at the urging of Li Dazhao, went to the living quarters of rickshaw men to investigate their miserable conditions. Deng Zhongxia and others went to Changxindian, a locomotive repair centre in the suburbs of Beijing, to conduct revolutionary propaganda among the workers and begin to forge links with them. From the very beginning, the participants in the Marxist ideological movement saw to it that they integrated their revolutionary ideas with practice and joined the masses in their struggle. This was one of the characteristics and strong points of24 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC the Marxist ideological movement. At first, however, the dissemination of Marxism was confined mainly to a small number of intellectuals. Communist groups in various parts of the country, embryonic organizations of the Communist Party of China, made it their principal task to disseminate Marxism and to integrate it with the workers’ movement.

The Founding of the Communist Party of China

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helped the socialists in Tianjin, Tangshan, Taiyuan, Jinan and other cities in northern China to establish Party and Youth League organizations. Between the autumn of 1920 and the spring of 1921, Dong Biwu, Chen Tanqiu, Bao Huiseng and others in Wuhan; Mao Zedong, He Shuheng and others in Changsha; Wang Jinmei, Deng Enming and others in Jinan; and Tan Pingshan, Tan Zhitang and others in Guangzhou also established Communist groups, propagating communist ideas and carrying out organizational activities. Most such groups were established in key cities, where the new cultural movement and the patriotic May 4th Movement had had a profound influence, where large communities of industrial workers were located and where there were the first groups of intellectuals who believed in Marxism. Communist organizations were also formed by progressives among the Chinese students in Japan and France. These early organizations had different names. The Shanghai group, for example, was known as the Communist Party of China from the very beginning. The Beijing group called itself the Beijing Branch of the Communist Party of China. In later years all these local organizations, which were soon to form the Communist Party of China, were commonly known as Communist groups. Work of the Communist Groups Once established, the Communist groups in various parts of China disseminated Marxism in a planned way, doing propaganda and organizational work among the workers and promoting the integration of Marxism with the workers’ movement. This was ideological and organizational preparation for the founding of the Communist Party of China. Their main activities were as follows. 1. Studying and propagating Marxism. In September 1920 New Youth became the organ of the Shanghai Communist group and began to propagate Marxism openly. The new column “Study of Russia” in the magazine dealt with the experience of the October Revolution and of Soviet Russia. In November of the same year, the group launched The Communist Party , a semi-clandestine monthly, to spread elementary knowledge about a potential Communist Party and to give news of the Communist International and of Communist parties in other countries, thus preparing the ground for the founding of such a party in China. The Communist groups in various parts of the country propagated Marxism through newspapers and periodicals, including those published by themselves, such as Awakening , a supplement to the Republican Daily in Shanghai, the Wuhan Weekly Review in Hubei, the fortnightly Encourage the New in Jinan and the Mass Journal in Guangdong. Thanks to these journals, scientific socialism became a strong trend of thought in China. The Communist groups in Shanghai and Beijing also published many translations of Marxist works. The Chinese translation, by Chen Wangdao, of The Communist Manifesto was published in August 1920. About one thousand copies were printed for the first edition, and the work was reprinted in many other cities. The same month saw the publication of the Chinese translation of Socialism: Utopian and Scientific by Engels. Also translated and published were writings on Marxism such as The ABC of “ Capi taC by Marx , An Explanation of Historical Materialism, Class Struggle and The History of Socialism. The publication of these books made it possible for the progressives in China to have a systematic understanding of Marxism. In their initial propagation of Marxism, the Communist groups gave paramount importance to the theories of scientific socialism and class struggle, and these theories had widespread influence in ideological circles. In the original or newly established Marxist societies and other organizations, some of the Communist groups organized progressive young people to learn the basic theories of Marxism and study the practical problems of China. In this way they created the earliest backbone force of the future Party. In particular, the Society for the Study of Marxist Theories in Beijing University, under the guidance of Li Dazhao, served this function: many of its members and corresponding members were revolutionary young people who later became Communists. 2. Conducting polemics against anti-Marxist trends of thought.

While the influence of Marxist ideology was spreading, some factions that supported bourgeois and petty bourgeois ideology were also propagating their political views under the name of socialism. At this time, not all progressives who were seeking the truth were able to see the essential distinction between Marxism and these other forms of socialism. The Communist groups had to struggle to make a clear distinction between scientific socialism and other forms of socialism and to win over persons who were patriotic and inclined towards progress but who had been influenced by other schools of thought. At the end of 1920, Zhang Dongsun and Liang Qichao launched a debate about socialism. Although they stated that capitalism was bound to fall and socialism was sure to rise, they emphasized that since China was industrially backward, there was no ground for the founding of a political party representing the labouring classes and that a real worker-peasant revolution would never take place. They believed that poverty was the major problem in China and that the solution was for the gentry and mercantile class to vitalize industry and commerce and develop capitalism. They called for “a rectified attitude toward capitalists” in order to “bring about sound, gradual development under the present economic system.” They expressed their faith in the guild socialism advocated by Bertrand Russell, a British scholar, — bourgeois reformism under the guise of socialism. These views were firmly rejected by the first group of Marxists in China. The Marxists declared that one could not think about ways to solve China’s problems without taking into account the conditions of the times, and that judging from international conditions and the state of society at home, it was impossible for the country to develop capitalism independently. “The Chinese people’s position in the world economy,” they pointed out, “has been secured in the mounting tide of the labour movement, and it is theoretically impermissible and practically impossible to institute a system that protects capitalists.” It was necessary, they felt, for China to develop education and industry, but it should do so by means of socialism so as to “uproot the plundering classes at home and resist international capitalism,” instead of “following the wrong path taken by Europe, the United States and Japan.” They added that the existence of the proletariat in China was an undeniable fact and that “the Chinese proletariat is suffering even greater misery than the proletariat in Europe, the United States and Japan.” “This state of affairs,” they concluded, “cannot be remedied unless the Chinese labourers unite and form revolutionary organizations to transform the system of production.” The first group of Marxists were not aware that, for the revolution in semi-colonial, semi-feudal China, the first step had to be democracy, with socialism only as the second step. But from the very beginning they stressed that capitalism was an impasse in China, that socialism was the only solution and that it was necessary to found a party of the working class to lead the Chinese people in revolution. This understanding was absolutely correct and of far-reaching significance. They expounded their views on a theoretical plane and tested them against the actual circumstances of Chinese society. This showed that scientific socialism could take root in China. Among the various trends of socialist thought, anarchism was dominant for a period of time. Proceeding from ultraindividualism, the anarchists preached absolute freedom of the individual in his opposition to power, to any form of organization and discipline, to any authority and to any type of government, including the dictatorship of the proletariat. They also attacked private ownership and advocated absolute egalitarianism. China was a country with a large petty bourgeoisie. In essence, the proposals of the anarchists, which centred around the interests of the individual and seemed to be immensely radical and thoroughgoing, echoed the sentiments of the small producers, who were dissatisfied with the status quo because they had been reduced to bankruptcy, and of the petty-bourgeois intellectuals, who had been reduced to despair politically. A number of young people who were discontent with the old society and looking for a way out, were also influenced by this ideology because they knew little about socialism. Before the May 4th Movement, Shi Fu and others had preached anarchism in China. During the period of the movement, anarchism had found many adherents, especially in Guangdong Province, and more than 70 periodicals and books were published to propagate their ideas. As anarchism was essentially antagonistic to Marxism, they increasingly directed their attacks at Marxism, which was being disseminated on an everwider scale. Huang Lingshuang and others wrote articles with such titles as “Criticism of Marxist Theories” and “We Are Against ‘Bolshevism,’ ” posing an open challenge to Marxism. It became an important task for the Marxists to expose the true nature of this school of petty-bourgeois socialist ideology. During the polemics against the anarchists, the Marxists argued that while the power of the bourgeoisie should undoubtedly be opposed, the power of the proletariat should not. Revolutionary means must be adopted to seize political power and establish the dictatorship of the proletariat. That was the only way to protect the interests of the labourers and ultimately to eliminate classes and make the state wither away. Advocating absolute freedom of the individual, the Marxists said, would only make it impossible for the working class to close ranks and become a powerful combat force, and it would therefore make it easier for the bourgeoisie to destroy the workers’ movement. Social and economic chaos would result if the principle of distribution “from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs” were put into effect before the productive forces were highly developed. In reality, the social contradictions in modern China were so acute that only great unity and unremitting struggle could overthrow the old forces. Yet while the anarchists expressed opposition to power, they called for absolute freedom of the individual and urged the elimination of all discipline and of any restraint by the collective. In the end, however, this was all empty talk. The anarchists could form only small, loosely organized groups with a tiny total membership, and they were unable to play an important role in political life. Accordingly, when they encountered scathing criticism from the Marxists, their influence quickly waned. The Marxists also rejected the revisionism of the Second International. Denouncing the assertion that “parliamentary tactics CHAPTER ONE THE FOUNDING OF THE CPC 31 should be employed for the elevation of the workers’ status and the shift of political power” in China, they pointed out that “social democrats try to make use of the parliament as a means of transformation, but in reality, parliamentary legislation invariably protects the propertied classes.” They also declared that as a result of the misrepresentations of the Second International, the “cream” of Marxist socialism had disappeared completely. The social democrats’ socialism, they said, had degenerated into liberalism, and their revolutionism had degenerated into reformism. This revisionist thinking, they continued, found little support in China, because the class contradictions were extremely acute and the Chinese parliament had long since become a toy in the hands of the warlords. The Marxists’ criticism of the position taken by the Second International indicated that from the very beginning the communist movement in China adhered to a revolutionary orientation. Actually, the polemics against the anti-Marxist trends of thought were a struggle to win over the masses. They helped progressives who were inclined to socialism to distinguish between scientific socialism and the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois schools of socialism and to embrace Marxism. Many progressive young people who had been influenced by anarchistic ideas became staunch Marxists later on. 3. Conducting propaganda and organizing the workers. Once formed, the Communist groups in various parts of the country took a direct and energetic part in the labour movement, organizing and educating the workers. This was something no other political party had ever done in China. The Chinese working class displayed great strength in the later stage of the May 4th Movement, but it was still young, and a great many of its members came from among the impoverished peasants and urban vagrants, devoid of class consciousness. Originally they had had guilds and secret societies; later they had had so-called trade unions, which were only organizations manipulated by hooligans or by employers. To propagate Marxism among the workers and awaken their class consciousness, the Communist groups launched publications addressed to them. These included Labour in Shanghai, The Voice of Labour and the Workers' Weekly in Beijing and the Jinan Labour Monthly in Jinan. At the same time, they established various types of workers’ schools, the most well-known of which were the school for continuing education in Changxindian in suburban Beijing, established by Deng Zhongxia and others of the Beijing group, and a similar one in western Shanghai established by Li Qihan and others of the Shanghai group. Running such schools was the Party’s way of “starting its work among the workers and of coming into contact with the masses to organize trade unions.”30 As a result of these efforts at propaganda and education, the politically awakened workers demanded organization. In November 1920 the Shanghai Machine-building Trade Union, the first trade union led by a Communist group, was founded with an initial membership of about 370. Soon after that, the Shanghai Printing Trade Union came into existence, with a membership of more than 1,300. On May 1, 1921, more than a thousand workers in Changxindian took part in a parade to mark International Labour Day, and to announce the establishment of a “workers’ club” (trade union). One after another, trade unions were organized by industrial workers and handicraftsmen in Wuhan, Changsha, Guangzhou and Jinan. These trade unions began to call upon the workers to strike. Most of the members of the Communist groups were intellectuals. In order to carry out effective propaganda and organizational work among the workers, they put on workers’ clothes, learned to speak their language and joined in their labour, doing everything possible to become one with them. Yu Xiusong, for example, wrote to a friend that he had “changed his name and changed his clothes” to take a job at the Housheng Iron Works, where he gave lectures to the workers.31 Li Zhong, a student from Hunan No. One Normal School and a member of the Socialist Youth League, worked as a blacksmith at the Jiangnan Shipyard and helped Chen Duxiu and others organize the Machinebuilding Trade Union.32 So it was that from the very outset the Marxist ideological movement in China was one in which the intellectuals were integrated with the workers. 4. Founding the Socialist Youth League. As a vigorous social force receptive to new ideas, young people were, of course, highly valued by the Marxists. On the other hand, they were generally inexperienced and needed good leadership. To meet this need, in August 1920 the Shanghai Communist group founded the Socialist Youth League. Yu Xiusong became the secretary. After that, Youth League organizations were established in Beijing, Tianjin, Wuchang, Hankou, Changsha and other cities, where they organized their members to study Marxism and take part in labour struggles, creating a reserve force for the future Party. These four activities of the Communist groups gave a powerful impetus to the dissemination of Marxism and to its integration with the workers’ movement. In the process, those intellectuals who had only recently come to believe in communism gradually underwent profound changes in their thinking and in their attitude toward workers. At the same time, a number of workers learned something about Marxism and raised their class consciousness, becoming advanced elements of the proletariat. All this helped prepare the ground for the founding of a communist party. The 1st National Congress of the Communist Party of China In March 1921, Li Dazhao wrote an article calling for the founding of a political party of the working class. “In China today,” he said, “there is no organization that can really represent the people. If friends of Faction C | the Communists] can establish a solid and well-knit organization and see to the collective training of its members, there will be support for a great, thoroughgoing reform in China.”33 In March of the same year, representatives of Communist organizations throughout the country held a meeting at which they issued a common statement of objectives and principles and worked out a provisional programme.34 On July 23, 1921, the 1st National Congress of the Communist Party of China was convened at No. 106 Wangzhi Road (now. No.76 Xingye Road), in the French concession in Shanghai. As the meeting place caught the eye of plainclothes detectives and was searched by foreign policemen, the delegates had to go to Jiaxing County in Zhejiang Province, where they held their final session on a pleasure boat on Lake Nanhu. Attending the 1st Party Congress were twelve delegates representing fifty-three Party members in seven localities. They were: Li Da and Li Hanjun (Shanghai), Zhang Guotao and Liu Renjing (Beijing), Mao Zedong and He Shuheng (Changsha), Dong Biwu and Chen Tanqiu (Wuhan), Wang Jinmei and Deng Enming (Jinan), Chen Gongbo (Guangzhou) and Zhou Fohai (residing in Japan). Bao Huiseng, designated by Chen Duxiu, who was then in Guangzhou, also attended the congress. Two representatives of the Communist International, G. Maring and Nicolsky, attended as observers. The congress decided that the name of the new party would be “the Communist Party of China” and that its programme would be “to overthrow the bourgeoisie by means of the revolutionary army of the proletariat ... to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat in order to attain the objective of class struggle, that is, the elimination of classes ... to abolish private ownership of capital” and to ally itself with the Third International. From the day of its founding, the Communist Party of China set itself the goal of socialism and, ultimately, communism, and advocated the attainment of that goal by revolutionary means. Thus it made a clear distinction of principle between itself and the social democrats of the Second International, who worshipped bourgeois democracy and parliamentarianism. The congress called for “cooperation with other political parties in the struggle against the common enemy” — that is, the warlords but it failed to work out an explicit programme for the stage of democratic revolution. The newborn Communist Party of China had set socialism and communism as its goal and was firmly determined to make a revolution, but it had little understanding of the specific conditions of the country and did not see the difference and connections between democratic revolution and socialist revolution. Under the social circumstances of semi-colonial and semi-feudal China, with poorly developed capCHAPTER ONE THE FOUNDING OF THE CPC 35 italism and ruthless oppression by foreign imperialists, the Communist Party of China could not clearly understand such questions as whether it was possible to make socialist revolution immediately and directly and what steps should be taken to realize socialism and then communism. When the congress discussed the plan for practical work, it became clear that because the Party’s membership was so small, it would be difficult to organize the peasants and armed forces. Accordingly, it decided to concentrate the Party’s energy on organizing factory workers. The Party’s first resolution adopted by the congress provided that the basic task of the Party at the time would be “the establishment of trade unions of industrial workers,” that “the Party should imbue the trade unions with the spirit of class struggle” and that it should send members to work in them. As the vanguard of the working class, the Communist Party of China did not simply concern itself with propagating Marxism but paid great attention to establishing close ties with the working class. This was one of its chief merits. To ensure that the CPC would be an advanced party, the congress sought to guarantee the quality of Party members. It decided to “admit new members only with particular caution and after strict examination,” and since the Party was then composed almost entirely of intellectuals, to “make special effort in organizing the workers and educating them in the spirit of communism.” The programme adopted by the congress also stipulated that persons who applied for Party membership must not have any inclination toward non-communist ideas. Before they were admitted, “they must sever relations with any other party or group which [was] opposed to the Communist Party programme.” Furthermore, it was stipulated that “the views of the Party and the identity of Party members should be kept secret until such time as conditions are ripe for them to be brought into the open.” At a time when the Party had just been born, however, its ranks could hardly be totally pure. The twelve delegates to the 1st Party Congress split up later on. Most of them adhered unswervingly to their faith in socialism and communism and upheld the cause of the Chinese revolution, for which some of them gave their lives.People like Chen Gongbo and Zhou Fohai, however, were not genuine Communists, and they were expelled from the Party soon after its founding. Others quit the Party, and some even betrayed the revolution. This was not surprising in a party that had only just come into being. Even when the CPC grew into a mass party composed for the most part of fine, staunch Communists, it was inevitable that waverers, dissidents and turncoats should appear in its ranks. The congress elected Chen Duxiu and two others to form the Central Bureau, the leading organ of the Party. Chen Duxiu was to serve as secretary, while Li Da and Zhang Guotao were to be in charge of propaganda and organizational work respectively. The 1st National Congress of the Party proclaimed the founding of the Communist Party of China. The birth of the CPC was an inevitable outcome of the development of the revolutionary movement in China. Almost at the same time a number of progressives who had no links with the Shanghai group, which initiated the founding of the CPC, were also preparing to found a party. In July 1920 a number of Chinese students who were on a work-study programme in France gathered at a meeting in College de Montargis. According to Li Weihan, one of those present, Cai Hesen “called for making a radical revolution, organizing a Communist party and enforcing the dictatorship of the proletariat, that is, following the path of the October Revolution in Russia.” He also consulted Li Weihan and others about how to prepare for the establishment of a Communist party. This was never accomplished, however, Li recalled, “because Cai was busy leading the Chinese students’ struggle to secure opportunities to study.”35 In the summer of 1921, members of the Liqun Study Society met in Huanggang, Hubei Province, expressing support for the formation of a party of the Bolshevik type and proposing that the organization be named “Bo She” (for Bolshevik). Upon hearing of the founding of the Communist Party of China, Yun Daiying, founder of the society, immediately called on its members to disband it and join the CPC.36 In the winter of 1923, more than twenty people in Sichuan Province, including Wu Yuzhang and Yang Angong, secretly organized the Chinese Youth Communist Party and began to publish Chixin Pinglun (Sincere Review) as its organ. Later this party abolished itself and urged its members to join the CPC as individuals.37 These facts show that the establishment of a political party of the working class to lead the Chinese people in their struggle had become the common demand of the most conscious revolutionaries in China and was an outcome of the development of the objective situation. That the Communist Party of China was founded in the early 1920s was by no means accidental. The CPC is a revolutionary Marxist party and the vanguard of the Chinese working class. It came into being under specific social and historical circumstances. On the one hand, it was founded after the October Revolution in Russia had been crowned with victory and after the social-democratic trend of thought espoused by the Second International had been discredited during World War I. It embraced Marxism, which was composed of a complete scientific world outlook and the theory of social revolution; Leninism, which was Marxism developed in the era of imperialism and proletarian revolution; and scientific socialism, which was clearly distinguished from bourgeois and petty-bourgeois schools of socialism in the course of struggle. On the other hand, it was founded on the basis of the workers’ movement in semicolonial and semi-feudal China. The social contradictions in modern China were extremely acute. The working class was relatively new, and many workers had been small producers in the past, but it cherished a fierce desire for revolution, because it was subject to ruthless oppression and exploitation by the foreign imperialists and by the domestic bourgeoisie and feudal forces. Within this class there was no stratum of labour aristocracy such as could be found in Europe, and no solid economic foundation for reformism. China had not passed through a stage of “peaceful” development of capitalism as Europe had done, so the Chinese working class could not carry out peaceful parliamentary struggles and could have no illusions about bourgeois democracy. Therefore, the Party was not influenced by the Second International. It was, from the outset, a party with Marxism-Leninism asits theoretical basis, a new type of revolutionary party of the working class. Being different from the political parties of the past, the Communist Party of China took a clear stand, analyzing problems in China from the Marxist point of view of class struggle and carrying out mass work among the workers. By so doing, the Party, despite its small size, threw all the decadent forces of the old society into a panic. When the communist movement in China was only just stirring, it was criticized as “extremist” and repressed jointly by the reactionaries at home and abroad. In April 1920 the Northern warlord government, basing itself on a reporter’s despatch in the American newspaper The Chicago Sun that spoke of the need to guard against extremist preaching, sent telegrams to the military inspectors, governors and superintendents of all provinces and regions, instructing them to keep a sharp lookout for “extremists.”38 In December, at the request of Wang Huaiqing, commander-in-chief of the infantry, the State Council of the Northern warlord government sent a letter to the Ministry of Internal Affairs instructing it to draft special provisions for punishing “extremists.” In his letter of request, Wang cried out in alarm that the “scourge” of the propagation of communism was “worse than fierce floods or savage beasts” and “should be strictly guarded against so as to nip the trouble in the bud.”39 Under these circumstances, which lasted many years, the CPC had to operate as an outlawed and clandestine party, whose members were always in danger of being tracked down, arrested and executed by the reactionary troops and police. Rarely had a political party in China had to function under such difficult conditions. As the political party of the working class, the most advanced class in the country, the CPC represented the interests not only of that class but of the vast masses of the people and the nation as a whole. Using Marxism to clarify its own understanding, the Party was able to illumine for the Chinese people the goal of their struggle and the path to victory. That is why it was able gradually to take root in Chinese soil and to grow into an invincible force. The founding of the Communist Party brought light and hope to the disaster-ridden Chinese people. A revolutionary party of CHAPTER ONE THE FOUNDING OF THE CPC 39 the working class was the first requirement for the victory of the Chinese revolution. With the birth of the CPC, the Chinese revolution took on an entirely new complexion. The Party had to operate in a semi-colonial, semi-feudal country with a vast territory, a huge population, complicated conditions and a backward economy and culture. It had to integrate the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution, a daunting undertaking for which its forerunners provided no experience to draw on. Inevitably, a period of time would be required for the Party to grope its way in the darkness and accumulate experience in the struggle. It would be a slow hard task for the Party to gain strength and to work out a Marxist line, guiding principles and policies that were suited to the conditions of China.

Formulating the Programme of Democratic Revolution

Before the founding of the Communist Party of China, the Chinese people had waged protracted struggles against foreign aggressors and domestic feudal rulers. Yet these struggles had two fundamental weaknesses. First, those who took part in them did not see clearly the targets of revolution, and they failed to unite with their real friends to attack their real enemies. The slogan “Support the Qing and exterminate the foreigners!” adopted by the Yi He Tuan movement (the Boxers) and the actions they took showed that the peasants did not understand the true nature of the foreign aggressors and the ties between them and the feudal rulers at home. When the Chinese Revolutionary League, the predecessor of the Kuomintang, had overthrown the monarchy of the Qing Dynasty, it believed that it had accomplished its task and as a result, “the revolutionary army prospered while the revolutionary party waned.” For more than ten years after the Revolution of 1911, the Kuomintang only sought to preserve the Provisional Constitution promulgated in the first year of the Republic of China (the so-called pro-Constitution campaign). It failed to take a firm stand against imperialism and allied itself with the local warlords to counter the Northern warlords, thus proving that the bourgeois democrats, too, were incapable of identifying the goal for which the Chinese people should struggle. This was the main reason why little had been achieved in the revolutionary struggles of the past. Second, the earlier revolutionaries did not arouse the people on a broad scale and, in particular, did not go deep among the workers and peasants to launch organized, sustained mass movements. The activities of the Chinese Revolutionary League were conducted mainly by a small number of revolutionaries in alliance with some secret societies or the New Army. They did not integrate themselves with the peasants in the rural areas, and their activities were divorced from the peasants’ spontaneous struggles. Neither did they integrate themselves with the workers in the cities. After the Revolution of 1911, although the Kuomintang waged a struggle against Yuan Shikai and opposed the Northern warlord government, it did little mass work. As Zhou Enlai remarked years later, the ordinary workers and intellectuals “were not deeply impressed” by the Kuomintang.40 This was another main reason why little had been achieved in the revolutionary struggles of the past. Shortly after the founding of the Communist Party of China, radical changes took place in these two respects. The CPC took an active part in revolutionary activities and learned, in the course of the struggle, to apply the Marxist method in observing and analyzing the problems China was faced with. In January 1922, the introduction to The Pioneers, a magazine, declared that the first task should be “to study assiduously the objective conditions of China so as to find the most appropriate solution to the country’s problems.” The Washington Conference convened by the imperialist powers towards the end of 1921 served as a practical lesson for the young Communist Party of China. At the conference a treaty was adopted by the nine nations — the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal, Belgium and China (i.e., the warlord government in Beijing). This treaty CHAPTER ONE THE FOUNDING OF THE CPC 41 approved the principle of “equal opportunity in China for the commerce and industry of all nations” and the principle of the “Open Door,” which had been proposed by the United States in a bid to curb Japan’s exclusive domination of China and to confirm the imperialist powers’ joint control of the country. Manipulated by the imperialists, the warlords of various factions in China intensified their rivalry and fought each other again and again in large-scale wars such as the Zhili-Anhui War and the Zbili-Fengtian War, throwing the political situation in China into utter chaos. These events made it clear to the CPC that what the Chinese people suffered from most was not ordinary capitalist exploitation but oppression by imperialists and rule by feudal warlords. In January 1922 the Party sent representatives to Moscow to attend the first congress of representatives from Communist parties and national revolutionary organizations of the Far Eastern countries, convened by the Communist International. The congress expounded Lenin’s theories on the national and colonial questions and stated that, so far as China was concerned, the first thing to do at the time was to “free the country from the shackles of foreign countries, overthrow the military governors” and establish a democratic republic. These ideas were of direct assistance to the CPC in working out a revolutionary programme for that period. The 2nd National Congress of the Communist Party of China The programme of anti-imperialist and anti-feudal democratic revolution in China was formulated at the 2nd National Congress of the CPC, held in Shanghai in July 1922. Twelve delegates attended the congress, representing 195 Party members (21 of whom were workers) from various parts of the country. The congress analyzed China’s economic and political conditions and brought to light the semi-colonial and semi-feudal nature of the society. On the one hand, the congress stated, China had been placed under the control of the imperialist powers both politically and economically and, indeed, had become “a semi ?independent country under the domination of international capitalist-imperialist forces.” On the other hand, it said, China remained under the political domination of the warlord and bureaucratic feudal system, which constituted an immense obstacle to the development of the rising Chinese bourgeoisie. It concluded that the democratic revolutionary movement against the imperialist and feudal forces was of paramount importance. While the Party’s maximum programme was to realize socialism and communism, the programme for the present stage should be to overthrow the warlords, to cast off oppression by world imperialism and to unify the country as a genuine democratic republic. Given present conditions, the congress believed, this was a stage that could not be skipped over. The congress went on to say that in order to attain the goal of the revolutionary struggle against the imperialists and warlords, it was imperative to form a democratic, united front. After making an elementary analysis of the conditions of all classes in Chinese society, it noted that the masses of Chinese peasants, with their tremendous revolutionary enthusiasm, were “the greatest essential factor in the revolutionary movement.” A large section of the petty bourgeoisie would also join the revolutionary ranks, because they were suffering untold misery. To free themselves from economic oppression, the emerging bourgeoisie would have to rise and struggle against world capitalist imperialism. As for the working class, it was a great force that would steadily grow into a revolutionary army that would overthrow imperialism in China. Thus, for the first time, the 2nd National Party Congress proposed for the Chinese people a clearly defined programme of anti-imperialist and anti-feudal democratic revolution. For a long time, the participants in that revolution, launched in the previous century, had had no clear idea of its targets and motive force and had never come out openly against the imperialist and feudal forces. But just a year after the Communist Party of China was founded, these questions had been clarified. Only the CPC, armed with Marxism, could point the way for the Chinese revolution. After the declaration of the 2nd Party Congress was made public, CHAPTER ONE THE FOUNDING OF THE CPC 43 Hu Shi published in the weekly Endeavour an article entitled “International China,” ridiculing the Party’s scientific thesis that the imperialists were sponsoring the feudal warlords as “a tall story told by country bumpkins.” He held that the major problem of the time was to form “a good government” composed of “good people,” and that it was not necessary to “involve any problem of world imperialism at this time.” However, it was impossible to establish any really good government or to achieve any economic and political progress unless imperialist oppression and the warlords’ regime were overthrown. What the Communist Party stated in scientific language was precisely what the Chinese people had dimly perceived from the realities of their own lives. For this reason, the Party’s programme quickly spread far and wide and was accepted by the public. “Down with the imperialist powers! Down with the warlords!” became the demand of the people. Nevertheless, the Communist Party also had some mistaken views regarding the Chinese revolution. It believed that the success of the democratic revolution would only bring the proletariat some freedoms and rights. In other words, the victory of the democratic revolution would be a victory for the bourgeoisie. The Chinese Communists reached this conclusion by judging from what had happened in Western countries, but the Western model was not applicable to the Chinese revolution. The Party had understood the difference between democratic revolution and socialist revolution, but not the difference between old democratic revolution and new democratic revolution. And it did not realize that under the new historical conditions, the democratic revolution should be a new democratic revolution led by the proletariat. Besides formulating an explicitly anti-imperialist and antifeudal revolutionary programme, the Communist Party adopted a brand-new method that had never been, and could never be, adopted by the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois political parties and groups — the method of arousing the masses and relying on them to carry out the revolution. As the vanguard of the working class, the Communist Party of China was different from other parties. All its activities were undertaken to serve the interests of the working class and the masses and to achieve their liberation. It dared therefore to trust the people and rely on them. In its declaration, the Second Party Congress stated: “Our Communist Party is neither a Marxist academic society organized by intellectuals nor a utopian revolutionary organization of a few Communists who are divorced from the masses .... Since ours is a party fighting for the proletariat, we should go among the masses and form a large mass party.” It went on to say that the Party should have the organization and training that would fit it for the revolution and that “all the Party’s activities should be conducted in the depths of the masses” and “must never be divorced from the masses.” The upsurge of the Chinese workers’ movement in the early stage of the Party’s existence was an initial manifestation of the might of the Party’s mass line. The Upsurge of the Labour Movement To promote the labour movement, the Communist Party established the Secretariat of the Chinese Labour Organization as a headquarters openly directing the movement. The head office was set up in Shanghai and later moved to Beijing. The director was Zhang Guotao, who was later replaced by Deng Zhongxia. Branches of the organization were established in Beijing, Wuhan, Hunan, Guangdong, Shanghai and other places. The Secretariat published the journal Labour Weekly, ran workers’ schools, formed industrial workers’ trade unions and organized strikes. These included strikes of workers at British and American cigarette factories in Shanghai, of workers on the Wuchang-Changsha section of the Guangzhou-Hankou Railway and of rickshaw men in the foreign concessions in Hankou. The political influence of the Party was growing among the workers and in society as a whole. In May 1 922 the Secretariat of the Chinese Labour Organization convened the First National Labour Conference in Guangzhou to discuss a number of questions, including ways of strengthening the unity of workers all over the country. Present at the conference were CHAPTER ONE THE FOUNDING OF THE CPC 45 162 representatives from trade unions in different parts of the country who belonged to different political parties and groups. “Because the Communist Party enjoyed extremely high prestige at the conference,” wrote Deng Zhongxia, “the different parties and groups expressed no objections” to the three slogans put up at the conference hall — “Down with imperialism!”, “Down with the warlords!” and “Long live the Communist Party of China!” “The conference adopted the proposal that until an all-China federation of trade unions was established, the Secretariat of the Chinese Labour Organization should serve as the general liaison office for the workers’ organizations throughout the country, and, actually, it was acknowledged as the only leader in this field.” This was a confirmation of the leading position of the Party in the labour movement. The success of the conference “led the working class onto the road to national unity.”41 Around the time of the 1st National Labour Conference, there came a first upsurge of the Chinese workers’ movement. It began with a strike by seamen in Hong Kong in January 1922 and culminated in a strike by the Beijing-Hankou Railway workers in February 1923. Within those thirteen months, more than a hundred strikes of different dimensions were staged in various parts of the country, with the participation of more than 300,000 workers. The seamen’s strike in Hong Kong was the first organized battle of the Chinese working class against the imperialist forces. It started in Hong Kong and spread to the Yangtze River Valley, lasting about four months. In January 1922 seamen in Hong Kong went on strike, demanding higher wages. Under the leadership of Su Zhaozheng, Lin Weimin and others, the strikers persisted in their struggle for 56 days, overcoming every sort of obstruction and sabotage by the Hong Kong British authorities. The strike paralyzed all shipping, urban traffic and production in Hong Kong, and the authorities were compelled to cancel the order declaring the seamen’s union illegal and to increase their wages by 15-30 percent. In the words of Deng Zhongxia, “The British imperialists, who had been self-assured and awe-inspiring for seventy years, yielded to the power of Chinese seamen at last.”42 The anti-imperialist strike won the support of Sun Yat-sen and the Kuomintang. The Secretariat of the Chinese Labour Organization also helped the striking sailors along the Yangtze. The victory of the strike strengthened the courage and confidence of the working class in their struggle and fostered the growth of the labour movement all over the country. Another of the major strikes staged in southern China in this upsurge of the labour movement was the strike of the workers of the Anyuan Coal Mines in Jiangxi Province and of the railway leading from the mines to Zhuzhou in neighbouring Hunan Province. There were more than 17,000 workers at the Anyuan mines and on the railway. Mao Zedong went to Anyuan on a fact-finding mission and then Li Lisan went there to organize the workers. On May 1, International Labour Day, 1922, the Anyuan Mine and Railway Workers’ Club (trade union) was established. Early in September, Mao Zedong returned to Anyuan to organize a strike; he was followed by Liu Shaoqi. On September 14, to press the authorities for recognition of the club and a wage increase, the workers went on strike. They put forward seventeen demands, including protection of their political rights and improvement of their material benefits. The mine and railway authorities tried to buy over the workers’ leaders and to assassinate Li Lisan, but their schemes ended in failure. Then they sent a telegram to the local warlords, asking them to set up a martial law enforcement headquarters in Anyuan. When Liu Shaoqi walked to the headquarters to negotiate with the authorities, thousands of workers encircled the building to ensure the safety of their representative. The Communist Party employed good tactics in this strike. Liu Shaoqi said, “We should tell the cadres and Party members beforehand that the aim of the revolution is to seize political power. The workers cannot be thoroughly liberated before we gain political power. Therefore we can only put forward limited demands in the strike. The results of negotiations will surely be limited, too. So long as wages are raised and the workers’ club is recognized, we should declare the strike victorious and end it.”43 Thanks to the valiant struggle of the workers and the sympathy and support they gained from people of all walks of life, the mine and railway authorities were compelled to CHAPTER ONE THE FOUNDING OF THE CPC 47 meet most of the workers’ demands, so the three-day strike at Anyuan came to a victorious conclusion. The membership of the workers’ club, which had been 700 before the strike, grew rapidly to more than 10,000. Shortly thereafter, a major strike took place in northern China. On October 23, the workers at the Kailuan Coal Mines near Tangshan in Hebei Province struck for higher wages and recognition of their workers’ club. Fifty thousand miners at Kailuan joined in the strike, placing pickets to keep order. The Secretariat of the Chinese Labour Organization appointed Peng Lihe and others to assume command of this struggle. Several miners were killed and fifty others were wounded in front of the office of the mine administration by troops and police who had been called out to suppress the strikers. This bloodshed did not dampen the morale of the strikers, and none of them returned to work. After more than twenty days, considering that the strike had been going on for quite a long time and that it was difficult to keep it up any longer, the strikers accepted mediation and, when the mine authorities increased their wages somewhat, reluctantly returned to work. The strike of the Bcijing-Hankou Railway workers was designed to win recognition of the General Beijing-Hankou Railway Trade Union. Zhang Guotao, Luo Zhanglong and other Communists were the principal leaders. The Beijing-Hankou Railway, a major north-south artery, was controlled by Wu Peifu, chief of the warlords of the Zhili faction, for whom it was an important source of revenue with which to finance his troops. The inaugural meeting of the General Beijing-Hankou Railway Trade Union was scheduled for February 1, 1923, in Zhengzhou, Henan Province. Wu Peifu, who in an open telegram had promised to “protect the workers,” suddenly turned hostile and ordered his troops to prevent the meeting from being held. On February 1 the troops and police took control of the entire city of Zhengzhou and cordoned off the union headquarters. Representatives of the workers broke through the lines and crowded into the hall, shouting “Long live the General Beijing-Hankou Railway Trade Union!” and other slogans. However, the meeting could not be held because the hall had been wrecked and the temporary residence of some of the representatives was under siege. The union called on workers all along the railway to go on strike “to fight for freedom and human rights.” On February 4, thirty thousand workers held an orderly general strike. Within three hours, the entire 1,000 kilometre-long Beijing-Hankou railway was shut down. On February 7, Wu Peifu, with the support of the imperialist forces, assembled troops and police to shoot down the striking workers in cold blood. In Hankou the reactionaries tied Lin Xiangqian, president of the Hankou Branch of the union (a Communist Party member), to an electricity pole and tried to force him to call the strikers back to work. Lin refused to surrender and died a hero’s death. Shi Yang, legal consultant to the General Beijing-Hankou Railway Trade Union (also a Communist Party member), who had gone to Zhengzhou to attend the inaugural meeting of the union and had now returned, was murdered in nearby Wuchang. Struck by three bullets, he shouted “Long live the workers!” three times before he died. During this massacre, 52 people were killed and more than 300 were wounded. Afterward, some 40 were thrown into prison, and more than 1,000 others were dismissed or went into exile. After the February 7th massacre, trade union organizations in all parts of the country, except those in Guangdong and Hunan provinces, were banned. The workers were demoralized, and for some time the labour movement across the country remained at a low ebb. During this period, the workers’ struggles were organized mainly under the leadership of the Communist Party. These struggles demonstrated the revolutionary steadfastness and combat capability of the Chinese working class and expanded the political influence of the Party as the vanguard of that class. This provided favourable conditions for cooperation between the Party and other revolutionary forces and for the launching of a great nationwide revolution. Through the struggles of this period, the Communist Party forged closer ties with the working class and increased its own strength. In June 1922 the Party’s Central Committee planned to CHAPTER ONE THE FOUNDING OF THE CPC 49 recruit more members from among the workers. With the growth of the labour movement, a number of outstanding figures emerging from the ranks — such as Su Zhaozheng, Shi Wenbin, Xiang Ying, Deng Pei and Wang Hebo — joined the Party one after another. Grassroots organizations of the Party were also established in industrial and mining enterprises. For example, a Party branch was set up in the area of the Anyuan mine and railway in February 1922, and by May 1924 it already had more than 60 members. The struggles of this period provided important lessons. First, the enemies of the Chinese revolution were extremely strong. To defeat such formidable enemies, it was not sufficient for the proletariat to fight alone, and every opportunity had to be used to win over all potential allies. Second, in semi-colonial and semi-feudal China, the workers were not permitted any democratic rights whatsoever, and almost all their large-scale struggles were suppressed by the reactionary troops and police. It was therefore impracticable to rely on strikes and legal battles to bring about victory, without waging revolutionary armed struggles. In a statement issued after the February 7th massacre, the Secretariat of the Chinese Labour Organization made this point when it asked, “Would the workers have let themselves be slaughtered like this if they had had weapons?”44 Bearing these lessons in mind, the young Communist Party of China entered a period of great revolution based on cooperation with the Kuomintang. NOTES 1. The leaders of the movement tried to use the Emperor’s authority to adopt reforms to save the nation from extinction and develop capitalism without basically changing the feudal system. 2. “The Orientation of the Youth Movement,” Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Eng. ed., Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1975, Vol. II, p. 243. 3. Complete Works of Sun Yat-sen, Chin, ed., Zhonghua Book Company, Beijing, 1981, Vol. I, pp. 288-89. 4. Complete Works of Sun Yat-sen, Chin, ed., Zhonghua Book Company, Beijing, 1986, Vol. IX, p. 99. 5. Mao Zedong, “How to Study the History of the Communist Party of China,”

In the Torrent of the Great Revolution

The Establishment of the First Period of Cooperation Between the KMT and the CPC

From 1924 to 1927, a great revolutionary movement swept across the country. This movement was unprecedented in modern Chinese history, because vast numbers of people were mobilized to participate in it. In China it is known as the “Great Revolution.” As expressed in the lyrics of a popular song of the lime, the aim of this revolution was to “overthrow the great powers and eliminate the warlords.” “The great powers” was a reference to the imperialist powers, and of course, even if the revolution were successful, that would not rid the world of them. But this slogan expressed the people’s determination to combat the invasion and oppression by the imperialist powers, to liberate the country from their rule and to gain independence. The imperialists governed China indirectly through the feudal warlords, of which the Northern warlords were the most powerful at this time. Accordingly, the objective of the Great Revolution was to overthrow the regime of the imperialists and the Northern warlords; thus, it was to be a national democratic revolution. The Great Revolution gave vent to the people’s pent-up hatred and rage against the imperialists and feudal warlords. That it took place in the mid-1920s can be attributed to the existence of the Communist Party of China. Although the CPC was still small and CHAPTER TWO IN THE TORRENT OF THE GREAT REVOLUTION 53 weak, it clearly articulated the goal of a national democratic revolution and, moreover, waged a courageous struggle for that goal. The initial victories in this revolution resulted from political cooperation between the Kuomintang and the CPC. The outbreak of the Revolution of 1911 and the founding ot the Republic of China had kindled hope in the hearts of many Chinese. However, their hope had been quickly extinguished, and now they were anxiously groping in the dark, seeking a way out of their intolerable situation. By the early 1920s, the people were confronted with two major problems. First, after the European powers and the United States had gone through the economic crisis following World War I, they had staged a comeback and were now redoubling their efforts to plunder China. They played out their conflicts and alliances on Chinese soil and controlled the country politically and economically. The conditions under which the national industries had expanded successfully during the war no longer existed, and most people were directly experiencing, great pressure from the imperialist powers, so that there was widespread resentment against them. Second, fighting between the warlords, each backed by a different imperialist power and each trying to control the whole country, had become a salient feature of the socio-political landscape. At this lime the Northern warlords, who controlled the central government in Beijing, were divided into three principal factions in three different provinces: the Zhili (present-day Hebei) clique, the Anhui clique and the Fengtian (present-day Liaoning) clique. These factions engaged in constant warfare. In 1920 war broke out between the Zhili and Anhui warlords. In 1922 and 1924 there were two wars between the Zhili and Fengtian warlords. Some of the warlords in southern China cooperated with or maintained ties with the Kuomintang, which was led by Sun Yat-sen. A constant state of war persisted between them and the Northern warlords. In 1917 the number of soldiers involved in this internecine fighting was about 55,000. By 1924 it had reached 450,000. Military expenditures rose sharply, placing an unbearable tax burden on the people. The nation was disintegrating. In provinces that had experienced several years of continuous civil war, the lives and property of the people could hardly be guaranteed. People of all social strata were hoping for a great revolution that would change these conditions. However, it would be extremely difficult to fulfil such hopes. The imperialist powers and the feudal warlords were deeply entrenched, and it would be impossible for an isolated minority or scattered individuals to overthrow them. From the failure of the Beijing-Hankou Railway workers’ strike, the Communists had learned that in semi-colonial, semi-feudal China, although the working class was resolutely revolutionary, it was too small to prevail alone. The only way for the Communist Party to ensure the victory of the revolution would be to form the broadest possible united front. The peasant masses were naturally the most reliable allies for the working class. The national bourgeoisie and the urban petty bourgeoisie were also potential participants in the united front, because they too had felt the bitterness of imperialist and feudal oppression. The alliance of all these classes would be an important characteristic of the Chinese national democratic revolution. Basing itself on this judgement, the Communist Party decided to form an alliance with the Kuomintang. On the whole, the Kuomintang led by Sun Yat-sen represented the interests of the bourgeoisie and the urban petty bourgeoisie. Having experienced setbacks over the years, it was quite weak. Moreover, its members came from different backgrounds and were divorced from the masses. Nevertheless, the Kuomintang had strengths that could not be overlooked. First, it still enjoyed widespread prestige, thanks to Sun Yat-sen, who had led the Revolution of 1911 that had overthrown the government of the Qing Dynasty and established the Republic. Afterwards, under extremely difficult circumstances, Sun had continued to fight relentlessly against foreign aggressors and domestic warlords. He had become a symbol of national democratic revolution. Second, the KMT had already established a valuable revolutionary base area in southern China. In February 1923 armed forces loyal to Sun Yat-sen drove general Chen Jiongming, who had betrayed Sun, out of Guangzhou [Canton]. Sun Yat-sen returned to Guangdong Province and established his headquarters there as CHAPTER TWO IN THE TORRENT OF THE GREAT REVOLUTION 55 generalissimo of the army and navy. He also gained control of the rich Pearl River Delta and central Guangdong and secured the loyaty of tens of thousands of soldiers. Although most of these soldiers were commanded by local warlords, they supported the national revolution in the areas controlled by Sun s government and permitted the revolutionary forces to be active openly. In no other place in China was this allowed. Third, having experienced setbacks over and over again. Sun Yat-sen had become keenly aware that many members of the Kuomintang were increasingly corrupt and that new tactics had to be adopted tor the Chinese revolution. So he began to establish contacts with the CPC with a view to cooperation between the two parties. He also welcomed the Soviet Union’s offer to support the national revolution in China. In June 1922, the CPC issued a statement on the current situation, in which it pointed out that “among the many political parties in China today, only the Kuomintang is comparatively revolutionary and democratic and is relatively sincere in its commitment to democracy, but there is a real need to change its vacillating policy.” Thus, when the CPC prepared to establish a united front, naturally it first considered reaching out to the KMT. The 3rd National Congress of the Communist Party of China In July 1922 the 2nd National Party Congress had tentatively raised the possibility of “extra-party” cooperation as one form of a united front. Another proposal they had discussed was for “intra-party” cooperation, under which Communist Party and Youth League members would join the KMT, turning it into an alliance of the revolutionary classes. This proposal had been made by G. Maring, the representative in China of the Communist International, and had its support. In August of the same year, several leaders of the Central Committee of the CPC had met in Hangzhou. When Maring made his proposal at this meeting, most of the participants had at first opposed it, but it was evenually accepted. In January 1923, the Executive Committee of the Communist International had adopted a “Resolution on the Re?lationship between the Communist Party of China and the Kuomintang” that was based on Maring’s proposal. During June 12-20, 1923, the CPC held its 3rd National Congress in Guangzhou and made a formal decision on policies and methods for cooperation between the CPC and the KMT. The participants at the congress correctly assessed Sun Yatsen’s revolutionary stance and the possibility of reorganization of the KMT. They decided that the best way to establish cooperation between the two parties was for CPC members to join the KMT in their individual capacity. This was the only form of cooperation acceptable to Sun Yat-sen and the Kuomintang at the time. When Sun Yat-sen’s wife Soong Ching Ling asked, “Why do we need to have Communist Party members join the Kuomintang?” her husband replied, “The Kuomintang is degenerating; to save it, we need an infusion of new blood.”' When Communists joined the Kuomintang, it helped both parties develop and advanced the Chinese revolution. In this way, the CPC was able to have more influence over the policies of the Kuomintang, promote its regeneration and encourage the bourgeois and petty bourgeois who were under its influence to join the revolutionary ranks. In addition, by taking advantage of the Kuomintang organizations, the CPC was able to mobilize the workers and peasants and secure mass support for the KMT, giving it a new lease on life. This also gave the Communist Party an opportunity to expand its previously limited operations, to be tempered in revolutionary struggles on a broader scale and to bring about an upsurge in the Great Revolution. The decision adopted at the 3rd National Congress of the CPC was therefore of major historical significance. The congress made it clear that while Party members were to join the Kuomintang as individuals, the Party itself should maintain its political, ideological and organizational independence. It emphasized that the interests of the workers and peasants could never be forgotten, that it was the special responsibility of the Party to organize them and carry out propaganda among them, and that encouraging the workers and peasants to participate in the national revolution was the Party’s central task. All this was chapter two in the torrent of the great revolution 57 quite right. However, the congress was wrong in some respects. For example, it failed to point out that the democratic revolution should be led by the working class. It stated that the Kuomintang should provide the main impetus for the national revolution, and should occupy the position of leadership in it. Furthermore, the congress underestimated the complexity of the Kuomintang’s internal situation, and it did not foresee that relations between the KMT and CPC would change in the years to come. To some degree, these oversights were later responsible for Chen Duxiu’s Right opportunist deviation. They also reflected the inexperience and immaturity of the Party at this early stage. The Establishment of Cooperation Between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party After the 3rd National Congress of the CPC, cooperation between the KMT and the CPC progressed rapidly. Communist Party organizations at all levels did much propaganda work, mobilized Party members and revolutionary youth to join the Kuomintang and actively promoted the national ^ revolution throughout China. In early October 1923, at the invitation of Sun Yat-sen, Soviet representative Mikhail Markovich Borodin arrived in Guangzhou. The Soviet government also provided military and material assistance to the Guangzhou government. As Borodin was a politically experienced and capable organizer, Sun asked him to serve as the Kuomintang’s organizational instructor (later as its political adviser). Not long after this, Sun Yat-sen wrote a letter to Chiang Kai-shek in which he categorically stated, “Our party’s revolution will never succeed without the guidance of Russia.” The Kuomintang soon began a reorganization. During January 20-30, 1924, in Guangzhou, Sun Yat-sen presided over the 1st National Congress of the Kuomintang. Of the 165 delegates who attended to opening ceremony, more than 20 were from the Communist Party. They included: Li Dazhao, Tan Pingshan, Lin Zuhan (Lin Boqu), Zhang Guotao, Qu Qiubai and Mao Zedong. Sun Yat-sen designated Li Dazhao as a member of the presidium of the congress, and Tan Pingshan delivered a work report on behalf of the Kuomintang Provisional Central Executive Committee. The congress approved a manifesto giving a new, updated interpretation of the Three People’s Principles that had been enunciated years before by Sun Yat-sen. “Nationalism” now meant anti-imperialism; “democracy” stressed the democratic rights shared by all the common people, and the “people’s livelihood” included the “equalization of land ownership” and the “regulation of capital.” Addressing the congress, Sun Yat-sen declared, “Now it is time for us to put forward an explicit revolutionary programme against imperialism and to arouse the masses of the people to fight for the freedom and independence of China! To do otherwise would mean staging an aimless, meaningless revolution, which would never succeed.”2 Not long after the congress, Sun Yat-sen also put forth the slogan: “Land to the tiller.” The political programme adopted at the 1st National Congress of the KMT was essentially compatible with some of the basic principles in the political programme of the Communist Party at the stage of democratic revolution, and it became the common programme for the first period of KuomintangCommunist cooperation. In fact, the 1st National Congress of the KMT adopted three great revolutionary policies — alliance with Russia, cooperation with the Communist Party and assistance to the peasants and workers. It also elected a Central Executive Committee. Ten Communists, including Li Dazhao, Tan Pingshan, Mao Zedong, Lin Zuhan and Qu Qiubai, were elected members or alternate members of the Committee, representing one-fourth of its total membership. After the congress, Communist Party members holding important posts in the headquarters of the Kuomintang included Tang Pingshan, director of the Department of Organization; Lin Zuhan, director of the Department of Peasants; and Mao Zedong, acting director of the Department of Propaganda. The success of the 1st National Congress of the KMT marked CHAPTER TWO IN THE TORRENT OF THE GREAT REVOLUTION 59 the beginning of cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party.

New Developments in the Revolution After the Establishment of Cooperation Between the KMT and the CPC

After cooperation between the two parties was established, the country’s revolutionary forces gathered at Guangzhou, quickly creating new prospects for the revolution against the imperialists and the feudal warlords. As soon as Communists began to join the Kuomintang, they worked to help form KMT organizations throughout the country. Until this time, Kuomintang branches had existed in only a few areas, such as Guangdong, Sichuan and Shandong provinces, Shanghai and overseas, and their work had been limited to the upper social strata. Although some progressives within the Kuomintang wanted to change this situation, they had no experience of mass work among the lower classes. The Communists, in contrast, placed great importance on such work and had acquired considerable experience in it. CPC members who joined the Kuomintang made a point of doing propaganda and organizational work among the masses in areas where warlords ruled, encouraging them to support the national revolution. Nineteen years later, looking back on the relations between the two parties, Zhou Enlai said: At that time, the Kuomintang relied on us not only ideologically, to revive and develop its Three People’s Principles, but also organizationally, to set up its headquarters and expand its membership in the provinces.... Most of the leading members of the Kuomintang in the provinces at the time were our comrades. ...It was our Party that drew the revolutionary youth into the Kuomintang and it was our Party that enabled it to establish ties with the workers and peasants. Members of the Kuomintang left wing predominated in all its local organizations. The places where the Kuomintang expanded most rapidly were precisely those where the left-wingers were in the dominant position and where there were the largest numbers of Communists.3 In January 1926, after two years of hard work the Kuomintang convened its 2nd National Congress. By this time, it had established twelve provincial headquarters, four special municipal headquarters and nine provisional provincial headquarters. The de facto leading members of many of these provincial or municipal headquarters were Communist Party members. These included Li Dazhao in Beijing, Lin Zuhan in Hankou, Dong Yongwei (Dong Biwu) and Chen Tanqiu in Hubei, He Shuheng and Xia Xi in Hunan, Xuan Zhonghua in Zhejiang, Yu Fangzhou and Li Yongsheng in Hebei and Hou Shaoqiu in Jiangsu. The labour movements led by the Communist Party, like the workers’ schools they organized, were all launched in the name of the Kuomintang. Therefore, although conditions in the Kuomintang were quite complicated, it had allied itself with the workers, peasants, urban petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie to fight for democratic revolution. With the establishment of cooperation between the Kuomintang and the CPC, the workers’ movement, led by the Communists, revived and progressed. For example, the workers’ and peasants’ movements were legalized in Guangdong, which was under the jurisdiction of the revolutionary government, and thereafter developed even more rapidly. In July 1924, in the Shamian Concessions in Guangzhou which were inhabited by many foreigners, several thousand workers staged a political strike in protest against a new police regulation, issued by the British and French authorities, denying the Chinese free access to the concessions. Chinese police also participated in the strike, which lasted for more than a month and ended in victory. Deng Zhongxia, a respected early leader of the workers’ movement led by the Party, praised this strike, saying, “Ever since the failure of the great strike of February 7, 1923, the workers’ movement had been at a low ebb. In 1924 the great July strike in Shamian CHAPTER TWO IN THE TORRENT OF TIIE GREAT REVOLUTION 61 finally put an end to this. ...This strike caused a stir in Guangzhou and Hong Kong, and its influence spread to central and northern China.”4 The peasant movement also continued to grow. As early as 1922, Peng Pai had begun to organize peasant associations in Haifeng County, Guangdong Province, mobilizing the peasants to demand reductions in land rents. Now peasants all over Guangdong began organizing associations and self-defence corps to struggle against local tyrants, evil gentry and corrupt officials. To train personnel to form the core of the peasant movement, the KMT Central Executive Committee inaugurated the Peasant Movement Institute in July 1924, at the suggestion of the Communists. At various times Communist Party members, including Peng Pai, Ruan Xiaoxian and Mao Zedong, served as director of the institute. The cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party made it possible to establish a revolutionary military force. Sun Yat-sen had depended on the armies of the old regime to undertake revolutionary action and had suffered repeated defeats as a result. This had taught him a bitter lesson. At the suggestion of the Communists, at its 1st National Congress the Kuomintang decided to found an army academy. The Whampoa Military Academy — it was located on Whampoa Island near Guangzhou — opened in May 1924 with Sun Yat-sen as chairman. To serve as president of the academy, Sun appointed Chiang Kai-shek, chief of staff of the Guangdong Army, who had just returned from a tour of investigation in the Soviet Union. Liao Zhongkai, a well-known Kuomintang left-winger, was named the representative of the KMT. General Vasily Blucher (who assumed the name of Galen during his stay in China) and other generals of the Soviet Red Army were invited to serve as military advisers. In November the chairman of the Guangdong Regional Committee of the CPC, Zhou Enlai, who had just returned from Europe, was appointed director of the academy’s political department. The CPC also selected a large number of Communist Party and Youth League members and other revolutionary young people to study there. In the first group of students who registered at the academy were 56 Communist Party and Youth League members, representing one-tenth of the total enrollment. They included Xu Xiangqian, Chen Geng, Jiang Xianyun, Zuo Quan and Xu Jishen. What distinguished the Whampoa Military Academy from all military schools of the old type was that it attached equal importance to military training and political education. It emphasized the cultivation of patriotism and revolutionary spirit among the students. Zhou Enlai and other Communists were particularly instrumental in this. The system of military training combined with political work was later introduced to other military units under the Guangzhou Revolutionary Government. Not long after the War of Resistance Against Japan broke out in 1937, Mao Zedong said: “In 1924-27 the spirit of the Kuomintang troops was broadly similar to that of the Eighth Route Army today.... A fresh spirit prevailed among these forces; on the whole there was unity between officers and men and between the army and the people, and the army was filled with a revolutionary militancy. The system of Party representatives and of political departments, adopted for the first time in China, entirely changed the complexion of these armed forces.”5 Thanks to the joint efforts of the Communist Party and the Kuomintang, the idea of national revolution spread from south to north and throughout the country. In October 1924, during the second Zhili-Fengtian war, Feng Yuxiang of the Zhili clique staged a coup d’6tat and overthrew the Beijing government controlled by the chief Zhili warlords, Cao Kun and Wu Peifu. Feng Yuxiang thus gained control over the Beijing-Tianjin area. He then reorganized his troops into the National Army and sent a telegram to Sun Yat-sen inviting him to come north to discuss important matters of state. As Feng encountered many difficulties after the coup, he had to invite the veteran chief of the Northern warlords, Duan Qirui, to preside over the discussions. Duan Qirui and Zhang Zuolin, chief of the Fengtian clique, who was preparing to go to Beijing from the Northeast, also sent separate telegrams to Sun Yat-sen inviting him to go north. In November, Sun left Guangzhou for Beijing. Along the way, he CHAPTER TWO IN THE TORRENT OF THE GREAT REVOLUTION 63 called for the convocation of a national assembly and the abrogation of all unequal treaties with the imperialists. In Shanghai, Zhejiang, Guangdong, Hunan, Hubei and other provinces, associations for the convocation of the national assembly were established. Mass organizations everywhere sent him telegrams expressing their support for the assembly. This became a political propaganda movement. At the time, the political climate in China was good. The country seethed with activity and there was a great wave of anti-imperialist and anti-warlord sentiment, but contradictions were becoming apparent within the revolutionary camp. The Kuomintang was a complex organization, and its members included representatives of the big landlord and comprador classes. In June 1924 right-wingers in the KMT ranks, such as Deng Zeru, Zhang Ji and Xie Chi, began hostilities against the CPC by presenting to the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee a “Proposal to Impeach the Communist Party.” On the pretext that the Communist Party had its own organizations within the Kuomintang, they declared that the KMT absolutely could not permit “a party within the party” and called for a split with the Communists. To counter this attack, the Central Committee of the CPC issued an inner-Party circular on July 21, asking Party organizations at all levels to expose the reactionary activities of the right-wingers in the Kuomintang. Chen Duxiu, Yun Daiying, Qu Qiubai and Cai Hesen, among others, wrote a stream of articles defending the political programme adopted at the 1st National Congress of the KMT and blasting the Right-wingers for undermining unity in the revolutionary ranks. On August 20, before leaving for Beijing, Sun Yat-sen presided over a meeting of the Political Committee of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee, which forcefully rejected the right-wingers’ position. It issued a directive stating: “Those who say that our party has been changed ideologically because the Communists have joined are mistaken and entirely unreasonable. There is no need to debate this point.... Those who say that our party will split because the Communists have joined it are similarly entertaining groundless fears.”6 Because of Sun Yat-sen’s high prestige in the Kuomintang, his firm support for cooperation between the two parties thwarted the Right-wingers’ anticommunist activities and their attempt to split the KMT. As the revolution progressed, the left and right wings of the Kuomintang grew further apart and relations between the KMT and the CPC became increasingly strained. There were many new problems in the revolutionary movement. From January 1 1 to 22, 1925, the Communist Party of China held its 4th National Congress in Shanghai. By this time the Party had 994 members. The historical significance of this congress can be summed up as follows. First, it raised the question of the leadership of the Chinese proletariat in the democratic revolution, declaring that unless the proletariat, which was the most revolutionary class, participated vigorously in the national revolutionary movement and exercised leadership over it, the movement would not succeed. Second, it raised the question of the alliance between workers and peasants, pointing out that the revolution needed the extensive participation of the workers, the peasants and the urban petty bourgeoisie. The peasants, it said, were important, since they were the natural allies of the working class. If the proletariat and its party did not mobilize the peasants to participate in the struggle, it would be unable to lead the revolution, and the revolution would fail. Third, the congress added to the content of the democratic revolution, stating that while opposing international imperialism, the Party should simultaneously oppose feudal warlord politics and feudal economic relations. This last statement demonstrated that the Party, having reviewed the events since its founding and particularly since the beginning of its cooperation with the KMT one year earlier, had made major progress in its understanding of the issues involved in the Chinese revolution. They also demonstrated that the Party had already elucidated the basic concept of the new-democratic revolution. Nevertheless, the 4th National Party Congress offered no concrete solution to the complex problem of how the proletariat was to win the struggle with the bourgeoisie for leadership of the revolution. Also, it did not fully understand the vital importance of political power and armed struggle. These weaknesses were to CHAPTER TWO IN THE TORRENT OF THE GREAT REVOLUTION 65 become more apparent as the revolutionary movement progressed. Less than two months after the congress, Sun Yat-sen died of liver cancer in Beijing. In his testament, he wrote: “For forty years I have devoted myself to the cause of the national revolution with the aim of winning freedom and equality for China. My experience during these forty years has convinced me that to achieve this aim we must arouse the masses and unite in a common struggle with those nations of the world which treat us as equals.” Naturally Sun believed that the Soviet Union would be the first nation to treat China as an equal and that to arouse the masses, the Kuomintang should cooperate with the CPC and assist the peasants and workers. These were the two basic conclusions reached by Sun Yat-sen, a great patriot and revolutionary, as he summed up the political experience of his lifetime. Sun’s death caused great sorrow throughout China. The KMT and CPC organized mourning ceremonies involving people from all walks of life, so as to disseminate throughout the country the message of Sun’s testament and his revolutionary spirit. The national revolutionary movement rose to a new height.

The May 30th Movement and the Unification of the Guangdong Revolutionary Base Area

The upsurge of the nationwide Great Revolution began in May 1925 with the anti-British and anti-Japanese strike of workers in Shanghai. At this time Shanghai, China’s largest industrial city, had 800,000 workers, almost one-third of the national total. The city was an important base for the imperialist powers’ aggression in China. There were the “International Settlement,” controlled by the British, and the “French Concession,” and many Japanese, British and other foreign-owned factories were located in Shanghai. The imperialists cruelly wrung every ounce of sweat and blood out of the Chinese labourers, arousing their hatred. Shanghai was also the seat of the Central Committee of the CPC, and the Party was active among the workers there. Using Shanghai University as their main base, Party members went out to do propaganda and organizing among the workers. They had established night schools for workers in seven districts. In the summer of 1924, under the leadership of Deng Zhongxia, Xiang Ying and others, they had founded the West Shanghai Workers’ Club, a mass organization with nearly 2,000 members that did much to advance the workers’ movement in Shanghai. In February 1925 the workers at the Japanese-owned Naigai No.8 Cotton Mill had gone on strike because a Japanese overseer had beaten a Chinese woman worker. The ranks of the strikers swelled to more than 35,000, as workers from 20 other Japanese-owned textile mills joined the strike. Victory in this struggle had greatly inspired workers throughout the country. On May 1, the 2nd National Labour Congress opened in Guangzhou, and the AllChina Federation of Trade Unions was formally established. Communist Party members Lin Weimin and Liu Shaoqi were elected president and vice-president of the federation. The Nationwide May 30th Movement On May 15, a Japanese capitalist of the Naigai No.7 Cotton Mill in Shanghai killed Gu Zhenghong, a worker who was a Communist. The Central Committee of the CPC met several times to discuss an appropriate response. Cai Hesen urged that the economic struggle of the workers be turned into a national struggle. On May 28 the Central Committee called an emergency meeting at which it decided to mobilize students and workers to launch a large-scale anti-imperialist demonstration in the International Settlement on May 30. On that day the Shanghai workers and students marched and spoke on street corners in support of the textile workers. Suddenly, the British police in the International Settlement opened fire on the crowd marching along Nanjing Road, killing 13 and wounding many others. The martyrs who sacrificed their lives at this demonstration included ShangCHAPTER TWO IN THE TORRENT OF THE GREAT REVOLUTION 67 hai University student and Communist Party member He Bingyi. For several days after this, there were instances of British and Japanese police killing Chinese civilians in Shanghai and other cities. These incidents enraged the people of Shanghai and throughout the country. All their pent-up fury against the imperialists suddenly poured out. Students, workers and shopkeepers all went on strike. On June 11 more than 200,000 people gathered at a mass rally in Shanghai. Approximately 17 million people participated in this movement nationwide. From the great commercial cities to the most remote areas of the countryside, people cried angrily “Down with imperialism!” and “Abolish the unequal treaties!” The wave of anti-imperialism swept the nation with astounding speed. While leading the May 30th Movement, the Communist Party greatly increased its membership. At the time of the Party’s 4th National Congress in January 1925, it had only 994 members. By October of the same year, it had 3,000. By December, the number was 10,000. In one year the Party had grown tenfold. As the movement spread across the country, new Party organizations were established in many provinces where there had been none before, such as Yunnan, Guangxi, Anhui and Fujian. The Parly was tempered well in the struggle. On June 3, after news of the May 30th massacre had reached Guangzhou, people from every section of the city’s population took to the streets in a mammoth demonstration. On June 19 members of the seamen’s, trolley workers’ and printers’ unions went on strike. Other unionized workers soon joined them, and the Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions was established. One slogan of the strike was, “Fight the imperialists to the death!” Within a fortnight the number of strikers swelled to 250,000. Of these, more than 100,000 left Hong Kong and returned to Guangzhou. On June 23, the Hong Kong strikers joined 100,000 people from all walks of life in Guangzhou to hold a rally and a demonstration. Led by Zhou Enlai, 2,000 instructors, cadets and soldiers of the Whampoa Military Academy also participated in the demonstration. As the marchers passed through Shaji, a street on the opposite bank of the Pearl River, the British troops and police from the Shamian Concession suddenly opened fire, killing 52 people and seriously wounding some 170. After the Shaji massacre, the Guangzhou Revolutionary Government immediately severed all economic relations with Britain and blockaded the Guangzhou harbour. Workers from Hong Kong and Shamian convened in Guangzhou a conference of representatives of the Guangzhou and Hong Kong strikers and established a Strike Committee, with Communist Party member Su Zhaozheng as chairman. The committee had subcommittees in charge of armed self-defence, picketing, legal affairs and so on. The strikers managed to blockade the port of Hong Kong. The Guangzhou Revolutionary Government supported them and subsidized the Strike Committee with 10,000 yuan a month. Communist Party members Xu Chengzhang, Chen Geng and others served as chairman of the picketing committee, general instructor and instructors of the armed pickets. The simultaneous strikes in Guangzhou and Hong Kong lasted for 16 months. They were an important component of the May 30th Movement and an unprecedented feat in the history of China’s labour movement. They gave a powerful impetus to the Great Revolution, and the several hundred thousand strikers in Guangzhou became a pillar of the Guangzhou Revolutionary Government. The Unification of the Guangdong Revolutionary Base Area The vigorous development of the May 30th Movement created favourable conditions in which the KMT and CPC cooperated to create a revolutionary base area in Guangdong. Although the Guangzhou Revolutionary Government had been established two years earlier, it was internally unstable and had never been able to control all of Guangdong Province. The major threat to the government was Chen Jiongming’s hostile troops, who were entrenched along the Dongjiang River in eastern Guangdong. Furthermore, there were government troops who nominally supported national revolution, but who were in fact loyal to the local warlords Yang Ximin (the Yunnan Army) and Liu Zhenhuan (the Guangxi Army). These troops dominated Guangzhou, levying exorbitant taxes and committing outrages. Sun Yat-sen had once sorrowfully told them, “You operate in my name, but you ravage my hometown.” Early in 1925, when Sun Yat-sen was away in the north and seriously ill, Chen Jiongming took advantage of the opportunity to attack Guangzhou. The Guangzhou government organized the Eastern Expeditionary Army, which was divided into three columns taking three different routes, and sent it on a punitive expedition against Chen Jiongming. However, the forces that were to take the north and central routes were led by Yang Ximin and Liu Zhenhuan and refused to go into battle. Two recently established officers’ training regiments from the Whampoa Military Academy and the Guangdong army commanded by Xu Chongzhi took the south route and swiftly routed Chen Jiongming’s main force, gaining control of the Dongjiang area. By April, the first eastern expedition had proved victorious. In May, Yang Xiwen and Liu Zhenhuan’s troops staged a rebellion in Guangzhou in an attempt to overthrow the Guangzhou Revolutionary Government. Although Yang and Liu commanded a substantial number of troops, their plundering and corruption had turned the people against them and weakened their combat effectiveness. The Eastern Expeditionary Army quickly returned to Guangzhou and quelled their rebellion. The KMT and the CPC then began to reorganize the Guangzhou government and the armed forces. On July 1 the National Government was founded in Guangzhou to replace the former Revolutionary Government. Wang Jingwei, who was regarded as a member of the Kuomintang left, was elected president. M. M. Borodin was invited to serve as senior adviser to the government. However, because the CPC did not fully understand the importance of political power, it decided not to participate directly in the government and instead opted for a supervisory role. After the National Government was established, the army of the Whampoa Military Academy, along with the Guangdong, Hunan and Yunnan armies stationed in Guangdong, were reorganized into six armies of the National Revolutionary Army, with a total of 85,000 troops. The army of the Whampoa Military Academy was expanded to become the First Army. Many Communists were given responsibility for political work in the National Revolutionary Army. Zhou Enlai, Li Fuchun, Zhu Kejing and Luo Han served respectively as deputy Party representative and director of the political department of the First, Second, Third and Fourth Armies, and Lin Zuhan served as Party representative and director of the political department of the Sixth Army. Command over these armies, however, still rested with Chiang Kai-shek and the other members of the old military. A major mistake made by the Communists was to underestimate the importance of military command. It was only in the beginning of 1926 that Communist Party member Ye Ting became commander of the Independent Regiment of the Fourth Army of the National Revolutionary Army. The Independent Regiment was directly under the command of the Communist Party, but it represented only a small fraction of the National Revolutionary Army. On August 20, 1925, Liao Zhongkai, leader of the KMT’s Left wing, was assassinated in Guangzhou. This was a heavy blow to cooperation between the KMT and the CPC. Xu Chongzhi, Minister of Military Affairs of the National Government and commander-in-chief of the Guangdong Army, was forced out by Chiang Kai-shek. The forces under Xu’s command were then taken over and reorganized by Chiang, which further strengthened his power and influence in the military. In September 1925 the remaining troops of Chen Jiongming took advantage of the Eastern Expeditionary Army’s return to Guangzhou to reoccupy the Dongjiang area. The National Government decided to launch a second eastern expedition, with Chiang Kai-shek as commander of the expeditionary forces and Zhou Enlai as director of the General Political Department. By the end of November the expeditionary army, with the support of the peasant associations in the Dongjiang area, had wiped out Chen Jiongming’s forces, thus bringing to a successful conclusion the second eastern expedition. At the same time, another detachment of the National Revolutionary Army launched a southern expedition and wiped out all the forces commanded by the local CHAPTER TWO IN THE TORRENT OF THE GREAT REVOLUTION 71 warlord, Deng Benyin, that had been entrenched in southern Guangdong and on Hainan Island. In the end, the entire province of Guangdong was unified, which created a solid base for the coming Northern Expedition against the Northern warlords. The Emergence of the New KMT Right Wing and the CPC’s Countermove The revolution was progressing rapidly, but at the same time a reactionary faction was emerging within the Kuomintang. The Kuomintang had long been divided, and after the death of Sun Yat-sen, that resolute supporter of KMT-CPC cooperation, the divisions became increasingly apparent. Because the dilferent factions in the KMT represented the interests of different classes, their goals in the forthcoming Northern Expedition were also different. The Left-wingers, who represented the interests of the workers, the peasants and the petty bourgeoisie, wanted to eliminate the imperialist forces and the feudal warlords and establish a state governed by an alliance of all the revolutionary classes. The middle-of-the-roaders, who represented the interests of the national bourgeoisie, sought to overthrow the Northern warlords and then build a state governed by the national bourgeoisie. The Right-wingers, who represented the interests of the landlord and comprador classes, plotted to use the strength of the workers and peasants to overthrow the Northern warlords and then build a regime of the landlord and comprador classes. These three factions were at odds over the political programme laid out at the KMT’s 1st National Congress and Sun Yat-sen’s “Three Great Policies” — alliance with Russia, cooperation with the Communist Party and assistance to the peasants and workers. The conflicts within the KMT intensified day by day. In June and July 1925, Dai Jitao, a new Right-winger and a close friend of Chiang Kai-shek, wrote several pamphlets, including “Philosophical Foundations of Sun Yat-senism,” and “The National Revolution and the Chinese Kuomintang.” In these works he advocated compromise between opposing classes and criticized the Marxist theory of class struggle, while demanding that all Communists who had joined the Kuomintang “separate themselves from all other Party organizations in order to become true members of the Kuomintang.” In November of the same year, the old Rightwingers of the Kuomintang, including Zou Lu and Xie Chi, illegally convened the so-called 4th Plenary Session of the 1st Central Executive Committee of the KMT at the Biyun Temple in the Western Hills outside Beijing. They pronounced the expulsion of Communist Party members from the Kuomintang and announced that Borodin would no longer be an adviser. This group of old Right-wingers became known as the “Western Hills clique. Even more ominously, after the two eastern expeditions and the suppression of the rebellion by Yang Ximin and Liu Zhenhuan, Chiang Kai-shek expanded his forces and increased his power in the revolutionary ranks. He began to reveal his true anti-Communist character, using the Society for the Study of Sun Yat-sen’s Doctrines, controlled by the new KMT Right-wingers, to carry out anti-Communist activities. Chiang Kai-shek was a two-faced careerist. For a time, to strengthen his own position, outwardly he supported alliance with Russia and cooperation with the Communist Party. Inwardly however, he was rabidly anti-Communist, and his ultimate aim was to take the place of the Northern warlords himself. To attain this goal, he needed to use the Communist Party and the workers and peasants under its leadership to bolster his strength and expand his influence. At the same time, however, he was afraid that the workers and peasants might become strong enough to obstruct his climb to power. Therefore, while ostensibly cooperating with the Communist Party, he worked to restrain it, so that the people’s forces could not grow substantially and independently. In fact, he protected and organized the Rightist forces. That is, he simultaneously adhered to two policies, cooperating with the Communist Party and at the same time restraining it. After the May 30th Movement, the revolutionary mass movement reached a peak throughout the country. When Chiang Kai-shek saw that the people’s forces had grown stronger, he gradually intensified his anti-Communist activities. This situation posed a formidable new problem for the ComCHAPTER TWO IN THE TORRENT OF TIIE GREAT REVOLUTION 73 munist Party. Naturally it was of vital importance to maintain cooperation with the Kuomintang. However, in the face of growing tensions with the old and new Right-wingers in the Kuomintang, the Party needed to find an appropriate response. It was just as Mao Zedong wrote in an article on the united front in 1940: “If unity is sought through struggle, it will live; if unity is sought through yielding, it will perish.”7 At this time many Communist Party members believed that since the Kuomintang Right wing (especially the new Right) was openly trying to split the two parties, the Communist Party should fight back vigorously and appropriately so as to maintain KMT-CPC cooperation. In December 1925 Mao Zedong wrote an essay in which he emphasized the importance of distinguishing between friends and enemies of the revolutionary struggle, lo make this distinction, he proceeded to analyse the economic status of various classes in Chinese society and their respective political attitudes. He pointed out that the staunchest and numerically the largest ally of the proletariat was the peasantry, thus solving the major problem of finding allies in the revolution. Moreover, he reminded people that the national bourgeoisie held contradictory and vacillating attitudes: on the one hand, they felt the need for revolution; on the other hand, they were suspicious of it. He predicted that the Right wing of the national bourgeoisie might become the enemy of the revolutionary forces, while its Left wing might become their friend, but concluded that “we must be constantly on our guard and not let them create confusion within our ranks.”8 However, in the face of the combined attack of the imperialists and the warlords, Chen Duxiu, general secretary of the CPC Central Committee, felt that the Party’s strength was inadequate. He was afraid that struggle against the new Right wing of the Kuomintang would impair the relations between the two parties and lead to the isolation and ultimate failure of the revolution in Guangdong. He hoped that unilateral concessions would help alleviate the contradictions within the camp of the national revolutionary forces. This course of action was supported by the Comintern representatives, and therefore carried the day within From January 1 to 19, 1926, the Kuomintang held its 2nd National Congress in Guangzhou. Among the representatives elected from different parts of the country, the majority were Communists and KMT Left-wingers. As a result, the Kuomintang officially continued to oppose the imperialists and warlord forces, adhering to the Three Great Policies of alliance with Russia, cooperation with the Communist Party and assistance to the peasants and workers. Furthermore, the congress decided to take disciplinary measures against the old Right-wingers who had attended the Western Hills meeting. In this sense, the congress was a success. When the congress opened, the leaders of the Communist Party organization in Guangdong were in favour of attacking the Right wing of the Kuomintang, isolating the middle-of-the-roaders and expanding the Left wing, while preparing to repel Chiang’s attack. However, under the influence of Chen Duxiu and Zhang Guotao, no action was taken against the new Right wing. The Communists and the KMT Left-wingers were definitely in the minority on the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee and its Central Supervisory Committee. As for Chiang Kai-shek, his standing in the Kuomintang was not particularly high to begin with. At the 1st National Congress, he had not been elected to the Central Executive Committee. But at the 2nd congress he became a member of it and soon after a member of its Standing Committee as well. Similarly, at the time of the 1st National Congress, he had been only the commander of one of the six armies in the National Revolutionary Army. At the second congress, he became chief inspector of the NRA. Thus, his status both in the KMT and in the army rose considerably. The concessions made by the Communist Party did absolutely nothing to moderate the conflicts within the revolutionary camp. On the contrary, they only helped encourage the new KMT Right-wingers. For every inch offered, the new Right-wingers seized an ell. On March 20, only two months after the 2nd National Congress of the KMT ended, Chiang Kai-shek suddenly took grave actions against the Communists. He concocted the CHAPTER TWO IN THE TORRENT OF THE GREAT REVOLUTION 75 story that the Communists were secretly moving the Zhongshan Warship to Whampoa near Guangzhou in an attempt to kidnap him and take him out of Guangdong. Using this as a pretext, he enforced martial law in Guangzhou. He put Communist Party members under surveillance or hou~°. arrest and disarmed the picket corps of the Guangzhou-Hong Kong Strike Committee. He had troops surround the Soviet consulate and put the Soviet advisers under surveillance. At a meeting on March 22, the Central Executive Committee of the KMT adopted a resolution proposed by Chiang to exclude CPC members from the Whampoa Military Academy and from the First Army of the National Revolutionary Army. Wang Jingwei, president of the National Government and chairman of its Military Commission, was forced to resign on account of “illness,” clearing the path for Chiang to advance to the highest and most powerful position in the Kuomintang. This series of events became known as the Zhongshan Warship Incident. The CPC Central Committee was not prepared for such a drastic turn of events, and had no experience as a guide in coping with it. In fact, Chiang Kai-shek still had only limited power and had taken these actions partly to see how the CPC would respond. No sooner had he completed the manoeuvre than he released all those he had arrested and returned the guns he had captured. He apologized for the incident, calling it a “misunderstanding” for which he asked to be “severely punished.” Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and Chen Yannian, among others, called for a counterattack. Because only one of the six armies of the National Revolutionary Army was directly under Chiang’s command, and because even in that army there were many who were Communists or who sympathized with the revolution, Chiang’s position had not been completely consolidated and such a counter-attack was feasible. However, Chen Duxiu and the Soviet adviser N. V. Kuibishev were overwhelmed by Chiang’s display of strength, and they were afraid of a split between the KMT and the CPC. They believed that only further concessions would persuade Chiang to participate in the Northern Expedition. In the end, their yielding stance encouraged Chiang to proceed confidently with his activities to restrain the Communist Party. On May 15 the Kuomintang held the 2nd Plenary Session of its 2nd Central Executive Committee. On pretext of avoiding “disputes” within the KMT and of finding “a concrete method of removing misunderstandings,” Chiang Kai-shek proposed a “Resolution on Rectification of Party Affairs.” This resolution stipulated that members of the Communist Party must not exceed more than one-third of the members of executive committees of KMT organizations at or above the municipal or provincial level. It also provided that CPC members could not serve as directors of departments of the KMT Central Executive Committee and that the list of all CPC members who had joined the Kuomintang should be made public. The KMT Left-wingers, including Liu Yazi and He Xiangning, all voted against this draft resolution. Chen Duxiu and Zhang Guotao, however, still believed that the reason for the strained relations between the KMT and the CPC was that the “Communist Party had taken on too many responsibilities” and accordingly advocated further concessions. Thus Chiang’s resolution was adopted. At this point, all directors of departments of the KMT Central Executive Committee coming from the CPC had no choice but to resign, and the Communist Party had no further say in the affairs of the Kuomintang. Chiang, on the other hand, was appointed director of the Organization Department of the Central Executive Committee and minister of Military Affairs. He then became chairman of the Standing Committee of the KMT Central Executive Committee and commander-in-chief of the National Revolutionary Army. Thus, he became the most powerful figure in southern China. The 2nd National Congress of the Kuomintang, the Zhongshan Warship Incident and the adoption of the “Resolution on Rectification of Party Affairs” all took place less than six months before the Northern Expedition was to begin. At this critical moment, Chiang Kai-shek did not hesitate to launch one attack after another against the Communists, gaining positions of leadership as they made concessions. He gathered all available power into his own grip and prepared for an anti-Communist coup. After the Zhongshan Warship Incident, Chiang was already CHAPTER TWO IN THE TORRENT OF TIIE GREAT REVOLUTION 77 aligned with the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie. In analysing class relations, several leaders of the Communist Party turned a blind eye to this new development. They did not understand that the representatives of each class could change their political stance. While Chiang was openly taking steps to launch an anti-Communist attack, they still did not dare to mount a resolute counter-attack, for fear of a split between the two parties. Nevertheless, Chiang’s power was still limited. To achieve victory in the Northern Expedition he still needed the support of the Communist Party of China and the Soviet Union. As a result, he did not immediately split with the CPC publicly. As late as May 1926, he still stated, “Not only am I not opposed to Communism, but I very much approve of it.”9 For the time being, the KMT continued to cooperate with the CPC. But the fact that command over the Northern Expeditionary Army was largely in Chiang’s hands made it clear that while the revolution was progressing rapidly, it was already in a serious crisis.

The Triumphant Progress of the Northern Expedition and the Rise of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Movements

The immediate objective of the Northern Expedition was to topple the Northern warlords who were supported by the imperialists. The Northern warlords seemed a colossus far mightier than the Northern Expeditionary Army. For more than ten years they had controlled the internationally recognized central government and possessed vast financial and material resources. They directly commanded an army of 700,000 men, while the National Revolutionary Army had only about 100,000. At the beginning of the Northern Expedition, this total included both the original six armies in Guangdong and two new ones: the Seventh of Guangxi, commanded by Li Zongren, and the Eighth of Hunan, command?ed by Tang Shengzhi. However, the Northern warlords had two fatal weaknesses. First, the Chinese people had long felt a deep hatred for their rule and hoped for an early end to their internecine fighting that had lasted for more than ten years. They longed for the day when China would be independent and unified, and thus increasingly placed their hopes in the National Government in the South. The will of the people would surely play a decisive role in the coming struggle. Second, the Northern warlords were internally divided, principally into three factions. The chief of the already declining Zhili faction, Wu Peifu, still controlled Hunan, Hubei and Henan provinces and the area around the city of Baoding in Zhili (now Hebei Province). His forces totalled approximately 200,000 and were still concentrated in the Nankou area of north China, where they were attacking a part of the National Army commanded by Feng Yuxiang whose main forces had already retreated to the Northwest. Sun Chuanfang, whose forces occupied Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Jiangxi and Fujian provinces, was known as the “commander-in-chief of five provinces.” He led 200,000 troops who operated as an independent force and whose combat effectiveness had surpassed that of Wu Peifu’s army. The most powerful of the warlords was Zhang Zuolin of the Fengtian clique, who with 300,000 troops at his command controlled the three provinces of the Northeast (present-day Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang), Rehe, Chahar, Beijing, Tianjin and Shandong. Deep contradictions persisted as these three forces intrigued against each other. They were unable to coordinate their military operations, and this made it easier for the Northern Expeditionary Army to destroy them one by one. The Northern Expedition Launched Jointly by the KMT and the CPC It was at the suggestion of the Soviet military advisers led by Galen that the National Revolutionary Army adopted a strategy of massing its forces and annihilating the enemy armies one at a time. First, it would send troops into Hunan and Hubei, quickly wiping out Wu Peifu’s main force, the weakest link in the CHAPTER TWO IN THE TORRENT OF THE GREAT REVOLUTION 79 Northern warlords. It would try to keep Zhang Zuolin and Sun Chuanfang neutral for a time; then, after the troops sent to Hunan and Hubei had achieved victory, they would turn east to wipe out Sun Chuanfang’s army. Finally, they would move north to attack the most powerful forces, those of Zhang Zuolin. In accordance with this plan, in May 1926, a part of the National Revolutionary Army’s Seventh Army and Ye Ting’s Independent Regiment of the Fourth Army moved as advance forces to Hunan Province to assist Tang Shengzhi’s Eighth Army, which had been defeated by Wu Peifu and was retreating to Hengyang in southern Hunan. On July 9, the National Revolutionary Army took a mass pledge in Guangzhou and formally launched the Northern Expedition. Two days later, after the main body of the Fourth and Seventh Armies joined forces with the Eighth Army, they succeeded in taking Changsha. On August 22, they occupied Yuezhou, and thereafter they entered Hubei Province. The Northern Expedition was enthusiastically supported by the people in both the battle areas and the rear. CPC organizations at all levels did effective work in mobilizing the workers and peasants. At this time, Hunan and Hubei were suffering from severe food shortages, and as construction of the WuhanGuangdong Railway was not yet completed, it was a major problem to keep the troops supplied. Under the leadership of the Guangdong Regional Party Committee, the Hong KongGuangzhou Strike Committee of Guangdong organized 3,000 men into transport, propaganda and medical teams to follow the troops north. The Hunan Regional Party Committee had always been a strong organization. According to statistics compiled in August 1926, the province had 2,699 Party members, a figure second only to Guangdong’s. The Party counted 400,000 peasants and 110,000 workers in Hunan under its leadership. When the Northern Expeditionary Army advanced toward Changsha, the Hunan Regional Party Committee mobilized these people to act as guides, deliver letters, serve as scouts, help with transport, sweep mines, carry stretchers, give first aid, bring gifts to servicemen and create disorder in the enemy’s rear. They also organized peasant self-defence militias to participate directly in the fighting. Such enthusiasm had rarely been seen in previous wars in China. Knowing that the Northern Expeditionary Army was advancing on Wuhan, Wu Peifu hurriedly recalled his troops from the North. He built defences at two strategic points along the railway, the Tingsi and Hesheng bridges near Wuhan. Wu personally commanded his guards and organized a special corps to force the soldiers at gunpoint to fight at the front. In late August, after an intense and bitter battle, the main force of the National Revolutionary Army’s Fourth and Seventh Armies and a part of the Eighth Army finally captured the two railway bridges, routed Wu Peifu’s main force and marched on Wuhan. Ye Ting’s Independent Regiment fought heroically in the fierce battle. Subsequently the main force of the Eighth Army crossed the Yangtze River and on September 6 and 7 occupied Hanyang and Hankou. On October 10 the main force of the Fourth Army and a part of the Eighth Army captured Wuchang, after laying siege to the city for more than a month. The men of Ye Ting’s Independent Regiment were the first to scale the walls. The rest of the armies then entered the city, where they annihilated Wu Peifu’s main force. After this, the Fourth Army, of which the Independent Regiment was a part, became known as the “Iron Army.” After the great victories of the Northern Expeditionary Army in Hunan and Hubei provinces, Sun Chuanfang abandoned his neutral stand. In late August, he dispatched massive forces from Jiangxi Province, launching a flank attack on Hunan and Hubei in an attempt to cut off the retreat of the Northern Expeditionary Army. During September the National Revolutionary Army’s Second, Third and Sixth Armies and the First Division of its First Army, which had been ordered to keep watch on the movements of Sun Chuanfang’s army, entered Jiangxi and captured Nanchang for a time. Sun Chuanfang threw his main force into a ferocious counter attack and recaptured Nanchang, inflicting heavy casualties on the First Division of the First Army, which was commanded by Chiang Kai-shek. At this juncture, the Fourth Army and then the Seventh Army entered Jiangxi, joining forces with the other troops there, and in early November CHAPTER TWO IN THE TORRENT OF THE GREAT REVOLUTION 81 launched a fierce offensive along the Nanchang-Jiujiang Railway. Finally, they wiped out Sun Chuanfang’s main force and captured Jiujiang and Nanchang. This brought about a complete change in the military situation in Jiangxi. Two divisions of the First Army that had been stationed in the Guangdong-Fujian border area took this opportunity to launch an attack on F ujian Province, and in mid-December they took the city of Fuzhou without a fight. , While the Northern Expeditionary Army was winning these great victories, Feng Yuxiang’s National Army troops had withdrawn from Nankou, a strategic point near Beijing, to defend Suiyuan Province (now part of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region). On September 17, in Wuyuan County, Suiyuan, these troops took a mass pledge to fight the Northern warlords and started to move south with the help of the Soviet Union and the CPC. Feng Yuxiang, who had just returned from the Soviet Union and joined the Kuom intang, became commander-in-chief of the combined forces of the National Army. Liu Bojian, a Communist Party member, served as deputy director ol the army’s political department. By November, the combined forces already controlled Shaanxi and Gansu provinces. Thus, in six months after launching the Northern Expedition, the National Revolutionary Army had made surprising progress. By late 1926 it had already wiped out the main forces of Wu Peifu and Sun Chuanfang and gained control of all the southern provinces except Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Anhui. Feng Yuxiang’s forces controlled the Northwest and were preparing to move east through Tongguan, a county of strategic importance in eastern Shaanxi Province, in coordination with the Northern Expeditionary Army’s operation. As most people could clearly see, the victorious conclusion of the Northern Expedition was at hand and it was only a matter of time before the regime of the Northern warlords would finally collapse. Even in the provinces they still controlled, the people cherished new hope. Everywhere the people enthusiastically prepared to welcome the arrival of the Northern Expeditionary Army. In the early stage of the Northern Expedition there were contradictions between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. Nevertheless, in the face of a powerful common enemy, the anti-Communist forces within the KMT temporarily ceased their active opposition and by and large, the two parties maintained their alliance. The Northern Expedition was launched under the anti-imperialist and anti-warlord slogans of the Communist Party. In the course of the expedition, Party members made enormous contributions, both by spreading political propaganda in the army and by mobilizing the peasants and workers. Soviet military advisers and material assistance also played an important role. Thanks to cooperation between the KMT and the CPC, the Northern Expeditionary Army was able to achieve major victories in a short space of time. The Mass Movements of Workers and Peasants in Hunan, Hubei and Jiangxi Provinces As the warlord regime collapsed before the advancing Northern Expeditionary Army, the mass movements of workers and peasants expanded at an unprecedented rate. This was particularly the case in Hunan, Hubei and Jiangxi provinces. In these provinces, the peasant movement was the first to gain momentum. On September 1, 1926, Mao Zedong published an article entitled “The National Revolution and the Peasant Movement,” in which he pointed out the overriding importance of that movement: “The peasant problem is the central issue of the national revolution.... A large part of the so-called national revolutionary movement is the peasant movement.... Unless the peasants in the rural areas rise to overthrow the privileges of the patriarchal feudal landlord class, the warlord and imperialist forces will never be brought down.” In November of the same year, Mao Zedong became the secretary of the CPC Central Committee’s Peasant Movement Committee, which decided to make Hunan, Hubei, Jiangxi and Henan provinces the centres of the movement. In Hunan, for example, from July 1926 when the Northern Expeditionary CHAPTER TWO IN THE TORRENT OF THE GREAT REVOLUTION 83 Army arrived there to January of the following year, the membership of peasant associations rose from 400,000 to two million. A total of ten million people were active under the leadership of the peasant associations; in other words, about half the peasants in Hunan were already organized. In many counties almost all the peasants were members of peasant associations. Once organized, they went into action and brought about an unprecedented revolution in the countryside. Their main targets were local tyrants, evil gentry and lawless landlords. They also attacked patriarchal ideas and institutions, corrupt officials in the cities and bad practices and customs in the countryside. As Mao Zedong put it at the time, “In force and momentum the attack is tempestuous.... [T]he popular slogan ‘All power to the peasant associations’ has become a reality.”'0 In Hubei, the total membership of the peasant associations swelled to 200,000 by November. In Jiangxi, it reached 50,000 by October. A great rural revolution, unparalleled in Chinese history, was beginning to develop in these two provinces as well. Mao Zedong underlined its significance: “[T]he national revolution requires a great change in the countryside. The Revolution of 1911 did not bring about this change, hence its failure. This change is now taking place, and it is an important factor for the completion of the revolution.”11 As the great rural revolution unfolded, the urban workers’ movement also surged forward. In the autumn of 1926 federations of trade unions were formed in Hunan and Hubei. By the following January they had a total of 700,000 members. In Wuhan, union membership had risen tenfold, from about 10,000 before the Northern Expedition to 100,000. Trade unions were also formed in many counties. Shortly after this, a federation of trade unions was established in Jiangxi Province. Following the example of the Guangzhou-Hong Kong Strike Committee, the trade unions in Hunan, Hubei and Jiangxi all formed armed workers’ picket corps. In Changsha, Wuhan, Jiujiang and other cities, the workers organized large-scale strikes, demanding higher wages, shorter working hours and better working conditions, and opposing feudal overseers and the indentured labour system under which the workers were exploited by both capitalists and contractors. Most of these struggles were successful. However, in certain cities, particularly Wuhan, there was some “Left” deviation in the labour movement. Some workers and shop assistants demanded wages that were too high and hours that were too short, leaving certain middle- and small-scale industrialists and merchants no profits. Furthermore, some workers took excessive actions against such employers. As the revolution swept over Hunan, Hubei and Jiangxi in the South, it also made headway in the North. Under the leadership of the Party, the people struggled to overthrow the Fcngtian warlords and topple Duan Qirui, chief of the Anhui warlords. Major victories were also achieved in the mass struggle against imperialism, in January 1927 British sailors killed or wounded several Chinese civilians in Hankou and Jiujiang. Under the leadership of Communist Party members, including Liu Shaoqi and Li Lisan, workers and other residents of Wuhan responded by entering and occupying the British concession in Hankou, while the National Revolutionary Army’s Second Independent Division took over the British concession in Jiujiang. On February 9 the Foreign Ministry of the National Government signed an agreement with the British government by which China recovered the two concessions. The CPC Central Committee Falls Behind the Events While the mass movements of the workers and peasants were gaining momentum in Hunan, Hubei and Jiangxi provinces, the leading bodies of the Central Committee of the CPC stayed in Shanghai, far from the centre of the revolutionary storm. They lagged far behind revolutionary developments in their understanding and action. At the time, it was important to launch mass movements to support the Northern Expedition, but basically it was the army that fought the war. The Party leadership made a major mistake. As Mao Zedong wrote a decade later, “During the Northern Expedition it neglected to win over the army but laid one-sided stress on the mass movement....”12 Before the Northern Expedition began, Soviet adviser Galen CHAPTER TWO IN THE TORRENT OF THE GREAT REVOLUTION 85 asked the CPC Central Committee, through Zhou Enlai, to resolve the political question of whether the Communists should support or weaken Chiang Kai-shek in the course of the expedition. Chen Duxiu had Zhang Guotao hold a meeting on the question, but there was no real discussion. At the meeting Zhang Guotao uttered only one sentence: “Our Party’s policy during the Northern Expedition is to both support and oppose Chiang Kaishek.” Accordingly, for a long time the Party’s policy remained unclear, and objectively this helped strengthen Chiang’s position. As the Northern Expedition progressed, Chiang tightened his grip on the military and on political power. The Communists should have, and could have, taken advantage of the favourable situation to control some military units and local organs of political power. This would have made it possible to cope with any eventualities. But with Chen Duxiu as general secretary, the Central Committee did not allow such a course of action. It sent a letter to the members of the Hubei Regional Party Committee instructing them that “From now on, we must use our manpower exclusively in mass work; we must never participate in government work.”13 Later, the Central Committee criticized the Hubei Regional Party Committee for allowing Dong Biwu to participate in the Hubei provincial government and asked those Party members who had participated in the Jiangxi provisional provincial government, including Li Fuchun and Lin Zuhan, to leave their posts. It ordered Party members who were magistrates in Jiujiang, Yongxiu and other counties in Jiangxi to resign or be expelled from the Party. It also sent a letter to Liu Bojian, deputy director of the political department of the Combined Forces of the National Army, asking him to see that all Party members and Youth League members serving as Party representatives in the Combined Forces devoted their attention to political propaganda and did not interfere in military and administrative matters.14 Chen Duxiu believed that adopting a concessionary policy would make it clear that the Communists were not scheming to seize power and would case Chiang Kai-shek’s concerns. This, in turn, would prevent a rupture between the KMT and the CPC. But Chiang did not slacken his attempt to split the two parties, and when he suddenly launched a full-scale assault on the CPC, the Central Committee was unprepared and unable to organize a forceful resistance. This was a bitter and tragic lesson.

Before and After the Coup of April 12, 1927

The split in the southern revolutionary camp became increasingly apparent after its decisive victory in Jiangxi in November 1926. In the autumn of 1926 the Northern Expeditionary Army had won victories in Hunan and Hubei, but Sun Chuanfang continued to menace its flanks. Sun’s forces were more powerful than Wu Peifu’s. If they entered Hunan from Jiangxi, the Northern Expeditionary Army might find itself in the dangerous position of being cut off from its rear areas. At the same time, however, actual control over the military forces in Hunan and Hubei was already in the hands of General Tang Shengzhi, and the worker and peasant movements were rapidly expanding there. If Chiang Kai-shek were defeated in Jiangxi, it would be hard for him to survive. Under these circumstances, Chiang had no choice but to proceed cautiously in dealing with the relations between the KMT and the CPC. After Sun Chuanfang’s main force was defeated in Jiangxi, however, the situation changed drastically. Chiang, who was stationed at Nanchang, was aware that this was not only a victory in Jiangxi but also the prelude to victory throughout the Southeast. The political and military situation in southern China had totally changed. Reactionary Forces at Home and Abroad Gather Around Chiang Kai-shek At this time, the attitude of the imperialist powers toward Chiang Kai-shek underwent a subtle change. They had not expected that the Northern warlords would collapse so quickly. Having weathered the crisis of post World War I and entered a CHAPTER TWO IN THE TORRENT OF THE GREAT REVOLUTION 87 period of relative stability, they were prepared to intervene in the Chinese revolution. The British, centred in the rich Yangtze valley, had the most special privileges. Not long after the Northern Expeditionary Army entered Hubei, British warships provoked a series of incidents, using them as a pretext to shell the county seat of Wanxian in Sichuan Province on the upper Yangtze. More than a thousand soldiers and civilians were killed or wounded in the Wanxian massacre. Sixty-three foreign warships were stationed on the Yangtze River, and more than twenty thousand foreign troops were mustered in Shanghai. Combined with the international business community and police force, the total number of foreigners in Shanghai was over 30,000. The foreign powers plotted to use violence and threats to prevent the continued advance of the Chinese revolution. At the same time, they saw that the fall of the Northern warlords was already inevitable and intensified their efforts to split the revolutionary camp by supporting new agents. The first to do this were the Japanese. At the end of 1926, the director of the Treaties Bureau of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs went to Wuhan and then Nanchang, where he met with Chiang Kai-shek. He reported back to the Japanese government that there were sharp contradictions between Wuhan and Nanchang and that in the future the rifts would inevitably become more apparent. In January 1927 Chiang met with the Japanese consul in Jiujiang, where he stated clearly that far from planning to abolish the unequal treaties that China had been forced to sign with the imperialist powers after the Opium War of 1840, he would respect them to the greatest possible extent. He also promised to recognize foreign loans to China and to repay them within the specified time. In short, he assured the consul that the special privileges enjoyed by foreigners in China would be completely protected. Thus, the imperialist powers began to view Chiang Kai-shek as the leader of the “moderate” faction within the Kuomintang. They began to court him, maintaining that he and his group were the only forces that could prevent the Communists from controlling the vast area south of the Yangtze River. As the political and military situation was increasingly favourable to the South, many of the military forces formerly loyal to the Northern warlords or to local warlords were incorporated into Chiang’s. Thus his strength increased rapidly. Politicians and bureaucrats also came from the North to work for Chiang. One of them was Huang Fu, who had close personal ties to him. When Huang Fu came through Shanghai on his way south, he went to see the vice president of the Bank of China, Zhang Gongquan, who promised him that Chiang would be permitted to overdraw his account by one million yuan. When this incident became known, it gave rise to the popular saying, “In the military there is the Northern Expedition, while in politics there is the Southern Expedition.” Against this background, Chiang Kai-shek’s anti-Communist stand became more and more evident. Suddenly, he proposed moving the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee and the National Government from Guangzhou to Nanchang, where the headquarters of the Northern Expeditionary Army was located. This would place them under his direct control. On February 21, 1927, he publicly announced his anti-Communist position in a speech at the Nanchang headquarters. He proclaimed himself the “leader of the Chinese revolution” and stated that “when Communist Party members do something wrong or behave improperly, I have the responsibility and the power to intervene and punish them.” He began to openly suppress the revolutionary forces of the workers and peasants. On March 6 he ordered the New First Division of the National Revolutionary Army, stationed in Jiangxi, to trap and kill Chen Zanxian, a Communist Party member who was the chairman of the Ganzhou Federation of Trade Unions and vice-chairman of the Jiangxi Provincial Federation of Trade Unions. During March 10-17, the 2nd Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang held its 3rd Plenary Session in Wuhan. Because several KMT leaders in Wuhan did not want Chiang Kai-shek to exercise dictatorial rule, participants at this session rejected his proposal to move the capital to Nanchang. They adopted resolutions reaffirming Sun Yat-sen’s Three Great Policies, strengthening the party’s authority and opposing military dictatorship. CHAPTER TWO IN THE TORRENT OF THE GREAT REVOLUTION 89 Furthermore, by changing the system of leadership, they in effect dismissed Chiang Kai-shek from the chairmanship of the Standing Committee of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee. However, because Chiang controlled most of the military power, the resolution strengthening the party’s authority had no effect. Chiang accelerated his anti-Communist activities. Having gone to Jiujiang from Nanchang on March 16, he instigated thugs from the Green Band and the Red Band — secret, Mafia-style organizations — to destroy the Jiujiang KMT headquarters and the offices of the city’s Federation of Trade Unions, in which Leftwingers constituted a majority. Three people were killed at the KMT headquarters, and at the federation one was killed and six were injured. Chiang then took a warship east to Anqing. On March 23, at his instigation, a gang of ruffians there destroyed the Anhui KMT headquarters, which was dominated by Leftwingers, and the offices of the Federation of Trade Unions and of the peasant association. Again, many people were wounded. The thugs proudly said: “We have made all the arrangements with our leader. We will attack Red elements everywhere we go.” On April 9 the deputy director of the National Revolutionary Army’s general political department, Guo Moruo, who had investigated the violence in Anqing and Jiujiang, published a long article entitled “Look at Today’s Chiang Kai-shek.” After reviewing the facts, he wrote, “Chiang Kai-shek is no longer the commander-in-chief of our National Revolutionary Army. He is the central force behind a broad spectrum of counterrevolutionaries, including thugs and ruffians, local tyrants and evil gentry, corrupt officials and traitorous warlords.... Inside the KMT he is more dangerous than enemies outside it.”15 It was only a matter of time before the Chiang clique would openly betray the revolution. Different Opinions Within the Communist Party of China There were two different opinions within the CPC as to how the Party should respond to the grave split that might occur in the revolutionary camp at any time. The members of the Guangdong Regional Party Committee had recognized the impending danger earlier. In November 1926 they had submitted a political report to the Central Committee of the CPC in which they pointed out that there could be no hope of long-term cooperation with the new warlords. Therefore, they advised: “We should prepare our forces, organize the masses and consolidate power of the people.... We should try to avoid pointless struggle and prevent the eruption of large-scale struggle (of course, that is not to say we should avoid struggle completely). At the same time, we should do everything possible to prepare all our forces for a great rebellion, and wc should have such great forces. In the event of a large-scale struggle, they said, they hoped to be victorious.”16 On December 11 Zhou Enlai published an article entitled “The Chinese Communist Party in the Present Political Struggle,” in which he stated explicitly: “For if there were conflicts, they would be conflicts between the masses of revolutionary workers and peasants and a bourgeoisie that was compromising with the imperialist enemies; if there were a split, it would be a split between an alliance of the revolutionary Left wing of the Kuomintang and the Communists on the one hand and the Right wing that was abandoning the revolution on the other.”17 He also warned that the CPC should prepare, mentally and in practical work, for the divisive activities of the new Right-wingers within the KMT. But the Central Committee of the CPC saw this view as “a major, dangerous, and essential error,” one that could “lead to terrible repercussions.”18 It demanded that this error be corrected. It was at this crucial juncture that, on December 13, 1926, the Central Committee convened a special meeting. In his political report, Chen Duxiu stated at the outset: “The important issue in the political report to be addressed at this meeting is still the Kuomintang. Since the military victory in Jiangxi, there have been many new changes in the relationship between the CPC and the KMT, and we need to discuss that question again.” The resolution adopted by the meeting, in line with Chen Duxiu’s report, said: CHAPTER TWO IN THE TORRENT OF THE GREAT REVOLUTION 91 “Of all the dangerous tendencies, the most serious is that as the mass movements gain momentum, the people tend toward the ‘Left’ while the military regime, terrified of the mass movements, ends towards the Right. If these ‘Left’ and Right tendencies continue to develop, the united front will ultimately rupture, and that will endanger the entire national revolutionary movement.” In other words, the Central Committee declared that both the Right tendencies of the military regime and the “Left” tendencies of the mass movements should be prevented. But the first half of the statement was merely empty talk. There was certainly no practical, effective method of countering the rightward swing of Chiang’s forces. In fact, the only course of action available was to prevent the “Left” tendencies in the mass movements, that is, to suppress the vigorously expanding workers’ and peasants’ movements. At a time when the Kuomintang new Right-wingers had already resolved to oppose the Communists and cause a rupture between the KMT and the CPC, and when almost all military and political power was concentrated in their hands, the major force that the Communist Party could rely on was the workers and peasants. If the CPC abandoned the policy of mobilizing and organizing the masses into an effective force, not only would it be unable to counter a coup staged by the new Right wing of the KMT, but it would be unable even to control the vacillations of the upper petty bourgeoisie. Thus, at this special meeting the CPC Central Committee failed to resolve the question of how the Party was to survive and persist in the struggle when faced with imminent danger. Worse, it adopted a mistaken policy toward the mass movements, which led to even more serious consequences. After the meeting, the capitulationist policy of stifling the workers’ and peasants’ movements in order to appease the Right wing of the KMT began to be carried out in the Party’s practical work. Chen Duxiu himself had a talk with the secretary of the Hunan Provincial Party Committee, ordering him to put a stop to the “extreme” actions of the peasants. Some Party members opposed this Right capitulationist error. From January 4 to February 5, 1927, Mao Zedong spent thirtytwo days investigating the peasant movement in Hunan. In the report he submitted to the Central Committee of the CPC, he wrote: “The masses are now shifting to the Left. Our Party has in many respects indicated that it is out of step with the revolutionary mood of the masses. The Kuomintang is even further out of step. This is something we should pay close attention to.” In March, an article entitled “Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan” began to be published in the weekly magazine Soldier. In this report, Mao sharply rejected the skepticism and criticisms heaped on the peasant movement from both inside and outside the Party. He explained the great significance of the revolution in rural areas and pointed out that all revolutionary comrades ought to march at the head of the peasants and lead them, not trail behind them, gesticulating and criticizing or worse, stand in their way and oppose them. He emphasized that the Party should rely on the poor peasants, who were the “vanguard of the revolution” and should unite also with the middle peasants and other forces that could be won over. The Party should work to establish peasant associations and peasant armed forces so that the associations could take all power in the countryside. Then they should reduce rent for land and interest on loans and redistribute the land, and so on. This report was the most important Marxist document of the Chinese Communist Party on leading the peasant movement. In February, Qu Qiubai wrote an article entitled “A Controversy over the Chinese Revolution,” in which he criticized the Right capitulationist mistakes that had emerged in the Party, and emphasized the need for the Chinese revolution to be led by the proletariat. At this time. Sun Chuanfang’s forces had already collapsed, and Chiang Kai-shek had already essentially taken possession of the rich regions of Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Shanghai. On March 21, when the Northern Expeditionary Army was advancing from Zhejiang to the suburbs of Shanghai, the workers in Shanghai, led by a special committee that included Chen Duxiu, Luo Yinong, Zhou Enlai and Zhao Shiyan, organized a general strike and then staged an armed uprising. (The Shanghai workers had already launched two armed uprisings, both of which had ended in failure because of incomplete preparations and bad timing.) After more CHAPTER TWO IN THE TORRENT OF THE GREAT REVOLUTION 93 than thirty hours of fighting, they defeated the troops of the Northern warlords stationed in Shanghai and occupied all districts of the city except the foreign concessions. This was a heroic feat of the working class during the period of the Great Revolution. It was only after the victorious workers had occupied Shanghai that the Northern Expeditionary Army, which had been stationed in the southern suburbs of Shanghai, finally entered the city under the command of Bai Chongxi. Three days later, on March 24, the Sixth and Second Armies of the National Revolutionary Army moved east from Anhui Province and occupied the city of Nanjing. In the afternoon of the same day, British and American warships cruising on the Yangtze River, on pretext of protecting their nationals, suddenly bombarded Nanjing, killing and wounding many Chinese soldiers and civilians. The Nanjing Incident hastened Chiang Kai-shek’s decision to ally himself with the imperialist forces. The Anti-Communist Coup of April 12, 1927 Chiang Kai-shek had resolved to oppose the Communists. But if he was to make a major move against them, he would have to have the support of the imperialist powers and financial assistance from the Zhejiang and Jiangsu plutocrats. He would also need to rely on the gangs of Shanghai thugs. Having hurried from Anhui to Shanghai by warship on March 26, Chiang held a series of secret meetings with the imperialists, plutocrats and gang leaders. He sent representatives to the Shanghai consulates of the five countries involved in the Nanjing Incident (Britain, the United States, France, Japan and Italy), making an apology and telling them that the incident would be resolved immediately, that the workers’ armed forces in Shanghai would be disarmed and that action would be taken to foil any attempt to recover the foreign concessions in Shanghai by armed force and rebellion. The imperialists urged him to act quickly and decisively. The Jiangsu and Zhejiang tycoons gave him generous financial support totalling several million yuan. Huang Jinrong, Du Yuesheng and other Shanghai gang leaders promised to use the thugs of the Green Band and Red Band to disarm the worker’s armed picket corps on his behalf. Chiang also transferred all military units not completely under his control away from Shanghai and brought his own troops into the Shanghai-Nanjing area. In early April he held a secret meeting in Shanghai with Li Zongren, Bai Chongxi, Huang Shaohong, Li Jishen, Zhang Jingjiang, Wu Zhihui, Li Shizeng and other KMT right-wingers and pro-Chiang warlords, at which they decided to “purge the party” by force, thus completing Chiang’s preparations for a surprise attack on the Communists. The Central Committee of the CPC and the Shanghai Regional Party Committee were aware of some of Chiang Kai-shek’s plot, and tried to strengthen the workers’ picket corps to secure the gains of the revolution. But at that time the Comintern’s hopes still rested with Chiang Kai-shek, and it refused to support a split with him. In late March Chen Duxiu sent a letter to the Shanghai Regional Party Committee in which he declared that they should “stop opposing Chiang.”19 On April 1 Wang Jingwei returned to Shanghai from overseas and soon afterward had secret talks with Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang advocated the immediate separation of the Communist Party from the KMT. Concerned that such a separation would enable Chiang to arrogate too much power to himself, Wang proposed that a plenary session of the Central Executive Committee of the KMT be called to discuss his proposal. He also suggested that Chen Duxiu be notified of the session and asked to order Communist Party members nationwide to “temporarily suspend their activities and await the decision of the session.” On April 5 Chen Duxiu and Wang Jingwei released a joint declaration dismissing as rumours the assertions that the “KMT leaders would expel the CPC and crack down on the trade unions and the workers’ picket corps” and asking everyone to “forget their suspicions, ignore the rumours, respect each other and sincerely discuss all their concerns.” This declaration led some Communist Party members to relax their vigilance, thinking that the tension had been dissipated. After this, Chen Duxiu and Wang Jingwei left for Wuhan together. The Central CommitCHAPTER TWO IN THE TORRENT OF THE GREAT REVOLUTION 95 tee of the CPC also moved its headquarters from Shanghai to Wuhan. A few days later, Chiang Kai-shek suddenly staged a counterrevolutionary coup in Shanghai. At dawn on April 12, a large number of well-prepared, well-armed thugs of the Green Band and the Red Band rushed out of the foreign concessions and launched a surprise attack on the workers’ picket corps stationed at the Shanghai Federation of Trade Unions and elsewhere. The pickets immediately rose to resist them. At this time, the Twentysixth Army of the National Revolutionary Army (the former forces of the warlord Sun Chuanfang, which had been reorganized by Chiang) arrived, claiming that they were going to mediate and would first disarm the thugs. The workers’ pickets believed this lie and opened the gates. Caught completely unprepared, they were forced to hand over their arms. Some of the workers resisted, but because of the great disparity in numbers, they were defeated. Wang Shouhua, a Communist Party member who was chairman of the Shanghai Federation of Trade Unions, had been tricked and murdered by Du Yuesheng the day before. On the morning of April 13, over 100,000 Shanghai workers and other citizens held a mass rally and a protest march, demanding the release of those who had been arrested and the return of the weapons of the workers’ picket corps. When the marchers reached Baoshan Road, a unit of the Twenty-sixth Army, lying in ambush, suddenly opened fire on the crowd, killing more than one hundred people and wounding countless others. After the coup of April 12 in Shanghai, in the name of “purging the party” large numbers of Communists and other revolutionary people were killed in Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian, Guangdong and Guangxi. In Guangdong alone, more than 2,000 people were arrested and executed, including outstanding Communist Party members such as Xiao Chunti and Xiong Xiong. On April 18, Chiang Kai-shek established in Nanjing a “National Government” representing the interests of the big landlord class and the big bourgeoisie, in opposition to the National Government in Wuhan. Yan Xishan, the warlord of Shanxi, and Liu Xiang, the warlord of Sichuan, also began to “purge the party” in their domains and expressed their support for the Nanjing government. At the same time, the Fengtian warlord, Zhang Zuolin, executed a large number of Communists and other revolutionary people in northern China. On April 28 Li Dazhao, one of the founders of the Communist Party of China, was hanged in Beijing. The Great Revolution suffered a major setback. The counter-revolutionary coup of April 12 was proof that Chiang Kai-shek had already become the rallying point for the anti-Communist forces dependent on the imperialists and consisting of big landlords and the big bourgeoisie. Outwardly, however, he continued to espouse bourgeois reformism in order to deceive the public. Chiang Kai-shek’s counter-revolutionary coup won the support of the big bourgeoisie and of certain individuals from the upper strata of the national bourgeoisie. The Shanghai Federation of Commerce sent a telegram expressing its “backing for the government authorities’ effort to purge the party.” Individual representatives of the bourgeoisie were drawn to Nanjing to participate in the government and became ornaments of the counterrevolutionary military dictatorship of the big landlord class and the big bourgeoisie. The angry people denounced the coup staged by the Chiang Kai-shek clique. On April 14 seven prominent persons in Shanghai, including Hu Yuzhi, Zheng Zhcnduo and Wu Juenong, signed a letter sharply criticizing the military brutality. In Wuhan, Changsha and other cities, rallies of several hundred thousand people were held to express opposition to the imperialists and denounce Chiang. On April 20 the Central Committee of the CPC issued a delcaration on Chiang’s massacre of the people, exposing him as the “public enemy of the national revolution” and calling on the revolutionary people to overthrow the new warlords and the military dictatorship. On April 22, thirty-nine members and alternate members of the KMT Central Executive Committee, and its Central Supervisory Committee, including Soong Ching Ling, Deng Yanda, He Xiangning, Tan Pingshan, Wu Yuzhang, Lin Zuhan and Mao Zedong, signed an open CHAPTER TWO IN THE TORRENT OF THE GREAT REVOLUTION 97 telegram denouncing Chiang. “If,” they wrote, “our people and comrades, especially those in the military, do not want the revolution to be destroyed by Chiang, they must act in accordance with the orders of the Central Executive Committee and overthrow this traitor to Sun Yat-sen, the party and the people. All forces of the National Revolutionary Army should erase this deep disgrace.”20 At this time, the KMT was still cooperating with the CPC m Wuhan. The KMT leadership there, including Wang Jingwei, did not wish to see all power in Chiang’s hands. On April 17, the Central Executive Committee of the KMT in Wuhan issued an order expelling Chiang from the party and stripping him of all posts.

The Failure of the Great Revolution

After the coup of April 12, the political situation in China underwent a fundamental change. There were now three centres of power: two counter-revolutionary governments — one in Beijing led by Zhang Zuolin and one in Nanjing led by Chiang Kai-shek — and one revolutionary government — the National Government in Wuhan, which still maintained cooperation between the KMT and the CPC. The Wuhan National Government had direct control over the provinces of Hubei, Hunan and Jiangxi. It faced threats from two directions: the new warlord Chiang Kai-shek to the east and the old warlord Zhang Zuolin to the north. After the armies of Wu Peifu and Sun Chuanfang were defeated, Zhang Zuolin had transferred his troops south. His main force was stationed along the Beijing-Hankou Railway and controlled Henan, thus posing a major threat to the Wuhan government. Also, the situation within the Wuhan government was extremely complex. Wang Jingwei, who had recently arrived in Wuhan and was acting under the pretence of opposing Chiang, quickly assumed leading positions in the Central Executive Committee of the KMT and in the National Government. At this time, he was posing as a leader of the Left wing. He called on those who wanted to participate in revolution to come to the Left and those who did not to go away at once. At heart, however, he was eager to expel the Communists; the time, he wrote, was not yet right, but “people must make the necessary preparations.”21 Wang Jingwei joined forces with Tang Shengzhi, who controlled the KMT troops in the area of Wuhan. Together they began to restrict the activities of the workers’ and peasants’ movements, manoeuvred to take control of the situation in Wuhan and waited for the right moment to betray the revolution. After moving to Wuhan, the CPC Central Committee continued to cooperate with Wang Jingwei’s faction of the Kuomintang. The tasks the Communists faced were even more complex than before. How should they deal with their enemies outside the Wuhan government? How should they deal with their unreliable allies within the government? Should they and could they prepare for the possibility of another sudden change? These were the problems the Party had to consider. The 5th National Congress of the Party Convened at a Critical Moment Two heated disputes arose within the Party at this time: one was about “deepening vs. broadening,” the other about “the eastern expedition vs. the northern expedition.” “Deepening” meant initiating an agrarian revolution in Hubei, Hunan and Jiangxi provinces in order to consolidate the existing revolutionary base areas and then expand them. “Broadening” meant expanding into other areas and taking Beijing before launching an agrarian revolution. Advocates of an eastern expedition supported a punitive expedition against Chiang, while advocates of a northern expedition supported a military campaign against the troops of the Fengtian warlords in Henan. These disputes were resolved in favour of a plan put forward by Borodin and Chen Duxiu, which called for a northern expediCH AFTER TWO IN THE TORRENT OF THE GREAT REVOLUTION 99 tion against the Fengtian warlords. This was in accord with the intentions of Wang Jingwei’s National Government in Wuhan. There were four reasons that Borodin and Chen Duxiu proposed this plan. First, the Comintern and the CPC Central Committee naively trusted the combined forces of the National Army commanded by Feng Yuxiang, who at the time was preparing to move his troops from Shaanxi east into Henan. They believed that he was a reliable ally and that by cooperating with him in a punitive expedition against the Fengtian warlords and joining forces at Zhengzhou, capital of Henan Province, they could build a solid base in the Northwest, open up an international route between China and the Soviet Union and then advance to the east. Second, they believed that the imperialist powers were too strong in the Southeast. They feared that if they launched an eastern expedition immediately, they would come into direct conflict with the imperialists and would surely be defeated. Third, since the area of Wuhan was surrounded on four sides by enemy forces, commerce and banking could not function normally and goods were in short supply. Borodin and Chen believed that if they did not fight their way out, they would be unable to surmount the economic difficulties. Outward expansion, they thought, was the key to survival. Fourth, they believed that since the leaders of the National Government in Wuhan represented the upper petty bourgeoisie, their support for the revolution tended to waver. If the Communists initiated an agrarian revolution, it would drive them to abandon the revolution and make a compromise with Chiang Kai-shek. This line of reasoning was known at the time as the “Northwest doctrine.” The advocates of the “Northwest doctrine” were afraid to launch a thoroughgoing agrarian revolution and arm the masses of workers and peasants. Instead, they tried to keep the revolution within the limits imposed by Wang Jingwei so as to stabilize the Kuomintang government in Wuhan. It was just as Zhou Enlai later analysed it: “The central idea of the ‘go north’ group was to steer clear of the peasant movement in Hunan and Hubei....”22 Those who supported this plan thus expressed their lack of faith in the people’s forces and their fear of the enemy. They placed their hopes primarily on an alliance with Feng Yuxiang and not on the mobilization of the workers and peasants. On April 19 the National Government in Wuhan held a meeting and pledged to continue the Northern Expedition. Its main army marched north into Henan. Thus, there would be no eastern expedition against Chiang and no thoroughgoing agrarian revolution. At this critical moment in the Chinese revolution, the Communist Party held its 5th National Congress in Wuhan. There were now many more Party members than before the Northern Expedition: nearly 58,000. The 5th National Party Congress was convened on April 27, 1927, just two weeks after the coup of April 12. The entire Party expected this congress to make a sober assessment of the situation and to answer the most pressing question: how to save the revolution. It did not do so. The congress declared that although the bourgeoisie had already betrayed the revolution, the revolution had entered the stage of a democratic dictatorship of the workers, peasants and petty bourgeoisie. The Party, it said, should use a programme ol agrarian revolution and democratic government to mobilize the peasants and the petty bourgeois; it should make the revolution skip over the capitalist stage of development. But statements like that were only empty talk, far removed from the actual situation of the time. The congress viewed Chiang’s betrayal of the revolution as a betrayal by the national bourgeoisie as a whole. This view was unrealistic and later led to ultra-Left actions against the bourgeoisie. It saw Wang Jingwei as a representative of the petty bourgeoisie and his Wuhan government as a reliable ally an alliance of the workers, peasants and petty bourgeois. This misconception led to the adoption of Right concessionary policies towards Wang and the Wuhan government. Furthermore, because of it, the Party did not anticipate their possible betrayal and consequently failed to prepare for it. The proposal for agrarian revolution was sound, but the emphasis on winning the support of the petty bourgeoisie — or, in effect, the support of Wang Jingwei and his clique — rendered it meaningless. At the congress there was no talk of expanding revolutionary CHAPTER TWO IN THE TORRENT OF THE GREAT REVOLUTION 101 troops directly under the leadership of the CPC. Under these dangerous circumstances, when the entire Party expected emergency measures to save the revolution, talk of “skipping over the capitalist stage of development” was simply irrelevant and unrealistic. The congress criticized the Right opportunist errors, but proposed no measures to correct them. Moreover, it reelected Chen Duxiu general secretary. As a result, while the CPC hovered on the brink of disaster, the congress failed to determine an appropriate course of action and provide powerful leadership for the Party. Furthermore, having let this opportunity slip, it watched passively as the overall situation continued to deteriorate. The Right Capitulationism of the CPC Central Committee After the 5th National Party Congress, the situation in the area under the jurisdiction of the National Government in Wuhan became increasingly critical. Because this area was surrounded and blockaded by reactionary forces, business stagnated, factories closed, everyday necessities became extremely scarce, prices skyrocketed and currency depreciated. The government ran up a huge deficit. Many workers and shop assistants lost their jobs. Local tyrants, evil gentry and reactionary officers fished in the troubled waters. Wang Jingwei and his government increasingly spoke and acted in ways destructive to the workers’ and peasants’ movements. On May 13, 1927, Xia Douyin, commander of the Fourteenth Independent Division of the National Revolutionary Army, stationed in Yichang, sent an open telegram denouncing the Wuhan government. On the 17th, he attacked Zhifang, near Wuchang. The attack was repulsed by Ye Ting, commander of the Wuchang garrison. On May 21 Xu Kexiang, commander of the 33rd Regiment of the National Revolutionary Army’s 35th Army, which had been reorganized from warlord troops, staged a counter-revolutionary coup in Changsha. His troops disarmed the workers’ pickets and arrested and killed more than one hundred Communists and other revolutionaries. The city of Changsha was overwhelmed by White terror. On June 6 Zhu Peide, the governor of Jiangxi Province and commander-in-chief of the National Revolutionary Army’s Fifth Front Army, expelled a large number of Communists and Kuomintang Leftwingers from the province. He began to close down revolutionary organizations and to arrest leaders of the workers’ and peasants’ movements. Under these circumstances, Borodin and Chen Duxiu, among others, still pinned their hopes on the junction of the National Revolutionary Army carrying on the Northern Expedition and Feng Yuxiang’s troops. The National Revolutionary Army’s troops marching north fought bloody battles, suffering 14,000 casualties. (The Fourth and Eleventh Armies, which had the most Communists, lost the most men, including the talented commander and Party member Jiang Xianyun.) The National Revolutionary Army routed the Fengtian warlords’ main force in Henan, enabling Feng Yuxiang’s troops, who had marched east through Tongguan, to capture Zhengzhou on May 31. From June 10 to 12, the leaders of the Wuhan National Government, including Wang Jingwei, Tan Yankai and Sun Ke, held talks with Feng Yuxiang in Zhengzhou. They decided to give Feng complete military and political control in Henan and the Northwest and to send the Northern Expeditionary Army back to Wuhan. Feng’s political attitude had changed substantially: he now proposed putting an end to the conflict between the Wuhan and Nanjing governments. On June 20 he went to Xuzhou to hold talks with Chiang Kai-shek and openly sided with him. After this he sent a telegram to the National Government in Wuhan demanding that Borodin be removed from his post and sent back to the Soviet Union. He further demanded that all Communist Party members and large numbers of political officers in the combined forces of the National Revolutionary Army be dismissed. Consequently, the “Northwest doctrine” advocated by Borodin and Chen Duxiu came to nothing, and the Wang Jingwei clique intensified its anti-Communist activities. The situation was growing more ominous. Chen Duxiu and the Soviet advisers, lacking confidence and afraid of provoking Wang Jingwei and Tang Shengzhi, were unable to offer any practical CHAPTER TWO IN THE TORRENT OF THE GREAT REVOLUTION 103 solutions. They continued to pursue a concessionary policy, believing that in this way they could avoid providing Wang and Tang with further pretexts for a split. They cancelled the plan to stage an armed uprising in Hunan and disbanded the workers’ picket corps in Wuhan. These actions did nothing to stabilize the National Government in Wuhan and only encouraged further displays of arrogance by the reactionary forces. A.B. Bakulin, a Soviet adviser, wrote in his diary: “Wuhan is becoming more and more like Nanjing.”23 A counter-revolutionary coup in Wuhan was becoming increasingly likely. At this critical juncture, the Executive Committee of the Communist International adopted a resolution on China, and issued a directive (known as the “May Directive”) to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. This directive urged the CPC to transform the Kuomintang by encouraging large numbers of workers and peasants to join it; to turn the peasant associations into organs of village government and confiscate the land held by the landlords; and to organize an army of 70,000 men, of which 20,000 should be Communist Party members. Although the Comintern had made a series of errors in its advice to the Chinese revolutionaries, this particular directive correctly addressed the crucial question of the time: how to save the revolution. Of course, this is not to say that the revolutionaries could have easily achieved victory, but if the CPC had resolutely followed these recommendations, it would have been well prepared to struggle effectively against the Wang Jingwei clique and in a stronger position to confront the reactionaries in all eventualities. Thus it could have prevented a crushing defeat. However, the Central Committee of the CPC believed that it would be too difficult to accomplish the tasks proposed in the Comintern’s “May Directive,” and it still hoped that at the last minute its capitulationist tactics would succeed in winning over the Wang Jingwei clique. Dissatisfaction with Chen Duxiu’s Right capitulationist errors was growing within the Party. Ren Bishi, the secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Youth League, wrote a letter criticizing Chen Duxiu. Chen Duxiu ripped the letter to shreds in front of him. On July 4 the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee held an enlarged meeting at which Mao Zedong proposed that the peasant armed forces go to the mountains or join military units connected to the Party. “Unless we preserve our own armed forces,” he said, “we shall be helpless to cope with emergencies.” In mid-July, the Central Committee of the CPC was reorganized in accordance with an instruction of the Comintern Executive Committee. Its Provisional Standing Committee was now composed of Zhang Guotao, Li Weihan, Zhou Enlai, Li Lisan and Zhang Tailci. On July 13 the Central Committee issued a statement declaring that China had reached a critical moment when the revolution was at stake. It condemned the KMT Central Executive Committee and the National Government in Wuhan for “recently and publicly preparing for a coup,” for “acting against the interests of the vast majority of the Chinese people and against the basic principles and policies of Dr. Sun Yat-sen” and for “destroying the national revolution.” It therefore decided to recall all Communist Party members serving in the National Government. At the same time, it proclaimed that it would continue to support the revolutionary struggle against imperialism and feudalism and that it wished to continue to cooperate with revolutionary elements in the Kuomintang. Even though this announcement was released rather late, it helped heighten the revolutionary spirit within the Party. On July 14 Soong Ching Ling (Mme. Sun Yat-sen), a prominent representative of the left wing of the KMT, wrote a “Statement Issued in Protest Against the Violation of Sun Yat-sen’s Revolutionary Principles and Policies,” which was later published in Hankou. In this statement she said: “Sun Yat-sen’s policies are clear. If leaders of the party [the KMT] do not carry them out consistently, then they are no longer Sun’s true followers, and the Party is no longer a revolutionary party, but merely a tool in the hands of this or that militarist.” “Feeling thus,” she declared, “I must disassociate myself from active participation in the carrying out of these new policies of the party.”24 On July 15 in Wuhan, Wang Jingwei called an enlarged meeting of the Standing Committee of the KMT Central ExecuCHAPTER TWO IN THE TORRENT OF THE GREAT REVOLUTION 105 tive Committee at which a formal decision was made to break off relations with the CPC. This action definitively ended the first period of cooperation between the KMT and the CPC and marked the failure of the Great Revolution of 1924-1927. Launched during the first period of cooperation between the Communist Party and the Kuomintang, the Great Revolution was an unprecedented revolutionary movement in which workers and peasants played the major role. Essentially, it overthrew the rule of the hated Northern warlords and struck heavy blows against the imperialist and feudal forces. Through this movement people came to have their first understanding of the meaning of revolution. Even though it failed, it exerted an enduring influence. It marked a new starting point for subsequent advances in the Chinese revolution. There were two reasons for the failure of the Great Revolution. First, at that time the strength and political experience of the combined imperialist and feudal forces far surpassed those of the revolutionary camp. Furthermore, the Kuomintang suddenly betrayed the revolution and launched a surprise attack on the Communist Party and on the workers’ and peasants’ movements under its leadership. Second, the CPC Central Committee, represented by Chen Duxiu, committed Right capitulationist errors. During the early stages of the Great Revolution, the Party’s line was by and large correct. Party members, both cadres and rank and file, all played active roles and as a result achieved great successes. However, the Party was still immature and inexperienced and did not fully understand either Chinese history and society or the special characteristics and laws of the Chinese revolution. Moreover, it still lacked a deep understanding of Marxist-Leninist theory and of the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution. Therefore, its leading bodies vacillated on certain key questions, and at the later stage of the Great Revolution they failed to lead the Party in taking appropriate action. Instead, they were tricked by the counter-revolutionary forces, and this led to the failure of the Great Revolution. As a branch of the Communist International, the Communist Party of China received direct guidance from it. While actively contributing to the Great Revolution, the Comintern and its representatives in China ultimately failed to understand the actual conditions in China. Some of their ideas were correct, but others were wrong, and these were partly responsible for the Right capitulationist errors made by the leadership of the CPC. It was difficult for the immature Chinese Party to reject the mistaken guidance of the Comintern. Although the Great Revolution failed, it still had enormous significance. Through this revolution, the anti-imperialist, antifeudal programme put forward by the CPC came to be resoundingly supported by the masses. The Party rapidly spread its political influence among the people and greatly expanded its organizations. Millions upon millions of workers and peasants were organized under the leadership of the Party, and the Party began to control part of the troops. In addition, the ordeals the Party went through during this period served to temper it, and its victories and defeats provided it with valuable experience. All of this helped to prepare the ground for the next stage, when, with the leadership of the Party, the Chinese people would push their struggle to a higher plane.

The Agrarian Revolution

The Revolution at a Low Ebb and Armed Resistance by the Communists

Following the betrayal of the revolution by Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei, the political situation in China took a sharp turn for the worse. The Great Revolution came to a premature end. The southern part of the country, where the revolutionary movement had been vigorous, descended into bloodshed. The Communist Party of China was subjected to the severest test since its founding. According to incomplete statistics provided by the 6th National Congress of the Party, during the period from March 1927 to June 1928, some 310,000 people had been killed, of whom more than 26,000 were Parly members. Chen Yannian, Zhao Shiyan, Luo Yinong, Xiang Jingyu, Chen Qiaonian, Xia Minghan, Guo Liang and other respected Party activists who had been much loved by the people were killed by the Kuomintang reactionaries. Communist organizations had no choice but to go underground, and the Party suffered great losses. Many local Party organizations were broken up, and many members lost contact with the Party. Those without firm commitment quit the Party or the Youth League, some openly announcing their departure in the press and expressing their repentance for having joined, some even leading the way for enemy agents in their search for Communists. Party membership, which had reached nearly 60,000 at the height of the Great Revolution, dropped to 10,000. Those who remained in the Party were at a CHAPTER THREE THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION 109 loss what to do. Trade unions and peasant associations, which had thrived throughout the country, were outlawed or disbanded. Under the White terror, the worker-peasant movement sank to a low ebb. A great number of people took a middle course, constantly shifting their political allegiance. When the revolution was developing successfully, they would turn to the Left; when it suffered setbacks or was in decline, they would turn to the Right. In these dark days, although some political activists outside the Party and other persons of integrity persisted in their revolutionary stand and refused to side with the Kuomintang led by Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei, many of those taking the middle course distanced themselves from the Communist Party. Some of them were frightened by the KMT’s bloody slaughter and had been driven to despair; others still had unrealistic hopes for the KMT, seeing it as a party that had a revolutionary history, that was still flying the banner of Sun Yal-sen and that was continuing the Northern Expedition. The stark reality was that the Chinese revolution was at a very low ebb. The counter-revolutionary forces far surpassed the revolutionary forces led by the Party, and the Party itself was in danger of disintegrating or of being wiped out. In this time of savage repression, when the future of the revolution seemed so bleak, when to be a revolutionary meant risking death, it was not easy to remain steadfast in one’s belief and to carry on the struggle. Yet the Communist Party of China was indomitable. As Mao Zedong said more than ten years later, “The Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people were neither cowed nor conquered nor exterminated. They picked themselves up, wiped off the blood, buried their fallen comrades and went into battle again.”1 Unlike those who left the Party in the time of danger, some staunch revolutionaries, including Peng Dehuai, He Long and Xu Teli, chose this moment to join it. Many workers and peasants rallied around the Party again and continued the fight. When the reactionaries hung Guo Liang’s head at the gate of the city wall of Changsha, Lu Xun, a true friend of the Party, said, “Revolutions have seldom been defeated by hanging a head.... It was precisely because there was darkness and no future that the revolution was begun.”2 Faced with the reactionaries’ policy of butchering all revolutionaries, the Communists had only one choice. If they were not simply to wait for death and allow the whole country to be plunged into darkness, they must hold high the revolutionary banner and carry out armed resistance. But the question remained: under such difficult circumstances, how was that to be done? The Nanchang Uprising, the August 7th Meeting, the Autumn Harvest Uprising and the Guangzhou Uprising The Nanchang Uprising represented the Party’s first unequivocal reply. Because when the Great Revolution was forging ahead, the CPC Central Committee had failed to recognize the vital importance of controlling armed forces, the overwhelming majority of the troops in the South were in the hands of the Kuomintang. Those that the Party could control or influence were mainly among the Second Front Army of the Fourth Group Army led by Zhang Fakui of the Kuomintang, including the units under the command of He Long and Ye Ting, which at this time were stationed in northern Jiangxi Province. These forces attracted the attention of both the revolutionary and the counter-revolutionary sides. On July 15, 1927, the Wuhan government officially adopted the policy of “separating from the Communists” and immediately sent troops to encircle this area. Also Zhang Fakui declared that “senior officers, like Ye Ting, who are Communists must withdraw from the army or leave the Communist Party.” The situation had become so critical that the slightest hesitation would bring about the doom of the small revolutionary armed forces. Under these circumstances, the Central Committee of the CPC decided in mid-July to stage an armed uprising in Nanchang, Jiangxi Province. A Front Committee was formed, headed by Zhou Enlai. On August 1 Zhou Etilai, He Long, Ye Ting, Zhu De and Liu Bocheng, leading twenty thousand troops of the Northern charter three the agrarian revolution in Expeditionary Army under the control or influence of the Party, declared an armed uprising in Nanchang. After four hours of fierce fighting, the insurgent forces took the city. Then, they promptly pulled out and headed for the Chaozhou-Santou area of Guangdong Province via southern Jiangxi and western Fujian, as planned. The purpose of this move was to join forces with the militant peasants of the Dongjiang area of Guangdong, which had a revolutionary tradition, so as to start the agrarian revolution. Then the plan was to march to Guangzhou, re-establish the Guangdong revolutionary base area, occupy an outlet to the sea to obtain assistance from the Communist International and continue with the Northern Expedition. By the end of September the revolutionary forces had occupied Chao’an County and Shantou City in Guangdong Province, and the main units had marched to Jieyang County and then westward to Tangken Town in the same province. Their numbers were now greatly reduced because of battlefield casualties, desertions and the fatigue of constant marching under a blazing summer sun. In early October the troops stationed in the Chaozhou-Santou area and those heading west were encircled, attacked and eventually defeated by a superior enemy force. Some of the remaining troops made their way to the Haifeng-Lufeng area, where they joined forces with the local armed peasants; others, led by Zhu De and Chen Yi, moved to southern Hunan, by way of southern Jiangxi and northern Guangdong, and started guerrilla warfare there. The Nanchang Uprising of August 1, 1927, marked the beginning of a new era in the history of the Communist Party of China. Zhou Enlai said later that the August 1st uprising led by the Communist Party had fired the first shot at the Kuomintang reactionaries and that overall, it had been a correct move. For millions of revolutionary people, after repeated defeats, this uprising was a torch held aloft in the darkness. I he people’s armed forces under the leadership ot the CPC were born during this uprising. However, there were important lessons to be learned trom the Nanchang Uprising. As Zhou Enlai put it, at that time the purpose of the armed uprising was not to go straight into the surrounding countryside, mobilize and arm the peasants, start the agrarian revolution and establish rural base areas. Rather, the plan was to go south to Guangdong, rely on foreign aid and attack the big cities in the name of a national revolutionary government of the Left. This, said Zhou, was the basic policy mistake. Such a mistake was natural enough. Up until this time the CPC had only had experience of regular battles to occupy key cities during the Northern Expedition, when revolutionary armed forces in the rural areas were considered merely supplementary. In the history of the international Communist movement, there had been no precedent for taking the rural areas first. It was inevitable that the Party should handle new problems according to the experience it had already had. At this time it was imperative for the Party to criticize and rectify the serious mistakes of the past and to decide on new lines and policies. Six days after the Nanchang Uprising, the CPC Central Committee held a secret emergency meeting in Hankou, Hubei Province, to deal ith the problem. B. Lominadze, a Russian who was the newly arrived representative of the Communist International, made a report entitled “The Past Mistakes and New Line of the Party.” Qu Qiubai delivered a work report on behalf of the Standing Committee of the Central Committee. A number of resolutions were adopted, including a “Message from the CPC Central Executive Committee to Members of the Whole Party,” and a new Provisional Political Bureau was elected, headed by Qu Qiubai. At the August 7th Meeting, the mistakes of the Right opportunist line represented by Chen Duxiu in the later stage of the Great Revolution were unequivocally criticized. One of the resolutions adopted at the meeting stated that in handling relations with the Kuomintang, the opportunist leaders abandoned the independent political stand of the CPC and made one concession after another. The resolution criticized these leaders who had never thought of arming the workers and peasants and forming them into a truly revolutionary army. It also pointed out that intimidated by the leaders of the KMT, the Right opportunists had proposed no programme of revolutionary action to solve the CHAPTER THREE THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION 113 oroblem of land. Of course, Chen Duxiu alone could not be blamed for the failure of the Great Revolution, and not all the criticism of past policies that was made at the August 7th Meeting was justified. However, without that shrewd criticism, it would not have been possible to rapidly reinvigorate the whole Party and to bring about a fundamental change of guiding ideology. It was at this meeting that the Central Committee formulated the general principle of agrarian revolution and armed resistance to the Kuomintang reactionaries. The Party had arrived at the correct conclusion at the cost of much blood. Speaking at the meeting, Mao Zedong emphasized the importance of military affairs. “From now on,” he said, “we must be aware that political power is to be obtained by the gun.”3 Thus, the August 7th Meeting pointed out a new road tor the CPC, which had been mired in ideological contusion and organizational disintegration, making a great contribution to saving the Party and the revolution. It was the historic turning point from the failure of the Great Revolution to the rise of the agrarian revolutionary war. Nevertheless, owing to the “Left” ideas of the Communist International and its representatives and to the “Left” tendency within the CPC, while the Central Committee corrected Right mistakes at this meeting, it did nothing to prevent ‘ Left mistakes. On the contrary, adventurism and commandism were allowed and even encouraged. Although the “Left” tendency within the Party was only of secondary importance at the meeting, its later development was to cause enormous damage to the Chinese revolution. . , „ „ After the August 7th Meeting, the Provisional Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee dispatched many cadres to different places to disseminate the decisions taken at the meeting and to reestablish and rebuild the Party organizations. Earlier on August 3, the Central Committee had already drawn up a Plan for the Autumn Harvest Uprising of the Peasants in the Provinces of Hunan, Hubei, Guangdong and Jiangxi,” where the peasant movements had been well organized during the Great Revolution. As soon as the meeting ended, Mao Zedong was sent to Hunan as a special envoy of the Central Committee to reorganize the CPC Hunan Provincial Committee and to lead the uprising there. At a meeting of the Hunan Provincial Party Committee held in Changsha, two main subjects were discussed: the question of the uprising and the question of land. Mao Zedong made important remarks on both questions. So far as staging an uprising was concerned, he argued that it was not enough to rely on the peasants alone; they must have help from the military. “One of the Party’s mistakes in the past,” he said, “was that it neglected the military. Now we must pay sixty per cent of our attention to the military movement. We must seize and build political power by means of the gun.” As for the question of land, he held that the needs of the peasants could not be met by confiscating the land of big landlords alone. “We must confiscate the land of all the landlords,” he said, “and give it to the peasants.”4 The Provincial Party Committee decided that instead of staging an uprising in the whole province as originally planned, it would do it in the seven counties around Changsha in central Hunan. A Front Committee was established with Mao Zedong as its secretary. The main forces to take part in the Autumn Harvest Uprising included two sections. One was the former Guards Regiment of the General Headquarters of the Second Front Army of the Fourth Group Army of the National Revolutionary Army. This unit had not been able to participate in the Nanchang Uprising, but it included many Communists. The other was the First Division of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Revolutionary Army, composed of armed peasants from Pingjiang and Liuyang counties in Hunan and from Chongyang and Tongcheng counties in southern Hubei, and workers’ armed forces from the Anyuan Coal Mines in Jiangxi Province, totalling about five thousand. Thus, the Autumn Harvest Uprising was to differ from the Nanchang Uprising in that it was to be an action involving not only the military but also a huge number of armed workers and peasants. For the first time, the flag of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Revolutionary Army was to be publicly raised. However, the objective of the uprising was still to take Changsha, the central CHAPTER THREE THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION 115 city of Hunan Province. The key elements of the plan were as follows: the regiments were to set off separately and join with the local peasant forces to encircle Changsha; then, when all the detachments were in place, they were to capture Changsha in a single attack, combined with a simultaneous rising of the workers within the city. The uprising was launched on September 9. At one point the revolutionary forces took over some towns, including the county seats of Liling and Liuyang. But as the reactionary forces were far superior, the different columns of insurgents approaching the city by different routes suffered major setbacks one after another. It was then that Mao Zedong showed his outstanding ability to learn from practice. Realizing that Changsha could not be captured, he promptly decided to change the plan. On September 19 the Front Committee held a meeting in Wenjiashi, Liuyang County, at which, after heated debate, the idea of attacking Changsha via Liuyang was rejected. At Mao Zedong’s urging, it was decided to withdraw immediately from Pingjiang and Liuyang, enter Jiangxi Province and move south through the Luoxiao Mountains. The revolutionary forces would seek a foothold in the mountain areas, where the enemy’s control was relatively weak, in order to preserve their strength for future development. This was another decisive turning point in the history of the people’s revolution: the change from attacking big cities to advancing into the rural areas. After the revolutionary forces arrived at the village of Sanwan in Yongxing County, Jiangxi, the tamous “Sanwan reorganization” was accomplished under the leadership of Mao Zedong. The Front Committee reorganized the former division, which now had fewer than one thousand men, into a regiment, established a Party branch for every company and founded soldiers’ committees at various levels, so that the officers and men were politically equal and democratic management was practised. This was the beginning of a new type of people’s army under the leadership of the proletariat. Mao Zedong also sent men to contact the peasant armed forces under Yuan Wencai and Wang Zuo in the Jinggang Mountains. On October 7 he led the Workers’ and Peasants’ evolutionary Army to Maoping in Ninggang County at the north foot of the Jinggang range and began the struggle to set up a revolutionary base area in the mountains. Following the Nanchang Uprising and the Autumn Harvest Uprising, the CPC launched an uprising in Guangzhou. At this time the lorces led by Zhang Fakui had already come south and were stationed in Guangzhou. They included the Training Regiment led by Ye Jianying, an undercover Communist. The worker-peasant movement in Guangzhou and the surrounding area had built a good foundation during the upsurge of the Great Revolution. In November, a war broke out between Zhang Fakui on one side, and Li Jishen and Huang Shaohong on the other lor control of Guangdong. Zhang sent most of his troops to fight in Zhaoqing and Wuzhou, leaving only a few in Guangzhou. The Training Regiment and other revolutionary units in Guangzhou had already aroused the suspicion of the enemy. Unless they took immediate action, they were likely to be disbanded or wiped out. On December 1 1, on the instructions of the CPC Central Committee, the Guangdong Provincial Party Committee launched an uprising. 1 his uprising was led by Zhang Tailei, secretary of the Provincial Party Committee, Ye Ting and Ye Jianying. The forces participating were the Training Regiment and part of the Guards Regiment of the Fourth Army of the National Revolutionary Army, seven detachments of the Guangdong Workers’ Red Guards and some groups of armed peasants from the suburbs of Guangzhou. After more than ten hours of heavy fighting, the insurgent forces occupied most of the urban area of Guangzhou, where they set up the Guangzhou Soviet Government — the Russian word soviet means a council of representatives — with Su Zhaozheng as chairman. (As Su was ill and did not assume office, Zhang Tailei served as acting chairman). They put forward such political slogans as “Down with imperialism!”, “Down with warlords!” and “Suppress landlords and despotic gentry!”, and announced that an eight-hour day would be instituted for workers and that all land distributed among the peasants. At this time, however, the main forces under Zhang Fakui hurried back to 117 CHAPTER thrf.e the agrarian revolution Guangzhou. Because of the great disparity in strength between the enemy and the insurgents, it was impossible for the latter to hold on in Guangzhou. Ye Ting argued that the revolutionary forces should withdraw from the city before Zhang Fakui’s troops arrived. But this wise proposal was severely criticized by Heinz Neumann, the German representative of the Communist International, who held that the uprising could only centre around cities, that the insurgent forces had to “attack, attack and attack again" and that any retreat represented “wavering.” As a result, the insurgents lost the chance of evading an attack by superior enemy forces. Greatly outnumbered, they were defeated on the third day of the uprising. Zhang Tailei and many other revolutionaries died a heroic death. The Guangzhou Uprising was another valiant counterattack against the Kuomintang reactionaries’ policy of butchery. The insurgent forces took full advantage of the internecine warfare among the new warlords of the Kuomintang. But, once again, events showed that the enemy armies were too strong for the revolutionaries to achieve victory by staging armed urban uprisings or trying to take big cities. When the insurgent forces were outnumbered by the enemy, even if they gained control of the big cities, they would be unable to hold on to them and would suffer crushing defeat. Besides these large-scale uprisings, by early 1928 the CPC had initiated quite a few smaller armed uprisings in other parts of the country. The major ones were as follows: —In Guangdong, the Dongjiang Uprising, centred around Haifeng and Lufeng, and the Qiongya Uprising; —in Jiangxi, the Southwestern Jiangxi Uprising, centred around Donggu in Ji’an County, the Northeastern Jiangxi Uprising, centred around Yiyang and Hengfeng, and the Wan’an Uprising; —in Hunan, the Southern Hunan Uprisings led by Zhu De and Chen Yi, who had brought the surviving forces of the Nanchang Uprising from Guangdong into the area and who, with the cooperation of the CPC Southern Hunan Special Committee and local peasant armed forces, succeeded in occupying seven counties including Yizhang and Chenxian; — in the Honghu Lake area of Hubei and the Sangzhi area of Hunan, the Western Hunan-Hubei Uprising led by Zhou Yiqun and He Long; — in the Hubei-Henan border region, the Huang’an and Macheng Uprising led by the CPC Huang’an-Macheng Special Committee; — in Fujian, the Western Fujian Uprising led by Guo Diren, Deng Zihui and Zhang Dingcheng; —in Henan, the Queshan Uprising led by Ma Shangde (Yang Jingyu); and — in Shaanxi, the Weinan and Huaxian Uprising led by Liu Zhidan. All these uprisings demonstrated that the fire of revolution could never be put out by military suppression by the counterrevolutionaries, because the uprisings were just and corresponded to the demands of the people. Many of them were organized by Communists and other revolutionaries who had gone through the storms of the Great Revolution, adhered to their political belief and returned to their hometowns where the reactionary regime was relatively weak. Making use of their former social connections, they mobilized the oppressed masses of workers and peasants, gradually building forces for the uprisings. Some of these uprisings soon failed, either because wrong policies were followed or because the enemy forces were far superior. Others were continued, mainly in areas bordering several provinces, or in mountain areas remote from the key cities under Kuomintang rule. In such places, the insurgent forces conducted guerrilla warfare on a growing scale, laying the foundation for the later large-scale development of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army and the establishment of rural revolutionary bases. Left Putschism The revolution had virtually come to a standstill. The key cities were under the powerful economic, political and military control of the imperialists and of the reactionary Kuomintang regime. In those places, which had never experienced the Great CHAPTER THREE THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION 119 Revolution, it was not easy for uprisings to take place or to survive for any length of time. In the rural areas, however, where the reactionary forces were relatively weak, and especially in places where the masses of workers, peasants and soldiers had been actively involved in the Great Revolution, there was still room for the Communists to manoeuvre. At this time there could be no question of their launching another movement like the Northern Expedition, that is, of attempting to take key cities and areas, which would immediately bring about a revolutionary situation all over the country. Instead, they had to withdraw to the rural areas that did not attract much attention, so as to preserve and nourish the sparks of revolution. The peasants wanted a revolution, but it was not easy to organize them into fighting units because they were reluctant to leave their homes, and because the villages were widely scattered. Still, the revolutionary forces could survive and gradually develop, as long as they relied closely on the suffering people and pursued correct policies. Because of the realities of semi-colonial, semi-feudal China, if they had not kept firmly to this road, the revolution would have failed. At the time, the members of the CPC Central Committee did not have a correct assessment of the situation and failed to identify tasks appropriate for the struggle. They held that as the fundamental contradictions in Chinese society had not been resolved, the tide of revolution could only continue to rise. They did not take into consideration the political and economic realities of Chinese society and the uneven development of the revolution. They made no effort to distinguish between places where there were conditions for staging an armed uprising and places where it was only possible to organize an orderly retreat. Instead, they ordered Party members, who were few in number, and the masses to organize armed rebellion everywhere, regardless of the strength of the enemy or the discouragement of the people after the failure of the Great Revolution. They even staged hopeless uprisings in some areas that were strictly controlled by the enemy, hoping to astonish and hearten the whole nation. They claimed that the idea of refraining from any rash move so as to preserve the Party’s forces was “a manifestation of opportunism that would eventually obstruct the development of rebellion among the masses.”5 Disciplinary action was taken against cadres who were accused of such opportunism. The representative of the Communist International, B. Lominadze, who did not know much about the realities in China, gave much misguided advice of this nature and put forward the proposition of “uninterrupted revolution,” which confused democratic revolution with socialist revolution. Through an enlarged meeting of the Provisional Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee held in November 1927, “Left” putschism came to dominate the Party for a period of time. In the resolution adopted at that meeting the Bureau declared that “the present situation of China is a situation ready for direct revolution.” On the basis of this assessment, it formulated the general strategy of a nationwide armed uprising, with urban uprisings as the “central and guiding element.” Further, the Bureau predicted that “the present revolutionary struggle will certainly go beyond a democratic revolution and develop rapidly.” At the meeting, leaders of the Nanchang Uprising and the Autumn Harvest Uprising, including Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong, were accused of having made opportunist mistakes and were disciplined. Both before and after this meeting, reckless actions were undertaken in places where the Party organization was weak and where the enemy was militarily strong. Ill-considered armed uprisings were staged, for example, in Wuxi and Yixing. Most of them were quickly suppressed. Thus, the limited revolutionary forces that had survived after the failure of the Great Revolution again suffered heavy losses. Nevertheless, it was clear that although none of the fundamental contradictions in Chinese society had been resolved, the reactionary forces could not establish a lasting and stable rule, and that the people would not give up fighting. But there was another side of the story. After the failure of the Great Revolution, the reactionary forces were strengthened, while the revolutionary forces were seriously weakened. In view of the overall situation CHAPTER THREE THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION 121 of the country, the revolutionary tide, far from rising, had come to a low ebb. How was it, then, that at such a time the Party could make the mistake of “Left” putschism? It was wonderful that so many Communists were able to carry on the struggle under extremely difficult conditions, but they did not have enough experience to deal with complex problems. Their outrage at the massacres perpetrated by the enemy, their desire for revenge and their abhorrence of Right opportunism, like a fire burning in their hearts, drove them to desperate acts. They could see only one side of the picture and went to extremes, mistaking the awareness of advanced elements for the awareness of the masses. These “Left” attitudes were very common among revolutionaries at the time. Indeed, they were a historical phenomenon that could not have been completely avoided. Nevertheless, the dismal failure of the premature uprisings had a sobering effect and led the Party to give second thought to the problems. In February 1928 the 9th Enlarged Session of the Executive Committee of the Communist International adopted a resolution on China that criticized putschism and Lominadze’s mistakes. In April the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee issued a circular endorsing that resolution and admitting that “Left” mistakes of putschism had been made. By this time, most of those mistakes had been eliminated in the Party’s practical work throughout the country. The 6th National Congress of the Communist Party of China With the help of the Comintern, the CPC held its 6th National Congress in Moscow from June 18 to July 11, 1928. This congress was of major historical significance. It reviewed the Party’s experience since the failure of the Great Revolution and gave basically correct answers to a series of essential questions concerning the Chinese revolution over which there had been heated controversies. Thus, by and large, the congress unified, the thinking of the whole Party, which had been in ideological chaos. The line of the 6th National Congress was basically correct. It stated that since China was still a semi-colonial, semi-feudal country and since none of the basic contradictions that had given rise to the revolution had been resolved, it was still a bourgeoisdemocratic revolution. At the time, quite a number of Party members believed that since the bourgeoisie had already withdrawn from the revolution, it was no longer a bourgeoisdemocratic revolution. Addressing this question, the congress decided that the nature of the revolution was determined by its mission rather than by its motive force. The congress also made a correct assessment of the situation of the Chinese revolution and the tasks ahead. The first wave of revolution, it said, had passed with the failures, and the new wave had not yet come. The forces of counter-revolution were stronger than those of the workers and peasants, and the Party’s general line at this stage must be to win over the masses. Putschism and commandism were identified as the most dangerous tendencies, as either of them would divorce the Parly from the people. In short, at the 6th National Congress the Party decided to shift its efforts from organizing uprisings by every possible means to undertaking patient, long-term work among the masses, while guarding against “Left” tendencies. These were major changes in the work of the Party, and when the congress’s resolution was made known to all members for implementation, it produced far-reaching effects. The 6th National Congress elected a new Central Committee. Xiang Zhongfa, a dock worker from Wuhan, was selected to be chairman of the Political Bureau and of its Standing Committee, while Zhou Enlai was elected member and secretary-general of the Standing Committee and head of the Central Committee’s Organization Department. The election of Xiang Zhongfa as the principal leader of the Party was due to the influence of the Communist International, which in selecting cadres put undue emphasis on the workers’ class status. In reality, Xiang Zhongfa did not have the ability to play the principal role in the Central Committee. For a period of time after this, the actual leader of the Party was Zhou Enlai. There were other shortcomings in the work of the congress, especially the following. First, the congress still placed primary CHAPTER THREE THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION 123 emphasis on work in the cities, without taking into account how long and complex the revolution would be or recognizing the special importance of the rural areas. Second, because it did not correctly assess the important role played by the middle-of-theroaders and the internal contradictions among the reactionary forces, it continued to regard the national bourgeoisie as an enemy of the revolution. Thus, the Party lost the opportunity to win over another force and gain its cooperation. At this time the CPC was in a period of major historical change, a period in which it was faced with many complicated problems new to Marxism. In the early stage of the revolution, it was not possible for the Party to reach a correct understanding of all these problems at once. The problem of the relations between urban and rural areas was an example. In the classic works of Marxism, the focus of revolutionary activity had always been the urban proletariat. But China was a country in which the overwhelming majority of the population were peasants. Class contradictions were very acute in the rural areas, and it was impossible for the reactionary rulers to maintain tight control over every part of the vast countryside. Under these circumstances, the Party had to shift the focus of its revolutionary activity first to the rural areas. Only through repeated trial and error in concrete practice could the Party come to a clear understanding of the special rules of the Chinese revolution, and only then could it begin to resolve the problems one by one.

From the Struggle in the Jinggang Mountains to the Gutian Meeting

After the failure of the Great Revolution, the struggle in the Jinggang Mountains revolutionary base area, under the leadership of Mao Zedong and Zhu De, represented the correct orientation of the Chinese revolution. How was it that in the Jinggang Mountains an independent revolutionary regime, although surrounded by areas under White terror, was able not only to survive but to expand greatly? In a report to the Central Committee dated November 25, 1928, Mao Zedong gave the answer: “We find on analysis that one reason for this phenomenon lies in the incessant splits and wars within China’s comprador and landlord classes. So long as these splits and wars continue, it is possible for an armed independent regime of workers and peasants to survive and grow. In addition, its survival and growth require the following conditions: (1) a sound mass base, (2) a sound Party organization, (3) a fairly strong Red Army, (4) terrain favourable to military operations, and (5) economic resources sufficient for sustenance.”6 The Establishment of the Revolutionary Base Area in the Jinggang Mountains The Jinggang Mountains are situated at the middle section of the Luoxiao Mountains in the border region between Hunan and Jiangxi provinces. Mao Zedong had chosen this place to set up the first revolutionary base area for a number of reasons, including the following: — There was a good mass base. During the Great Revolution, Party organizations and peasant associations had been established in various counties in the border region. —Local peasant forces of the old type led by Yuan Wencai and Wang Zuo were ready to unite with the worker-peasant revolutionary army. —It was strategically located, easy to defend but hard to attack. —The self-supporting agricultural economy in the surrounding counties made it easy for the army to raise funds and grain. — It was relatively far from the centre of the Kuomintang regime. Also there were contradictions between the warlords of the two provinces of Hunan and Jiangxi, and their control over the area was fairly weak. When Mao Zedong arrived in the border region with his forces, CHAPTER THREE THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION 125 new splits were occurring within the ruling class. In southern China, Li Zongren’s forces were at war with those of Tang Shengzhi. Warlord forces in the locality were busy moving north, leaving the border region between Hunan and Jiangxi empty. Mao took advantage of the situation, doing everything possible to build up the Party, the army and political power there. In early November 1927, chairing a meeting of leading Party members from the various border counties, he urged them to establish or reestablish Party organizations as soon as possible. The previously existing ones had all been destroyed after the May 21st Incident; only some Party members had survived, gone into hiding and were living dispersed. Without an organized Party leadership, it would not be possible to open up a revolutionary base area. After three months of work, Party organizations in the region were gradually restored. Mao Zedong called on the worker-peasant revolutionary army to change the old tradition of undertaking only military operations. The army, he said, must not only fight the enemy, but also expropriate funds from the local tyrants and do propaganda work among the people. In this way, the army would be able not only to win battles, but also to mobilize the masses and to solve the problem of economic resources. After reviewing the army’s experience in doing mass work, Mao Zedong set down Three Rules of Discipline and Six Points for Attention. The three rules were: 1. Obey orders in your actions. 2. Don’t take anything from the workers and peasants. 3. Turn in all things taken from local tyrants. The six points for attention were: 1. Put back the doors you have taken down for bed-boards. 2. Put back the straw you have used for bedding. 3. Speak politely. 4. Pay fairly for what you buy. 5. Return everything you borrow. 6. Pay for anything you damage. Later two more points were added: Don’t bathe within sight of women, and don’t search the pockets of captives. These regulations demonstrated the nature of the people’s army, and because they were strictly enforced, the army was able to establish close ties with the local people and to win their trust and support. The revolutionary army also reorganized the peasant armed forces led by Yuan Wencai and Wang Zuo and helped organize the Red Guards and other local units for the border counties and townships. It defeated the “suppression campaign” of the Kuomintang army units sent against it and took the county seats of Chaling, Suichuan and Ninggang counties, setting up worker-peasant-soldier governments there. Thus, the revolutionary base area in the border region of Hunan and Jiangxi began to lake shape with Ninggang as its centre. Just at this time, the less than ten thousand troops that had survived the Nanchang Uprising, led by Zhu De and Chen Yi, were moving towards the Jinggang Mountains after the Southern Hunan Uprising. In late April of 1928 the troops under Zhu De and Mao Zedong joined forces in the Jinggang Mountains and were reorganized into the Fourth Army of the Chinese WorkerPeasant Revolutionary Army (shortly thereafter renamed the Fourth Army of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army), with Zhu De as commander and Mao Zedong as Party representative and secretary of the Army Committee. This joining of forces was a momentous event. It raised the number of troops in the Jinggang Mountains revolutionary base area from two thousand to over ten thousand. The backbone of the forces that had survived from the Nanchang Uprising, now under the leadership of Zhu De and Chen Yi, was the Independent Regiment led by Ye Ting, a well-armed, well-trained unit that had distinguished itself during the Great Revolution. Tan Zhenlin, a senior officer who had taken part in the joining of forces, recalled it in these words: “With the joining of the forces led by Zhu De and Mao Zedong, the army was expanded, and we were then able to take Yongxing County. Of course, we had already attacked Chaling and Suichuan counties and occupied the seat of Ninggang County. But we had not dared to go too far afield, as we would not have been able to win if the Kuomintang had sent two regiments against us. We became much stronger after Zhu and Mao joined 127 chapter three the agrarian revolution forces.”7 After this, the CPC established a Special Committee for the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Region and a Worker-Peasant-Soldier Soviet Government of the Border Region. At this time there was a temporary lull in the war between the new Kuomintang warlords. The reactionary rule in the South was relatively stable. Chiang Kai-shek ordered the Kuomintang troops in Hunan and Jiangxi to mount one “suppression campaign” after another against the base area in the Jinggang Mountains. In response, the Special Committee of the Border Region and the Army Committee of the Fourth Red Army laid down the following policies: —The army should stand firm against the enemy and not flee; —The Party should deepen the agrarian revolution in the border region; — The Party organizations in the army should help develop Party organizations in the localities, and the regular army should help develop local armed forces; —The army should take a defensive position toward the comparatively strong ruling forces in Hunan and an offensive position toward the comparatively weak ruling forces in Jiangxi; —The army should concentrate its forces to fight the enemy, confronting him when the time is opportune, and not divide its forces, lest they be destroyed one by one; and —The base area should be expanded by advancing in a series of waves and not by making adventuristic thrusts. Thanks to these proper tactics, to the terrain of the border region, which favoured the operations of the revolutionaries, and to the inadequate coordination between the different Kuomintang forces invading from Hunan and Jiangxi, the Red Army, in four months of fighting, was able to break up three successive “suppression campaigns,” despite the fact that the superior enemy forces numbered from eight to 18 regiments. The biggest victory was won in the Battle of Longyuangou on June 23, when one enemy regiment was wiped out and two more were routed. After this victory, the revolutionary base area in the Jinggang Mountains was extended to cover all of Ninggang, Yongxing and Lianhua counties and parts of Ji’an, Anfu, Suichuan and Lingxian counties. This was the period of greatest expansion of the base area. The Front Committee attached great importance to the building of the revolutionary army. Members of the Fourth Red Army were drawn mainly from two sources: the peasants and the old army. The first concern was to strengthen Party-building and political work among the new troops in order to turn them into a people’s army of a new type under the leadership of the Communist Party. The Party organization was divided into four levels: the company branch, with a group in each squad; the battalion committee; the regimental committee; and the army committee. The number of Party members rose until they represented about a quarter of the army. In his November report to the Central Committee, Mao Zedong summed up the results of this policy: “After receiving political education, the Red Army soldiers have become class-conscious, learned the essentials of distributing land, setting up political power, arming the workers and peasants, etc., and they know they are fighting for themselves, for the working class and the peasantry. Hence they can endure the hardships of the bitter struggle without complaint.”8 Such men took every opportunity to serve the masses and were ready to sacrifice their lives for the revolution. Another means of building the Red Army was to ensure democracy in the ranks. In the same report, Mao explained the importance of this policy: “Apart from the role played by the Party, the reason why the Red Army has been able to carry on in spite of such poor material conditions and such frequent engagements is its practice of democracy. The officers do not beat the men; officers and men receive equal treatment; soldiers are free to hold meetings and to speak out; trivial formalities have been done away with; and the accounts are open for all to inspect. The soldiers handle the mess arrangements and, out of the daily five cents for cooking oil, salt, firewood and vegetables, they can even save a little for pocket money, amounting to roughly six or seven coppers per person per day, which is called ‘mess savings.’ All this gives great satisfaction to the soldiers. The newly captured soldiers in particular feel that CHAPTER THREE THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION 129 our army and the Kuomintang army are worlds apart. They feel spiritually liberated, even though material conditions in the Red Army are not equal to those in the White army. The very soldiers who had no courage in the White army yesterday are very brave in the Red Army today; such is the effect of democracy.”'' So far as military operations were concerned, Mao Zedong and Zhu De summed up the Red Army’s practice as follows: “The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue.” These were the simple and basic principles for guerrilla warfare. They corresponded to the circumstances of the time and proved an excellent guide for the Red Army’s operations. The military struggle could not be separated from the agrarian revolution. The Jinggang Mountains base area was situated in an agricultural region cut off from other parts of the country, where the overwhelming majority of the residents were peasants. Their fundamental interest lay in the land, and the land question was their primary concern. In the Hunan-Jiangxi border region, over 60 percent of the land was in the hands of the landlords, while the peasants owned less than 40 percent. The peasants who had no land, or very little, had to rent land from the landlords to survive. They had to turn over more than half of the harvest to the landlords as rent, in addition to providing them with various corvfee services and suffering from exploitation by tradesmen and usurers. This land system was the very foundation of the feudal system in China. For generations it had been the dream of poor peasants to acquire land. In the new-democratic revolution there would be no agrarian revolution without victory in the armed struggle, and there could be no victory in the armed struggle without an agrarian revolution to secure the full support ol the peasants. In the early stage of the founding of the Jinggang Mountains base area, the masses were mobilized to strike down local tyrants and evil gentry, while the distribution of land was carried out in only a few places on a trial basis. From May to July 1928, when the situation in the base area had become more stable, a movement for general distribution of land swept across the counties in the border region. At this time, the method of distributing land was as follows. Land committees composed of poor peasants at the county, district and township levels were established to take charge of the process. Officers of the Red Army were also sent to help in the villages. In general, the township was taken as the basic unit, but in a few hilly places where there was little farmland, three or four townships were taken as one unit. All the inhabitants, men or women, old or young, were given equal shares of land, and fertile and less fertile land was equally apportioned. Then the distribution was examined to ensure that it had been done fairly. The title deeds for land owned by the landlords were burned in public. Bamboo slips with names were set up along the demarcation lines of the various households’ plots, and a land tax was then levied. In December 1928 a Land Law was promulgated in the Jinggang Mountains. This was of greal significance, because it was the CPCs first experiment in land rclorm in so large an area as several counties. This first Land Law, however, had some weaknesses. First, it provided that all the land was to be confiscated and redistributed, not just that of the landlords. This encroached upon the interests of the middle peasants. Second, it provided that the land was to be owned by the government, not by the peasants, who had only the right to use it and were forbidden to sell it’ Nevertheless, since they were given the land, the poor peasants became aware that the Red Army was struggling on their behalf, and they began to support it enthusiastically. This was the social foundation for the survival and development of the revolutionary base area in the Jinggang Mountains. If the revolutionary forces were to wage a long-term struggle it was essential for them to have a reliable base area and to build the people’s political power. The slogan for the rural areas put forward by the Central Committee at its meeting of August 7, ^^’„was Political power belongs to the peasant associations.” Later, Party documents called for the establishment of revolutionary committees or of worker-peasant Soviets. Soviet governments were set up in Lufeng and Haifeng counties in Guangdong. On November 28, 1927, after the Jinggang Mountains base area was founded, a worker-peasant-soldier Soviet CHAPTER THREE THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION 131 government was established in Chaling County, with Tan Zhenlin as chairman. In May 1928 a worker-peasant-soldier Soviet government of the Hunan-Jiangxi border region was set up at Maoping in Ninggang County. At the time of greatest expansion there were six such county governments in the border region. These governments enjoyed high prestige among the people. In a report to the Hunan Provincial Party Committee, Du Xiujing, the Committee’s representative, wrote: “Since the toppling of the local tyrants, the people believe in Commander Mao, and since the distribution of land, they believe in the Party and the Soviet.” There was one setback in the development of the Jinggang Mountains revolutionary base area. In June 1928, the Provincial Party Committee of Hunan, under the influence of putschism, sent a representative to the Jinggang Mountains instructing the Fourth Red Army to go immediately to southern Hunan. Now, it happened that the 29lh Regiment of the Fourth Red Army was composed mainly of peasants from Yizhang County in southern Hunan. While they had proved resolute in the Southern Hunan Uprising, they still had the weaknesses of small peasant producers who felt a great nostalgia for their home villages and were not used to the hard life in the Jinggang Mountains. When these peasants learned of the Hunan Provincial Party Committee’s instructions, they insistently demanded to return to southern Hunan and, despite persistent opposition by Mao Zedong and repeated attempts by Zhu De and Chen Yi to dissuade them, prepared to move off on their own. Fearing that if they moved independently they would be wiped out by the enemy, Zhu De and Chen Yi had no choice but to lead the 28th Regiment on the march to southern Hunan along with them. By this time the reactionary rule in that area had become relatively strong. When the Red Army took Chenxian County, the enemy started a counterattack. At this juncture, the soldiers of the 29th Regiment deserted and returned to their home villages. The surviving forces were led by Zhu De and Chen Yi to eastern Guangxi, where they were met by Mao Zedong, who had arrived at the head of part of the 31st Regiment; then they all returned to the Jinggang Mountains base area. During this operation, the Fourth Red Army and the Jinggang Mountains base area suffered heavy losses. The whole episode, known as the “August defeat,” showed that it was not easy to transform peasant armed forces into a new type of people’s army under the leadership of the CPC. It was inevitable that such losses should occur in the early days of the people’s army. After the main forces of the Fourth Red Army returned to the Jinggang Mountains, they won several battles in succession, recovering most of the territory they had lost. They defeated the enemy’s “suppression campaigns” and largely restored the base area. The CPC Central Committee decided to reestablish a Front Committee, with Mao Zedong as secretary, to take charge of the work of the Border Region Special Committee and the Army Committee of the Fourth Red Army. In October 1928 the Second Party Congress of the Hunan- Jiangxi Border Region was convened. The congress adopted a resolution drafted by Mao Zedong, the first part of which dealt with the question of why it was possible for Red political power to exist in China. Mao analysed the conditions under which a small, independent worker-peasant regime had been able to emerge and survive, discussed its significance and answered the question, which had been raised by some people in the Red Army, of how long such a regime could last. In November, in his report to the CPC Central Committee, Mao pointed out the importance of proletarian leadership: “The Party organizations in the border area counties,” he wrote, “which are composed almost exclusively of peasants, will go astray without the ideological leadership of the proletariat.”10 This showed that the leaders of the Fourth Red Army clearly understood the distinction between the people’s revolution led by the CPC and peasant warfare of the old type. At a time when the revolution throughout the country was at a low ebb, the establishment of the Jinggang Mountains revolutionary base area represented a remarkable achievement. By founding a revolutionary army, by advancing the agrarian revolution and by building a political power, the area not only set an example and provided comprehensive experience for insurgent forces elsewhere, but also kindled new hope among the masses of revolutionaries. 133 CHAPTER THREE THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION Nevertheless, the Jinggang Mountains area had disadvantages as a revolutionary base. First, although easy to defend and difficult to attack, the area had fewer than two thousand people and produced less than 500 tons of grain a year. As the Red Army grew rapidly in numbers, and as the Kuomintang army carried out repeated “suppression campaigns” and tightly blockaded the region, economic difficulties became so serious that even daily requirements of the army and the people for food, clothing and other necessities could not be met. Second, the Jinggang Mountains were situated in a long, narrow strip of land between the Xiangjiang River to the west and the Ganjiang River to the east, both of which were too deep to be forded. And it was not easy to expand toward the north or south, so the army did not have enough room for manoeuvre. These disadvantages were not so prominent in the beginning, but as the Red Army grew, they became increasingly evident. During July 1928, part of the Kuomintang troops staged a rebellion in Pingjiang County, Hunan, under the leadership of Peng Dehuai, Teng Daiyuan and Huang Gongliie, and formed the Fifth Army of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army. For several months the troops of this new branch of the Red Army fought the enemy in the border region of Hunan, Hubei and Jiangxi, east of Pingjiang. Then, on December 11, Peng Dehuai and Teng Daiyuan led more than seven hundred of them to the Jinggang Mountains and joined forces with the Fourth Army of the Red Army. Before long, six brigades of the KMT army in the two provinces of Hunan and Jiangxi, totalling about 30,000 men, started to attack the Jinggang Mountains by five different routes. A joint meeting of the Front Committee, the Special Committee of the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Region, the Army Committee of the Fourth Army and the Army Committee of the Fifth Army was held at Bailu Village in Ninggang County. At this meeting it was decided that a part of the Red Army, led by Peng Dehuai and Teng Daiyuan, should stay to defend the Jinggang Mountains, while the main forces of the Fourth Army, led by Mao Zedong, Zhu De and Chen Yi, should march to southern Jiangxi to launch an attack there. The March to Southern Jiangxi and Western Fujian and the Gutian Meeting Conditions in southern Jiangxi were much better for the Fourth Red Army. The undulating hills and thick forests of the area were favourable for guerrilla warfare, it was rich in natural resources and it was linked to the mountainous regions of western Fujian and northern Guangdong, providing a large space for manoeuvre. Party organizations had a good foundation there, and the masses were politically aware. After the failure of the Great Revolution, the 2nd and 4lh Independent Regiments of the Red Army of Jiangxi were formed under the leadership of Li Wenlin and others, and a small, secret Soviet area was established in Donggu, Ji’an County. The reactionary troops stationed there were weak and did not have much fighting capability. In particular, most of them came from other provinces and therefore had no close links with the local landlords and despotic gentry. The area was remote and far from big cities, transportation was poor and it would be hard for enemy troops to concentrate there. These were favourable conditions for developing guerrilla warfare. On January 14, 1929, the main forces of the Fourth Red Army, numbering 3,600, came down from the Jinggang Mountains. They encountered great difficulties in the beginning. On more than one occasion they were in danger, because they had left the original base area and were being pursued and attacked by strong enemy forces. On February 11, however, they laid an ambush at Dabaidi in Ruijin County in southern Jiangxi and at one stroke wiped out most of the enemy brigade led by Liu Shiyi, which was following closely. This great victory enabled them to regain the initiative. They went north to Donggu, where they joined forces with the 2nd and 4th Independent Regiments of the Red Army of Jiangxi, led by Li Wenlin and others, and began to gain a foothold in southern Jiangxi. The leaders of the Fourth Red Army analysed the situation and used their forces in a flexible way. First, they took advantage of the enemy’s weakness in western Fujian to make a swift move chapter three the agrarian revolution 135 there. On March 14, at Changlingzhai, they wiped out Guo Fengming’s brigade of the KMT’s Fujian Provincial Defence Army and occupied the important town of Changting, capturing large quantities of arms and supplies. After that, they returned to southern Jiangxi and on April 1 in Ruijin joined up with the main forces of the Fifth Red Army, which had broken out of an encirclement in the Jinggang Mountains. From May to October, when the main forces of the local warlord army of Fujian had gone to participate in the war between the warlords of Guangdong and Guangxi, the Fourth Red Army made two more sorties into western Fujian. There, with the support of the local workers’ and peasants’ armed forces, it eliminated the two brigades led by Chen Guohui and Lu Xinming. Soviet governments were established successively in southwestern Jiangxi and in western Fujian, and the local armed forces of the two regions were greatly expanded. Thus, a foundation was laid for the establishment of a central revolutionary base area. At this time, a difference of opinion appeared in the Fourth Red Army’s Party organizations and among the leaders. On June 22 at the 7th Party Congress of the Fourth Red Army, held in Longyan, Fujian, an argument broke out regarding the establishment of an Army Committee. Jiang Hua, who was then secretarygeneral of the Political Department of the Fourth Red Army later recalled the outcome: “Although the argument as to whether an Army Committee should be set up was resolved, the difference of opinion on the relationship between the Party and the army, which was behind the argument, was not finally settled.... During the argument, certain elements of non-proletarian thinking, such as the purely military viewpoint, the ideology of roving rebel bands, ultrademocracy and vestiges of warlordism gained some ground in the army.”11 These ideas persisted because most members of the Red Army had come from the peasantry and from old armies. It would take time and effort to change their old concepts and habits. Since no agreement was reached on these questions at the 7th Party Congress of the Fourth Red Army, Mao Zedong, who had originally been appointed secretary of the Front Committee by the CPC Central Committee, was not reelected to that post; nevertheless, he remained a member. Then he left for Jiaoyang in Shanghang County, where the Special Committee of Western Fujian was located, to help guide the Party’s work there. On August 21 the CPC Central Committee sent to the Front Committee of the Fourth Red Army a letter, drafted by Zhou Enlai, in which it criticized the 7th Party Congress of the Fourth Red Army. The Central Committee emphasized that the Red Army was not only a fighting organization but also had a great role to play in propaganda and politics. It pointed out that the Red Army must have a relatively centralized leadership, that it was by no means patriarchal for the Party secretary to have more responsibilities, and that demanding that everything be discussed within the Party branch was an expression of ultra-democracy.12 Soon, Chen Yi went to Shanghai to report in detail to the Central Committee on the work of the Fourth Army. On September 28 the Central Committee again sent a directive to the Front Committee. “Now we have the Red Army in the countryside,” the Central Committee wrote, “and later we will have political power in the cities. This is the characteristic of the Chinese revolution. It is a product of the Chinese economic base.” The directive went on to list the basic tasks of the Red Army: ( 1 ) lo mobilize the masses in struggle, accomplish the agrarian revolution and establish Soviet regimes. (2) To carry on guerrilla warfare, arm the peasants and expand the Red Army. (3) To extend guerrilla areas and our political influence throughout the country.13 The directive analysed conditions within the Party organizations of the Fourth Red Army and pointed out that “the only way to combat peasant ideology [among the soldiers was] to build up proletarian ideology and make it predominate.”14 The reason for the combat effectiveness of the Party and the peoples army was that ideological and political unity was guaranteed by a strong sense of organization and discipline. The directive stressed that all the Party’s power must be centralized in the Front Committee as the leading organ, and 137 CHAPTER THREE THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION that the charge of “patriarchalism” must not be made indiscriminately to weaken it and to serve as a cover for ultra-democracy. At the same time, it said, the Front Committee should not concern itself with everyday administrative affairs, which should be handled by the administrative organs. Thus, the Central Committee put an end to the argument within the Party organizations of the Fourth Red Army. It also urged the Front Committee and all officers and men to support the leadership of Zhu De and Mao Zedong and asked that Mao Zedong be reinstated as secretary of the Front Committee. In late December the 9th Party Congress of the Fourth Red Army was held in Gutian, Shanghang County, Fujian Province. At the meeting, Mao Zedong delivered a report, and a number of resolutions were adopted. The most important of these was one drafted by Mao on correcting mistaken ideas in the Party. This resolution stated that the Chinese Red Army was “an armed body for carrying out the political tasks of the revolution” and that it must subject itself to the absolute leadership of the Party. It criticized Party members who were exclusively concerned with military affairs and who argued that military affairs and politics were opposed to each other. It reiterated that the Red Army must be integrated with the people and take up the combined tasks of fighting, raising funds and doing propaganda and organizational work among the masses. It criticized those who wanted only to move from city to city to seek an easy life and engage in roving guerrilla actions, refusing to do the hard work of building revolutionary political power. It also criticized manifestations of ultra-democracy and the disregard of organizational discipline, pointing out that its root causes were petty-bourgeois individualism and aversion to discipline. The danger of ultra-democracy, the resolution said, was that it could weaken or even completely undermine the Party’s fighting capacity, rendering the Party incapable of fulfilling its fighting tasks and thereby causing the defeat of the revolution. The resolution emphasized the importance of strengthening ideological education in the Party, analysed the various expressions of non-proletarian ideas in the Fourth Red Army’s Party organizations and insisted that the Party and the army must be built on proletarian ideas. The resolution of the Gutian meeting was a programme for the building of the Communist Party of China and the Red Army. It answered the fundamental question of how to turn a revolutionary army that was mainly composed of peasants and operating in an environment of rural warfare into a people’s army of a new type. Never in the history of China had there been such an army. The resolution of the Gutian meeting was implemented not only by the Fourth Red Army but also by other units of the Red Army to some extent in other parts of the country. It was a milestone in the history of the people’s army of China. At the Gutian meeting a new Front Committee was elected with Mao Zedong as secretary. In June 1930 the Red Army units in southwestern Jiangxi and western Fujian were merged into the First Army Group of the Red Army, with Zhu De as commanderin-chicl and Mao Zedong as political commissar and secretary of the Front Committee. The new First Army Group comprised more than 20,000 troops and was thus the strongest Red Army force in the country. In the revolutionary base areas in southern Jiangxi and western Fujian, the agrarian revolution loo developed to a new stage. In April 1929 Mao Zedong, who was in charge of drafting the Land Law lor Xingguo County, Jiangxi, initiated a major change of principle. While the Land Law for the Jinggang Mountains had stipulated that “all the land” was to be confiscated and redistributed, in the new law this provision was changed to read “all the public land and the land of the landlord class.” In July the 1st Party Congress of Western Fujian adopted a resolution providing that land held by peasants was not to be confiscated and that the principle of “taking from those who have a surplus and giving to those who have a shortage” was to be introduced. After this congress, land distribution was carried out in an area of nearly 40,000 square kilometers in western Fujian. As a result, more than 600,000 poor peasants received land. Following the Gutian meeting in December, the main forces of the Fourth Red Army returned to southern Jiangxi. On February 7, 1930, the Front Committee of the Fourth Red Army called a meeting in Ji’an, CHAPTER THREE THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION 139 Jiangxi with the local authorities at which it was decided that the agrarian revolution must be deepened in Jiangxi as well. Accordingly, land distribution was carried out in the whole area of Xingguo and five other counties and in parts of Yongfeng and other counties. A year later, following a decision by the CPC Central Committee, Mao Zedong directed governments at different levels to issue a proclamation making it clear that, once the land had been distributed (according to the principles of “taking from those who have a surplus and giving to those who have a shortage, and taking from those who have better and giving to those who have worse”), the distribution was final. Anyone who had been given land was to manage it himself. The land belonged to him, other people must not encroach upon it and he could rent it out or sell it as he pleased. Produce from the land belonged to the peasant, except that he was expected to pay a land tax to the government. This policy represented a reversal of the Land Law of the Jinggang Mountains, which had provided that land belonged to the government and not to the peasant, who had the right to use it but not to sell it. Through repeated trial and error, the Party gradually developed a complete programme for land reform that corresponded to the realities of the Chinese countryside. Following the land reform in the revolutionary base areas of southern Jiangxi and western Fujian, a fundamental change took place in the social structure and the relations between classes. In October 1930 Mao Zedong conducted a one-week survey of the rural areas in Xingguo, after which he concluded that the situation with regard to the struggle for land throughout southern Jiangxi was more or less the same as in Xingguo. In his report on this survey he wrote that the poor peasants had benefited from the land reform in twelve respects: 1. They had been given farmland, which was the fundamental benefit. 2. They had been given the hills. 3. The grain of the landlords and counter-revolutionary rich peasants had been distributed to them. 4. All the debts owed before the revolution had been cancelled. Rice was cheaper. 6. It was no longer necessary to have money in order to take a wife. 7. It was no longer necessary to pay funeral expenses to bury the dead. 8. The price of an ox was lower than before. 9. They no longer needed money for ritual gift-giving and superstitious practices, as both had been done away with. 10. Drugs, gambling, thieves and bandits had disappeared. 11. They could now afford meat. 12. Most important, political power was now in their hands. The middle peasants too, Mao wrote, had benefited from the agrarian revolution both economically and politically. Most of them had received land, and they were no longer under the rule of the landlords and rich peasants, ordered about in everything. Now they too had the right to speak out, along with the poor peasants and farm labourers. Thus, the overwhelming majority of the peasants supported the agrarian revolution and the Communist Party. Everywhere their enthusiasm for the revolution ran high, and major successes were being achieved in the struggle against feudalism. At about this time, the agrarian revolution was also begun in other revolutionary base areas, one after another. The agrarian revolution was one of the basic components of the Chinese democratic revolution. Without changing the feudal land system it would be impossible to dismantle feudalism. In China there was no political party that represented solely the peasants. The political parties of the national bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie and their representatives either were not concerned with the peasants’ land problem or only talked about it and did nothing. Only the Communist Party took practical, resolute action. Only the Communist Party led the masses of poor peasants in a fierce struggle to overthrow the feudal system that had ruled Chinese society for thousands of years. The peasants were realistic about their own interests. The fact that the CPC was leading the agrarian revolution helped them understand the difference between it and the Kuomintang. By the 141 CHAPTER THREE THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION same token, it greatly mobilized their support for the revolutionary war and their eagerness to defend and build the revolutionary base areas. As small producers, the peasants naturally had weaknesses, such as short-sightedness and aversion to discipline; therefore, they had to be educated and remoulded. However, they had a vast reservoir of hatred for imperialism and feudalism, far exceeding the resentment of other classes in society. It would be a mistake to stress the negative aspects of the peasantry at that time without recognizing its positive aspects. After the failure of the Great Revolution, the national bourgeoisie withdrew from the revolution, and the urban petty bourgeoisie wavered a great deal. If the Chinese revolution was to continue to develop into an irresistible force, it was essential for the Communist Party to rely firmly on the peasants, who accounted for the overwhelming majority of the population, winning their support through a thoroughgoing agrarian revolution. The people’s revolution led by the Communist Party followed a unique strategy: to encircle the cities from the countryside and seize state power by armed force. This unique strategy, developed by the collective efforts of the Party and the people, took shape only after serious setbacks, through repeated trial and error and constant reviewing of experience. Mao Zedong made the most outstanding contribution to this process. He was the first to advocate shifting the focus of armed struggle to the countryside and to insist on developing rural revolutionary base areas; moreover, it was he who explained the theoretical basis for the strategy of the Chinese revolution. He criticized the idea that there was a contradiction between adhering to the leadership of the proletariat and relying on the peasants as the main force of revolution. “For in the revolution in semi-colonial China,” he wrote, “the peasant struggle must always fail if it does not have the leadership of the workers, but the revolution is never harmed if the peasant struggle outstrips the forces of the workers.”15 He emphasized the importance of persisting in the struggle in rural revolutionary base areas: “Only thus is it possible to build the confidence of the revolutionary masses throughout the country, as the Soviet Union has built it throughout the world. Only thus is it possible to create tremendous difficulties for the reactionary ruling classes, shake their foundations and hasten their internal disintegration. Only thus is it really possible to create a Red Army which will become the chief weapon for the great revolution of the future. In short, only thus is it possible to hasten the revolutionary high tide.”16 A few years later, Mao pointed out in more explicit terms that in semi -colonial, semi-feudal China, the Communist Party had to proceed differently than communist parties in capitalist countries. “Basically,” he said, “the task of the Communist Party here is not to go through a long period of legal struggle before launching insurrection and war, and not to seize the big cities first and then occupy the countryside, but the reverse.”17 After the decision was made at the meeting of August 7, 1927, to resist the murderous policies of the Kuomintang reactionaries with armed struggle, the Party was faced with the fundamental question of how to win that struggle. For a time the Party continued to focus its work on the cities. The first three famous insurrections in key cities after the defeat of the Great Revolution had failed to achieve their goals. But the idea of trying first to gain control of the cities did not quickly disappear. Instead, as will be seen, it continued to emerge, bringing repeated losses to the revolution. If the Chinese Communists, instead of turning to the rural areas, where the reactionary forces were weak, had merely adhered to the dogma in books, blindly copied the model of other countries and continued to concentrate on the cities, the revolution would have soon failed. But the Chinese Marxists represented by Mao Zedong persisted in proceeding from the realities in the country and in learning through practice and from the masses. Thus, displaying admirable initiative at a critical moment when the revolution was at stake, they were able to determine the correct strategy of surrounding the cities from the countryside and seizing state power with armed force, something that had never been done before.

The “Left” Mistakes During the Resurgence of Revolution and the Red Army’s Victory in the Counter-Campaigns Against “Encirclement and Suppression”

During the two years immediately following the 6th National Congress of the CPC in 1928, the revolution revived across the country. Through arduous struggle, the CPC, which seemed to have fallen into hopeless straits after the failure of the Great Revolution, reemcrged as an important political force. There were both objective and subjective reasons for this. The objective reasons were as follows. A period of relative stability prevailed after the founding of the KMT government in Nanjing, but after war broke out between Chiang Kai-shek and the Guangxi clique in March 1929, the country relapsed into incessant tangled warfare between the new warlords. Many of the troops that had previously been engaged in attempts to encircle and suppress the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army were moved to other battlefields to take part in that warfare, leaving a vacuum in certain areas and an opportunity for the Red Army to grow. Moreover, under the rule of the KMT government, the national crisis was aggravated. Every one of the fundamental contradictions in Chinese society became intensified, and the Nanjing government grew increasingly fascist. The ordinary workers and peasants and even the national bourgeoisie had won not an iota of emancipation, political, economic or ideological. Discontent was growing even among those who had cherished illusions about the KMT. The subjective reason for the revival of the revolution at this time was that the CPC Central Committee adhered to a basically correct line and did a great deal of fruitful work by proceeding from the actual conditions in the country. The Resurgence of Revolution in 1929 and Early 1930 In its political resolution, the 6th National Congress of the CPC wrote: “Since the revolution has suffered serious defeats, it is essential to shift from direct armed uprisings on a broad scale to the day-to-day work of organizing and mobilizing the masses.... The general line of the Party is to win over the masses.” A sharp change in the Party’s work was effected in the wake of the congress. The Party faced a grim situation in the areas under KMT rule. The “Left” putschism that had emerged in November 1927 brought further heavy losses to the forces that had managed to survive the failure of the Great Revolution. For a time, the Central Committee regarded Hunan, Hubei and Guangdong provinces as centres from which to relaunch struggles, but it was precisely those areas that suffered the heaviest losses. Local Party organizations were ill adapted to the new and perilous environment, since they had mushroomed when the revolutionary activity was at its height and had had only two kinds of experience. Either they had engaged in open or semi-open activities during the period of the Great Revolution, or following the instructions of putschist leaders, they had relied only on a small number of people who acted recklessly, without regard for consequences or even for their own lives. Things had begun to change around the time of the 6th Party Congress, but there was no fundamental turn for the better. Most of the key Party members were concentrated in provincial Party committees, special committees and certain major cities and townships, forming a huge secret organization. The Party was estranged from the masses. Many Party branches had become inactive and existed in name only. Under these difficult conditions, many outstanding Party members immersed themselves in hard, solid work. After the 6th Party Congress, the Central Committee laid down the following principles for the Party’s work. First, it was essential to go into the midst of the masses and start work from the grassroots. Only when the organizations at lower levels had been consolidated and become active could organizations at higher levels be set up. Second, secret work should be integrated with open work. Party chapter three the agrarian revolution 145 organizations in every locality should use all means (including legal and semi-legal means) to get in touch with workers and peasants, so as to truly understand their hardships and demands and to patiently mobilize them and lead them in daily struggles. Thus gradually, over a long period of time, the Party would accumulate strength and fulfil its objective of “winning over the masses.” Third, Party cadres should have regular jobs and social relations with people in different milieus, so as to be able to make full use of the cover provided by their professional and social connections. While endeavouring to rectify the “Left” mistakes, the Party also struggled resolutely against the Right views and actions. At this time Chen Duxiu and others, despairing of the future of the revolution, gradually turned liquidationist. Embracing Trotskyite views, they held that after the defeat of the Great Revolution in 1927, the Chinese bourgeoisie had triumphed over the imperialist and feudal forces and stabilized its rule over the people; capitalism had gained the upper hand in Chinese society and would enjoy peaceful development. They concluded that since the bourgeois-democratic revolution in China had ended, the Chinese proletariat could not bring about a “socialist revolution” until some time in the future. Meanwhile, it could only engage in a legal movement, which would centre around the call for a national conference, attended by representatives from all walks of life, to seek a political solution to the country’s problems. They advocated abolishing revolutionary movements and slandered the Red Army’s military operations as the actions of “roving rebel bands.” Instead of accepting criticism, they tried to split the Party by secretly setting up small opposition factions. This led to their expulsion from the Party. In the face of the cruel White terror, the arrests and massacres in the vast areas under the reactionary KMT regime, it was extremely hard to keep the Party organizations there intact, let alone to consolidate and expand them. It took not only courage and tenacity but also resourcefulness and correct guidance. After a year’s preparation, the 2nd Plenary Session of the 6th Central Committee of the CPC was held in June 1929. It made the following judgement on the condition of the Party: “The Party has been rescued from weakness and inactivity and has regained its unity. At the same time, the Party has made progress in its work, gaining ground in its relations with the people, increasing its political influence among the masses and expanding its capacity to lead struggles.”18 According to statistics, Party membership grew from a little over 40,000 in July 1928, at the time of the 6th Party Congress, to 69,000 in June 1929, at the time of the 2nd Plenary Session of the 6th Central Committee, and to 100,000 in March 1930. In spite of some grave setbacks during this time,, the Party gained much valuable experience in underground work in areas strictly controlled by the reactionary forces. This experience was of great importance for the Party’s future work in such areas. More important, the strengthening of the CPC Central Committee’s leadership of the Red Army and the rural base areas brought about a tremendous expansion of the revolutionary forces. By March 1930, the Red Army had grown to 13 armies with over 62,000 men. And in addition to the base areas in southwestern Jiangxi and western Fujian led by Mao Zedong and others, there were major bases in the border regions of western Hunan-Hubci, Hubei-Henan-Anhui, Fujian-Zhejiang-Jiangxi, Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi and Hunan-Jiangxi, as well as in certain areas of Guangxi and Guangdong. Early in 1928, He Long, Zhou Yiqun and others arrived in the Honghu Lake area of Hubei and the Sangzhi area of Hunan. Using his social connections in his hometown of Sangzhi, He Long built a new revolutionary force by merging several peasant guerrilla units and reorganized them into the Fourth Army of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Revolutionary Army. On March 19, 1929, the CPC Central Committee wrote to He Long and the other leaders of the Front Committee of the Fourth Army, instructing them to concentrate on mobilizing the rural population to deepen the agrarian revolution, rather than on taking big cities. In July 1930 the newly formed Fourth Army joined forces in Gong’an County, Hubei Province, with the Sixth Red Army, which had been established by expanding the Western Hubei Guerrilla 147 CHAPTER THREE THF. AGRARIAN REVOLUTION Corps. Together, the two armies formed the Second Red Army Group, totalling more than 10,000 men, with He Long as commander-in-chief and Zhou Yiqun as political commissar. Soon after that, a Soviet government was set up in the western Hunan-Hubei base area. The Red Army guerrilla forces also grew rapidly in the HubeiHenan-Anhui base area. At first they were divided into three parts, one in the Hubei-Henan border base area, formed after the Huang’an-Machcng Uprising; one in the southeastern Henan base area, formed after the Southern Shangcheng Uprising; and one in the western Anhui base area, formed after the Lu’an-Huoshan Uprising. The Military Commission of the Central Committee assigned Xu Xiangqian to command the Hubei-Henan border base area. In January 1930, seeing the necessity of unifying the leadership of the Party organizations and the command of the Red Army units, the Central Committee decided to set up a Special Committee for the entire Hubei-Henan-Anhui border base area and appointed Guo Shushen as secretary. It also merged the three separate units into the First Army of the Red Army with Xu Jishen as commander, Xu Xiangqian as deputy commander and Cao Dajun as political commissar. The Special Committee and the First Army were the predecessors of the HubeiHenan-Anhui Bureau of the Central Committee and the Fourth Front Army of the Red Army. Having returned to the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi border region from southern Jiangxi, the Fifth Army of the Red Army, led by Peng Dehuai and Teng Daiyuan, joined with local guerrilla forces to form the Third Army Group of the Red Army. Peng Dehuai became commander-in-chief of the group and secretary of its Front Committee, and Teng Daiyuan was named political commissar. This army group opened up the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi Revolutionary Base Area. In the western part of Guangxi Province, Deng Xiaoping, representative of the CPC Central Committee, and Zhang Yunyi, Wei Baqun and others led part of the Guangxi army and local peasant forces influenced by the Party in the Bose Uprising of December 1929 and the Longzhou Uprising of February 1930. They founded the Seventh and Eighth armies of the Red Army, with Li Mingrui as commander-in-chief and Deng Xiaoping as political commissar of both armies, and established the Zuojiang and Youjiang Rivers Revolutionary Base Area. Thanks to these events, the Chinese revolutionary movement soon took on a very different aspect. In an article written in April 1930, Zhou Enlai declared: “Peasant guerrilla warfare and the agrarian revolution are the main features of the Chinese revolution today.”19 This was a highly important new assessment, based on the Party’s practice during the nearly two years since its 6th Congress. The Emergence of “Left” Adventurism As the situation improved, “Left” impetuosity gradually grew within the Communist Party. The renewal of the warfare between new warlords representing various KMT factions, triggered by the war between Chiang Kai-shek and the Guangxi clique, and the Chinese Eastern Railway Incident20 led the CPC Central Committee to a wrong assessment of the situation and encouraged a resurgence of “Left” thinking. More important, in 1929 the Communist International sent the CPC Central Committee a series of four letters stressing the “struggle against Right tendencies.” The most influential of these, dated October 26, asserted that the time was ripe for decisive action: “China has entered a period of profound national crisis. ...It is now possible and necessary to prepare the masses for the revolution that will overthrow the political power based on the alliance between the landlord class and the bourgeoisie and establish the dictatorship of the workers and peasants in the Soviet form, to engage energetically in the revolutionary forms of class struggle (political strikes by the masses, revolutionary demonstrations, guerrilla warfare, etc.) and to keep expanding them.” The letter added that by and large, the putschist mistakes had been corrected. On January 1 1, 1930, the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee adopted a resolution concurring with the view of the Communist International that the country was in profound crisis. CHAPTER THREE THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION 149 “The pace at which the revolution develops,” the resolution went on, “depends on the pace at which the reactionary regime is overthrown directly through armed rebellion.... We should act on the instructions of the Communist International, start at once to prepare the masses to fulfil this task and energetically initiate and expand revolutionary forms of class struggle.” In 1928, when the revolution had suffered grave setbacks, it had been easy to see that the “Left” tendencies in the Party were wrong and to quickly put an end to putschist mistakes. But at this time, when the KMT warlords of different factions were fighting among themselves, and when the revolutionary movement appeared to be reviving, many Party members overestimated revolutionary developments, and this fostered a more intense and sustained growth of “Left” impetuosity. The war in the Central Plains that broke out in May 1930 between Chiang Kai-shek on one side and Yan Xishan and Feng Yuxiang on the other marked a struggle between new warlords on an unprecedented scale. At the time, Zhou Enlai was in the Soviet Union reporting to the Communist International. Li Lisan and others, who were actually in charge of the work of the Central Committee, considered that the revolutionary crisis had come to a head nationwide. On June 11 the Political Bureau adopted a resolution, drafted by Li Lisan, entitled “The New Revolutionary High Tide and Winning Victory First in One or More Provinces.” “Left” adventurism (later known as the Li Lisan line) thus became dominant in the Central Committee. In this resolution “Left” adventurism manifested itself in several ways. First, the Political Bureau made a totally incorrect assessment of the situation, maintaining that the decisive battle not only for the Chinese revolution but for the world revolution was just around the corner. “The fundamental economic and political crisis in China,” the Bureau wrote, “continues to sharpen in an identical manner in every part of the country without the slightest essential difference.... The general situation shows that a new revolutionary upsurge in China is upon us.... The situation for direct revolution is already in existence on a national basis and is very likely to be turned into nationwide victory of the revolution.” Moreover, the outbreak of the Chinese revolution, it said, would immediately “set off a great revolution worldwide and give rise to the possibility of the final decisive class battle the world over.” Second, the Political Bureau argued that it was no longer necessary to gradually accumulate and prepare the subjective forces of revolution, since the masses, who aspired to large-scale action, would be content with nothing less than a nationwide armed uprising. Third, the Political Bureau continued to espouse the mistaken “city centre theory.” “The great struggle of the proletariat is the decisive force,” the resolution declared. “Without an upsurge in working class strikes and without armed uprisings in key cities, it is absolutely impossible to achieve victory in one or more provinces.” It rejected “encircling the cities from the countryside” as a grossly incorrect concept and called for “a drastic change in the guerrilla tactics of the past.” Fourth, the Political Bureau again confused the bounds of the democratic revolution and the socialist revolution. It maintained that the bourgeoisie had become part of the reactionary alliance and that if the revolution succeeded fixst in one or more provinces, “the factories, enterprises and banks owned by the Chinese bourgeoisie should be confiscated” and “the workers’ and peasants’ dictatorship must be turned into the dictatorship of the proletariat.” Guided by this sort of thinking, Li Lisan and his followers formed an adventuristic plan to launch armed uprisings in all the key cities of China with Wuhan as the centre and to concentrate all the Red Army forces to attack major cities. The plan emphasized the importance of uprisings in Wuhan and Nanjing and of a general strike in Shanghai, and instructed all Red Army units to “join forces in Wuhan” and “water their horses in the Yangtze River.” In late July the lhird Red Army Group, taking advantage of the enemy’s weak defence, captured Changsha, the provincial capital of Hunan, and occupied it for a time (pulling out on August 5). Li Lisan was so delighted with this victory that he considered it a vindication of his views and plan. In early August CHAPTER THREE THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION 151 a National General Action Committee was set up as the supreme commanding body for the armed uprisings and the general strike. The leading bodies of the CPC, the Youth League and the trade unions were merged into action committees at various levels, and the normal activities of those organizations were suspended. A detailed plan was put forward to prepare for nationwide uprisings, and appeals for cooperation were sent to Mongolia, which was asked to send troops, and to the Soviet Union, which was asked to prepare for war. Although the mistaken “Left” line held sway for only a little more than three months (from June to September 1930), the Party paid dearly for it. In the areas under KMT rule, many local Party organizations, impatient to organize uprisings, exposed their few members in open actions. This led to the destruction of eleven provincial Party committees and to nearly total disintegration of the Party organizations in Wuhan, Nanjing and other cities. In addition, the Red Army suffered huge losses during its attacks on large cities. An important feature of “Left” adventurism was that its adherents were divorced from reality — that is, they proceeded purely from subjective thinking or imagination and were impatient for success. Naturally, this attitude was resisted by those Party cadres who knew the actual situation and looked the facts in the face. For example, He Mengxiong, a member of the standing committee of the Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee, at a meeting sharply criticized Li Lisan’s mistake of neglecting both subjective and objective conditions; he was silenced and attacked. In June the Central Committee ordered the First Army Group of the Red Army, led by Mao Zedong and Zhu De, to attack Nanchang and Jiujiang. As they approached Nanchang, however, recognizing that their forces were greatly outnumbered by the enemy, they decided against an attack. By this time, the Third Army Group had already pulled out of Changsha. The First and Third Army Groups joined forces and formed the First Front Army of the Red Army, totalling over 30,000 men. Zhu De became the commander-in-chief and Mao Zedong the general political commissar and secretary of the General Front Committee. They were ordered to retake Changsha but failed after fierce fighting. Flexibly changing tactics according to circumstances, Mao Zedong decided to withdraw from Changsha and enter Jiangxi. In other revolutionary base areas, some leaders of the Party and the Red Army were also doubtful about the Li Lisan line and resisted it in varying degrees. Thus, it was not implemented in an all-round way in practical work, especially in the army and the base areas. Li Lisan’s “Left” adventurism had also gone beyond the tolerance of the Communist International. In late July, the Executive Committee of the Comintern adopted a resolution on the question of China stating, “For the time being, we have not yet achieved an objective situation of revolution throughout China.” Zhou Enlai and Qu Qiubai were sent home to rectify Li Lisan’s mistake, which they started to do as soon as they returned. During September 24-28, 1930, in Shanghai, the CPC held the Enlarged 3rd Plenary Session of the 6th Central Committee. In his report transmitting the resolution of the Communist International, Zhou Enlai pointed out the uneven development of the Chinese revolution and concluded that “the present situation is not yet a situation for direct armed uprising throughout the country.” He criticized Li Lisan for having made the mistake of “Left” adventurism in planning the Party’s work. Li Lisan made a self-criticism, and Qu Qiubai delivered a summary of the political discussion at the session. The 3rd Plenary Session corrected the ultra-Left assessment of the revolutionary situation in China made by Li Lisan and others, and after the meeting Li left his leading position. The programme for urban uprisings was canceled, and after the failure of the second attack on Changsha, the Red Army discontinued its attacks on big cities. Action committees for the central and local levels were dismantled, and the Party, Youth League and trade union organizations were rehabilitated. Work in the rural revolutionary base areas and the Red Army was given an increasingly important position. Nevertheless, the 3rd Plenary Session failed to make a thorough ideological and theoretical criticism of the “Left” mistake, represented by Li Lisan. It tolerated his thinking 153 CHAPTER THREE THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION to an extent and wrongly criticized He Mengxiong who had opposed Li Lisan. Still, those mistakes, which were the main reflection of the Li Lisan line in practical work, were rectified, the problem was basically solved and the work as a whole gradually returned to normal. But soon there was a sudden change. In October the Communist International wrote a letter to the CPC Central Committee declaring that the Li Lisan line was opposed to that of the International. At this time, Wang Ming (Chen Shaoyu) and Bo Gu (Qin Bangxian) had just returned from Moscow, where they had been studying and where they had won the confidence of Pavel Mif, deputy head of the Comintern’s Far Eastern Bureau. Through abnormal channels, Wang and Bo learned the contents of the letter before the Central Committee did. They immediately called for “opposing conciliation” and violently attacked the Central Committee as constituted at the 3rd Plenary Session. Wang Ming also distributed his programmatic pamphlet TwoLine Struggle (later revised and renamed Strive to Make the CPC More Bolshevik). He and Bo Gu exaggerated the proportion of capitalism in the Chinese economy and the importance of struggling against the bourgeoisie and the rich peasants at the present stage of the revolution, and they denied the existence of a camp of intermediate forces. They insisted that there was a nationwide revolutionary upsurge and, eager for quick victory in one or more major provinces with key cities, urged that the Party launch nationwide attacks. A “true” Red Army and a government formed by a conference of workers, peasants and soldiers, they said, should already have been established in China, and the main dangers within the Party were Right opportunism in its line, and in its practical work and the defence of the interests of rich peasants. They called on Party members to form a provisional central leading organ and demanded that leading organs at different levels be transformed, consolidated and staffed with “militant cadres” who vigorously supported and implemented their line. The statements and activities of Wang Ming and Bo Gu threw the Party into ideological disarray. Some local Party cadres and organizations that had been criticized by Li Lisan and the 3rd Plenary Session demanded that the Central Committee be reorganized. With the National Federation of Trade Unions in their hands, Luo Zhanglong and others manoeuvred to split the Party. Amid this chaos, the Central Committee found it impossible to carry out its normal work. The 4th Plenary Session of the 6th Central Committee of the CPC was convened in Shanghai on January 7, 1931. It was dominated by Pavel Mif, who had come to China. The main theme of the session was criticism of the 3rd Plenary Session’s so-called conciliatory attitude towards the Li Lisan line. “Right deviation” was identified as the chief danger within the Party, and it was decided that “leading organs at different levels should be transformed and consolidated.” Qu Qiubai, Zhou Enlai and others were severely criticized at the meeting. With the support of Mif, Wang Ming, although he was only 26 and had little experience in struggle, was elected not only to the Central Committee but also to the Political Bureau. Nothing positive came out of the 4th Session of the 6th Central Committee. For four long years afterwards, the Central Committee was dominated by the “Left” dogmatism represented by Wang Ming. How was it that Wang Ming was able to gain such ascendancy? There were several reasons. Ever since the August 7th Meeting, there had been heavy “Left” tendencies in the Party, which had never been eliminated from its guiding ideology. Many Party cadres were enthusiastic about revolution but ill prepared with theory and practice. When Wang Ming and his followers tried to intimidate them with a lot of Marxist terms and received full support from the representative of the Communist International, many of them were unable to judge his position correctly and resist it. Wang Ming and his faction argued that the Li Lisan line was not a “Left” deviation but a Right deviation that denied the possibility of winning victory first in one or more provinces. Wang Ming had written in his pamphlet, “At present we have not yet achieved a situation of direct revolution in the whole country, but such a situation could be achieved in one or more major provinces soon, as new waves of revolutionary movement 155 CHAPTER THREE THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION throughout the country are growing and developing at different .needs ” Accordingly, he called for efforts to achieve victory in the provinces of Hunan, Hubei and Jiangxi, which would pave the way for nationwide victory. He and his supporters demanded continued attacks on the intermediate forces and the launching of a nationwide offensive. Generally speaking, Wang Ming and his faction were more determined and more arrogant than Li Lisan and those who had followed his line of “Left” adventurism, and clothed their arguments in more theoretical verbiage. Therefore they caused greater damage. After the 4th Plenary Session in 1931, the Party’s work in the areas under Kuomintang rule was completely disrupted. A number of outstanding Party cadres, including He Mengxiong, Lm Yunan and Li Qiushi, were arrested and executed because renegades informed against them. Luo Zhanglong and others formed an “Extraordinary Central Committee” in opposition to the policies of the 4th Plenary Session and attempted to organize a separate party; they were therefore expelled from the CPC. In late April Gu Sh unzhang, an alternate member of the Political Bureau who had assisted in running the Party’s security work and had access to many of the Central Committee’s top secrets, was arrested in Wuhan and betrayed the Party. He proposed that the Kuomintang authorities wipe out the headquarters and principal leaders of the CPC Central Committee at one blow in a surprise attack. This highly confidential piece of information was made known to Qian Zhuangfei, an underground Communist who had made his way into the Investigation Section of the KM Fs Central Organization Department and worked there as a confidential secretary. He immediately sent a courier from Nanjing to Shanghai to report to Li Kenong, who was in charge of the Section of Special Tasks of the CPC Central Committee and who would then convey the information to the Central Committee. At this critical moment, Zhou Enlai, assisted by Chen Yun and others, calmly acted to protect the Central Committee and thus averted disaster. In late June Xiang Zhongfa, who was then chairman of the Political Bureau, was arrested because of his imprudence, and soon he too betrayed the Party. Under these circumstances, Wang Ming left Shanghai for Moscow, and Zhou Enlai was forced to leave for Ruijin, Jiangxi, in the Central Revolutionary Base Area. Because both the Central Committee and the Political Bureau in Shanghai had lost more than half their members, a Provisional Central Political Bureau was set up in accordance with instructions from the Communist International. Bo Gu, Zhang Wentian (Luo Fu) and Lu Futan became members of the Standing Committee of the CPC Central Committee, Bo Gu being given overall responsibility, and they continued to follow the “Left” adventurist line represented by Wang Ming. The Red Army’s Victories in the CounterCampaigns Against “Encirclement and Suppression” The Central Committee formed at the 4th Plenary Session sent representatives, representative organs or new leading cadres to the various revolutionary base areas to carry out the struggle against what it called Right deviation. However, in many of them, especially the Central Base Area under the leadership of Mao Zedong, there was no time to carry out the “Left” policies promoted by these emissaries before the KMT began launching its “encirclement and suppression” campaigns. For this reason, it was still possible for the Red Army to defeat the enemy on several occasions. The Kuomintang ruling clique was shocked by the growth of the Red Army and the base areas, and particularly by the Red Army’s adventurist attacks on key cities during the period when the Party was following the Li Lisan line. By October 1930 the six-month war on the Central Plains between Chiang Kai-shek on one side and Yan Xishan and Feng Yuxiang on the other, involving more than a million men, was over. Immediately after he had won, Chiang turned back and concentrated large forces to “encircle and suppress” the Red Army in the revolutionary base areas in southern China. By this time the Red Army had expanded to more than 100,000 men. It was now possible to make the major change from waging chiefly guerrilla warfare to waging chiefly mobile warfare. Wherever the Red Army went, it established 157 CHAPTER THREE THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION Party organizations and revolutionary political power. It conducted a struggle for the distribution of land, winning the support of the masses. Stable revolutionary base areas were established, providing broad combat theatres for the Red Army and plenty of room for them to manoeuvre. These conditions had not been available to the Red Army in the past. Thus, in its countercampaigns against the KMT troops’ “encirclement and suppression” during this period, the Red Army fought on a larger scale and gained greater victories than ever before. The main target of the Kuomintang army’s “encirclement and suppression” campaigns was the First Front Army of the Red Army, led by Mao Zedong and Zhu De. Beginning in October 1930, Chiang Kai-shek gathered over 100,000 troops and mounted the first “encirclement and suppression” campaign, directed by Lu Diping, Governor of Jiangxi. As they underestimated the Red Army, the KMT forces adopted the tactic of driving straight into the revolutionary base area and making a concerted attack by converging columns, hoping to wipe out the main forces of the First Front Army at one blow. On October 30 the General Front Committee and the Jiangxi Action Committee held a joint meeting in Luofang. Noting that the 40,000 men of the First Front Army were greatly outnumbered and that the enemy forces in Hunan were strong while those in Jiangxi were weak, they decided to retreat to the centre of the base area and look for a favourable opportunity for combat. The plan was to lure the enemy troops in deep, wait for them to wear out their strength and then eliminate them in mobile warfare. And indeed, when the KMT army had penetrated deep into the revolutionary base area, it found that its battle line was overextended and its forces were spread too thin. On December 30 the division headquarters and two brigades led by Zhang Huizan, commander of the 18th Division of the “encirclement and suppression” army, entered the narrow mountain paths in the Longgang area and were ambushed by the Red Army. In just one day of heavy fighting, the Red Army wiped out some 10,000 enemy troops and captured Zhang Huizan. It followed up this victory with an attack to the east that eliminated half of Tan Daoyuan’s division in Dongshao. The first large-scale “encirclement and suppression” campaign was smashed. Before long, the Kuomintang regime sent He Yingqin, Minister of War and concurrently director of the Nanchang provisional headquarters of the commander-in-chief of the army, navy and air force, to command 200,000 forces in a second “encirclement and suppression” campaign. Drawing the lesson from the failure in the previous campaign, he changed tactics, advancing by stages, attacking only when sure of success and consolidating his position at every step. He also imposed a light economic blockade on the Soviet base area. The Soviet Area Bureau of the Central Committee held several meetings to consider counter-measures. A proposal to withdraw from the area and another to divide the Red Army forces in an attempt to push back the enemy were both rejected in favour of the former tactic of luring the enemy in deep. Utilizing the favourable conditions of the base area, the First Front Army concentrated its main forces, identified the enemy’s weak links and made sure that it had superior forces for every battle. First it attacked where the enemy was weak, then moved rapidly from west to east, wiping out the enemy units one by one. During the period of May 16-31, starting from Futian, the Red Army won five battles in succession, sweeping across 350 kilometres from the Ganjiang River in Jiangxi to Jianning in Fujian and eliminating over 30,000 enemy troops. Thus, the KMT’s second “encirclement and suppression” campaign was also smashed. As soon as the campaign was over in June, Chiang Kai-shek personally took up the post of commander-in-chief of the “encirclement and suppression” army, making He Yingqin front line commander, and gathered 300,000 troops for a third attempt. Counting on their tenfold numerical superiority, Chiang and He reverted to the tactic of driving straight into the base area in an attempt to force the Red Army back to the east bank of the Ganjiang River, disperse it and then “mop up” the smaller units. Mao Zedong and Zhu Dc decided to avoid the main forces of Chiang’s army and attack its weak spots. Accordingly, they led the main body of the Red Army on a 500-kilometre detour to 159 CHAPTER THREE THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION Xingguo in southern Jiangxi. By this time, the enemy forces were dosing in on them by different routes. Suddenly, however, the Red Army broke through a gap in their lines and won three successive battles, eliminating more than ten thousand enemy troops. Chiang immediately ordered all his units to turn east in pursuit. The Red Army disguised a small number of troops as its main force to lead the Kuomintang army far to the northeast, while its real main force again moved west, making its way through a mountain pass between concentrations of enemy troops. Then they returned to Xingguo to hide, rest and regroup. By the time the enemy discovered the deception and turned west, the Red Army had already had a fortnight’s respite. The enemy troops were so hungry, tired and demoralized that they had to withdraw. The Red Army took advantage of this and wiped out another thirty thousand of them. In this way, the KMT’s third attempt at “encirclement and suppression,” personally directed by Chiang Kai-shek, was defeated like the first two. After this campaign, the two revolutionary base areas of southern Jiangxi and western Fujian were linked up to form the Central Revolutionary Base Area, an area of fifty thousand square kilometres with twenty-one county towns and a population of two and a half million. Not long after, on December 14, over 17,000 men of the KMT’s 26th Route Army (formerly part of the Northwestern Army under Feng Yuxiang) staged a mass defection in Ningdu, Jiangxi Province, under the leadership of Zhao Bosheng, the army’s chief of staff who was an underground Communist, and generals Ji Zhentong, Dong Zhentang and Huang Zhongyue. These troops were reorganized as the Fifth Army Group of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army. This was the first time that a big regular army unit of the Kuomintang, with strong fighting capacity, had defected on the battlefield and gone over to the Red Army. This showed that the KMT’s policy of civil war was unpopular and that the Red Army had grown much stronger. At about this time major victories were also achieved in the struggle against “encirclement and suppression” in the revolutionary base areas of Hubei-Henan-Anhui and western Hunan-Hubei. The Red Army and the base areas in those regions had likewise grown enormously. The basic reason that the Red Army was able to defeat one KMT “encirclement and suppression” campaign after another in extremely difficult circumstances, even though greatly outnumbered, was that it had the enthusiastic support of the masses of poor peasants in the base areas. These peasants had been given land in the agrarian revolution, and they vied with each other to join the army and to help in the revolutionary war in every way possible. Without that support, the Red Army’s victories would not have been possible. The able leadership of Mao Zedong and others was also indispensable. In essence, their strategy was to concentrate the revolutionary forces and destroy the enemy units one by one. Tactically, this meant finding the enemy’s weak links while he was on the move and engaging him in quickly decided battles, fighting only when the Red Army could win and retreating when it could not. These strategic and tactical principles solved the complex and difficult problem of defeating a strong enemy by means of inferior forces with backward weapons. They took shape gradually in practice, in response to the specific conditions of the revolutionary war in China. A few years later Mao Zedong was to explain them systematically in his “Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War.”

Changes in the Domestic Political Situation and Grave Damage Brought About by “Left” Errors in the Party after the September 18th Incident

Late in the night of September 18, 1931, an event took place that shocked the whole country and changed the destiny of China. The Japanese Kwantung Army, which, in accordance with the terms of an unequal treaty, was stationed in northeast China, attacked Beidaying, where the Northeastern Army was garrisoned, and the city of Shenyang. The next day the Japanese army, encountering only light resistance, occupied Shenyang, Changchun and some twenty other cities. In four months’ time, the three provinces of Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang fell into enemy hands, and the people of northeast China sank into the miserable life of slaves in a conquered land. On January 28, 1932, the Japanese army launched a fresh attack in Shanghai. On March 9 it declared the founding of a puppet Manchukuo regime with Pu Yi, the last emperor of the Qing Dynasty, as the “Executive” (a title that two years later was changed to Emperor). The Awakening of the Nation After the September 18th Incident The September 18th Incident was a natural result of the expansionist policy of aggression against China that had long been followed by the Japanese militarists. It was a major step toward turning China into a colony exclusively occupied by Japan. China had been subjected more than once to the threat of being divided among imperialist powers, but this time it was in imminent danger of being conquered. “The Chinese nation laces its greatest danger; from each one the urgent call for action comes forth.” The words of the “March of the Volunteers” expressed the indignation in the hearts of hundreds of millions of Chinese. As a result of the Japanese imperialists’ invasion of China, the national contradiction between the two countries became the principal one and brought about major changes in the relations between different classes in China. The Chinese workers and peasants wanted to resist the aggression. After having remained inactive for more than four years, the student youth and the urban petty bourgeoisie also began to call for resistance. Cities that had been quiet for some time were again the scene of indignant protests. In Beiping,22 Shanghai, Nanjing, Guangzhou and Wuhan, students, workers and other residents organized demonstrations and strikes and published open telegrams to the government demanding that it resist Japanese aggression. On September 28, 1931, several thousand students from Shanghai and Nanjing went to the Kuomintang government and the central headquarters of the Kuomintang in Nanjing to demand a declaration of war against Japan; some of them even beat Wang Zhengting, the Foreign Minister. The national bourgeoisie also began to change its attitude and take an active part in the protests. The Sheri Bao and Xin Wen Bao, two newspapers in Shanghai, carried a students’ manifesto of resistance. Businesses in Shanghai, Hankou, Tianjin and other cities boycotted Japanese goods and asked that economic relations with Japan be severed. In northeast China under Japanese occupation, large numbers of volunteers rose in resistance. Under conditions of extreme hardship and difficulty, they carried out guerrilla warfare in the area between the Changbai Mountains and the Heilongjiang River, winning the admiration of the whole country. In the face of the Japanese invasion, the government in Nanjing made repeated concessions. At the time of the September 18th Incident, the Japanese Kwantung Army had only 10,000 men, while the Chinese Northeastern Army had 165,000 troops stationed in northeast China, in addition to 70,000 who had moved into the area south of Shanhaiguan, the east end of the Great Wall, before the conclusion of the Central Plains campaign. But two months earlier, Chiang Kai-shek had already announced the policy of “internal pacification before resistance to foreign invasion,” and he insisted on using his main forces to “encircle and suppress” the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army, which stood for resistance to the Japanese. When the September 18th Incident took place, the Nanjing government telegraphed the Northeastern Army: “This act of the Japanese Army is merely an ordinary act of provocation. To prevent the incident from developing further, you must keep to absolute non-resistance.”23 This attitude of the Nanjing government allowed the Japanese imperialists to launch large-scale attacks recklessly. But as the national crisis came to a head, divisions appeared within the Kuomintang. Ma Zhanshan, Li Du and other generals of the Northeastern Army resisted the Japanese in northeast China. In January 1932, when the Japanese 163 CHAPTER THREE THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION attacked Shanghai, the 19th Route Army under the command of Jiang Guangnai and Cai Tingkai fought them heroically. As Shanghai and Nanjing were the heart of the Kuomintang regime, and as the Japanese were receiving large-scale reinforcements, the government also sent into battle troops of the Fifth Army under the command of Zhang Zhizhong. However, its basic principle was still to sue for peace. On May 5, through the mediation of Britain and the U.S.A., the government signed the WusongShanghai Armistice Agreement with the Japanese aggressors, surrendering the country’s sovereign rights under humiliating terms. The following year, when Rehe Province had fallen into enemy hands and the battle of resistance along the Great Wall had failed, it signed the Tanggu Agreement, which similarly gave away sovereignty over north China. In Zhangjiakou, Feng Yuxiang organized the Chahar People’s Anti-Japanese Allied Army, but he met with only obstruction and sabotage from the Nanjing government. From the time of the September 18th Incident, the Communist Parly of China stood firmly for resistance against Japan. On September 20 the CPC Central Committee issued a “Declaration on the Brutal Occupation of the Three Northeastern Provinces by the Japanese Imperialists,” in which it unequivocally demanded opposition to the seizure, immediate withdrawal of all the Japanese ground, naval and air forces occupying the three Northeastern provinces and nullification of all unequal treaties. On November 27 the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic, which had just declared its founding in Ruijin, Jiangxi, issued a statement calling on the people of the whole country to mobilize and arm themselves to combat Japanese aggression and the reactionary regime of the Kuomintang. The CPC Provincial Committee of Manchuria instructed local Party organizations to strengthen their contacts with the people’s volunteers and to organize armed resistance forces under the Party’s leadership. The Central Committee sent Yang Jingyu, Zhao Shangzhi, Zhou Baozhong and Zhao Yiman to the Northeast to strengthen the leadership of Party organizations there. By early 1933, guerrilla units had been founded successively in Bayan, Hailong, Ning’an, Tangyuan and Hailun and in southern and eastern Manchuria; these were eventually to become the main armed forces resisting Japan in northeast China. In this unprecedented national crisis, the Party faced the questions of how to understand the profound changes in class relations in the country and how to advance the national democratic revolution. At this time, “Left” adventurism represented by Wang Ming was already dominant in the Provisional Central Committee. The Committee failed to understand and deal with these questions correctly. It adopted a series of resolutions that only reinforced the tendency towards “Left” adventurism in practical work. The Communist International held that the Japanese occupation of northeast China was to be regarded chiefly as “a further step towards war against the Soviet Union.”24 Following its instructions, the CPC Provisional Central Committee raised the slogan, “Defend the Soviet Union with arms.” This demand was far removed from reality and naturally unacceptable to the Chinese people. The Provisional Central Committee did not understand the changes in class relations in China that had been touched off by the Japanese aggression. It failed to see the positive change in the attitude of the middle-of-the-roaders, who were demanding resistance, or to recognize the splits that were taking place in the Kuomintang. On the contrary, they held that the middle-of-theroaders would help the Kuomintang maintain its rule and prevent the masses from overthrowing it. Therefore, it said, “these sections are the most dangerous enemy, and we should use our main forces to fight these counter-revolutionaries who seek compromise.”25 In this way, some middle-of-the-roaders who might have been friends were pushed into the arms of Chiang Kai-shek. In the new situation, instead of calling for a national united front against Japan, the Provisional Central Committee emphasized the antagonism between the Kuomintang regime and the Soviet political power. It declared that the collapse of the Kuomintang regime was imminent and that the central political 165 CHAPTER THREE THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION conflict in China was “a life-and-death struggle between counterrevolution and revolution.”26 ]n leading workers’ movements in cities, the Provisional Central Committee followed adventuristic policies. For example, it demanded that in Shanghai and other cities the workers do everything possible to prepare for general strikes, declared that the most pressing task was to arm the workers and peasants to resist Japanese imperialism and refused to organize legal workers’ struggles. Ignoring objective conditions, it insisted that Party organizations in Shanxi, Henan and Hebei should immediately create “a Soviet area in the north” by organizing mutinies by KMT soldiers and insurrections by workers and peasants. Having made these arbitrary decisions, the Provisional Central Committee wrote with full confidence, “the Central Committee is absolutely convinced that the various Party organs will accomplish these urgent tasks one hundred percent in the shortest possible lime!”27 In the areas under KMT rule, these much advertised policies, which were based on “Left” adventurism and closed-doorism and showed no regard for objective reality, were criticized and resisted by leading cadres who had practical experience. These included Liu Shaoqi, head of the Workers Department of the CPC Central Committee and secretary of the Leading Party Group of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, and Li Tiefu, secretary of the Leading Party Group of the Beiping Anti-Imperialist Alliance and Head of the Propaganda Department of the Hebei Provincial Party Committee. Liu Shaoqi maintained that in work among the masses, open and legal means should be used as much as possible, so that underground Party organizations could gradually accumulate strength and consolidate themselves. These leading cadres published articles in Red Flag, the weekly organ of the CPC Central Committee, criticizing the policy of having Party members quit the “yellow trade unions” controlled by the Kuomintang, but their position was not accepted. On the contrary, they were accused of making opportunist mistakes and dismissed from their leading posts. Work in the Areas under Kuomintang Rule in the Early 1930s It was extremely difficult for the CPC to operate in the areas under Kuomintang rule. And “Left” adventurism and closeddoorism led to foolhardy acts that inflicted heavy losses on the Party, making things even more difficult. During 1931 and 1932 the Hebei Provincial Party Committee was decimated on three separate occasions by arrests of its members. By January 1932 membership in the Red trade unions had been reduced to 3,000. By early 1933 it had become too dangerous for the Provisional Central Committee to stay on in Shanghai, and it was obliged to move to the Central Soviet Area. The Shanghai Bureau of the Central Committee was established to lead the Party’s work in the KMT-controlled areas and to maintain contact with the Communist International. Between March 1934 and February 1935, this Bureau was nearly wiped out no less than six times, and the following July it was forced to suspend operations. By that time, all but a handful of the Party organizations in the KMTcontrolled areas had been destroyed. It is worth noting that even under such harsh conditions, a number of Communists and progressives outside the Party still continued their struggle in the KMT areas. They made a great contribution by promoting the movement for resistance to Japan and for national salvation, opposing Chiang Kai-shek’s dictatorship, disseminating Marxism and using literature and the arts to expand the influence of the Party. How could this happen? Two factors were at work. First, even though after the September 18th Incident the national crisis reached unprecedented proportions, Chiang’s ruling clique stubbornly followed the traitorous policy of “internal pacification before resistance to foreign invasion” and intensified its fascist dictatorship. This was extremely unpopular and could not but arouse growing indignation among the people and cause splits among the middle-of-theroaders and even within the KMT ruling clique. Despite the serious “Left” mistakes made by the Provisional Central Committee, many progressives could see that the Communist Party was 167 CHAPTER THREE THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION standing firmly for resistance to Japanese aggression, demanding a democratic politics and working for the benefit of the toiling masses. For this reason, they drew closer and closer to the Party. Second, the “Left” theories of the Provisional Central Committee did not work in practice. Although it had imposed those theories in many places, some Party organizations and many individual members, taught by objective realities, consciously or unconsciously broke away from them for the sake of advancing the revolution. They gradually adjusted their practical work, adopting flexible and effective measures. When the Provisional Central Committee had moved to the Central Soviet Area and the Shanghai Bureau had been repeatedly sabotaged, some Party organizations in Shanghai — for example, the Commission for Cultural Work of the CPC Central Committee and the Provisional Party Committee of Jiangsu Province — lost contact with the higher levels. In the extremely complicated circumstances, they did some exploring on their own and blazed a few new trails, refusing to be guided by the subjectivism of a few leaders. Their abandonment of “Left” thinking manifested itself chiefly in a new concern for uniting with other social forces and for making full use of legal means of propaganda. Although at the time people working in this way did not necessarily have a clear understanding of the right political line, facts proved that they were doing the right thing. Some leaders in the Provisional Central Committee also showed signs of a change in their thinking. In October 1932 Zhang Wentian published in Struggle, another organ of the CPC Central Committee, two articles entitled “Closed-doorism in the Field of Literature and Art” and “On Our Propaganda and Agitation Work.” In these articles he declared that it was chiefly “Left” closed-doorism that had prevented the Left-wing movement in literature and art from expanding beyond the narrow confines of underground work. “It is absolutely essential,” he wrote, “to combat “Left” phrase-mongering and closed-doorism, if the present Left-wing movement in literature and art in China is to become a movement of the masses. Only a broad revolutionary united front can transform our underground activities within narrow confines, enabling us to work openly or semi-openly and to reach a wide range of people.”28 In August 1931 Soong Ching Ling returned home from Europe because her mother had died. She immediately threw herself into the international campaign to secure the release of Paul Noulens, the leader of the Far Eastern Bureau of the Communist International, who had been arrested in Shanghai. When Deng Yanda, the former political director of the Northern Expeditionary Army and her old friend, was murdered on orders from Chiang Kaishek, in grief and indignation she issued a statement entitled, “The Kuomintang Is No Longer a Political Power.” “I firmly believe, she wrote, “that only a revolution built on mass support and for the masses can break the power of militarists and politicians, throw off the yoke of foreign imperialism and truly realize socialism.”29 Soong Ching Ling played a leading role in the founding of the Society for Wiping Out National Humiliation and for Self-Salvation, the China League for the Protection of Civil Rights (together with Cai Yuanpei and Yang Xingfo, who was later murdered by Kuomintang agents for his part in it) and the Chinese People’s Committee for Armed Self-defence. She served as the most prominent spokesperson for all these organizations, evoking much favourable response both at home and abroad. Certain Communists kept in close contact with her. In many of his essays the great writer Lu Xun, who had already become a Marxist and kept in close contact with the Party, ruthlessly exposed the dictatorial nature of the ruling clique of big landlords and compradors, their subservience to foreign powers, their shameful failure to resist Japanese aggression and their brutal “encirclement and suppression” campaign against writers and artists. He also sharply criticized manifestations of ultra-Leftism in cultural circles. In March 1930, in a speech at the inaugural meeting of the League of Chinese’ LeftWing Writers, he said: “Our failure to form a united front shows that we do not have a common objective, or that our objective is only to serve small groups or individuals. If our objective were to serve the masses of workers and peasants, then the front would naturally be united.” Years later, Mao Zedong w'as to pay him this tribute: “Representing the great majority of the nation, Lu 169 chapter three the agrarian revolution Xun breached and stormed the enemy citadel; on the cultural front he was the bravest and most correct, the firmest, the most loyal and the most ardent national hero, a hero without parallel in our history. The road he took was the very road of China’s new national culture.”30 The help that Communists gave to Zou Taofen, editor-in-chief of Life Weekly, was a successful example of uniting with patriots and developing progressive forces. Originally, the magazine was devoted chiefly to self-improvement, a subject on which it offered its readers “professional guidance.” Its political position was generally that of the patriotic national bourgeoisie. The September 18th Incident, however, had an enormous effect on Zou Taofen. With the help of Hu Yuzhi and other Communists, he soon espoused the cause of resistance and national salvation and drew closer to the Party. From then on. Life Weekly became a lively and popular publication with a circulation of over 100,000. Zou Taofen’s words gained great influence among young people. In July 1932 he founded the Life Bookstore, which also published a large number of progressive books on the social sciences, literature and the arts. The bookstore became an important bastion of progressive culture in areas under Kuomintang rule. Many Communists worked for the bookstore. Notwithstanding the KMT’s policy of brutal repression, some Communists and progressives were able to make full use of legal means to conduct their propaganda. In the spring of 1929 Cai Yuanpei, one of the founding members of the Kuomintang, president of the Central Research Academy and director of the Social Sciences Institute, appointed the distinguished scholar Chen Hansheng, a Party member, deputy director of the Institute. To gain a better understanding of the nature of Chinese society, Chen organized a Marxist survey group, which over a period of six years carried out extensive, thoroughgoing investigations of Chinese rural society. In 1933, together with Xue Muqiao and others, he founded the Society for Research on the Chinese Rural Economy and the monthly Chinese Countryside. This magazine, which was published openly, printed many survey reports and treatises on the necessity of reforming the feudal land system, supporting the agrarian revolution led by the Communist Party. Left-wing writers and artists also worked hard to cooperate with the middle-of-the-roaders. Articles by Lu Xun, Qu Qiubai, Mao Dun and Zhou Yang appeared in “Free Talk,” a supplement of the daily newspaper Sheri Bao, edited by Li Liewen, and in the monthly magazine Literature, edited by Fu Donghua. The famous novel Midnight by Mao Dun was published by the Kaiming Bookstore in February 1933 and reprinted four times in three months, which was rare at the time. Communists Xia Yan, Yang Hansheng and Tian Han, through the Mingxing Film Studio and the Lianhua Film Studio, made many progressive films that attracted large audiences. The “March of the Volunteers” — the theme song from the film Heroes and Heroines, written by Xia Yan and produced by the Diantong Film Studio — swept the country. This stirring song, with music by Nie Er and words by Tian Han, did much to mobilize the people for national salvation. Left-wing social scientists translated many Marxist works. The first complete Chinese translations of volume I of Marx’s Capital , Engels’ Anti-Duhring , Marx’s A Critique of Political Economy, Lenin’s Materialism and Empirio-Criticism were all published in the early 1930s. Progressive social scientists took part in debates on the history and nature of Chinese society, using the tools of Marxist analysis and criticizing views that did not correspond to the realities. Guo Moruo’s Studies of Ancient Chinese Society, written while the author was in exile in Japan and published in 1930, was the first book on Chinese history written from a Marxist viewpoint. More and more, Left-wing social scientists were introducing dialectical-materialist and historical-materialist viewpoints into their studies of China and the world. They propagated Marxism in a number of ways, making it easily accessible to young people. Although many of the members of the League of Chinese Left-Wing Writers, the League of Chinese Social Scientists and similar organizations were affected at this time by “Left” ideas, the cultural movement they championed made a great contribution to China’s modern ideological development. In particular, the movement played a historic role in disseminating progressive CHAPTER THREE THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION 171 thinking and promoting the anti-Japanese movement for national salvation. It tempered a strong group of revolutionary intellectuals, many of whom later became the backbone of the Party in the fields of ideology and theory, literature and the arts. The Failure of the Central Red Army in the Fifth Campaign Against “Encirclement and Suppression” Since the CPC Provisional Central Committee was still in Shanghai in the early 1930s, it was some time before its “Left” policies penetrated the Red Army and the revolutionary base areas. During November 1-5, 1931, the Party organizations in the Central Soviet Area held their first congress (known as the southern Jiangxi meeting) in Ruijin, Jiangxi. At this meeting, which was presided over by the delegation sent to the Central Soviet Area by the Central Committee after its 4th Plenary Session, Mao Zedong’s correct views were denounced as reflecting “narrow empiricism,” “the rich peasants’ line ’ and extremely serious and consistent Right opportunism,” and stressed that concentrated efforts should be made to fight against Right opportunism. Immediately after this meeting, the 1st National Congress of the Chinese Soviet was held in the same city from November 7 to 20. At this congress the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic was founded, Mao Zedong was elected chairman of the government and Xiang Ying and Zhang Guotao vice-chairmen. The congress also established the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, with Zhu De as chairman and Wang Jiaxiang and Peng Dehuai as vice-chairmen. At this time the different Soviet areas were separated from each other. The establishment of the Provisional Central Government and the Central Revolutionary Military Commission helped to centralize command over them and over units of the Red Army. However, the Provisional Central Committee based its policies on the directives of the Communist International, which put undue emphasis on the antagonism between the Soviet political power and the Kuomintang regime and demanded that the separate Soviet areas be linked up to form a whole, as if national victory of the revolution were at hand. This assessment was not realistic. Accordingly, some “Left” policies were laid down in the documents drafted by the Provisional Central Committee and adopted by the 1st National Congress of the Chinese Soviet — for example, the policy of giving no land to landlords and only poor land to rich peasants, which hampered the development of the base areas. In the second half of 1930, in the complicated struggle in the Central Soviet Area, the need to eliminate counterrevolutionaries was greatly exaggerated. Confessions were elicited by force and then given credence, with the result that many cadres and soldiers loyal to the revolution were executed as members of the A-B Group31 or the Social Democrats. This was a bitter lesson for the Party. In the summer of 1932, as soon as it had signed the WusongShanghai Armistice Agreement with Japan which humiliated the Chinese nation and betrayed its sovereignty, the Kuomintang regime dispatched a large number of troops for a fourth “encirclement and suppression” campaign against the revolutionary base areas. Their strategy was to proceed in two stages: an attack on the Hubei-Henan-Anhui and Western Hunan-Hubei revolutionary base areas, followed by a concerted attack by all forces on the Central Revolutionary Base Area. First, in July 1932 Chiang Kai-shek massed more than 300,000 troops under his personal command to attack the Hubei-HenanAnhui Revolutionary Base Area. The main forces of the Red Army in that area were the Fourth Front Army commanded by Xu Xiangqian. Through long, hard struggle, the Fourth Front Army had grown to 45,000 seasoned men. It had worked out a set of effective principles for combat, including the following: —when the enemy is strong and the revolutionary forces are weak, keep the initiative and lure him deep into Red territory; — avoid engagement with strong enemy units and attack the weak; —encircle and outflank the enemy; —besiege a point to annihilate an enemy relief force; —concentrate a superior force to eliminate enemy units one CHAPTER THREE THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION 173 by one; .... „ , — under special conditions, take the initiative and attack the enemy, and thwart the enemy’s scheme of “encirclement and suppression.” However, Zhang Guotao, whom the Provisional Central Committee had sent to the area after the 4th Plenary Session as secretary of the Hubei-Henan-Anhui Sub-Bureau of the Central Committee and chairman of the Military Commission, to fulfil his own ambitions, got rid of dissidents and dismissed Zeng Zhongsheng, the former leader of the border region. Before long, during the campaign to eliminate counter-revolutionaries, he had Xu Jishen, an outstanding general of the Red Army, executed, along with many other loyal cadres and soldiers. Some time afterwards, Zeng Zhongsheng was also executed. This produced chaos in the ranks of the revolution. When the Kuomintang was preparing to launch a large-scale attack on the base area, Zhang Guotao underestimated the enemy and made no preparations tor defence. On the contrary, he ordered the Red Army to press south over a long distance. Although the Fourth Front Army fought heroically and inflicted heavy casualties on the Kuomintang troops, it suffered heavy losses and was exhausted from continuous fighting. A large KMT force bore down upon the border, reducing the Red Army to a passive position and repeatedly defeating it. Zhang Guotao was alarmed by these events and decided that more than 20,000 of the main forces of the Fourth Front Army should cross the Beiping-Hankou Railway and move west. After more than two months of marching they entered northern Sichuan and established the Sichuan-Shaanxi Revolutionary Base Area. In July 1932 when an attack was launched on the HubeiHenan-Anhui Revolutionary Base Area, more than 100,000 KMT troops attacked the Western Hunan-Hubei Revolutionary Base Area. Beginning in the winter of 1930, the Second Army Group of the Red Army (with He Long as commander-in-chief and Zhou Yiqun and Deng Zhongxia, successively, as political commissar), had won several battles in the counter-campaign against “encirclement and suppression.” In the region of Honghu Lake, they had utilized the advantageous terrain for guerrilla warfare, inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy. However, after the 4th Plenary Session of the Central Committee, Xia Xi was sent to be secretary of the Western Hunan-Hubei Sub-Bureau of the Central Committee and political commissar of the Second Army Group (now reorganized into the Third Army of the Red Army), and he too followed the policies of “Left” adventurism and sectarianism. Duan Dechang and many other outstanding generals were wrongly executed in the movement to eliminate counterrevolutionaries. At first the Third Red Army underestimated the enemy and advanced too rapidly; then, it was forced onto the defensive, suffered heavy losses and eventually had to withdraw from the western Hunan-Hubei region (Xia Xi died during the march). After protracted fighting, it was finally able to open the Eastern Guizhou Revolutionary Base Area. Then, the Sixth Army Group led by Ren Bishi (with Xiao Ke as commander-inchief and Wang Zhen as political commissar) came there to join forces. The Third Army resumed its designation as the Second Army Group and was reorganized with He Long as commanderin-chief, Ren Bishi as political commissar and Guan Xiangying as deputy political commissar. The merger of the Second and Sixth Army Groups greatly strengthened them. Together they opened the Hunan-Hubei-Sichuan-Guizhou Revolutionary Base Area. The CPC Provisional Central Committee, which was still in Shanghai at this time, sent instructions to the Central Revolutionary Base Area: “At present, you should go on the offensive to eliminate the enemy’s armed forces, expand the Soviet area and take one or two key cities, so as to bring the revolution to victory in one or more provinces.” In August 1932 the First Front Army of the Red Army, under the command of Zhou Enlai, Mao Zedong, Zhu Dc and Wang Jiaxiang, took first Le’an County and then Yihuang County, both in Jiangxi, wiping out three enemy brigades. At this time, however, a difference of opinion arose in the Central Committee’s Soviet Area Bureau between leaders at the front and in the rear. Leaders of the rear wanted the First Front Army to take the initiative in the face of the enemy’s 175 chapter three the agrarian revolution i urge-scale offensive, to attack cities, strike enemy reinforcements and win quick victories. Zhou, Mao, Zhu and Wang, who were responsible for command at the front, telegraphed the Soviet Area Bureau in late September, arguing that under present conditions if they followed such a plan there would be no assurance of victory. “If,” they said, “we are itching to fight and act rashly, we shall waste our efforts, tiring out the troops and achieving nothing. It will be a case of more haste and less speed, and will only put us at a greater disadvantage.” In early October the Soviet Area Bureau held a plenary session in Ningdu, Jiangxi. At the meeting, the plan of the leaders at the front was heavily criticized as “a purely defensive line” and a Righl-deviatiomst policy that “focuses on making preparations and waiting for the enemy to attack.” A heated argument took place about whether Mao Zedong should remain at the front. Zhou, Zhu and Wang insisted that he should be kept there, but most of the participants did not agree. After the meeting, Mao was translerred to the rear, on the excuse that he should preside over the work of the Central Government. He was relieved of his post as general political commissar of the First Front Army, and it was given to Zhou Enlai as an added responsibility. At the end of 1932, the Kuomintang concentrated more than thirty divisions and in February 1933 launched the fourth “encirclement and suppression” campaign against the Central Revolutionary Base Area, approaching in three converging columns. I he twelve divisions under the command of Chen Cheng served as the central army of 160,000 men, who were to carry out the mam attack. At this time, the First Front Army had about 70,000 troops The Soviet Area Bureau repeatedly sent telegrams to the front, urging the First Front Army to launch its own attack and quickly occupy Nanfeng and Nancheng. Zhou Enlai replied that the present conditions were not good for attacking cities and that the Red Army should rather seek to wipe out the enemy through mobile warfare. This view was based on a correct assessment ol the situation, but it was rejected by the Soviet Area Bureau. Having failed to take Nanfeng, Zhou Enlai and Zhu Dc immediately decided that their main forces should move elsewhere secretly and wait for an opportunity to attack. In two ambushes in Huangbei and Caotaigang, they were able to wipe out three divisions of the well-equipped main force of Chen Cheng and capture more than 10,000 guns. By so doing they smashed the Kuomintang army’s fourth “encirclement and suppression” campaign against the Central Soviet Area and set an example of ambush by a large force that was unprecedented in the history of the Red Army. It was during this campaign that the CPC Provisional Central Committee moved to the Central Soviet Area. More than a year before, it had already declared: “We must achieve victory first in several key provinces (Hunan, Hubei, Jiangxi and Anhui). This revolutionary task is not for the future but for the present. All our work must be focused on accomplishing it.”32 After moving to the Central Soviet Area, the Provisional Central Committee implemented its “Left” adventuristic policies throughout the Party, the Red Army and the base area. To overcome resistance, organizationally it took a sectarian approach, regarding all cadres who disagreed with its policies as “opportunists,” attacking them mercilessly. Luo Ming, acting secretary of the CPC Fujian Provincial Committee, and Deng Xiaoping, head of the Propaganda Department of the Jiangxi Provincial Committee, opposed this “Left” line of going on the offensive. However, they were denounced as followers of a Right opportunist line who were pessimistic about the revolution and were trying to flee before the enemy. The Provisional Central Committee struggled first against the “Luo Ming line” in Fujian, and then against the “Jiangxi Luo Ming line” of Deng Xiaoping, Mao Zetan, Xie Weijun and Gu Bai in Jiangxi. Its main target was the views of Mao Zedong. This suppression of dissenting opinion threw everyone into a state of anxiety and created an abnormal political atmosphere in the Central Soviet Area. In the second half of 1933, after six months of preparation, Chiang Kai-shek launched a fifth campaign of “encirclement and suppression” against the Central Soviet Area, with himself as commander-in-chief. He had learned from previous failures and now relied “thirty percent on military means and seventy percent 177 CHAPTER THREE THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION on politics.” He imposed a tight economic blockade on the Central Soviet Area and utilized the new tactic of building blockhouses and advancing one step at a time. He had already sent a total of one million troops to attack the Red Army in different places. Now, beginning in late September, he sent half a million to attack the Central Soviet Area. By this time, the number of Red Army troops in the Central Soviet Area had grown to more than 80,000. Bo Gu, the leader of the Provisional Central Committee, relied for military command on Li De (the Chinese name of the German Otto Braun), a military adviser associated with the Communist International. Braun had experience only of the formal positional warfare of World War I and knew nothing of the characteristics of the revolutionary war in China. Under his guidance, the Provisional Central Committee abandoned the policy of active defence, which had been effective against the earlier “encirclement and suppression” campaigns. It called the impending conflict “a war to decide between two opposing visions of China’s future” and raised the slogans, “Don’t give up one inch of the base area!” and “Engage the enemy outside the gates!” It ordered the main forces of the Red Army to march north to fight, with the result that they were obliged to move between the main forces of the enemy and his blockhouses and were reduced to passivity. When the Red Army failed to launch an attack, the Provisional Central Committee shifted to a policy of passive defence. It maintained that the Red Army should be divided for defence purposes and fight a war of short, swift thrusts, attempting to substitute positional warfare for guerrilla and mobile warfare and to fight the well-equipped KMT forces in a war of attrition. Thus, as the war progressed, the Red Army found itself increasingly at a disadvantage. One good opportunity did arise for the Red Army to smash the fifth “encirclement and suppression” campaign. In November 1933 the generals of the KMT’s 19th Route Army, which the year before had tried to defend Shanghai against the Japanese, founded the People’s Revolutionary Government of the Chinese Republic and appointed Li Jishen as its chairman. They openly declared that they would resist Japanese aggression and oppose Chiang Kai-shek and sent representatives to negotiate cooperation with the Red Army. The two sides signed an initial agreement. On January 17, 1933, the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet and the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army had issued a statement that they were ready to sign an agreement on joint operations to resist Japanese aggression with any armed forces on the following three conditions: 1. they must immediately stop attacking the Soviet areas; 2. they must immediately guarantee the democratic rights of the people (freedom of assembly, association and speech, the right to strike and the right to publish); 3. they must immediately arm the people and establish armed volunteers to defend China and strive for its independence, unity and territorial inlcgrity. This statement was enormously important. However, Bo Gu and others continued to regard the middle-of-the-roaders as the most dangerous enemy. They refused to accept the advice of Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Zhang Wentian and Peng Dehuai. They held that the action taken by the leaders of the 19th Route Army to resist Japan and oppose Chiang was merely designed to deceive the people, and they refused to cooperate with them in military affairs. As a result, in January 1934, isolated and cut off from help, the Fujian People’s Government was defeated by Chiang’s military attack and political trickery. Since the Red Army let slip this golden opportunity, Chiang, having defeated the Fujian People’s Government, was able to complete his encirclement of the Central Soviet Area. In that same month, the CPC Provisional Central Committee, acting for the 6th Central Committee, held the 5th Plenary Session in Ruijin, Jiangxi. At this meeting the “Left” adventuristic line was pushed to an extreme. The Provisional Central Committee reaffirmed that the fifth counter-campaign against “encirclement and suppression” was to be a “struggle for the complete victory of Soviet China,” a struggle that would decide whether the country would take “the road of the Soviet or the road of colonialism.” Once again identifying the main danger as 179 chapter three the agrarian revolution Rjeht opportunism and warning against any compromise with it, thr Provisional Central Committee continued to be torn by facial strife. Even under the attack of a strong enemy, it intensified the “Left” policy of giving no land to the landlords and only noor land to the rich peasants, broadening the struggle unnecessarily and creating social disorder. But the w'orst consequence of the Provisional Central Committee’s continued “Left” adventurism was the failure of the Red Army in the fifth countercampaign against “encirclement and suppression,” which led to the abandonment of the Central Soviet Area. In mid-April 1934 the KMT army gathered a superior force to attack Guangchang, the northern gateway to the Central Soviet Area. Bo Gu and Otto Braun decided to concentrate the main forces of the Red Army and build fortifications to hold the town, regardless of the enemy’s numerical superiority, and they personally went to the front to direct operations. At the end of eighteen days of bloody battle, the Red Army had suffered heavy casualties and Guangchang had fallen. In early October the KMT army pushed into the heartland of the Central Soviet Area. The main forces of the Red Army were compelled to start a strategic shift of position. The Provisional Central Committee and the Central Red Army (the First Front Army of the Red Army), totalling more than 86,000 men, withdrew from the Central Soviet Area and marched west to break out of their encirclement. This was the beginning of the Long March. In July 1934 the Seventh Army Group of the Red Army was ordered to reorganize as the Vanguard Detachment to Resist the Japanese Invaders in the North and entered the border area of Fujian-Zhejiang-Anhui-Jiangxi. There it joined forces with the Tenth Army of the Red Army, led by Fang Zhirnm, to form the Tenth Army Group, which continued the march north in two columns. However, in January 1935, intercepted and pursued by greatly superior forces of the KMT army, the newly formed army group was routed. Fang Zhimin was captured and executed. As we have seen, in the grim aftermath of the failure of the Great Revolution, the Party, learning lessons paid for in blood and going through trial and error, had begun to revitalize the revolution. In the early period of the Kuomintang’s large-scale encirclement and suppression” campaigns against the Soviet areas and the Red Army, thanks to correct policies, the Party and army were still able to win great victories, even though the enemy was much stronger. After the September 18th Incident, national contradictions were intensified and great changes took place in the relations between different classes, creating excellent conditions for the Party and the Red Army to unite with the overwhelming majority of the people and to advance the national democratic revolution. However, at this time the leadership of the CPC Central Committee fell into the hands of “Left” dogmatists who understood nothing about conditions in China but who were trusted by the Communist International. This almost led to the failure of the revolution.

The Zunyi Meeting and the Triumph of the Red Army's Long March

The Long March of the Red Army was a heroic feat unprecedented in history. In October 1934 the Central Red Army (the First Front Army) began the Long March as the forced response to its defeat in the fifth counter-campaign against the enemy’s “encirclement and suppression. In trying to break out of the encirclement and effect a strategic shift of position, the leaders of the CPC Central Committee, who had already made “Left” errors, made the further mistake of allowing the troops to flee in disorder, trying to take everything with them. The army carried with it printing equipment, machinery for manufacturing munitions and other cumbersome gear. The entire force of over 80,000 had to travel through mountains along winding trails so narrow that often they could file through only a single pass in one night. The KMT army of “pursuit and suppression,” consisting of 77 regiments from 16 divisions deployed on four blockade lines, was CHAPTER THREE THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION 181 made up of the Guangdong Army, the Hunan Army and the Guangxi Army, each of which tried to obstruct and intercept the Red Army. Although the Red Army broke through the four blockade lines one after another, it suffered heavy losses. When it was going to break through the last line along the Xiangjiang River, conflicts between the Hunan and Guangxi warlords brought about a breach in the line. On November 27, 1934, vanguard troops of the Red Army occupied the major ferry point at Jieshou on the east side of the Xiangjiang River. If the troops had been marching with light packs, they might have been able to cross the river quickly, but because they were so heavily laden, they advanced too slowly. Leading organs of the Central Committee were not able to reach the ferry for two days. By this time, the KMT’s Hunan and Guangxi armies were already mounting a rapid pincer attack on the ferry, with air support. The Xiangjiang River battle was the fiercest yet fought by the Central Red Army since it had begun the Long March and involved the heaviest losses. The Red Army troops entrenched at the ferry made a tremendous sacrifice to cover the other troops crossing the river. By December 1 the main body of the Red Army had crossed the river, but it had lost on the east bank the entire 34th Division of the Fifth Army Group and the 18th Regiment of the Third Army Group. The Red Army and the detachment from the Central Committee had been reduced from more than 80,000 men to just over 30,000. After this bitter experience, the troops began to feel that the current leadership was no longer satisfactory and that it needed to be changed. Some leaders who had supported the mistaken “Left” line also began gradually to change their attitude in the light of harsh realities. The Zunyi Meeting At this time Chiang Kai-shek, realizing that the Red Army was advancing towards western Hunan Province to join forces with the Second and Sixth Army Groups, shifted the concentration of his troops, arranging them in a pocket-formation to await the entrance of the Central Red Army and then draw the net tight. At this critical juncture, Mao Zedong suggested that, under the circumstances, it would be best to give up the plan to join forces with the Second and Sixth Army Groups and, to march instead to Guizhou Province, where the enemy was relatively weak. This proposal was approved. After occupying the county of Tongdao, on the southwest border of Hunan Province, the troops entered Guizhou. On November 18 the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee held a meeting at Liping, where it formally abandoned the plan to advance towards western Hunan and decided to march to northern Guizhou instead. On January 7, 1935, the Red Army captured Zunyi, a town of strategic importance in northern Guizhou. Because the Red Army suddenly changed direction, it was able to elude the enemy who had been in hot pursuit, and to have 12 days to rest and regroup in Zunyi. From January 15 to 17 the CPC Central Committee held an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau in Zunyi. The meeting focused on rectifying the “Left” errors in military and organizational matters of decisive importance. Major speeches were made by Mao Zedong, Zhang Wentian and Wang Jiaxiang, all of whom sharply criticized two mistakes — the purely defensive action undertaken during the fifth counter-campaign against the enemy’s “encirclement and suppression” and the flight carried out during the Long March. After heated debate, most of those present came to agree with the opinions expressed by Mao and the other two and rejected the views presented in the report by Bo Gu concerning the fifth counter-campaign. The Political Bureau elected Mao Zedong to its Standing Committee and assigned Zhang Wentian to draft for the Central Committee a resolution evaluating the fifth countercampaign. Not long after this meeting, the Standing Committee decided that Zhang Wentian should take over all responsibility from Bo Gu, and it set up a group of three persons — Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and Wang Jiaxiang — to take command of all the Red Army’s military operations. The Zunyi Meeting actually established the correct leadership of the Central Committee with Mao Zedong at the core. In this critical situation, the meeting saved the Communist Party, the Red Army and the Chinese revolution. It was a life-or-death turning point in the history of the Party. CHAPTER THREE THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION 183 After the Zunyi Meeting, it was as though the Central Red Army had suddenly obtained a new lease on life. Under the command of Mao Zedong and the others, it became more flexible, changing the direction of battle as the situation changed, turning first east, then west and moving circuitously to go around areas of heavy enemy troop concentration. It took the initiative everywhere. West of Zunyi, on the border of Sichuan and Guizhou provinces, the Red Army crossed the Chishui River four times, confusing the enemy and tiring him out by keeping him on the move. Late in March, it crossed the Wujiang River in the south to feign an attack on Guiyang. Chiang Kai-shek, who was supervising operations at Guiyang at the time, hurriedly moved his Yunnan troops up as reinforcements. Mao Zedong had said long before, “If we can just get the Y unnan troops moved out of the province, it will be a victory.”33 As soon as this had happened, the Red Army launched a long-range raid on Yunnan, its vanguard troops pressing on the provincial capital, Kunming. At this time Kunming was only lightly defended, so reinforcements were hastily called up from the forces defending the Jinsha River, which were thus seriously weakened. The Red Army again suddenly changed direction to head north, moving rapidly so that by May 9 the entire force had crossed the Jinsha River. In this way it got neatly away from the encirclement, pursuit, obstruction and interception of the KMT army, a force hundreds of thousands strong, and attained a decisive victory in its strategic shift of position. The First and Fourth Front Armies Join Forces After the Central Red Army crossed the Jinsha River, it rested in Huili County in Sichuan for five full days and then continued north. When the army entered the Yi minority area in the Daliang Mountains, Chief of Staff Liu Bocheng, in accordance with the Party’s policy on nationalities, participated in a sacrificial ceremony to form an alliance with Xiao Yedan, leader of the Guji tribe of the Yi nationality. He persuaded the other tribes to remain neutral, so that the army was allowed to pass without hindrance through the Yi nationality area and to reach the ferry at Anshunchang on the south bank of the Dadu River. In the area around Anshunchang the river was swift and the mountains steep; it was here that in 1863 during the Taiping Revolution, Shi Dakai’s troops were unable to cross to the north and finally met their downfall. Led by seventeen brave men, a part of the Red Army successfully crossed the river. But the main body of troops would have been unable to cross at this point in a reasonable amount of time. It was therefore decided to make a race for the Luding Bridge 170 km. upstream, which the enemy had not yet had time to destroy. The troops covered the distance in two days. A shock force composed of 22 soldiers braved intense enemy fire to climb across the cables of bridge and wipe out the defenders, allowing the Central Red Army to cross. Having overcome this obstacle, the army had to cross the first great snow-capped mountain it was to encounter on the Long March — Jiajin Mountain, south of Maogong. To climb this mountain and descend on the other side required a trek of 35 kilometres. And at an altitude of more than 4,000 metres, the concentration of oxygen was low on the high peaks, causing the men to gasp for breath and feel light-headed; some who sat down to rest could not get up again. By June 12 an advance party of the Central Red Army had crossed the Jiajin Mountain and reached Dawei, southeast of Maogong, where they were met by Li Xiannian, the political commissar of the 30th Army of the Fourth Front Army. (The Fourth Front Army, after emerging victorious from the Jialing River campaign in April, had left the Sichuan-Shaanxi Soviet Area and shifted to the west.) Then the First Front Army (the Central Red Army) and the Fourth Front Army joined forces at Lianghekou, north of Maogong. Present at this meeting were Mao Zedong, Zhu De, Zhou Enlai and Zhang Guotao, leader of the Fourth Front Army. With the joining of these two major forces, the concentration of Red Army troops in the area reached more than a hundred thousand. On the second day after they had come together, the Central Committee called a meeting of the Political Bureau at Lianghekou. Zhou Enlai gave a report on the current strategic principle. At this time, the two front armies had left their former base areas, and the 185 CHAPTER three the agrarian revolution chief problem they confronted now was where to establish a new one. In his report Zhou suggested that the new base area should meet three conditions: 1 ) it should cover a wide area and allow for highly mobile operations; 2) it should have a large population and a fairly sound mass base; and 3) it should have good economic conditions. The conclusion was that they should go to the Sichuan-ShaanxiGansu border region. No one at the meeting made a counterproposal, and this strategic principle was adopted unanimously. Accordingly, the Political Bureau made a decision stating, “Our strategic principle is to concentrate the main forces to attack to the north, wipe out large numbers of the enemy in mobile warfare and seize southern Gansu first in order to build a Sichuan-ShaanxiGansu Soviet Base Area.”34 With the joining up of the two main forces, the Red Army’s strength was greatly increased, and with the correct strategic principle the situation seemed very favourable. But the Fourth Front Army had over 80,000 men, while the First Front Army had only around 30,000, and the numerical superiority of the men under his command fed Zhang Guolao’s ambition. At the Lianghekou meeting he had nodded his head and indicated that he agreed with the principle of moving north. Afterwards, however, he raised all kinds of objections, putting pressure on the Central Committee to appoint him the general political commissar of the Red Army, while all the while secretly considering a move south to the border between Sichuan and Xikang provinces. On August 3 the General Headquarters of the Red Army reorganized the army into left and right columns to march north for the Xiahe River-Taohe River campaign. The right column consisted of the First and Third armies of the First Front Army (at this time, the First, Third, Fifth and Ninth Army Groups of the First Front Army had become the First, Third, Fifth and Thirty-second Armies) and the Fourth and Thirtieth Armies of the Fourth Front Army, accompanied by the detachment from the Central Committee and the Front Command. The left column was composed of the Ninth, Thirty-first and Thirty-third Armies of the Fourth Front Army and the Fifth and Thirty-second Armies of the First Front Army, led by Zhu De, commander-inchief, Zhang Guotao, general political commissar and Liu Bocheng, chief of staff. On August 21 the right column began to cross the grasslands in northern Sichuan. The great stretches of grassland were wild and uninhabited, full of weedy swamps and black, stinking sludge pits. The weather changed unpredictably; sometimes fierce winds would blow from all sides with torrential rain, at other times there would be whirling snow and sudden hail. If a man made the slightest miscalculation when approaching a quagmire, he would be swallowed up. The cadres and soldiers had to trek over long distances with little food and salt, and the cold and hunger sapped their strength; in the end many died on the grasslands. Nevertheless, after marching six days and nights, the right column emerged at last to wait for the pre-arranged meeting with the left column. At this point, however, unexpected news arrived: Zhang Guotao, giving all kinds of pretexts, refused to march north and, instead, wanted the right column to march south. Attempting to split the Central Committee and endanger its safety, on September 9 Zhang sent a telegram without the knowledge of the Committee to Chen Changhao, the right column’s political commissar, ordering him to lead the column south. When Ye Jianying, who was serving as chief of staff of the right column, saw the telegram, he immediately reported it to Mao Zedong. Mao, Zhou Enlai, Zhang Wentian and Bo Gu held an urgent discussion and decided that to avoid possible internal conflicts in the Red Army, they should set out that very night to lead the First and Third Armies and a detachment of the Military Commission north, in accordance with the strategic principle. Some cadres of the Fourth Front Army did not understand the true situation and advocated the use of force to bar their way. However, Xu Xiangqian, commander-in-chief of the Fourth Front Army, forbade any such action, preserving the unity of the Red Army. The next day the Central Committee sent a telegram to Zhang Guotao demanding that he immediately lead his troops north, which he still refused to do. On September 12 at Ejie, the Political Bureau held an enlarged meeting at which it adopted a “Decision On Comrade Zhang Guotao’s Errors” and renamed the part of chapter three the agrarian revolution the Red Army that was marching north, the Shaanxi-Gansu Detachment. The Red Army Marches North and Its Three Main Forces Join Together After the Ejie meeting, the Central Committee led the ShaanxiGansu Detachment rapidly north. On September 17, 1935, they reached Lazikou, a natural barrier of steep cliffs and overhanging rocks on the Sichuan-Gansu border. Scaling the cliffs, the vanguard troops made a surprise attack on the rear of the defending KMT troops and in one stroke broke through to the wide-open terrain of southern Gansu. Immediately after that they occupied the town of Hadapu. Here they learned from a newspaper that in northern Shaanxi there was a very large Soviet area and a big contingent of the Red Army. On the 27th the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau held a meeting at Bangluo Town and decided to press on to northern Shaanxi. On October 19 the Red Army that was marching north reached Wuqi Town in the Shaanxi-Gansu Soviet Area. At the beginning of November, in Ganquan, it joined up with the Fifteenth Army Group, led by Xu Haidong, Cheng Zihua and Liu Zhidan, which had been active in the Shaanxi-Gansu Soviet Area. The Long March of the Central Red Army, which had covered 12,500 kilometres and crossed eleven provinces, finally came to an end, bringing victory for the Communist Party of China and the Red Army and defeat for the enemy. Late in September Zhang Guotao, still persistently moving south in his split with the Central Committee, ordered the former left column and part of the former right column to recross the grasslands, planning to head for the area of Baoxing, Lushan and Tianquan counties in western Sichuan, where grain was fairly plentiful. On October 5 he openly established a separate “Central Committee,” of which he appointed himself chairman. Zhu Dc and Liu Bocheng resolutely struggled with Zhang, patiently trying, along with Xu Xiangqian and others who opposed the split, to convince the officers and men that he had misled them. On January 22, 1936, the Central Committee adopted the “Decision on Comrade Zhang Guotao’s Establishment of a Second ‘Central Committee,”’ instructing Zhang to immediately dissolve his “Central Committee” and to stop all anti-Party activity. Zhang Guotao’s attempt to split the Party was not popular in the Fourth Front Army. The troops who moved south again suffered heavy casualties in battle, and by April only about 40,000 men were left, less than half the original number. At this time, the Central Committee again sent one telegram after another urging the Fourth Front Army to head north. Meanwhile, the Second and Sixth Army Groups were about to arrive in western Sichuan Province. Zhang Hao, in the name of the CPC’s delegation to the Communist International, also sent a telegram to Zhang Guotao, asking him to dissolve his “Central Committee” and establish a Southwest Bureau of the Central Committee instead. Under these circumstances, Zhang Guotao had little choice but to announce the dissolution of his “Central Committee” on June 6, 1936. Meanwhile, in November 1935, the Second and Sixth Army Groups led by Ren Bishi, He Long and others, which had been active in the Hunan-Hubei-Sichuan-Guizhou Revolutionary Base Area, had also set out for the north from Sangzhi County, Hunan. They too experienced many hardships and perils, crossing the Jinsha River and snow-capped mountains to join up at last, on July 2, 1936, with the Fourth Front Army at Ganzi in western Sichuan. The Central Committee ordered the Second and Sixth Army Groups to combine with the Thirty-second Army to become the Second Front Army, with He Long as commander-inchief and Ren Bishi as political commissar. Through the efforts of Zhu De, Ren Bishi, He Long and others, and with the support of many of the officers and men of the Fourth Front Army, the Second and Fourth Front Armies finally marched north together. On October 9, the staff of the Fourth Front Army headquarters reached Huining County in Gansu to join forces with the First Front Army. On the 22nd the staff of the Second Front Army headquarters arrived at Jiangtaibu, north of Jingning County, Gansu, where it too joined up with the First Front Army. This marked the victorious completion of the Long March for the Second and Fourth Front Armies as well. CHAPTER THREE THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION 189 Late in October a part of the Fourth Front Army received instructions from the Central Military Commission to cross the Yellow River to the west and begin a campaign in Ningxia. In the first half of November, in accordance with a decision of the Central Committee and the Central Military Commission, the troops crossing the river changed their name to the West Route Army. Under conditions of extreme hardship, they fought alone for four months, annihilating more than twenty thousand enemy troops, until in March of 1937, being greatly outnumbered, they were defeated. After the main forces of the Red Army set out on the Long March, the part that had remained behind, both north and south of the Yangtze River, under the leadership of Xiang Ying, Chen Yi and others, together with guerrilla forces, independently carried out three years of guerrilla warfare in fifteen areas spread over eight provinces. Although they met with great hardship — they lost contact with the CPC Central Committee, and the enemy broke them up and blockaded them — with the support of the masses they were able to overcome one difficulty after another, maintaining their own strength, holding their ground and making a great contribution to the Chinese revolution. Meanwhile, the anti-Japanese armed forces in northeast China, under the leadership of the Communist Party, continued the struggle in extremely difficult circumstances. They included the First, Second, Third and Sixth Armies of the Northeast People’s Revolutionary Army, the Fourth Army of the Northeast AntiJapanese Allied Army, the Fifth Army of the Northeast AntiJapanese United Army, the Tangyuan Guerrilla Corps, etc. Later these units became the main armed strength of the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army. The triumph of the Long March of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army was the turning point for the Chinese revolution. 1 he officers and men of the Red Army maintained unswerving faith in the victory of the revolution. Eluding pursuit and breaking through blockades by large numbers of KMT troops, overcoming the natural barriers of snow-capped mountains and the grasslands, suffering cold, hunger, wounds and sickness, surmounting the crisis of the internal split in the Party and victoriously completing the Long March, all under conditions of extreme hardship, they demonstrated amazing stamina, courage and resourcefulness. The legendary stories of the Long March, which have circulated both in China and abroad, show that the Communist Party of China and the Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army were invincible. Before the KMT’s filth “encirclement and suppression” campaign, the Red Army had grown to 300,000 men. Because of the errors made by the Party leadership, the revolution suffered a grave setback, and when the three main forces of the Red Army joined together at the end of the Long March they numbered less than 30,000. However, these troops, which were what remained after rigorous testing, were the cream of the Communist Party and of the Red Army, and they were to become the core force in the War of Resistance Against Japan and the People’s War of Liberation. During the Long March they had spread the seeds of revolution everywhere along the way. Just as the flames of war with Japan were about to ignite across the country, the three Red Army contingents joined forces in northern Shaanxi, not far from the anti-Japanese battlefront. The historic importance of the victory of the Long March cannot be overestimated.

The Party's Struggle to Establish an Anti-Japanese United Front

After the September 18th Incident of 1931, the Japanese invaders incessantly attacked in an effort to occupy the whole of China exclusively. The KMT authorities, while devoting all their strength to “encircling and suppressing” the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army on the Long March, steadily retreated before the Japanese. In February 1935 Chiang Kai-shek, speaking to a Japanese reporter, said, “China and Japan need to cooperate with each other.... The Chinese people have taken no action to fight CHAPTER THREE THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION 191 the Japanese, have no desire to fight them and, furthermore, have h need to do so.”35 However, the deep penetration of the country hv a heavily armed enemy raised a nationwide wave of resistance to the invaders, going against the will of Chiang Kai-shek s Kuomintang. The North China Incident and the December 9th Movement Shortly before the Red Army, marching north under the leadership of the Central Committee of the CPC, reached the Shaanxi-Gansu Border Region, the Japanese militarists took advantage of the KMT’s policy of non-resistance to intensify their efforts to take north China. Their first step was to use the June 1935 He-Umezu Agreement (an agreement between the KM1 commanding officer in Beiping, He Yingqin and the commander of the Japanese troops stationed in north China, Yoshijiro Ume zu) to force the KMT Central Army to evacuate Beiping, Tianjin and Hebei Province. The second step was to instigate the autonomy” movement in the five provinces of north China (Hebei, Chahar, Shanxi, Shandong and Suiyuan). In October the director of the Japanese secret service in Shenyang, Kenji Dohihara, in the name of the Japanese Kwantung Army that had occupied the city, made several demands of Song Zheyuan, commander of the 29th Army, which was garrisoned in Beiping, Tianjin, Hebei and Chahar. These included that he announce the establishment of a North China Autonomous Government in an open telegram and dismiss all the north China officials appointed by Nanjmg^On November 6 Kenji Dohihara even insolently ordered Song Zheyuan to announce autonomy before November 20 or the Japanese would send five divisions to take Hebei and six to take Shandong. The Japanese army then began shifting large masses of troops to north China. At the instigation of the Japanese secret service, Yin Rugeng, the supervisory commissioner of the KM 1 government s Jimi Prefecture in Hebei Province, set up a separatist regime consisting of 22 counties in eastern Hebei and established the Eastern Hebei Anti-Communist Autonomous Administration in Tongxian County on the outskirts of Beiping. In December the KMT established the Hebei-Chahar Political Council in Beiping with Song Zheyuan as chairman, imposing a special administration in north China. Dark clouds gathered over the skies of Beiping and Tianjin, and all of north China was in imminent danger. The reaction of the people in north China was naturally intense, particularly among the students, who were closely following the development of the political situation. Beiping students shouted with grief and indignation, “North China is vast, but there is no room in it now for quiet study!” At a time when almost all the Party organizations in the KMT area had been destroyed, one provincial Party committee in Hebei survived and over thirty Party members no longer connected with an organization remained in Beiping. In late spring and early summer of 1935, Li Changqing, a special representative from the Hebei Provincial Party Committee went to Beiping to establish a CCP Interim Work Committee there. The committee, composed of Peng Tao and others, appointed Zhou Xiaozhou to take charge of the work of the Beiping branch of the Chinese National Armed Selfdefence Council. With the people’s anti-Japanese sentiment growing stronger every day, students in Beiping, led by the CPC Interim Work Committee and organized and directed by Huang Jing, Yao Yilin, Guo Mingqiu and other Party members, raised a cry of protest in a demonstration held on December 9. Students of Qinghua, Yanjing and other universities in the suburbs started marching downtown but were blocked by military police, and a conflict broke out at Xizhimen Gate at the northwest corner of the city wall. At Xinhuamen, in the centre of town, one or two thousand students broke through the military police lines, shouting, “Down with imperialism!” “Stop the civil war!” “Unite against the enemy!” and other slogans as they tried to present a petition to the government. Because they got no response, they began a protest march. By the time the procession reached Wangfujing Street, the crowd had increased to 3,000. The military police suddenly turned a water cannon on the demonstrators and charged them from both sides, brandishing whips, gunstocks and billyclubs. The demonstrators were dispersed, and more than chapter three the agrarian revolution 193 forty students were injured. The next day, the student body of every school in Beiping boycotted classes en masse. The storm quickly swept the whole country. Beginning on December 11, student gatherings and demonstrations took place in Tianjin, Baoding, Taiyuan, Hangzhou, Shanghai, Wuhan, Chengdu, Chongqing, Quangzhou and other large and mediumsized cities. Factory workers in many areas went on strike. 1 atriotic societies and individuals in Shanghai and other places established national salvation committees, sent open telegrams and launched publications calling for an end to the civil war and for the despatch of soldiers to fight the Japanese. Late in December the Students’ Union of Beiping, under the leadership of the Party, organized a propaganda team for the area south of and Tianjin. This team went out into the countryside ol Hebei Province to spread anti-Japanese propaganda, thus joining in solidarity with the workers and peasants. The propaganda team was expanded into the Chinese National Liberation Vanguard Corps. The students of Shanghai, Wuhan, Jinan and other cities also went to the countryside to spread the word. Some prolessors and scholars who had formerly been unwilling to participate in political activities wrote articles supporting resistance to the Japanese and nationwide cooperation. The struggle against the Japanese and for national salvation grew into a turbulent nationwide mass movement. _ The December 9th Movement, as it came to be called, not only raised the people’s awareness of the crisis lacing the nation but demonstrated to them their own strength. It showed that only by uniting all forces within the country could the Japanese invasion be defeated, and it increased the people’s determination to light to save China. . o1 These events demonstrated that in the winter of 1935 the political situation in China was on the eve of a great change. The KMT was neither willing nor able to lead the anti-Japanese forces among the people; instead, it stood in their way. The KM 1 with its many internal factions all jockeying for supremacy, which often led to large-scale internecine strife, was also incapable of effecting nation wide unity. Under the KMT, the feudal land relations had not changed one iota. Since it could not alter China’s semi-colonial semi-feudal status, it could not turn China into a capitalist country! At this time China’s heavy industry was negligible. In 1933 total output of steel was only 35,000 tons, and the most developed light industry was cotton textiles. However, between 1927 and 1936, the number of spindles owned by foreign capital increased from 42.9 percent of the total to 46.2 percent, while the share held by capital of the national bourgeoisie dropped from 57.1 percent to 53.8. During the same period, the share of looms owned by foreign capital increased from 54.8 percent to 5 8.1, with a corresponding drop from 45.2 percent to 41.9 in the share owned by capital of the national bourgeoisie. When the KMT authorities began to take over political power throughout the country, the middle class expected they would develop China’s capitalist economy, but instead they brought the country to the brink of national subjugation. The mission of ringing together the various forces calling for resistance to Japan and organizing an anti-Japanese national united front fell to the Communist Party. Whether the Party could carry out this mission would determine whether it could introduce the next stage of the Chinese revolution. The Wayaobu Meeting On July 25, 1935, the Communist International held its Seventh Congress. At this meeting General Secretary Georgi Dirni-fru’ t renownecl Bulgarian activist, delivered a report entitled 1 he Tascist Attack and the Communist International’s Task for the Unity of the Working Class in Its Anti-fascist Struggle,” in which he raised for the worldwide communist movement' the question of creating a united front to combat fascism. On August 1 the CPC delegation to the Communist International drafted An Appeal to All Fellow-Countrymen for Resistance Against Japan and lor National Salvation” in the name of the Chinese Soviet Central Government and the CPC Central Committee Soon afterwards this document was publicly promulgated and became commonly known as the “August 1st Declaration ” 195 CHAPTER THREE THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION Shortly after the Red Army finished its 12,500-km Long March to northern Shaanxi and gained a firm foothold there, an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau was held at Wayaobu from December 17 to 25 to discuss military strategy, the political situation in China and the Party’s tactical line. At this meeting, Mao Zedong asserted that the strategic principle should be to wage a resolute national revolutionary war, first of all subordinating the civil war to the national war and the entire war effort to the fight against the Japanese invaders. He believed that China’s national bourgeoisie had a dual nature and could be won over. The Political Bureau adopted the Central Committee’s “Resolution on the Present Political Situation and the Tasks of the Party,” drafted by Zhang Wentian. This resolution staled in part: “Changes have taken place or are taking place in the relations between all classes, strata, political parties and armed forces in China’s political life.... Therefore, the Party’s tactical line is to arouse, unite and organize the revolutionary forces throughout the country and among all the nationalities to oppose the chief enemy confronting them, namely, Japanese imperialism and the arch-traitor Chiang Kai-shek.”36 It added that the main danger within the Party was “closed -doorism.” Two days later, at a meeting of Party activists, Mao Zedong made a report in the spirit of the Wayaobu meeting. In a report entitled “On Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism,” he began by asking, “What is the present situation?” and answering, “Its main characteristic is that Japanese imperialism wants to turn China into a colony.”37 “This,” he said, “faces all classes and political groups in China with the question of what to do.”38 Mao pointed out that the workers and peasants were all demanding resistance, as was the petty bourgeoisie, and that even the attitude of the national bourgeoisie was likely to change in the new circumstances. “When the national crisis reaches a crucial point,” he added, “splits will occur in the Kuomintang camp.”39 Summing up the question of class relations, he said, “The basic change in the situation, namely, the Japanese invasion of China south of the Great Wall, has changed the relationship among the various classes in China, strengthening the camp of national revolution and weakening that of counter-revolution.”40 Therefore, the Party’s basic tactical task was to form a broad revolutionary national united front. Rejecting the closed-door tactics advocated by some, he declared, “In order to attack the forces of the counterrevolution, what the revolutionary forces need today is to organize millions upon millions of the masses and move a mighty revolutionary army into action.”41 The Wayaobu meeting was one of the most important held in the turbulent period between the Second Revolutionary Civil War and the War of Resistance Against Japan. It showed that the Party, having overcome the “Left” adventurism and “closeddoorism” that had dominated the thinking of the leadership in the period before the Long March, had lost no time in formulating the policy of a national united front against Japan, thus gaining the political initiative in the period to come. It also showed that the Party had matured through the lessons it had learned from its victories and defeats, and that it was capable of adapting to a new situation and creatively carrying out its work. After the Wayaobu meeting, the troops of the First Front Army, called the “Anti-Japanese Vanguard Corps of the Chinese People’s Red Army,” prepared to march east to directly engage the Japanese army in battle. Their purpose was to expand the base areas and the anti-Japanese armed forces. Led by Mao Zedong and Peng Dehuai, they crossed the Yellow River in northern Shaanxi and entered Shanxi, beginning the Eastern Expedition campaign. Meanwhile, practical measures were taken to strengthen the united front. The work was done between two groups, the general civilian population and the high-ranking KMT military officers. First, the Party did all it could to foster the anti-Japanese national salvation movement, which had begun to grow after the December 9th students’ movement. In the spring of 1936, the Central Committee of the CPC sent Liu Shaoqi to Tianjin to serve as secretary of the Party’s Northern Bureau and strengthen Party leadership of the national salvation movement there. This movement of the students of Beiping and Tianjin, severely suppressed 197 chapter THREE the agrarian revolution hv the KMT authorities, was flagging. After arriving m Tianjin, Liu Shaoqi began publishing articles in the spirit of the Wayaobu meeting with such titles as “Eliminating ‘Closed-doorism and Adventurism,” systematically explaining the Party s line and policies. He emphasized the need to expand the revolutionary Ces in preparation for a decisive battle, as well as the need to build long-term relations with the masses. This last would enable the Party to carry out intensive propaganda work, consolidate and enlarge the anti-Japanese national united front, increase its own strength and improve its position. Referring to the problems relating to the Beiping and Tianjin students movement, he called for a correct implementation of the united front policy in handling relations with the teachers and school officials as well as with the 29th Army and General Song Zheyuan, encouraging them to move in the right direction. Liu worked hard to rebuild and strengthen Party organizations in north China which had been seriously damaged, opening a new chapter in their work The Central Committee of the CPC and its delegation to the Communist International sent Feng Xuefeng and Pan Hanman to Shanghai to reestablish connections with Party organizations there that had lost contact with the Central Committee and to expand united front work. In May 1936 a number of patriots, including Soong Ching Ling, Shen Junru, Zou Taolen, Tao Xingzhi and Zhang Naiqi, announced in Shanghai the establishment of the All-China Federation of All Circles for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation, which called for cessation ot the civil war and united opposition to the Japanese. One after another, antiJapanese national salvation associations in Shanghai, Nanjing, Beiping and many other cities joined the new federation. Later, the All-China Students’ Federation was founded, giving further impetus to the nationwide patriotic movement of youth working to save the nation. , • Second, the Party did everything possible to persuade senior KMT officials and army generals to support the anti- Japanese national salvation movement. Mao Zedong and Zhou many letters to them. In the case of the KM f s Northeastern Army headed by Zhang Xueliang, this work was notably successful. The majority of the officers and men of the Northeastern Army, already appalled to see their hometowns fall into enemy hands and eager to return there to fight, had no wish to combat the Red Army, which supported resistance to the Japanese. Their attitude had an effect on Zhang Xueliang and the senior officers. Progressives who were born in northeast China, such as Du Zhongyuan and others, also did a great deal of work to convince Zhang Xueliang. The CPC Central Committee twice sent Li Kenong, chief of the Liaison Bureau, to talk with Zhang about cooperating to resist the invaders. On the evening of April 9, 1936, Zhou Enlai and Zhang Xueliang had a secret meeting in a church in Yan’an. They agreed on the need to stop the civil war and work together in the resistance, exchanged ideas on a number of issues and finally reached an agreement. The Party’s efforts to achieve a united front were also effective with Yang Hucheng, who, as commander-in-chief of the KMT’s Seventeenth Route Army and head of the Pacification Headquarters in Xi’an, was the leader of those who were in actual control of Shaanxi Province. Yang was in favour of resistance to Japan, had certain other progressive ideas and was friendly with some members of the CPC. The Central Committee sent a succession of people to see him, including Wang Feng and Wang Shiying, and concluded a preliminary agreement of cooperation with him. In this way, by the summer of 1936 hostilities between the Red Army and the Northeastern and Seventeenth Route Armies had virtually ceased. This was the first major victory of the Party’s united front policy in northwest China. A similar victory was achieved in Shanxi. In October 1936 the Northern Bureau of the CPC Central Committee sent Bo Yibo and four other Party members (later increased to a total of 16) to Taiyuan, in response to an invitation from Yan Xishan. Yan, who was the leader of those who were in actual control of Shanxi Province, had asked for the Party’s help in preparing for armed resistance. The Northern Bureau decided to establish the CPC Shanxi Working Committee, with Bo Yibo as secretary. This committee was set up especially to direct overt, legal activities, carrying out high-level united front work and developing the 199 chapter three the agrarian revolution nti- Japanese national salvation movement. It reported directly an h Northern Bureau and was kept strictly separate from t Party’s^nderground Shanxi Interim Provincial Committee, with , . v, it had no horizontal connections. WhAt this time there was an important anti-Japanese gr°uP in Qhfnxi called the “League of Self-Sacrifice for National Salvation ” or the “Self-Sacrifice League” for short. Because ot opposi ■ from the KMT authorities, within a month after the foundXof the orgfnTzaUon. it essentially ceased to function In the first half of November, however, after he arnved in Shanxi, Bo Yibo took over as secretary of the League and assumed resP°n^ bility for its activities. After that, the League evo ve in anti-Japanese national united front organization under he lead ershin of the CPC. The organization spread from Taiyuan to every county in the province, and with its encouragement the national salvation movement flourished throughout Shanxi. In "he early months of 1937, the CPC Shanx, Working Committee began to train military and government cadres with a view to building a revolutionary armed force in the province. The Approach of KMT-CPC Cooperation The attitude of Chiang Kai-shek and the Central Executive Committee of the KMT towards resistance to Japan began to Change after the North China Incident. Under , he . usion that the problems between the two countries could t* ^before the dinlomacv Chiang had backed down time after time before the Japanese But the illusion was destroyed as the invaders steadily pressed on When the North China Incident took place, direcUy threatening the very existence of the Nanjing government, the K uomln t ang1 had no choice but to consider changing its policy t°'c)n November 19, 1935, the 5th National Congre^of the KMT adopted a resolution proposed by Ch,ang Kai-shek. Chiang s statement recommending this resolution contained a key sent ence- “While there is still some hope of peace, we must under no circumstances' give up on peace, and while the time for self ?sacrifice is not yet at hand, we must not speak lightly of selfsacrifice.” This sentence implied that when the time was at hand, there would be no choice but to “give up on peace” and resolutely face “self-sacrifice.” In January of the following year Japan’s foreign minister, Hirotake Hirota, announced three principles, which, among other demands, called for “coordination of the economies of China, Japan and Manchuria.” This meant recognition of Manchukuo, which Chiang found it hard to accept. Later he wrote, “The situation of the time was very clear: if we rejected his principles it would mean war, and if wc acceded to his demands it would mean extinction.”42 The voracious appetite of the Japanese militarists left Chiang Kai-shek less and less room to manoeuvre. Faced with this situation, at the end of 1935 the Nanjing government began to look for a way out, asking for assistance from the Soviet Union and even seeking ways to make contact with the Communist Party of China. Chiang later explained his policy this way: “War between China and Japan was now inevitable and, while the National Government was negotiating with the Soviet Union, it was also looking for ways to solve the problem of the Chinese Communist Party.”43 After this, the KMT and the CPC made secret contacts through a variety of channels. With the help of Soong Ching Ling, the leadership of the KMT sought out Dong Jianwu, a Protestant minister and a Communist Party member. On February 27, 1936, Dong secretly made a trip to Wayaobu to see Bo Gu, carrying the message that the KMT authorities wanted to negotiate with the CPC Central Committee. On March 4 Zhang Wentian, Mao Zedong and Peng Dehuai, who were at the front lines in Shanxi at the time, sent a telegram to Dong Jianwu through Bo Gu expressing the Party’s eagerness to negotiate. “We enthusiastically welcome this wise and sensible gesture from the Nanjing authorities,” they said, “and wc should like to begin concrete, practical negotiations with them in order to bring together all forces in the country to resist Japan and save the nation.” In addition, they made five concrete demands: 1. All civil war should stop and there should be no distinction between Red and White troops in the armed forces: all must resist chapter three the agrarian revolution 201 JaP2anA government of national defence and a united anti’TV'S S forces 5 ffSU «,™*™ « hould be allowed to concentrate without delay in Hebei, so that thev can first of all resist the advance of the Japanese invader . 4 All political prisoners should be released, and the people * — * »«■nalaffairsand the «;onomy.” back t0 Nanjing. iS- the KMT and the CPC which had been broken off more than eight years earlier, had been reestab '^'rtfshow their sincerity, the entire Anti-Japanese Vanguard Corns of the Chinese People’s Red Army, which had crossed the Yellow River from Shaanxi into Shanxi, crossed back and sent an open telegram to the Nanjing government. ln_,this ,tele.®” P abandoned its anti-Chiang Kai-shek stand and called upon the KMT to enter into peace negotiations to stop the t civd war : a d to ioin the CPC in fighting Japan. On August 25 the CPC Centra Committee sent an open letter to the Kuomintang t the current peril facing the whole nation had been brought about by the wron" P°licy pursued by the KMT a policy that must be radically changed. In the letter the CPC declared. “We are ready to form with you a solid, revolutionary, united front like the one against imperialist a"d feudal oppression ha existed during the great revolutionary period of 1925 2/, tor tnat ^the onN way today to save the nation from subjugation and ensure ^survival.... Only if the Kuommtang and the Chinese Communist Party once again work together and cooperate with every11 political party, group and sector across the country will it be possible to save the country and ensure its survival. b On September 1 the CPC Central Committee issued an internal dir^%Tetp:n^mperialists continuing their attack and the national revolutionary movement growing across the country. is possible that Chiang Kai-shek’s entire army, or at least the greater part, may join in resisting Japan. Our general policy should be to force Chiang Kai-shek to resist Japan.... We are now informing [the KMT] that to facilitate negotiations, the CPC Central Committee is prepared to send representatives immediately or to receive representatives from the Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-shek in the Soviet Area.” The Central Committee was now considering the possibility of holding high-level negotiations with the KMT, perhaps sending Zhou Enlai as its representative. The shift from opposing Chiang Kai-shek to forcing him to resist Japan, made in accordance with the changing class relations in the country, was an important change of policy for the Party. But it did not prove easy to carry out the new policy. Chiang was still committed to opposing the Communists. When he spoke of “solving the problem of the Chinese Communist Party,” what he actually wanted was that the CPC should surrender to the KMT and accept reorganization, meaning, in particular, that the Party’s armed forces would have to be dissolved to “effect a solution by political means.” Naturally, this was impossible. He therefore continued to seek such a solution by force. Thus, in the autumn of 1936, when Chiang Kai-shek had settled ’the Guangdong-Guangxi Incident, he moved swiftly, concentrating his troops in preparation tor a new attempt to suppress the revolutionary base area in northern Shaanxi.44 The steadily mounting tide of the anti-Japanese national salvation movement in the country was also causing Chiang great anxiety. In Shanghai, on the night of November 22, the KMT government arrested seven leaders of the All-China Federation of All Circles for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation, Shen Junru, Zhang Naiqi, Zou Taofen, Li Gongpu, Sha Qianli, Wang Zaoshi and Shi Liang, and took them to a jail in Suzhou. This created a stir for a while, and the case became known as “the jailing of the seven patriotic leaders.” Shortly thereafter the KMT government arrested the leaders of the Nanjing National Salvation Society, Sun Xiaocun and Cao Mengjun. These arrests aroused the indignation of people from every sector across the country and provoked a vast movement calling for the prisoners’ release. In the midst of chapter three the agrarian revolution 203 this movement came the Xi’an Incident. The Peaceful Resolution of the Xi’an Incident The KMT general Zhang Xueliang had on many occasions strongly urged Chiang Kai-shek to stop the civil war and join in the fight against Japanese aggression, but each time Chiang had refused. On December 4, 1936, he mustered the army of approximately 30 divisions directly under his control and prepared to set out from Henan for Shaanxi and Gansu to “suppress the Communists.” Chiang flew to the city of Xi’an in Shaanxi Province. There he ordered General Zhang Xueliang and General Yang Hucheng to lead all their troops to the front line in northern Shaanxi to fight the Red Army. Zhang and Yang pleaded with him for several days on end, but he harshly rebuked them. On the afternoon of December 7 Zhang went to Huaqingchi in Lintong County on the outskirts of Xi’an, where Chiang was staying, and tried once more to explain to him the gravity of the Japanese threat. The two men argued for two or three hours, until Zhang was in tears. Finally Chiang pounded the table and shouted, “Even if you were to take a gun and shoot me dead, it wouldn’t change my policy of suppressing the Communists.”45 This forced Zhang and Yang to the conclusion that the only way to convince him was to start a mutiny. Before dawn on December 12, a contingent of the Northeastern Army under Zhang’s command, acting on the plan worked out by Zhang and Yang, swiftly surrounded Huaqingchi and seized Chiang Kai-shek. Meanwhile, the KMT’s Seventeenth Route Army was moving to take control of the entire city of Xi’an, and had taken Chen Cheng, Wei Lihuang, Jiang Dingwen, Zhu Shaoliang and other important KMT officers and officials into custody. Zhang and Yang also sent an open telegram explaining the reasons for the mutiny and making eight proposals, as follows: 1. The Nanjing government should be reorganized to accommodate all parties and groups and make saving the nation their common responsibility. 2. The civil war must stop altogether. The patriotic leaders imprisoned in Shanghai should be immediately released. 4. All political prisoners in the country should be released. 5. The ban on mass patriotic movements should be lifted. 6. All political rights including freedom of assembly and association should be guaranteed. 7. Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s Testament should be executed to the letter. 8. A national salvation meeting should be convened without delay. This was the Xi’an Incident, which shook China and the rest of the world. Naturally, it came as a great shock to the Nanjing government. Among the authorities two views emerged as to how to handle the incident. Some supported sending a punitive expedition against Zhang and Yang, while others advocated negotiations to free Chiang. He Yingqin, the pro-Japanese Minister of War, having obtained authorization to conduct a troop transfer, mustered the East and West Column Armies in preparation for an assault on Xi’an. In the meantime, Soong Mei-ling (Madame Chiang Kaishek], H. H. Rung, T.V. Soong and other relatives of Chiang who belonged to a faction aligned with Britain and the United States, in spite of opposition from He Yingqin, worked to find a peaceful resolution of the Xi’an Incident and to secure Chiang’s release. The Communist Party had no prior knowledge of the Xi’an Incident. Immediately after Chiang’s arrest, Zhang Xueliang sent a telegram to the CPC Central Committee asking for suggestions. In response, the Central Committee despatched Zhou Enlai to Xi’an, where he arrived on December 17. The Central Committee completely approved of Zhang and Yang’s stand and of their purpose in detaining Chiang. After careful analysis of the situation, it came to the following conclusion. If Xi’an were put in a position antagonistic to Nanjing, it might prove extremely dangerous for the Chinese nation, igniting a new, large-scale civil war, which would be welcomed only by Japan and the proJapanese faction. At present it was still possible to work for a peaceful solution, thus ending the civil war and creating conditions for a unified effort to resist Japan. This would be welcomed 205 cHAPTER THREE the agrarian revolution hv all the people in the country, and especially by all parties, amuDS sectors and armies who were in favour of resistance. For these reasons, the CPC Central Committee supported a peaceful settlement of the Xi’an Incident. When the KMT authorities in Nanjing understood that neither Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng nor the Communist Party had any intention of harming Chiang Kai-shek and that they wished to resolve the incident peacefully, they sent T.V. Soong and Soong Mei-ling to Xi’an on December 22 to negotiate. Zhou Enlai participated in the negotiations with Zhang and Yang After two days of discussion, Soong Mei-ling issued a series ot statements promising, among other things, that the KMT would cease its suppression of the Communists, and that in three months it would launch a war of resistance against Japan. On the evening of December 24, Zhou Enlai, accompanied by the two Soongs, went to see Chiang Kai-shek. Once again Chiang told Zhou to his face, “The suppression of Communists will stop, there will be an alliance with the Red Army to resist Japan.... The next day Zhang Xueliang, without notitying Zhou Enlai, accompanied Chiang on a flight back to Nanjing. As soon as they arrived, Chiang placed Zhang under arrest. When the news reached Xi’an, there was pandemonium, and once again the danger of civil war seemed imminent. In this most dillicuit situation, Zhou Enlai carefully set to work, preserving the peaceful resolution of the incident at last. After this the civil war basically ceased, and relations between the Communist Party and the Kuomintang developed rapidly. The Xi’an Incident showed how intense the demand tor a united resistance had become throughout the country, even within the ranks of the KMT. The CPC, instead of taking advantage of Chiang Kai-shek’s predicament, had done everything possible to see that the incident was settled peacefully, thus showing the sincerity of its intentions to unite with the rest of the country to resist Japan. The Xi’an Incident took place just as the objective conditions for renewed KMT-CPC cooperation were ripening, and its effect was to push those conditions to fruition. At a meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee on December 27, 1936, Mao Zedong said, “The Xi’an Incident was the key to the transformation of the KMT. If not for that incident, the transformation might have taken longer, since a certain degree of compulsion was definitely needed to force the transformation upon it.... What put an end to the civil war after ten years? It was the Xi’an incident.” In an effort to ensure that cooperation between the KMT and CPC was actually carried out, on February 10, 1937, the CPC Central Committee sent a telegram to the Third Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the KMT. In this telegram the CPC asked that the KMT make it the national policy to do the following: ( 1 ) end all civil wars and concentrate the country’s strength in a united effort to meet the foreign aggression; (2) guarantee freedom of speech, assembly and association, and release all political prisoners; (3) call a conference of representatives of all political parties, people of all walks of life and all armies, and concentrate the nation’s talents in a common endeavour to save the country; (4) speedily complete all preparations for resisting Japan; and (5) improve the livelihood of the people. If the KMT adopted this policy, the telegram said, the CPC would pledge the following: (1) the policy of armed insurrection to overthrow the National Government will be discontinued throughout the country; (2) the Workers’ and Peasants’ Democratic Government will be renamed the Government of the Special Region of the Republic of China and the Red Army will be redesignated as part of the National Revolutionary Army, and they will come under the direction of the Central Government in Nanjing and its Military Council respectively; (3) a thoroughly democratic system based on universal suffrage will be put into effect in the areas under the Government of the Special Region; and (4) the policy of confiscating the land of the landlords will be discontinued and the common programme of the anti-Japanese national united front resolutely carried out.47 207 chapter three the agrarian revolution Making these four pledges meant yielding a great deal to the KMT but it was a principled and necessary step. It was the on y to stop the confrontation between the two political powers in country and bring about their cooperation in the resistance ag WEen^he five demands and four pledges of the CPC became known they received widespread support, including support rom STfaction of the KMT that favoured resistance. At the 3rd Plenary Session of the 5th Central Executive Committee of the KMT it was proposed that the KMT should return to the Three Great Policies” of Sun Yat-sen: alliance with Russia, cooperation with the Communist Party and assistance to the peasants and workers The group calling for this move included not only Soong Ching Ling, He Xiangning and others who had always taken a revolutionary stand, together with Feng Ynxiang and others who had vigorously supported resistance ever since the September 18th Incident, but also founding members of the Kuomintang like Zhang Jingjiang, Li Shizeng, Sun Ke and Li Liejun This broad spectrum of supporters reflected the great popularity the proposal had already achieved. In January 1937 the leading organs of the CPC Central Com mittee moved from Bao’an in northern Shaanxi to Yan an. In May the Party held a National Conference there (known then as the Representative Conference of the Soviet Areas) which was attended by representatives from the Soviet areas, the White areas and the Red Army. Mao Zedong gave a report entitled The Tasks of the Chinese Communist Party in the Period of Resistance to Japan” and a concluding speech entitled Win the Masses in Their Millions for the Anti-Japanese National United Front. Afterwards, the representatives from the White areas held a separate meeting. In July and August Mao Zedong eemred on philosophy at the Anti-Japanese Military and Political College in Yan’an and wrote his celebrated essays “On Practice and Contradiction.” These two essays were written to counter the dogmatism rampant in the Party at the time, but they are also Marxist philosophical works of permanent importance. On various occasions the CPC sent Zhou Enlai, Ye Jianying, in Boqu, Bo Gu and others to Xi’an, Hangzhou, Lushan and Nanjing to meet KMT leaders. Although there were ups and downs in the development of the situation, the civil war had already been stopped, high-level talks between the two parties had begun and the tide of history would irreversibly turn in favour of a united resistance to the Japanese invasion. During the ten years between the defeat of the Great Revolution and the eve of the War of Resistance Against Japan, the Communist Party of China persisted in its struggle under conditions of extreme hardship, maturing politically along the way. During this period the CPC passed through two great trials — the defeat of the Great Revolution and the defeat of the fifth countercampaign against “encirclement and suppression.” These two defeats greatly weakened the Party, bringing it to the very brink of extinction. Some members, who were less determined, panicked and became utterly dejected, even defecting to reactionary forces. Enemies both in China and abroad believed that the CPC would be thoroughly defeated. The steadfast Party members, however, consistently maintained their revolutionary optimism, indomitable will and complete faith in the future, under conditions of unimaginable peril and hardship. They kept their heads and focused on the task at hand, surviving through the darkest hours. This ten-year experience also demonstrated that the strength of the Chinese Communists came from combining the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the specific practice of the Chinese revolution, from working closely with the great majority of the people, seeking truth from facts, adhering to the mass line and maintaining the principle of independence. It demonstrated that any method that ignored realities, dogmatically copied the experience of other countries, relied simply on subjective hopes or prematurely sought quick result was doomed to fail. During these ten years, although several times the Party leadership made “Left” mistakes in thinking that resulted in serious setbacks for the revolutionary cause, the Party finally corrected these mistakes. Thus, as the new period of war with Japan approached, despite the complexity of the contradictions between the Chinese 209 CHAPTER THREE THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION nation and the foreign invaders and between the various classes , home the Party was able to adopt correct policies that would preserve’ the major gains from the period of the agrarian revolution.

The Mainstay in the War of Resistance Against Japan

The Line of Total Resistance and the Principle of Protracted War

On the night of July 7, 1937, near the Lugouqiao (Marco Polo Bridge) southwest of Beiping, the Japanese aggressor troops, nominally conducting a military exercise, suddenly attacked the local contingent of the KMT’s 29th Army stationed there. The Chinese troops fought back, and thus began the War of Resistance Against Japan. The Japanese attack on the Marco Polo Bridge marked the long-premeditated launching of all-out war on China. This war was the largest imperialist invasion ever experienced by China. By the end of July the Japanese army had occupied Beiping and Tianjin. Three hundred thousand troops traveled along the Beiping-Suiyuan, Beiping-Hankou and Tianjin-Pukou rail lines, expanding their attack on north China. On August 13 they turned their guns on Shanghai, hoping to fight a war of quick decision. Relying on their highly developed industry and superior military might, the Japanese believed they were fully capable of forcing China to surrender within a short time and with little cost to themselves. In the “Outline Guide to the Use of Armed Force in North China in the War on China,” drawn up by the headquarters of the general staff of the Japanese army, two months were allotted for “mopping up” the KMT’s 29th Army and three months for defeating its Central Army.1 212 CHAPTER FOUR THE WAR OF RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN 213 The Formal Establishment of an Anti- Japanese National United Front Tanan’s full-scale invasion brought the Chinese people face to faCe with the grave peril of national extinction. The situation Store them was clear: the only way for the country to survive the crisis threatening its very existence was for the whole nation to join together in a war of resistance. Every class and every political group must put aside its own interests m favour of the interest of the nation as a whole, which was to resist the Japanese aggressors. Otherwise, there would be no future for any of therm This was recognized both by the Communist Paity an > vast number of patriots throughout the country. The day after the incident at the Marco Polo Bridge, the CPC Central Committee issued a manifesto that was a call to arms: “Beiping and Tianjin are in peril! North China is in peril. The Chinese nation is in peril! A war of resistance by the whok nation is the only way out.” The Central Committee called upon the people of the whole country, the government and the armed forces to unite and build the national united front as a Great Wall of resistance to Japanese aggression.” It called upon the Kuomintang and the Communist Party to “cooperate closely and resist the§new attacks of the Japanese aggressors.” “The whole nation from top to bottom,” it said, “must at once abandon any idea of being able to live in submissive peace with the Japanese aggressors.”2 _ _ , . . That same day Mao Zedong, Zhu De, Peng Dehuai and other leaders of the Red Army sent a telegram to Chiang Kai-sheK saying that the officers and men of the Red Army wished to “engage the enemy to defend the country and save the nation. Next, Ye Jianying was sent to Xi’an, where he issued a statemen on July 14 on behalf of the Central Committee of the CPU Ihe statement, addressed to the Nanjing government, carried the following message: “Desiring to resist the enemy vigorously under the command of Chiang Kai-shek, the main force of the Red Army is preparing to set out as soon as possible to resist the Japanese. All armies have been ordered to complete preparations within ten days and await orders to move to the Beiping-Suiyuan defence line.” On July 15 Zhou Enlai, Bo Gu and Lin Boqu presented to Chiang Kai-shek an “Announcement of Kuomintang-Communist Cooperation by the Central Committee of the CPC.” In this announcement the Central Committee emphasized the need for national unity: “As we all know, with our nation facing extreme peril today, it is only through internal unity that we can defeat Japanese imperialist aggression.”4 The announcement set forth three basic objectives — to launch a national war of resistance, to put democracy into effect, and to improve the lives of the people. It reaffirmed the Communist Party’s four pledges for KMT-CPC cooperation.5 On July 17 the representatives of the Central Committee held negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek, Shao Lizi and Zhang Chong at a summer resort in the Lushan Mountains in Jiangxi. The CPC representatives proposed using the announcement as the political basis for cooperation between the two parties, and it was agreed that the document would be released through the Central News Agency of the KMT. That same day, under pressure of the swelling nationwide movement to resist Japan and of the CPC’s insistence on cooperation, Chiang Kai-shek gave a speech calling for a united resistance. “Once war breaks out,” he said, “every person, young or old, in the north or in the south, must take up the responsibility of resisting Japan and defending our homeland and should be resolved to sacrifice everything for the cause.” But Chiang still cherished illusions of making peace with the Japanese and continued to view the attack at the Marco Polo Bridge as a “local incident.” Song Zheyuan, chairman of the Hebei-Chahar Government Administration Council, continued negotiations with the Japanese army in north China. On July 19 the Foreign Affairs Ministry of the National Government proposed to the Japanese embassy that the two governments cease military operations and return all troops to their former locations, then find a peaceful settlement through diplomacy. This proposal was rejected. The occupation of Beiping and Tianjin shocked the entire country and made it difficult to continue any negotiation. The attack on 215 CHAPTER FOUR THE WAR OF RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN Shanghai was an even more direct threat to the heartland of the KMT’s ruling clique and to the interests of Britain and the United States in China. On August 14, under pressure of a flood of demands from all over the country to take up the war of resistance, the Foreign Affairs Ministry of the National Government released a statement declaring, “Forced by the unrelenting invasion of Japan, China must now act in self-defence and resist this violence.” The leaders of the KMT had been hoping that the Japanese aggressors would stop before they went too far. The Japanese had been urging them to join in “mutual defence against the Communists,” and the KMT leaders had been ready to succumb to their wiles. However, the facts showed that the purpose of the Japanese invasion was to take over the whole ol China. If that happened, it would be a death blow not only for the Chinese nation but for themselves. They had no choice but to change their tune and accept the proposal of the CPC and other Chinese patriots that they work together to resist Japan. Chiang Kai-shek very much wanted the Red Army to move to the front, and during the KMT-CPC negotiations he began to express his desire for unity and cooperation with the CPC, agreeing not to send KMT personnel into the Red Army. In August of 1937 the two sides agreed to redesignate the main force of the Red Army, currently in northern Shaanxi, as the Eighth Route Arm> of the National Revolutionary Army, to set up liaison offices of the Eighth Route Army in various cities in KMT-ruled areas and to publish the newspaper New China Daily. On August 22 the Military Council of the National Government issued an order redesignating the Red Army as the Eighth Route Army of the National Revolutionary Army. Three days later the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee issued an order to reorganize the Red Army as the Eighth Route Army of the National Revolutionary Army, which consisted of the 115th, 120th and 129th Divisions.6 Zhu De was designated commanderin-chief with Peng Dehuai as his deputy, Ye Jianying was named chief of staff with Zuo Quan as his deputy and Ren Bishi became director of the political department with Deng Xiaoping as his deputy. Lin Biao was appointed commander and Nie Rongzhen deputy commander of the 115th Division, which was made up chiefly of the former First and Fifteenth Army Groups of the First Front Army of the Red Army. He Long was appointed commander and Xiao Ke deputy commander of the 120th Division, which was composed mainly of the former Second Front Army; and Liu Bocheng was appointed commander and Xu Xiangqian deputy commander of the 129th Division, mainly composed of the former Fourth Front Army. All these divisions, with a total of more than 45,000 men, were sent to join the KM T army in combating the enemy. In September of 1937 the ShaanxiGansu-Ningxia Revolutionary Base Area was redesignated the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Area Government. It included 23 counties with a total population of 1.5 million, and the CPCCentral Committee was located there. It can be seen that the second cooperation between the KMT and the CPC started with the military. At the urging of the Communist Party, on September 22 the KMT Central News Agency published the “Announcement of Kuomintang-Communist Cooperation by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China,” and the next day Chiang Kai-shek made a statement recognizing the legality of the Communist Party. The CPC’s announcement and Chiang’s statement proclaimed the intention of the two parties to cooperate for the second time and the formation of an anti- Japanese national united front. The acceptance by the top leader of the KMT ot a second period of cooperation with the CPC and his agreement to undertake a war of resistance against Japan represented a great service to the people of the country. At this time the KMT was the ruling party and had at its disposal an army of two million men. The shift in its policy made it possible to launch a total war of resistance. The renewal of cooperation between the KMT and the CPC was welcomed throughout the country. In November of 1937 the great patriot Soong Ching Ling issued a statement calling for unity: “The Communist Party is a party which stands for the interests of the working classes, both industrial and agricultural. Sun 217 chapter FOUR the war of resistance AGAINST JAPAN r Vat-sen 1 realized that without the keen support and cooperation Lf these classes, the mission of completing the national revolution ronld not easily be carried out.... During the present crisis, all former differences should be forgotten. The whole nation must ioin together in opposing Japanese aggression and fighting for the final victory.”7 The National Revolutionary League of China, led hv Li Jishen and other high-ranking KMT officers and officials who stood for resistance, had originally opposed Chiang. Now it changed its position and supported him. The National Socialist Party the Chinese Youth Party, the Chinese Vocational Education Society, the Rural Construction Party and others all indicated their support for the resistance effort. Workers, peasants intellectuals and other patriotic persons added to the flood of anti-Japanese sentiment. Capitalists engaged in industry and commerce also joined in the struggle, buying national salvation bonds, donating money and supplies to the front and organizing factories and firms to move to the interior. In Singapore the General Association of Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia for Aid to Refugees of the Motherland was established with Jan Kah Kee as chairman, and branches were set up in various countries in Southeast Asia. Ethnic Chinese living in Europe, the United States and other countries set up national salvation groups to spread anti- Japanese propaganda, collect money and materiel and organize young men to return to China and join the army. Mass participation in the resistance grew to a scale unprecedented in modern Chinese history. The Japanese invaders suddenly discovered they were facing a united front composed ot the entire Chinese nation. The Conflict Between the Line of Total Resistance and the Line of Partial Resistance Because of the War of Resistance Against Japan, the situation at home and abroad was complex. Internationally, there were several forces with differing attitudes towards the war. The Japanese imperialists intended to annex China and pretended to be preparing an attack on the Soviet Union in an attempt to induce the anti-Soviet British and U.S. imperialists to make concessions to Japan. The German and Italian fascists supported Japan’s invasion of China. The Soviet Union, although it explicitly supported China, considered the Kuomintang to be the most important force in the country and the main force in the resistance. On August 21, 1937, the government of the Soviet Union and the National Government of China signed a treaty of mutual non-aggression. After that, Soviet national defence minister K.Y. Voroshilov declared that the Soviet Union would never sit idly by as an indifferent observer of the war between China and Japan. The Soviet Union sent to China first military advisers and then a team of air force volunteers. In addition, it provided the Chinese government with financial and materiel aid. As for Britain and the United Slates, they had a two-sided policy with regard to the China question. As Japan’s war of aggression encroached on their interests in China and in the East as a whole, their conflicts with Japan increased. At the same time, they were busy dealing with the tense situation in the West caused by Germany and Italy, and they feared the rise of the Chinese revolutionary force. Thus, on the one hand they hoped that China would resist Japanese aggression and gave China some support; on the other hand, they appeased Japan and tried to alleviate their contradictions with that country by sacrificing China’s sovereignty over some of its territory. They also encouraged Japan to attack the Soviet Union, in the hope that this would be to their benefit. In China, too, there were several forces with differing attitudes towards the Japanese aggression. The people were firmly in favour of resistance and determined to defend their motherland. Faced with the threat of national subjugation, not only the workers, peasants and the urban petty and national bourgeoisie but also some landlords, the enlightened gentry of the landlord class in particular, favoured resistance to Japan and refused to be slaves of a foreign power. Many of them, however, were at a loss how to resist and had no understanding of the Communist Party. The middle-of-the-roaders, who constituted the bulk of the population, favoured the resistance, though they still did not fully CHAPTER FOUR THE WAR OF RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN 219 understand the situation. The Kuomintang was the ruling party and had an internationally recognized legitimate government as well as an army of two million men. Accordingly, most of the middle-of-the-roaders recognized the legitimacy of the Kuomintang and, though they resented its corruption and undemocratic practices, pinned their hopes of resistance on it. Inside the Kuomintang, some members were democratic advocates of resistance to Japan, others were hidden traitors and still others — the majority, who had real power in their hands and worked in the interest of the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie — belonged to the pro-British, pro-American Chiang Kai-shek clique. The members of this clique had a dual character. On the one hand, the country was under full-scale invasion and in danger of being subjugated. If they refused to resist, the people would not tolerate them, and it would be impossible for them to remain in power. Furthermore, there were contradictions between them and Britain and the U.S., as well as contradictions between them and Japan. For these reasons, they resisted Japanese aggression quite actively in the initial period of the war. On the other hand, they continued to oppress the people, were reluctant to see them mobilized on a broad scale and hoped to win the war by relying on international aid. They even tried to take advantage of the war to eliminate, or at least weaken, the people’s revolutionary forces led by the Communist Party. Throughout the war, the National Government was controlled solely by the Kuomintang and was not based on a national, democratic united front. It was because of this dual character of those in power in the Kuomintang that even though the KMT and the Communist Party had agreed to cooperate in the War of Resistance, it was very difficult to consolidate and expand that cooperation. From the very beginning, the two parties had serious differences over how to conduct the war, and they followed two completely different lines. The Kuomintang, representing the interests of the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie, prosecuted the war only to the extent it judged necessary to hold on to its position in power after the Japanese aggressors were defeated. Therefore, it pursued a line of partial resistance. That is to say, adhering to its one-party dictatorship, it engaged only the government and its troops in the resistance, refused to carry out any fundamental reform that would facilitate the war effort, denied the people democratic freedoms and rights and refused to improve their living standards so as to prevent them from taking part in the war and expanding their strength. In its Programme for Resisting Japan and Rebuilding the Nation, adopted at a provisional national congress that met from March 29 to April 1, 1938, the Kuomintang took a positive attitude towards resistance, but it also imposed a number of restrictions on the development of the people’s movement. On the other hand, the Communist Party, representing the fundamental interests of the Chinese nation, put forward a line of total resistance. The Party maintained that China had the strength to resist the aggression and would eventually triumph. The ultimate source of that strength was the vast number of people. Only by mobilizing and organizing the people could China resist the powerful enemy. It was therefore necessary to introduce political and economic reforms nationwide, putting an end to the one-party dictatorship of the Kuomintang, granting the people full democratic rights to resist Japan and improving the living standards of the workers and peasants. Everything possible had to be done to mobilize, organize and arm the people, so as to make the War of Resistance a true people’s war. The Ten-Point Programme for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation, adopted at an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee held in Luochuan, in northern Shaanxi, August 22-25, 1937, set forth this line of total resistance.8 These two lines led to two different outcomes. If the Chinese people followed the line of total resistance, they would expel the invading Japanese imperialists and gain their freedom and liberation. But if they followed the line of partial resistance, they would never win the war, and China would remain occupied by Japan. These two completely different lines inevitably gave rise to conflicts throughout the War of Resistance. At the beginning of the war, Mao Zedong made the basic contradiction clear: chapter four the war of resistance against japan 221 “Will the proletariat lead the bourgeoisie in the united front, or the bourgeoisie the proletariat? Will the Kuomintang draw over the Communist Party, or the Communist Party the Kuomintang9 In relation to the current specific political task this question means: Is the Kuomintang to be raised to the level of the Ten-Point Programme for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation to the level of the total resistance advocated by the Communist Party? Or is the Communist Party to sink to the level of the Kuomintang dictatorship of the landlords and bourgeoisie, to the level of partial resistance?” He gave a straight answer to this question: “The key to leading the anti- Japanese national revolutionary war to victory is to explain, apply and uphold the principle of ‘independence and initiative within the united front’.”9 Events were to prove him correct. The Strategic Principle of Protracted War To mobilize and organize the people for an all-out war ot resistance, the CPC had to formulate a strategic principle for the war. Even before the Japanese attack on July 7, 1937, the CPC Central Committee had predicted that the War ot Resistance would be long drawn out. At the meeting of Party activists held at Wayaobu in northern Shaanxi Province in December 1935, Mao Zedong had declared, “To defeat our enemies we must be prepared to fight a protracted war.” After the attack, at a meeting on military affairs convened by the Nanjing National Government in August 1937, the CPC representatives Zhou Enlai, Zhu De and Ye Jianying stated that strategically, the nationwide War of Resistance should be a long-term defensive war, but that tactical offensives, or active defence, should be carried out within the strategic defensive. They also recommended that the war zones in north China increase their capacity to operate independently for a long time to come by shifting from positional warfare to mobile warfare. At the same time, they said, these zones should mobilize the people on the flanks ol the enemy and in occupied areas to engage in guerrilla warfare and to sabotage transport lines, in an effort to wipe out Japanese troops or pin them down. However, these suggestions were not accepted by the leading body of the Kuomintang. , . . . It was not long before the Communist Party noted again, in its Resolution on the Present Situation and the Tasks ot the Paity, adopted at the Luochuan meeting, “It should be realized that the war will be an arduous and protracted war.”10 How should such a war be conducted? What tasks should the Red Army fulfil? At the same meeting, Mao Zedong declared that the basic tasks oi the Red Army were as follows: to pursue independent guerrilla warfare, to undertake mobile warfare when conditions were favourable, to establish anti- Japanese base areas in the enemy s rear, to pin down and wipe out enemy troops, to give strategic support to friendly armies and to preserve and expand its own ranks. The meeting decided that the strategic tasks ol the Red Army were to freely carry out independent guerrilla warfare, mainly in mountainous areas in the enemy’s rear in support of front-line battlefields, to open up new battlefields and to establish anti-Japanese base areas behind the enemy lines. After the Luochuan meeting, Zhang Wentian, Peng Dehuai, Zhou Enlai and others published articles explaining both inside and outside the Party the principle of protracted war, in light ot the events since the Japanese attack of July 7. Nevertheless, a great many people still believed either that China would be subjugated or that it would win a quick victory. In the Kuomintang camp, some said, “China is inferior in arms and is bound to lose. Continuing the war means subjugation.’ Others said, “If we fight for just three months, the international situation is bound to change. The Soviet Union will most probably send troops to China, and Britain and the United States may intervene in Shanghai.” Before the fall of Nanjing, Chiang Kaishek sent Stalin a telegram asking him to send troops as soon as possible In the Communist Party, meanwhile, some members took the enemy lightly and held that China would achieve a quick victory by relying on the Kuomintang’s regular army of two million men. Both Party members and non-Party members belittled the importance of guerrilla warfare and pinned their hopes for victory on regular warfare. But the course of the war during 223 :HAPTER four the war of resistance against japan r,B ssrisfss ewiirtriistssis , • the war to refute the prevailing ideas about its tuture Si'ESKSIKtSW Jclmmn ibU the W« of Resistance *«" S" ”K” wl, lone and that the final victory would be Chinas, lhe war between China and Japan,” he wrote, “is not just any war U is soecifically a war of life and death between semi-colonial and semi-feudal China and imperialist Japan, fought m the Nineteen Thirties In this war, China and Japan had four basic sets of contrasting features. First, Japan was a powerful impertalts country while China was a weak semi-colonial and semi feudal country' Second, Japan’s war of aggression was retrogressive barbarous whereas China’s resistance was progressive and jus . Third although it had great war capabilities, Japan was a comparafi'vely small country deficient tn manpower and in military, Cnda and material resources, and it could not stand a long W^r China on the contrary, was a big country with vast territory, rich resources, a large population and plenty of “^etS; and was capable of sustaining a long war. Four*’ Jdp h chjna meagre international support for its unjust war, whereas Ch would find abundant support for its just resistance. Because of the;11 first set of contrasting features, the Japanese invaders wou d run rampant for a time, and as Mao put it, China would not be able to oust the Japanese quickly” and would inevitably have a hard stremh of road to travel.-’ Because of the other features however, China could not be subjugated and would win the find V1Cln“On Protracted War” Mao predicted that for the Chinese, the war would go through the three stages of strategic defensive, strategic stalemate and strategic offensive. As far as the relative strength of the belligerents was concerned, in the three stages China would inevitably move from inferiority to parity and then to superiority, while Japan would inevitably move from superiority to parity and then to inferiority. The stage of strategic stalemate would last quite a long time, and it would be the most trying period but also the pivotal one in the war as a whole. In this stage, China’s form of fighting would be primarily guerrilla warfare supplemented by mobile warfare. The fighting in this stage would be ruthless, but the guerrilla warfare would be successful. The exponents of quick victory, Mao wrote, did not realize that war was a contest of strength and that before a certain change had taken place in the relative strength of the belligerents, there was no basis for trying to fight strategically decisive battles. ‘Whether China becomes an independent country or is reduced to a colony will be determined not by the retention or loss of the big cities in the first stage but by the extent to which the whole nation exerts itself in the second. If we can persevere in the War of Resistance, in the united front and in the protracted war, China will in that stage gain the power to change from weakness to strength.’13 Mao emphasized that the army and the people were the foundation of victory and that the richest source of power to wage war lay in the masses. He made it clear that the only way to win the war with Japan was to mobilize and rely on them and make it a people’s war. In “On Protracted War” Mao set forth a programme for the Communist Party to follow as it led the people in the long War of Resistance. He not only predicted that China would achieve the final victory in that war but outlined the methods by which it could do so, constantly weakening the enemy and expanding its own forces. Written soon after the war began and at a time when many people could not foresee how it would proceed, “On Protracted War” presented a clear blueprint for the entire war and offered answers to all kinds of questions about it. Few articles had been as convincing and inspiring as these lectures. And as the war chapter four the war of resistance against japan225 unfolded, events were to prove that Mao’s analysis of the situation had been sound and his predictions correct.

Carrying Out Guerrilla Warfare behind the Enemy Lines

The stage of strategic defensive in China’s War of Resistance Against Japan began with the Marco Polo Bridge Incident on Jalv 7 1957. and ended with the fall of Guangzhou and Wuhan in October 1938. This stage had two major characteristics One was that the invading Japanese troops penetrated further into China’s vast territory along separate routes and their °f ™sives on front-line battlefields reached a peak. The other was that the army of the Chinese people opened up new battlefields behind the enemy lines and expanded rapidly. . , At this time the Japanese invaders directed their attack chiefly against the Kuomintang. Both strategic! illy and “ naigns front-line battlefields were the mam battlefields lor re sistLg the invasion. The Kuomintang was relatively eager to resist and had its troops wage the Beiping-Tianjin, Wusong Shanghai. Northern Shanxi and Xuzhou campaigns and the ba tie to defend Wuhan. These troops won a victory in the Taier zhuang campaign in Shandong Province, frustrating the plan of the Japanese imperialists to subjugate China in three months. Nevertheless, the situation on the front-line b^^ld^S Tas unfavourable, because the enemy was strong whereas China was weak and because the Chiang Kai-shek clique followed the line of partial resistance and implemented the principle of passive defence Even the great victory in the Tai’erzhuang campaign failed to extricate the Chinese side from its passive potion in the war as a whole. Between July 1937 and October 1938, the Ja panese troops seized Beiping, Tianjin, Shanghai, zhou and Wuhan and occupied a vast territory with a den population, inflicting untold suffering upon the Chinese peopkn For six weeks after they seized Nanjing he ^Ptta of the Kuomintang government, on December 13, 1937, the Japanese militarists carried out a shocking, bloody slaughter, shooting and burying alive more than 300,000 Chinese troops and civilians there. The Eighth Route Army Marches to the Front After the Red Army was reorganized as the Eighth Route Army of the National Revolutionary Army in August 1937, it marched to the front without delay. In order to exercise more effective leadership over it, the Central Committee of the Communist Party decided to establish a front-line military subcommission under the leadership of the Central Military Commission, with Zhu De as secretary and Peng Dehuai as his deputy. The Central Committee also set two strategic tasks for the Eighth Route Army. One was to support the Kuomintang troops in the front-line battlefields by outflanking the Japanese troops invading Shanxi Province, so as to check their advance and cover the retreat of friendly armies. The other was to seize all opportunities to penetrate the encmy-occupied areas and develop guerrilla warfare there. Before the fall of Taiyuan early in November 1937, the Eighth Route Army mainly supported the Kuomintang troops in their military operations, while dispatching a small number of its men to mobilize and arm the masses. As a leader of the League of Self-Sacrifice for National Salvation in Shanxi Province, Bo Yibo twice proposed to Yan Xishan, the warlord of Shanxi, that a new army be organized there to expand the anti-Japanese armed forces. Yan Xishan first approved the establishment of one regiment on a trial basis and later authorized Bo Yibo to organize five brigades. The Shanxi New Army, also known as the Shanxi Youth Resistance “Daredevil” Corps, was a de facto revolutionary army organized and led by the open Shanxi Working Committee of the CPC. Later, the New Army expanded to 50 regiments under the leadership of the Party. This unit played an important role in the war by fighting in close cooperation with the Eighth Route Army. In mid-September 1937, the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army marched to northeastern Shanxi and made Mount CHATTER FOUR THE WAR OF RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN 227 Henushan its base. On September 22 some units of Japan’s Fifth Division began to close in on Pingxingguan, a strategic P°‘n‘ cl°f . the Great Wall in northeastern Shanxi. The next day, Zhu De nnd Peng Dehuai sent a telegram to Lin Biao, commander of the 115th Division, ordering him to set out for the area between Pingxingguan and Lingqiu County and launch flexible flank attacks against the invaders. On September 25 a unit ol the 115th Division successfully carried out its first ambush wiping out more than 1,000 troops of the 21st Brigade of the Itagaki Division destroying more than 100 Japanese vehicles and capturing a quantity of supplies and weapons. This was the first great victory of the Chinese army in the War of Resistance and it put an end to the myth that Japan’s Imperial Army was invincible. It enormously enhanced the confidence ol the army and the people increased the prestige of the Communist Party and of the Eighth Route Army and convinced many people that the Communist Party was not only resolutely resisting the Japanese but also capable of defeating them. After the Pingxingguan campaign, the three divisions of the Eighth Route Army and the Kuomintang troops fought together in the Xinkou campaign, which lasted over 20 days. The Kuomintang and the Communist Party cooperated fairly well in this campaign, the fiercest and the largest ever fought in north China. . , • • After the fall of Taiyuan, in accordance with the decision adopted at the Luochuan meeting of the CPC Central Committee in August 1937, the army under the leadership of the Party concentrated on penetrating the enemy’s rear areas to open up a second battlefront and establish base areas there, so as to give the Kuomintang armies strategic support. Thus two batllefronts emerged that supported each other in the War of Resistance: the front-line battlefront, for which the KM1 army was chiefly responsible, and the battlefront behind enemy lines, for which the CPC army was chiefly responsible. Opening Up the Battlefront Behind Enemy Lines At this time something curious happened on the Shanxi front: when the Japanese troops, taking advantage of their superior forces, forged ahead, the Kuomintang armies staged one retreat after another, whereas the poorly equipped Eighth Route Army, in small groups, rapidly penetrated the enemy’s rear areas. The policy of opening the batllefront behind enemy lines, adopted at the Luochuan meeting, was correct and essential. First, because the enemy was strong while the Chinese side was weak, the invading forces were able to seize vast areas in a very short period of time. If the Japanese troops were allowed to remain in these areas undisturbed, they would make them their military bases and launch fiercer offensives elsewhere. Fighting the enemy in his rear areas would make him lose some of his occupied territory, harass him and pin him down. It would pose a serious threat to Japan, which had a shortage of troops. Second, it would help mobilize and expand the people’s own anti- Japanese forces. Having undergone the inhuman atrocities committed by the Japanese aggressors who were burning, killing and plundering everywhere, the people in the occupied areas longed to avenge the sufferings inflicted upon their families and on the motherland as a whole. However, as they were scattered, disorganized and inexperienced in armed struggle, their spontaneous resistance was often short-lived. There was therefore an urgent need for a people’s army like the Eighth Route Army to penetrate behind enemy lines and serve as a centre around which all anti-Japanese forces could rally. Only by resisting the Japanese for a long time could the people in the occupied areas enhance their understanding of the war, organize themselves effectively and gradually expand their forces. And only by waging a large-scale people’s war in those areas could China win final victory. The conditions in occupied territory made it possible for the Eighth Route Army to wage such a war. Having limited troops, the Japanese could only lake control of cities and transport lines, while in the vast countryside and small towns their rule was weak. In those places the original government organs of the Kuomintang had collapsed because of the invasion, and anarchy prevailed. The masses in the occupied areas were determined to fight Japan. Except for a small number of traitors, all classes, including 229 CHAPTER FOUR THE WAR OF RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN the landlords, were demanding that the invaders be repelled, so there was a solid mass base for the resistance there. Moreover, the hnsically self-sufficient economy in the occupied rural areas nrovided favourable conditions for surviving the tight blockade imposed by the enemy. For these reasons, when the men ot the Eighth Route Army, tempered in the long revolutionary war under the leadership of the Communist Party, moved into the rear areas of the enemy, they were able to serve as the backbone of the resistance, to mobilize and organize powerful people’s armed forces and to establish democratic anti-Japanese base areas. „ , .. How should the Eighth Route Army fight the enemy once it had penetrated the occupied areas? The Communist Party formulated the combat principle, “Guerrilla warfare is basic, but lose no chance for mobile warfare under favourable conditions.”14 This represented a major change in military strategy, a change from the mobile warfare used in the later stage of the Agrarian Revolutionary War to guerrilla warfare, a form of fighting well suited to a weak nation resisting a powerful enemy. To conduct guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines, the people’s armed forces had to establish anti-Japanese base areas. Such warfare had to be carried out without the support of the country’s general rear areas, so base areas must serve that function. It there were no base areas behind enemy lines, it would be impossible to continue guerrilla warfare tor any length ol time. 1 here were two basic conditions for establishing and expanding base areas. 1 ) to have armed forces and use them to organize the people to defeat enemy offensives, and 2) to mobilize the people for all the work in the base areas, especially for the establishment and consolidation of democratic organs of political power. In mid-November 1937 the three divisions of the Eighth Route Army and the Shanxi New Army began their strategic deployment in the occupied areas of Shanxi. In cooperation with the local Party organizations, they organized working groups and established battlefield mobilization committees and anti-Japanese associations for national salvation in effect which exercised political power. After the beginning of the War of Resistance Against Japan in July 1937, many county magistrates in Shanxi Province fled or were afraid to perform their duties. Taking advantage of the legal status of the League of Self-Sacrifice for National Salvation, Bo Yibo and others sent a large number of cadres from the League and from the Shanxi New Army to replace them. Of the 105 counties in Shanxi, 70 had Communists as their magistrates. Most of them were special representatives sent by the League. As a result, the League became an quasi-political organization. At a meeting of representatives of the army, the government and the people of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hcbei Border Area, convened at Fuping in western Hebei on January 10, 1938, a Provisional Administrative Council of the Border Area was formed by democratic election.15 This was the first united front anti- Japanese democratic government led by the Communist Party behind enemy lines. In October 1937, when the Eighth Route Army was marching to the front, the KMT and the CPC reached an agreement in Nanjing on redesignating the Red Army units and guerrilla forces that remained in the border areas of Hunan, Jiangxi, Fujian, Guangdong, Zhejiang, Hubei, Henan and Anhui provinces (not including the Qiongya Red Army Guerrillas in Guangdong) as the New Fourth Army of the National Revolutionary Army. In December the headquarters of the New Fourth Army was established in Hankou, Hubei, and soon thereafter it was moved first to Nanchang, Jiangxi, and then to Yansi in southern Anhui. Ye Ting was appointed commander and Xiang Ying deputy commander of this army, which consisted of four detachments. The first three detachments comprised the Red Army units and guerrilla forces in provinces south of the Yangtze River, while the fourth detachment was made up of the Hubei-HenanAnhui, southern Henan and northeastern Hubei Red Army units and guerrilla forces north of the Yangtze. The New Fourth Army had a total of 10,300 men. At the same time, the Southeast Sub-Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and the New Fourth Army Subcommission of the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee were established. Xiang Ying was appointed 231 chapter FOUR the war of resistance against japan cretary 0f both units and Chen Yi was named deputy secretary nf the subcommission. After the New Fourth Army was formed, the army units under the command of Chen Yi and Su Yu marched into enemy-occupied territory to conduct guerrilla warfare and establish base areas. For more than a year the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army successfully carried out guerrilla warfare mainly in the mountains; then they gradually moved into the plains. By October 1938 they had fought over 1,600 engagements with the Japanese troops, killing, wounding or capturing more than 54,000 of them As the people living under the occupation were eagei to join the army to fight Japan, the Eighth Route Army expanded to over 156,000 men and the New Fourth Army to 25,000. In north China they established anti-Japanese base areas in ShanxiChahar-Hebei, northwestern Shanxi, Daqing Mountain in Suiyuan, Shanxi-Hebei-Henan, southwestern Shanxi, the HebeiShandong border and Shandong, and in central China they set up bases in southern Jiangsu, central Anhui, eastern Henan and other places. Many people, including Chiang Kai-shek, had not expected that the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army could create such a situation behind enemy lines within so short a period of time. ^ . , In the winter of 1938 the CPC Central Committee made another strategic decision: it sent the three main forces of the Eighth Route Army from the mountainous areas ot Shanxi Province to the plains of Hebei and Shandong. Late in November the main force of the 129th Division entered southern Hebei, the main force of the 120th Division penetrated into central Hebei and the headquarters staff of the 115th Division led its 343th Brigade to the Hebei-Shandong-Henan border area and Shandong Province to establish new base areas in those places. This important strategic action did a great deal to strengthen anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare in the plains. The units of the New Fourth Army also took advantage of the varied terrain of mountains, rivers lakes and branching streams to carry out guerrilla warfare. All this created a new situation in the war behind enemy lines. When the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army marched to the areas behind enemy lines, the Northeast AntiJapanese United Army led by the Communist Yang Jingyu, which had long been engaged in armed struggle against Japan in northeast China, became more active than ever before. Its soldiers of the Han, Manchu and Korean nationalities dealt heavy blows to Japanese and puppet troops. The strategic general rear area of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army was the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region. To consolidate the region, the government there, which was under the chairmanship of Lin Boqu, suppressed bandits and fought traitors, secret agents, reactionary landlords and despotic gentry. The Central Committee of the CPC and the government of the region, both based in Yan’an in northern Shaanxi, opened a variety of schools that trained a large number of cadres in different disciplines. They included the Chinese People’s AntiJapanese Military and Political College, the Northern Shaanxi College, an institution for training young cadres, the Lu Xun Art Academy, the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, the Party School of the Central Committee of the CPC, the School for Workers and Staff Members, the Women’s University of China and the PublicHealth School. Tens of thousands of patriotic young people journeyed to Yan’an from every corner of the country. After studying and being tempered in practical work, many of them became staunch revolutionaries determined to fight the Japanese. The consolidation and development of the general rear area enabled the CPC Central Committee to concentrate on commanding military operations behind enemy lines and made it possible for the Party to unite with the people of the whole country in resisting Japanese aggression. The guerrilla warfare carried out behind enemy lines by the armies under the leadership of the CPC was one of the most difficult undertakings in military history. Confronted by the powerful Japanese invaders, the poorly equipped Chinese troops received no replenishment of guns or ammunition from their rear areas. Encircled by the enemy, they created anti-Japanese base areas in remote areas with strikingly poor material conditions. For example, when Nie Rongzhen led some units of the 115th 233 chapter four the war of resistance against JAPAN nivision to the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei border area in November it began to snow on Mount Wutai. However, the troops were *9j, wearing unlined clothes and straw shoes and camping at ni^ht in ruined temples. In spite of all this, they finally game ?irm control of the ground. The key element that enabled them m do so was the support of the local people. As Nie Rongzhen nut it “The people, once mobilized, became ‘mountains and seas ?o check the Japanese aggressors.”16 It would have ^been ummag inable for them to persevere in guerrilla warfare let alone expand it in such a difficult environment if they had not been an army of the people and had not formed the closest ties with the Bureau of the CPC Central Committee was set up in Wuhan, the centre of resistance in the Kuomintang area. The representatives of the Communist Party stayed in contact with members of the Kuomintang and consulted with them on important issues in the relatively cooperative atmosphere that existed for a time. Later, with the approval of the Central Committee of the CPC, Zhou Enlai was appointed deputy director of the Political Department of the Military Council of the National Government, and Guo Moruo was named director of the same department’s Third Division, which was in charge of culture and propaganda. Communists also participated in the People’s Political Council convened by the Kuomintang. The restrictions of the earlier period having been lifted, they again had the opportunity to contact people openly. They made friends and cooperated with persons who opposed the invasion but held political attitudes different from theirs. The Communists also made friends with a number of people from other countries, and to enhance their understanding of and sympathy with the Party, explained to them the Party’s principle of uniting to resist Japan. It was at this time that renowned foreign friends of the Party, such as Dr. Norman Bethune of Canada and Dr. D. S. Kotnis of India, stopped over in Wuhan on their way to the anti-Japanese democratic base areas. The Third Division of the Political Department of the Military Council of the National Government, which included Communists and progressives, mounted big propaganda campaigns against Japan. It launched the “Week of Anti-Japanese Propaganda” and similar activities in Wuhan and formed ten opera groups, four publicity teams and a children’s troupe to arouse popular feeling against the enemy. Under the leadership of the CPC’s Yangtze Bureau, the Party organizations in southern China that had been seriously damaged in the later period of the ten-year civil war gradually recovered and expanded. Between September 1937 and September 1938, CPC provincial committees or working committees were established in Henan, Hubei, Jiangsu, Sichuan, Hunan, Guangxi, Guizhou, Anhui, Guangdong, Yunnan, Zhejiang, Jiangxi and Fujian. By September 1938 the number of Party members (exchaPTER four the war of resistance against JAPAN „ those in the army) exceeded 67,000. C‘ Generally speaking, the work done by the Party in the Wuhan times was effective. It opened up a new situation, and this hac far-reaching effects

Overcoming the Right-Deviationist Mistakes and Maintaining the Independence and Initiative of the Party in the United Front

During the War of Resistance Against Japan, because ol the complex international and domestic situation and because of the two different lines followed by the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, the key to the success of the resistance lay in the Party’s correct handling, in the united front, of the relation, between unity and independence, between solidarity and struggle. At the very beginning of the war, the CPC Central Committee declared that the Party must follow the principle ol 'ndependence and initiative within the united front. This meant tha would be both unity and independence, that the Party would both unite with the Kuomintang and struggle against it, seeking unity through struggle. The CPC would remain independent ideologically, politically and organizationally and follow its own political line of freely mobilizing the masses and leading the people of the whole nation in resistance to Japan. It would maintain its absolute leadership over the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and other people’s armed forces, break the restrictions imposed on it by the Kuomintang and work hard to expand the people’s armed forces. To uphold the principle of independence and initiative in the anti-Japanese national united front was, in essence, to strive for leadership in the War of Resistance. When this principle was first formulated by the CPC Central Committee, it was not fully understood by the whole Party. After the united front was established, certain Party members made Right mistakes. For example, some ol them yielded to the Kuomintang when it interfered in, and even suppressed, the mass campaign for national salvation. When one unit of the Red Army was being reorganized into the National Revolutionary Army, its commander lowered his vigilance against the anti-Communist schemes of the Kuomintang, with disastrous results.17 Some Party members in KMT areas, having too much faith in the Kuomintang, tended to carry out all their activities openly. Others, who were in the army, tried to secure appointments by the Kuomintang government. When they succeeded, they refused to continue to lead a hard life and to accept the leadership of the Party. Still others were not bold enough to struggle against the Kuomintang secret agents who were sabotaging their base areas. This Right deviationism violated the Party’s principle of independence and initiative and was detrimental to the preservation of the united front based on cooperation between the KMT and the CPC. Party organizations at all levels struggled successfully to overcome it. At the end of November 1937, Wang Ming, the CPC’s representative to the Communist International, member of the International’s Executive Committee and presidium and alternate secretary of its Secretariat, was sent back to China. Before he left, the Secretariat of the International held a special meeting on the situation in the Sino-Japanese war and on the tasks for the CPC. The General Secretary of the Executive Committee, Georgi Dimitrov, maintained that as the CPC and the Chinese working class were relatively weak, in the War of Resistance China should rely on the Kuomintang with Chiang Kai-shek as its head. The CPC, according to Dimitrov, should draw on the practice of the French Communist Party, summed up in the slogan, “Everything for the popular front and everything through the popular front,” and share responsibility and leadership with the Kuomintang. As a matter of fact, the practice of the French Communist Party had not been successful. If the CPC were to give up its proletarian stand of independence and initiative, make no distinction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, refrain from arousing the masses and try to appease the bourgeoisie in all matters so as to maintain the united front, it would only weaken the position of the proletariat, put the united front at the mercy of the 237 chapter FOUR the WAR OF RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN w^nreeoisie and eventually bring about China’s defeat. Nevertheless, after he arrived in Yan’an, Wang Ming did ,vervthine possible to carry out this “new policy” of the Communist International. At a meeting of the Politburo of the CPC rentral Committee held from December 9 to 14, 1937, he made , report entitled "How to Carry On the Nationwide War of Resistance and Win It.” In this report he put forward some correct ideas on persevering in the war and continuing to cooperate with the Kuomintang. But he also set forth a series of Right capitulationist ideas on the question of how to consolidate and expand the anti-Japanese national united front. Denying the differences of principle between the CPC’s line ol total resistance and the Kuomintang’s line of partial resistance, Wang Ming maintained that the Kuomintang should be the leader in the war, negating the leading role played by the Communist Party. He also rejected the principle of independence and initiative within the united front, saying that “everything must be submitted to the united front” and that “everything must go through the united front.” In this way, he confined the activity of the Party to the limits imposed by the Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-shek and opposed the free mobilization and arming of the masses. He belittled the role of guerrilla warfare, the people’s armed lorces and the anti-Japanese base areas behind enemy lines under the leadership of the Communist Party, and asserted that a quick victory could be achieved by relying on the Kuomintang armies. Wang Ming confused many participants in the meeting when he said that in his report he was relaying the instructions ol the Communist International. Towards the end of December 1937, Wang Ming went to Wuhan as a member of the CPC delegation. There, without the approval of the CPC Central Committee, he published “Manifesto of the Communist Party of China on the Present Situation,” “The Key to Saving the Present Situation” and other articles, and he delivered a speech at Wuhan University entitled “On the Anti-Japanese National United Front,” propagating his wrong ideas At a meeting held by the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee in Yan’an from February 27 to March 1, 1938, Wang Ming presented the report “The Present Situation of the AntiJapanese War and How to Carry On the War and Win It.” Although he admitted that in his “Manifesto of the Communist Party of China on the Present Situation” he had made too many concessions to the Kuomintang, he compounded his mistakes by setting forth the strategic principle that mobile warfare, supported by positional warfare, was primary and guerrilla warfare supplementary. He also agreed with the Kuomintang proposal that there should be only one army under unified command. He demanded that the people’s armed forces led by the Communist Party come under the command of the Kuomintang and insisted that they and the KMT armies have uniform organization, arms, discipline and material treatment as well as unified operational plans and combat operations. That the Kuomintang would ever agree to the people’s armed forces having the same arms and material treatment as its own was only wishful thinking on Wang Ming’s part. And if the Communist Party agreed that the two armies would carry out unified combat operations under unified command in accordance with unified operational plans, it would restrict itself in expanding the people’s guerrilla warfare. After the meeting, in violation of the Party’s principle of democratic centralism, and in defiance of criticisms by Mao Zedong, Zhang Wentian and others, Wang Ming wrote “A Summary of the March Meeting of the Politburo” and published it in the weekly magazine The Masses. Why did Wang Ming oppose the principle of independence and initiative within the united front? Why did he shift from his “Left” deviation during the Agrarian Revolutionary War to Right deviation at the beginning of the War of Resistance? Because he never understood the Party’s policy regarding the united front. When the Kuomintang suppressed the Communist Party militarily, the “Left” forces, with Wang Ming at their head, emphasized struggle to the neglect of unity, negating the need for the Party to unite with all kinds of middle-of-the-roaders. When the Kuomintang took a turn in favour of joint resistance to Japan, Wang Ming put good relations with the Kuomintang above everything else and thought that, for the sake of the war effort, the Party 239 chapter four the war OF resistance AGAINST JAPAN C A n„ alternative but to listen to the KMT in all matters. tad in* the unhed front would collapse if the KMT were offendFf stressed the importance of unity to the neglect of struggle These ideas made him shift from “Left” to Right mistakes, which were duplications of those the Party had made in the later stage °f A nodie r' reason' for Wang Ming’s Right-deviationist mistakes „ h . he worshipped the instructions of the Comintern and Mindly followed the foreign policy of the Soviet Union There was nothing wrong in the Soviet Union’s decision at the time to maintain foreign relations only with the Kuomintang governmen in China. But some leaders of the Comintern and of the Soviet Union overestimated Chiang Kai-shek’s enthusiasm for resisting Janan while underestimating his determination to eliminate the CommlX. and their thinking had a great influence on Wang MWang did some useful work in promoting cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party and conducting pro£ aganda against the Japanese. However, he rejected the CPC Central Committee’s principle of independence ^d mUiaUve within the united front, always acting withinthe LT^For by the Kuomintang. As a result, he impeded the Party swork_For example in the winter of 1937 and the spring of 1938, he made it Impossible for the Party to conduct more extensive guerrilla warfare and to establish more anti-Japanese base areas behinc enemy lines in central China, as it should have done. The Central Committee struggled determinedly to reject ^ang Ming’s Right-deviationist mistakes. It insisted that m north China the Party conduct guerrilla warfare independently behind enemy lines and that strategy was brilliantly successful. In central China, despite Wang’s interference, the Yangtze Bureau Central Committee for the most part implemented the Cm111”11 tec’s principle of independence and initiative. It did much united frontwork, helped local Party organizations with their work and provided leadership in the campaign for national salvation, whde also expanding the armed forces. Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, Z De and others reviewed the practical experience gained in guerrilla warfare and made a theoretical generalization of the strategic principles for such warfare, refuting Wang Ming’s erroneous ideas. As the Party was determined to be independent within the united front, it confined the influence of those ideas to certain areas and was able to eradicate it in a comparatively short time. After the Politburo meeting of March 1938, the Central Committee sent Ren Bishi as its representative to the Soviet Union to explain to the Communist International the actual situation in China’s anti-Japanese national united front. The leaders of the International, who now had a better understanding of China, said they agreed with the political line of the CPC Central Committee headed by Mao Zedong. This helped the Party to correct Wang Ming’s mistakes before too long. At the Enlarged 6th Plenary Session of the 6th CPC Central Committee, held in Yan’an from September 29 to November 6, 1938, Mao Zedong made a political report and summarized the work of the session. Many other comrades delivered speeches about their experience in the anti-Japanese war over the previous 15 months. The session basically put an end to Wang Ming’s mistakes and reiterated that the CPC must independently lead the people in the fight against the Japanese invaders. Thus, it further unified the thinking and action of the whole Party. This was a vital meeting in the history of the Party, as it upheld the principle of integrating Marxism-Leninism with the realities of the Chinese revolution and reaffirmed the leadership of Mao Zedong. If these problems had not been solved at the beginning of the war, it would have been impossible for the CPC to lead the people to victory.

Upholding the Principle of Resistance, Unity and Progress

After the Japanese troops seized Guangzhou and Wuhan in October 1938, the War of Resistance passed from the stage of strategic defensive to the stage of strategic stalemate. This was possible because changes had taken place in the relative strength of China and Japan. 241 chapter FOUR the war of resistance against japan After 16 months of fighting, the Japanese troops had occupied major industrial cities and other economically developed ChJ" In terms of campaigns, Japan was the winner but it was not af strategically. The full-scale invasion had tailed to destroy China s Stance forces, let alone the people’s determination to resist. During the Wuhan campaign, the deputy chief of the Japanese General staff said that even if Wuhan and Guangzhou were t seized China would not give up and the Japanese forces would be dragged deener into the interior, which would be greatly to Japans disadvantage.18 As the invaders occupied more and more territory, a their front line extended and as they were increasingly worn down by protracted warfare, Japan’s fundamental weaknesses, such as its shortage of financial and material resources and of troops had come to light As its difficulties increased daily, Japan was unable “wage any more large-scale strategic offensives. The guerrilla warfare led by the CPC had expanded m the occupied areas, leaving the Japanese troops in control of only major transport lines and key cities. Their so-called security zones were actually restricted to on y a few kilometres on either side of major transport lines. TheEighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army were in control of the vast rural areas and carried out constant attacks on the enemy, giving rise to a “jigsaw” pattern, in which the Chinese and Japanese troops encirclcd^each other. The Japanese aggressors had not anticipated such a pattern. As for the Chinese, in the stage of strategic defensive, the Kuomintang troops had retreated time after time from frontline battlefields. And although the people s anti-Japanese forces had expanded, they were far from being able to carry out a strategic counter-offensive ; before they were ready to do that they would still have a long, hard struggle to go through. For these reasons, the war had entered upon a stage of strategic stalemate. Major Changes in Class Relations During the Stage of Stalemate When the stalemate began, major changes took place in Japan’s policy for the conduct of the war. From the time they seized Wuhan in October 1938 to the beginning of 1944, the Japanese ceased their strategic offensives on the front lines and began to use more and more of their main forces to fight the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army in their rear areas. So far as the Kuomintang government was concerned, the Japanese invaders reversed their policy of making military offensives primary and political inducement to capitulate secondary. In the occupied areas the Japanese stepped up their efforts to prop up puppet governments and to establish traitors’ organizations. At the time, the economic crises of the capitalist countries were further aggravating world contradictions. War clouds hung over the European continent. The fascists in Germany, Italy and Japan exploited and collaborated with each other. To deal with the war started by Germany and Italy in Europe, Britain and the United States tried to appease Japan by sacrificing China to some extent, in the hope that the Japanese would not side with Hitler against them. Accordingly, Britain and the United States also tried to persuade the Kuomintang government to capitulate. Under these circumstances, the capitulationist, divisive and retrogressive activities within the Kuomintang ruling clique became more serious every day. In December 1938 the pro-Japanese Kuomintang group, headed by Wang Jingwei, vice-president of the KMT, chairman of the Central Political Council, vice-chairman of the Supreme National Defence Conference and chairman of the People’s Political Council of the Kuomintang, openly capitulated to the Japanese. In 1 940, as directed by the Japanese military, Wang Jingwei and other leading puppets from both southern and northern China were to hold negotiations with each other and establish a united puppet central government — the “National Government of the Republic of China.” The pro-British and pro-American Kuomintang group headed by Chiang Kai-shek continued to resist, but without conviction, pursuing the policy of passively resisting Japan and actively opposing the Communist Party. At the 5th Plenary Session of the 5th Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, held in January 1939, the political situation in China took a turn for the worse. The Kuomintang gradually shifted its focus from external affairs to internal affairs and adopted the reactionary principle of “corroding,” “guarding against,” “restricting” and 243 chapter four the war of resistance against japan - the Communist Party. After the meeting, a committee “combating t specific methods of carrying out this eSllfctrtam”rrasfricSnbetween the KMT and the CPC principle. In certain serjes of serious incidents took became increasingly^ shenJ[ian> Pjngjian and Queshan. In place, sue Japanese troops and civilians and cadres work thCSe of the Communist Party wem suddenly killed or attacked by Kuomintang troops and secret to maintain the coop d the anti-Japanese national every effort to conso Centra) Committee issued a “Manifesto oifthe^ Present Situation, Marking the Second Annivmsary of the War of Resistance,” in whrch it put forward the oppose retrogression. lhese g the partv to recogmoved to Chongqing. In vi ^ Central Committee the 6th Plenary Session of the Wuhan and decided to abolish its Yangtz , iq-iq the South establish a South Bureau instead On January 13 1939 the Sou h Bureau was officially set up m Chongqmg. Ud by Zhou&da the bureau did hard but very effective areas. It scored outstanding underground and open), united front work (among pc P ^ ™" ‘n». Buicau publicized the proposals of the Communist Party, mobilized workers and peasants, united people of all classes and supported the resistance against Japan behind enemy lines. Using flexible tactics, it also waged a resolute struggle against the capitulationists and die-hards who were against resistance, unity and progress so as to ensure that the whole nation fought the Japanese. The bouth Bureau paid particular attention to work among the middle-of-the-roaders. While in the Kuomintang areas, Zhou Lnlai and others contacted representatives of democratic parties prominent persons without party affiliation, democrats in the Kuomintang, members of regional power groups and outstanding intellectuals. They discussed state affairs with these people and gradually gained their understanding and trust, thus expanding the anti-Japanese national united front. Expanding Guerrilla Warfare Behind Enemy Lines and Building the Anti-Japanese Base Areas When the Japanese invaders began using their main armies to attack the resistance forces in the occupied areas, the CPC began to shoulder the chief responsibility for fighting the aggressors. The Japanese concentrated their “mopping-up operations” on the base areas in north China. In spring 1939, they formulated a plan for public security and the elimination of Communists” and launched a “total war” including the military, economic and cultural domains and involving the help of secret agents. The commander-in-chief of the invading Japanese forces proposed what he called a “butcher’s knife tactic,” meaning that although e army led by the CPC was small, it must be attacked with great force In the two years of 1939 and 1940, the Japanese launched 109 large-scale “mopping-up operations” in north China alone using a total ot more than 500,000 troops, each operation involving more than 1,000. Following the instructions of the CPC Central Committee, the Eighth Route Army persevered in guerrilla warfare in north China, relying on the population and making use of the advantageous terrain in the mountainous areas. The army and people also 245 chapter four the war of resistance AGAINST JAPAN . intiy sabotaged railways and highways and developed guerrilla warfare in the vast plains, taking advantage of irrigation ditches for concealment. Again in coordination with the local people, army units travelled to different areas to spy on the regular movements of the Japanese troops and accumulate a superior force to ambush them. Immediately after a successful ambush, the army would leave the scene and begin to search for other opportunities to wipe out enemy troops and enlist more men. Early in November 1939, with the support ol the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army, the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei army unit ambushed and wiped out more than 900 Japanese and puppet troops, including Lieutenant General Norihide Abe, commandei of the Japanese Second Independent Mixed Brigade. In the process of fighting, the Shanxi New Army expanded to 50,000 men. Meanwhile, in order to develop guerrilla warfare in central China, in February 1939 the CPC Central Committee sent Zhou Enlai to southern Anhui Province to consult with the leaders of the New Fourth Army. They agreed that the strategic tasks for the army were to consolidate the south, light battles in the east and expand to the north. After this the New Fourth Army and the guerrilla warfare in central China expanded considerably. In May 1940 the Central Committee sent 12,000 men ot the Eighth Route Army south to join the New Fourth Army in developing the anti-Japanese base areas in central China. In November 1940, in order to unify the leadership of the two armies in central China, the Central China General Headquarters was established with Ye Ting as commander-in-chief, Liu Shaoqi as political commissar and Chen Yi as deputy commander-in-chief. (Chen Yi was acting commander-in-chief until Ye ling came north ol the Yangtze to take up his post.) As for south China, after the fall of Guangzhou in 1938, the Guangdong Party organizations led the people in carrying out guerrilla warfare and establishing the Dongjiang Anti-Japanese Base Area. The Red Army Guerrilla Corps that had been operating on Hainan Island for a long time conducted guerrilla warfare and later expanded to become the Qiongya Column. For more than twro years, from the winter of 1938 to 1940, the war effort led by the CPC behind enemy lines pinned down a great number of invading Japanese troops. In the vast rear areas of the enemy, guerrilla forces carried out countless small-scale surprise attacks, gradually wiping out Japanese effectives and at the same time increasing their own numbers and combat effectiveness. By the end of 1940, the armed forces under the leadership of the CPC had expanded from 50,000 men to 500,000, not counting a large number of local armed units and militiamen. In north, central and south China, 16 new anti-Japanese base areas had been established, in Shanxi-Chahar-Hcbei, Shanxi-HebeiHenan, Shanxi-Suiyuan, Hcbei-Shandong-Henan, Henan-Hubei Shandong, Northeastern Anhui, Eastern Anhui, Central Anhui,’ Southern Anhui, Southern Jiangsu, Central Jiangsu, Northern Jiangsu, Henan-Anhui-Jiangsu, Dongjiang and Qiongya. Together with the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, the base areas under the leadership of the CPC had a population of 100 million and played an increasingly important role in the national war of resistance. To sustain the war for a long time, the base areas in occupied territory had to be not only expanded but consolidated. To this end, the CPC attached great importance to promoting all undertakings there. The first of these was to establish organs of political power. The Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region set the example in this respect. At the First Assembly of Representatives of the Border Region, held in Yan’an from the middle of January to the beginning of February 1939, the “Administrative Programme of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region During the War of Resistance Against Japan” was adopted, and a government council for the region was elected, with Lin Boqu as chairman. The programme was of great importance, because it contained the basic policies that would be implemented by the CPC in all anti- Japanese base areas. Later, the CPC Central Committee issued a series of directives on the establishment of organs of political power in base areas. These were as follows: 1. The organ of democratic political power of an anti-Japanese chapter HOUR the WAR OF RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN 247 base area would be a united front led by the CPC. In other words, it would be the joint democratic dictatorship of several revolutionary classes over the traitors and reactionaries. 2. In employing government staff, a “three thirds system” was to be implemented, with Communists, non-Party Left progressives and middle-of-the-roaders each taking a third of the posts. This system included people from all backgrounds and helped to unite anti-Japanese elements of all classes. 3. The leading position of the Communist Party in the government was to be maintained through the Party’s correct policies, the exemplary conduct of its members and the support of the people. 4. The government should constantly improve democratic systems in all spheres of work. Communists must cooperate with non-Party members in a democratic manner, listening to their opinions and discussing matters with them whenever possible. They should not act arbitrarily or monopolize all power. 5. The policy measures of the government would be to oppose the Japanese imperialists, protect the people who were resisting Japan, properly adjust the interests of all the anti-Japanese classes and improve the life of the workers and peasants. In August 1940, in accordance with the directives of the CPC Central Committee, the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Border Region promulgated its own Administrative Programme. In the autumn of the same year, a general election was held throughout the region. One after another, the other anti- Japanese base areas established organs of political power based on the “three thirds system.” The governments at the grassroots level were formed through direct, democratic elections and enjoyed the support of the local people. The main task of the Party in the War of Resistance behind enemy lines was to mobilize and organize the peasants to resist the Japanese. In essence, it was the peasants, led by the CPC, who were the main force in the resistance. By the time the war broke out, the CPC had abandoned its agrarian policy of confiscating the land of landlords. To mobilize the peasants and improve their material life, the Central Committee decided to introduce the policy of reducing land rents and interest and protecting tenants’ rights. The implementation of this policy could not solve the land problem once for all, but politically, it shook the feudal regime, and economically, it weakened feudal exploitation. Thus, during the national war, this policy gave consideration to the interests of both peasants and landlords, integrating the need to maintain the united front with the need to deal with the peasant question. From the winter of 1939 on, all base areas began to reduce rents and interest. The original rents were cut by 25 percent, and the general annual interest rate was fixed at ten percent (with a maximum rate of 15 percent). Other miscellaneous rents, corvee and all forms of usury were brought to an end. Thanks to this policy, the peasants not only benefited economically but also enhanced their political status and became more enthusiastic about farming than ever before. On Lhc basis of the progress in agricultural production, industrial production and all other economic undertakings developed in the base areas. The base areas also actively promoted culture and education. The Central Committee proposed that as many intellectuals as possible be encouraged to take part in the War of Resistance. The governments of base areas organized intellectuals to develop education. In spite of the difficulties presented by the lack of necessary materials, the poverty of the people and constant harassment by the enemy, the governments made full use of their poor facilities to establish primary and secondary schools and to promote education in the society at large, so as to raise the educational level of the masses. At the same time, a number of cadres’ schools were set up in Yan’an and in all base areas, the graduates of which became the backbone of the people’s armed forces and major contributors to the development of these areas. The Central Committee also attached great importance to developing science and technology in the base areas. In February 1940 the Research Association of Natural Sciences was formed in Yan’an. In August of the same year, the Academy of Natural Sciences was launched, the first of its kind in the history of the CPC, to train scientific and technological personnel. The progress in all undertakings in the base areas greatly 249 cHApter four the war of resistance against japan ct lengthened the ties between the CPC and the local people and S reased their confidence in the Party and the people s armed forces. This was vital, if the resistance forces were to continue operating behind enemy lines, where the environment was extremely challenging, and to win final victory. Through its work in the base areas, the Party accumulated much experience m establishing organs of political power and promoting economic development, culture and education. Later, this experience would prove highly valuable in the building of New China. In northeast China, the Japanese aggressors repeatedly launched merciless attacks on the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army. Under the leadership of the Communist Party, the army conducted guerrilla warfare and, in May 1939, was reorganized into the First, Second and Third Route Armies. In 1940 Japan sent more troops to northeast China, making it even more difficult for the United Army to operate than before. On February 23, 1940, Yang Jingyu, commander-in-chief of the First Route Army laid down his life heroically in a battle 1 ought m Mengjiang County, Jilin Province. Towards the end of the same year, the United Army moved to the Sino-Soviet border to reorganize and train and continue to fight the Japanese and puppet troops. During 1939 and 1940 the Japanese troops launched some small-scale offensives against the Kuomintang troops. These included the Nanchang, Suixian-Zaoyang, First Changsha, Southern Guangxi, and Zaoyang-Yichang campaigns. However, the KMT forces put up strong resistance and the Japanese tailed to make great advances. During this period, when the Japanese invaders launched frontal attacks, fierce battles were fought. Many Kuomintang officers and men fought valiantly, but these campaigns pinned down only a small part of the Japanese troops and came to an end when the Japanese stopped their offensives. The 100-Regiment Campaign In north China, behind enemy lines, as the people’s armed forces and the anti-Japanese base areas were rapidly expanding, from August 20 to the beginning of December 1940 the General Headquarters of the Eighth Route Army launched large-scale offensives against the Japanese troops. As more than 100 regiments of the Eighth Route Army with a total of more than 200,000 men took part in these operations, they were called the 100-Regiment Campaign. Why did the General Headquarters of the Eighth Route Army launch these offensives? Mainly because there had appeared “the gravest danger of capitulation and unprecedented difficulties in the War of Resistance.”20 In September 1939 Hitler had sent his troops to attack Poland, and Britain and France had declared war on Germany. The arrogance of the German fascists greatly encouraged the Japanese aggressors. They stepped up their efforts to force or induce the Chiang Kai-shek clique of the Kuomintang to capitulate. In May and June 1940 they occupied Yichang in the Xiangyang- Yichang Campaign in Hubei Province, thus seizing the entrance to Sichuan Province from Hubei. Then they imposed blockades on the transportation line from Yunnan Province to neighbouring Vietnam. And on two occasions — in March 1940 in Hong Kong and again in June in Macao — representatives of the Japanese army and representatives of the Chongqing government held secret negotiations on the conditions for a truce. At the same time, in the occupied areas the invading troops stepped up the implementation of their “prisoners’ cages” policy, using railways, highways and blockhouses, supplemented by blockade walls and trenches, to divide the anti-Japanese base areas into small pieces and encircle them. Then they carried out “mopping-up operations” against these areas and “nibbled at” them. Under these circumstances, the general headquarters of the Eighth Route Army concluded that to combat capitulationism, inspire the army and people fighting the Japanese and temper its own forces, it was essential to organize large-scale sabotage operations against the enemy.21 In the first stage of the 100-Regiment Campaign (from August 20 to September 10, 1940) transportation lines were sabotaged. At the same time, army units, guerrillas and the militia launched offensives against the Japanese and puppet troops. They damaged CHAPTER FOUR, the WAR of RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN 251 ,he Zhengding-Taiyuan, Datong-Puzhou, Beiping-Hankou, chiiiazhuang-Dezhou, Beiping-Suiyuan, Bciping-Shenyang Thmiin-Pukou and Baigui-Jincheng railways, annihilated a large lumber of enemy troops and even seized for a while the strategic Niangzi Pass, a fortified pass held by the Japanese on the border between Shanxi and Hebei. Caught off guard and assar ed from many sides at once, the Japanese and puppet troops had to acccp MUle without preparation and suffered heavy losses. On Septem ber 20 in Yan’an the people held a rally to celebrate the victory of the 100-Regiment Campaign. They also sent a telegram to e Eighth Route Army, encouraging it to “advance unremittingly from victory to victory.” In the second stage (from September 22 to early October), the Eighth Route Army continued to launch surprise attacks on both sides of railways, destroyed Japanese fortified points in the base areas and attacked the county seats of Yushe, Liaoxian, Laiyuan and Lingqiu. However, because the Japanese troops now remained on the alert and the Eighth Route Army was worn out from continuous fighting, the army suffered heav> casu® ^S' 0 seized only one county seat, Yushe, and was unable to clear all the enemy fortified points in the base areas, as it ^.^JiToOO do. From early October, the Japanese dispatched all the 20,000 troops that it could concentrate in north China, in addition to a large number of puppet troops, to carry out des. perate retaliato: ry “mopping-up operations.” The army and people in the base areas fought valiantly against them. During the 100-Regiment Campaign the officers and men of the Eighth Route Army fought the enemy courageously. By the beginning of December, they had fought 1,824 battles, large an small, killed or wounded more than 25,000 Japanese and puppet troops and captured more than 280 Japanese troops and 8,000 puppet troops, as well as guns, artillery and other matdriel The Eighth Route Army itself suffered 17,00p casualties^ The : cam paign dealt a heavy blow to the “prisoners cages policy that was designed to carve up the armed units and people in the antiJapanese base areas into isolated groups. The campaign also pinned down many Japanese troops and deflated their aggressi arrogance. It not only tempered the people’s armed forces and enhanced the prestige of the Communist Party and the Eighth Route Army, but also inspired the nation at a time when the War of Resistance was at low ebb. The fact that the Communist Party had persevered for so long in resisting Japan behind enemy lines and had launched the 100- Regiment Campaign was a convincing refutation of the view, held by some, that in the War of Resistance the Party’s guerrilla warfare consisted of just moving around without fighting. In spite of the extremely difficult conditions, the army of the Communist Party not only survived but kept a large number of Japanese and puppet troops pinned down in occupied territory. The army and the people fought countless small engagements and also, when conditions were ripe, large-scale battles such as in the 100-Regiment Campaign. During that campaign, on September 11, 1940, Chiang Kai-shek sent Zhu De and Peng Dehuai a telegram reading, “Your army has unhesitatingly seized this good opportunity to launch offensives and has dealt a heavy blow to the enemy. I therefore send this telegram as a citation.” This shows that the Kuomintang authorities officially recognized the achievements of the CPC’s Eighth Route Army in the War of Resistance.

Repulsing the Anti-Communist Onslaughts Launched by the KMT

Throughout the period of the War of Resistance Against Japan there were contradictions that had an important bearing on China’s destiny: first, the national contradiction between China and Japan, which determined whether the Chinese nation would survive; second, the class contradiction between the Communist Party and the Kuomintang, which determined whether the people would be able to carry the War of Resistance through to the end and afterwards build a new China. These two contradictions were closely interrelated. 253 CHAPTER FOUR THE WAR OF RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN Unlike Wang Jingwei, Chiang Kai-shek, the chief leader of the Kuomintang, never forgot to make a pretense of resisting Japan, but when the war was at a stalemate, he adopted a passive attitude toward the War of Resistance and even went so far as to try secretly to reach a compromise with the invaders. He carried out an anti-democratic policy that damaged the efforts for unity and resistance. Furthermore, in the KMT-controlled areas he began to actively oppose the Communist Party, strengthening fascist rule and the activities of secret agents, destroying Communist Party groups and other progressive organizations and jailing Party members and other patriots. He instigated frequent provocations of the Communist Party, attacking the people’s army, arresting and killing cadres who supported the resistance, engineering incidents of “friction” between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party and even launching armed attacks on the Communist-led anti-Japanese base areas.22 All these acts made the class contradiction between the CPC and the KMT more acute. How, then, was the contradiction to be handled? This was an important and complicated question. The CPC Central Committee held that during the war with Japan, the national contradiction between China and Japan was primary and the domestic class struggle should be subordinated to it. The class struggle should not be denied, but it should serve the national struggle. Accordingly, while rallying the people around itself in the war effort, the CPC sought to maintain its cooperation with the Kuomintang and to carry on the war to the end by following a policy of both alliance with and struggle against the Chiang Kai-shek clique. Alliance with Chiang Kai-shek meant that the Party would do everything possible to persist in the War of Resistance and to secure unity and progress, and that it would support the patriotic forces both inside and outside the Kuomintang so as to keep it in the anti-Japanese united front. The troops commanded by the Communist Party behind enemy lines tied up a great number of Japanese soldiers, which reduced the pressure on the KMT forces in the front-line battlefields. This was an important factor in persuading the KMT to continue its efforts in the War of Resistance. Struggle against Chiang Kai-shek meant that the Party would resist any attempts by the KMT diehards to capitulate, cause splits or retrogress and that it would make no unprincipled concessions. When the Kuomintang launched its campaign against the Communist Party, the latter, upholding the principle of the anti-Japanese national united front, united firmly with the democratic parties and with patriotic and progressive people of all strata and waged the necessary and appropriate struggle against it. The purpose of this class struggle was not to overthrow the KMT government, but to prevent it from capitulating to the Japanese invaders and fighting the Communists and to keep it in the united front. The policy of uniting with the Chiang Kai-shek clique and at the same time struggling against it was based on the lessons the Party had learned from following a policy of alliance without struggle during the period of the Great Revolution and a policy of struggle without alliance during the period of the ten-year civil war. The formulation of the new policy represented a major development of the Party’s thinking on the question of the united front. Bearing this policy in mind, the Party was able to approach problems coolly and in an all-round way and to control the development of the overall situation. Repulsing the First Anti-Communist Onslaught In the winter of 1939 and the spring of 1940 the Kuomintang diehards launched their first onslaught on the Communists. At the 6th Plenary Session of its 5th Central Executive Committee, held in November 1939, the KMT established the policy of making the military restriction of the Communist Party its principal objective and the political restriction of the Party subsidiary. In December Kuomintang troops attacked the ShaanxiGansu-Ningxia Border Region, took five county seats there and planned to attack Yan’an. The army led by the CPC resolutely counter-attacked. In Shanxi, Yan Xishan used all his troops to attack the New Army (the Anti-Japanese Daredevil Corps) and the Eighth Route Army. In the Zhongtiao Mountains in Shanxi, several corps under the command of Chiang Kai-shek likewise 255 chapter four the war of resistance against japan , forked the Communist-led armies. The New Army, supported hv the Eighth Route Army, repelled these attacks. By January 1Q40 northwestern Shanxi had become an anti-Japanese base area •der the leadership of the Communist Party. In February and March the Kuomintang troops attacked the anti-Japanese base areas in southern Hebei and the Taihang Mountains in southeastern Shanxi where the General Headquarters of the Eighth Route Army was located. The Eighth Route Army, subjected to a pincer movement by the Japanese invaders and the Kuomintang troops, nevertheless repulsed the latter’s attacks. Soon after this demonstration of its strength, the CPC Central Committee sent Zhu De to negotiate with Wei Lihuang in Luoyang, Henan Province and Xiao lingguang and Wang Ruofei to negotiate with Yan Xishan at Qiulin Town in Yichuan County, Shaanxi Province. They reached agreement on stopping the armed conflict between their forces, dividing up the areas where their respective troops were to be stationed and where they were to resist the Japanese. While repelling the Kuomintang’s first military onslaught, the Communist Party also frustrated its political and ideological attacks. The Kuomintang set all its propaganda machines in motion, promoting the view that Communism did not suit C hina s reality and that there was no need for a Communist party in China Ye Qing, a reactionary scholar, said: “The Three People’s Principles can satisfy all China’s present and future needs. If these principles are implemented, there is no need for China to practise socialism or to organize a political party to strive for socialism.” The people were worried by the KM Vs attacks on the Communist Party, and many of them raised the question of what direction China should take. The representatives of the national bourgeoisie were dissatisfied with the autocratic rule of the Kuomintang and its passivity in the War of Resistance, but they were skeptical about the Communist Party’s proposals. Some of them were under the illusion that after Japan was defeated, a capitalist society of the European and American type would be established in China. At this crucial moment, the Communist Party had to make clear to the Chinese people its views on the revolution and to answer the question, what direction should China take? In October and December of 1939 Mao Zedong published two articles entitled respectively “Introducing The Communist ” and “The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party.” In January 1940 he published another called “On New Democracy,” in which he explicitly expounded the views of the Communist Party. He answered three fundamental questions: 1. What kind of state should be built in China? 2. What kind of political, economic and cultural systems should this state have? 3. What were the prospects for this state? In essence, he replied as follows: 1. The basic contradictions in the semi-colonial and semifeudal society of China were the contradiction between imperialism and the Chinese nation and the contradiction between feudalism and the great masses of the people. The first of these was the principal one. Because of the society’s semi-colonial and semi-feudal nature, the Chinese revolution must go through two stages: first, a democratic revolution, and second, a socialist revolution. 2. After the May 4th Movement of 1919, the Chinese democratic revolution was no longer a general one but a newdemocratic revolution. It .was an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolution of the masses, and it was led by the proletariat, this being the essential difference between it and the old democratic revolution. During the period of this revolution, which was based on the worker-peasant alliance, the proletariat united the national bourgeoisie and, under special circumstances, a part of the big bourgeoisie to form a broad united front, so as to isolate and strike the main enemy. 3. The political programme of the new-democratic revolution was to end the oppression by imperialism and feudalism and to establish a democratic republic under the joint dictatorship of all revolutionary classes, led by the proletariat and based on the alliance of workers and peasants. Its economic programme was first, to confiscate the big banks and the big industrial and commercial enterprises that dominated the livelihood of the people and convert them into state-owned enterprises, and second, to confiscate the land of the landlords and distribute it to the 257 cHAPTER FOUR THE WAR OF RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN . „„rnnra2ini! them to establish a cooperative economy, peasants, imefethe new-democratic republic would allow the A‘ Tnment of a’ national-capitalist economy and the existence de h neas an t economy. Its cultural programme was to sweep away 'the feudal, comprador culture and develop a national, The "demS'ratk ' revolution would ultimately lead to socialism The new-democratic revolution and the socialist « m, on were two different revolutionary stages, and the latte M he carried out only after the former was completed. I C°“ fd be impossible to accomplish the tasks of the two stages at ne s«ok ^ ‘he second must follow immediately upon the first, whhout allowing any intervening stage of bourgeois dictatOT5hThe new-democratic revolution was guided by the commui-swna s m and w i hout the guidance of the communist ideology the s-rrssss— tion was a major event in the nistory ■ _ Tt pnahled the whole membership to get a clear anu revolution, the taste it^ntai chinese people as they KSiS — “on and played a grea’ ' y nation of MarxismLemnism with the practice of the ChmeserevolutiomBefore^ bourgeoisie.23 The Comintern declared that the bourgeoisdemocratic revolution would not necessarily lead China onto the capitalist road, but that idea was not clearly explained. With the theory of the new-democratic revolution, many of the problems that had arisen during that stage were solved satisfactorily. It should be remembered, however, that the Party was able to set forth this theory only after it had been through nearly twenty years of arduous struggle and, especially, only after it had reviewed what it had learned, both from its successes and from its failures in the Great Revolution, in the ten-year civil war and in the anti-Japanese war. Having repulsed the first anti-Communist onslaught, the CPC Central Committee made a serious analysis of the domestic situation. It stated that at a time when the Japanese were invading China, the principal contradiction was the one between China and Japan, and the domestic class contradiction was subordinate. There was still a possibility, it said, of preventing the situation from deteriorating and of changing it for the better, and the Party’s present task was to consolidate and expand the antiJapanese national united front. After reviewing its experience in united front work, the Central Committee formulated several important tactical principles for such work. These principles were as follows: 1. In the period of the united front, the Party should develop the progressive forces, win over the middle-of-the-roaders and, as far as possible, try to isolate the diehards. These three things were related, but the main emphasis should be on developing the progressive forces. The middle-of-the-roaders tended to vacillate and were bound to break up as a group. They might often be a decisive factor in the struggle between the progressive forces and the diehards, so it was very important for the Party to win them over. 2. In the struggle against the Kuomintang diehards the Party should adhere to the principle of self-defence. That is, it should not attack unless it was attacked. In that case, it should counterattack, but only on just grounds, when the situation was to its advantage and with restraint. By fighting only on just grounds, 259 CHAPTER FOUR THE WAR of RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN lhe party would win the sympathy and support of the people of he whole country. By fighting only when the sttuauon was to its advantage and only with restraint, it would ensure victory and be careful to stop at the appropriate time. By observing this pnncipte . party would be able to develop the progressive forces, win over the middle-of-the-roaders, isolate the diehards and carry the War of Resistance to the end. 1 In the period of the anti-Japanese united Iront, struggle was the means to unity and unity was the aim of struggle. As Mao Zedong put it, “If unity |was] sought through struggle it [would] live' if unity [was] sought through yielding, it [would] perish. 4 While trying to improve the situation, the whole Party and the whole army should be on the alert for any eventualities on a local or national scale and prepared to deal with them, lhe mistake of 1927 must not be repeated. These important tactical principles guided not only the united front work at that time but also the long revolutionary struggle that came afterwards, enabling the Party to tackle all kinds ol thorny problems more skillfully and to achieve ever more successes. Repulsing the Second Anti-Communist Onslaught Despite the failure of its first onslaught on the Communists, the Kuomintang did not give up. In September 1940 Germany, Italy and Japan signed a pact of alliance. Britain and the United States tried hard to win over the Kuomintang government. Thin ing this was a favourable moment, Chiang Kai-shek intensified his anti-Communist activities, shifting the focus of his armed attacks from north China to central China. In mid-September 1940, Han Deqin, the Kuomintang governor of Jiangsu Province and deputy commander-in-chief of the Shandong- Jiangsu war zone, ordered his main force to attack Huangqiao in northern Jiangsu, an important base of the New Fourth Army, m an attempt to wipe out the units stationed there. From October 4 to 6 the northern Jiangsu command of the New Fourth Army fough back in self-defence and annihilated 11,000 of Han Deqin s troops. After the Huangqiao campaign, Chiang Kai-shek launched the second anti-Communist onslaught. In a telegram to Zhou Enlai who was then in Chongqing, Mao Zedong warned that the CPC should prepare for the most difficult and dangerous situation, making all arrangements accordingly. On January 4, 1941, in accordance with orders from the Military Council of the National Government and with the consent of the Central Committee of the CPC, the headquarters staff of the New Fourth Army and more than 9,000 New Fourth Army troops in southern Anhui began to move north of the Yangtze River. As they were approaching the area of Maolin in Jingxian County on the 6th, they were ambushed by seven divisions totalling more than 80,000 Kuomintang troops. Surrounded and greatly outnumbered, the New Fourth Army troops nevertheless put up heroic resistance. After a bloody battle that lasted seven days, their supplies of food and ammunition were exhausted. Only some 2,000 of them broke through the enemy lines, while the rest laid down their lives or were captured. Ye Ting, commander of the New Fourth Army, was detained when he went to the headquarters of the Kuomintang troops to negotiate. Xiang Ying, deputy commander of the Army, was murdered after breaking through the siege. Strictly speaking, this engagement was not a war but a trap laid by Chiang Kai-shek, who was taking advantage of his post of supreme commander to get rid of dissidents. On January 17 he even spread the rumour that the New Fourth Army had staged a mutiny. He cancelled its official designation and declared that Ye Ting would be handed over to a military court for trial. This was the Southern Anhui Incident, which shocked China and the rest of the world and was the culmination of the second antiCommunist onslaught launched by the Kuomintang. Before these events, Xiang Ying, the secretary of the Southeast Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and one of the leaders of the New Fourth Army, had made contributions to the revolution by carrying on guerrilla warfare for three years in southern China and organizing the New Fourth Army. But he did not correctly understand the principle of maintaining independence and initia261 CHAPTER FOUR THE WAR OF RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN tive in the united front and the Central Committee’s policy of expanding the armed forces to the north and in occupied terntorv He was reluctant to carry out the Central Committee’s directive to move north, and when he finally did so he was not sufficiently aware of the danger of attacks by the Kuomintang diehards. He was therefore not adequately prepared for an emergency. Also, before the enemy’s attack he made some tactical mistakes. As a result, he was unable to avoid or reduce the grave losses suffered by the New Fourth Army in the Southern Anhui Incident. . ...... After this incident, some people both inside and outside the Party thought that the situation would be a repetition ot the one in April 1927, that cooperation between the Communist Party and the Kuomintang would soon break down and that the civil war would expand. Indeed, the Southern Anhui Incident staged by Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang was quite similar to the coup of April 12, 1927. But the situation in 1941 was dillerent from the one in 1927. In 1941, facing the Japanese invasion, the people throughout the country opposed the civil war and demanded unity and resistance to Japan. Also, the balance of strength between the CPC and the Kuomintang was different from what it had been in 1927. More important, the Communist Party already had a mature leadership that frequently reviewed the experience it had gained in revolutionary practice. This leadership did not panic in the face of any eventuality; it did not make unlimited concessions to the reactionary forces, nor did it take any adventurist actions that might serve them as a pretext for sabotaging unity and the resistance. Confronting the grave situation after the Southern Anhui Incident, the CPC Central Committee still put the interests of the resistance above everything else and upheld the policy of both unity and struggle and of seeking unity through struggle. So far as the KMT’s military offensives were concerned, the CPC persisted in the policy of self-defence, and as for the political offensives, it resolutely crushed them. . . n On January 20, 1941, the Military Commission ot the CPC Central Committee issued an order to reestablish the New Fourth Army Headquarters. A week later this was done in Yancheng County ot northern Jiangsu, Chen Yi being appointed acting commander, Liu Shaoqi political commissar and Zhang Yunyi deputy commander. The army was reorganized into seven divisions and one independent brigade with a total strength of 90,000 men. These forces carried on the War of Resistance on both sides of the Yangtze. In the meantime, the Central Committee made public a host of facts exposing the Kuomintang’s scheme to undermine the resistance, and it demanded that twelve steps be taken to solve the problems caused by the Southern Anhui Incident.25 In Chongqing, Zhou Enlai lodged a strong protest with the Kuomintang authorities. In a phone call to He Yingqin, chief of the KMT general staff, he denounced the KMT saying, “What you have done has grieved our friends and gladdened our enemies. You have done what the Japanese invaders tried but failed to do. You will be condemned for all time as a traitor to the Chinese nation.” New China Daily , defying the KMT’s press censorship, carried two commemorative “inscriptions” by Zhou Enlai. One was: “Mourn for the martyrs of the Southern Anhui Incident. The other was: “It is as great a wrong as history has ever known that Ye Ting has been thrown into jail. How brutal some people are to have killed their own family members!” These two inscriptions, written with grief and indignation, had wide repercussions in Chongqing and throughout the Kuomintangcontrolled areas. Liao Chengzhi, a prominent Communist, exposed the truth of the Southern Anhui Incident in a statement in Hong Kong. He made the following clear to the world: ‘The Communist Party of China has no intention of changing its policy of resistance and unity after the Southern Anhui Incident, but it will have to remain on the alert for a possible anti-Communist military attack. It does not want to see a largescale civil war, and if those who have provoked a civil war form greater plots from which the Japanese will benefit, the future of the War of Resistance in China will be jeopardized. We hope the international community will join in averting this danger.”26 The Communist Party’s determination to give priority to the chapter four the war of resistance against japan 263 w_r of Resistance won widespread sympathy among the Chinese Zlolc including the middle-of-the-roaders and patriotic mem£!rs of the Kuomintang, and also among people abroad. Many Iconic knew that it was the army led by the Communist Party of rhina that was carrying on the resistance behind enemy lines. On the other hand, the Kuomintang diehards, confronted with a formidable enemy, the Japanese imperialists, nevertheless continued to attack the Communists, thereby losing all popular support. Soong Ching Ling, He Xiangning, Liu Yazi, Peng Zemin and others launched a protest campaign in Hong Kong writing letters to Chiang Kai-shek and to the Central Executive Committee and Supervisory Committee of the KMT. They denounced the Kuomintang authorities for their encirclement and suppression of the New Fourth Army and demanded that they renounce their suppression of the Communist Party and plan to cooperate with it, instead, expand all the anti-Japanese forces and protect all the anti- Japanese parties. , Huang Yanpei, a noted democrat, declared that the Kuomintang authorities were utterly wrong to have attacked the New Fourth Army in Southern Anhui. Feng Yuxiang said that everyone knew the New Fourth Army had made great contributions to the resistance and that the Kuomintang government would be condemned by the people for having annihilated that army Several hundred people in cultural circles issued a statement denouncing the Kuomintang for having turned its guns against the people. Tan Kah Kee, a patriotic leader of the Chinese community in Singapore, sent a telegram to the People s Political Council, appealing for unity and condemning Chiang Kai-sheks betrayal. The majority of the middle-of-the-roaders sympathized with the CPC. Internationally, the Soviet Union, the United States and Britain were dissatisfied with the Kuomintang and urged China to continue its resistance to Japan. In February 1941 President Roosevelt sent his representative Laughlin Currie to China While in Hong Kong, Currie told Soong Ching Ling that he would warn Chiang Kai-shek not to continue to deceive : and attack the troops of the CPC. In Chongqing he told Zhou Enlai that the United States wanted to see China united against Japan. The Kuomintang diehards had not expected that the Communist Party would be so uncompromising towards them and that the reactions to the Southern Anhui Incident would be so strong both at home and abroad. As they were in an extremely isolated and awkward position, they had no choice but to restrain their anti-Communist activities. On March 6, 1941, in a speech delivered at the second session of the People’s Political Council, Chiang Kai-shek pledged that absolutely no further military actions would be undertaken against the Communists. Then Dong Biwu, a leading member of the CPC, was elected a non-voting member of the Council. Chiang Kai-shek invited Zhou Enlai for talks to solve the problems concerning relations between the two parties. Thus, the second anti-Communist onslaught mounted by the Kuomintang was repulsed. Far from achieving the object of destroying the Communist Party, Chiang’s policy served only to bring about his own isolation by revealing the truth to many people who had formerly harboured illusions about him. On May 8, 1941, the CPC Central Committee issued a directive laying down the policy for Party organizations in the great rear areas: to have well-selected cadres working underground for a long period, accumulating strength and biding their time. In January 1942 in Chongqing, at a meeting of the Southern Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, Zhou Enlai stated that to build a strong and militant Party organization, Party members in the Kuomintang-controlled areas must work and study assiduously. They should make more friends and hold regular jobs so as to have a place in society as cover. Guided by these correct principles, the Party organizations working underground in the KMTcontrolled areas managed to preserve, consolidate and expand themselves and strike deep roots among the masses, despite the fact that the KMT authorities tried every means to undermine them. The ability of the Communist Party to repulse the two onslaughts of the Kuomintang and its determination to persevere in the policy of resistance, unity and progress proved that the leadership of the CPC Central Committee had become politically mature and that despite the complex circumstances, it could CHAPTER FOUR THE WAR OF RES1STANCE AGA,NST JAPAN up correctly the relations between the national struggle and struggle. As if it had lifted a rock only to drop it on its lhe feet Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang had failed in its cam°Tenfto wipe out the troops under the leadership of the ComS, party More and more people had come to see clearly tha !^ CPC worked not for the interest of a single party or group but for that of the whole nation. Thanks to its correct policies the Party had been able to turn a bad situation around, to unite with I nf-the-roaders and to make the ruling clique ol the Kuomintang^think army would exterminate everyone in north China who refused to yield and that it would establish a “Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere” in a sea of blood. Accordingly, the Japanese troops began massacring Chinese soldiers and civilians. In late January, for example, 1,500 Japanese troops “mopped up” the village of Panjiayu, Fengrun County, in eastern Hebei Province. They burned more than 1,000 houses and, in a massacre of unparalleled savagery, drove all the villagers — some 1,300, including women, children and old people — into a courtyard and mowed them down with machine-gun fire. On June 22, 1941, Nazi Germany launched a full-scale invasion of the Soviet Union. The Soviet people immediately began a heroic defence of their country. Earlier, on April 13, 1941, the Soviet Union and Japan had signed a treaty of neutrality. The Soviet Union, which had to cope with a tense situation in Europe, wanted to avoid fighting on two fronts. Japan hoped that if it marched into the area south of China, the treaty would remove any apprehensions for the safety of its rear. In October Hideki Tojo formed a new cabinet and expanded the aggressive war. In the small hours of the morning of December 8, 1941 (Tokyo time), Japan made a surprise aerial attack on Pearl Harbour in Hawaii, the U.S. naval base in the Pacific. Thus began the Pacific War between Japan and the United States and Great Britain. The outbreak of the Soviet-German war and the Pacific War greatly enlarged the scale of World War II, which eventually involved 61 countries and regions. China’s War of Resistance Against Japan became an important component of the worldwide anti-fascist war, coordinated with the efforts of other allied countries. On the second day of the war in the Pacific, the CPC Central Committee declared that the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, which were enduring great hardships, would persist in their War of Resistance in the enemy’s rear in north and central China, thwart his “mopping-up” operations and tic up large numbers of his troops. On January 1, 1942, in Washington, D.C., twenty-six countries involved in the fight against the Axis powers, headed by the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and China, signed the Declaration of the United Nations, ^pter four the war of resistance against japan 267 . nalling the formal establishment of an international antiracist united front. This created a favourable condition for the rhinese people in their efforts to win the War of Resistance. During this period, China still had to resist the main strength nf Japan’s ground forces. By the end of 1941 Japan’s total forces had increased to more than 2,400,000 men (300,000 in the navy and over 2,100,000 in the army). About 400,000 troops were stationed in Japan, another 400,000 were fighting elsewhere m Asia and in the Pacific and the remaining 1,300,000, including the Kwantung Army stationed in northeast China, were all deployed in China. If Japan’s main ground troops, which made up more than half of the country’s total military strength, had been available for use elsewhere in Asia and the Pacific region, the whole war would inevitably have presented quite a different picture The Chinese people’s effort to tie up the main forces ot the Japanese army was therefore a great contribution to the worldwide anti-fascist war. The Struggle Against Mopping-Up Operations To turn China into a rear base for the war in the Pacific, the Japanese aggressors instituted a brutal colonial rule in the occupied areas and proceeded to plunder them economically, in addition, the Japanese and puppet armies were mustered to conduct repeated “mopping-up” operations against the antiJapanese bases in their rear areas led by the Communist Party. During 1941 and 1942, in the north China base areas, there were 132 such operations involving between 1,000 and 10,000 men each time and 27 operations involving between 10,000 and /U,000 men. Sometimes the “mopping-up” lasted for three or four months in a single area, with the Japanese following a policy ot “burn all, kill all and loot all.” In some places they even used poison gas and germ warfare to create depopulated zones. In central China, too, the Japanese army launched large-sccde attacks against the army and the people in its rear. Alter the Pacific war broke out, the Japanese still had 290,000 troops m central China. They and the puppet troops set up blockade lines around anti-Japanese base areas in an attempt to consolidate the occupied areas, ensure control over the main transportation lines and plunder strategic materials. They also targeted the central and southern parts of Jiangsu Province, “mopping up” the countryside again and again. Under the ruthless attacks of the Japanese, the army and the people behind enemy lines suffered heavy casualties. By 1942 the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army had been reduced from 500,000 to about 400,000. Some organs of anti- Japanese democratic political power in the North China Plain had been destroyed. The base areas had shrunk, and their total population had fallen from 100 million to less than 50 million. Much of the arable land in the enemy’s rear areas was damaged, so it was impossible to maintain normal production. Marauding Japanese troops also looted grain and domestic animals, causing a famine. This was done deliberately, to ruin the economy of the base areas and thus deprive the anti-Japanese forces of their means of survival. During this period, in the Zhongtiao Mountains of southern Shanxi Province, in the city of Changsha in Hunan and in Zhejiang and Jiangxi provinces and other areas, the Kuomintang troops also resisted the attacks of the Japanese army. In addition, they organized a Chinese Expeditionary Army to march into Burma in support of operations conducted by the anti-fascist allies. After the Pacific war broke out, however, since the Chiang Kai-shek clique believed that it could rely on the United States and Great Britain to fight the war against Japan, it continued to increase the friction between itself and the Communist Party. The Kuomintang government suspended the pay of the Eighth Route Army and withheld ammunition, bedding, clothing and other supplies. Moreover, it gathered several hundred thousand troops to encircle the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region and enforce an economic blockade, cutting off support from the outside. Although the people in the Communist-led anti-Japanese bases and the resistance fighters behind enemy lines faced serious hardships, the Communists were not dismayed. The CPC Central Committee made it clear that these difficulties in the War of 269 chapter four the war of resistance against japan Resistance were difficulties encountered as the people were advancing and that they were only temporary, because victory was drawing near. They could be overcome by the revolutionary spirit, the spirit that made one seek truth from facts and serve the people wholeheartedly, the spirit of self-reliance and hard struggle, of unity and solidarity, the spirit that later came to be called the “Yan’an spirit.” The Japanese army, reviewing its experience of fighting in its rear areas, concluded that it could not depend on force of arms alone to suppress the Communist Party. Vigorous and tenacious efforts had to be made to combine military measures with civilian ones. Using “mopping-up” as the main form of action, the Japanese troops also combed areas to find resistance fighters and “nibbled” at the territory controlled by the Communists, mounted campaigns to “tighten public security” and employed other tactics. From March 1941 to December 1942, the Japanese army, having undertaken to “wipe out Communism” and “establish a new order in East Asia,” carried out no less than five such campaigns. They divided all of north China into three classifications: “secure zones” (the occupied areas), “quasi-secure zones” (guerrilla areas where their control was contested) and “nonsecure zones” (the anti-Japanese base areas). Different policies were adopted for each classification. Throughout the occupied areas, Chinese traitors were formed into “associations for the preservation of order,” the bao-jia system was tightened and villages were merged and stockaded.- The Japanese also organized villagers into “self-defence corps,” “garrison forces” and “security forces.” They checked household registers, issued identification cards to “disciplined citizens” and practised collective punishment (if one household was found to be anti-Japanese, the members of ten neighbouring households would be killed as well). They arrested Communist Party members and anti-Japanese activists and suppressed all anti-Japanese movements. At the same time, the Japanese controlled steel, iron, zinc and other strategic materials, monopolized or swallowed up Chinese iactoiics and commercial firms, compelled the peasants to plant opium, pillaged great quantities of grain and introduced a rationing system. In addition, they organized “teams of labour for public service” to oppress and exploit the labourers. The Japanese aggressors also spread lies and propaganda to justify the enslavement of the Chinese people and their own brutal colonial rule. In the guerrilla areas, the Japanese army built a network of roads and clusters of blockhouses and constructed ditches, walls and watchtowers to prevent the people’s armed forces from gaining a foothold in the guerrilla areas and the occupied areas. As for the anti-Japanese base areas, the Japanese army unceasingly “nibbled” away at them and conducted ruthless and devastating “mopping-up” operations. In view of these ferocious attacks, the Communist Party held that the power of the people’s war had to be fully utilized in an all-out struggle against the enemy. The struggle should not consist merely of reckless fighting but should be waged on the political, economic, ideological, cultural and other fronts as well. Only in this way could the enemy be constantly weakened and the strength of the resistance forces be preserved and accumulated. The key to achieving this goal was to practise unified leadership and to coordinate the work in all areas. According to a decision on centralized leadership in the base areas made by the CPC Central Committee on September 1, 1942, the agency of the Central Committee (its bureau or sub-bureau) and the Party committees at all levels were to be the supreme leading organs in the base areas. Secretaries of the Party committees at all levels were to serve concurrently as political commissars in army units at the same levels. In the meantime, the military system, which consisted of the main formations of the regular army, the local formations and the self-defence corps of the people’s militia, should be organized in such a way that the main formations of the regular army were the backbone of the armed forces and the other two types of units were strong reserves. When the enemy posed a serious threat, the main formations could be separated and dispersed. When the situation took a favourable turn, the local formations and the people’s militia could be concentrated to coordinate with, or act as, main formations carrying out largescale operations. In sum, various forms of struggle should be 271 nAPTER FOUR THE WAR OF RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN waged to repel the enemy when he attacked the anti- Japanese base areas and to foil his campaigns to “tighten public security.” jn central China, the struggle in the enemy’s rear areas was as intense as in north China. From the spring of 1942 to the end of 1943. the New Fourth Army streamlined its troops, simplified its administration and combined armed struggle with unarmed struggle. The main formations of the regular army watched for opportunities to move from one place to another or make a surprise assault on the enemy, while the regional armed forces and the people’s militia kept up guerrilla warfare in the same areas. The local Party and government organizations were totally militarized, so that they were able to adapt to the circumstances of guerrilla warfare. They were dispersed and hidden in the local areas, persisting in the struggle no matter what the situation was. The New Fourth Army harassed the concentrated enemy troops, while they surrounded and annihilated those that were scattered. The New Fourth Army also made it difficult for the puppet troops to return safely from the villages they had attacked to the places where they were stationed. If the Japanese and puppet armies concentrated their forces to “mop up’ an area, the people s armed forces in neighbouring areas would strike simultaneously, so that the enemy could occupy one area only at the cost of losing others. Thanks to these flexible tactics, the “mopping up” plan of the Japanese and puppet troops was toiled, and the army and the people in the anti- Japanese base areas became stronger. In the course of this hard struggle behind enemy lines, the army and the people devised a number of very effective tactics. They included “sparrow” warfare, tunnel warfare, land-mine warfare, sabotage operations, guerrilla warfare on the lakes and rivers and the use of armed work teams. I hese tactics represented a further development of the people’s war. “Sparrow” warfare was conducted mainly in the mountain areas, where the terrain was rough and the paths rugged. Naturally, the people’s self-defence armed forces (the people’s militia) were familiar with the local conditions. When the Japanese and puppet troops entered the anti-Japanese base areas, the people s disperse the next, attacking them everywhere. The enemy, unfamiliar with the terrain, had to rush here and there and take a beating on the roads. Tunnel warfare and sabotage operations were conducted in the plains. The army and the people in the base areas in the North China Plain dug trenches in the roads to slow the advance of the Japanese mechanized forces, thus protecting their own retreat. As the circumstances worsened, each household in a village would dig a cellar or burrow, and connecting tunnels would be built between them. These tunnels were later developed into extensive networks linking many villages and suitable for attacking, hiding and moving from place to place. The Japanese soldiers tried to fill the tunnels with smoke, water and poison gas, but all these methods were without avail. By depending on the tunnels, single villages and even individuals could effectively attack the enemy and protect themselves. In both mountain areas and plains, land mines were used. The people made mines o t difterent kinds out of local resources such as scrap iron, glass bottles, clay pottery and even stones. They would lay these mines at the entrance to a village or a road, at a door or in the corner of a courtyard, endangering the lives of the Japanese and puppet soldiers as soon as they entered a village or a house. The army and the people even laid mines under the exits ot the Japanese blockhouses, otten killing or wounding enemies who came out and shaking the morale of the others. Guerrilla warfare on the water was waged largely on the river networks of central China. Thousands of soldiers and civilians, taking advantage of the varied terrain of rivers, lakes and branching streams, built dams and underwater barriers to make it difficult for the motorboats of the Japanese army to navigate. With small, silent wooden boats that could go everywhere in the vast water areas, they themselves found opportunities to strike the enemy heavy blows. The armed work teams were organized by the army and people behind enemy lines in an attempt to gain the initiative in the struggle against the mopping-up operations. In the spring of 1942, the policy ol advancing as the enemy advanced was initiated in 273 CHAPTER four the WAR OF RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN orth China. When the Japanese and puppet troops attacked the anti-Japanese base areas there, the soldiers and civilians would use a part of their forces to penetrate the enemy’s rear areas. There they would launch extensive military and political offensives, eliminating diehard Chinese traitors, persuading members of the puppet army and organizations like the “associations for the preservation of order” to cross over to the anti-Japanese side or educating them so they would work for the people insofar as circumstances allowed. These people’s armed forces gradually developed into armed work teams operating deep inside occupied territory. Each of them, not only a fighter but also a propagandist and an organizer, was capable of functioning independently — fighting, educating the masses and mobilizing them. By combining military struggle with political struggle and overt struggle with covert struggle, they were able to conduct extensive education among the masses, expose the enemy’s true colours, gather information, eliminate traitors and combat spies. They disrupted the order of the Japanese and puppet regimes, won over members of the puppet army and organizations, built secret armed forces and established dual regimes, or covert base areas. Thus, areas in the very heart of the territory controlled by the Japanese and puppet armies were turned into torward positions tor attacking them. In the vicinity of the blockhouses, the enemy could hear members of the armed work teams shouting political propaganda. The members also called on the families of soldiers in the puppet army, asking them to urge their men to give up evil and return to good as soon as possible. When the Japanese and puppet troops came to loot the grain in a village, the armed work teams would appear in time to help the villagers resist and protect their stores. Under these circumstances, the Japanese army could have no sense of security even in the “secure zones.” Although the Japanese and puppet troops made desperate attacks, it was inevitable that they would be drowned in the vast ocean of the people’s war. During 1941 and 1942 the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, the guerrilla forces and the people’s militia fought more than 42,000 engagements with the enemy troops, killing, wounding or capturing 331,000 of them. In particular, in their struggle against mopping-up operations behind enemy lines, the army and the people tied up or eliminated a large number of Japanese troops, making a major contribution to the protracted war of resistance against Japanese aggression and giving great support to the anti-fascist war fought by the Allies. In the struggle in occupied territory, soldiers and civilians alike fought indomitably and performed countless acts of heroism. On August 1, 1941, for example, puppet troops encircled Dongxin Village in Xianxian County in central Hebei Province. They tried to force the villagers to identify the mother of Ma Benzhai, the brave and capable commander of the Hui Nationality Detachment. A few villagers who refused to inform against her were killed on the spot; others were cruelly tortured. Ma’s mother, who could not tolerate seeing people beaten or killed for her sake, stepped forward bravely. The enemy alternated threats and inducements to compel her to write a letter persuading her son to surrender. She denounced them scathingly: “I am Chinese, and I do not know the word ‘surrender.’” She remained unyielding and starved herself to death. In another incident, on September 25, 1941, on Langya Mountain near the Yishui River in western Hebei Province, under attack by Japanese arid puppet troops, five soldiers of the Eighth Route Army — Ma Baoyu, Hu Delin, Hu Fucai, Song Xueyi and Ge Zhenlin — deliberately drew the enemy fire on themselves to allow the members of Party and government organizations and the people in the area to move to a place of safety. They retreated to a steep cliff and from this vantage point repelled four successive assaults by the Japanese troops. When their last bullet had been fired, they resolutely smashed their guns and leaped from the cliff. Three fell to their death. The other two were caught on the branches of trees and eventually made their escape. The five soldiers became known as the Five Heroes of Langya Mountain. Again, on May 25, 1942, in a critical situation in which the General Headquarters of the Eighth Route Army stationed in Liaoxian County was encircled by the enemy, Zuo Quan, the deputy chief of staff, broke through the encirclement at the head of his men. As he was leading the 275 CHAPTER four the war of resistance against japan last group of soldiers through the enemy lines, Zuo Quan was struck by a bullet and gave his life for his country. Thousands upon thousands of such national heroes emerged in the War of Resistance. The revolutionary spirit of the Communist-led army and people in the enemy’s rear areas — the spirit that bade them unite as one, resist aggression and defy brute force — was the source of strength that brought them victory in the struggle against the enemy’s mopping-up operations. The Chinese people will always remember the great deeds performed by the heroes and martyrs in the War of Resistance Against Japan. Overcoming Economic Difficulties and Initiating the Great Production Campaign During that hard time, the CPC Central Committee adopted a number of effective policies to overcome difficulties and consolidate the anti-Japanese base areas. To lighten the burden on the people, the troops were streamlined and administration was simplified1. The “three thirds system” of political power and the policy of reducing land rents and interest rates were further implemented to arouse the enthusiasm of the peasants and unite people of all social strata in the War of Resistance. In addition, to keep closer relations between the army and the government and between the army and the people, a movement was launched in the army to support the government and cherish the people and a movement was organized among the masses to support the army and give preferential treatment to the families of revolutionary soldiers and martyrs. In the effort to overcome the grave difficulties in material lile and to persevere in the War ot Resistance without unduly increasing the people’s burden, the great production campaign in the anti-Japanese base areas played a decisive role. The general principle of this campaign was to develop the economy and ensure supplies. Bearing in mind that the rural economy was based on individual producers, that the countryside was divided by the enemy politically and that it was in a state of guerrilla warfare, the CPC Central Committee formulated the following policies: On production : first priority should be given to agriculture but animal husbandry, industry, handicrafts, transportation and commerce should also be developed; — On the relationship between the public and private sectors : both public and private interests, both the army and the people, should be taken into account; — On the relationship between the higher and lower economic departments : leadership should be centralized and management decentralized; — On the relationship between production and consumption: the guiding principle should be to work hard in production and practise strict economy in consumption; — On organizing economic development: cooperation and mutual help should be promoted, emulation should be encouraged in production and rewards should be established for “heroes of labour.” Economic self-sufficiency of the army, government organizations and schools was a creation of the production campaign in the anti-Japanese base areas. The idea that the army should be self-supporting appeared to go against the principle of the division of labour and to be a step backward. In essence, however, it was progressive. It enabled the army to relieve the scarcity of basic necessities, to improve its living conditions, to lessen the burden of taxation on the people and still to have sufficient resources to sustain a protracted war. The CPC Central Committee took the lead in carrying out this policy in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region. At the beginning of 1941, it ordered the 359th Brigade of the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army to march into Nanniwan, a region not far from Yan’an, the seat of the CPC Central Committee, that was desolate and uninhabited but endowed with fertile soil. In March, after Zhu De had made a field investigation, Wang Zhen led the 359th Brigade into Nanniwan to reclaim the wasteland and plant grain. Under extremely difficult circumstances, lacking funds and tools for production and relying only on themselves, the officers and men of the brigade dug cave dwellings to live in, surveyed the areas to be reclaimed, learned farming techniques, made tools and opened hapter FOUR THE war of resistance against japan lhe wasteland. At the same time, tens of thousands of people “P hthe Party government, army, schools and other circles in Wa!iid in the production campaign. Mao Zedong, Zhu De, Zhou Enlai, Ren Bishi and other leaders took part in productive 13 This campaign in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region and in the anti-Japanese base areas behind enemy lines was highly successful. The output value of agriculture and industry and the volume of commerce increased rapidly, the tax burden ™ the people was greatly alleviated and the material conditions "^soldiers and civflians were markedly improved. During the three years from 1942 through 1944, more than two mil ion ,nu (over 130,000 hectares) of wasteland were brought unde cultivation in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Regiom By 1945 the majority of peasants in the region had saved out of three years’ harvests enough grain to last them for an additio year. Some had even saved that much out of a Singh e years harvest In 1944 the 359lh Brigade ot the Eighth Route Army, which had done this and had been self-suffictcnt m other basic necessities as well, was declared a model for lhe whole army. In 1941 the “public grain” collected Horn the peasants m the region as a form of taxation made up 13.58 percent of the total yield, but in 1942 the proportion dropped to 11.14 a"d in 1943 to less than 9 percent. From 1943 on, most of the Party and government organizations in all anti-Iapanese base areas behind enemy lines could grow enough grain and veget ablcs to supply their own needs for three or even six momhs_ The tax burden on the people constituted onU about ^ percen of their total revenue. In terms of the standard of living a the time, the cadres had sufficient food and clothing and had been provided mainly by the work of their own hands. The great production campaign was a paean to self-reliance. It supported the hard struggle in the enemy’s rear areas, and at the samT time it served to train numbers of cadres m economic development and give the CPC some experience in this area.

The Democratic Movement in Areas Ruled by the KMT

From 1943 on, the Allies in the anti-fascist war advanced rapidly toward victory. On the European front, following its victory in the battle of Stalingrad, the Soviet army moved on to an all-out counteroffensive, driving deep into the Germanoccupied areas and into Germany itself. The British and American troops landed at Normandy, opening up the second front in Europe. On May 8, 1945, the German fascists surrendered unconditionally. On the Asian and Pacific fronts, the United States launched a frog-hopping attack in the Pacific Ocean, while the Chinese and British troops organized the battle of north Burma and captured the city of Myitkyina. The CPC-led War of Resistance behind enemy lines entered a new stage of development. In 1943 the army and the people in north China, having survived the difficult years 1941 and 1942, were able to launch an offensive against the Japanese army. In 1944 all base areas in north, central and south China opened regional counteroffensives against the Japanese and puppet armies, extending the existing base areas and marching into the enemy’s rear areas to open up new ones in Henan, on the Hunan-Guangdong border and on the Jiangsu-Zhejiang-Anhui border. By the spring of 1945, there were nineteen Communist-led anti-Japanese base areas, covering 950,000 square kilometres and having a population of 95.5 million. The Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and local people’s armed forces had increased to 910,000 and the people’s militia to 2.2 million. Halting the Third Anti-Communist Onslaught While the CPC-led War of Resistance in the enemy’s rear was entering a new phase, the Kuomintang authorities in the main took a wait-and-see attitude, avoiding engagements with the Japanese. On the one hand, they hoped to rely on Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union to win the war; on the other hand, they were still trying to eliminate, or at least weaken, the -hapter four the war of resistance against japan 279 Communist-led revolutionary forces so that they could maintain their autocratic rule after the victory. In the spring of 1943, the KMT launched the third anti-Communist onslaught. In his book China’s Destiny, Chiang Kai-shek preached Chinese fascism and openly opposed Communists and liberals, implying that the Communist Party and all other revolutionary forces would be eradicated within two years. Soon after this, the KMT diehards took advantage of the dissolution of the Communist International in May 1943 to demand that the Chinese Communist Party be disbanded and the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region abolished. They secretly ordered a massive concentration of troops stationed in northwest China under the command of Hu Zongnan to prepare for an attack on the region. To halt this third anti-Communist onslaught by the Kuomintang diehards, the CPC launched a vigorous political counterattack. Liberation Daily, the official newspaper of the CPC Central Committee published in Yan’an, carried articles criticizing China’s Destiny and exposing the KMT diehards’ plan to launch a civil war. On July 4 and 6, 1943, Zhu De telegraphed Hu Zongnan and Chiang Kai-shek respectively to protest Hu’s armed provocation and to appeal for unity. On July 9, 30,000 people in Yan’an held a rally and adopted a statement opposing civil war and calling for unity in the fight against Japan. On July 10, to conceal his plan to attack the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, Hu Zongnan arranged a reception for Zhou Enlai, who was returning from Chongqing to Yan’an via Xi’an. Zhou announced at the reception that he had asked Hu Zongnan personally if he had sent his troops defending the Yellow River west to prepare an attack on the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region. “Deputy Commander Hu told me,” he said, “that he had no intention of attacking the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region and that the troops under his command would take no such action. I was very happy to hear this, and I believe everyone else will be happy, too.”28 Thus Hu’s scheme to attack the region was made known to the public. On July 12 Mao Zedong wrote tor Liberation Daily an editorial entitled “Some Pointed Questions for the Kuomintang,” bringing to light the KMT’s moves to wreck unity and calling on the people of the whole country to prevent a civil war. Eventually, the KMT’s third anti-Communist onslaught was brought to a halt before it could develop into a large-scale armed attack. The Rise of the Patriotic and Democratic Movement in Areas Ruled by the Kuomintang Nevertheless, the KMT did not abandon its one-party dictatorship and, indeed, became even more autocratic. After the outbreak of the Pacific war, Chiang Kai-shek was appointed supreme commander of the ground and air forces of the allied armies in the China theatre (which included Vietnam, Thailand and other countries). General Joseph W. Stilwell was sent by the United States to serve as Chiang’s chief of staff. After his arrival in China, Stilwell realized the role the CPC was playing in the war with Japan and believed that the Kuomintang and the Communist Party should cooperate in the war effort. However, as the anti-fascist forces worldwide were making good progress, the U.S. government began considering what was to be done after the war. In accordance with its overall strategy for the postwar period of contending for world hegemony and in line with its aim of replacing Japan as the dominant imperialist power in China, it adopted new policies towards China. In January 1943 the United States signed a bilateral treaty with the KMT government abrogating U.S. extraterritorial rights in China, so as to indicate U.S. support for the KMT government and enhance the latter’s international standing. From then on, the United States’ China policy gradually changed from favouring cooperation between the KMT and the CPC to supporting Chiang and opposing the Communists. In the autumn of 1944, the U.S. government recalled Stilwell and sent General Albert C. Wedemeyer to take over. Patrick J. Hurley was sent to China as a personal envoy of the President and then was made Ambassador to China. Hurley’s mission was to prevent the KMT government from collapsing and to help Chiang unify the country. After the shift in United States policy, the KMT government, feeling secure with U.S. support, became increasingchapter FOUR the war of resistance against JAPAN 281 nrruot and degenerate and eventually reached a grave crisis ly The corrupt and reactionary nature of the KMT was manifest in politically, Cth°f I&iomintang persisted in one-party dictatorship , -lengthened the secret service and the bao-jia system. The KMT secret agents, ignoring legal procedures, clandestinely ar«fed many Communists, revolutionary young people and patriotic democrats, cruelly torturing them or killing them at wiU. The people were deprived of their rights of free speech, assembly Thi Sication and not even their lives and property were safe. A commentary in the American newspaper Evening and Sunday v"d that the Kuomintang, led by Chiang Kai-shek who arrogated all power to himself and whose position was as high a. that of emperors in the past, was controlled by Chen Lif u and rins brother Chen Guofu, who believed that the thinking of rndtv d uals should be dominated by the state, a view that might well be ^Economically, the four families of Chiang Kai-shek, foreign Minister T V. Soong, Finance Minister H.H Kung and the Chen brothers, which represented bureaucrat-capitalism in China con trolled the country’s main lifelines by takmg advantage of tie privileges granted them. By monopolizing banking and com merce, grabbing land, swallowing up factories and mines con trolling transportation and increasing ahead y-exorbitant tax es they rapidly extended comprador and feudal bureaucrat capitalfsm andmade huge fortunes in the nudst : of nationa calamity. In 1944 the property of T.V. Soong in the United State alone exceeded U.S.S47 million. The expansion of bureaucrat capitalism greatly worsened the situation in the areas ^ under Kuomintang rule, where the economy crumbled, pnces skyrock eted and the people, living in destitution, boiled with resentment But it was in military affairs that the weaknesses of the Kuomintang were even more evident. In the face of attacks launched by the Japanese, the KMT army, whose morale was low almost lost its capacity to fight. Beginning from April 944 in order to open up north-south transportation lines, Japan renewed its strategic attacks on Henan, Hunan, Guangxi and other provinces along the Beiping-Hankou, Guangzhou-Hankou and Hunan-Guangxi railway lines. The Japanese army named these attacks its No. 1 Operation. In these engagements, all but a few of the KMT troops were defeated at the first encounter or fled without a battle. The KMT armies were utterly routed. During April and May 1944 Japanese troops attacking Henan occupied Zhengzhou and Xuchang, opening up the Beiping-Hankou Railway. In June and August those attacking Hunan took Changsha and Hengyang and then went on to attack Guangxi, seizing Guilin and Nanning in November. The Japanese pursued the fleeing KMT troops as far as Dushan County, not far from Guiyang, capital of Guizhou Province. This posed a grave threat to Chongqing in neighbouring Sichuan Province. The KMT authorities then sent the troops it had stationed in Burma and those blockading the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region to reinforce its army in Guizhou. In early December, Dushan was recovered, but the Japanese plan to open up land transportation had been realized. In eight months, the Kuomintang authorities had lost more than 200,000 square kilometres of land and 146 cities in Henan, Hunan, Guangxi, Guangdong and Fujian provinces. Consequently, more than 60 million of their countrymen were subjected to great suffering under the cruel oppression of Japanese imperialism. On October 31, 1944, when the KMT had been utterly defeated on all fronts, some 4,000 men from the 359th Brigade of the Eighth Route Army, with Wang Zhen as commander and Wang Shoudao as political commissar, were organized into a detachment to march south from Yan’an. Their mission was to enter enemy-occupied territory in Henan, Hubei, Hunan and Guangdong and establish new anti-Japanese base areas there. The defeat of the Kuomintang troops in Henan, Hunan and Guangxi, especially when compared to the victories of the Allies elsewhere, exposed the corruption and incompetence of the KMT government and completely discredited it. The defeats at the front also formed a sharp contrast with the situation in the enemy’s rear. People saw what was happening and drew their own conclusions: the Kuomintang ruling clique was unable to win the CHAPTER FOUR THE WAR OF RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN 283 of Resistance Against Japan; it could neither defend China's WHenendence nor promote its economic development^ It was only in Jfsmcle to progress. This disillusionment with the Kuommf was a major reason for the rise of a patriotic and democratic movement in the areas under its control. Tnother reason was that the Communist Party had united with the democratic parties and with unaff.liated patriotic de™°"a« in the Struggle against the Kuomintang. During the period of the lend anticommunist onslaught, the KMT diehards persecuted not only Communists but also non-Commumst patriots Ma Yin chu a well-known economist, was arrested and sent to jail fo rebuking the wealthy families for their control of capital. The KMT authorities also cancelled the membership in the Peoples Political Council of Shen Junru, Zhang Bojun, Shi Liang and other prominent democrats. The contradictions between the middle-of-the-roaders and the Kuomintang ruling clique became increasingly acute. More and more middle-of-the-roaders began to understand the CPC’s policies and to voice their support for the Party. After the Southern Anhui Incident, the high-handed policies of the Kuomintang diehards, instead of estranging t e great number of middle-of-the-roaders from the Communist Party, drew them closer. In the struggle to save the nation, the Cl C fought alongside these people through thick and thin. On March 19, 1941, the China Federation of Democratic Political Groups, whose social base was the middle bourgeoisie and the upper petty bourgeoisie, was founded in Chongqing. Because the KM 1 authorities created various difficulties for the Federation, it was unable to function openly in Chongqing and had to send some o its members to work in Hong Kong, where they received support from the local CPC office affiliated with the Southern Bureau of the Central Committee. On September 18 the Federation started publishing its official newspaper, the Guangming News ?. On October 10 it published a summary of its views on the current situation and a declaration of the establishment ot the Federation. In these articles it maintained that the KMT government should resolutely resist Japan, strengthen unity, put an end to one-party rule, introduce a constitutional system, practise democracy and guarantee the people’s democratic freedoms. The cooperative relationship between the Communist Party and the democratic parties was further strengthened as they struggled side by side. In the first half of 1 944, the struggle for democracy in the areas under Kuomintang control became unprecedentedly dynamic. During January and February of that year Huang Yanpei, a well-known figure in industrial and commercial circles, convened in Chongqing a forum on democratic constitutional government. He advanced ten proposals, including that a provisional constitution be adopted, that the freedom of the people be respected, that politics be renewed, that corrupt practices be abolished and that the people be mobilized and supplied with arms. These proposals evoked a positive response from people of all walks of life. The CPC Central Committee decided to participate in the movement for constitutional government and asked Party members to unite with all democrats so as to defeat the Japanese aggression and establish a democratic state. In May of the same year, the China Federation of Democratic Political Groups published another statement on the current situation, denouncing the Kuomintang for eliminating dissidents and for refusing to carry out democratic reform. In September the Federation was renamed the China Democratic League and admitted many people who had no party affiliations. In the meantime, a group of writers and artists set forth three objectives for their colleagues, namely, to resist Japan, to unite and to advocate democracy. More than fifty writers and other intellectuals, including Zhang Shenfu and Cao Yu, held a meeting demanding freedom of speech and publication. In Guangxi, Liu Yazi, Li Jishen and other enlightened members of the Kuomintang established the Anti- Japanese Association of Cultural Circles in Guilin, calling upon the KMT to mobilize the masses, resist the Japanese and uproot defeatism. A Proposal for the Establishment of a Democratic Coalition Government To persevere in the anti-Japanese war being waged by the entire nation, the CPC Central Committee decided to renew 285 chapter FOUR the WAR OF RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN paotiations with the Kuomintang. Starting on May 4, 1944, Lin rouu the Central Committee’s representative, held several taiks with Zhang Zhizhong and other representatives of the KMT in arld Chongqing. The Communist Party demanded that L Kuomintang acknowledge the democratic rights of the antiJapanese base areas, enlarge the armies led by the CPC, give th neople democracy and freedom and grant the democratic parties fegal status. Owing to the KMT’s unjustifiable obstructions, he talks came to nothing. As the failed talks coincided with the KMT’s crushing military defeat, popular indignation increased. The withdrawal and defeat of the KMT troops, which started in Henan and Hunan provinces, fully revealed the corruption and incompetence of the Kuomintang government. People of all persuasions, including many middle-of-the-roaders * * to increase unity in the fight against Japan, the KMT s one-party dictatorship be abolished and democratic politics introduced^ This was something new. On September 15, 1944, at a meeting of the People’s Political Council, Lin Boqu, following instiuctions from the CPC Central Committee, submitted a formal proposal for the establishment of a democratic coalition government: “We hope that the Kuomintang will immediately end the domination of a single party and that the National Government will call a conference on state affairs, in which representatives of all parties, anti- Japanese armies, local governments and peoples organizations will participate, to discuss the establishment of a coalition government to be formed by all anti-Japanese parties. The new government, by claiming the world’s attention, |nsP^S the people of the whole country and raising the morale of the army at the front, will help strengthen national unity, bring together all talented people and concentrate all the anti-Japanese forces. Thus, in coordination with the counteroffensive to be launched by the Allied armies, we shall be able to defeat the Japanese aggressors.”29 Lin’s speech to the Council was published in full in New China Daily. Afterwards, the CPC submitted in written form the proposal for the establishment of a democratic coalition government. On October 10 in Yanan, Z ou n ai delivered a speech explaining the specific steps and methods tor carrying it out. This proposal produced strong repercussions at home and abroad. The Japanese army was continuing to attack Guangxi from Hunan. The question of uniting the country to check the enemy attack assumed the greatest urgency and was of concern to everyone. During September and October 1944 the democratic movement in the Kuomin tang-controlled areas expanded day by day. More than 500 patriotic democrats from various circles in Chongqing, including Zhang Lan, Shen Junru and Feng Yuxiang, held a meeting calling for democracy and the termination of the KMT’s one-party dictatorship. Dong Biwu also attended the meeting. Seventy-two prominent people, including Soong Ching Ling, Guo Moruo and Zhang Lan, sponsored a memorial meeting for the patriotic journalist Zou Taofen, who, being persecuted by the Kuomintang, had died in exile the previous summer. (According to Zou’s wish, unrealized during his lifetime, the CPC Central Committee admitted him posthumously as a Party member.) Several thousand people from all walks of life attending the meeting unanimously denounced the Kuomintang for trampling on democracy and persecuting patriots and declared their determination to struggle against its fascist regime. More than 2,000 people from five universities including West China Union University and Jinling University and twelve learned societies in the city of Chengdu, Sichuan, held a symposium on state affairs and demanded that the Kuomintang government and its supreme command be reorganized and a democratic coalition government established. On October 10 the China Democratic League published a declaration on the final stage of the anti-Japanese war, demanding the immediate abolition of the one-party system, the establishment of a multiparty coalition regime and the institution of political democracy. Under the influence of the Communist Party, the progressive forces were uniting more closely, and the middle-of-the-roaders were becoming politically active and inclined towards progressive views. The patriotic and democratic movement in the areas under Kuomintang rule was increasingly focused on a definite political objective — the establishment of a coalition government. 287 chapter FOUR the war of resistance AGAINST JAPAN _ , . a flexible approach to negotiations, the CPC also I^TdetermSed struggle agatnst the U.S. policy of sup^rtChiang and opposing the Communists. When Hurley first mE to China the U.S. government tried to prevent the KM T “ ™ent from collapsing. Realizing that the CPC had become fhJ mo” dynamic force in China, while the Kuomintang and the N tS Government were falling apart day by day, it asked Hurley to mediate between the two parties. It also understock that the Communist Party led an army of high combat effective ness and that, since the KMT government was corrupt, if a civil war with the Communists broke out before the Japanese were defeated the Kuomintang would face the danger of dtssolut The United States therefore hoped that Chiang Kai-shek would ahow alittle democracy so as to induce hand over its army to the Kuomintang. It believed that if the CPC did so, when the anti-Japanese war was over cl!iaI18 s dommant position could be stabilized. In the meantime the United States £u,d avoid conflict with the Soviet Union on tlx i China quesUom On November 7, 1944, Hurley flew to Yan an, where he indicated his consent to the CPC’s proposal to abolish the one-party dicta torship of the Kuomintang and to form a democratic coahtion government. After three days of negotiations. Hurley and the CPC leaders drew up a draft agreement between the National Government and the Kuomintang on the one hand and i the Communist Party of China on the other However, the^ agreement was rejected by Chiang Kai-shek, and Hurley himself later aban doned his endorsement of a democratic coahuongovernmentm the various contacts and negotiations between the KMT and he CPC Hurley’s position was that a measure of democracy could be permitted only after the CPC had turned its troops over to the KMT On April 2, 1945, when this political manoeuvring had foiled, Hurley announced that the U.S. government would cooperate only with the KMT, not with the CPC. rmnneine Now that the U.S. policy of supporting Chiang aI,d 0PP°sing the Communists was openly avowed, the reactionary K g ernment became even more arrogant, and the likelihood of civil war ”n China increased. From May 5 to 21, 1945, the Kuomintang held its 6th National Congress. At this congress, the KMT refused to form a democratic coalition government and decided to persist in its dictatorship and prepare for civil war. Neither the machinations of the U.S. imperialists nor the threats and deceit of Chiang Kai-shek could halt the advance of the Chinese people in their drive for independence, democracy and liberation. However, they foreboded another long and bitter struggle to be waged after the victory over Japan.

The Rectification Movement

In the spring of 1942, the Communist Party of China launched a rectification movement throughout the Party. Its purpose was to combat subjectivism in order to rectify the style of study, to combat sectarianism in order to rectify the style in Party relations and to combat Party stereotypes in order to rectify the style of writing. 1 he movement not only added an important page to the annals of the CPC but was also an innovation in the international communist movement. Why did the Party need a rectification movement? Because it had to adapt to the actual situation in which it was leading the Chinese revolution forward. The movement was initiated against a specific historical background. The Communist Party had existed for more than twenty years. During those years, the Chinese revolution had not only won tremendous victories but also suffered grave setbacks; thus, the Party had ample experience of both success and failure. The dogmatist errors made by Wang Ming and his faction had been the most damaging. From the Zunyi Meeting in 1935 to the 6th Plenary Session of the 6th Central Committee of the CPC in 1938, the Party criticized and corrected the “Left” mistakes Wang had made during the later stage of the Agrarian Revolutionary War and the Right-deviationist mistakes he had made in the initial period of the anti-Japanese war. However, the Party had not had time for the entire membership to make a systematic review of its historical experience and, in particular, it had not thoroughly 289 chapter four THE war of resistance against japan nnlvsed the kinds of thinking that were at the root of the “Left” Right mistakes of the past. Accordingly, there were still aHTerences of opinion with regard to the Party’s guiding ideology, and these continued to be damaging to the revolutionary cause at rertain times and places and in certain respects. if a mistake were not truly recognized as such, it would inevitably be repeated in various forms under other conditions. The CPC Central Committee therefore deemed it necessary to conduct a rectification movement within the Party, using the correct stand, viewpoint and method to overcome erroneous ones At the same time, the Party was in the midst ol the most difficult period of the War of Resistance. A rectification movement was also indispensable to achieve ideological and political unity and ensure that the Party acted in unison to win final victory over the Japanese. , _ . ~ In 1938 the 6th Plenary Session of the 6th Central Committee of the CPC helped correct the Party’s ideological line by setting the task of “applying Marxism concretely in China. In May 1941 at a cadres’ meeting in Yan’an, Mao Zedong made a report entitled “Reform Our Study,” in which he said, The twenty years of the Communist Party of China have been twenty years in which the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism has become more and more integrated with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution.”-0 He criticized incisively the “subjectivist style” of some Party members who were unwilling to carry on systematic and thorough investigation and study ot the specific conditions ... and issue orders on no other basis than their scanty knowledge and ‘It must be so because it seems so to me.’”31 He proposed that the Party should reform the method and the system of study. From September 10 to October 22 1941, the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee held an’ enlarged meeting to study the Party’s history and summarize its experience, so that the members could distinguish between right and wrong political lines and achieve unity of understanding. Thus, conditions for a rectification movement were gradually growing ripe. . — . The Party-wide rectification movement was launched in February 1942, when Mao Zedong gave two speeches, “Rectify the Party’s Style of Work” and “Oppose Stereotyped Party Writing.” The Central Committee set up a general study committee under Mao’s direction to provide guidance for the movement. The movement had five stages: understanding the importance of the movement, examining the style of study, examining the Party’s style of work, examining the style of writing and reviewing the Party’s historical experience. This was a Marxist-Leninist educational movement throughout the Party — in other words, a movement in which the Party’s style of work was brought into line with the guiding principles of Marxism-Leninism. The most important task of the rectification was to combat subjectivism. Historically, subjectivism had dominated the Party for quite a long time. The Right and “Left” opportunist mistakes that had been repeatedly made all stemmed from subjectivism, which separated theory from practice and failed to conform subjective thinking to objective reality. The leading cadres who had made such mistakes did not truly understand the reality but tried to find solutions to problems in books, in their subjective wishes or in the experience of other countries. As a result, the Party had been seriously damaged and the Chinese revolution had almost collapsed. Since for a long time the ideological roots of these mistakes had not been recognized, the mistakes had been frequent. After the Zunyi Meeting, however, the CPC Central Committee represented by Mao Zedong, acting firmly but flexibly in accordance with objective reality, formulated and put into practice lines, principles and policies suitable to the actual conditions. It soon enabled the Chinese revolution to enter a new phase. These facts showed that it was a matter of life and death for the Party to correct the subjectivism that dominated its guiding ideology. In his report “Reform Our Study,” Mao Zedong emphasized in particular the importance of “seeking truth from facts.” He explained what this meant: “Facts” are all the things that exist objectively, “truth” means their internal relations, that is, the laws governing them, and “to means to study.... And in order to do that we must rely not ^subTective imagination, not on momentary enthusiasm, not on Hfe ess books, but on facts that exist objectively; we must approbate the material in detail and, guided by the general principles of Marxism-Leninism, draw correct conclusions from it. - In his snebh “Rectify the Party's Style of Work,” Mao called upon all Party members “to learn how to apply the Marxist-Leninist stand viewpoint and method in the serious study of China s history, and of China’s economics, politics, military affairs and culture and to analyse every problem concretely on the basis of detailed material and then draw theoretical conclusions. According to Mao, stereotyped Party writing was an expression of subjectivism. If it was not corrected, no vigorous ^vo'Htionary thinking could be inspired, the spirit of seeking truth from facts could not prevail and subjectivism could still find a place to hide. Therefore, if the Party wanted to root out subjectivism, it must also put an end to stereotyped Party writing. Another major task in the rectification movement was to combat sectarianism. , . , . . To achieve unity in the Party, unity of thinking alone was not enough- it had to be guaranteed by unity of organization. When subjectivist thinking had been dominant in ‘he Party, sectarianism had inevitably been practised organizationally, and dissidents who persisted in proceeding from reality had been attacked. After the Zunyi Meeting, sectarianism was no longer dominant u remnants of it still existed and found expression in both the Party’s internal and external relations. The remnants of inner-Party sectarianism appeared in various forms, such as the “mountain-stronghold” mentality and disunity.34 In his speech “Rectify the Party’s Style of Work, Mao Zedong first criticized the assertion of “independence, because it was most harmful to the revolution: Some comrades, see only the interests of the part and not the whole; they always put undue stress on that part ot the work lor which’ they themselves are responsible and always wish to subordinate the interests of the whole to the interests of their own part.... We should encourage comrades to take the interests ot the whole into account. Every Party member, every branch of work, every statement and every action must proceed from the interests of the whole Party; it is absolutely impermissible to violate this principle. Those who assert this kind of “independence” are usually wedded to the doctrine of “me first”.... Although in words they profess respect for the Party, in practice they put themselves first and the Party second.... Whenever they are put in charge of a branch of work, they assert their “independence.” With this aim, they draw some people in, push others out and resort to boasting, flattery and touting among the comrades, thus importing the vulgar style of the bourgeois political parties into the Communist Party. It is their dishonesty that causes them to come to grief. Mao was unequivocal in his condemnation of sectarianism: “We must build a centralized, unified Party,” he said, “and make a clean sweep of all unprincipled factional struggles. We must combat individualism and sectarianism so as to enable our whole Party to march in step and fight for one common goal.”35 Sectarianism still manifested itself in the Party’s external relations also. Some leading Party members had no respect for non-Party people and refused to cooperate with them, showing a “closed-door” mentality that had emerged during the time when “Left” opportunism was dominant. In his “Speech at the Assembly of Representatives of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region” in 1941, Mao Zedong stressed that the Communist Party should work in the interests not of just one section of society but of all the people. “Chinese society,” he said, “is small at both ends and big in the middle; that is, the proletariat at one end and the landlord class and big bourgeoisie at the other each constitute only a small minority, while the great majority of the people consists of the peasants, the urban petty bourgeoisie and the other intermediate classes.” It was therefore essential, he said, to give consideration to the interests of these classes. Mao held that Party members should pay careful attention to the opinions of nonParty people: “Communists must listen attentively to the views of people outside the Party and let them have their say. If what they say is 293 pour THE war of resistance against japan CHAP* ek H, we ought to welcome it. and we should learn from their rlg ’ ™ints if it is wrong, we should let them finish what they ^ny^and then patiently explain thtngs to them. A Commur must never be opinionated or domineering, or think that he " oT in everything while others are good in nothing, he must ’ ever shut himself up in his little room, or brag and boast and " rd it over others... Affairs of state, are the public affairs of the whole nation and not the private affairs of a single party or group. Hence Communists have the duty to cooperate democratically with non-Party people and have no right to exclude them and monopolize everything. The Communist Party is a POU^'^rty which works in the interests of the nation and people and which has absolutely no private ends to pursue. It should be supervised S the people and must never go against their will. Its member should be among the people and with them and must not set '^iTthTrectification movement, the Central Committee paid great attention to strengthening the Party ideologically, es^aal lv through ideological and political education of the membersAmong others, Chen Yun’s How to Be a Communist Party Mem her and Liu Shaoqi's How to Be a Good Communist were regarded as important documents for study. They did much to heighten the members’ Party spirit. . The policy of the rectification movement was, as Mao put it, to “learn from past mistakes to avoid future ones” and to cure the sickness to save the patient.- This was in sharp contra . to the policy of “ruthless struggle” and “merciless blows pursued by leaders who had made “Left” mistakes.- The rectification began with a serious study of relevant documents, followed by criticism and self-criticism. By examining their own thinking, work past records and the work in their areas or departments, Party members were expected to ascertain under what - circum stances and for what reasons they had made mistakes and what the nature of those mistakes was. Thus they gradua y achiev ed unity of understanding and learned how to correct heir it i stakes. In this process, particular emphasis was laid on self-criticism. ^ In May 1942, the CPC Central Committee held the Yanan Forum on Literature and Art. Speaking at this forum, Mao Zedong declared that the basic function of revolutionary literature and art was to serve the masses and, first of all, the workers, peasants and soldiers. He clarified many hotly debated questions, emphasizing that revolutionary literary and art workers had to understand clearly the problem of class stand and to adopt the correct attitude toward three different groups: the enemy, the Party’s allies in the united front and the masses. After the forum, writers and artists too began to study as part of the rectification movement. In March of 1943, the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee adopted a “Decision on the Readjustment and Simplification of the Central Organs.” Mao Zedong was elected chairman of the Political Bureau and of the Secretariat of the Central Committee. In the rectification movement, the Party’s senior cadres reviewed and summed up the Party’s experience. The Central Committee held many forums to discuss the Party’s history, including forums on the experience of Party organizations in the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi, Hunan-Jiangxi, Hubei-Henan-Anhui and Fujian-Guangdong border regions, and in the northeastern Jiangxi, western Fujian and Chaozhou-Meixian areas. There were also forums on the experience of the Seventh Army of the Red Army and the Fifth Army Group of the Red Army and of Party organizations in north China. All these forums helped the cadres to understand through their own experience which Party lines had been right and which wrong and to deepen their understanding of Marxism. In July 1942 Zhu De wrote: “Our Party has accumulated rich experience in struggle, correctly understood Marxist-Leninist theory and established in practice a Chinese theory of Marxism-Leninism to guide the Chinese revolution.”39 On July 8, 1943, in his article “The Communist Party of China and the Chinese Nation’s Road to Liberation,” published by Liberation Daily, Wang Jiaxiang presented for the first time the concept of “Mao Zedong Thought,” which found wide acceptance in the Party. On April 20, 1945, after a thorough review of the Party’s experience, the 7th Plenary Session of the 6th Central chapter four the war of resistance against japan 295 remittee of the CPC adopted the “Resolution on Certain QuesUnns in the History of Our Party.” The conclusions set forth m resolution helped the entire Party membership, especially Lor cadres, reach a common understanding, on the basis of Marxism-Leninism, of the fundamental questions regarding the Chinese democratic revolution. The resolution stated that if the Party hoped to win greater victories, it must take as its guide Mao Zedong Thought, which integrated Marxism-Leninism with the practice of the Chinese revolution. This meant that the Communist Party of China had truly chosen the correct course o remaining independent and of making the fundamental tenets ot Marxism-Leninism applicable to the situation in China, the resolution laid an ideological foundation lor the convocation o the 7th Party Congress and advanced the cause ol the Chinese revolution. It marked the successful conclusion of the rectification movement. , ,QH Between early September and the beginning of December 1943, when the rectification movement was in its later stage, the crc Central Committee, wishing to analyse the Parly’s experience, called three successive meetings of the Political Bureau to discuss the “Left” mistakes Wang Ming had made during the Agrarian Revolutionary War and the Right mistakes he had made at the beginning of the War of Resistance Against Japan. At these meetings, many comrades criticized Wang’s mistakes and some criticized themselves. Mao Zedong stressed that in examining Wang’s mistakes. Party members should take a historical view, proceed from reality, make self-criticisms and ensure the umty He said they should refrain from employing wrong methods ot struggle that had been used in the past, “learn from past mistakes to avoid future ones” and “cure the sickness to save the patient. Wang Ming pleaded illness and did not attend the meetings. T e Party leaders made painstaking efforts to help him understand his mistakes. Mao Zedong called on him several times and sent people to listen to his views. Zhou Enlai also visited him and had a heart-to-heart talk with him. As a result, Wang Ming admitted his mistakes and wrote to the Central Committee stating that he fully agreed with the judgments expressed in the “Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party.” At Mao’s urging, Wang Ming was again elected to the Central Committee at the 7th Party Congress. For a short time during the rectification movement in Yan’an, a mistaken campaign was conducted. On April 3, 1943, the CPC Central Committee issued a “Decision on Continuing the Rectification Movement,” stating that in the process of rectifying the Party’s style of work, an in-depth investigation should be made into the backgrounds of all Party cadres. In the decision the Central Committee overestimated the number of counterrevolutionaries hiding in the Party. On July 15 Kang Sheng, the deputy director of the General Study Committee and director of the Social Department of the Central Committee, made a report at a cadres’ meeting in Yan’an, entitled “Redeem Those Who Have Made Mistakes.” This report set off a so-called redemption campaign in which confessions were obtained by coercion and then given credence. For ten or fifteen days, a great number of people were falsely accused and unjustly dealt with. This mistake should never have been made in the rectification movement. But since the anti- Japanese base areas were cut off from the outside world, it was difficult to investigate the cadres’ backgrounds and, in fact, no real effort was made to do so. The result was that in eliminating counter-revolutionaries, some leading cadres failed to recognize the real number of counter-revolutionaries hiding in the Party, to proceed from the specific conditions in each unit, to seek truth from facts and to deal differently with different cases. Still, because the Central Committee soon put a stop to the “redemption” campaign, it was only a minor aspect of the rectification movement as a whole. It cannot be cited to negate the tremendous achievements of that movement. Above all, the rectification movement had generated a great debate both inside and outside the Party on some major questions. These included how to apply the principles of Marxism-Leninism by proceeding from reality instead of taking a dogmatic approach; how to relate the fundamental tenets of MarxismLeninism to the realities of the Chinese revolution and how to understand the two-line struggle that had taken place in the Party 297 after four the war of resistance against japan thp early 1930s. This debate had strengthened the positions of Cxism-Lemnism inside and outside the Party. Moreover, he rectification movement had greatly raised the ideological level of [he cadres and enabled the Party to become more mature and to thieve unprecedented unity. It was therefore of profound significance.

The 7th National Party Congress and the Chinese Victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan

As victory in the war with Japan drew near, the Chinese people were presented with a choice between two different offe postwar future, one bright, the other dark. The Communist Party was proposing the establishment of a new China that would be, in the words of Mao Zedong, “independent, free, democratic, united, prosperous and powerf ul.”™ The Chiang Kai-shek clique, on the other hand, was insisting on the perpetuation of the old China - semi-feudal, semi-colonial, ruled by the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie, a China in which the people ! would remain sunk in poverty. Communists would be I«rsei ;utec i and the nation would be split. In view of these ahematives the CPC believed it was its duty to lead the people toward the future that offered hope. The 7th National Congress of the Communist Party of China The 7th National Congress of the Party was held in Yan’an from April 23 to June 11, 1945. Five hundred and forty-seven regular delegates and 208 non-voting delegates attended the congress representing 1.21 million Party members. Seventeen years had passed since the 6th Party Congress in 1928. Accordingly, the 7th Party Congress had both to review the experience of the revolution and to prepare for victory in the war with Japan. Mao Zedong made a political report entitled “On Coalition Government,” Liu Shaoqi made a “Report on the Revision of the Party Constitution,” Zhu De made a military report entitled “The Battlefront in the Liberated Areas,” and Zhou Enlai delivered an important speech entitled “On the United Front.” Ren Bishi, Chen Yun and others also spoke. By the time the 7th Party Congress was convened, the Communist International had been dissolved for two years. For the Chinese Party the congress was an opportunity to put an end to the ideological trend, represented by Wang Ming, of making Marxism-Leninism a dogma and worshiping the Soviet experience and the resolutions of the Comintern. It was also an opportunity for the Party to solve independently the problems of the Chinese revolution in the light of Chinese conditions. The congress’s keynote was unity for victory. Its three major achievements were as follows. 1. The congress reviewed the experience gained over the 24 years during which the democratic revolution, led by the CPC, had been following a tortuous course, and especially the experience of the eight years of the War of Resistance. Then, on the basis of that review, it worked out a strategy for defeating the Japanese aggressors and a programme for building a new China. The congress declared that at a time when victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan was at hand, the task for the Party was to boldly mobilize the masses, expand the people’s forces and lead them to victory over the Japanese aggressors, liberate all the people of China and establish a new China that would be independent, free, democratic, united, prosperous and powerful. The new China could not, and should not, be a country of the old type, ruled by the bourgeoisie. Nevertheless, it could not be made into a socialist country all at once. It should be a country governed by a democratic alliance of all revolutionary classes, based on the united front of the overwhelming majority of the people and under the leadership of the working class — that is, a newdemocratic country. lo build such a country, the congress again called for the abolition of the Kuomintang’s one-party dictatorship and the formation of a democratic coalition government. It also expound299 chapter four the war of resistance against japan ed in detail the political, economic and cultural programmes to be carried out. However, since the policy of the Kuomintang ruling clique was to maintain its dictatorship, betray the country and launch civil war, the congress declared that the Party, while striving for the establishment of a coalition government, should prepare for another eventuality: the outbreak of civil war. If the KMT waged a civil war, the people would respond by waging a revolutionary war to overthrow the reactionary regime and build a new China. 2. The congress criticized certain wrong ideological trends in the Party and enunciated the major elements of the Party’s fine traditions and style of work, enabling all Party members to unify their thinking on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. The proceedings of the congress were highly democratic. In discussing the various reports and speeches, many delegates, speaking their minds freely, analysed the mistakes made by certain Party members in the past, especially the “Left” adventurist mistakes made by Wang Ming and his followers during the Agrarian Revolutionary War. Many delegates, starting from the desire for unity, criticized those who had made mistakes, and most of the persons criticized made self-criticisms as well. By summing up the experience and lessons of the past, the Party strengthened its unity based on the programme adopted at the 7th Congress. The congress noted that most Pary members were working in the countryside and came from families of peasants or petty bourgeois. However, the nature of the Party was not defined by the family background of its members. Rather, it was defined by its political struggle, its inner-Party activities, its ideological education it provided and its ideological and political leadership. The congress defined the Party’s excellent style of work, which had developed over the course of its long struggles, a style of work which, as Mao Zedong put it, “essentially entails integrating theory with practice, forging close links with the masses and practising self-criticism.”41 This was the hallmark distinguishing the Communist Party from other political parties, and it ensured the smooth implementation of the Party’s lines and policies. The Party Constitution adopted at the congress stipulated that the CPC should take as the guide for all its work Mao Zedong Thought, which was the integration of Marxist and Leninist theories with the revolutionary practice of China, and that it should correct any dogmatic or empirical mistakes. The congress stated that Mao Zedong Thought provided a solid theoretical basis on which all Party members could achieve unity in their thinking and in their action. The congress especially emphasized that the mass line was the basic political and organizational line of the Party. Party members must serve the Chinese people heart and soul and oppose any tendencies to enforce unquestioning obedience to authority, be bureaucratic or act like warlords, which would alienate them from the masses. In internal affairs, the Party should adhere to democratic centralism, integrating strict centralism with extensive democracy; by the same token, Party members should integrate a high sense of organization and discipline with individual enthusiasm and initiative. This would guarantee that the Party could carry out its political tasks and take concerted action in its struggle. 3. The congress selected a new Central Committee with Mao Zedong as chairman, enabling the Party to achieve unprecedented unity. Forty-four members and 33 alternates were elected to the Central Committee at the congress. In the election process three principles were followed: — Persons who had gone astray would not be considered ineligible, so long as they recognized their mistakes and were determined to correct them. — Since the revolutionary forces had long been scattered in the countryside, factions had inevitably formed. They should be acknowledged and given proper consideration, while at the same time they should be weakened until they were eradicated. However, outstanding figures from various localities and different fields of work should be elected to the Central Committee. 301 CHAPTER FOUR the WAR OF RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN CH_ Not every member of the Central Committee need be tile but the Committee as a whole should be composed ot «nns having a wide spectrum of knowledge and abilities. Swing these principles, the congress formed a Central „ mmittee of unprecedented prestige and unity, with outstanding members bringing to it a great variety of experience gained in different positions and in different localities. On June 19 at the Kt Plenary Session of the 7th Central Committee of the CPC 13 Central Committee members were elected to the decision-making political Bureau; Mao Zedong, Zhu De, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou En and Ren Bishi were elected to the Secretariat, which was in charge of the day-to-day work of the Central Committee; and Mao Zedong was elected chairman of the Central Committee. The 7th Party Congress was the last one held during the period of the democratic revolution and the most important. It went down in the annals of the CPC as a congress ot victory, a congress of unity. From that time on, the Party, rallying closely around the Central Committee headed by Mao Zedong, threw all its energy into gaining a final victory in the War ot Resistance Against Japan and a nationwide victory m the new-democratic revolution. The Final Victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan After mounting offensive operations against the Japanese troops in the summer of 1945, the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army tightened their encirciement of the places Many scattered Liberated Areas were linked up which enabled the people's armed forces to take the initiative militarily. Gradually, they turned guerrilla warfare into mobile warfare, creating the conditions necessary for a full-scale counteroffensive On July 26 1945, the United States, Britain and China issued the Potsdam Declaration, an ultimatum to Japan to surrender unconditionally. On August 8 the Soviet Union declared war on Japan. The participation of the Soviet army dealt a heavy blow to the Japanese troops entrenched in northeast China, thus hastening the end of the war. At this point the anti-Japanese forces in China entered a period of full-scale counteroffensive. At the time, the main formations of the Kuomintang army were in the western part of the country, while most of the cities, towns, communication lines and the coastal areas occupied by the Japanese troops were in the East, surrounded by base areas under the leadership of the Communist Party. The task of launching a full-scale counteroffensive was therefore carried out mainly by the people’s armed forces in the base areas. On August 9, 1945, Mao Zedong made a statement entitled “The Last Round with the Japanese Invaders.” On orders from the Yan’an headquarters, the people’s armed forces in the anti-Japanese base areas launched a major counteroffensive against both the Japanese and puppet troops. On August 14 the Japanese government sent a note to the governments of the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union and China, expressing acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration. The next day Emperor Hirohito publicly announced Japan’s unconditional surrender. On August 16 the Japanese supreme headquarters ordered its troops to “cease military operations,” but at the same time it ordered them to “carry out military operations in self-defence when they had no alternative.” Thus, although the Japanese troops had officially surrendered, they had not laid down their arms. Consequently, the armed forces under the leadership of the CPC continued their counteroffensive, which had begun on August 11. In the course of these operations, the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and the other people’s armed forces liberated 150 cities and counties. On September 2 the Japanese representatives signed the act of capitulation. The 1.28 million Japanese troops in China surrendered. This brought to an end the War of Resistance Against Japan and also the Second World War. The War of Resistance had been won through bitter fighting and at an extremely high price paid by the people of all nationalities in China. The number of Chinese soldiers and civilians killed and wounded during the war came to more than 21 million, properly losses were estimated at U.S.$60 billion and the expense of the war at U.S.$40 billion. ^TER four THE war of resistance against japan all the wars the Chinese people had fought over more °f hundred years for national liberation from capitalist and tha" IhsUnvaders, this was the first that had ended in complete imperialist mvaaers^ modern history> chlna, which had victory. Tor th® . . distance to armed foreign invasion, i " SSlTulmm, *. A. is®was able to a\engc . hen the Chinese nation This victory j decline It laid the foundation for independence and Uberation, and it greatly inspired :hri“ofPa?f“tionalities in China, enhancing their selfcause China’s resistance to the Japanese invaders gained support both from people all over the world and from the gdincu . anti-fascist war support that was an contributed greaUy to the victory of the anti-fascists in other parts °f DurinTte ' ^Resistance, the Communist Party mobilized y l lhf> rear from all walks of life, mainly peasants, and anefe and puppet troops (including 527,000 Japanese troops) and "he Smettee1: the3 ^“nder the leadership of the Communist Party made great sacrifices in .. „ Ann non casualties. The people in the base areas oeiu were in the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan base area. Th ters and civdians behind enemy lines, persevering in the struggle with the greatest devotion, wiped out large numbers of Japanese troops and brought about a gradual weakening of the enemy’s forces and a strengthening of their own. Eventually, this made it possible to shift to a full-scale counteroffensive against the Japanese aggressors, contributing greatly to the victory. The history of the War of Resistance clearly demonstrated that the Communist Party and the people’s armed forces under its leadership were the staunchest defenders of the nation’s interests, the mainstay of the alliance against Japan and the decisive factor in winning the war. Thanks to the War of Resistance, a great change also took place in the balance of forces between the domestic political factions. This war was the third stage of the new-democratic revolution under the leadership of the Communist Party of China, following the Great Revolution and the Agrarian Revolutionary War. Dur ing this stage the Party, combining resistance to imperialism with the struggle against feudalism, correctly handled the relations between the national struggle and the class struggle, safeguarded the unity of the country and fought on tenaciously to win the War of Resistance and obtain the liberation and independence of the Chinese nation. In the course of the war, the majority of the Chinese people came to have a correct understanding of the Communist Party and to support it vigorously. A large section of the national bourgeoisie and the upper petty bourgeoisie openly changed their views ot the CPC and even became friends of the Party. During the eight years of the war, the Communist Party’s line of resisting Japan on all fronts, although it was implemented only in the democratic anti-Japanese base areas under its leadership and was rejected by the Kuomintang, became a call to the people of China to fight on until victory. Responding to this call, the working class, peasants, urban petty bourgeoisie, national bourgeoisie, the overseas Chinese and part of the landlordcomprador class all joined the anti-Japanese national united front in different ways, turning the War of Resistance into a war of the entire nation against the Japanese invaders. During this war, the Communist Party assumed political leadership. For this reason, when the war came to an end everyone recognized the CommuPTER FOUR THE WAR OF RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN Party and the Kuomintang as the two major political forces^ nist '.vnmkt Partv’s influence on the social and political iitc The CommumstParty^milue^ ^ ^ ^ before the war. 0f In'the war of Resistance. Mao Zedong Thought the megra• ‘ nf Marxism-Leninism with the revolutionary practice ot uon of Marxism the Communist Party gained a Chjna came to ma y,f of china,s democratic better grasp ot . rorrectlv the many complex W civil ».r. »» ».1| understanding of t J cpc managed politically and historical experience in a scient y Adhering to mmm-wm the war and to lay a solid foundation for later development of the Chinese revolution.

The Struggle for Nationwide Victory in the Democratic Revolution

The Postwar Political Situation and the Party’s Struggle for Peace and Democracy

a the democratic partite had mcreased enormously, as had the number of unaffiliated democrats, and they had established close ties with the CPC. In 1945, therefore, the role of the CPC in Chinese society was quite different from what it had been during the early years of the war. During the War of Resistance, the Kuomintang ruling clique persisted in exercising autocratic control, and during the middle and late phases of the war it followed a policy of passive resistance to the Japanese while doggedly fighting the Communist Party. This policy alienated it profoundly from the masses. With the approach of V-J Day, the KMT focused increasingly on the elimination of the CPC and other democratic elements. In May 1945, at the KMT’s 6th National Congress, Chiang Kai-shek announced: “Now our major goal is the elimination of the Communist Party! Japan is our external enemy while the CPC is our internal enemy! It is only with the elimination of the CPC that we shall complete our mission!”1 Immediately after the victory over Japan, the KMT ruling clique made plans to deprive the people of the rights they had just gained and to turn China into the same kind of semi-colonial, semi-feudal society it had been before the war. The Chinese people, of course, would not tolerate this. The U.S. government supported the anti-Communisl policy of the KMT. After World War II the United States relied on its great economic and military might for overseas expansion, attempting to strengthen its dominant position in the world. Control over China was an important component of America’s global strategy. As was stated in a report prepared by the National Security Council, “The basic long-range objective of the United States in China is the furtherance of a stable, representative government over an independent and unified China which is friendly to the United States,... however, the most important objective which it is practicable to pursue in the short run is the prevention of complete communist control of China.”2 In sum, the situation at the end of the War of Resistance Against Japan was as follows: With U.S. support, the KMT government was plotting to monopolize the fruits of victory, but it was doomed to fail for two reasons: politically, the people did chapTER five victory in the democratic revolution 311 nt trust it, and militarily, its vast army had never fully and °ff ectively participated in the war el fort. In contrast, having Endured the hardships of war, the people’s armed forces under the leadership of the Communist Party were able to gather some oi ‘ fruits of victory, although they were still unable to turn that victory into a total triumph for the people. The fate ol China lay with both the CPC and the KMT, and as a direct result of their actions during the war, one party was gaining strength, while the other was beset with crises. How, then, did events unfold after the war? The CPC strove to avoid civil war and to build a new China by peaceful means; it wanted to introduce social and political reforms while strengthening the national economy. Alter eight cruel years of war, the Chinese people were eager for such reforms. If the KMT had been willing to accept a peacelul solution and cooperate with other parties and groups in the process of reconstruction and reform, then despite the complicated struggles which that effort would inevitably have entailed, the CPC would have been willing to compromise, because, after all, that would have benefitted the people. Chiang Kai-shek, however, chose to maintain his policy ol autocracy and civil war. Failing to see his own political weakness, he believed that since his military strength far exceeded that ol the CPC, he could do whatever he liked. On August 11, 1945, immediately after Japan announced its intention to surrender, the Supreme Command of Chiang’s government issued orders to all KMT officers and men in the various war zones “to step up the war effort and, in accordance with existing military plans and orders, to actively push forward without the slightest relaxation. At the same time, a different order was issued to the Eighteenth Group Army (also known as the Eighth Route Army) led by the CPC: “All units of the Eighteenth Group Army should stay where they are, pending further orders” — in other words, they should wait passively for the enemy to attack them. Puppet troops in enemy-occupied areas were ordered to “maintain order and were allowed to be incorporated only into the KMT iorces. Chiang Kai-shek’s next step was going to be to launch civil war in an effort to eliminate the Communist Party and to destroy the Liberated Areas and the people’s armed forces under its leadership. The CPC, however, was no longer what it had been in 1927, when it was unable to withstand adversity. It would not obtain peace and national reconstruction at the expense of the people’s fundamental interests, by allowing China to return to its prewar status. On August 13 the Xinhua News Agency issued a commentary written by Mao Zedong, entitled “Chiang Kai-shek Is Provoking Civil War,” in which he stated point-blank that Chiang’s “orders” were from beginning to end “provocations to civil war.” “Can there be any doubt,” the commentary continued, “that the grave danger of civil war will confront the people of the whole country the moment the War of Resistance is over? We now appeal to all our fellow-countrymen and to the Allied countries to take action, together with the people of the Liberated Areas, resolutely to prevent a civil war in China, which would endanger world peace.”3 On the same day, at a meeting of cadres in Yan’an, Mao Zedong made a speech again warning of civil war: “With regard to Chiang Kai-shek’s plot to launch a civil war, our Party’s policy has been clear and consistent, that is, resolutely to oppose civil war, be against civil war and prevent civil war. In the days to come, we shall continue, with the utmost effort and greatest patience, to lead the people in preventing civil war. Nevertheless, it is necessary to be soberly aware that the danger of civil war is extremely serious because Chiang Kai-shek’s policy is already set.”4 “In short,” he concluded, “we must be prepared. Being prepared, we shall able to deal properly with all kinds of complicated situations.”5 Chiang Kai-shek had misgivings about immediately launching full-scale civil war. After eight years of tenacious resistance and such a costly victory, people across the land were longing to rebuild their country in peace. A civil war would be diametrically opposed to their wishes. Furthermore, at that time, the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union were all opposed to civil war in China. In addition, during the War of Resistance, most of Chiang’s crack troops had retreated to southwest and northwest chapter five victory in the democratic revolution 0 „ ,nd d would be difficult for them to advance swiftly into ciuI? ’ ml east China let alone northeast China. Lastly, since the rPC unequivocally Earned him of the consequences, he dared CPtCmke reckless action. He still needed more time to prepare n°It was under these circumstances that Chiang sent three teleTto Yan’an inviting Mao Zedong to Chongqing to discuss fm^ t ni que tions of the time. Chiang calculated that if Mao Xd to “me, he could accuse the CPC of rejecting peace Xiations and he could then blame the civil war on the Communists. If, on the other hand, Mao did come, he could use the peace negotiations to put the CPC off guard inducing it to handover the people’s armed forces and political power in the Liberated Areas and at the same time gaming the time he needed to deulov his troops for civil war. The Communist Party truly wished to pursue peace, but it was also soberly aware of the situation. The CPC Central Committee believed that no matter what happened, it was necessary to ent into peace negotiations with the KMT for three reasons. First the people desperately wished for peace, democracy and unity alter {he war. If :hcre was the slightest possibility of brmging about progress and development by peaceful means the Party should try to do so. Second, since Chiang Kai-shek could hardly complete his military deployment for civil war within a short period l o time, it was possible for the Party and the People to achieve peace even if only a temporary peace, and that would be usefu I t revolutionary forces, which also needed time to .prepare for any exigencies. Third, the peace negotiations would clearly dem strate to the nation whether the KMT reactionaries truly wanted peace and democracy or were only trying to bring about civil war and totalitarianism under cover of negotiations. This circular, drafted by Mao Zedong, entitled “On Peace Negotiations with the Kuomintang.” It analysed the situation at the time and outlined the Party’s position with regard to the negotiations: “At present the Soviet Union, the United States and Britain all disapprove of civil war in China; at the same time our Party has put forward the three great slogans of peace, democracy and unity and is sending Comrades Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and Wang Ruofei to Chongqing to discuss with Chiang Kai-shek the great issues of unity and national reconstruction; thus it is possible that the civil war plot of the Chinese reactionaries may be frustrated. The Kuomintang has now strengthened its position by recovering Shanghai, Nanjing and other places, reopening sea communications, taking over the arms of the enemy and incorporating the puppet troops into its own forces. Nevertheless, it is riddled with a thousand gaping wounds, torn by innumerable internal contradictions and beset with great difficulties. It is possible that after the negotiations the Kuomintang, under domestic and foreign pressure, may conditionally recognize our Party’s status. Our Party too may conditionally recognize the status of the Kuomintang. This would bring about a new stage of cooperation between the two parties (plus the Democratic League, etc.) and of peaceful development. In that event, our Party should strive to master all methods of legal struggle and intensify its work in the Kuomintang areas in the three main spheres, the cities, the villages and the army (all weak points in our work there). During the negotiations, the Kuomintang is sure to demand that we drastically reduce the size of the Liberated Areas, cut down the strength of the Liberation Army and stop issuing currency. We on our side are prepared to make such concessions as are necessary and as do not damage the fundamental interests of the people. Without such concessions, we cannot explode the Kuomintang’s civil war plot, cannot gain the political initiative, cannot win the sympathy of world public opinion and the middle-of-the-roaders within the country and cannot obtain in exchange legal status for our Party and a state of peace. But there are limits to such concessions; the principle is that they must not damage the fundamental interests of the people. chapter five victory in the democratic revolution «Tf the Kuomintang still wants to launch civil war after our _ r?v haS taken the above steps, it will put itself in the wrong m Par > eS of the whole nation and the whole world, and our Party m be justified in waging a war of self-defence to crush its ntacks Moreover, our Party is powerful, and if anyone attacks us and if the conditions arc favourable for battle, we will certainIv act in self-defence to wipe him out resolutely, thoroughly, wholly and completely (we do not strike rashly but when we do strike, we must win). We must never be cowed by the Muster ^of reictionaries. But we must at all times firmly adhere to, and never forget, these principles: unity, struggle, unity through struggle; to wage struggles with good reason, with advantage an with restraint; and to make use of contradictions win over the many, oppose the few and crush our enemies one by one.

The Peace Negotiations in Chongqing and the Political Consultative Conference

On August 28, 1945, in accordance with the Central Committee’s decision, Mao Zedong flew from Yan’an to Chongqing with Zhou Enlai and Wang Ruofei for peace negotiations with the Kuomintang authorities. They were accompanied by the KM 1 representative Zhang Zhizhong and by U.S. ambassador Patrick J. Hurley. , , , , This event attracted much attention both at home and abroad, enabling many people to see more clearly that the CPC was sincere in seeking a peaceful solution. Mao’s action was widely praised and supported. The poet Liu Yazi wrote a poem extolling it as an act of “overwhelming courage.” Zhang Zhizhong also said that this was a major event in Chinese history. The Achievements of the Peace Negotiations in Chongqing While in Chongqing, Mao Zedong discussed matters of peace nd national reconstruction several times directly with Chiang Kai-shek. Most of the negotiations on specific issues were carried out by CPC representatives Zhou Enlai and Wang Ruofei, and KMT representatives Wang Shijie, Zhang Qun, Zhang Zhizhong and Shao Lizi. Chiang Kai-shek’s plans for this round of negotiations can be seen in a passage from his diary written on August 28 and 29, 1945: “Political and military questions should all be resolved. With regard to political issues, however, we should adopt an extremely generous attitude, while making no concessions in military matters.” Moreover, he wrote, “Government administration and military command should be unified.” These political and military questions were, according to Chiang, “at the heart of the issue.” In fact, however, Chiang was never extremely generous in political matters; he merely made a few empty promises of democracy. What he was actually interested in was “unifying” government administration and military command — in other words, eliminating the Liberated Areas and the people’s armed forces. On this point, Chiang would brook no concessions. The CPC Central Committee realized beforehand what his attitude would be. To force him to fulfil his promises of democracy, to secure the peace and democracy the nation needed and to disprove the rumour that the Communist Party did not want peace and unity, the CPC Central Committee was prepared, as stated in its internal circular, to reduce the size of the Liberated Areas and the people’s armed forces, insofar as such concessions did not harm the fundamental interests of the people. On October 10, 1945, after 43 days of negotiations, the two sides signed a “Summary of Conversations Between the Representatives of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China” (also known as the “October 10th Agreement”). In this summary, the KMT authorities agreed with the “basic policy of peace and national reconstruction”, accepted “long-term cooperation... resolute avoidance of civil war and the building of a new China, independent, free, prosperous and powerful.” They also agreed to bring the KMT’s political tutelage to an end, acknowledged some of the people’s democratic rights and consentJJAPTER FIVE VICTORY IN THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION 3 1 a to “actively carry out local self-government and conduct Lneral elections from the lower level upward.” 8 during the course of negotiations, both sides agreed to convene _ nolitical consultative conference attended by representatives of all parties and noted public figures, to discuss plans for peace and national reconstruction. . . , The Liberated Areas and the army were the major points ol contention. The CPC representatives took the initiative, offering to move troops stationed in base areas in Guangdong, Zhejiang, southern Jiangsu, central and southern Anhui, Hunan, Hu ci and Henan (excluding northern Henan) to the north. At the same time, they also stated that on condition of “an equitable and rational reorganization of the armed forces ol the who e country,” they would be willing to reduce their troops from 1.2 million to 24 divisions or to a minimum of 20 divisions, if this represented one-seventh of the total number of reorganized troops. Despite the willingness of the Communist Party to make such major concessions, these two issues remained outstanding, because the Kuomintang was determined to eliminate the people’s armed forces and the people’s regnpe in the Liberated Areas. . . . ~ The result of the Chongqing negotiations was a victory lor the people’s forces. The day after the signing of the October 10th Agreement, Mao Zedong returned to Yan’an and made the following statement at a meeting of the Political Bureau: “The first positive aspect of the negotiations is that they were conducted in an equal manner. For the first time in history both sides formally signed an agreement. Second, the six agreements already signed are all beneficial to the people.” Through the negotiations, the KMT had accepted the policy of peace and unity. Even though the agreements were mere words on paper, if the KMT once again tried to provoke civil war, it would put itself in the wrong in the eyes of the nation and the world and would lose all political initiative. The agreements, therefore, could still give powerful impetus to the democratic movement in the KMT areas. The KMT Launches a Military Offensive During the Peace Negotiations Even though the KMT authorities were holding peace negotiations with the CPC, their main plan was still to use armed might to eliminate the people’s revolutionary forces. Furthermore, during the negotiations in Chongqing, the KMT authorities secretly reprinted Chiang Kai-shek’s Handbook on the Suppression of Bandits written during his 1933 campaign to “encircle and suppress” the Red Army. The October 10th Agreement was no sooner signed than Chiang secretly ordered his troops to attack the Liberated Areas, calling upon his generals to act according to his instructions in the handbook — that is, urge their officers and men to do their utmost to suppress the “bandits” with all speed. The KMT’s strategy was to take complete control of the region south of the Yangtze River and to capture strategic areas and key communication lines in north China, thereby dividing the Liberated Areas and reducing their size, while opening up a route to northeast China. After this, they would proceed to occupy the whole of northeast China, taking advantage of the provisions of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance.7 During the two months from the time of the Japanese surrender on August 14, 1945, to October 17, 1945, KMT troops occupied thirty cities in the Liberated Areas. While working hard for peace and democracy, the Communist Party entertained no illusions about the Kuomintang authorities. In the inner-Party circular of August 26, the Central Committee had firmly stated: “You must definitely not hope that the Kuomintang will be kind-hearted, because it will never be kindhearted. You must rely on your own strength, on correct guidance of activities, on brotherly unity within the Party and good relations with the people.”8 Only then could the Party’s position be invulnerable, only then could it lay a solid foundation for peace and democracy and for the building of a new China. On September 19, to protect the fruits of the people’s victory in the anti-Japanese war and to expand the people’s revolutionary forces, the CPC Central Committee issued a directive to all its pR jtjvE VICTORY IN THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION cHApTbR Hvj^ /.nils succinctly stating its nationwide military strategy : Exbur . ,0 the North, while taking a defensive position in e C*’°The most important components of this strategy were to S concessions in the South by shortening the line of defence ni’pre- to consolidate north China and the Liberated Areas in east and central China; and to gain control over Rehe and Chahar provinces, while concentrating forces to capture the strategically imnortant areas in northeast China.9 To implement this plan and lead the Party's work mno^east rhina the CPC Central Committee transferred 1 1 0,000 military personnel and 20,000 political cadres there and established its Northeast Bureau, with Peng Zhen as secretary and Chen Yun and others as members. At the same time the KMT, wishing to penetrate deep into north China and open a route to the NorthMst dispatched three units to attack the Liberated Areas in north China One unit attacked eastward along the Bciping-Suiyuan Radway the second attacked northward along the TianjrnPukou Railway, while the third pushed toward Beip‘ng “l0“g Datong-Puzhou, Zhengding-Taiyuan and fieipmg-Hankou rail ways The people’s armed forces resolutely fought back. In the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Liberated Area the pcop^ armed forces, under the command of Liu Bocheng and D "g Xiaoping wiped out 35,000 men of the attacking troops under the command of Yan Xishan in Shangdang, Shanxi Province. This contained the KMT assault on the Liberated Areas and strength Tned the position of the CPC at the Chongqing negotiations, facilitating the signing of the October 10th Agreement. Ip m d to late October, the people’s armed forces m the Liber a tec Areas fought three battles along the Beiping-Suiyuan Railway the Tianjin-Pukou Railway and the Beiping-Hankou Rai^ay^ Handan), annihilating 110,000 attacking tt~ps.By so doing they delayed the KMT’s penetration of north China and slowed its advance toward northeast China. °nMg the Hand^ campaign, the CPC succeeded in winning over th : depu ty ^com mander of the KMT’s 1 1th War Zone and commander o its Ne Eighth Corps, Gao Shuxun, who, on the battlefield, ordered the 10,000 troops under his command to join the people s armcforces. The KMT was so unpopular for having started a civil war after the victory over Japan that even this high-ranking officer broke with it. The event had tremendous repercussions throughout the country. The people’s armed forces, acting on the CPC Central Committee’s directive, recovered territory from the Japanese and puppet troops. At the same time, they fought a war of self-defence against the KM1 troops. By January 1946, the Liberated Areas covered an area of 2,391,000 square kilometres with a population of 149 million, and they included 506 cities. The KMT, hgwever, did not learn from its failures and stop its attacks on the Liberated Areas but continued to move large numbers of troops to the civil war battlefront. By early December 1945, the KMT had thrown against the Liberated Areas a total of 1.9 million men, including 1.2 million regular troops, 350,000 puppet Troops and even 350,000 Japanese troops. Naturally, this aroused the fury of the people, who wanted peace and democracy. On November 19 in Chongqing, Guo Moruo, Shen Junru and others staged a protest against the civil war and established the Anti-Civil War Association of All Circles. On November 25 in Kunming, more than 6,000 university and secondary-school students assembled at Southwest Associated University (formed by Beijing University, Qinghua University and Nankai University, which had all moved there at the beginning of the anti- Japanese war) to discuss current affairs and protest the civil war. Faced with pressure from reactionary soldiers, police and secret agents, 30,000 students in Kunming went on strike. The CPC Working Committee of Yunnan Province led the students in this struggle. On December 1 a large band of armed thugs sent by the KMT attacked the campus of Southwest Associated University and other schools with hand grenades, killing four students and wounding several dozen. This incident, which shook the entire nation, came to be known as the December 1st Massacre. The students of Kunming, supported by teachers and individuals from all walks of life, nevertheless continued their struggle. In Chongqing, Shanghai and other cities, there was an outpouring of support for them in the form of strikes and demonstrations by chapter five victory in the democratic revolution 321 n.dents and other people. The December 1st Movement, based s slogan “Oppose civil war and struggle for democracy! oushed the KMT authorities, who clung to their policy of civil JL, still further into a passive position politically. In September 1945 in Chongqing, as the democratic movement surged forward, intellectuals in the fields of science, technology, culture and education turned what was originally the Democracy ind Science Forum into a formal political organization called the September 3rd Forum. This was the forerunner of the Jiu San (September 3rd) Society. In December of the same year, China Democratic National Construction Association and China Association for Promoting Democracy were founded in Chongqing and Shanghai, respectively. China Democratic League, democratic factions within the KMT and other organizations intensified their activities. They all called for democracy and an end to civil war. The patriotic and democratic movement in the KMT areas was gaining momentum every day. The KMT government dispatched a great number ot ofiicials to all the formerly enemy-occupied areas they could reach, particularly the cities, to resume control there. The people in such areas, having just cast off the yoke of the Japanese invaders, at first welcomed the return of the KMT. But many corrupt officials took advantage of their position to expropriate wealth as “booty. There was severe inflation and social chaos, and the masses lived in dire poverty. The bureaucrat-capitalists waxed fat in the name of the takeover, while the future of national industry became increasingly hopeless. The people lost faith in the KMT. At this time, the U.S. government announced the recall of its ambassador, Patrick Hurley, who had lost his credibility as a mediator by stating publicly that the U.S. would cooperate only with Chiang Kai-shek, and appointed General George Marshall as President Truman’s special envoy to China to “mediate in the civil war. On December 15 General Marshall left for China. On the same day, President Truman made a statement on U.S. policy toward China, expressing support for the convening ol a meeting of representatives of major political parties in China to work out an early solution to the internal strife — a solution that would bring about the unification of the country. But he also stated that the existence of autonomous armies such as the Communist army was inconsistent with political unity and actually made it impossible. Accordingly, once a representative government was established, the autonomous armies and all other armed forces in China should be incorporated into the National Army. On December 27 the Soviet, U.S. and British foreign ministers published an agreement on China they had reached at a meeting in Moscow, stating, “In China unity and democratization must be realized under the leadership of the National Government, democrats must be recruited into all organs of the National Government, and the internal struggle must stop.”10 Marshall’s mission was to persuade the Chinese government to convene a national conference attended by representatives of all major parties in order to “bring about China’s unification,” a plan that deliberately denied the existence of the Communist-led people’s armed forces. At the same time, he was to help the KMT move troops into northeast China and prepare to move others into north China. His main objective was to implement the established policy of helping the KMT expand its authority in China as much as possible. The Political Consultative Conference Under these circumstances, Chiang Kai-shek agreed to hold a political consultative conference as stipulated in the October 10th Agreement. On December 16 Zhou Enlai arrived in Chongqing as the head of the CPC delegation to attend the Political Consultative Conference. To create better conditions for the conference, the CPC delegation first proposed an unconditional cease-fire. After repeated negotiations, on January 5, 1946, it signed an agreement with the KMT authorities on the cessation of hostilities. On January 10 both sides issued orders that from midnight of January 13, their armies should hold their positions and halt all military activity. Thus, for a period of time the fighting truly stopped (except in northeast China), kindling a new hope in the hearts of a people who had suffered through so many years of war 323 CHAPTER five victory in the democratic revolution and chaos — the hope that civil war might be averted. On the same day that the cease-fire order was issued, the political Consultative Conference opened in Chongqing. A total 0f 38 delegates attended, including representatives of the KMT, the CPC, the Democratic League and the Youth Party and individuals without party affiliation. The CPC and the middleof-the-roaders, represented by the Democratic League, had much in common with regard to basic political questions: they all supported peace as opposed to civil war, and democracy as opposed to one-party dictatorship by the KMT. During the conference, the CPC and Democratic League delegations and some other representatives often discussed major issues among themselves so as to reach a consensus and act in concert. The conference, which lasted twenty-two days and ended on January 31, adopted five agreements: on government organization, on a national assembly, on a programme for peace and national reconstruction, on military affairs and on a draft constitution. According to the first of these agreements, the one-party government of the KMT was to be reorganized with a Government Council as the supreme organ. Half of the councilors were to be from other parties. During the transition period between the termination of the KMT’s political tutelage and the formation of a constitutional government, the Council would be responsible for convening a national assembly to draft a constitution. According to the agreement on the draft constitution, a Legislative Yuan would be the highest legislative organ and would be elected by popular vote. An Executive Yuan would be the highest administrative organ and would be responsible to the Legislative Yuan. If the Legislative Yuan collectively lacked confidence in the Executive Yuan, the latter would have either to resign or to request that the President dissolve the Legislative Yuan. This central government structure was equivalent to the parliamentary or cabinet system in Britain and France; It could restrict Chiang Kai-shek’s dictatorial powers. The agreement also stipulated that central and local government should be separate. The province would be the highest unit of local self-government, the provincial governor would be elected by the people, and the province would have a constitution, etc. This provided a potential safeguard for the continued existence of democratic governments in the Liberated Areas. The agreement on military affairs mandated that military power should be separate from political parties, that military authority should be separate from civil authority and that the military system should be reformed in line with a democratic system of government. It provided that a three-man military sub-committee (consisting of CPC representative Zhou Enlai, KMT representative Zhang Zhizhong and U.S. special envoy George Marshall) should reach an agreement on measures for reorganizing the troops of the CPC and that the troops of the KMT should be reorganized according to the plan already worked out by the KMT’s Ministry of War. The various agreements reached at the Political Consultative Conference did not represent new-democracy, but they did help break up Chiang Kai-shek’s dictatorship and promote democracy, and they advanced the cause of peace and national reconstruction. In varying degrees, therefore, they were beneficial to the people and were welcomed by them. These agreements aroused in the hearts of hundreds of millions of the Chinese people the fervent hope for nationwide peace, democracy, unity and unification. Because the agreements embodied many of the opinions of the middle-of-the-roaders, their response was particularly enthusiastic. As a result, for quite a long time in the KMT areas the agreements served as the criterion by which people judged right and wrong: those who upheld the line of the Political Consultative Conference had the support of the people, while those who abrogated it were in clear opposition to them. The CPC was prepared to implement these agreements. When issuing the cease-fire orders, Chairman Mao Zedong had said that a new stage of peace and democracy in China was about to begin and that the entire Party should strive to consolidate domestic peace, carry out democratic reform and build an independent, free, prosperous and powerful new China. The day after the Political Consultative Conference ended, the CPC Central Com325 ^ter five victory in the democratic revolution ■ttee issued an inner-Party directive repeating that the country entering upon a new stage of peace and democracy. _ The principal form of revolution in China, it said, had shifted fro =rmedP struggle to unarmed mass struggle and parliamentary struggle Domestic problems would be solved by political means ,1 of the Party’s work must be adapted to this new situation and the entire Party must work for the realization of agreements reached by the Political Consultative Conference. The CPC, the Central Committee said, was sincerely prepared to realize domestic peace, advance economic development and social and political reform and work for progress and prosperity, in accordance with the wishes of the great majority - provided it could protect ^and preserve the basic rights gamed by the people during the ar Resistance Against Japan. At the same time, it continued, Chiang Kai-shek had accepted the agreement only under P^ure, and Britain the U.S. and the big bourgeoisie in China still had many hidden’sehemes. The road to democracy in China would be long and tortuous, it warned, and people should be prepared for the possibility of war. Because of this possibility, the Central Committee advised that it was important for the people s forces to remain on guard and to defend and expand their positions. The [hree most important tasks for the Liberated Areas it declared, were to train soldiers, reduce rents and increase Pr°du«™\ The KMT represented the interests of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie and was therefore based on a very narrow segment ot society. Consequently, it could not tolerate any democratic informs The Chiang Kai-shek clique believed that neither people s democracy nor Western-style bourgeois democracy could be realized in China. The U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson later mentioned this in his memoirs, noting that “more and more the Kuomintang evinced the conviction that pursuit of a united and democratic China meant that they would lose all.”1' Precisely for this reason, the KMT was never prepared to fulfil the agreements adopted at the Political Consultative Conference. While the conference was still in session, the Anti-Civi Association of All Circles in Chongqing had held a senes ot “ meetings at Cangbai Hall. The KMT had sent secret agents to disrupt the meetings, beat people and prevent the lectures from continuing. As soon as the conference was over, at a meeting of the Standing Committee of the KMT Central Executive Committee, many of the diehards angrily denounced the agreements, complaining that they were not favourable to the KMT and, indeed, represented a failure for the party. Chiang Kai-shek himself said, “I am not satisfied with the draft constitution either, but since the matter has already reached this point, there is no way to turn back. For the time being, we have to adopt it and see what we can do in the future.”12 On February 10, 1946, in Chongqing, KMT secret agents disrupted a public meeting held to celebrate the success of the Political Consultative Conference. In March, at the Second Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Executive Committee of the KMT, Chiang Kai-shek told his followers to take remedial measures with regard to the main points of the agreements. He then intensified the civil war, thereby turning them into mere scraps of paper.

Smashing the Kuomintang's Offensive by a War of Self-Defence

Despite the agreements, the KMT ruling clique still sought to weaken and then destroy the people’s revolutionary forces by military means. In the first half of 1946, a political storm was brewing in China. On the surface, the truce agreement signed in January was being carried out. To maintain the cease-fire, the Executive Headquarters for Military Mediation, consisting of representatives of the KMT, the CPC and the United States, sent mediators wherever military clashes occurred. Although the KMT troops never stopped nibbling away at the Liberated Areas, no large-scale military confrontations occurred except in northeast China. But this was merely the calm before the storm. Chiang Kai-shek was using the lull to prepare for full-scale civil war. 327 chapter five victory in the democratic revolution The Kuomintang Intensifies Preparations for Full-Scale Civil War r, was largely because Chiang could count on the support and distance of the U.S. government that he dared tear up the agreements of the Political Consultative Conference and prepare f° To launch full-scale civil war, Chiang first needed to move his rrick troops swiftly to north and east China to gam control over ch c ksPl4 Shanghai, Nanjing, Beiping and Tianjin. From September 1945 to June 1946, the United States used military ^ “and warships to transport 14 KMT corps 41 divisions and eight regiments of the communications P0'1^ 640 000 men in all, to north, east, northeast and south China. The United States also landed 90,000 marines in China and statlon^ them in Shanghai, Qingdao, Tianjin, Beiping, Qinhuangd. ao i in other places, with’orders to hold those areas unt.l they could^ turned over to the KMT troops. In a short time, the KMT forces took over military equipment from more than one million Jap anese troops and several hundred thousand puppet troops. They a"so!ncor%rated a large number of puppet troops into their own armies greatly increasing their military strength. Having gained control of all the major cities south of the Great Wall, the KMT troops focused theu attack on no^ast Chta^ Union declarldwar onJ^panm August 1 945, JinzhouPPChengde, etc. Other units also advanced into n°rtheast China, recapturing broad areas, except ™ ssstswss ss ss&iss'attack on northeast China. During November they reoccupied Shanhaiguan Jinzhou and other places held by Communist-led forces At the time of the signing of the truce agreement in January 1946, the KMT government had excluded northeast China on the pretext that “sovereignty had not yet been regained there.” In February the U.S. Seventh Fleet used transport vessels to move crack KMT troops (five corps including the New First and Sixth Corps) to Qinhuangdao, from which point the troops advanced to northeast China. In this way, the KMT military presence in the Northeast increased dramatically to 285,000 men. In early March the Soviet army, acting in accordance with the Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty, began to withdraw from the cities and rail lines in northeast China. The KMT army immediately seized Shenyang and advanced against the Liberated Areas from several directions. Beginning on April 18, the main forces of the Communist-led Northeast Democratic Allied Army fought an intense, month-long battle to defend Sipingjie. After annihilating 10,000 enemy troops, they withdrew from the city. In late May, the KMT army captured Changchun and gained control over most of the area south of the Songhua River in Heilongjiang Province. Because the KMT government announced that it would move the capital from Chongqing back to Nanjing in early May, the site of the negotiations between the KMT and the CPC also moved to Nanjing. Zhou Enlai led the CPC delegation to Nanjing and Shanghai, continuing the arduous negotiations and trying hard to avert a full-scale civil war at the last moment. But since Chiang Kai-shek had already committed himself to his course of action, the negotiations were doomed to failure. In the meantime, the U.S. government increased its aid to the KMT. In March 1946 the United States successively organized army and navy advisory teams. On June 17 the two governments signed the Sino-American Lend-Lease Agreement, which transferred U.S.$51.7 million worth of military equipment to the KMT. Secretary of State Acheson later admitted the importance of the U.S. role. In a letter to President Truman on July 30, 1949, he noted: “Indeed during that period, thanks very largely to our aid in transporting, arming and supplying their forces, they extended their control over a large part of North China and Manchuria.”13 These facts shattered the myth of U.S. “mediachapteR FIVE VICTORY IN THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION 329 a°The actions by Chiang and the United States caused the * anxiety among the people, including many democratic Arties and unaffiliated democrats. In mid-June the Federation People’s Organizations of Shanghai formed a delegation to go t Nanking with a petition to the KMT authorities appealing for neace The group included well-known persons from the Associa for Promoting Democracy, the Democratic National Com struction Association and religious circles. On June 23 the CPC Central Committee’s Shanghai Bureau organized more than0°' nOO people from all walks of life to see the petitioners off at the railway station That night, when they arrived at Xiaguan Station n NaniS a group of Thugs dispatched by the KMT authorities surrounded them and beat them in a melee that lasted five hours. Ma Xulun leader of the delegation, and several other representatives were seriously injured. Zhou Enlai hurried to the hospital to express his sympathy and concern. Ma took Zhou s hand an said to him that the hopes of all Chma were pinned on the “"devetopments indicated that the full-scale avU war sought by Chiang Kai-shek was already imminent. Despite the Communist Party’s many efforts to achieve peace, it could not prevent the outbreak of war. While doing its best to uphold the agreements of the Political Consultative Coherence, the Party wL forced to prepare to defend itself. On April 16 Zhou Enlai sent a telegram to the CPC Central Committee warning of the grave danger. “To fool the people,” he wrote, “Chiang superficially seeks to reach a compromise, but he is covertly deploying his trips He is hatching formidable plots.” On May 21 l the Centra Committee issued a document telling all Party members that the Kuomintang was preparing for nationwide civil war. We, for our part^the Central Committee directed, “should increase our own preparations (and especially the training of soldiers) in order to stop him ” Earlier, on May 4, the Central Committee had issued a d ireedve (known as the May 4th Directive) to solve the rural land question 14 This was designed to increase the peasants enthusism for revolution and production and to lay an even stronger foundation for mass support in the impending war of self-defence On June 19, the eve of the outbreak of civil war, the CPc Central Committee issued an inner-Party directive assessing the situation: “Chiang Kai-shek is bent on launching a major attack, which will be hard to prevent. Once he starts, we judge that if, after about six months of fighting, we win a great victory, peace negotiations can certainly be held. If it is a stalemate, peace talks are also possible. If Chiang’s forces win a great victory, there will be no peace talks. Therefore, to win peace our troops must defeat Chiang’s attacking forces.” Subsequently, in a directive issued to the commanders of all military units, the Central Committee stated, “Even though our Party is doing everything in its power to arrive at a compromise, making major concessions at the negotiations in Nanjing, you should harbour no illusions.” Facts show that the CPC took action only when its very existence was at stake and when it could no longer avoid defending itself. Moreover, even after being forced into a war of self-defence, it was prepared to make concessions to stop the war. It was entirely due to the machinations of the KMT ruling clique that civil war broke out in China after the victory over Japan, and the KMT should therefore bear full responsibility for it. Full-scale Civil War Breaks Out As soon as they had completed their preparations for war, the KMT authorities revealed their true nature — their contempt for the truce agreement and for the agreements of the Political Consultative Conference — by launching a full-scale attack on the Liberated Areas. On June 26, 1946, two hundred and twenty thousand KMT troops began the assault by besieging the Central Plains Liberated Area in the border region between Hubei and Henan provinces. On the night of the same day, the main forces of the Central Plains Command, led by Commander Li Xiannian and Political Commissar Zheng Weisan and divided into two columns, broke through the enemy siege. Then the KMT forces mounted major offensives against the Liberated Areas of east CHAPTER FIVE victory in the democratic REVOLUTION 331 rhina Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan, Shanxi-Suiyuan, the Northeast and Hainan Island. These attacks marked the outbreak of full-scale civil war. . • On July 11 KMT secret agents in Kunming assassinated Li Gongpu, a member of the Central Committee of the Democratic League and an activist famous for his participation in the Patriotic National Salvation Movement on the eve of the outbreak of the war with Japan. On July 15 Wen Yiduo, a poet and scholar who was a professor at Southwest Associated University, was assassinated in the same city. At the end ol the anti- Japanese war, outraged by the lawless acts of the KMT, Wen had taken an active part in the democratic movement. It was obvious that the KMT reactionaries were aiming their guns not only at the Communists but also at all people of good will who called for peace and democracy. As the KMT government overestimated its own strength, it was confident of the outcome of the war and hoped to win a quick victory. For the assault on the Liberated Areas it had assembled 193 brigades (divisions), or 1.6 million of its regular troops, representing 80 percent of its total strength of 248 brigades (divisions), numbering two million. The KMT’s principal strategy was to follow the trunk rail lines, attack from south to north and seize and control the cities and lines of communication of the Liberated Areas, wiping out the main elements of the people’s armed forces or forcing them north of the Yellow River, where they could then be rounded up and annihilated. Chiang Kai-shek claimed that in view of the KMT’s superior military strength, with proper cooperation and flexible tactics the war could be brought to a speedy conclusion. His chief of staff, Chen Cheng, estimated that the Communist-led people’s armed forces could be wiped out in three to five months at most. The situation of the people’s revolutionary lorces at the beginning of the war was truly grim. In terms of military and economic strength, the KMT was clearly superior. At the time, the people’s armed forces consisted of 1.27 million men equipped basically with weapons captured from Japanese and puppet foot soldiers. They had only a few pieces of artillery. The Liberated Areas covered a region measuring approximately 2.3 million square kilometres, populated by 136 million people. Feudal forces within these areas had not yet been eliminated, and the rear areas were not yet consolidated. Moreover, the Liberated Areas were geographically separated from each other by KMT forces and were therefore unable to obtain material assistance from outside. With such a wide disparity between its own strength and that of the enemy, the first question the Communist Party was forced to answer was whether it dared to fight a revolutionary war against the counter-revolutionaries. As we have seen, one major reason that the KMT dared to launch a full-scale civil war was the support that it received from the U.S. government. At that time, the United States seemed invincible, combining great economic strength with its monopoly of the secret of the atomic bomb. The Chinese reactionaries invoked the power of their backer to intimidate others. At the beginning of the war, some middle-of-the-roaders were misled by the outward strength of the reactionaries and overcome by pessimism and fear. Some people even went so far as to advocate that soldiers and civilians in the Liberated Areas, faced with attack, should compromise and make concessions. Internationally, the U.S. was escalating the “cold war.” At the time a clamour was raised that the United States and the USSR were bound to fight, and many people believed that World War III was imminent. The Soviet leaders took a pessimistic view of the situation: they believed that if civil war broke out in China, the United States and the Soviet Union might be drawn into the conflict. China would then be the battlefield in a world war, and the Chinese nation would risk extermination. For this reason, they proposed that the CPC ought to join with Chiang Kai-shek’s government and disband its own army. Despite all this, the CPC remained calm and was determined to fight back. After the outbreak of the civil war, all of the Communist-led people’s armed forces were compelled to fight in self-defence. The Party believed that Chiang’s offensive not only must but could be defeated. Could the Chinese civil war lead to a world war? To answer 333 CHAPTER five victory in the democratic revolution thjs question, in April 1946 Mao Zedong wrote an i essay “Some Points in Appraisal of the Present International Situation^ He declared that while there was a danger of world war, the demoStic forces of the people of the world were torging ahead and S they must and fould avert that danger. The United States Britain and France and the Soviet Union would arrive at a compromise sooner or later. But, he added, “such compromise doesPnot require the people in the countries ot the capitalist world to follow suit and make compromises at home, lhe people in those countries will continue to wage different struggles in accordance with their different conditions.”15 In August of the same vear, not long after the civil war broke out, when talking with the American correspondent Anna Louise Strong, Mao Zedong put forward his famous thesis, “All reactionaries are paper tigers “In appearance ” he said, “the reactionaries are terrifying but in reality they are not so powerful. From a long-term point of view it is not the reactionaries but the people who arc really powerful.”16 Mao’s views greatly strengthened the confidence and resolve of the entire Party membership, the army and the peop c, convincing them that the Chinese reactionaries could be defeated. But, what would it take to repulse the KMT s military attack. This was another question the CPC had to answer. The Centra] Committee enunciated this fundamental principle- “In order to smash Chiang Kai-shek’s offensive we must cooperate closely with the masses of the people and win over all who can be won over.”1’ The people’s armed forces were m an inferior position both in numbers and in equipment. If they were to defeat Chiang, they had to rely on the people and fight a people’s war; there was no other alternative. This was the key to victory. For this purpose, the Party had to solve the rural lan problem, rely on the poor peasants and farm labourers and unite with the middle peasants, while distinguishing the ordinary rich peasants and middle and small landlords from the -traitors bdd gentry and local tyrants. It had to consolidate the Liberated Areas and obtain unending human and material resources to support the war. In the cities, the Party should rely on the working class, the petty bourgeoisie and all progressives and take care to unite with the middle-of-the-roaders and isolate the reactionaries. Among the KMT troops, it should win over all the possible opponents of civil war and isolate the bellicose elements. In short, the Party’s political principle was to mobilize the masses, unite with all the forces that could be united with and build the broadest possible people’s democratic united front. The Party’s military strategy was based on the principle of concentrating a superior force to destroy the enemy forces one by one. Hence, the tactic of dispersing forces for guerrilla warfare, which had been the one chiefly used in the anti-Japanese war, was for the most part supplanted by the tactic of concentrating forces for mobile warfare. And to implement a strategy of active defence, rather than trying to hold or seize a specific city or place, the CPC made elimination of enemy effectives its main objective. During the period from June 1946 to June 1947, the people’s armed forces were in a stage of strategic defensive, fighting mainly in the Liberated Areas. During the first eight months of this period, they repelled a general KMT attack on all fronts; during the last four months, when the KMT troops launched concentrated attacks on key sectors, they repelled those as well. At the beginning of the war the KMT, relying on its superiority in numbers and equipment, mounted fierce assaults on the Liberated Areas in an attempt to wipe out the people’s armed forces with one blow. The CPC Central Committee, however, had always been prepared for two eventualities. While it had been striving for peace, it had also been preparing to deal with any surprise attack by the KMT. When the KMT troops advanced en masse, the people’s troops in the Liberated Areas fought back steadily, concentrating superior forces and trying to annihilate the enemy in mobile warfare. Not long after breaking the siege on the Central Plains, the Central China Field Army, under the command of Su Yu, won seven successive victories in central Jiangsu Province, wiping out six enemy brigades and five battalions of the enemy’s communications police corps, totalling more than 50,000 men. Victories were also reported from the area north of the Huaihe River, from the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Liberated Area, from the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Liberated Area 335 ER HVE VICTORY IN THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION _ the Northeast These victories dulled the edge of the and from the Northeas . first experjence m armed forces recaptured 48 wiping out cQuld use m mc'tonnmes fttaduaUy decreased, their morale sank andrteir the peoples tioops recaP TJlc ^^T was weakening, beblocking further '““effectives had been destroyed and because prison duty ur the occupied areas abandoned by the people’s^anned forces .In h d t - « "wwie the KMT was attacking the Liberated Are^ militarily, U T alTyihe ZhouEnlai and tions with the KMT. 1 he , d the civji war but continr ^ t ' t me"1 Marshall ^and^the newly appointed US ambassador to China, Leighton Stuart M ^ declaring that the d^th“a T “mfdiatmn” had already difficult to resolve and that ^ headed by Zh0u failed. On September 30 regard to the breakttSBSPO&gBzZSi CPC’s Liberated Areas, to push relations between the KMT and the CPC to the final breaking point.”18 The letter contained a stern warning: “We have received special orders which state that if the government does not immediately cease its military operations against Zhangjiakou and the surrounding areas, the CPC will have no alternative but to view such actions as the government’s public declaration of complete failure of the negotiations and its final rejection of a political solution. Full responsibility for all the grave consequences arising therefrom will, of course, be borne by the government.” On October 1 1 the KMT army, without heeding the repeated CPC warnings, launched an assault on Zhangjiakou and occupied it. The KMT authorities let this victory cloud their judgment and immediately abrogated the Political Consultative Conference agreement on the National Assembly. That agreement provided that the National Assembly should be convened not by the one-party government of the KMT but by a reorganized coalition government of all parties. Yet on the very afternoon of the capture of Zhangjiakou, the KMT formally announced that it was going to convene the Assembly. In this way, even more people came to see that it was the KMT that rejected peace and democracy, while the CPC, left with no other choice, had been forced into a war of self-defence. Thus, the sympathy of the people was with the Communist Party. The KMT asked all organizations that had attended the Political Consultative Conference to hand in lists of the representatives they would send to the National Assembly. The CPC flatly refused to do so, and the Democratic League did likewise. The KMT-dominated National Assembly opened in Nanjing in midNovember 1946 (apart from the KMT members, it was attended only by a few politicians from the Youth Party and the Democratic Socialist Party). It adopted the so-called Constitution of the Republic of China, designed to support the dictatorial regime of Chiang Kai-shek. On November 19 Zhou Enlai concluded his attempts to negotiate peace, which had lasted more than twelve months, and returned to Yan’an. In January 1947 General Marshall issued a statement of his intention to leave China and then chapter FIVE VICTORY IN the DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION C turned to the United States. On January 29 the U.S govern1 nt announced the withdrawal of its representatives front the Executive Headquarters for Military Mediation On February2 the KMT authorities forced the CPC representatives to the Exe hnve Headquarters for Military Mediation, including Ye JianCXrto return to Yan’an. Next they ordered the CPC representI fves stationed in Nanjing, Shanghai and Chongqing mdudmg Dong Biwu, Wu Yuzhang and their colleagues, to leave those cities bv March 5. New China Daily, published in Chongoing wls orderfd to shut down. At this point, the KMT blocked all possible avenues to peace and broke off all relations wi c CPh,' March 1947 the KMT troops began to suffer repeated setbacks in their full-scale offensive and had to shift the focus their attacks to key sectors in the Liberated Areas. In the ShanxiHebei-Shandong-Henan and Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei aret* andrn northeast China, they were forced to go on lhe defensive T KMT concentrated its main strength on wiping out the peop e s armed forces in the Northern Shaanxi and Shandong Liberated Areas before turning to others. The people’s armed forces continued to follow their strategy of active defence^ In Shandong Province in late February, the East China Held Army under tghe command of Chen Yi and Su Yu, aunched a surprise attack in the Laiwu area. It wiped out over 56,000 men of the KMT’s 2nd Pacification Zone, who had been advancing south under deputy commander Li Xianzhou. This dealt a crushing blow to the enemy troops, and made it possible i^h iVearly East China Field Army to focus on fighting in the South. In ear y March the commander-in-chief of the KMT grounc 1 forces Gu Zhutong, ordered 60 brigades, approximately 450,000 men, to advance8 steadily in close formation, ‘inching a new a^ ck^on the Shandong front. Acting on orders ol the CPC Central rary Commission, the East China Field Army lured the enemy m deep carefully biding its time and keeping its mam contingen in reserve Then in mid-May it finally seized the initiative and nut out of action 32,000 of the KMT’s American-equipped crack troops, ihe Reorganized 74th Division, at the battle of Menglianggu. This smashed the KMT’s attack on key sectors in the Shandong Liberated Area. Jn northern Shaanxi, the KMT launched a sudden assault on Yan’an, seat of the CPC Central Committee and General Headquarters of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Two hundred and fifty thousand troops, under the command of Hu Zongnan and others, engaged the 20,000 CPC troops. Although outnumbered ten to one, for six days of round-the-clock combat the Communist troops held back the KMT forces south of Yan’an covering the withdrawal of the CPC central officials and other residents. On March 19 they abandoned Yan’an, beginning a period of bitter fighting in northern Shaanxi. The KMT generals were overjoyed at the capture of Yan’an, but they soon realized that their happiness was premature. After withdrawing from Yan’an, the CPC Central Committee decided to send to north China a working committee consisting o( several of its members, including Liu Shaoqi and Zhu De from the Secretariat, to carry out certain tasks on its behalf. The majority of the Secretariat, including Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and Ren Bishi, remained in northern Shaanxi. From there they led the simple but efficient organs of the Central Committee and the PLA General Headquarters, directing military operations on all fronts nationwide. Ye Jianying and Yang Shangkun took charge ot the Central Committee’s Rear Area Commission and moved to northwestern Shanxi to manage the work in the rear. Taking advantage of the favourable conditions in northern Shaanxi, including a good mass base, mountainous terrain and plenty of room for manoeuvre, the PLA’s Northwest Field Army Group, later called the Northwest Field Army, used the tactic that Mao Zedong described as “wearing the enemy down to complete exhaustion and then wiping him out.”19 Acting according to this principle, the Northwest Field Army, led by Peng Dehuai, dealt the attacking enemy forces heavy blows. Within 45 days after abandoning Yan’an, the army won three battles fought at Qinghuabian, Yangmahe and Panlongzhen, wiping out more than 20,000 enemy troops. They then turned to fight in northwestern Shaanxi and at Shajiadian completely wiped out the ^PTER FIVE victory in the democratic revolution 339 headquarters staff of the Reorganized 36th Division H^dquarh ‘ and its two brigades under Hu Zongnan. By August the KMT «ault on key sectors of northern Shaanxi had been smashed. During the period from March to June 1947, while in the nrocess of defending themselves against KM 1 attacks on key sectors PLA units began a partial counterattack in the Northeast, Rehe eastern Hebei, northern Henan and southern Shanxi. Although 95 cities in the Liberated Areas remained under enemy occupation, the people’s armed forces managed to recapture or liberate 153 cities and to annihilate over 400,000 enemy troops. Within the one year period from July 1946 through June 1947, the People’s armed forces wiped out 97 and a half regular brigades, or 780,000 men, as well as 340,000 puppet troops, peace preservation corps and others — altogether, 1.12 million of tie enemy. At the same time, its own ranks swelled to 1.9 million men. In view of these circumstances, the people’s armed forces were able to complete the phase ot strategic defence as they entered the second year of the War ot Liberation.

The Opening of the Second Front

At this time the Kuomintang ruling clique was growing increasingly corrupt, increasingly divorced trom the people, io carry on the civil war, it relied heavily on the U.S. imperialists and sold out the rights and interests of the nation. U.S. soldiers stationed in China behaved like a domineering army of occupation. The KMT bureaucrat-capitalists waxed fat on the wealth they stole from the people. A great many industrial and commercial enterprises of the national bourgeoisie shut down, the rural economy stagnated and prices skyrocketed. The areas under KMT control sank into economic crisis. Huge numbers of people struggled on the brink of starvation. People of all political persuasions (including the middle-of-the-roaders) gradually came to realize that in this war the central issue was not which party, me KMT or the CPC, would win, but whether China would finally become independent, unified, free and prosperous, as generations of Chinese had longed for it to be. While the army and people of the Liberated Areas were achieving great victories in their war of self-defence, the people of the KMT areas launched a momentous patriotic and democratic movement. With the students in the van, this movement against the reactionary KMT government gradually crystallized into a second front in the people’s War of Liberation. The Movement to Protest U.S. Atrocities This movement stemmed from the U.S. policy of supporting Chiang in the civil war and opposing the Communist Party. In exchange for U.S. aid, the KMT authorities signed the Sino-U.S. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, one of a number of agreements and treaties, both open and secret, which surrendered the nation’s sovereignty under humiliating conditions. Taking advantage of special trading privileges, American manufacturers flooded China’s markets with their products, quickly gaining a monopoly. For example, 80 percent of the goods on the shelves of the department stores in Shanghai were made in the United States. U.S. investment accounted for 80 percent of the total foreign capital in China. These percentages were the result not of normal international investment and fair economic exchange but of the unequal treaties signed by the KMT government at the expense of national sovereignty. These circumstances were a mortal blow to the already precarious Chinese national bourgeoisie. Areas controlled by the KMT after the War of Resistance Against Japan had essentially become American colonies. With the connivance of the KMT government, U.S. military personnel in China had been made subject to U.S. rather than Chinese law, and the soldiers stationed in China ran rampant. According to incomplete statistics, between August 1945 and November 1946, they committed at least 3,800 violent acts in the five cities of Shanghai, Nanjing, Beiping, Tianjin and Qingdao, killing or wounding more than 3,300 Chinese. Such crimes could not but fire the indignation of the Chinese people, who had long FIVE VICTORY IN THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION uert their fill of imperialist oppression. TT . . SinThese events showed many Chinese that while the United Thef ? been an ally during World War II, its postwar policy S?l62orting Chiang and opposing the Communist Party was a ot supp . • sufferings When American soldiers gang n,aJdaChLcse univershy swdent in the Dongdan Playing Field S Beiping on December 24, 1946, the incident triggered a mass December 30 more than five thousand students from . University Qinghua University and other universities mlle^es in Bering held a demonstration to protest the crimes thce ^3tut0nPt — S;«pience .of this Ancient city under KMT rule but also caused a nattonwrde suree of anti-American sentiment. . __ On December 31 the CPC Central Co^mi^^SSa^sautgTng live to its underground organizations in the KMT arf^’ “®lng them to mobilize the masses in big ciues in response to the sWdent movement in Be, ping. It asked the orgamzamns brnkUhe broadest base of support” for this movement, take brave action and “lead the movement forward so as to isolate the U K and Chime” Evtr^rTtteZT; “m°onestrikeeSAsmany alloOdJOO participated nationwide. Many professors, scholars and well-known cultural figures in Beiping Shanghai and other cities denounced the outrages perpe trated by U S soldiers as an insult to the Chinese people, esc ng he student movement as a struggle for mdividua and natiom al dignity. The Shanghai chapter of the Democratic National Construction Association, the Shanghai Association of IndustraJists and Merchants for Progress and the Chongqing Chamber of Commerce, among others, issued statements in support of the students’ patriotic actions and demanded the withdrawal of U S troops.^ The student movement developed into a broad-based people’s movement, a united front against the U.S. and Chiane Kai-shek. ' 6 The anti-atrocity movement demonstrated that the Chinese nation would tolerate no humiliation. It helped the people understand the underlying connections between American interference in China’s affairs and Chiang Kai-shek’s autocratic regime and policy of civil war. It also advanced the patriotic democratic movement. In December 1946, to strengthen its leadership of the people’s movement in the KMT areas, the CPC Central Committee made Zhou EnJai director of its Urban Work Department. Under the Party’s unified leadership, the movement made great advances. The Movement Against Hunger and Civil War in the KMT areas China’s bureaucrat capital, combined with U.S. monopoly capital, controlled the economic lifeline of the nation. In 1947 it made up two-thirds of China’s total investment m industry and 80 percent of its fixed assets in industry and transportation. The bureaucrat-capitalists took advantage of all sorts of political privileges to bleed the labouring people white and mercilessly annex capital of the national bourgeoisie, thus creating a severe recession in the national economy. As the civil war continued, the KMT government’s military expenses soared to 80 percent of its total expenditures. To make up for the huge deficit this caused, the government printed money at an appalling rate. At the end of the War of Resistance Against Japan, the annual rate of currency issue was 1.5 trillion yuan. By the end of 1947, it had reached 40 trillion. Drastic inflation drove consumer prices skyward. An Associated Press report from Shanghai on July 24, 1947, depicted this fact vividly: “In 1940> 100 yuan bought a pig; in 1943, a chicken; in 1945, a fish; in 1946, an egg; and in 1947, one-third of a box of matches.” cHAPTER five victory in THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION 343 This vicious inflation was actually a widespread form of plunder of the masses. Under these circumstances, national industry and commerce gradually went bankrupt and were on the verge of total collapse. From October 1946 to February 1947, as many as 27,000 factories and shops closed in 20 cities including Shanghai, Wuhan and Guangzhou. Total industrial output fell by more than 30 percent of its prewar ( 1936) level. The number of unemployed increased sharply. The vast majority of workers, city dwellers and even members of the middle and lower petty bourgeoisie were brought to the brink of disaster. The rural economy also went into a sharp recession. In 1946 agricultural production sank 8 to 12 percent below its 1936 level, and in 1947 it sank a further 33 to 40 percent. Starving people became a common sight in many villages, and bodies of the starved lined the roads. Government employees, teachers and students were also in desperate straits. By July 1947 prices had soared to 60,000 times their prewar levels, and the cost of living had increased by a factor of 6,000 to 7,000. Those who lived on fixed salaries or school subsidies could not afford adequate food and struggled on the edge of starvation. On February 28, 1947, the CPC Central Committee issued a directive on work in the KMT areas. On the foundation of the struggle for survival, the Central Committee said, the Party should try to build a broad front against the betrayal of the nation, civil war, dictatorial rule and the terror practised by secret agents. Thus, it gave the right orientation to the people’s movement. In May the patriotic students initiated a movement on an even larger scale than the one launched the previous December against U.S. soldiers’ atrocities. This time the targets were hunger and civil war. On the 15th in Nanjing, the capital of the KMT government, students from Central University and other schools marched to the KMT Executive Yuan and Ministry of Education to present petitions. On the 18th students from Beijing University and Qinghua University took to the streets and called on the people to oppose hunger and civil war. The KMT government issued an order forbidding groups of more than ten to gather to lodge petitions and banning all protest marches and all strikes, including strikes by students. Chiang Kai-shek issued a warning, stating that “drastic action” would be taken against the students. But they did not give in. On May 20 in Nanjing more than 5,000 students broke through a blockade of military police and marched through the streets carrying a banner that read “Demonstration of Students from sixteen Universities and Colleges in Nanjing, Shanghai, Suzhou and Hangzhou Against the Crisis in Education.” As they marched, they shouted the slogans “Oppose hunger!” and “Oppose civil war!” On the same day, in Beiping, more .than 7,000 students took to the streets carrying a banner that read, “Demonstration of Students from Beiping and North China Against Hunger and Civil War.” Patriotic students in Tianjin, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Chongqing, Fuzhou, Guilin, Jinan, Changsha, Kunming and other cities joined the struggle with strikes and marches. Many professors and secondary school teachers sympathized with their movement. The Shanghai Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, its Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Bureau and underground Party organizations in Nanjing, Beiping and other cities organized and led these struggles, which became known as the May 20th Movement. The May 20th Movement served to unmask and isolate the KMT reactionaries politically. Not long before this, in April 1947, the KMT government had already used the ruse of government reorganization to draw members of the Democratic Socialist Party and the Youth Party into its cabinet, calling itself a “liberal, multiparty” government. The KMT-controlled People’s Political Council was scheduled to open on May 20 in Nanjing. The students’ large protest march on that day was therefore a major political blow to the KMT government. The KMT authorities in Nanjing sent troops and policemen to suppress the students, and more than 150 students were wounded or arrested. But the repressive action of the reactionary government failed to achieve its intended result; it only served to spread throughout the country the student movement against hunger and civil war. In the KMT areas, other aspects of the people’s movement also intensified rapidly. FIVE VICTORY IN THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION M5 CHApTER . . A tr uniarv 78 1947 the people in Taiwan rose in armea °"Fe“t £ despotic ruTe of the Kuomimang. People of ^^nationality and of the native Gaoshan nationality fought thC u ", shoulder paralyzing the reactionary government m Sh™t of the province. The KMT sent a large detachment of troops the mainland, who landed at the port city of Jilong. In the Woody suppression of this rebellion more than 30,000 people were kl During 1947 about 3.2 million workers went on strike in more twenty cities in the KMT areas. In September Shanghai workers went on strike to protest the authorities use of force to take over three democratic trade umons. The workers fought th roons and police who had been sent to suppress them. In the rural areas, the peasants rebelled against press-ganging an ,he requTsition of grain and taxes. By January 1947 rebellions had occurred in more than 300 counties. Between May and June 1947, the grain riots had spread to more than 40 cities, including Naniins Shanghai, Beiping, Wuxi and Wuhu. There were new developments in the revolutionary movemen in minoriTy-nationality areas as well. In April 1946 the people o Inner Mongolia held a conference to unify the movement autonomy in the region and decided on a policy t of F sti ruggle i for equality, autonomy and national liberation. In Apri 1947 they convened the Conference of Peoples Representatives of Inn Mongolia, at which a provisional people’s political council wa elected. The council in turn elected the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Government with Ulanhu, a Mongol and member of the ?_nLt Party, as chairman. On May 1 the Inner Mongoh Autonomous Region was formally founded. The revolutmnary movement in northern Xinjiang, whic egan 1 • tu:s in Hi, Tacheng and Altay, also continued to expand during thi 56 A^Mao Zedong pointed out in a commentary written for the Xinhua News Agency on May 30, 1947’*e^e had turn against the Chiang Kai-shek government. On both the military and political fronts,” he wrote, “it has met defeats, is now begged by the forces it has declared to be its enemies and can find no way of escape.” “The march of events in China,” he added, “is faster than people expected.... The Chinese people should quickly prepare all the necessary conditions for the establishment of a peaceful, democratic and independent new China.” By the end of the first year of fighting, the situation in the civil war had changed dramatically. By July 1947 the Kuomintang’s total military strength had already fallen from 4.3 million men to 3.73 million, its regular troops having dropped from two million to 1.5 million. Because its battle lines were overextended and most of its troops were needed for garrison duty, the number of men available for combat was greatly reduced. As a result of successive defeats, it had lost large numbers of men, and morale continued to sink: the mood among the officers and men was defeatist and war-weary. Moreover, the people in the KMT areas rose up in struggle, making the KMT army’s rear insecure. In contrast, the People’s Liberation Army had grown from 1.27 million men to 1.95 million, with the number of regular troops approaching one million. Furthermore, having captured a large quantity of materiel from the enemy, they were now better equipped. Because the PLA did not need to divide its troops to defend supply lines or cities, the number of men available for combat duty had also increased greatly. Lastly, as most of the Liberated Areas were undergoing agrarian reform, the peasant masses had greater enthusiasm for revolution and production, and the PLA’s rear area was therefore secure. On July 4, 1947, in an attempt to get out of his predicament, Chiang Kai-shek issued the “General Mobilization Bill.” This was a desperate attempt to extend the war to the Liberated Areas, so as to wear them down and make it difficult for the PLA to sustain the war. riTin. five victory in the democratic revolution CHAPTtK Advancing Towards the Central Plains A, this time the KMT forces still enjoyed superiority in mhers and, in particular, in equipment. The PLA still faced a a Tficult situation. Nevertheless, the CPC Central Committee d fhe an unexpected policy decision: it would immediately shift m a country-wide offensive, without waiting for the enemy is strategic offensive to be completely defeated and for ““PLA Ifn numerical superiority. It formulated the basic task for the fecond year of the War of Liberation in these terms: “To launch a countrywide counter-offensive, that is, to use our main forces to fight our way to exterior lines, carry the war into re Kuomintang areas, wipe out large numbers of the enemy on the exterior lines and completely wreck the Kuommtangs counter-revolutionary strategy, which is, on the contrary, to c So carry the war into the Liberated Areas, further damage and drain our manpower and material resources and make it imnossible for us to hold out very long. The CPC Central Committee chose the Dabie Mountains of the Central Plains as the main target of their assault, because this region, bordering on three provinces (Hubei, Henan and l Antal was strategically located between Nanjing, the KMT capital an the important city of Wuhan on the middle reaches oi the Yan^e River. Relying on the Yellow River as a natura bamer the KMT had concentrated its troops on the eastern flank in Shandong province and the western flank in northern Shaanxi, deploying only a small number ot troops to defend the central region. Furthermore, the Dabie Mountains had been i an . ol revolutionary base area, and mass support was . 'da“vnd^“° ^ which would make it easy for the Peop es Liberation Army to gam a firm foothold there. Once the PLA took the Dabie Moun tains, it would constitute a threat to Nanjing to the east, Wuha to the west and the Yangtze River to the south. It would therefore be in a position to force Chiang Kai-shek to recall the troops he had sent to attack Shandong and northern Shaanxi so they could intend with the PLA for control of this strategic region. Although it would be most difficult for the PLA to capture Ahe region, success would immediately brmg about a dramatic change in the course of the war, carrying the fighting away from the Liberated Areas into the KMT areas. The CPC Central Committee further decided that in advancing towards the Dabie Mountains, the PLA should refrain from consolidating each city it captured, as it had done during the Northern Expedition in 1926 and 1927. Instead, it should advance by leaps, penetrating swiftly and deeply into enemy territory and abandoning any attempt to build solid rear areas. It should first occupy vast rural territory, then build up revolutionary base areas and finally take the cities. To carry out this strategic plan, the CPC Central Committee coordinated the movements of three armies and deployed troops to tie down the enemy on the flanks. That is, the main force of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army, led by Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping, was to launch an assault along the central route, heading directly for the Dabie Mountains. The main force of the East China Field Army, led by Chen Yi and Su Yu, was to take the eastern route, pushing into the area between Jiangsu, Shandong, Henan and Anhui. Part of the Shanxi-HebeiShandong-Henan Field Army, led by Chen Geng and Xie Fuzhi, was to take the western route, advancing into western Henan. The three armies were to annihilate the enemy forces through coordinated mobile operations. For the containing action on the flanks, the Northwest Field Army was to attack Yulin to draw the enemy troops that were attacking northern Shaanxi up north, and the Shandong Army of the East China Field Army was to start an offensive in eastern Shandong, driving the enemy troops toward the sea. The 500-kilometre drive on the Dabie Mountains was a unique attack. Mao Zedong predicted the serious difficulties involved in this strategy. He pointed out that in fighting towards the exterior lines, there were three possible outcomes. Having paid the price to conquer a given territory, the PLA might 1) be unable to hold its ground and be forced back; 2) be unable to completely hold its ground and be forced to engage in guerrilla warfare on the periphery; or 3) hold its ground. He urged the commanders to prepare for the worst and strive for the best. On the night of June 30, 1947, Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiao349 chapter five victory in the democratic revolution ■ o led 120 000 troops in a surprise manoeuvre, crossing the P^ural barrier of the Yellow River and thus raising the curtain n lhe pLA’s strategic offensive. In 28 days of continuous fight•' jn southwestern Shandong, the PLA troops annihilated 56,000 nf the enemy, opening a route to the south. Then they began their heroic 500-kilometre march south, fighting all the way against hundreds of thousands of KMT troops who intercepted and nursued them. They crossed 15 kilometres of marshes inundated by the Yellow River, waded the Shahe River and fought their way across the Ruhe and Huaihe rivers. In late August, after more than twenty days of exhausting marches and heavy combat, they reached the Dabie Mountains. The advance of Liu and Deng’s army forced the KMT to move its main forces back as reinforcements, quickly increasing the troops surrounding the Dabie Mountains to more than 30 bn gades, totalling 200,000 men. Liu and Deng’s men were worn out from continuous marching and fighting. Also, they had never fought in the south before. After arriving in a new area, they needed time to establish political power and to mobilize the masses, and they were short of food, clothing and ammunition. In view of these circumstances, Liu and Deng deployed one part of their forces in the northern foothills of the mountains and moved the remainder to western Anhui and eastern Hubei. With firm support from the masses, the troops fought tenaciously, repulsing repeated attacks by the KMT troops on key sectors. By November they had annihilated over 30,000 enemy troops and set up democratic governments in 33 counties. These were the preliminary successes in the Dabie Mountains. In late August, while Liu and Deng’s troops were on their 500kilometre trek to the Dabie Mountains, a detachment of 80,000 men from the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army, led by Chen Geng and Xie Fuzhi, crossed the Yellow River into western Henan. By late November they had wiped out 50,000 enemy troops and established democratic governments in 39 counties, fulfilling their strategic mission in the Henan-Shaanxi border area. In September the East China Field Army, led by Chen Yi and Su Yu, crossed the Longhai Railway and marched south into the Henan-Anhui- Jiangsu plains to fight on exterior lines. By late November they too had carried out their strategic mission. At this point, the three armies had fought their way to the exterior lines. They had advanced together in a triangle formation sweeping through the vast area bounded by the Yellow River to the north, the Yangtze to the south, the Hanshui River to the west and the sea to the east. Supporting each other like the three legs of an ancient bronze vessel, the three armies pressed forward and approached the KMT’s line of defence along the Yangtze, posing a direct threat to Nanjing and Wuhan. This action pushed the battlefront south from the Yellow River to the north bank of the Yangtze, transforming the Central Plains once an important rear area from which the KMT troops had launched attacks on the Liberated Areas — into a base from which the PL A troops would advance to nationwide victory. Not long after, a spokesman for the General Headquarters of the PLA said that as the three armies moved south they had “manipulated and drawn towards themselves some 90 out of the 160-odd brigades which Chiang Kai-shek had on the southern front, forced his armies into a passive position, played a decisive strategic role and won the acclaim of the people all over the country.”22 Other PLA units were still fighting on the interior lines. These included the Northwest Field Army led by Peng Dehuai, the Shandong Army of the East China Field Army led by Tan Zhenlin and Xu Shiyou, the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Field Army led by Nie Rongzhen and the Taiyue Army of the Shanxi-HebeiShandong-Henan Field Army led by Xu Xiangqian. They intensified their military operations and gradually went over to a counteroffensive. During the summer of 1947, the Northeast Democratic United Army launched a strategic counteroffensive, completely changing the military situation in northeast China. Conducting offensive operations on every front, the PLA had, in fact, switched to a strategic offensive nationwide. This was an event of historic significance. Mao Zedong said at the time: “This is a turning point in history. It is the turning point from growth to extinction for Chiang Kai-shek’s twenty-year counterrevolutionary rule. It is the turning point from growth to extinc351 HAPTER f,ve victory in thh DEMOCRAT1C revolution „ for imperialist rule in China, now over a hundred years old This is a momentous event ... and, having occurred, tt will certainly culminate in victory throughout the country. Reform of the Land System As the PLA went over to the strategic offensive, the new situation demanded an intensive land reform movement throughout the Liberated Areas. Such a movement was necessary to arouse the peasants’ enthusiasm for revolution and production and to win their support, which was vital to successful operation. in the War of Liberation. In 1946 the CPC Central Committee issued the May 4th Directive ,” which marked the CPC’s change from a policy of reducing rent and interest to a policy of confiscating the land of the landlords and distributing it among the peasants. During the period from May 1946 to June 1947, the land question was essentially resolved in two-thirds of the Liberated Areas A total of 600,000 peasants had enlisted in the PLA and ano er million were doing support work at the front lines. Ho'*'ever> reform had not yet reached one-third of the Liberated Areas, and in some places it had not been carried out thoroughly. Fr °m July to September 1947, to facilitate further advances m land reform the Working Committee of the CPC Central Committee held the National Land Conference under the chairmanship of Liu Shaoqi at Xibaipo Village in Pingshan County Hebei Province^ On October 10 the Outline Land Law of China formulated by the conference was approved and promulgated by the Central Com mittcc The Outline Land Law of China presented a thoroughly revolutionary programme. First, it stipulated, “The land system of feudal and semi-feudal exploitation is to be abolished and the system of land to the tillers put into effect. This was a pubhc demonstration of the Party’s commitment to overthrowing the feudal system of land ownership. Second, the Law stipulated, “All the land of the landlords and the public land in the villages is to be taken over by the local peasant associations and, together with all other land there, is to be equally distributed among the entire rural population, regardless of sex or age.” The method to be used was to take from those who had a surplus of land and give to those who had a shortage and to take from those who had better land and give to those who had worse. In general, these provisions served to meet the need of the peasants — especially the poor peasants and farm labourers — for land. They also helped avoid the mistake made in the past of allotting no land to landlords and only poor land to rich peasants. However, equal redistribution of all land tended to encroach upon the interests of the middle peasants. This method was therefore changed when land reform was conducted in the newly-liberated areas and in all other parts of the country. Third, the Law stipulated that peasants’ congresses and their elected committees were to be the lawful bodies responsible for carrying out the land reform. It also provided for the establishment of people’s courts to ensure implementation of the policies and decrees relating to land reform and to maintain revolutionary public order. Thus, while the peasants were mobilized to overthrow the landlords and acquire land themselves, the government promulgated laws and decrees to support them in their struggle, guaranteeing the complete success of the movement. As the War of Liberation progressed, under the guidance of the Outline Land Law hundreds of millions of peasants oppressed under the feudal system participated in a great democratic revolution. However, while the National Land Conference made an enormous contribution, it overestimated the deficiencies in the land reform in the Liberated Areas and overstated the problems within the Party. It did not adopt specific policies to prevent the reform from encroaching upon the interests of the middle peasants and to protect national industry and commerce, and it stressed only the need to guard against Right tendencies, without mentioning the danger of “Left” tendencies. This was one of the reasons why during the land reform and the related Party consolidation, serious “Left” errors were made in many areas. After the National Land Conference, leading Party and govter FIVE victory in the democratic revolution SuTTh. p»». -T; poor P“sany^fthae° land and punish those who were local was soon berng carried out enthus.asttwere encroached upon, or . , odiers were barred from sified as rich peasants participating in decision ma ^ deviation also harmed tax was imposed on ^ them. exaim3le the industrial and national industry and comme landlords were confiscated, and commercial enterprises run y distinction was the taxes levied on enterprises ^^^^between big, made between the landl^rd b t en dcspotic and non-despotic middle and small landlords, 01 ^ - in the landlords. All these people were denounced ^ ^ ^ same way. Some landlor s , nhces they were beaten left with no means sle ^PCCemral Committee found out about ST steps situation and gradually put the reform uc on vast area represented The land reform conducted across history. It uproota social transformation unpara e China, liberated the ed the feudal system from the ^rtd to cruel oppression and peasants who had so long political and economic shackles, their political consciousness and organizational level reached unprecedented heights. In response to the Party’s call, “Join the army to protect your land!” ablebodied peasants swarmed into the people’s armed forces. Peasants everywhere sent grain, bedding and clothes to the front. Moreover, they organized themselves into transport teams, stretcher teams, railway and road sabotage teams and other military support units. Many established or strengthened people’s militia units, which cooperated with the PL A in the defence of the Liberated Areas. The people’s armed forces thus found an inexhaustible source of manpower and material assistance, enough to win the War of Liberation. It was precisely as Mao Zedong had said: “The whole Party must understand that thoroughgoing reform of the land system is a basic task of the Chinese revolution in its present stage. If we can solve the land problem universally and completely, we shall have obtained the most fundamental condition for the defeat of all our enemies.”

The Party’s Programme to Overthrow Chiang Kai-shek and Liberate All China

After the War of Liberation entered the stage of strategic offensive, the General Headquarters of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army issued a manifesto containing the resounding slogan, “Overthrow Chiang Kai-shek and liberate all China!” The pace of historical progress sometimes exceeds human expectations. As Zhou Enlai put it in the autumn of 1947, “For a time after the Japanese surrender, the Party hoped to establish a new China through peaceful means, though without any relaxation of armed self-defence.”25 However, Chiang Kai-shek tried every means possible to frustrate the efforts for peace of the Communist Party and the Chinese people and imposed on the people the unprecedented calamity of nationwide civil war. After the outbreak of that war, the Party, while responding with armed ^PTER F1VE VICTORY IN THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION if defence still did everything in its power to salvage peace Chiang Kai-shek, for his part, ceaselessly expanded the war, at fhe same time convening the bogus National Assembly that Wonted a so-called Constitution and forcing the CPC represent Lves to leave the KMT areas, thus closing the door to peace negotiations. In July 1947 the KMT government issued an Order for General Mobilization to Suppress the Insurrection of the Communist Bandits.” This order indicated in legal form its final and complete break with the Chinese people. By issuing it, Chiang Kai-shek lifted a rock only to drop it on his own feeti He left t Chinese people with only one alternative: to unite and overthrow him In the second half of 1947, the military situation changed greatly to his disadvantage. As Zhou Enlai explained: We have shown the people with facts that we are strong enough to overthrow him, and the people don’t want him anyway. Even e in the upper social strata (except for a few reactionary cliques) and the middle class are getting tired of the loadandwantto overthrow him. Thus, it is opportune to raise the slogan. Over throw Chiang Kai-shek!’”26 Formulating a Programme of Action for the New Period In December 1947 the CPC Central Committee held a meeting at Yangjiagou, Mizhi County, northern Shaanxi, to draw up a specific plan for overthrowing Chiang Kai-shek and liberating all China. At this meeting Mao Zedong presented a report outlining a political, military and economic programme fol Heh began by declaring, “The Chinese people’s revolutionary war has now reached a turning point.”27 This was a victory bought at enormous cost, a victory won after iongyears of struggleby the Chinese people under the leadership of the Communist Party ““'reiterated the main points of the PLAN Manifesto of October 1947, which listed eight basic policies of the army, lhe ^“Unite workers, peasants, soldiers, intellectuals and businessmen, all oppressed classes, all people’s organizations, democratic parties, minority nationalities, overseas Chinese and other patriots; form a national united front; overthrow the dictatorial Chiang Kai-shek government; and establish a democratic coalition government.”28 This, he said, was the fundamental political programme of the CPC. Practice had demonstrated that without the broadest possible united front, consisting of the overwhelming majority of the population, it would be impossible to bring the Chinese revolution to victory. And without firm leadership by the Party, it would be impossible for any revolutionary united front to consolidate and expand. From the military point of view, Mao analysed the methods that the PLA had been using and that would enable it to carry the War of Liberation to a victorious conclusion. He highlighted ten principles of operation, all of which centred around the basic principle of concentrating a superior force in every engagement so as to destroy the enemy forces one by one. He emphasized the need for the PLA to suit its methods of operation to the new situation, now that it had shifted to the strategic offensive. For example, one of the principles was: “Strive to wipe out the enemy through mobile warfare. At the same time, pay attention to the tactics of positional attack and capture enemy fortified points and cities.” Another, designed to leave the enemy no time to breathe, was: “Give full play to our style of fighting — courage in battle, no fear of sacrifice, no fear of fatigue, and continuous fighting.”29 The army, Mao said, should replenish its strength with all the arms and most of the personnel captured from the enemy, making the front its main source of manpower and materiel. (This was particularly important for main forces fighting far from their bases or without a rear area to fall back on.) Military leaders in world history have seldom made such an open statement of their strategy and tactics while fighting was still going on. But Mao pointed out that because the PLA’s strategy and tactics were based on a people’s war, no army opposed to the people could either adopt them or counter them. With nationwide victory in sight, the CPC also felt it necessary to proclaim a basic economic programme for the new China. pjvE VICTORY IN THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION CHAPTLK r,v Accordingly, in his report Mao set forth the CPC’s plans in this ^Confiscate the land of the feudal class and turn it over to the ™-asants. Confiscate monopoly capital, headed by Chiang Kai diek T v Soong, H.H. Kung and Chen Lifu, and turn it over to he new-democratic state. Protect the industry and commerce of 1 national bourgeoisie. These are the three major economic oolicies of the new-democratic revolution. The principles SL1iding the new-democratic national economy,” he added, must closely conform to the general objective of developing production promoting economic prosperity, giving consideration to both nubiic and private interests and benefiting both labour and capital. Any principle, policy or measure that deviates from this general objective is wrong.”31 , „ . , Mao emphasized that to ensure achievement of the Party s political, military and economic objectives, the Party must firs consolidate its ranks by solving the problem of ‘ impurities in the class composition and style of work of its local organizations, especially those at the primary level in the countryside. Only when these “impurities” were removed, he said, could the Party and the broadest masses of working people all march in the same direction and could the Party lead the masses forward. Mao concluded his report with these forceful words: Ihe dawn is ahead, we must exert ourselves. A decision adopted at the CPC Central Committees meeting in December 1947 stated that Mao Zedong’s report was a programmatic document in the political, military and economic fields for the entire period of the overthrow of the reactionaiy Chiang Kai-shek ruling clique and of the founding of a newdemocratic China.”33 Formulating New Policies and Tactics for the New Situation During the period following its December meeting, the CPC Central Committee concentrated on developing concrete policies and tactics appropriate to the new situation. There were three reasons for this. First, as the PLA progressed triumphantly, new areas were liberated, including many cities, and these presented the Party with unfamiliar circumstances and tasks of which it had no experience. Second, the Party and army consisted mainly of peasants and petty bourgeois. Some of them were inclined to approach urban work from the perspective of small producers or to apply their methods of rural work empirically to the urban work. Without guidance from the Party, such tendencies could become destructive. Third, historical experience had shown that in periods when the Party had broken with the KMT, “Left” deviations were likely to occur, and that when successes were scored in revolution, some people were prone to become arrogant and imprudent, which likewise led to “Left” deviations. According to Mao Zedong, in spite of the fact that the line, basic principles and policies of the GPC Central Committee were correct, in practical application “Left” deviations had occurred “to a greater or lesser extent in all the Liberated Areas and in some cases had developed into serious adventurist tendencies.”34 In rural work, such deviations consisted in encroaching on the interests of the middle peasants, neglecting the tactical importance of narrowing the scope of attack in land reform in the new Liberated Areas (that is, neglecting to neutralize the rich peasants and small landlords) and lacking the patience to work step by step. In urban work, “Left” deviations manifested themselves in encroachment on the interests of the industry and commerce of the national bourgeoisie, one-sided stress in the labour movement on the immediate interests of the workers to the neglect of production and construction in the cities, and destruction of production facilities there. As for relations between the Party and the masses, “Left” deviation was seen in the sweeping slogan, “Do everything as the masses want it done,” which rejected the Party’s leadership role and encouraged the tendency to let the Party “tail after” the people. In view of these problems, Mao Zedong strictly admonished the Party: “All comrades in the Party should understand that the enemy is now completely isolated. But his isolation is not tantamount to our victory. If we make mistakes in policy, we shall still be unable chapter five victory in the democratic revolution 359 ‘0 - *£• S withreganL to any outlie SS fees^ on'the war, Party consolidation, land reform indusUy and and, t3CtiCSt iaier inner Party encu comrades at all levels must ■=»“ “ land reform, Mao Zedong drafted “^^fproblems of kSsksSSS framework of the Prlf C P id^le and smalllandlords, as well as were not. ^"uninate ^en ral Committee also reissued two Agrarian Revolutionary War (1927 37 ). emit Qn Some jSraS! for Land " These provided guidelines for local organizations in dealing with such Problems. was very much in the sp analysed the causes of the been made during Und ^ forward principles and methods to conec classes should be ated the criteria according to ^^t^rtanS of rmly uniting j J need to adopt a policy to protect intellectuals and to win over as many of them as possible so they might serve a people’s republic. He also stressed the need to avoid adopting any adventurist policies towards industry and commerce. He declared that the CPC was strongly against indiscriminate beating and killing and the torturing of criminals. The CPC Central Committee distributed copies of this speech to Party organizations at all levels and published it in the Party’s newspapers. It proved very helpful in putting the land reform and other mass movements back on the right track. With Mao Zedong’s approval, the “Report on Some of the Problems in Land Reform” by the secretary of the Northwest Bureau, Xi Zhongxun, and the “Report on Problems in Work in the New Areas” by the secretary of the Central Plains Bureau, Deng Xiaoping, were also distributed to Party organizations everywhere. Thanks to the Party membership’s hard work, by the spring of 1948 the “Left” mistakes in land reform had for the most part been rectified, and the land reform movement had returned to its proper course. Because the peasants in most villages in the new Liberated Areas were not yet organized and public order was still unstable, the conditions there were not yet ripe for reform of the land system. Accordingly, the CPC Central Committee decided that in those villages the methods developed during the War of Resistance Against Japan could be used. This meant that in the beginning the policy would be to reduce rent and interest, to readjust the distribution of seed and grain and to institute a rational distribution of the grain-tax burden. This would provide the peasants with material benefits and shift a larger percentage of the tax burden to the landlords and rich peasants. Only when the necessary conditions were present for enforcing the Land Law would land reform be introduced. The reform would be conducted in two stages. During the first stage, efforts would be made to bring the rich peasants to a neutral stand and struggle would be directed exclusively against the landlords. During the second stage, land would be equally distributed, including the surplus land previously rented out by the rich peasants. These methods were applied in the new Liberation Areas, where they served not VICTORY IN THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION 361 ChaPTEK FIVE otiefv the needs of the peasants but also to reduce the '"mberof persons subjected to political attack, rapidly stabilizn miblic order and stimulating production. ingw h he successive liberation of a series of large and medium• ^cities the CPC was confronted with many new problems. a th.t its nolicv had been construction, not destruction. No ZS22B3SSL .now- „ «*■•»« entering their style of extravagant y_ y A1) individuals and organizations, other tharfthe^governrnent authorities (including the public se ^hy bureau)8 had been prohibited from making arrests or confiscating property. recaptured from the Sisli'HSSH “fevery of the organs of Kuo mintang rule', arrest only the chief reactionaries and do not invoive too mny personSf defining bureaucrat™ " «»-» »» 7 bI ... d„ » ^t'o^'ntnnftra^do 'noUighUy^ advance slogans of ra^1nnftteCTCrc" Co0mmiUee°approved and issued “The Northeast Bureau’s Directive on Protecting Newly Recaptured Cities,” which emphasized that when dealing with urban matters it was necessary to abandon practices- suited to guerrilla warfare or to villages. Instead, newly recaptured cities should be governed in the short term by a system of military control. In December the Central Committee approved and distributed Chen Yun’s report on the takeover of Shenyang in Liaoning Province. The experience in Shenyang helped solve the two most difficult problems: how to ensure complete control over a city and how to quickly restore public order. Chen Yun enumerated the specific methods to be used as follows: “a) different aspects of the work should be assigned to different divisions; b) in each enterprise or government department the military control commission should start from the top; c) the original staff of each unit should be left unchanged; and d) the commission should take over all units before placing each under the administration of the appropriate division.”38 These methods, Chen Yun said, had been used successfully in Shenyang and had served to ensure a quick takeover, so as to allow no lime for sabotage and to avoid confusion and social unrest. At the same time, he considered it imperative to solve the key political and economic problems in order to set people’s minds at rest — restoring electricity, stabilizing currency and prices, disarming enemy police, using the media to publicize government policies and calm the public, issuing wages, and so on. He added, “To ensure success in taking over a city, it is most important that the troops be well disciplined.”39 It was necessary to enforce social reform measures systematically, only when conditions were ripe. Because the Party adopted a series of correct policies, public order in the newly-liberated cities was stabilized quickly, production resumed and increased and the Party established good relations wiih the city dwellers of various social strata. These newly-liberated cities contributed greatly to the war effort and to the economic prosperity of the Liberated Areas. To ensure rigorous application of the Party’s line, principles CJ^PTFJ* FIVE VICTORY IN THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION 363 , noiicies for all fields of work, Mao Zedong repeatedly urged fhe entire Party membership to acquire a solid understanding of £* Party’s general line. In April 1948, speaking at a conference Of cadres, he summed up that line as follows: “The revolution against imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism waged bv the broad masses of the people under the leadership of the nroletariat - this is China’s new-democratic revolution, and this fs the general line and general policy of the Communist Party of China at the present stage of history.” “If we actually forget the Party’s general line and general policy,” he warned “then we shall he blind half-baked, muddle-headed revolutionaries, and when we carry out a specific line for work and a specific policy, we shall lose our bearings and vacillate now to the left and now to the right, and the work will suffer.”40 . ... He also insisted that the Party must determine its tactics according to the circumstances. In applying the policies adopted by the Central Committee, the Party organizations must make concrete plans, taking into account different local conditions and avoiding over-simplification. Mao emphasized the need to translate the Party s policies into the people’s actions. He pointed out that exponents of the slogan “Do everything as the masses want it done were absolutely mistaken: they were denying the leadership role Jarty,f encouraging cadres to “tail after” the masses. The Party he said “must lead the masses to carry out all their correct ideas in the light of the circumstances and educate them to correct any wrong ideas they may entertain. . • To ensure thorough implementation of the Partys policies it was essential to uphold the Party’s centralized, unified leadership and to increase Party members’ sense of organization and discipline The problem was particularly important at this point, because the revolution had already made tremendous progress. Many of the Liberated Areas had been linked together and many cities had been or were about to be liberated The War of Liberation had become much more of a regular war. These changes required that the Party move quickly to do away with the indiscipline, anarchy, localism, and practice ol operating independently that had grown up during the long years of guerrilla warfare when the various army units had been separated from each other by the enemy. The Central Committee required that all local Party organizations strictly enforce its policies and that they establish a regular system of asking the Central Committee for instructions and submitting reports to it at stated intervals. At the same time, they were to strengthen inncr-Party democracy and the Party committee system. Having come to an historic turning point, the Communist Party, as the political party of the proletariat, had to anticipate and study new situations and problems as they arose, and formulate appropriate and effective measures to deal with them. The CPC instituted practical policies and worked hard to help all its members understand their importance and maintain a high degree of unity based on a correct line. Thus, work in all fields was conducted in an orderly manner. All this provided the most important preconditions for nationwide victory in the revolution. As the People’s Liberation Army went over to the strategicoffensive, the KMT authorities, in an effort to maintain their tottering rule, stepped up their oppression and exploitation of the people and their suppression of the patriotic democratic forces. After issuing the “Order for General Mobilization to Suppress the Insurrection of the Communist Bandits” in July 1947, the KMT government drafted all eligible men and requisitioned all available material resources to continue the civil war. It arbitrarily arrested, imprisoned and executed workers, students and other patriotic democrats and promulgated a series of reactionary laws and decrees, including “Methods for Dealing with the Communists in Rear Areas,” “Regulations Governing the Establishment cHAFrER FIVE VICTORY IN THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION f Snecial Criminal Courts" and “Martial Law.” The areas under S-MT control were devastated by White terror. R To give its dictatorial rule an air of democracy, from March to vri 1948 the KMT held in Nanjing a Constitutional Congress ^ wh ch Chiang Kai-shek was “elected” President. Because of factional conflicts within the KMT administration, and because [he United States government was considering finding another leader of the KMT to replace Chiang, the leader of the Guangxi faction, Li Zongren, was “elected” vice-president. At the same time the KMT authorities were deploying their remaining regu lar army forces and local troops to reinforce the South and outlying regions in preparation for a last-ditch struggle agams the revolutionary people. f In 1948 the economy of the KMT areas was on the brin collapse Prices rose sharply. In June of that year, the price oi rice in Shanghai reached eight million yuan per hectolitre, eight times the January level. In August the KMT government issued a document entitled “Emergency Measures ; for Handling nancial and Economic Situation” and in October another called “Supplementary Measures for Improving Economic Control. It also issued “gold yuan” notes to replace the original currency .The exchange rate was three million yuan for one gold yuan notec However, the new currency also depreciated quickly, and prices soared Thus, all the KMT government s efforts to alleviate he economic crisis were in vain. They served only to worsen the situation for both urban and rural working people and brought national industry and commerce to the verge of fasten As the KMT regime crumbled, the Peoples Liberation Army advanced triumphantly. Under the influence and leadership of the Communist Party of China, the peoples movements xn the KMT areas began to gain momentum. The student masses increasingly pinned their hopes on vie y in the War of Liberation. Accordingly, they dropped the slogan “Oppose civil war!” and instead called on people to Oppose persecution!” In October 1947 the chairman of the Zhejiang University Autonomous Student Association, Yu Zisan was arrested and tortured to death in jail. When they learned of this atrocity, more than 100,000 students demonstrated in twelve cities, including Hangzhou, Nanjing, Shanghai and Beiping. They waged a struggle against persecution, illegal arrests, secret police and the killing of young people. In early 1948, when the KMT authorities had students at Tongji University massacred, students in Shanghai, Beiping and other cities intensified their protests. In April students in north China protested against the KMT authorities’ suppression of the North China Students’ Association with the slogan “Oppose persecution, protect the Students’ Association!” Moreover, they joined the teachers and other school staff in Beiping and Tianjin in demanding better material benefits. The teachers, workers, researchers and doctors all held strikes. The movement grew and became known as the “April storm.” During May and June, a nationwide student-led movement against U.S. support for the Japanese militarists swelled to include people from all sectors of society. The reactionary KMT rulers were thus completely isolated. All the democratic parlies and the majority of democrats without party affiliation became daily more inclined to support the people’s revolution. As successes were scored in the War of Liberation, the KMT authorities stepped up persecution of the patriotic democratic forces, and as the CPC’s propaganda struck deep roots among the people, some democrats and hitherto uncommitted persons began to turn away from the once widespread search for a “third road.”42 Although the Youth Party and the Democratic Socialist Party, once participants in the Democratic League, had gone over to the KMT, the Democratic League and other democratic parties and most of the independent democrats stood with the CPC. They refused to participate in the “National Assembly” or the KMT government and opposed the bogus constitution. On June 28, 1946, the eve of the full-scale civil war launched by the KMT, the CPC Central Committee stated in a circular on the current situation: “On the question of negotiations, the Democratic League advocated that the CPC take a strong position and oppose any concession. If the KMT wants war, they think the CPC should fight back. They believed that war was inevitable.” ^ VICTORY „ ™ DEMOCRATIC ~ *7 The Demoaatk ^ague. the CPC Central Committee sai^ alS° “fdMy ” The democratic parties and times of difficulty. Jn lhe struggie against the KMTs crats played an ac civil war. They cooperated with dictatorial rule “d its pol Y jn the course of struggle. ThhisCwas the major characteristic of all the democratic parties at "kMT authorities not only bitterly hated the CPC but were also hostile towards all consistently though the Democratic ec ^. ms t0 achieve democracy and advocated the use of dem( . authorities continual means to achieve of ually used violence to perse h ■ inenl democrat, Du Li Gongpu and Wen Yiduo ano t members of local Bincheng, was assassinated in X iam Qr kidnapped. branches of the Democratic eag or raided In May 1947 Several of its newspapers were demolish c ■ CPC’s “MT published a document purpo. rung t Programme for the prepared by the KMT, d h pederation of CornAssociation for Promoting 6 mo , progressive rades of the Throe People s Principles and other ^ organizations as “receiving ; orders [™m thcCPCa^ ^ be the willing tools ot ih rvmneratic League an illegal KMT authorities declared the ^mentary puborganization and banned all ^ November 6, 1947, prolished by the Xinhua > unarmed organization. Its tested: “The Democratic League _is an 00^^ ^ Thdr Qnly members have no guns, ^ J3 . , tj.ev were long ago weapons are speech and ^ i ' l Chiang could ss sass sr s=,Se.. ... was forced to announce the dissolution of the party: “Let it be known that from this day onward, the members of this organization will cease all political activities, all members of this headquarters will resign from their posts and this headquarters is hereby dissolved as of today.” The CPC made every possible effort to unite with the democratic parties and individuals. Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and other CPC leaders and the Party organizations maintained close contact with the leaders of the democratic parties, encouraging and supporting them in their struggle against the dictatorship of the KMT. This also helped strengthen the left-wing factions in those parties. In January 1948 Shen Junru and other leaders of the Democratic League convened the 3rd Plenary Session of its 1st Central Committee, at which they declared they would not accept the dissolution of the League and would restore the headquarters. The participants in this session clearly stated that the League would “absolutely not adopt a neutral stand in matters of right and wrong.” They also pointed out that the argument for an independent “middle road” was untenable under the prevailing circumstances in China. The League, then, had no alternative but to take the people’s democratic, revolutionary stand and join in the struggle to overthrow the KMT ruling clique, eradicate the feudal system of land ownership, drive the U.S. imperialists out of China and achieve a people’s democracy. The participants in the session affirmed that the Communist Party of China was “worthy of every patriot’s admiration” and that from then on the League would cooperate with it. This session marked the Democratic League’s conversion to the standpoint of new-democratic revolution. As the leader of the League, Shi Liang, said many years later, “This political change will go down in the history of the Democratic League. From this point on, the Democratic League took the right path of total cooperation with the Communist Party of China and, practically speaking, accepted the CPC’s leadership.”43 At about this time, the democratic factions in the KMT began to form a revolutionary alliance. On November 12, 1947, in Hong pjvE VICTORY IN THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION in the KM , rhine^e Kuomintang. On January 1, 1948, ocratic Factions of the Chinese g f th Kuomintang. they founded the RevoiuUonary Comnuttee^a^ ^ u Jishen as with Soong A^he^amgres^the^announced, “Our immediate chairman. At the cong Qverthrow the traitorous, dictatorial rerevolutionary wsk is t realize independence, democracy gune Of Chh*"? sh h Revolutionary Committee of the and peace in China. . lf tQ cooperation with the Kuomintang tirm y c , . basic principles of the Communist Party and revolution progressed and as new-democracy PI0g“tee le raedlh rough practical struggle, ifea^ne to^ublicly^c^iowledge the^eadersh^p of the Communist "“other democratic parties. al Construction A^aUon Cht Dfimocratic Par°e"u San Society6 China Zhi Gong Dang and the Taiwan Demrcradc^dfSovernment League, all expressed thetr commitmeo A nrfl nri"eacVrCentTal Committee issued a May Day^logan that called for thew“”Je“x“® df aV TeactSnaiies consultative conference w ic ^ coalition government. the Liberated Areas to and IhetuXg^fa new ChLa under the people's democratic ..pub,. ... * a country suffering under imperialist oppression.”44 With the exception of a few exponents of bourgeois democracy who had turned reactionary, the great majority of them had gradually discarded it and now believed that the Communist Party’s political position on building socialism through the establishment of a people’s republic was correct. It was this belief that provided the foundation for the Communist-led system of multiparty cooperation and political consultation. VIII. THE GREAT DECISIVE BATTLES In the autumn of 1948 the War of Liberation entered the decisive phase for nationwide victory of the people’s forces. A t I his time, the People’s Liberation Army had expanded to a total of 2.8 million men, of which 1.49 million were in the field armies, as compared to 1.27 million at the beginning of the war. It was also much better equipped, great quantities of new equip^ ment having been captured from the enemy — one could say that the United States was supplying the PLA through the KMT troops. The PLA had now established powerful artillery and engineering corps, which made it possible for it to attack strongly fortified positions and thus to gain experience in positional warfare. Moreover, the ideological education movement carried out in the army by the methods of “pouring out grievances” and the three check-ups” had greatly enhanced the political consciousness of the troops and their combat effectiveness.45 The Liberated ^ccSAAAd gradually been linked t0 form a continuous area of 2,355,000 square kilometres, or 24.5 percent of the total territory of the country. Their population was now 168 million, or 35.3 percent of the total. Land reform had been completed in most of the Liberated Areas, and the enthusiasm of the peasant masses for revolution and production had reached unprecedented heights. The rear areas of the PLA were therefore increasingly secure. In contrast, the KMT troops had decreased from 4.3 million men at the start of the war to 3.65 million. Because a significant cHAptf.r five victory in the DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION 371 number of them were deployed for garrison duties, only 1.74 million were available for use at the front lines. Moreover, morale was low and the troops lacked combat effectiveness. Even though the KMT reactionaries still controlled three quarters of the territory and two-thirds of the population, they were faced with a hostile people and were extremely isolated. Under these circumstances, they were forced to abandon their strategy of “total defence” and adopt one of “defence of key sectors.” Their five strategic armies (under Hu Zongnan, Bai Chongxi, Liu Zhi, Fu Zuoyi and Wei Lihuang) had been cut off from each other by the PLA and had been operating separately in northwest China, the Central Plains, east China, north China and northeast China, without adequate coordination. As a result, the only thing they could do was to guard strategic areas and communication lines, leaving only a small number of troops available tor strategic manoeuvring. They had already lost the advantage of a continuous battlefront. The KMT regime was on the verge of collapse. All these circumstances showed that the moment for decisive battles between the PLA and the KMT troops was at hand. But the total military strength of the KMT still exceeded that of the PLA. The Communist Party was therefore faced with two major strategic questions. First, did it dare launch decisive battles, fighting on an unprecedentedly large scale? Second, did it dare attempt to capture the enemy’s key cities and to annihilate his strongest corps? At the time, the KMT authorities were in the process of making a major strategic change in troop deployment. In August 1948 they convened a “military self-criticism meeting” in Nanjing, during which they decided: 1) to concentrate their forces in the area between the Yellow River and the Yangtze, 2) to strengthen the defence of Liaodong and Rehe in northeast China in order to stabilize north China and to defend their positions south of the Yellow River, and 3) to do all they could to defend the Central Shaanxi Plain and Hanzhong in northwest China in order to protect their line of defence in southwest China. If the PLA allowed time for the KMT to conduct this strategic concentration of forces, it would find it very hard to carry on military operations later. The CPC Central Committee, headed by Mao Zedong, analysed the military situation and decided to seize the opportunity for decisive battles. It organized three consecutive major campaigns — the Liaoxi-Shenyang campaign, the Huai-Hai campaign and the Beiping-Tianjin campaign. These campaigns were correlated with each other, so that they proceeded from one victory to another. The overall strategy called for annihilation of the enemy by groups. The Central Committee chose the correct target for the first strike and began the decisive phase of the war in northeast China. This would prevent the KMT from carrying out its strategic plan of concentrating its forces. At the same time, some of the PLA troops in northeast China could move to fight south of the Great Wall. Moreover, the CPC could take advantage of the industry there to support the war effort nationwide. At this time the military situation in northeast China was most favourable to the PLA, which was quite sure of victory. Although there were still 550,000 KMT troops in the region, they had been cut off trom each other in three areas — Changchun, Shenyang and Jinzhou. The PLA, for its part, had 700,000 regular troops stationed in northeast China, which, together with 300,000 local troops, totalled one million men, far outnumbering the enemy. The Liberated Areas covered 97 percent of the region’s total land area and contained 86 percent of its population. Of the 2,100 kilometres of railways, 2,000 km. were in the people’s hands. After land reform and the elimination of bandits, the PLA’s rear areas were secure. Such favourable conditions were absent in other sectors. The Central Committee accordingly decided to begin the final push in northeast China, so as to be certain of victory in the first campaign. The opening shot in this series of decisive battles was fired on September 16, 1948, in Shandong, in the battle of Jinan, which ended on September 24. The East China Field Army had massed a powerful force to attack this strategically important city. After eight days and nights of fierce fighting, 20,000 men from the KMT’s reorganized 96th Corps, under the command of Wu Huawen, revolted and crossed over to the people’s side. A further 1 10,000 enemy troops were wiped out, and the commander of the CHAPTER five victory in the democratic revolution 373 KMT’s 2nd Pacification Zone, Wang Yaowu, was captured. This was the beginning of a series of victories in which the PLA liberated the enemy’s heavily fortified cities, and it was therefore .he beginning of the total collapse of Chiang Kai-shek s defence svstem which was dependent upon them. The liberation of Jinan linked up the North China and East China Liberated Areas and greatly improved conditions for support of the front lines. It also freed the East China Liberation Army to move south and join the Central Plains Liberation Army in its large-scale campaign to annihilate the enemy south of the Longhai Railway. For these reasons, the victory at Jinan was of great consequence. The Liaoxi-Shenyang Campaign On September 12 the Northeast Liberation Army concentrated its main forde of 700,000 men and launched the momentous Liaoxi [Western Liaoning Province ]-Shenyang campaign. On the basis of strategic considerations, the CPC Central Committee believed that it would be wise to hem in Chiang Kai-shek’s troops in northeast China and annihilate them one by one. Chiang did not know what to do with his 550,000 troops stranded north of the Great Wall. If these troops, led by Wei Lihuang, were to retreat south of the Great Wall, the KM 1 would be able to retain them as a relatively complete unit of strategicimportance. Moreover, they could then be combined with Fu Zuoyi’s army in north China, to cause trouble for the PLA later on. Mao Zedong pointed out the need to consider the possibility of such a retreat and to wipe out all the enemy troops while they were still in northeast China. To do this, the Northeast Field Army had first to gain control over the Beiping-Liaomng Railway and then to capture Jinzhou, in Liaoning Province, sealing off the exit from the Northeast. But the commander of the Northeast Field Army, Lin Biao, put undue emphasis on the difficulties involved in moving south for the operation and advocated attacking the city of Changchun, in Jilin, instead. After a period o hesitation and repeated criticism by the Central Committee, Lin Biao resolved to move his troops south. On September 12 the Northeast Field Army under the command of Lin Biao and Luo Ronghuan began the attack on Jinzhou. To reinforce the city’s defence, Chiang Kai-shek hurriedly summoned a portion of his troops from north China and Shandong and organized them into an army to move east. In the meantime, he organized the main body of his troops at Shenyang into an army to move west. The first of these two armies was blocked by the PLA in the Tashan-Hongluoxian sector, and the second was intercepted northeast of Heishan and Dahushan. On October 14 the Northeast Field Army launched its final assault on Jinzhou. In 31 hours of intense fighting, it succeeded in annihilating nearly 90,000 enemy troops and capturing Fan Hanjie, deputy commander-in-chief of the KMT’s Northeast “Bandit Suppression” Flcadquarters. The liberation of Jinzhou impelled part of the KMT troops defending Changchun to revolt and the remainder to surrender. Seeing that the retreat route out of northeast China was now cut off, Chiang Kai-shek gave Liao Yaoxiang, who was in command of the army moving west, strict orders to recapture Jinzhou. The Northeast Field Army immediately encircled Liao’s army which consisted of crack troops of the New First Corps and the New Sixth Corps — from the north and south. After stiff fighting lasting two days and one night, it completely wiped out the 100,000 troops of that army and captured Liao Yaoxiang. The Northeast Field Army followed up this victory and on November 2 took Shenyang and Yingkou. Thus, the whole of northeast China was liberated. During the 52 days of the Liaoxi-Shenyang campaign, 472,000 enemy troops were wiped out. From this time onward, the PLA was numerically superior to the KMT, a change that marked another turning point in the Chinese revolution. The liberation of northeast China not only turned the one-million-strong Northeast Field Army into a powerful strategic reserve but also provided favourable conditions for the subsequent liberation of Beiping, Tianjin and the rest of north China. Moreover, it provided the PLA with a secure strategic rear area where there was a certain amount of industry. 375 chapter five victory in the democratic revolution The Huai-Hai Campaign Immediately following the conclusion of the Liaoxi-Shenyang campaign, 600,000 men from the East China Field Army, the Central Plains Field Army and regional armed forces from east China, the Central Plains and north China, launched the HuaiHai [Huaihe-Haizhou] campaign. Unprecedented in scope, this campaign was centred at Xuzhou in Jiangsu and extended east as far as Haizhou, west as far as Shangqiu, north to Lincheng (now Xuccheng) and south to the Huaihe River. In November 1948 the KMT convened a military conference at Xuzhou, where it decided to transfer the armies under Liu Zhi and Du Yuming to Xuzhou, with orders to fight if they could. If they could not, then they were to retreat south across the Huaihe River to defend the Yangtze. This showed that the KMT General Headquarters was still wavering between defence and withdrawal. At the time, there were 800,000 KMT troops deployed around the intersection of the Tianjin-Pukou and Longhai railways at Xuzhou. . Early in September, Su Yu, deputy commander of the Last China Field Army, had suggested organizing the Huai-Hai campaign. He recommended that the main forces ot the East China Field Army leave southwest Shandong for northern Jiangsu, with the aim of wiping out the right flank of the KMT army stationed at Xuzhou. The Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee had agreed. In November the Military Commission decided to expand the scope of the Huai-Hai campaign, with the overall plan of separating Xuzhou and Bengbu and wiping out Liu Zhi’s main forces. In a telegram sent to Liu Bocheng, Chen Yi, Deng Xiaoping and others on November 16, the Military Commission pointed out that victory in this campaign would not only secure the situation north of the Yangtze but also lay the foundation lor the resolution of the situation nationwide. On that day the CPC Central Committee decided to organize a General Front Committee consisting of Liu Bocheng, Chen Yi, Deng Xiaoping, Su Yu and Tan Zhenlin, with Deng Xiaoping as secretary. The committee was to assume unified leadership ol the East China Field Army and the Central Plains Field Army. Throughout the Huai-Hai campaign, the KMT’s troop strength in this sector exceeded the PLA’s. Its equipment was also far superior. Under these circumstances, the PLA s tactic was to repeatedly divide the enemy’s troops, massing a superior force to annihilate his forces one by one. The campaign was divided into three phases. The first phase lasted from November 6 to 22, 1948. During this period, the KMT army under Huang Baitao was stationed along the Longhai Railway between Lianyungang in the east and Xuzhou in the west. As Mao Zedong stated in a telegram addressed to the forces which were to take part, in this first stage of the campaign, the central task was to concentrate forces to wipe out that army. The PLA decided to use more than half of its total effectives to cut off and attack the enemy troops that were coming to reinforce Huang’s army; this would prevent the two units from joining forces and ensure that Huang’s troops did not escape. On November 6 the battle began. Huang’s army tried to escape to the west. At Jiawang and Taierzhuang, the 23,000 men led by He Jifeng and Zhang Kexia, who were deputy commanders ol the KMT’s Third Pacification Zone and underground members of the CPC, suddenly revolted. The main forces of the East China Field Army immediately crossed the area those troops had been defending and quickly cut off Huang Baitao’s line of retreat as he approached Xuzhou. The enemy reinforcements from all directions were checked. Huang’s army had no choice but to turn back to Nianzhuang. Thus forced into a pocket no more than 10 kilometres in length and breadth, Huang’s entire unit was wiped out on November 22. _ _ . The second phase of the campaign lasted from November 15 to December 15. The main objective now was to annihilate Huang Wei’s army, which had been dispatched as reinforcements and was to march alone all the way from southern Henan to the Huai-Hai area. The 120,000 men of Huang’s army were Chiang Kai-shek’s own personal troops, and their combat effectiveness was relatively strong. The 18th Corps of Huang’s army was part of the KMT’s crack force. The main forces of the Central Plams Field Army and part of the East China Field Army adopted the 377 CHAPTER five victory in the democratic revolution rtic of surrounding the enemy while allowing him one channel f escape which was designed as a trap. On November 25 the PL^ trooPs encircled Huang Wei’s army south of the Kua.he pjver at Shuangduiji. The enemy) reinforcements were either wioed out or intercepted. From December 6 to 15, the PLA inducted a general offensive and destroyed the enemy s enure force in the area. During this period, the KMT armies under Qiu rinpnuan Li Mi and Sun Yuanliang, all commanded by Du Yuming^deputy commander-in-chief of the KMT’s “Bandit Supnression” Headquarters at Xuzhou, withdrew from the city. They were besieged by the main forces of the East^ China Field Army near Chenguanzhuang, and Sun Yuanliang’s entire army was anmhihitedd ^ of the campaign lasted from December 15, 1948 to January 10, 1949. The chief objective now was to wipe out Du Yuming’s forces. However, in order to coordmate tto action with the Beiping-Tianjm campaign, in the beginning of this phase the PLA troops on the front line of the Huai-Hai campaign were ordered to stop their attack on Du’s army for two weeks to give Fu Zuoyi’s army on the north China front a false sense of security. In the meantime, the PLA concentrated on a pohucal offensive, urging Du and others to surrender with their troops. On January 6, 1949, after the PLA had succeeded in dividing and surrounding Fu Zuoyi’s army, it launched a general attack on the troops under Du Yuming, who refused to surrender. After four days and nights of intense fighting, the armies led by Li Mi and Qiu Qingquan were completely annihilated. The units wiped out included the 5th Corps, one of the KMT’s crack umts_ Du Yuming was captured. This marked the successful end of the Huai-Hai campaign. . . . , ^r».rHr The campaign had lasted 66 days. During this time the K had lost 555,000 men, and its crack troo^ along the southern front had been destroyed. The area north of the middle and lower reaches of the Yangtze had been liberated and linked up with h North China Liberated Area. The PLA had pressed south to the north bank of the Yangtze. Thus, the KMT capital of Nanjing layex posed directly in front of the PLA forces. The reactionary Kuomintang regime was disintegrating. The Beiping-Tianjin Campaign With the successful conclusion of the Liaoxi-Shenyang campaign, and with victory on the horizon in the Huai-Hai campaign, one million men from the Northeast Field Army and the Second and Third Armies of the North China Military Command joined forces to launch the Beiping-Tianjin campaign. At the time, the KMT’s north China forces, not counting the 50,000 of Fu Zuoyi’s men stationed at Guisui and Datong, numbered more than 500,000. These men were stationed in a narrow stretch of land extending 500 kilometres east from Shanhaiguan along the Beiping-Liaoning Railway and west to Zhangjiakou along the Beiping-Suiyuan Railway, with Tanggu as their opening to the sea. Of these troops, 17 divisions were commanded by Fu Zuoyi, and 25 were directly under Chiang Kai-shek. Earlier, Chiang had told Fu to withdraw his troops southward to reinforce the defence line along the Yangtze. Fu was deeply suspicious of Chiang’s discrimination against those who were not his own men and had not wanted to withdraw. At this time, his troops were already shaken by the PLA’s victories in northeast China. However, he calculated that the Northeast Field Army would need three to six months of rest to recuperate from the LiaoxiShenyang campaign and would not be ready to fight south of the Great Wall until the following spring. For this reason, he decided to defend Beiping and Tianjin, control an escape route by sea, seek to expand his forces and wait to see what would happen. Accordingly, he began to withdraw forces from other areas under his control, including Chengde, Baoding, Shanhaiguan and Qinhuangdao, and prepared to flee south by sea or west toward Suiyuan if necessary. If Fu Zuoyi withdrew, the PLA could seize Beiping and Tianjin without fighting. But then Fu’s troops would help reinforce the KMT units along the Yangtze River defence line or, in any event, make it possible for the KMT to maintain greater military strength. That would be disadvantageous to the PLA in later battles. Therefore, the CPC Central Committee chapter five victory in the democratic revolution vv»lieved that the key to success was to postpone the enemy s decision to flee south or west and hold him in north China so the PI A could wipe him out there. , , Acting in accordance with the Central Committee s plan, the main forces of the Northeast Field Army ended their period of rest and consolidation early, not long after the conclusion ol the I iaoxi-Shenyang campaign. Starting on November 23, they took a short cut and covertly moved south of the Great Wall. There they joined forces with the Second and Third Armies ol the North China Military Command. Applying the principle of encircling the enemy troops without attacking them or separating the enemy troops without encircling them, with lightning speed the combined forces made a strategic encirclement and cut the links between the enemy forces in Beiping, Tianjin and Zhangjiakou, but did not make a tactical encirclement. This action cut off their escape routes to the south and west and at the same time drew the KMT’s 92nd, 94th and 105th corps, originally stationed at Tianjin and Tanggu, to the area around Beiping. After that, the PLA started a general assault by taking enemy positions on both wings and then capturing the ones in the middle. In late December, the PLA troops conquered Xinbao an and Zhangjiakou on the west wing. At Xinbao’an they annihilated 16,000 men from the 35th Corps, the main force directly under Fu Zuoyi’s command. At Zhangjiakou they destroyed the headquarters of the enemy’s 1 1th Army and the 105th Corps, wiping out more than 54,000 men. On January 10, 1949, the CPC Central Committee decided to form a General Front Committee for the Beiping-Tianjin campaign under Lin Biao, Luo Ronghuan and Nie Rongzhen. On January 14, when the enemy defending Tianjin on the east wing refused to surrender, the PLA used a powerful force to launch a general offensive against the city. After 29 hours of intense fighting, the solidly fortified and heavily defended city fell. The 130,000 enemy troops had all been wiped out, and Chen Changjie, commander of the KMT’s Tianjin garrison, had been captured. After Tianjin was liberated, the enemy troops defending Tanggu took to their boats and fled south. In order to avoid destroying the world-famous ancient capital of Beiping, the PLA first surrounded the city and then dispatched representatives to meet with Fu Zuoyi. Thanks to the PLA’s great strength and the speed with which it had carried out its deployment, and thanks also to the CPC’s patient persuasion and to the urging of people from all social strata, in the end Fu Zuoyi was obliged to give in. Acting in accordance with the will of the people, he ordered the troops under his command to leave the city to await reorganization. On January 31, 1949, Fu’s army completed its move, and the PLA entered the city. The peaceful liberation of Beiping was proclaimed. The Beiping-Tianjin campaign had lasted for 64 days. More than 520,000 KMT troops had been put out of action or reorganized as part of the PLA, and most of north China had been liberated. A few enemy troops were allowed to remain in Suiyuan. In September 1949 these troops, led by Dong Qiwu, indicated their willingness to revolt and accept incorporation into the PLA. Thus, three patterns were set for disposing of the KMT troops — the Tianjin pattern (fighting them), the Beiping pattern (reorganizing them into PLA units), and the Suiyuan pattern (keeping them intact for a time, winning them over or neutralizing them politically, and reorganizing them at a later date). In terms of their scope and achievements, the three great campaigns of Liaoxi-Shenyang, Huai-Hai and Beiping-Tianjin were unprecedented in Chinese military history and unusual even in world military history. Over the course of four months and nineteen days, from September 12, 1948, to January 31, 1949, these campaigns led to the annihilation of more than 1.54 million KMT troops. Essentially, they caused the collapse of the military strength that had propped up the reactionary KMT regime and thus provided a firm foundation for nationwide victory of the Chinese revolution. The success of the three campaigns was a great victory in the people’s war. During the course of the campaigns, the commanders and fighters of the People’s Liberation Army displayed a high degree of revolutionary commitment and initiative, fighting heroically and resourcefully against the KMT troops. The people cHAptf.r five victory in the democratic revolution 381 of the Liberated Areas showed incomparable enthusiasm and ceaselessly provided enormous amounts of human and material support for the front. The underground CPC organizations and revolutionary people in the KMT areas also contributed to the PLA’s victory in the campaigns. At the time, although the PLA’s equipment had improved, transport conditions remained extremely poor. To ensure the needs of the vast army at the front, people helped transport supplies on their shoulders or in pushcarts. According to statistics, no less than 5.43 million labourers were mobilized to support the Huai-Hai campaign, and they carried 7,300 tons of ammunition and 480,000 tons of grain and other goods. Chen Yi once gratefully remarked that victory in the Huai-Hai campaign had been brought in pushcarts by the people. This mass participation was powerful proof of the enthusiastic popular support enjoyed by the Communist Party in the War of Liberation. The victory in the three campaigns was also a victory for Mao Zedong Thought. The CPC Central Committee and its Military Commission, headed by Mao Zedong, with their great revolutionary prowess and superior military command skills, seized the right moment for decisive strategic action and selected the proper course. They mapped out different concepts of operation in the light of the different situations in northeast, east and north China. All of these factors contributed to victory in these great campaigns.

Carrying the Revolution Through to the End

By the end of the three campaigns, the KMT government’s military strength north of the Yangtze River had crumbled. It was even having trouble organizing its defence south of the river. On November 9, 1948, Chiang Kai-shek sent a letter to President Truman asking him to quickly provide more military support and even to send U.S. military advisors to help conduct the war. The United States government, however, sensed Chiang’s imminent doom and did not wish to accede to his request. On January 8, 1949, Chiang’s government sent messages to the governments of the United States, Britain, France and the Soviet Union asking them to “mediate” in the Chinese civil war. All tour governments tactfully cited their own particular considerations and declined. At this point, Mao Zedong summed up the situation as follows: “The U.S. government has changed its policy of simply backing the Kuomintang’s counter-revolutionary war to a policy ot embracing two forms of struggle: “1. Organizing the remnants of the Kuomintang’s armed forces and the so-called local forces to continue to resist the People’s Liberation Army south of the Yangtze River and in the remote border provinces, and “2 Organizing an opposition faction within the revolutionary camp to strive with might and main to halt the revolution where it is or, if it must advance, to moderate it and prevent it from encroaching too far on the interests of the imperialists and their running dogs.”46 Li Zongren, leader of the Guangxi faction, was prepared to take a chance. He stood ready to replace Chiang Kai-shek, and in order to gain time to implement his scheme of instituting two governments divided by the Yangtze River, he was willing to negotiate with the Communist Party. With this in the background, on December 24, 1948, Bai Chongxi, another leader ot the Guangxi faction, sent a telegram to Chiang urging him to hold peace talks. In response to Bai’s hint — or perhaps under his influence — the KMT’s Hubei Provincial Political Council and the governors of Henan and Hunan provinces recommended resumption of peace talks. In that interest, they also demanded Chiang’s resignation. As a result of these internal and external pressures, Chiang Kai-shek was forced to issue a statement on New Years Day, 1949 suing for peace. However, in his statement, he demanded, among other things, the preservation of the KMT-manufactured Constitution, (which had never been approved by the people), ot his so-called legally constituted authority and of his reactionary TFK FIVE VICTORY IN THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION CHAPTER Eiv* Unless these conditions were fulfilled, he said, he would 3rnlht to the finish” with the Communist Party. Clearly, these * f 're conditions not for peace but for the continuation of war. At t ti^ there were also some bourgeois Right-wingers who •hdsted\hat the Communist Party immediately put a stop to the War of Liberation, accept Chiang’s “conditions for peace and c fmm eliminating its enemies completely. rC Should the Chinese people carry the revolution through to t e . or should they abandon it halfway, allowing the reactionary forces the breathing-time to stage a comeback? At this historic moment with victory already in sight, this question took on vital importance' In the last hundred years, had not the people had enough bitter experience to know the answer- Q . M With these thoughts in mind, on Decembei 30, ’ 7„Hnn(1 iccned through the Xinhua News Agency a New Years message Tha t tva^a great call to carry the revolution through to ^“We1 must use the revolutionary method to wipe out all the forces of reaction resolutely, thoroughly, wholly and comp letely , we must unswervingly persist in overthrowing dalism and bureaucrat-capitalism; and we must overthrow the reactionary rule of the Kuomintang on a country-wide scale and set up a republic that is a people’s democratic dictatorship under the leadership of the proletariat and with the worker-peasant alliance as temain body.”47 This, he went on to say, would then make it possible for China to develop into a socialist society. But if the revolution were abandoned halfway, it would mean giving the^reactionaries a chance to heal their wounds, so that one day they might stage a comeback and again plunge the whole country into darkness g What was required of all those who wished to participate in the revolutionary cause, he said, was unanimity and cooperation, not the setting up of any ‘opposition faction or theOPnTnuary ^ 7, in his capacity as chairman of the CPC Central Committee, issued a statement indicating the a™, h,and abundant reason to wipe out completely the remnant armed forces of the reactionary Kuomintang government in not too long a period and has full confidence that it can do so, nevertheless, in order to hasten the end of the war, bring about genuine peace and alleviate the people’s sufferings, the Communist Party of China is willing to hold peace negotiations with the reactionary Nanjing Kuomintang government or with any local governments or military groups of the Kuomintang....”48 These negotiations would be held, he said, on the basis of eight terms, including that war criminals were to be punished, that the bogus constitution and the bogus “constituted authority” were to be abolished and that all reactionary troops were to be reorganized on democratic principles. Mao’s statement was warmly received by the democratic parties, democrats without party affiliation and other people from all social strata. On January 22, 55 individuals, including Li Jishen, Shen Junru, Guo Moruo and Tan Pingshan, who had just arrived in a Liberated Area, issued a joint statement expressing their firm support of Mao’s statement and their readiness to help advance the cause of revolution and build a new China under the leadership of the Communist Party of China. On January 21 Chiang Kai-shek announced that he would resign from the position of President and that Vice President Li Zongren would serve as Acting President. The next day, Li Zongren expressed his willingness to accept the Communist Party’s eight terms as the foundation on which to begin peace talks. After Chiang Kai-shek resigned, he returned to his hometown of Xikou in Fenghua County, Zhejiang Province. However, he continued to run the government from behind the scenes. He decided that the peace talks should be limited to dividing the country at the Yangtze River. In other words, he insisted that “the integrity of certain provinces south of the Yangtze should be ensured.”49 At the same time, Chiang ordered his followers to prepare for war by strengthening the armed forces. His plan was to reorganize and train two million troops south of the Yangtze over a period of three to six months in order to stage a comeback. At the same time, he began to make arrangements for his final cHA1>TER FIVE victory in the democratic revolution tr.at to Taiwan. Li Zongren’s government also intended to the territory south of the Yangtze. It was obvious that the KMT’s acceptance of the CPC’s eight terms was only a smokeSCrFrom March 5 to 13, 1949, the 7th Central Committee of the rommunist Party of China held its 2nd Plenary Session at Xibaipo Village in Pingshan County, Hebei Province. In his So the session, Mao Zedong set forth policies to promote the speedy achievement of the country-wide victory of the revo lutioTand to organize this victory. He proposed that afterwards the Party should shift the focus of its work from the rural areas o the cities and defined the basic political, economic and foreign nolicies the Party should adopt. He also set the general tasks and main course for transforming China from an agricultural country into an industrial one and from a new-democratic society into socialist one. He appraised the new situation in the class struggle both at home and abroad and gave timely warning that the “sugar-coated bullets” of the bourgeoisie would become the main danger to the proletariat. He stated the Party s policy with regard to negotiations: “Our policy is not to refuse negotiations . but to demand that the other side accept the eight terms in their entirety and to allow no bargaining.- He added that if negotiations on an overall basis succeeded, that would have great advantages. If they failed, then separate negotiations on a local basis would be held after the PLA had made further advances. To bring the war to an early conclusion and realize genuine peace on April I a CPC delegation headed by Zhou Enlai entered into negotiations in Beiping with the KMT ^government atives headed by Zhang Zhizhong. On April 15, after the two sides had had repeated exchanges of views and consultations t CPC representatives presented a final amended version of he Agreement on Internal Peace, demanding a response from i the KMT government by April 20. The KMT government representatives agreed unanimously to accept this agreement and sent Huang Shaohong back to Nanjmg with tlic doeument. It P pened that at this moment the KMT Central Executive Committee was holding a session of its Standing Committee and a Political Conference in Guangzhou. The Central Executive Committee issued a statement rejecting the agreement and instructed Li Zongren and He Yingqin to act accordingly. On April 20 Li and He sent a telegram to the KMT government representatives in Beiping telling them not to sign the Agreement on Interna] Peace. The failure of the negotiations was announced. Nevertheless, at the request of the Communist Party, the KMT government representatives remained in Beiping, and most of them later participated in the preparations for the People’s Political Consultative Conference of new China. Because the KMT government refused to sign the Agreement on Internal Peace, on April 21 Chairman Mao Zedong and Commander-in-Chief Zhu De issued an order to the army for a countrywide advance. The Second and Third Field Armies (lormerly the Central Plains Field Army and the East China Field Army), which had been placed under the command of Deng Xiaoping, secretary of the General Front Committee, started to cross the Yangtze River from north to south. In this operation they had the support of troops from the Central Plains Military Command and of the people along the north bank as well as the cooperation of the guerrilla forces south ot the river. The battle line stretched for more than 500 kilometres, from Hukou in Jiangxi Province in the west to Jiangyin in Jiangsu in the east. One million troops divided into ?ueV^1UmnS f0Ught their way across the Yangtze on boats, ihe KM 1 defence line along the river, which had been painstakingly built up over a period of three and a half months collapsed instantly. On April 20 and 21, while the PLA was crossing the Yangtze, four British warships, including the Amethyst, intruded into the Yangtze, an inland waterway of China, and proceeded to areas defended by the PLA, trying to prevent the crossing. The British and Chinese exchanged fire. The British killed or wounded 252 PLA men. The Amethyst was disabled by the PLA and forced to anchor on the river near Zhenjiang. The other three ships escaped. After this, the British government declared that British warships had the legal right to 387 CHAPTER five victory in the democratic revolution navigate the Yangtze. The Conservative Party leader Winston Churchill even proposed that aircraft carriers be dispatched to Chinese waters to provide “effective power of retaliation.” The General Headquarters of the PLA immediately issued a statement declaring, “The Chinese people will defend their territory and sovereignty and absolutely will not permit encroachment by foreign governments.” This statement demonstrated that China was not afraid of threats and would resolutely oppose any imperialist aggression. It made the Chinese people, long bullied and oppressed by the imperialists, proud and elated. This event showed that the time when foreign invaders, relying on their military might, could commit atrocities on China’s sovereign soil was gone forever. When the PLA troops broke through the KMT defence lines along the Yangtze, the government in Nanjing fled to Guangzhou. On April 23 the PLA captured Nanjing, the KMT capital, announcing the downfall of the reactionary regime that had lasted for 22 years. The PLA troops then continued their victorious advance to the provinces in south-central, northwest and southwest China. By either military or peaceful means, most of the remaining enemy forces were put out of action. The vast territory of the country was liberated and Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang clique was driven from the mainland.

The Great Victory of the Chinese Democratic Revolution

Now that the reactionary Kuomintang regime had been overthrown, conditions were ripe for the founding of the People’s Republic of China. In June 1949 in Beiping, the Preparatory Meeting for the New Political Consultative Conference was convened, and a standing committee headed by Mao Zedong was established. This committee was in charge of drafting the Common Programme and working out a government structure. This was the beginning of the comprehensive preparatory work to build a new regime in China. As early as March 1949, in a report to the 2nd Plenary Session of the 7th Central Committee of the CPC, Mao Zedong put forward a plan for the basic line of China’s development: China should be transformed from a new-democratic, agricultural country into a socialist, industrial one. On June 30 of the same year, in an important article entitled “On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship,” he restated this idea. Historical experience, he wrote, showed that the plan to build a bourgeois republic in China could come to nothing. The only solution was to found a people’s republic, transform China from an agricultural country into an industrial one and realize the transition from new-democracy through socialism to communism. “To sum up our experience,” he concluded, “and concentrate it into one point, it is: the people’s democratic dictatorship under the leadership of the working class (through the Communist Party) and based upon the alliance of workers and peasants.”51 Mao emphasized that the people’s dictatorship must be under the leadership of the working class, because “it is only the working class that is most far-sighted, most selfless and most thoroughly revolutionary.”52 The dictatorship was to be based on the alliance of the working class, the peasantry and the urban petty bourgeoisie, and mainly on the alliance of workers and peasants, because those two classes were the main force in overthrowing imperialism and feudalism and in making the transition from new-democracy to socialism. It was necessary to unite with the national bourgeoisie, Mao said, so as to resist the oppression of imperialism and develop China’s economy, but the national bourgeoisie could not be the leader of the revolution or have the chief role in state power. This article, together with Mao’s report to the Central Committee, laid the political basis for a common programme to be adopted by the New Political Consultative Conference. On September 21, 1949, the New Political Consultative Conference — renamed the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference — was solemnly inaugurated in Beiping. In his opening address Mao Zedong proudly proclaimed the founding of the People’s Republic of China: “,..[T]he Chinese people, comprising one quarter of humanity, 389 CHAPTEK FIVE VICTORY in THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION have now stood up.... We have closed our ranks and defeated both domestic and foreign oppressors through the Peoples War of Liberation and the great people’s revolution, and now we are proclaiming the founding of the People’s Republic of China From now on our nation will belong to the community of the oeace-loving and freedom-loving nations of the world and work courageously and industriously to foster its own civilization and well-being and at the same time to promote world peace and freedom. Ours will no longer be a nation subject to insult and humiliation. We have stood up.”53 . ^ The Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference was an organ of the people’s democratic united front, based on the alliance of workers and peasants and led by the Communist Party. It consisted of representatives of the CPC, the democratic parties, public figures without party affiliation, various people s organizations, the People’s Liberation Army, all the localities and nationalities and Chinese living overseas. The conference adopted its “Organic Law” and elected the 1st National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (Mao Zedong was elected its chairman on October 9). Until the National People’s Congress was convened after a general election, the plenary session of the CPPCC was to act in that capacity. ^ The conference also approved a “Common Programme. The Programme made the following stipulations regarding the state system and the form of government. “The People’s Republic of China is a new-democratic or a people’s democratic state. It carries out the people’s democratic dictatorship led by the working class, based on the alliance ol workers and peasants, and uniting all democratic classes and all nationalities in China.” “The people’s congresses and the people s governments at all levels are the organs for the exercise of state power by the people.” “The organs of state power at all levels shall practise democratic centralism.” , The basic principle for economic construction, the document stated, was “to develop production and bring about a prosperous economy through the policies of taking into account both public and private interests, of benefiting both labour and capital, ol mutual aid between the city and countryside, and circulation of goods between China and other countries.” The document noted that the state would coordinate and regulate the state-owned economy, individual economy, private capitalist economy, etc. “In this way,” it continued, “all components of the social economy can, under the leadership of the state-owned economy, carry out division and coordination of labour and play their respective parts in promoting the development of the social economy as a whole.” With regard to the policy towards nationalities, the Common Programme stated: “All nationalities within the boundaries of the People’s Republic of China are equal. They shall establish unity and mutual aid among themselves, and shall oppose imperialism and their own public enemies, so that the People’s Republic of China will become a big fraternal and cooperative family composed of all its nationalities.” “Regional autonomy shall be exercised in areas where national minorities are concentrated.” As for foreign policy, the document declared that it was to be based on the principle of “lasting international peace, and friendly cooperation between the peoples of all countries, and opposition to the imperialist policy of aggression and war.” This Common Programme became the great charter for the Chinese people, and served for a time as a provisional constitution. The conference also adopted the Organic Law of the Central People’s Government. It unanimously elected Mao Zedong chairman of the Central People’s Government and elected Zhu De, Liu Shaoqi, Soong Ching Ling, Li Jishen, Zhang Lan and Gao Gang vice-chairmen. Fifty-six other persons, including Chen Yi, were elected members. (Afterwards, the Central People’s Government Council appointed Zhou Enlai Premier of the Government Administration Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs.) The conference approved Beiping as the capital of the People’s Republic of China and changed the city’s name back to Beijing. It also adopted the Western calendar as the chronological system, the “March of the Volunteers” composed by Nie Er as the new national anthem and a national flag with five stars on a field of red, symbolizing the great unity of the people of the whole country under the leadership of the Communist Party. ^^r FIVE VICTORY IN THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION 391 _ . i_ __ -m First Plenary Session of the Chinese 0l| ^Political Consultative Conference came to a successful Peopl le * fhe evening a ceremony was held in Tian'anmen Square Cl:v the foundation stone for the Monument to the Peop£s Heroes. ^The epitaph on the Monument, composed by Mao Ze ^“Eternal gloryato*the heroes of the people who laid down their who laydown their lives in the people, war and the C^of^ many struggles against domesttc ^foragn enerme^ ^ ^ people^’ lhdusPwhUeCcelehrating their victories, the Communist Crti of CWna and the people of the whole country commemorated with reverence the revolutionary martyrs who had heroical "n their lives to the long-term struggle for nattonal independence and the pe ople ps b]ic of china marked the ,h. Chines, ib— »■«»»' "J ",Mon f„„ in a new era in Chinese nisxory, a neHowTad!he Chinesfpeople’s revolution come about, and how ‘nin^aid^-A revolution cannot be ‘made' ... revolutions and bureaucrat-comprador bourgeoisie, placed itself in opposition to the Chinese people. When the War of Resistance Against Japan came to an end, the Chiang Kai-shek clique ignored the fervent aspirations of the Chinese people to build an independent, democratic, strong and prosperous new China. Instead, it pursued a policy of autocracy and civil war, bringing the entire people to the brink of starvation and death. As a result, the people had to rise to save themselves. Thus it was profound social problems that touched off the revolution, and a solid mass basis provided the condition for its expansion. The Chinese people had always been heroic in their resistance to aggression and oppression. However, during the period of nearly eighty years from the Opium War in 1840 to the May 4th Movement in 1919, they had failed in all their struggles because they lacked the leadership of an advanced revolutionary party. It was the Communist Party that clarified for the people the aim of their revolution. And it was the Communist Party that, over a long course of struggle, found the way for them to bring that revolution to victory. It was the Party that cemented the Chinese people —who had always been considered “a plate of loose sand” — into an unconquerable force with one heart and one mind. It was under the leadership of the Party that the Chinese people, through twenty-eight years of arduous and courageous struggle, won their historic victory at last. Thus, from the revolutionary practice of modern times, the people have drawn a scientific conclusion: without the Communist Party there would have been no New China. This is the great truth confirmed by their own experience. The leadership position of the Communist Party was not the result of some individual’s desire or will. For a long time, the Chinese people were presented with a choice of three plans for building the country, three visions of its future. The first, represented by the Northern warlords and later by the Kuomintang ruling clique, was that China should be under the dictatorship of the landlord-comprador class and retain its semi-colonial and semi-feudal status. The second, advocated by some middle-of-theroaders, was that China should be a bourgeois republic and ^TER FIVE VICTORY IN THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION 1,6 -?hese th ee plans were put to the test of practice time and Asa result the first was abandoned by the Chinese people *r.~v v »' «■’ and to advance from new-democracy to socialism. That was an W T°hTreasoCn the Communist Party was able to lead the revolusissass Hism m thfmlsses’ “ ^inte “g Marxism-Leninism with the realto the masses- . * h le series of lines, principles correct theoretical principles guiding the Chinese revolution and a summation of the Party’s experience gained in practice. It is the crystallization of the collective wisdom of the Communist Party. The formation and development of Mao Zedong Thought meant that Marxism had already taken deep root in China. Once this Sinicized Marxist ideology was accepted by the Chinese people, it became a great material force in the revolutionary transformation of Chinese society. Seeing this point, even Dean Acheson, the U.S. Secretary of State, who adamantly opposed Communism, had to admit at the end of 1949: “We must face the fact that there is no Chinese basis of resistance to Communism.”56 He said this even though he would not resign himself to defeat and was still under the illusion that someday democratic individualists would prevail again and establish a capitalist system in China. Following the principle of combining Marxism-Leninism with the Chinese reality, the CPC accumulated valuable experience while leading the new-democratic revolution. As Mao Zedong summed it up: “A well-disciplined Party armed with the theory of MarxismLeninism, using the method of self-criticism and linked with the masses of the people; an army under the leadership of such a Party; a united front of all revolutionary classes and all revolutionary groups under the leadership of such a Party — these are the three main weapons with which we have defeated the enemy.... Relying on them, we have won basic victory.”57 The victory of the Chinese people’s revolution eloquently proved that Marxism-Leninism can guide not only the liberation struggles of people in capitalist countries but also those of people in colonial and semi-colonial countries. In 1949, in an article commemorating the 28th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of China, Mao Zedong said: “Twenty-eight years of our Party is a long period, in which we have accomplished only one thing — we have won basic victory in the revolutionary war. This calls for celebration, because it is the people’s victory, because it is a victory in a country as large as China. But we still have much work to do; to use the analogy of a journey, our past work is only the first step in a long march chapter five victory in the democratic revolution . , n thousand li (five thousand kilometres].”5" Having won ° rtory in the new-democratic revolution, the Communist Party Tf China integrating the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism ith the concrete practice in the country, would continue leading The peop“ ^ the long and difficult struggle to build the new China. NOTES , Cheng Siyuan, Reminiscences of Political Events, Chin. ed„ Guangxi People’s States MS Umted Stales Governn.cn, ‘SfSfffiS’Alffk Victory in die War of Resistance Against Japan,” Ibid., p. 13. 7I,nedAFens!S”4a"f4retherKM?governmcnl and the Soviet government signed ,hi“ treaty. along E3S5 StctTa lnced that tt && Central Government of China ha t B. the Nation i ^ fjghting ^ ceased jn Si^a^eSteNahoial Government of the Republic of China will assume full governing authority over them. _ Circular 0f the Central sfSssr, U Dean^Aches^mA/v^yenr^^n1 the State Department, W.W. Norton & Co., New After Japan’s surrender, in view of the peasants’ eager demand for land, the CPC Central Committee decided to change the land policy for the period of the War of Resistance. That is, instead of merely reducing rents and interest, it would confiscate the land of the landlords and distribute it among the peasants. The “May 4th Directive” marked this change.

The Founding of the People's Republic of China and Transition to Socialism

Socialist Construction Advances Tortuously Through Exploration

The “Cultural Revolution”: Ten Years of Nationwide Chaos

Dawn of a New Prospect in Socialist Construction