Library:A History of the U.S.S.R./Part 2

The Empire of the Russian Nobility in the 18th Century

Founding of the Russian Empire

The Russian State at the End of the 17th Century

The Backwardness of the Russian State

The backwardness of tsarist Bnssia became particularly noticeable at the beginning of the 17th century, and was chiefly the result of the unfavourable exter- nal political conditions under which the country developed. Russia was frequently attacked by foreign enemies who plundered and devas- tated the country and sometimes ruled it for long periods. Thus, the Tatar-Mongolian yoke lasted over 240 years (1237-1480); Turkey dominated the Black Sea and Azov coast for almost 340 years (1476- 1812), barring Russia’s access to the southern seas; Rusna was block- aded and cutoff from the Baltic Sea for over 140 years (1661-1703). Intervention by Poland, Sweden and Rome (1604-1618) also retard, ed the country’s development.

The wars .with Poland and Sweden in the 17th century clearly demonstrated the economic, military and cultural backwardness of the Russian state as compared with the countries of Western Europe. Rassia had no large industries and was obliged to import extensively from Holland and England, a circumstance which was extremely embarrassing in times of war. The Thirty Years’ War in Germany and the wars of Louis XIV had greatly stimulated the development of European military technique, artillery and military engineering, as well as army organization, training and combat methods. The Russian troops, which still consisted largely of levies drawn from the nobility, were poorly armed, employed outworn tactics, and were deficient in manoeuvring on the field. The Streltsi and even the regiments modelled on foreign lines were inefficient. Therefore, in spite of the inherent bravery of the Russian fighting man, military victo* ries were achieved at the price of heavy losses.

Though certain modifications had been introduced the state system remained essentially what it had been since the 16th century. The prikazi (government offices) system of administration headed by the boyar duma was a slow- working machine; the waywodes in the towns ruined the population by their extortions; chaos reigned in the fisc; taxation arrears piled up year by year; there were no schools, and few literate people in the country.

The low state of industrial development, state administration, army organization and the level of culture represented a serious menace to the country’s security. This state of affairs served as a bait to Euro- pean neighbours seeking aggrandizement at the expense of Russian lands.

Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich had endeavoured to strengthen Russia’s western borders and overcome the Baltic blockade, but he died before he was able to bring his plans to fruition. Nor were the administrative reforms inaugurated by him fully implemented.

After his d«ath the feuds and quarrels among the factious boyars and nobles over possession of the power, land and peasants, broke out with even greater force. The throne was especially furiously contest- ed by the boyar families of Miloslavsbi and Naryshkin.

Tsar Fyodor Alexeyevich

Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich had mar- ried twice. By his first wife, a Miloslavski, he had several daughters, the eldest of whom was Sophia, and two sons, named Fyodor and Ivan. Shortly before his death Tsar Alexei married Natalia Kirillovna, daugh- ter of the nobleman Naryshkin. She had been brought up in the family of the boyar Artamon Matveyev, a favourite of the tsar and an advo- cate of closer ties with western culture. Matveyev had furnished his home in the European style, and he even maintained a troupe of foreign actors. In 1672 Tsaritsa Natalia gave birth to a son, Peter. After the death of Alexei Mikhailovich, his eldest son, Fyodor (1676-1682), a sickly, weak-willed boy of fourteen, ascended the throne. The Na- ryshkins, who had become influential during Alexei Mikhailovich’s last years thanks to their kinship with the tsaritsa, were dismissed after Fyodor’s accession, and replaced by the Miloslavskis, relatives of Tsar Fyodor. The tsar was surrounded by an intimate circle of boyars and noblemen who realized the need for changes in the organic zation of the state,

A commission of elected nobles was set up in Moscow to improve the organization of the army on the basis of military experience. The commission proposed the abolition of the ancient system of pre- o^ence, which, owing to the advancement of a large number of people of inferior lineage to posts of importance, had practically lost its erstwhile significance. In 1682 this system was formally abolished at a grand convocation of the Ecnmenical Council consisting of the church prelates and the boyars. The records of disputes over precedence were burned outside the palace. The Commission on Military Service re- modelled the army of the nobility along lines more closely resembling the organization of regular regiments.

A new cultural influence made itself felt at the court of Fyodor chiefly through the Ukrainians and Greeks. Some of the boyars adopted Polish costume, and introduced foreign books and paintings into their homes. In 1687 the first permanent educational institution, the Sla- vonic-Greek-Latin Academy, was opened in Moscow. These were the first signs of reformation aimed at overcoming the backwardness of the Russian state.

The Regency of Sophia

The Uprising in Moscow in 1682

Tsar Fyodor Alexeyevich died in the spring of 1682 without male issue, and the crown was to pass to one of his brothers: either to Ivan, who though the older was feeble-minded, or to Peter. Tsar Fyodor’s ruling boyars disliked the overweening and grasping Miloslavskis, and even during the tsar’s lifetime had established friendly relations with the Naryshkins. As soon as Tsar Fyodor died, the patriarch and the boyars proclaimed Peter tsar. The crowd that gathered around the palace greeted the de- cision with cries of approval.

The numerous Miloslavski family refused to accept the transference of power to the Naryshkins, and took advantage of the unrest among the Streltsi as a means of combating their rivals. The condition of the rank-and-file Streltsi, artisans and petty tradesmen at the time grew visibly worse on account of heavy taxation and the general impoverish- ment of the petty townsfolk. The Streltsi had not received their pay for a long time. The nobles in command of the Streltsi oppressed their men whom they compelled to work on their estates as serfs. Those who com- plained of their treatment were cruelly punished. Partisans of the Miloslavskis encouraged the Streltsi to regard the Naryshkins as the cause of their troubles. On May 16, 1682, the Streltsi seized several guns, and with banners unfurled and beating drums broke into the Kremlin. Cries were raised in the crowd accusing the Naryshkins of having strangled Ivan, whereupon Peter’s mother, Tsaritsa Natalia, led both brothers — Ivan and Peter — out onto the porch. But the in- iuriated Streltsi, provoked by oppression and their hatred of the Na- ryshkins, rushed into the palace. One of the first to fall at the hands of the mutinous soldiery was their chief, Prince Dolgoruki. The mas- sacre of the boyars continued until late in the evening. The men dragged the corpses to £o6aoye Mesta with mocking cries such as ‘‘Here is Boyar Komodanovsky. Make way for the Member of the Duma!’' Among the slain were Boyar Artamon Matveyev and two of the tsaritsa's elder brothers.

The Streltsi mutiny was followed by a wider popular outbreak. The city poor raided the kkolopi prikaz where serf records were kept, and destroyed almost all the bondage documents.

The Streltsi routed the government of the Naryshkins. The govern- ment offices became deserted. The boyars and the clerks fled. Sophia took advantage of the tumult and adroitly made use of the Streltsi as an instrument of achieving her own ends. She conciliated the Streltsi by meeting all their demands and paid them arrears of pay for the past 35 years. On the insistence of the Streltsi both brothers— Ivan and Peter — were jointly proclaimed tsars, the feeble-minded Ivan be- ing considered as the “first” tsar. Sophia was proclaimed regent during the minority of her brothers.

Princess Sophia

The Moscow princesses led a secluded life in the privacy of their palace chambers. They were poorly educated and never appeared in public. Sophia was a striking contrast to the other prin- cesses. She studied Polish and read Polish books under the tuition of Simt on Polotski, and began to make her appearance in public, even in the presence of foreigners.

Sophia’s closest friend and “first minister” was Prince Vasili Vasilyevich Golitsyn, one of the best-educated boyars of the late 17th century. Prince Golitsyn was keenly alive to the necessity of radical reforms which he frequently discussed in his conversations with foreign- ers. But not a single of the reforms he cherished was destined to see* the light of day. Throughout her regency Sophia was absorbed by her struggle for personal sway and feared that reforips would arouse the discontent of the influential but conservative boyars. Golitsyn, whe had many enemies among the boyars, also had his misgivings on this score.

For a long time the Polish gentry could not reconcile itself to the loss of Ukrainian territory east of the Dnieper, and particularly ta the loss of Kiev. After the Truce of Andrusovo in 1667, the envoys of Muscovy and Poland met several times to conclude a final treaty of peace, but the disputed question of Kiev invariably resulted in the break-off of negotiations. The Turkish issue, however, eventually in* duced Poland to compromise and come to an agreement with Russia. Austria had formed an alliance with Poland and Venice against Turkey with whom she was then at war. Commerce in the Mediterranean was seriously affected by a hostile Turkish fleet. The allies defeated the Turkish troops at Vienna and compelled the sultan to raise bis siege of the Austrian capital. Unable to inflict a decisive defeat upon the Turks, however, the allies solicited Russia’s help. In 16S6 the Polish king sent a “grand embassy” to Moscow, which, after protracted negotiations, concluded a treaty of "eternal” peace. Poland agreed to the cession of Kiev and a small adjacent territory to Russia, while Russia undertook to begin ^ar immediately against the Crimean khan, a vassal of the Turkish sultan. Turkey blockaded Russia on the Black Sea. The Crimean Tatars continued to make inroads on southern Rus- sian lands.

The first Crimean campaign by a Russian army in 1687 under Prince V. V. Golitsyn ended in complete failure. The army could not cross the southern steppe, which the Tatars had set on fire, and was forced to turn back. In the early spring of 1689 Prince Golitsyn returned with a stronger army, which this time overcame the difficulties of the march across the steppes and reached the Tatar fortress of Perekop, erected at the narrowest point of the isthmus. Golitsyn, however, hesitated to take this fortress by storm and after a brief siege he ordered a retreat.. The Tatars harassed the retiring Russian troops.

The failure of the Crimean campaigns greatly weakened the po- sition of Sophia’s government. The nobles openly murmured against the difficulties caused by the war and the senseless losses. Meanwhile Peter’s adherents were growing in number.

Peter’s Youth

During Sophia’s regency Peter lived with his mother and their retinue in the suburban palaces, for the most part in the vil- lage of Preobrazhenskoye. Although Peter still retained his title of tsar, he had no power whatever. In the shady groves surrounding the village of Preobrazhenskoye, Peter spent the days playing soldiers with his playmates. They built small earthen fortifications and prac- tised taking them by assault. Several years later Peter formed his com- panions into two "sham” regiments, which came to be called the Preo- brazhensky and Semyonovsky regiments, after the names of the two villages.

Once Peter found a foreign sailboat among some of his grand- father’s old possessions in the village of Izmailovo. A resident of the foreign settlement in Moscow named Brant, who had once served in the navy, taught Peter to sail this boat, first on the narrow Yauza River (near Moscow) and then on the Izmailovo pond. The pond not providing sufficient cruising room Peter obtained his mother’s consent to sail his boat on the big lake at Pereyaslavl.

At first Sophia was delighted that Peter occupied himself with military games, for they kept his attention from palace affairs. But the years passed; Peter and his "sham” soldiers were growing up; Peter had already reached the age of seventeen. The two regiments of his childish games trained along European lines became the best in Moscow* Sophia realized the danger that was brewing and prej^red for a palace coup. She officially called herself "absolute ruler” and secretly received and feasted the Streltsi in her palace with the object oi winning their support. Relations between Sophia and Peter grew inimical to a point when rupture became unavoidable.

One night in August 1689 Peter received word that Sophia had as- sembled the Streltsi and was preparing to attack. Peter galloped to the Well-fortified Troitsk-Sergiyev Monastery, where he was liortly joined by his “sham” regiments and a regiment of the Streltsi, in addi- tion to some nobles and a few of the boyars. Sophia’s attempt to incite the Streltsi ended in failure. Meanwhile the number of Peter’s support- ers grew from day to day. A month later Peter took over power. Sophia, deserted by everyone, was interned in a convent, and her closest aide, Prince V. V. Golitsyn, was banished to the north.

The Azov Expeditions and Peter's Foreign Travels

The Azov Expeditions

In the early years following the fall of Sophia’s government, Peter did not meddle in his mother’s ad- ministration of affairs. He continued to indulge in his military games, which, however, grew more and more earnest as time went on. With a small group of assistants he built and launched a man-of-war on Lake Pereyaslavl. Shortly after, he set off for Archangi^l, where he had his first sight of big ships sailing the open sea. In Moscow Peter frequently visited the foreign settlement, where he made useful ac- quaintances with foreigners. Patrick Gordon, an old Scottish general, entertained him with descriptions of the battles he had taken part in. Francois Lefort, a jovial Swiss, arranged for him various amusements. Peter however did not neglect his education. The Dutchman, Tim- merman, gave him lessons in arithmetic, geometry and gunnery. Peter made such rapid progress that he soon began to correct the mistakes of his teacher, who was not too well versed in the sciences himself*

Peter’s military exercises and manoeuvres were preliminaries for a new expedition against the Crimea. After Golitsyn’s unsuccessful campaigns, the Moscow government had confined itself to fortifying the southern borders against Tatar raids. The war against Turkey which Austria and Poland had begun and to which Bussia had become a party was being waged half-heartedly. Austria and Poland, disregarding Russia’s interests, began negotiations with Turkey for concluding a separate peace, whereupon the Moscow government opened negotia- tions with the Crimean khan. The latter, however, categorically re- fused to cede to Russia the fortress of Azov, which was held by a Turk- ish garrison.

The ancient Russian territory in the region of the Sea pf Azoy. was essential to Russia, as a gateway to the sea via the With ^^sov in her possession Russia would constitute a threat to the Crimean khan in the event of the Tatars attacking the southern borderlands.

Peter decided to capture Azov. In the spring of 1695 a Bussian army of 30,000 sailed down the Oka to the Volga on river boats and then crossed over to the Don. Peter wrote back to Moscow: ‘‘We amused ourselves at Kozhukhov (Moscow suburb where the manoeuvres were held), and now We are off to Azov to play.” Having no fleet Peter could not blockade the fortress from the sea, whence the Turks were steadily receiving reinforcements, arms and provisions.

However, lack of coordination and mutual support among the different regiments of the Bussian army permitted the Turks to concen- *trate their forces at the most vulnerable points. The onset of autumn compelled the Bussians to lift ^ their siege of Azov.

The unsuccessful Azov campaign demonstrated to Peter how badly Bussia needed a navy.* Besolved upon renewing the campaign the fol- lowing summer, Peter ordered the construction in a single winter of a flotilla of galleys and other light craft. Shipyards were set up on the bank of the Voronezh River not far from its confluence with the Don, in the vicinity of a forest which provided excellent oak, linden and pine timber for shipbuilding. Peter himself took part in the work, sometimes as an engineer, sometimes as an ordinary carpenter*

In the spring of 1696, to the amazement of the Turks, a Russian fleet of 30 galleys and numerous small craft and rowboats appeared off Azov, The Turkish fleet withdrew without giving battle. Peter laid siege to Azov from the sea and from land. Despairing of assistance from Constantinople, the Turks surrendered at the close of the summer.

Peter's Trip Abroad

The taking of Azov did not end the war. The Turks had a strong navy and still dominated the Black Sea. Hence Peter decided to send out a “grand embassy” to establish closer contact with the countries of Western Europe. He commissioned the embassy not only to strengthen and broaden the alliance of European states against Turkey but also to hire a requisite number of foreign special- ists, engineers and artillerymen for the Russian army.

The embassy left Moscow in 1697. Peter attached himself to the embassy, travelling incognito in the capacity of a sailorman under the name of Peter Mikhailov. Peter wished to make a close study of the life, culture and technical achievements of Europe. His letters to Moscow bore a seal with the following Slavonic inscription: “I am a student seeking teachers,”

Arriving ahead of the “grand embassy,” Peter studied the rules of gunnery in the town of Koenigsberg. Prom here he hast( ntd to the town of Saardam in HolJand, noted for its excellent shipyard, where he rented lodgings in the humble home of a blacksmith and started to work at the shipyard as an ordinary carpenter. He was soon recognized, however, for many Dutch merchants had been to Russia and identified this stalwart six-and-a-half foot workman of powerful physique as the tsar of Russia. To escape the curious crowds Peter moved to Amsterdam, where he became an apprentice at one of the largest shipyards. He worked here for over four months, until a big ship he had started to build was launched. In his free time he visited the manufactories, workshops and museums, and talked with scientists, artists, etc.

Prom Holland Peter went to England, In London he studied the country *s system of government and attended a session of parliament. At Deptford on the Thames he devoted more than two months to the study of shipbuilding.

Peter left England for Vienna to negotiate an alliance against Tur- key with the Austrian emperor. But during the “grand embassy’s” so|ourn abroad it had become clear that the plan for a big alliance of European states against Turkey could not be realized. Most of the European powers were occupied with the fate of the Spanish dominions, since the hing of Spain, a descendant of the Hapsburg dynasty of Austria, had died leaving no issue.

The War of the Spanish Succession broke out soon after and lasted for almost 13 years (1701-1714). Austria not only had no desire to help Peter in the war against Turkey but hastened instead to conclude peace with her. Poland also suspended hostilities with Turkey.

During his foreign travels Peter became better acquainted with the political situation in the Baltic countries. Sweden, who had great- ly enhanced her power in the 17th century, had seized the Baltic sea- coast and threatened Denmark, Poland and Russia . Sweden deprived Russia of an outlet to the sea, which was essential for the country’s economic and cultural development. Already at the beginning of the 17th century she had seized ancient Russian lands along the coast of the Gulf of Finland. Sweden’s opponents considered the time ripe for recovering the Baltic seaboard. Peter, who fully realized the importance of the Baltic Sea for Russia, decided to end the war with Turkey and the Crimean khanate and to join the alliance against Sweden.

The Streltsi Mutiny

Peter’s return to Russia was hastened by news of a mutiny among the Streltsi. The Streltsi had been accus- tomed to performing light guard duties in Moscow and to engaging in petty trade or in the handicrafts the rest of the time. Peter demanded of them full-time military service. After the capture* of Azov he had left some of the Streltsi regiments in the south and transferred others closer to the western border. This aroused keen resentment among the Streltsi who had their families and trades in Moscow. Sophia and her followers, who cherished dreams of a revival of ancient Moscow customs, tried to turn the discontent among the Streltsi to their own ends. Sophia began secret negotiations with the Streltsi, who decided to seize the capital and proclaim her tsaritsa. The Streltsi movement was thus of a reactionary nature. In the summer of 1698 four regiments of the Streltsi stationed in the town of Toropets staged a mutiny and set out for Moscow. General Gordon easily crushed the rebels in an engagement fought near the capital.

News of the mutiny reaching Peter in Vienna, he set out post haste for Moscow. On the way he met King Augustus II of Poland and came to an understanding with him regarding a joint war against Sweden,

Desiring to avoid an elaborate reception, Peter returned to the capital when nobody expected him. Instead of proceeding to the pal- ace he put up in his modest home iii the village of Preobrazhenskoye. News of the tsar’s return from his foreign tour quickly spread through* out the city. The next morning the boyars, nobles, and merchants and other townspeople came to Preobrazhenskoye to greet him. Peter met them all cordially but would not permit the old ceremony of kneeling before him. During the reception Peter with his own hand clipped off the long beards of the boyars. Later he issued an ukase prohibiting th© wearing of the long, inconvenient, ancient Russian costume.

Peter was dissatisfied with the results of the investigations into the Streltsi mutiny. He reopened the enquiry, establishing the fact of Sophia ^s participation in the conspiracy. Peter dealt with the Streltsi who had taken part in the revolt with exemplary severity; gallows were set up in many parts of the city, and on the appointed day 195 Streltsi were hanged before Sbphia’s windows in the Novodevichy Nunnery. In all, 1 ,200 Streltsi were executed. Peter disbanded the Moscow Streltsi regiments. Princess Sophia, convicted of participating in the conspir- acy, was compelled to take the veil.

The Beginning of the War with Sweden

The Defeat at Narva

Peter entered into an alliance with Denmark and Poland against Sweden. In preparation for the war for the Baltic he formed new army units by recruiting peasant and house- hold serfs, and freemen. The new soldiers, dressed in dark green uni- form and cocked hats after the fashion of the infantry of Western Europe, Were drilled from morning to late at night in the suburbs of Moscow, In three months a contingent of 32,000 was trained. Meanwhile Peter had sent an embassy to Constantinople to negotiate with Turkey, with whom peace was concluded in August 1700. Under the peace terms Russia retained Azov.

King Charles XII of Sweden quickly mustered a small but efl&cient army. The Swedish troops had acquired a good training in the wars of the 17th century and were considered the best in Europe. Charles unexpectedly invaded Denmark and compelled the Danish king to conclude peace. His next plan was to attack his second opponent, King Augustus II of Poland. Sweden did not yet know of Russia’s war prep- arations.

After the conclusion of peace with Turkey, Peter immediately orderedthe army to attack the Swedish fortress of Narva, which guard- ed the approaches to the Baltic Sea.

The siege of Narva at once exposed the shortcomings in the organ- ization and supply system of the Russian troops. In the difficult march over muddy roads the baggage train fell behind the army. There were not enough shells for the artillery, and the gunpowder was of inferior quality. Gun carriages broke down after the first few shots. The soldiers suffered from hunger, cold and exposure in the trenches. Disease broke out.

When Charles learned that Narva was besieged by Russian troops he hastened to the rescue. The Swedish forces appeared before the Kussfan camp the day after Peter departed to prepare the Russian borders for defence. Under cover of a blizzard blowing against the Rus- sians, the Swedes attacked and broke through the first line of the Rus- sian defences. The mounted nobles’ levy fled. The foreign officers in command of Russian units turned traitor and went over to the Swedes. The Russian soldiers, left leaderless, broke up into small groups and continued to beat off the Swedes in hand-to-hand encounters. The Preobrazhensky and Semyonovsky regiments staunchly warded off all attacks and withdrew in full order. Nonetheless the Swedes scored a complete victory. They took many prisoners and captured all the artillery. After defeating the Russian army at Narva, Charles directed his arms against Augustus II. But he erred in thinking that the Russian army would not be able to continue the w^ar.

The Reorganization of the Army

Petei set about re^^toring and reorganizing his army with feverish haste and tremendous energy.

To make good the loss of his artillery he ordert d the bells removed from some of the churches and cast into guns (they were made of bronze in those days). Within a year he had 300 new guns, approximately twice as many as be had Jost at Narva. In place of the noblemen’s mounted levy and the Streltsi he built up a large army of dragoon and infantry regiments -after the Western European model. The comple- ment was maintained by recruitment, a fixed number of peasant house- holds being obliged to furnish one recruit. Each enlistment provided from 30,000 to 40,000 recruits, who were first trained in special camps and then assigned to various regiments. This system of army replace- ments was several decades ahead of the system used in Western Europe, which was based chiefly on the employment of mercenaries. The Rus- sian army had closer ties with the people. The nobles were also made to begin their service in the army from the ranks; only afterwards were they commissioned as officers in the guards or line regiments. Only the old and the disabled were allowed to retire from the army.

The first military reforms were accomplished with such speed that in 1701 the Russian army was ready to take the field. A corps under the command of Sheremetev twice defeated Swedish forces and occupied almost all of Liflandia. In 1703 Russian troops stormed and captured the fortress of Marienburg and the following year took Dorpat and Narva, Meanwhile Peter was conducting successful operations in Ingria (on the left bank of the Neva). In the autumn of 1702 he cap- tured the Swedish fortress of Noteborg, which had been built on the site of the old Novgorod town of Oreshek at the source of the Neva at Lake Ladoga. In a letter to Moscow announcing the capture of Noteborg- Oreshek, Peter, punning the word Oreshek, which in Russian is syn- onymous with ‘‘nut,” wrote: “Truly this was a hard nut, but it has happily been cracked, thank God.” Peter renamed this fortress Schlus- selburg, i.e., key city, for it provided an exit from Lake Ladoga. Ad- vancing down the Neva, Peter captured another Swedish fortress, Nyenskans, in the spring of 1703; this fortress was situated on the right bank of the Neva not far from the sea. In May of the same year he laid the cornerstone of the Fortress of Peter and Paul near this spot. Some wooden houses built nearby were the beginnings of the city of St. Petersburg.

Peter hastened to fortify himself on the Neva River, which provid- ed an outlet into the Baltic. Construction of the fortress of Kronslott (later known as Kronstadt) was begun on Kotlin Island near the mouth of the Neva. A shipyard (the Svirskaya) was built on Lake Ladoga, and its first ship slid down the ways in the selfsame year of 1703. Peter was making intensive preparations for a naval war against Sweden.

Peter thus took excellent advantage of Charles ’ mistake in under- estimating the fighting qualities of the Russian army and in trans- ferring his main forces to Poland for several years. During this time the reorganized Russian army, having received a school of training in victories over the Swedes, was growing strong.

The Condition of the Peasants under Peter the Great. Popular Uprisings

Hard Plight of the Peasantry

The big successes in consoli- dating the nobles ’ state were achieved at the cost of tremendous sac- rifices on the part of the masses of the people, particularly the peas- ants. State expenditures had increased several times over within a short period. Money was needed for the construction of a navy, the purchase of weapons abroad, and the maintenance of a large new army. “Money is the sinews of war,” Peter said. Within a few years taxes were raised fivefold. Taxes were levied on bees, bathhouses, salt, the sale of cucumbers, oak coffins and the like. Special revenue officers called ^^pribylshchikV were instituted with the express function of discovering new sources of taxation. Peter prohibited the wearing of beards and moustaches in the towns, but made an exception for those who purchased exemption at the price of a tax; the latter were given copper tokens as tax receipts. The peasants were allowed to wear beards in the villages, but upon entering or leaving town they also had to pay a special fee.

No less burdensome were the miscellaneous services imposed upon the peasants and the craftsmen. Almost every year recruitment ab- sorbed tens of thousands of men who never returned home, except for a small number of disabled soldiers. The peasants were compelled to furnish horses for the transportation of military supplies, to repair bridges, build roads, dig canals, etc.

The lot of the serf peasants was a wretched one, for in addition to paying state taxes they were obliged to render service to their landlords. The expenses of the nobles were growing rapidly at that period. The nobles spent practically all their lives in military or civil service. Those residing in the capital built houses, furnished them luxuriously and spent a good deal on entertainment. The nobles tried to cover their increased expenditures at the expense of their peasants. Through their overseers and bailiffs they kept a watchful eye on the lives of their peasants. If a peasant’s living conditions showed signs of improvement new exactions were immediately imposed on him. There was even a saying among the landlords: “Don’t let the peasant grow shaggy but shear him naked like a sheep.”

The difficult conditions under which the peasants, the lower strata of the Cossacks and the town population lived, led to a series of new uprisings.

The Uprising In Astrakhan

The first large uprising took place in Astrakhan, Every year the opening of the navigation season attracted a large number of people to Astrakhan seeking work in the salt and fishing industries. The heavy taxes particularly affected the poor people, and were a cause of discontent and unrest among the population. On the night of July 30, 1705, a re^volt broke out among the Streltsi and the lower strata of the townsfolk. The waywodes and most of the people in authority were killed. But the more prosperous merchants quickly seized power in the town and a “council of elders” was elected from among their number. With the help of the local gar- risons and residents the rebels captured several towns on the "iaik (Ural), Terek and Volga rivers. Attempts were made to stir up the Cossacks of the Don, but these attempts ended in failure. In Cheikassk the well-to-do Cossacks arrested the delegates who had come from As- trakhan. Troops under Field Marshal Sheremetev were sent out against .the rebellious population of Astrakhan. Discord arose among the reb- els. The well-to-do merchants and the Metropolitan sent a delegation to the tsar to plead for mercy, but the poor gathered at a meeting which resolved not to give up the town. Astrakhan was taken after a bombard- ment in March 1706. The Astrakhan uprising thus lasted almost eight months.

The Uprising of 1707–1708

The Astrakhan outbreak had bare- ly come to an end when a more formidable rising broke out on the Don under the leadership of Ataman Kondrati Bulavin. After the capture of Azov, various services and duties, including military serv- ice, had been imposed on the Don Cossacks. The government laid ever-growing restraints on Cossack autonomy, the existence of an in- dependent Cossack force being regarded as a political menace. This aroused discontent among well-to-do Cossackdom of the Lower Don. Since the end of the 17th century a vast number of fugitive peasants from the southern districts had been drifting toward the Upper Don area. The Raskolniks (dissenters) fleeing religious persecution also sought refuge here. The landlords of the southern districts constantly complained to the government that their peasants were running away. At the close of the 17th and the beginning of Ihe 18th centuries the government sent several punitive expeditions to the Don, which hunted down fugitive peasants and sacked the Cossack tovms where they had settled. Exceptional brutality was displayed by a punitive force under Prince Yuri Dolgoruki. One autumn night in 1707, when Dolgoruki’s detachment had pitched camp for the night in a Cossack village on the Aidar River, the poor, led by Ataman Kondrati Bulavin, wiped it out.

The uprising spread quickly among the Cossacks of the Upper Don and then to the workers of the Voronezh shipyards. In the Tambov and Kozlov districts the serf peasants attacked the estates of their landlords and then left to join the Cossacks. The uprising thus became a peasant as well as a Cossack movement. After a reverse in battle Bula- vin left for Zaporozhye to rouse the Ultrainian Cossacks. There, how- ever, he met with opposition from the wealthy Cossacks. But despite the prohibition of their hetman, the Zaporozhye rank-and-file poor Cossacks made their way to the Don in groups and joined the uprising.

In the spring of 1708 Bulavin returned to the upper reaches of the Don. The spontaneous uprising had by this time spread over a large area. Hastily mustering the rebel detachments, Bulavin led them to the town of Cherkassk, the administrative centre of the Don Cossacks. The well-to-do Cossacks of the Lower Don were also discontented with the actions of the tsarist government, but they were afraid of the poor. When the Cossack ataman tried to check the advance of the rebels, the majority of the Cossacks of his detachment deserted to Bulavin’s side without giving battle. The rank-and-file Cossacks had agreed among themselves to fire blank cartridges at Bulavin’s men. The inhabitants* of the Cossack villages met him with bread and salt, to show that he was welcome. Bulavin encountered no strong resistance and easily captured Cherkassk.

Although the wealthy Cossacks acknowledged Bulavin as their ataman, they secretly conspired against him. Bulavin was not suffi- ciently resolute in fighting the enemy. He tarried in Cherkassk while the tsarist government was making urgent preparations to crush the uprising. The government held the fortress of Azov, situated not far from Cherkassk. Bulavin let the time for a sudden attack on Azov slip by, and when he finally attempted to capture it after having spent two months in Cherkassk, he failed. The wealthy Cossacks promptly took advantage of this and rose against him in Cherkassk. They surrounded Bulavin’s house, but he fought them off for a long time. Then, rather than fall into the enemy’s hands alive, he shot himself.

After Bulavin’s death, rebel detachments under the command of atamans Khokhlach, Drany, Goly and others continued to operate in many places along the Lower Volga and the upper reaches of tho Don and the Donets rivers. Proclamations issued by Bulavin and his ata- mans were secretly circulated among the people. *‘We are not after the common people, we are after the boyars who do wrong wrote Ataman Goly. In response to these appeals, new revolts broke out among the masses. On the Volga Bulavin’s adherents took Tsaritsyn (now Stalingrad) and a])proached Saratov. The tsarist government was alarmed at the prospect of Bulavin’s detachments penetrating to the Middle Volga area, where revolt was fomenting among the Bashkirs. Sporadic outbreaks among the peasantry had occurred in various parts of the country: near Smolensk, at Nizhni Novgorod, along the upper reaches of the Volga, in Karelia, in the northern regions and elsewhere.

The government sent a large punitive army under Prince Vasili Dolgoruki to the Don and the Lower Volga. The scattered rebel detach- ments could not hold out for long against the tsarist regulars. Prince Dolgoruki slaughtered almost all the adult males in the area of the uprising. By the end of 1708 the main insurgent districts were sup- pressed and occupied by the royal troops.

The Uprising of the Bashkirs

Outbreaks among the Bashkirs had occurred as early as in 1704, three years before the Don uprising. The chief cause was the seizure of Bashkirian lands by Russian land- lords and the imposition of new burdensome taxes. The Bashkirs tes- tified that they were even taxed for having black or grey eyes. They refused to pay the taxes and did not permit the revenue officers to come on their lands to take a census. In the following year sporadic unrest broke out into open rebellion, and the Bashkirs crossed to the right bank of the Kama and stirred up the Tatar, Cheremissi (Mari), Votyak (Ud- murt) and Chuvash peoples. The rich hatyrs (feudal nobles), promi- nent among them Aldar and Kusyum, took over the leadership of the uprising. They hoped to set up a separate Bashkir state as a vassal of the Crimea or Turkey, In the spring of 1708 the Bashkirs were se- verely defeated by tsarist troops . Many of the hatyrs^ including Kusyum, then deserted the uprising. Isolated operations by insurgent Bashkirs continued for several more years.

By 1711 the tsarist government had suppressed the popular move- ments everywhere.

The End of the War with Sweden; the Wars of Peter the Great in the East

The Campaign of Charles XII Against Russia

Charles XII did not defeat Augustus II until 1706, when he compelled him to conclude peace. The Swedes now had only one opponent: Russia. At the end of 1707 the Swedish army marched towards the Russian fron- tier. The following summer Charles reached the Dnieper at Mogilev. Peter expected the Swedish king to march on Moscow, but the latter, who had learned that the Russian army was of a different mettle to the one he had engaged at Narva, did not risk such an undertaking. From Mogilev he turned south, to the Ukraine. There he planned to give bis army a rest, replenish his food supplies and await reinforce- ments from Sweden. Besides, the hetman of the Ukraine, Ivan Mazepa, was carrying on a secret correspondence with Charles and planning treason. He assured Charles that as soon as the Swedish forces appeared in the Ulcraine an uprising against Peter would flare up. Mazepa’s plans, however, fell through. In the autumn of 1708 Peter annihilated the Swedish relief army under Lewenhaupt. The encounter took place near the village of Lesnaya on the Sozh River (east of the Dnieper) while Lewenhaupt was on his way to join Charles with a large baggage train. Hetman Mazepa went over to Charles with a small detachment of Cossack elders. The Ukrainian population, however, far from sup- porting the traitor Mazepa, began a guerilla war against the Swedes. This placed the Swedes in still greater difficulties— they were faced with the menace of starvation, since they could not receive food sup- plies from a hostile population.

In April 1709 Charles reached the small fortress of Poltava and laid siege to it. Once this fortress was taken the Swedes would have before them an open road to Moscow and Voronezh, where food sup- plies for the Russian army had been concentrated. Peter also feared that the Turks would violate the peace terms and render the Swedes assist- ance by way of Azov.

The Victory at Poltava

Peter hurried to the rescue of Poltava with the main forces of his army. The decisive engagement between the Russian and Swedish armies took plaee on June 27, 1709, on the bank of the Vorskla River in the vicinity of Poltava. On the eve of the battle Peter’s order was read to the Russian troops:

“Men I The hour is at hand that will decide the fate of our country. And so, do not imagine that you are fighting for Peter, you are fight- ing for the kingdom entrusted to Peter, for your family and your na- tive country. Be not daunted by the enemy fame, who is alleged to be invincible, for it is a lie which you have repeatedly proven by your own victories. As for Peter, know ye that he does not hold his life dear, so long as Russia lives in joy and fame to your own well-being. . .

The Swedes opened the battle with a fierce attack on the Russian positions. The wounded King Charles spurred on his men with words of encouragement as he was carried aroimd his ranlcs on a stretcher. But all the efforts of the Swedes to break the resistance of the Russian regiments were in vain. Hand-to-hand fighting lasted two hours. Peter’s life was constantly in danger; his hat and his saddle were riddled with bullets. The onslaught of the Russians was so fierce that the Swedes broke ranks and fled. Only a small body of Swedish cavalry headed by Charles and Mazepa escaped from their pursuers and fled to Turkey. The rest of the Swedish army surrendered. Altogether about 20,000 prisoners were taken, including all of Charles’ generals.

The brilliant Russian victory at Poltava was of tremendous sig- nificance. The Swedes were considered the best troops in Europe and Charles an invincible general. Swedish military glory had been dealt a severe blow. Poland and Denmark again entered into an alliance with Russia to continue the war against Sweden. Prussia also joined this alliance.

The War with Turkey

Charles, who had fled to Turkey after his defeat, incited her against Russia, upon whom she declared war in

1710. Peter immediately marched toward the Danube with an army of 40,000; he counted on the assistance of the Polish army and on an up- rising among the Slav population under Turkish domination. However, a large Turkish army (about 200,000 men) advancing toward the Rus- sian border surrounded the Russian troops under Peter at the Pruth in

1711. The Russian army lacked provisions and sufficient ammunition. But the Turkish commander-in-chief, not suspecting the difficult straits the Russian army was in, agreed to conclude peace.

Though under the peace terms Peter returned Azov to Turkey he had managed to save his army.

The End of the Swedish War

After the Turkish war, Peter again turned his attention to Sweden. In the years immediately follow, ing the Battle of Poltava the Russian army had completely ousted the Swedes from the coasts of the Gulf of Riga and the Gulf of Finland. In Pomerania (on the southern shore of the Baltic Sea), the Russians were operating against the Swedes jointly with the Prussians and the Danes.

Peter’s main efforts were directed at permanently securing the Baltic seaboard for Russia. Under his command the young Russian navy won a brilliant victory over the Swedish fleet off Cape Hango udde (Finland) in 1714.

Peter’s infantry, embarked on galleys, drew alongside the Swedish ships in the face of heavy cannon fire. The Russian soldiers boarded the enemy ships by means of ladders and captured them after a fierce hand- to-hand melee.

This naval defeat forced Charles to enter into peace negotiations with Russia, but they were broken off after his death. The Swedish government decided to make peace with Prussia, Denmark and Po- land and to concentrate all its forces against Russia. The Russians won another great victory over the Swedish fleet in 1720 off the Island of Gidnhamn. After having in the course of the 13th to the 17th centu- ries been cut off from the Black and Baltic seas, Russia within a few years became a great naval power. Supremacy of the Russian fleet on the Baltic Sea enabled the Russian army to invade Sweden and even to appear in the neighbourhood of Stockholm.

A peace treaty was finally signed in Nystad, Finland, in 1721. Russia received the coasts of the Gulf of Finland and the Gulf of Riga: jDart of Karelia (including Vyborg), Tngria, Esthland (including Narva and Revel) and Liflandia (including Riga).

The victory over Sweden was of tremendous significance for Russia. The lack of convenient seaboards had retarded the country’s economic development. Livonia, and then Sweden, had deliberately deprived Russia of every opportimity not only of trading but also of maintain- ing cultural relations with Western Europe. Peter secured a footing on the Baltic Sea and thus brought to a conclusion the struggle of the Russian people for the seacoast, a struggle which they had been waging since the end of the l.'ith century. Peter took only what was absolutely essential for Russia’s normal development.

After the conclusion of the Treaty of Nystad, the Senate bestowed on Peter the title of emperor, and Russia became officially known as the Russian empire. This new name testified to the growth of the power and strength of the Rupsian state.

Relations with the East

Despite the prolonged war with Sweden which entailed heavy expenditure and effort, Peter did not lose sight of Russia’s eastern frontiers. In southwestern Siberia the Russians between 1715 and 1720 occupied the entire upper reaches of the Irtysh. A considerable number of small fortresses, including Omsk and Semipalatinsk, was built on the banks of this river. The Upper Irtysh was the starting point of an ancient caravan route to Bokhara and Khiva. The Russian government simultaneously made prepara- tions to invade Central Asia from the Caspian Sea. In 1716 a detach- ment under Prince Bekovich-Cherkassky was sent to Khiva ostensibly to congratulate the khan on his accession to the throne but actually to obtain economic and military-political information about Khiva and Bokhara. The detachment \vas surrounded in the steppes and al- most totally annihilated. This failure temporarily checked the advance of the Russians beyond the Caspian Sea.

Peter also endeavoured to entrench himself on the western shore of the Caspian. This was highly important for the strengthening of Russian influence in Transcaucasia and Persia, with whom trade was developing rapidly at the beginning of the 18th century. Russia used the pillaging of Russian merchants during an uprising in Shemakha (in Azerbaijan) against the rule of Persia as a pretext to send a mili- tary expedition to the western shore of the Caspian.

Peter himself took part in the campaign, which began in 1722, soon after the conclusion of peace with Sweden. Russia found support in Transcaucasia among the feudal lords of Azerbaijan, Eastern Georgia and Armenia as well as among the local tradesmen and the clergy. Their friendliness toward the Russian troops was due to their fear of Turkey, who strove to seize Ihe entire Caucasus. The peace treaty with Persia signed in 1723 gave Russia the western shore of the Caspian including Derbeut and Baku, and the southern shore, includ. ing Astrabad. Russia, however, was unable to retain these lands and soon abandoned them to Persia

Social and Economic Conditions in Russia and Peter's Economy Policy

The Development of Manufacturing

Russia \s poorly-developed industry made her dependent upon Western Europe. ‘When Peter the Great , having to deal with the more advanced countries of the West, began feverishly to build factories and workshops in order to supply his armies and to strengthen the defences of the country, it was a pecul- iar attempt on his part to escape from the grip of backwardness.” *

At the beginning of the 18th century the petty craftsmen were no longer able to satisfy the steadily increasing demands of the home mar- ket. Many articles that Russia did not produce had to be imported from Holland, England, Sweden and other countries. The war with Sweden severely hampered this trade. Meanwhile the army needed woollens and boots, as well as muskets, guns, gunpowder and other military equipment.

Peter promoted the development of manufacturing and granted the owners of manufactories extensive privileges. Since it was partic- ularly important to introduce the manufacture of goods that were supplied by import, he permitted foreigners to set up manufactories, and invited foreign technical experts to Russia, with whose assistance he established government manufactories which were subsequently turned over to commercial companies.

Serious difficulties were encoimtered in acquiring labour-power. Only an insignificant number of freemen came to work in the manu- factories, and the merchants who owned the majority of the establish- ments did not possess any serfs. Hence a decree was issued in 1721 per- mitting the purchase of entire villages of peasants on condition that they be permanently attached to the manufactories and not sold apart from them. These peasants came to be called “possessional” peasants. In addition to their work in the manufactories they had to till the land.

Manufacturing made great advances under Peter. The production of woollens, linens and leather increased many times over. There was an especially large iucreairic in the jiroduction of pig iron. A number of new industries was established, notably copper smelting, shipbuild* ing and silk weaving,

A large number of state-owned metallurgical works was built in the Urals, Factories were also founded there by Nikita Demidov, a former grmsmith from Tula. Ekaterinburg (now Sverdlovsk), the ad- ministrative centre of the Urals, subsequently became a major iron and steel to^vn.

By the end of Peter’s reign there were about 240 manufactories in Russia. The majority were small and did not survive long; only a few developed, and these formed a cornerstone for the further rise of manufacturing in the country.

The conditions of the manufactory workers were extremely bad. The proprietors treated them as serfs, paid them a miserable wage and subjected them to brutal and degrading punishments. The first disor- ders and the first strike broke out as early as in the twenties of the 18th century at the Moscow Cloth Manufactory.

The Mercantile System

Practically the whole output of the Russian factories was consumed within the coimtry. Raw materials and agricultural products continued to be exported. Following the con- quest of the Baltic seaboard, commerce with Western Europe passed chiefly through the Baltic ports, instead of through Archangel. In No- vember 1703 the first foreign merchant ship carrying a cargo for Rus- sia sailed up to the mouth of the Neva. In 1724, St. Petersburg was visited by about 200 foreign ships.

To facilitate the transportation of goods to St. Petersburg from Central Russia, Peter built the Vyshne-Volochok Canal linking the Tvertsa, a tributary of the Volga, with the Msta, which empties into Lake Ilmen. This created a direct water route between the Volga and the Baltic Sea. Work was started on the Ladoga Canal, to bypass the stormy Lake Ladoga, but it was not completed until after Peter death,

Peter’s government attached great importance to the accumula- tion of money in the country through foreign trade, and was interested in creating a favourable trade balance. The difference between the value of exports and imports remained in the country in the form of foreign coinage which was reminted into Russian currency. High tariffs were introduced to restrict imports. The government did its utmost to cur- tail or even completely prohibit the import of articles which were being produced by the Russian manufactories, in this way protecting the young Russian industry from competition against the more devel- oped industries of Western Europe. This government policy of reckon- ing the coimtry’s wealth by its monetary accumulations was known as the mercantile system. This economic policy was prosecuted by European countries in the 17th and 18th centuries.

The Poll Tax

The trade excises and the numerous petty imposts were not sufficient to cover the steadily increasing expendi- tures of the state. Huge funds were required for the maintenance of the large army. People quitted their homes to escape the burden of taxa- tion, arrears of whi^ grew from year to year. In view of this Peter decided to substitute the multitude of petty taxes collected from the peasants and the townsfolk by a single heavy poll tax, to be levied on the basis of capitation and not on the assessment of acreage, as in the 16th century, or per peasant household.

The introduction of the poll tax necessitated the taking of a new census. First the population itself supplied the required information, which was then verified by the authorities. This came to be known as the “first revision.” Periodical revisions (approximately every fifteen years) were carried out by generals and officers attended by army de- tachments, who dealt harshly with people who tried to evade the cen- sus or who gave false information. The poll tax for a landlord’s peas- ant was fixed at 74 kopeks a year (in addition the peasant had to pay the landlord about 60 kopeks); for state-owned peasants and for the tradesmen and artisans the tax was 1 ruble and 20 kopeks (the equivalent of ten gold rubles in late 19th century cunency).

The Peasants

The poll tax had an important effect on the status of the i)easants. The rural population now formed two main categories. All the peasants, kholopi (house serfs) and freemen who lived on the estates of private landowners became the latters* serfs. The separate category of kholopi went out of existence. The rural population living on crown lands came to be called state peasants. The poll tax further increased the power of the landlords over the peasants. The landlords and bailiffs were made responsible for punOiUal payment of the tax by their serfs. It was in Peter’s reign that the sale of serfs apart from the land began to be widely practised.

The Situation in the Towns; the Merchantry

Formerlj the urban population had suffered greatly from the arbitrary rule of the wasTwodes. Peter wished to provide better conditions for the develop- ment of trade and to bolster up the urban economy. To this end he car- ried out a complete reform of municipal administration. The residents of every town were divided into the categories of “regular” citizens (merchants, artists, doctors, craftsmen) and the “base born” (t.e., the “lower” people, or common labourers and craftsmen who were not guild members). The “regular” citizens comprised two guilds; the first was made up of the wealthy merchants, the intelligentsia (doctors, apothecaries, artists) and some of the master craftsmen; the second guild consisted of petty tradesmen, craftsmen and apprentices. The “regular” citizens discussed municipal affairs at meetings and from their midst elected burgomasters to administer the town. All the benefits of municipal reform were reaped by the upper stratum of the merchantry.

Peter attached great importance to the big merchants, who con- trolled foreign and domestic trade. He conferred various privileges on them and granted them loans. The merchants received government contracts and frequently gave the tsar advice on various economic matters. Peter did his utmost to interest the merchants in investing capital in industry.

The Nobles

Important changes took place in the status of the nobles during Peter’s reign. In the 17th century the nobles had been awarded fiefs in temporary tenure as payment for their services. Peter substituted these fiefs by money payments. All the land held in tenure by the nobles — including patrimonies and fiefs — ^became their absolute property and now came to be called ‘‘estates.” The differences that had existed between the patrimonies and the fiefs in the 16th and 17th centuries were completely effaced. To keep the estates intact when they were passed on by inheritance — ^for their division usually led to the impoverishment of the nobles — Peter in 1714 issued an edict establish- ing the principle of primogeniture for the inheritance of realty. The children who remained without an inheritance were to live on the sala- ry they received for their service. Many nobles were opposed to this law, however, and in 1730 they had it repealed.

Under Peter the difference between the ancient peerage and the newer nobility was further mitigated. Both became known as the gentry or the nobility. The nobles’ state now was in need of a large number Of officers and officials. In the 17th century nobles had evaded military service under various pretexts. Many spent all their lives on their patri- monies and estates. When summoned they either contrived to bribe the summoner or fled to the woods; many pretended to be infirm and sick. Peter insisted that no less than two-thirds of the nobility enter military service and one-third the civil service.

Reforms in State Administration

Central Administration

The old administrative system was utterly dislocated during the war with Sweden. The inherent weakness of the state machinery was revealed both by the war and by the struggle against the uprisings in Astrakhan, on the Don and in Bashkiria. Peter had no confidence in the boyar duma ruled by members of the ancient princely and boyar families who viewed the tsar’s activities with dis- favour and looked askance at the “new” men, such as Alexander Men- shikov, who was of humble origin, or Shafirov, Yaguzhinsky , Shereme- tev and others. At the very outset of his reign Peter had begun to settle important problems by consultation with his intima^ assist- ants, without recourse to the boyar duma. The duma was not even able to convene all its members, for Peter made no exception for the boyars in the matter of government service and gave them commis- sions to various tovYns and sent them to the wars. Instead of the ukases with their customary preamble “The tsar has decreed and the boyars have confirmed,” Peter issued fiats in his name alone.

Tile old Moscow prikazi could not handle the immensely increased volume of business demanding prompt decisions and action . Confusion ri igned in these offices, which frequently overlapped each other. Peter and his assistants fully realized the shortcomings of the Russian insti- tutions, and strove to utilize the experience of the advanced countries of Europe. During his sojourn abroad Peter had acquainted himself with the organization of European institutions . He sent his officials to various countries to study them and invited foreign officials to Russia. Before adopting western models of government organization, Peter had his officials ascertain to what extent they were applicable under Russian conditions.

In this manner the Russian state system under Peter was brought closer to that of the advanced countries of Europe.

When Peter set out to wage war against Turkey in 1711 he left behind in the capital a special commission consisting of nine members appointed by him which he named the Governing Senate. The Senate, which was to attend to affairs during the tsar’s absence from the capital, made the boyar duma superfluous . The rest of the time the Senate acted as the supreme organ of government, exercising a supervision over all government institutions. It drafted new laws and submitted them to the tsar for approval. The office of Procurator-General under the Senate was instituted. Peter called the Procurator-General “the royal eye.” In 1718 nine “colleges” were formed in place of the old prikazi^ Their number was subsequently increased to twelve. The functions of the colleges were clearly defined, each having charge of a particular branch of the administration. The College of Foreign Affairs handled rela- tions with other countries. The War and Admiralty Colleges had charge respectively^ of the army and the navy. Others were in charge of state finances, trade, the factories and mining. All juridical affairs in the realm were under the jurisdiction of the College of Justice. Admin- istration of the towns was concentrated in the chief magistracy.

Many of the prelates of the church disapproved of Peter’s reforms, Peter decided to subordinate the church completely to the state. He regarded the church as a part of the state apparatus and the clergy as a species of officialdom. To deprive the church of its independence Peter abolished the patriarchate and placed the Synod, or Spiritual College at the head of church administration. The church was thereby subor- * dinated to the sovereign temporal power.

By means of these reforms Peter built up a strong state apparatus to serve the needs of the ruling classes. Strict centralization was established, and a body of ofRciak obedient to the tsar created.

The same aim was pursued in the reforms introduced into the regional institutions.

Regional Institutions

Big changes were effected in the system of regional administra- tion. In 1708 Peter divided the country into eight gubernias, or governments. Each gubernia was administered by a gover- nor directly subordinate to the supreme authority, which made for greater centralization. Orig- inally the gubernias were very large. In 1719, fifty provinces of approximately the same size Were formed. The provinces in turn VYere subdivided into smaller administrative units. A completely uniform administra- tive system was thus established throughout the vast territory of the realm. Certain branches of administration (the courts, col- lection of taxes) were set up as separate institutions under the control of the waywodes and the governors.

The Army and the Navy

The protracted war with Sweden, who possessed the best army in Europe, was a stern but splendid school for the Russian army. All the deficiencies in the system of army replace- ment, supply and training were revealed early in the war. Peter with amazing expedition, persistence and skill made use of the lessons of the war to effect a complete reorganization of the army. Peter closely studied military organization in the western countries and that of his enemy, the Swedes, from whom he borrowed the best that fighting experience had vindicated. In reorganizing the Russian army, however, he did not blindly copy the foreign models, but used independent judgment, choosing what had been tried out and verified by his own experience. In distinction to foreign armies, which were in most cases maintained at fighting strength by means of mercenary units, Peter introduced a system of military service by the popu- lation by . means of recruitments. The Russian army became a regular force, uniformly equipped and armed, well trained and hardened in battle.

In the 17th century the troops cf Muscovy had gone into battle in large, unwieldy masses. Peter adopted the system used in the French army as the basis for the battle formation of his troops. On the battle- field the soldiers were arrayed in ranks, the front ranks firing while those behind them reloaded. The bayonet fixed to the rifle made its first ap- pearance, thereby increasing the importance of hand-to-hand fighting. The Russian battle array, however, had this distinguishing trait, that each regiment had its own battalion in the second line which always ensured support to the first line.

Peter, under the prevailing conditions of linear tactics, was able to create deep-line formations. The second line of Russian formation acquired an independent tactical designation. All this was a great step forward in the development of linear tactics.

Peter’s strategic art is deserving of attention. Peter demanded that military operations should conform to circumstances. Battle he regarded as the main object which required thorough and careful preparation. He trained the Russian soldiers to display independence and initiative. In a letter to Sheremetev Peter wrote: ^‘It seems you dare not take a step without our instruction. . . . And that is like the servant who will not save his drowning master until he finds out whether the contract says that he may.”

The cavalry in Peter’s army was the chief attacking force, and was therefore reinforced by a horse-drawn regimental artillery.

Appreciating the importance of material resources in the building up of a country’s armed forces Peter created a sound economic foundation for the army and navy by developing the metallurgical and metal- working industries. The development of industry enabled him to consid- erably improve the Russian artillery. The ordnance under Peter ac- quired greater mobility, the Russian horse-drawn artillery appearing fifty years in advance of the West .The Articles of War, published in 1716, clearly stipulate the place which the artillery occupies both on the march and in battle. Peter made a great step forward in developing the elements of coordination between infantry, cavalry, engineer corps and artillery. The army of Peter the Great possessed its Regulations and a system of military training. The commanding staff received a train- ing in special schools and guards regiments. For this purpose Peter set up in, Moscow a nautical school and medical school. In St. Peters- burg a naval academy and artillery school were opened. Techxucal and mathematical schools were also founded.

As a result of the military reforms, Russia by the end of Peter’s reign possessed a larg^ standing army whose fighting qualities were in no way inferior to the best troops in Europe, Besides the Cossacks, it numbered up to 200,000 men formed into approximately 130 regiments. Before Peter ’s day Russia had not had a single warship. At Peter death the Baltic fleet consisted of 48 large sailing vessels and a multitude of galleys. The Russian navy became one of the most powerful in Europe. Russian sailors covered themselves with imdying glory by their victories over the Swedish navy. "

In the 17th century boyars had simultaneously fulfilled the func- tions of army commanders, tax collectors and judges. Peter drew a line between military service and the civil service. In 1722 a “table of. ranks” establishing a new system of promotion was issued. This table divided all military and civil officials into 14 ranks. Everyone had to begin military or civil service in the lowest rank. Whereas before Peter *s day the sons of the aristocracy had immediately received the highest titles, they were now obliged to enter the Preobrazhensky or Semyonovsky guards regiments as rank-and-file soldiers and only later were commis- sioned as officers. No one was permitted to receive a higher rank without having first held the lower. The aim of the army reorganization was to create an armed force with which the noblesse empire could defend its borders and strengthen the power of the landlords within the country.

Opponents of Reformation

The changes in culture, social customs and political structure of Russia aroused opposition among the old aris- tocracy and a section of the clergy. The large landowners of old noble stock were loath to relinquish the old life of indolent ease and plenty and were hostile toward the “base born” men whom Peter had brought into prominence for their ability and merit.

The malcontents hoped that Prince Alexei, Peter *8 son by his first wife, Yevdokia Lopukhina, would abolish the innovations of his father after his death. Prince Alexei had been brought up under the influence of the clergy and his mother’s relatives, who hated Peter. Alexei impa- tiently awaited his father’s death and even hoped to incite a mutiny of the troops against hiim. Peter warned and urged his son several times to mend his ways. “You should love everything that advances the wel- fare and honour of your country,” he said to him. “If my advice goes unheeded I shall disown you.” Prince Alexei not only ignored his father’s advice but became a traitor to his country and fled to Austria. Peter arranged the extradition of his son and then had him tried for trea- son by a special tribunal, which passed a sentence of death. The prince died in prison soon after. His death was a great blow to those who dreamed of a return to the old order.

Culture and Education

Cultural Advancement

Cultural backwardness had been one of the oai^s of Russia’s weakness in the 17th century. The new institutions could not function without an educated and competent body of men. The army needed artillery specialists and engineers. Canal constructioiiy shipbuildings geological prospecting, mining and medicine all called for general education and specialized instruction. This demand could no lo%er be met by inviting foreign experts to Russia.

The shortage of printed books and absence of school education in the 17th century had greatly hampered the spread of literacy. Peter introduced a simplified and more readable type instead of the old church Slavonic type. Most of the books published after 1708 (with the excep- tion of church service books) were printed in this type, which is in use to this day. In the absence of technical books in Russian, translations of foreign works were largely resorted to. Many books on a variety of technical and scientific subjects were translated, especially on mathe- matics, shipbuilding, fortification, architecture, warfare, etc. Numer- ous historical works were published.

The first Russian newspaper, the Vedomosti, was published in Moscow in 1703, and later in St. Petersburg. This newspaper consisted of several small sheets and contained news of important political events as well as reports on the progress of military operations. The calendar in use before Peter I had been the ecclesiastical calendar, which counted time from the supposed “day of creation” and began the new year on September 1. As of January 1, 1700, Peter I introduced the Julian Calen- dar (established by Julius Caesar) which was then in use in many Euro- pean countries, although the more correct Gregorian Calendar (new style) already existed.

School education was first introduced during Peter’s reign. Several educational institutions were founded in Moscow and St. Petersburg which gave instruction in mathematics, navigation, gunnery and med- icine. Only children of the nobility were admitted to the schools. General schools for children of nobles, officials and clerks were opened in the provincial towns. These schools accepted children between the ages of 10 and 16, and taught them reading and writing, arithmetic end elementary geometry. The system of tuition was very severe.

In 1702 a troupe of foreign actors headed by Johann Kunst was in- vited to Moscow. A wooden “Palace of Comedies” was built, in which Kunst ’s troupe gave performances for Moscow audiences. At Peter’s request the theatre performed A Triumphant Comedy on the Taking of Oreshek.

The changes in life and customs were confined almost exclusively to the nobility, particularly the upper circles, Peter fully realized the importance of culture as a means of strengthening the noblesse realm. He insisted that all nobles between the ages of 10 and 16 take up studies and even prohibited the maiTiage of nobles who had not finished school. Adolescents of the nobility had to undergo “inspections,” at which their progress was reviewed. In outward appearance too the nobles of Peter’s day differed markedly from their fathers and grandfathers. The long-skirted Muscovite costume was superseded by the short European jacket, with its complement of powdered wig, cocked hat and high boots. Many of the nobles whom Peter had sent abroad borrowed the manners and tastes of the nobility of Western Europe. Social gather- ings, then known as “assemblies,” which were attended by the nobles ’ families including the womenfolk, became the mode. On holidays the capital became the scene of elaborate masquerades and merry- making that lasted several days.

Peter the Great’s Assistants

Most of the nobles, who realized the necessity of reforms for the strength- ening of the state, supported Peter. Many of Peter’s most active assistants both in military affairs and civil administration came from the nobility. Yet in choosing tal- ented and devoted assistants Peter did not limit himself to the nobil- ity; he also advanced men “from among the very basest born.” These men subsequently became nobles, acquired extensive estates and trampled upon the people in the old nobles’ way.

Procurator-General Yaguzhinsky was said to have been a swineherd in his youth. Shafirov, a Jew, who was in charge of foreign affairs, had been a shop assistant. Peter ’§ closest assistant was Alexander Danilovich Menshikov, who was said to have been a vendor of meat

pies in his childhood. Menshikov joined one of the “sham” regiments, went abroad with the tsar and worked with him in the shipyards. Peter liked Menshikov for his acumen, efficiency and courage, and put him in charge of military affairs. But Peter was aware of Menshikov’s shortcomings and in private used his stick on him more than once to teach him not to dip into the treasury.

Public initiative found a supporter in Peter.

The tsar had public-spirited assistants among various strata of the population, many of whom at their own initiative submitted mem- oranda suggesting reforms. An example is Ivan Pososhkov, a well- to-do peasant of a palace village near Moscow. Pososhkov had travelled extensively about the country as a tradesman and was well acquainted with its life. He wrote a work entitled “On 'poverty and Wealth'* and dedicated it to Peter, In this book he expounded his views on various problems of economics and state organization, devoting particular attention to commerce. He was unable, however, to bring his work to Peter’s notice. After the tsar’s death Pososhkov was arrested for his sharp criticism of the nobility, and he died in prison.

St. Petersburg

In 1712 the city of St. Petersburg, founded by Peter, became the capital of the Russian realm. The capital was erected on the site of a dense forest where several little villages had stood. It was begun by Peter building himself a small wooden cottage on Zayaclii Island hard by the Fortress of Peter and Paul, after which his intimates, followed by some of the nobles and merchants built their own houses alongside it. After the victory at Poltava Peter de- cided to make the new settlement the capital. Scores of thousands of peasants were driven here from all over the coimtry to build the city. They worked up to their knees in swamp water. There were not enough spades or wheelbarrows, and sometimes the peasants had to carry earth in their shirts. Under the difficult conditions thousands died, and new thousands were sent to take their place. St. Petersburg was laid out quite differently from Moscow. Broad, straight streets were built where the forest and swamps had been cleared. Peter wanted the new capital to be built of brick and stone. Since there were not enough masons in the country he prohibited the erection of stone build- ings in other towns and transferred the expert masons to Petersburg. He invited leading foreign architects and artists to beautify the city. Large stone buildings were erected along the banks of the Neva. Parks with neat paths and fountains were laid out. Opposite the Fortress of Peter and Paul a large shipyard was built. From here led a broad avenue which came to be called the Nevsky Prospect.

Moscow gradually became deserted. The nobles and the wealthy merchants left; the government offices closed down. In pursuance of Peter’s instruction? the northern capital quickly grew. In the space of 16 to 20 years St. Petersburg was transformed from a tiny village into a city with a population of 70,000.

The Personality of Peter

Peter the Great was unlike his pred- ecessors— the Muscovite tsars — whom the people had seen only dur- ing holidays in church, dressed in costly, clumsy garments of gold brocade. Peter was no lover of showy court ceremonies and ponipous speeches. Usually he dressed very simply.

Peter’s predecessors had regarded it beneath their dignity to en- gage in any kind of labour. Peter liked to work and knew how to work. He was a man of exceptionally strong physique: he could easily unbend a horseshoe with his bare hands and forge an iron strip weighing sev- eral poods. Peter knew many trades and manual labour was a hobby of his. His thirst for knowledge was unbounded, and he was not ashamed to study all his life.

The Russian tsars used to spend much of their time in church or listening to long prayers in their chambers. Peter beiran his day at about five o’clock in the morning with a half-hour walk to stretch his legs. Then he sat down to listen to reports read to him by his secretary. After a light breakfast he left for the city by carriage or on horseback, and in fine weather, on foot. On such occasions his tall figure could be seen here and there in the capital. He visited the shipyard, factories, workshops and offices. After a simple dinner Peter usually again oc- cupied himself with state affairs, and later busied himself with the lathe in his workshop. In the evening Peter frequently made calls. He visited not only his courtiers but paid informal calls on merchants, master craftsmen and sailors. All this was most unusual in the 17th and early 18th century.

Peter was a good organizer and an outstanding statesman. His predecessors did not even bother to sign the royal edicts, which were written by the scriveners and clerks. Peter drafted the texts of his laws himself.

Peter was aware of the historical tasks which faced the country. He strove to implant European culture in backward Russia. However, Peter himself suffered from many of the faults common to the society of his day. His amusements were coarse, his banquets were orgies, and his temper turbulent. Even for a trifle he would sometimes chastise the offender with a heavy cudgel.

Peter hated cowardice, falsehood, hypocrisy and dishonesty. Above all he hated attachment to old usage which interfered with the country’s regeneration. He strove to eliminate all backwardness: in economy, in technique, in state organization, in culture and customs. Strong-willed, resolute and persistent, Peter swept aside all the ob- stacles that stood in the way of his reforms. He was irreconcilable in his fight against backwardness and barbarity. . . Peter hastened the copying of western culture by barbarian Russia, and he did not hesitate to use barbarous methods in fighting against barbarism.” Russia — An Empire of Landlords and Merchants. Russia, after Peter’s reformation, became a powerful European state.

A large domestic industry came into being. The Russian army and navy won fame by their victories over the Swedish forces, which had been considered the best in Europe. The administrative institutions introduced by Peter brought order and system into the realm. Notable progress was achieved in culture. Despite all his talents and his energy Peter could not, however, completely overcome the backwardness of feudal Russia.

The landholding nobility had been and remained the ruling class in Russia. Hence all the benefits of Peter’s reforms were reaped primarily by the nobles, and to some extent by the nascent merchant class.

All the successes in strengthening the empire of the nobility were achieved through the ruthless exploitation of the peasants. Under Peter Bussia became a powerful realm of the landlords and the merchants.

. . Peter the Great did a great deal to elevate the landlord class and to develop the rising merchant class. Peter did a great deal to create and strengthen the national State of the landlords and merchants. It should be added that the elevation of the landlord class, the encourage- ment of the rising merchant class, and the strengthening of the na,tional State of these classes, was effected at the cost of the peasant serf who was bled white.”

Peter's Successors (1725–1762)

The Struggle of the Nobles for Power

The Palace Coups

During Peter’s reign the nobles had grown still more powerful. The government of the country was in their hands. They possessed big estates and large numbers of serfs. They controlled an armed force — the guards regiments— in which both officers and the majority of the men were of noble origin.

After the death of Peter the nobles resident in the capital inter- fered in matters of succession to the throne and organized palace coups. Peter’s successors, in an endeavour to secure the support of the nobles, increased their privileges still more.

During the thirty-seven years (1725-1762) following Peter’s death there were five palace coups. Such successors of Peter as Anna Ivanovna and Peter III were insignificant, poorly-educated, narrow-minded people, addicted to frivolous amusements and indolence. Favourites played a tremendous role in the 18th century and eternally wrangled with each other over power and influence. Vast sums were squandered on the extravagances of court life. Such of Peter’s successors as Peter II and Ivan Antonovich were emperors in name only. Chance persons ruled in their name.

Catherine I (1725–1727)

According to a law issued by Peter I in 1722 the emperor could exercise his own judgment in his choice of a successor and annul any previous instructions for the designation of an heir. This law was occasioned by Prince Alexei’s treason. To the very last Peter could not make up his mind about the succession. He did not wish the throne to pass to his grandson. Prince Alexei’s son, and hesitated to designate his wife, Catherine, or one of his daugh- ters, Elizabeth or Anna. He died without having left any instructions regarding his heir.

After his death the court aristocracy assembled at the palace to de- cide the question of succession. A group of high dignitaries of humble origin who had been influential during Peter’s reign were in favour of crowning Catherine, Peter’s second wife. The guards officers present at the discussion declared that they would break the heads of the “boyars” (as they called the dignitaries of ancient lineage) if they opposed Catherine. The threat was backed by the convenient arrival at the palace of the guards regiments. Catherine became empress.

To consolidate the power of the aristocracy, the intimates of the empress set up in February 1726 a Supreme Privy Council consisting of Prince D. M. Golitsyn as a representative of an old ducal family and men who had advanced to eminence under Peter (Menshikov, Golovkin and others). Thus a compromise was arrived at between members of the old nobility and the men who had come to the fore under Peter. The empress promised not to issue any edicts without the con- sent of the Supreme Privy Council, to which the Senate and admin- istrative colleges were subordinated. However, Menshikov, the favourite of the empress, who actually handled all state affairs, carried more weight than the Council itself. Desirous of ensuring the continued influence of his family in the affairs of the realm Menshikov persuaded Catherine to designate as her successor Peter Alexeyevich, Peter I’s grandson, whom he planned to marry to his daughter.

Peter II (1727–1730)

After Catherine’s death Menshikov set up the twelve-year-old emperor, Peter II, at his own palace and began to rule in his name.

Menshikov’s rise to power was resented by the rest of the aristoc- racy. He was accused of abuses and banished to his own estate and subsequently exiled to Beryozov, in Siberia. His place was taken by the Dolgoruki princes, who in turn decided to marry one of the prin- cesses of their own family to the emperor. During the preparations for the Wedding Peter II fell ill and died. With his death the male line of the Bomanov dynasty came to an end.

During the reigns of Catherine I and Peter II the state system estab- lished by Peter I began to deteriorate. With the formation of the Su- preme Privy Council the Senate lost its former significance. The imperial court and the higher aristocracy left St. Petersburg for Moscow during the reign of Peter* II, and this doomed the new capital to gradual decline. The strong navy built under Peter I, lying idle in the harbours, fell into decay through disrepair and neglect.

The Privy Councillors

After the death of Peter II supreme power was temporarily assumed by the Privy Council, which was now controlled by the old nobility (of the eight Council members six belonged to two princely families, the Golitsyns and the Dolgorukis). Prince D, M. Golitsyn, a big landowner, played an outstanding role in the Council. He was in favour of a type of state system which pre- vailed in European countries where power was wielded by the landed aristocracy (England, Sweden). Golitsyn wanted to introduce this system into Russia. At his suggestion the Privy Councillors offered the imperial throne to Peter I"s niece, Anna Ivanovna (daughter of Tsar Ivan Alexeyevich, Peter I’s brother). Anna had been married by Peter I to the Duke of Courland and had continued to live in Mittau after the duke’s death. The Councillors drew up the conditions of accession, under which Anna was to make no decision on important state matters without the consent of the Supreme Privy Council. Actually all power was to be transferred to the Supreme Privy Council, f.e., to a small group of large landowners. The empress was not to declare war, conclude peace, or expend state funds without the con- sent of the Sup.eme Privy Council. The Council also was to have direct control over the guards. Anna, desiring to become empress of Russia, accepted the conditions and wrote: *T promise to adhere unreservedly to everything.^’

The Councillors* plan to limit the power of the empress in their own favour aroused great indignation among the nobility, many of whom believed that an autocracy would be tc their greater advantage. When Anna arrived in Moscow the nobles came to the palace and pre- sented a complaint against the Councillors. The oflScers of the guards promised Anna their support, upon which she ordered the conditions she had signed brought to her and tore them up on the spot. The attempt of the Councillors to transfer power to the hands of the big landed aristocracy ended in complete failure. With the support of the Guards Anna became autocratic ruler of Russia.

Afina Ivanovna (1730–1740)

The new empress wa& not lacking in gratitude to the nobles for their part in the cov*p d^itat of 1730. Military service was made easier for them. A Cadet Corps for Nobles was founded. Upon graduation from the corps the sons of the nobles were at once commissioned as officers. The term of obligatory service for noblemen was reduced to twenty-five years. Once she had become an autocratic empress Anna Ivanovna quickly abolished the hostile Privy Council whose former members were severely dealt with.

Empress Anna occupied herself but little with state affairs. She was much addicted to amusements and pleasure, on which she spent huge sums. The Winter Palace in Petersburg was to her a large feudal manor, and from the people aroimd her she demanded the most abject Wor* ship.

Under Anna* Ivanovna the actual power and the administration of the state were wielded by Biren, her favourite, a stupid and unedu- cated German nobleman whom she had brought with her from Mittau. While he was in power German nobles occupied a very influential posi- tion. They directed the foreign policy and Were in command of the Russian army. The officers of two new guards regiments, the Izmailovo and the Horse regiments, were chosen mainly from among German Baltic nobles. The German nobles regarded Russians a country where they could easily enrich themselves. Biren despised Russia and delib- erately refused to study Russian. The money he extorted from the population he spent in purchasing lands for himself in Courland and clothes and jewels for his wife.

Anna’s reign marked the beginning of an intensive penetration of Germans into Russia, which continued throughout the 18th and 19tb centuries. This was an attempt to conquer Russia “by peaceful means,” to Germanize the government apparatus, to seize control of vital state institutions, the sciences and the education of the rising generation. A mob of adventurers and impostors poured into Russia from Germany upon the heels of the statesmen and tradesmen. Many succeeded in insinuating themselves into 1 he good graces of the wealthy nobles. As teachers and tutors in landlords’ homes they strove to fill their pupils with admiration for everything German and contempt for everything Rmssian. The Germans tried to establish themselves firmly in Russia: they bought up fertile lands, settled them and organ- ized large scale farming. German capital was invested extensively in Russian industry.

The foreigners surrounding Anna Ivanovna completely disrupted the system built up by Peter I. The population groaned under the in- creasingly intolerable burden of taxes. Biren maintained his power by a system of brutal terror. All suspected malcontents were interro- gated and tortured in the cells of the Secret Chancellery^ instituted in 1731. The predominance of Germans in the central and local govern- ments aroused the indignation of the Russian nobles who felt that they Were being wronged and deprived of their right to participate in the administration of the country. Among the discontented was Minister Artyemi Petrovich Volynsky, who dreamed of putting an end to Ger- man influence over the empress and of strengthening the position of the Russian nobility. Under pressure from Biren the empress ordered Volynsky and his friends brought to the Secret Chancellery, where they were examined and tortuied and then publicly executed. The sinister period of Biren ’s vicious rule was known among the i)eople as the Birmahchina.

The chief political event of Anna Ivanovna’s reign was the war with Turkey and the Crimea (1735-1739) for possession of the Black Sea coast. Russia acted in league with Austria, who suffered one defeat after another. The Russian army invaded the Crimea and later captured the strong Turkish fortress of Ochakov, which barred the outlet to the sea from the Dnieper. Continuing the offensive toward the Pruth, the Russian troops defeated the Turks at the village of Stavu- chany (near the town of Khotin). Under the peace treaty concluded in 1739 at Belgrade Russia received territory on both banks of the Dnieper but no outlet to the sea. This war, the aim of which had been to reject the Turkish yoke on the Black Sea coast, entailed large expend- itures and extremely heavy losses in man power. These expenditures were an additional heavy burden on the disorganized national economy.

Elizabeth Petrovna (1741–1761)

Movement of Russian Nobles Against German Control

Anna Ivanovna, who died childless, appointed as heir Ivan VI, the infant son of her niece Anna Leopoldovna, who was married to a German duke (Anton of Brunswick). In 1740, after the death of Anna Ivanovna, the three-months-old infant was declared emperor, with Biren as regent. The rise of Biren to such eminence evoked great discon- tent even among the court aristocrats who were close to him, and a conspiracy was formed against him. Field Marshal Miinnich marched into the palace with a group of guardsmen and arrested Biren.

Anna Leopoldovna, the mother of the infant emperor, was pro- claimed regent.

Her rule, however, lasted only about a year. While a struggle for power was in progress among the small faction of Germans who had fallen foul of each other after the death of Anna Ivanovna, a movement in defence of Russian honour and dignity was growing among the officers and soldiers of the guards. The guards favoured Elizabeth Petrovna, a daughter of Peter I. The conspiracy had the support of the French ambassador in St. Petersburg, France being anxious to see an end to German influence in Russia.

On the night of November 25, 1741, Elizabeth unexpectedly came to the palace with her adherents and a company of guards from the Preobrazhensky Regiment. The guardsmen arrested Anna Leopol- dovna and her family. The enraged soldiers assaulted the notables, among them Field Marshal Munnich, when arresting them. Elizabeth was proclaimed empress. The guards openly demanded that the new empress rid them of ‘‘the German yoke.*’ The infant emperor, Ivan VI, was imprisoned in the Schlusselburg Fortress, where he was subse- quently put to death during the reign of Catherine II. The Russian nobility won new privileges during the reign of Elizabeth Petrovna. Only nobles were given the right to own lands inhab- ited by peasants. They received immunity from such a degrading form of punishment as flogging. In St ..Petersburg a Nobles' Bank was estab- lished in which they could obtain loans at low rates of interest. The landlords were given the right to exile their serfs to Siberia without trial, every such exile being set off as an army recruit. The landlords made extensive use of this power to rid themselves of undesirables as well as of old and sick peasants. Most of the exiles died on the way from disease, exposure and hmiger; barely one out of four actually reached the Siberian towns.

Like her predecessors, Elizabeth gave but little attention to state affairs. Life at the palace with its continuous round of masquerades, balls and other entertainments came to resemble an endless fete. The empress spent lavish sums on her wardrobe.

Matters were complicated when Elizabeth Petrovna sent for her nephew, Karl Peter Ulrich (son of Peter I's daughter, Anna Petrovna, who had married the Duke of Holstein). In Russia he was called Peter Fyodorovich and proclaimed heir to the throne. Peter Fyodorovich was an ignorant, frivolous young man who drove his tutors to despair. At eighteen and twenty he was still playing with toy soldiers, which he addressed as though they were human beings. Brought up at a German feudal court, Peter Fyodorovich was a passionate admirer of the Prus- sian system of Frederick II. He hated Russia and called it “an accursed country Empress Elizabeth Petrovna married him to the daughter of a petty German prince, Sophia of Anhalt-Zerbst, who was called Catherine Alexeyevna in Russia. Unlike her husband, Catherine was capable and industrious; she read books, diligently studied the Russian language and Russian customs, and endeavoured in every way to win the favour of the Russian nobles.

The Seven Years' War (1756–1763)

The aggressive policy of King Frederick II of Prussia (1740-1786) began to cause his neigh- bours serious anxiety. Russia joined an alliance formed against Prussia by France, Austria and Saxony. England sided with Prussia. When Frederick II precipitated war by suddenly attacking Saxony, the Russian troops in 1757 marched into Prussia.

The arrogant Prussian king considered his army “invincible" and looked upon the war with Russia as something in the nature of a mili- tary picnic. The very first encounters with the Russians made him change his opinion. He sent a large force under the command of one of his most able generals to meet the Russian army that was advancing on the fortress of Koenigsberg. In August 1767 the Germans suddenly attacked the Russian regiments near the village of Gross-Jagerndorf while most of the units were moving along a nairow defile in the woods. The Russian vanguard on the fringe of the woods manfully accepted battle despite the enemy’s overwhelming numerical superiority. On their staunchness depended the fate of the whole army, which had to be given time to get out of the woods and deploy for action. The men and officers displayed wonderful heroism. Men with gaping wounds carried on until they lost consciousness. The ranks of the Russians began to dwindle. The Germans were flushed with elation. Victory seemed to be in their grasp.

At this juncture the regiments in the forest rushed into the fray on their own initiative. The supply carts obstructing their palh, the men burst through the thickets and took the enemy by surprise.

Giving the Germans no chance to collect themselves, the Russians, with shouts of “Hurrah!” charged the enemy with fixed bayonets. The Germans wavered before the shock of the impact and fled in disorder, abandoning their guns and wounded. The Russian army won a com- plete victory. Soon after, the big fortress of Koenigsberg surrendered to the Russian troops without offering resistance.

The defeats at the hands of the Russian troops brought Frederick to an impasse. Only the sluggishness of Russia’s allies saved him from disaster. France and Austria feared Russia more than they did Prussia. In 1759, after having rallied all his forces, Frederick led them against the Russian army, which was threatening Frankfort -on -Oder. The Russian troops under the veteran General Saltykov took up posi- tions near the village of Kimersdorf . At first the Germans succeeded in bearing down the left flank of the Russians despite their stubborn resistance. Frederick was so confident of victory that without waiting for the battle to end he sent a communique to Berlin annoimcing the complete rout of the Russian army. In the meantime the Russian regiments had regrouped and were warding off one fierce Prussian attack after another with unequalled bravery. Then the Russian cav- alry and infantry swooped down upon the enemy, striking a mortal blow. The Germans fled, abandoning their weapons and banners. Freder- ick himself barely escaped capture.

With almost his entire army lost in the battle at Kunersdorf, the Prussian king gave way to utter despair, and even contemplated sui- cide. "I am unfortunate to be alive, ” he wrote. “As I write this, everyone is fleeing and I no longer have any power over these men.” Berlin wae seized with panic.

Once more disagreement among the allies saved Frederick and gave him a respite and an opportunity to collect a new army. But a year later Russian troops occupied Berlin. In the autumn of 1760 a small Russian force marched up to the German capital. Apart from the armed inhabitants, the. garrison of Berlin consisted of 26 battalions of infantry and 46 squadrons of cavalry, with 120 heavy guns. However,, the victories of the Russian army had made such a powerful impres- sion that the German generals deeided not to defend the city, despite their numerical superiority, and quietly led their troops out of the city during the night. In the morning the municipal authorities of Ber- lin tendered the Russian command the key to the fortress gates of the city on a velvet cushion.

Frederick’s position was hopeless. He was snatched from destruc- tion by the death in December 1761 of Empress Elizabeth. The new emperor, Peter III, a Prussophile and an admirer of Frederick, im- mediately signed an armistice with Prussia.

The Seven ^'ea^s* War covered the battle standards of the Russian regiments with new glory. Foreigners began to say that no other sol- dier in the world could be compared to the Russian soldier. Even Fred- erick admitted that it was easier to kill the Russians than force them to retreat.

The well-known Russian general P. A. Rumyantsev (1725-1796) achieved some outstanding victories in this war. During the Seven Years’ War Rumyantsev had had occasion to convince himself of the superiority of the Russian school of war initiated by Peter the Great over the Prussian military system of Frederick II. Rumyantsev devel- oped Peter’s military art and was the first to employ extended order for securing effective rifle fire and attack in columns for massed bayonet charges.

Russian Science in the Middle of the 18th Century

The Russian Academy of Sciences conceived by Peter was founded at the end of 1725, after his death. Since there were no Russian scien- tists Peter had to invite foreigners to Russia to organize higher educa- tion and research . Some of the men who came to Russia were outstand- ing scientists whose names have gone down in the history of science. These include, for example, the mathematicians Bernoulli and Leonliard Euler* But a large number of adventurers who styled themselves scientists also came to Russia, The high state dignitaries appointed to membership of the academy foreigners who could do nothing more than write verses for court festivals.

The first Russian scientist was Mikhail Vasilyevich Lomonosov (1711-1765).

Mikhail l^monosov was born into the family of a well-to-do fisher- man in the northern coastal village «of Denisovka (near Kholmogory, not far from Archangel), When the boy was ten years old his father began to take him sea fishing. The dangerous life of a fisherman taught the precocious youngster to observe the phenomena of nature closely* During the long winter nights young Lomonosov diligently studied his letters, grammar and arithmetic. Reading further stimulated hia desire to study. He was refused admission to the school in Kholmogory since he was the son of a peasant. Then he set out for Moscow, travelling 'with a transport of fish. By concealing his peasant origin he was able to gain admission to the Slavonic- Greek-Latin Academy. For live years Mikhail Lomonosov lived from hand to mouth on three kopeks a day. The no- blemen’s sons who studied at the academy made fun of Lomonosov, a twenty-year- old giant, but despite his poverty and their mockery he made rapid progress. After five years at the Slavonic- Greek-Latin Academy, Lomo- nosov received an opportunity to enter the Academy of Sci- ences, since the gymnasium attached to it could not sup- ply enough noble-born stu- dents to fill the quota. There also Lomonosov’s ability and diligence attracted the atten- tion of the professors. As one of the three best students he was sent abroad to complete his education. During the four years Lomo- nosov spent abroad he delved into the works of the leading scientists of Europe, studying chemistry, metallurgy, mining and mathemat- ics. After his return to Kussia in 1745 he was made a professor, and was the first Russian scientist to become a member of the academy.

Lomonosov made numerous important discoveries in various fields of science. For versatility he has no equal in the history of Rus- sian, science. Many of his ideas and discoveries won recognition only in the 19th century, when they were brilliantly confirmed by the in- vestigations of Western European and Russian scientists of later gener- ations.

In the field of physics Lomonosov is the author of a theory of the structure of matter which enabled him to give a true explanation of many physical phenomena. He was the first to formulate the mechan- ical theory of heat, which in the 17th century had been ascribed to a subtle imponderable fluid called *‘caloric.” Lomonosov was the first to arrive at a conception of the chemical elements and gave a scientific substantiation for the law of the conservation of mass during chemical changes. Forty years later this law was rediscovered by the French chemist Lavoisier, to whom it is cr^ited. In the field of geology Lomonosov made a sftidy of the origin of minerals and ores which was of great practical significance for geological prospecting. He was the first to demonstrate the vegetable origin of coal. His works laid the foundation for research in physics, chemistry, astronomy, geology and geography in Russia. He was the first man in Europe to deliver a course of lectures on physical chemistry. He devoted much time to astronomy and navigation, and worked out a method for accurately determining a ship’s coordinates. He was almost sixty years ahead of Young in es- tablishing the type of undulatory vibrations of the earth’s surface. He was thirty years ahead pf Herschel in discovering the presence of an atmosphere on Venus. He was 135 years ahead of Nansen in indi- eating the direction of the drift in the Arctic Ocean.

Lomonosov always strove to apply scientific information and discoveries for the benefit of his country. For instance, after more than 3.000 experiments he worked out a melhod of making coloured glass. This enabled him and his pupils to make several mosaic paintings, including. a huge one of the Bittle of Poltava (see drawing on p. 29), Lomonosov drew up a remaikable plan for an expedition which was to open a route from Europe to Asia through the Arctic Ocean. In one of his poems Lomonosov expressed his confidence that Russian seamen

would solve this problem:

Grim Nature does in vain assay

To conceal from us the way

Twixt our shores and East.

Into the future I gaze

And Russia's Columbus I see

Amidst the ice^ scoring destiny

Lomonosov played a great role in the formation of the Russian

literary language. He eliminated distortions, obsolete ecclesiastical expressions and unnecessary foreign words, making it conform more closely to the language of the people. In his poetry he was the first to utilize the musical qualities of the Russian language. He was the author of a scientific Russian grammar; several generations used his textbook. Even this brief list of Lomonosov’s main works shows how extensive and varied was the activity of this Russian scientist. Of him the famous Russian poet Alexander Pushkin wrote:

‘‘Combining extraordinary strength of will with extraordinary strength of reason Lomonosov embraced all the branches of educa^ tion. The thirst for knowledge was an overpowering passion of a soul filled with passions. Historian, rhetorician, mechanic, chemist, mineralogist, artist and poet — he experienced everything and fath* omed all.’^ Lomonosov contributed greatly to the spread of science and the education of young scientists, writers and artists.

The Moscow University was founded in 1755 on Lomonosovas initiative. During the second half of the 18th century the university produced a number of outstanding scientists and writers.

The Colonial Policy of Russian Tsarism under Peter I's Successors

The Discovery of Kamchatka

The Russians continued to develop the Arctic, Siberia, the Amur region, and the coast and islands of the Pacific. The tsarist government tried to make good its acute deficit, brought on by the heavy war expenditures, the impoverishment of the population and the exhaustion of the coimtry, by new colonial conquests.

In 1697 and 1698 Vladimir Atlasov, an officer of the Streltsi, setting out from the Anadyr outpost (on the Anadyr River) at the head of a small detachment on deer sleds, reached the coast of Kamchatka and imposed tribute, primarily in furs, on the Kamchadales (Itelmens). This Russian explorer was the first to discover and describe the Kam- chatka Peninsula.

The Kamchadales lived in clan communities, each clan com- prising several hundred tent-homes. Pishing was the main occupation. The clan^ were embroiled in constant feuds. The Kamchadales ’ weapons Were bows with fiint and bone-tipped arrows. After Atlasov’s expedition the first Russian outposts were set up on Kamchatka, which were used by Cossacks. and soldiers as a base for freebooting expeditions or quests for tribute. The Kamchadales often attacked the collectors of tribute and sometimes came right up to the outposts, but were not able to capture them.

A big Kamchadale uprising, involving a large number of clans, flared up in 1731 and 1732. It was led by Kamchadales who had lived among the Russians and had learned the use of firearms. After the uprising had been quelled the Russians became firmly entrenched in Kamchatka. At the same time the large clan communities of the Kam- chadales began to disintegrate.

Less successful was the struggle of the tsarist government against the Koryaks (Nymylans). The Koryaks roamed with their deer herds in the tundra between the seacoast and the Kolyma River. At the approach of military detachments they would break camp and move on. The absence of roads and the scarcity of game rendered pursuit difficult. With their superior knowledge of locality the Koryaks would make sudden raids on groups of Russian Cossacks and soldiers and wipe them out. The Chukches (Luoravetlans), who inhabited the northeastern extremity of Asia, waged a similar struggle against the tsarist government.

Bering’s Expedition

In the middle of the 17th century an expedi* tion led by Simon Dezhnyov rounded the Chukotsk Peninsula and proved the existence of a strait lying between Asia and America. By the beginning of the 18th century, however, this discovery had been forgotten. Shortly before his death Peter I wrote out instructions for a Kamchatlia expedition which was to re-explore the noi'theastern coast of Asia and determine whether it was connected with America. Vitus Bering, a Dane serving in the Russian navy, was put in charge of the expedition. During the first expedition (1728-30) Bering reached the strait which bears his name, but he did not risk sailing on to the coast of America. Two years after Bering’s return a Russian seaman named Fyodorov and a geodesist named Gvozdev not only reached the American coast in a small boat but drew the first map of the oppo- site-lying coasts of Asia and America. This was a brilliant achievement of Russian geographical science.

A second expedition was fitted out at the beginning of the forties of the 18th century. After sailing for a month and a half Bering and his companions sighted the snow-capped ranges of Alaska. The first description of Alaska was also made by Russians.

On the return voyage the Bering expedition ran into great diflEicul- ties. The shortage of drinking water and food led to an outbreak of scurvy, which carried off one or two sailors every day. The expedition stopped to winter on one of the Komandorski Islands, which was named after Bering. It was on this island that Bering died and was buried. The following summer the surviving sailors built a new boat, in which they reached the coast of Kamchatka.

The expeditions of Russian navigators to the shore of America Were of great scientific importance. They conclusively established* the configuration of the northern coasts of Asia and America and at the same time collected abundant data on the inhabitants and flora and fauna of the regions.

The expeditions of scientists and explorers were followed by expedi- tions of big traders to the Kurile and Aleutian islands as well as to the American continent. From these areas traders and merchants shipped out a tremendous quantity of seal, beaver, silver fox, blue polar fox and other furs. The Russian-American Company was estab* lished at the end of the 18th century to protect big commercial interests and to fight English competition. This company received rights to exploit Alaska, which became a Russian colony in 1797 and remained one until 1867.

The Oppression of Bashkiria

After the suppression of the Aldar- Kusyum uprising of 1705-1711 the tsarist government continued to seize Bashkirian lands. The Bashkirs willingly gave refuge to Russian fugitive peasants and refused to hand them over to the tsarist government. With the idea of combating the Bashkirs and cutting them off from the rest of the Volga peoples the government began to build a new line of fortifications. First it built a chain of forts beyond the Kama River, called the Trans-Kama Line, which prevented the Bashkirs from crossing to the right bank of the Kama and to the left bank of the Middle Volga. Then the governntent began to fortify the line along the Yaik River (the Ural). The Bashkirs were forced to perform the hardest earth aiid timber work on the construction of the forts. The intensive exploitation of the Bashkirs by the tsarist government led to fresh popular uprisings in Bashkiria.

In the summer of 1735 insurgent Bashkirs tried to hinder the construction of Orenburg and other forts. Two years later another revolt broke out, headed by feudal lords who aimed at creating an independent Bashkir state. A few years later leadership of the Bashkirs was assumed by a gifted soldier nanited Karasakal (Blackboard) who claimed to be a descendant of Kuchum, the Siberian khan. He was Well acquainted with Central Asia and could speak all the local dialects. Karasakal was distinguished for his fearlessness. His memory lives to the present day in folk songs, which call him swift ^‘as the wind,*' and say that “the world has seen few men of his giant stature.’" Only in June 1740 did the tsarist troops succeed in routing the main forces of the insurgents near the Tobol River. Karasakal managed to escape to Kazakh territory.

After the suppression of this uprising oppression of the Bashkir population became still stronger. The Bashkirs were prohibited from using the forests which had been turned over to the factories. The tsarist government established a monopoly on salt, compelling the Bashkirs to pay a high price for it. The Orthodox church forcibly con- verted the Moslem Bashkirs to Christianity. Those who refused to accept Christianity were persecuted and moved to new areas. The church was used as a weapon to enslave and oppress the Bashkir people.

The year 1755 saw a Bashkir uprising, chiefly of a religious character, led by a mullah named Batyrsha. He circulated appeals throughout the countryside describing the persecution of the Ba-shkir population and calling upon the people to rise in defence of Islam. He urged them to cease their struggle against the Kazakhs and to act jointly for their common emancipation. Actually the religious nature of the movement cloaked a struggle of the Bashkir people for independence. The uprising assumed the form of guerilla warfare which went on for nearly two years. Batyrsha was arrested and brought in chains to St. Petersburg^ where he spent several years in a dimgeon of the Schlusselburg Portress. He perished in an attempt to escape after he had cut down several of the prison guards.

After the suppression of the upjising headed by Batyrsha over 60,000 Bashkirs tied to the Kazakh sleppes to escape persecution. Instigated by the tsarist government, the Kazakhs attacked the Bash- kirs. They killed some of the men and turned the rest over to the tsarist authorities. This is an example of how the tsarist government incited one people against another in order to strengthen its hold over them.

Central Asia in the 18th Century

With the increase in the power of the Uzbek feudal lords, who acquired vast domains, the Bokhara and Khiva khanates fell into utter political decline. The feudal lords waged interminable wars among themselves, ravaging each other’s estates and massacring or leading the people olF into captivity. Even such large cities as Samar- kand, Bokhai a and others became almost depopulated. The crafts and trade were in a state of total decline, the fields were overrun by weeds and the surviving population starved and scattered in all directions.

In 1740 Shah Nadir of Persia subjugated the Central Asian khanate. The devai?:tated country was in no condition to offer resistance. The shah led off to Persia a large number of young men whom he compelled to serve in his army.

After the departure of the Persian troops the feudal lords of Khiva renewed their struggle with redoubled energy. Nomad Tuikmen tribes took advantage of the anarchy to raid the settled areas and plunder the population. The struggle for the restoration of the Khiva khanate was begun by Mohammed-Emmin, an Uzbek nobleman, who suc- ceeded in drivingoff the Tuikmen tribes and ermhing the opposition of separate feudal lords. Peace was restored to the country and the people began to return to their former homes. The immediate descendants of Mohammed-Emmin founded a new Khiva dynasty.

The Bokhara khanate was restored by Mohammed-Rakhim, who was also of Uzbek noble origin. Taken prisoner during the campaign of the Persian shah, he served in his array and was sent by him to Bokhara as chief satrap. Mohammed-Rakhim ruthlessly crushed all opposition on the part of the feudal lords. In 1756 he became so power- ful that he assumed the title of klian and founded a new dynasty of Bokhara khans.

In the second half of the 18th century the Ferghana Valley became the centre of an independent Kokand khanate.

The consolidation in Central Asia of the Uzbek states, which defended their national independence against Persia and suppressed the local feudal lords, played an important role in the restoration of the economic life of these countries. The towns again grew populous and became centres of the crafts and trade. The increase in trade with Russia played an important part in the development of the towns.

The Kazakhs

At the end of the 17th century the Kazakhs were <iivided into three zhuza, or states: the Great Horde, occupying the Lake Balkhash area; the Medium Horde, in the steppes north of the middle reaches of the Syr Darya, and the Small Horde, north of the Aral Sea.

The Kazakh ruling caste, consisting of khans and sultans who traced their ancestry to Genghis KLhan, regarded themselves as ‘‘blue* bloods.” The power of the khans was hereditary. The various tribes were ruled by sultans who were vassals of the khans. Both khans and sultans extracted tribute from the population, impositions being made on pasturage, trading caravans, on husbandmen (along the Syr Darya) and on city dwellers.

In some of the tribes the hereditary clan elders became rulers, independent of the khans and the sultans. They owned tremendous herds of cattle and cruelly exploited the population, which still lived under the patriarchal clan-community system. While the land belonged to the community the cattle had long since become private property. The elders of many communities were directly subordinate to the sultans and the khans.

The Kazakh people had to wage a constant struggle against foreign enemies who strove to deprive them of their independence. Brave warriors known as batyri often led the struggle against the invaders.

In the twenties of the 18th century for example, the Kazakhs Were attacked in the east by the Jungars (Kalmucks). This period has been immortalized in Kazakh folklore as the time of the “Great Disaster.” The Great Horde was conquered and lost its political in- dependence. The towns on the Syr Darya were made subject to the Jungars. The Medium Horde migrated to the Tobol River. The Small Horde migrated to the Yaik River, closer to the Russian border, where the Kazakhs came into conflict with the Volga Kalmucks.

In 1731 the Kazakh khan of the Small Horde, Abulkhaiyr, took Russian citizenship in the hope of obtaining aid from the Russians against the Kalmucks.

In 1758 the Kazakh people under the leadership of the famous warrior Khan Ablai of the Medium Horde utterly routed the Jungars with the help of Chinese troops and thereby threw off the Jungar yoke.

The grievous condition of the Kazakh masses, oppressed both by their own feudal lords and the Russian government, led to a big uprising (1783-1797) in the Small Horde. The uprising* was headed by a batyr named Srym.

The tsarist detachments could not cope with the movement, which had assumed a sweeping character and was at the same time directed against the sultans and the rich elders. Thereupon the sultans of the Small Horde united and secured aid from, the sultans of the Medium Horde. Many rich elders went over to the side of the new khan appointed by the tsarist government.

Srym and his followers killed the khan, who was hated by the people, and moving deeper into the steppes continued the struggle against the tsarist forces. Pursued by Kazakh feudal lords^and Russian detachments, Srym fled to Khiva, where he perished in 1802,

On the Upper Yaik the Kazakhs came into conflict with the Bash- kirs. The tsarist government adroitly played off the Bashkirs, Kazakhs and Kalmucks against each other in order to strengthen its own in- fluence beyond the Volga. Tsarism regarded the Bashkirs as the most dangerous of these peoples.

The Noblesse Empire of Catherine II (1762–1796)

Beginning of the Reign of Catherine II

The Coup d’Etat of 1762

After Elizabeth’s death her nephew Peter Fyodorovich, the former Duke of Holstein, became the Rus- sian emperor as Peter III (1761-1762). He proclaimed himself an adherent of the king of Prussia and immediately suspended the operations of the Russian army against Frederick II. Peter III surrounded himself with generals and officers from Holstein and energetically set about introducing the Prussian system into the Russian army, which justifi- ably regarded itself as the victor over Frederick’s army. After conclud- ing peace with Frederick, Peter began to prepare for a war against Denmark in the interests of the Holstein dynasty, interests which were alien to the Russian state. The fact that he was emperor of Russia did not prevent Peter from espousing the cause of Prussia and Holstein.

Despite his contempt for the Russian nobles, Peter was obliged to pass a law on “liberties for the nobility” (1762), a law which had great importance for the landlords. It abolished the obligatory service of nobles in the "army and civil institutions. Many of the nobles immediately retired and busied themselves with their estates. However, even this important concession to the nobles only temporar- ily checked the outburst against Peter’s policy. A conspiracy was formed among the officers of the guards in favour of his consort, Catherine Alexeyevna, who had always been ambitious of becoming empress of Russia. The Orlov brothers, officers of the guards, headed the conspirators and maintained secret contact with Catherine. Early in the morning of June 28, 1762, they brought Catherine to St. Petersburg from a suburban palace and proclaimed her empress. The guards regiments willingly swore allegiance to her. The following day, after an unsuccess- ful attempt to flee to Kronstadt, Peter formally abdicated the throne. He was murdered shortly afterwards. Catherine Alexeyevna became Empress Catherine II.

Catherine II

At the time Catherine II ascended the throne, Russia ’s administrative system and economy was in a slate of utter disorganiza- tion and decline. There was no money in the treasury. The army had not received its pay for more than seven monihs. The ships were in disrepair and the fortresses were crumbling. Everywhere the people complained of oppression, bribery and extortions by the tsarist judges and officials. Unrest was rife among the masses, affecting about 49,000 peasants attached to factories and 150,000 serfs on landlords* estates. The jails were filled with prisoners and convicts.

Catherine realized the danger that threatened the feudal empire of the nobility. She understood that to consolidate the state, the adminis- trative system had to be put in order, the army strengthened and the economy restored. She considered that only a strong government would be able to check the spread of peasant uprisings. I^ile giving the landlords still more power over their peasants, Catherine in the early years of her reign nevertheless attempted to alleviate the burden of serfdom for fear of new peasant uprisings.

At the beginning of her reign Catherine studied the works of the enlightened philosophers, with some of whom she kept up a correspond- ence. Representatives of French philosophic school, such as Voltaire, Montesquieu, Diderot and others, attacked the feudal system and ridiculed medieval prejudices. They proclaimed the triumph of reason, which was to point the way to the reconstruction of the social system on the basis of equality of men before law. The philosophers placed their hopes for such a reformation on the activity of enlightened mon- archs. They proclaimed the ‘‘union of philosophers and monarchs.’* This system was called “enlightened absolutism,” i,e., a system under which the monarch was to do everything for the people, without, however, admitting them to the government of the state. The ideas of enlightened philosophy were widespread in thje countries where old feudal institutions were preventing the rise of the bourgeois social system, though conditions were ripe for it. However, it was inevitable that progressive bourgeois thinkers should lose faith in the possibility of reiaping the social system with the help of monarchs. In Russia, where the feudal-serf system reigned supreme, these enlightened ideas influenced only a small group of advanced intellectuals among the nobility. Catherine wanted to utilize the ideas of the philosophers and their criticism of feudalism not in order to destroy this system but to strengthen the absolutist-feudal state by introducing certain im- provements in administration.

Through her correspondence with Voltaire, Diderot and others, Catherine wished to create the impression in Europe that she was a wise and enlightened monarch. She deceived these writers. Poverty, hunger and ignorance reigned in the Russian serf village, yet Catherine informed Voltaire that there was not a peasant in Russia who did not eat chicken when he felt like it, and that lately (this was a hint at her own reign) the peasants had been showing a preference for turkey. Catherine was extremely hypocritical. While assuring the philosophers that she was prepared to make their doctrines her political precept, she at the same time ridiculed these doctrines. Catherine loved flattery and adoration. She surrounded herself with adulators and strove to have herself glorified in European literature.

Unlike her immediate predecessors, Catherine personally took part in the decision of all important questions of policy. She drafted laws and edicts, was interested in literature, and even published a magazine (A Bit of Everything).

During her reign the nobility received additional important privi- leges. “The Age of Catherine” was the golden age in the history of the noblesse empire.

A few days after her accession Catherine issued a special ukase demanding absolute obedience on the part of the peasants to the land- lords. To bring order into the government system she decided to convene a commission which was to draw up a new code of laws, she herself writing the Instructions for the guidance of the commission in which she drew extensively upon the works of Montesquieu and several other writers of Western Europe. In the Instructions she strove to prove the necessity of an autocracy for Russia.

The commission for drafting new laws began its sessions in the summer of 1767 in Moscow. The majority of the deputies were nobles and Wealthy townspeople. The serf peasants had not taken part in the election of the commission and were not represented on it. The deputies appeared with instructions from their electors in which the latter voiced their needs and desires. The nobles asked not only that their rights and privileges be preserved but that they be extended.

Most of the meetings of the commission were devoted to a reading of the Instructions from'the empress and a discussion of those submitted by the deputies. No practical results followed from Catherine *s‘Instruc- tions or from the commission she initiated for the drafting of new laws. At the end of 1768 the commission ceased functioning.

Foreign Policy of Catherine II prior to the Peasant War

The First Partition of Poland (Rzecz Pospolita)

The sudoesses of the Russian army in the Seven Years* War made a tremendous* impression in Western Europe both on Russia's allies in this war, Austria and France, and on her opponent, Prussia. Despite Russia's unexpected withdrawal from the war, her role in international affairs grew considerably. Austria and France regarded her growing power and influence with displeasure and alarm. France particularly feared Russian influence in the East. French merchants and statesmen hoped to monopolize trade with the East. Consequently France strove to surround Russia with a ring of hostile states, and to unite Turkey, -Poland, Sweden and Austria against her. The leaders of Russian foreign ^ policy tried to counter the Franco-Austrian alliance by an alliance of northern countries — Russia, Prussia, England, and others. But their attempts failed owing to irreconcilable antagonisms among these states.

Austria wished to conquer the fertile lands of Western Ukraine. Prussia wanted to annex Polish territory on the Lower Vistula. Russia strove to recover Byelorussian and Ukrainian lands which had been seized by Poland. Finally, every one of these countries — Russia, Austria and Prussia — feared each other's increase.

Poland was in a state of utter decline. The central government had little power. The king's authority was limited by the Diet. A single vote cast against a proposal in the Diet was sufficient to reject it. This was called liberum veto, a practice. which led to great abuses, for the deputies to the Diet openly traded their votes. Even a unanimous decision of the Diet was not always certain to be enforced, since the dissatisfied gentry formed armed confederations which could be made to yield only by force of arms.

The Polish state system benefited the big magnates for it enabled them to direct foreign and home policy in their own interests and to rule their vast possessions with a free hand! The lot of the Polish peasants was particularly hard. Even worse was the position of the other nationalities, especially the Ukrainians and the Byelorussians. The Orthodox population and the Protestants were subjected to all manner of persecutions.

After the death of King Augustus III of Poland (in 1763) the Russian government succeeded in having Count Stanislaus Poniatowski, Cather- ine's candidate, elected king, Russia and Prussia jointly demanded that ther Diet give equal rights to the Orthodox Believers, the Protes- tants and the Catholics. V^en the Diet refused to accede to this de«  mand, the Russian ambassador to Poland, Prince Repnin, organized three confederations of representatives of the Protestants, Orthodox Believers and of Catholics who were dissatisfied with the king. The confederates received large financial assistance from the Russian government, and Russian troops were sent into Polish territory. Voices continued to be raised in the Diet against any concessions, but Repnin arrested several senators in Warsaw itself and sent them to Russia under a strong guard. The Diet was compelled to agree to equalize the rights of the non-Catholic and the Catholic gentry. In 1768 a special agreement was concluded between Poland and Russia under which no changes were to be made in the Polish state system in the future^ Russia undertook to guarantee its inviolability,

A section of the gentry that was dissatisfied with the concessions- made to the Russian government formed an armed confederation ia the town of Bar. The confederates obtained the support of France^ who was interested in checking Russian influence, and began to make^ raids on the Ukrainian population. This led to a Cossack and peasant uprising in the Ukraine against Polish rule. The tsarist government helped the Polish authorities to suppress the uprising, since it waa afraid of the peasant movement spreading to Russia.

Russia’s growing influence in Poland exceedingly alarmed both Austria and Prussia. Frederick II, fearing that Russia would annex Poland, drew up a plan for the partition of Polish territory among Austria, Prussia and Russia. Under an agreement concluded by these- governments, Prussia took over the Polish possessions on the Baltie seacoast and part of Great Poland. The eastern part of Prussia was thus united with the western part (Brandenburg) in one whole, Prussia’s claims to Danzig and Thorn, however, were rejected by Catherine* Austria seized Ukrainian Galicia, and Russia took over part of Byelo- russia. This was the first partition of Poland, carried out in 1773* The First War With Turkey (1768-1774). The events in Poland accelerated the outbreak of war between Russia and Turkey. The French ambassador persuaded the Turkish government that the in- crease of Russian influence in Pi>laiid was to the disadvantage of Turkey and constituted a danger to her. Moreover, the events in Poland had tied down part of the Russian army. The Tuiks thought this an oppor- tune moment to check Russian advance to the Black Sea. In 1768 the sultan demanded of the Russian ambassador in Constantinople that Russia withdraw her troops from Poland. Upon receiving a refusal he ordered the Russian embassy arrested and imprisoned.

Europe was certain that Ru.<^sia would not be equal to a double' war with^Turkey and Poland and would be defeated. Hostilities were opened by the Crimean khan. In the spring of 1769 Tatar hordes invaded and ravaged the south Russian bordeilands. This was the last large* incursion of the Crimean Tatars into Russian or Ukrainian territory.

General Rumyantsev, an outstanding military leader, well known^ for his viotorieo over the Germans in the Seven Years’ War, was placed at the head of the Russian army. His method of warfare was distinguished for daring and novel tactics. Rumyantsev himself sought out the enemy. Above all he tried to destroy the enemy’s man power. He chose his commanders ably. Among them was Alexander Vasilyevich Suvorov, whose military genius brought him rapid advancement.

In 1770 Rumyantsev learned that a Turkish arrny of 80,000 stood encamped not far from the Larga River. Rumyantsev had only about ^0,000 men at his disposal. ‘‘Our glory and dignity do not allow us to suffer the presence of the enemy,” he said. The Russian army secretly crossed the river and dealt the enemy a swift Hanking blow. The battle -ended in complete victory for the Russian array.

Two weeks later Rumyantsev with about 80,000 Tatars in his rear was confronted bj^ the main forces of the Turks, 150,000 strong, 'Commanded by the vizier. The commander-in-chief of the Turkish army was certain that t he Russian army had fallen into a trap. Despite the enemy’s overwhelming superiority Rumyantsev decided to open the attack first. “To beat big forces with small ones,” he said, “is an art and glory, but to be defeated by a superior foe requires no skill.” Humyantsev did not wait to be attacked but launched an offensive against the vizier, who had camped on the banks of the Kagul River (a tributary of the Danube). The Turkish artillery opened withering fire on the attacking forces, and large masses of cavalry rushed between the columns in an attempt to scatter them. It was a critical moment. Some of the units began to waver. Just then Rumyantsev appeared. “Stick it, lads I” he cried to his men, and inspiring them by his own example led them forward. The picked Turkish troops fell back before the Russian bayonet charge and tied from the battlefield. This victory cleared the Turks from the entire territory between the Dniester and the Danube. Military operations lifted to the right bank of the Danube.

For his victories won during the First Turkish War Rumyantsev, among other awards, received the rank and title of General Field Marshal and the honorific epithet of Zaduaaishy (of the Danube) for his passage of the Danube.

Rumyantsev set forth his ideas on warfare in his “Rites of Military Service” which were later adopted with slight modification as the official regulations for the army. These instructions are permeated throughout by the idea of offensive strategy and tactics. Rumyantsev demanded consideration for the men and the cultivation in officers and men of a sense of military duty and resourcefulness. One of Ru- myantsev’s pupils was the great Russian genera] Suvorov.

Major successes were attained at sea as well. The Russian fleet, which up to the out break of war had been stationed in the Baltic Sea, rounded Europe and sailed up to the Greek coast in the Mediterranean. In June 1770 a Russian sqiiadron under Admiral Sviridov attacked the Turkish fleet near the Bay of Chesme (in Asia Minor, opposite the Island of Chios). The Turks had more than twice as many ships and guns as the Russians. The Russian fleet had its orders to destroy the enemy or perish in the attempt. After several hours of furious battle the Turkish fleet raised sail and hurried to take refuge in the Bay of Chesme. On the following day the entire Turkish fleet was destroyed.

In 1771 another Russian army conquered all the Crimea in a short space of time. The Russian army crossed the Danube repeatedly in the following years. Alexander Suvorov won renown in these campaigns.

Peace was concluded in 1774 in the village of Kuchuk Kainarji. Catherine II hastened to conclude peace because of a formidable upris* ing of peasants under the leadership of Pugachev that had flared up in the country. Under the peace terms Russia received the lands between the Dnieper and the Bug as well as Kerch in the Crimea, which furnished an outlet to the Black Sea through the Kerch Strait, Russian ships now enjoyed the same freedom of the Black Sea as the English and the French. Turkey also had to open the straits of the Dardanelles and the Bosporus to Russian ships. The Crimean khanate was proclaimed independent of Turkey, and Russian influence in the Crimea increased.

Serf Economy in the Second Half of the 18th Century

The Condition of the Peasants

In the second half of the 18th century Russia’s economy continued to be based on serfdom. Cather- ine made extensive grants of land, together with the peasants living on them, as presents and rewards to nobles. For example, the Orlov brothers, who had taken part in the palace coup of 1762, received an award of over 50,000 peasants; Field Marshal Potemkin was given more than 40,000. Altogether Catherine awarded her nobles 800,000 peasants. During her reign privately-owned serfs constituted slightly more than half of the entire peasant population. Of the remaining number the largest group were the ‘‘state” peasants. As in the 17th century, the peasants whose taxes went to maintain the court of the tsar were called “court” peasants. Under Paul I, Catherine’s son, peasants privately owned by the royal family began to be called appa- nage peasants. In 1764 Catherine dispossessed the monasteries of their demesnes and placed the peasants living on them under a special body, the College of Economy. These peasants were known as “eco- nomic.”

With the development of commodity circulation market relations became more stable and diversified. In the 18th century Russian exports of agricultural produce to Western Europe rapidly increased. The main items were flax and hemp, which constituted about one- third of the total value of the exports. Russian hemp was in great demand for European sailing ships. Com exports increased noticeably at the end of the century^ when Bussia had completely gained pos- session of the coast of the Black Sea. The demand for corn increased rapidly on the home market as well, owing to the growth of the non- agricultural urban population: in 1724 the urban population of Bussia was 328,000; in 1782 it was 802,000, and in 1796 it reached 1,301,000. The landlords, in need of ready money, marketed hemp, flax, fats^ corn and other produce. They strove to extract maximum profits from their serf economy.

The productivity of serf labour on the barren lands of the north- ern forest zone was so low that the landlords found it more profit- able to accept obrok (quit-rent) from the peasant than to compel him to till their land. On the other hand, in the southern black earth regions the harshchina (corvee) became the main form of service ren- dered by the peasants. Thus there arose the division of the serfs into a category which paid ohrok and another which rendered harshchina, services. During Catherine’s reign ohroJcs were more than doubled on the average. To raise money for ohrok payments peasants left their villages to find employment as carpenters, blacksmiths, factory work- ers, cab drivers in the towns, vendors, etc. The peasants who rendered harshchina had an even harder time. They had to work on the land- lord’s estate three days out of the week. Many landlords demanded even more days of work, and some left the peasants only the holidays on which to cultivate their own land.

Work hours were not fixed by law, and were left entirely to the discretion of the landlord. Usually the peasant started work before sunrise and finished only at dusk. To compel obedience the landlord had to possess great power over the peasants. An ukase issued by Catherine in 1765 gave a landlord the right to exile his peasants to penal servitude for being “insolent.” Two years later the peasants were prohibited from lodging any complaints against their landlords.

In the second half of the 18th century the purchase and sale of peasants became very common. Landlords often sold their peasants apart from the land, “for shipment.” Villages and families were sold wholesale, and frequently peasants were separated from their fami- lies, and children sold separately from their parents. The price of a peasant varied according to his sex, age, physique, and calling. Land- lords were known to have sold girls at 10 rubles apiece. At the same time they paid hundreds and even thousands of rubles for pedigree borzoi puppies. Advertisements for the sale of serfs were openly print- ed in the official newspapers side by side^ with announcements of the sale of cattle, dogs and misoellaneous chattels.

The landlords* power over the lives and property of the peasants led to monstrous crimes. The case of a woman landholder named Saltykova is an example of the savage tyranny that was rife among the landed proprietors. Over a period of 10 years Saltykova (whom the people called derisively Saltychikha) tortured to death about 140 persons, mostly women and girls, on trifling pretexts. She invent- ed the most refined tortures for her victims: she tore off their ears with red-hot pincers, compelled them to stand barefooted in the freez- ing cold, etc. Saltykova was brought to trial only five years after complaints had been lodged against her , Since she enjoyed immunity from corporal punishment as a member of the nobility, other people were tortured in her presence during the trial in order to instill fear in her. The court condemned Saltykova to hard labour, but Catherine com- muted the sentence to confinement in a cloister.

The Growth of Manufacturing

As in the 17th century, most of the goods which appeared on the market were supplied by the peas- ants and the petty urban craftsmen, since manufactory production, despite its considerable development, could not satisfy the demands of the market. The number of manufactories increased approximately threefold duriiig Catherine’s reign. Serf labour was widely employed in the manufactories, and serf factories remained the prevailing type up to the second half of the 18th century. Due to the shortage of free labom, the nobles who owned estates and peasants found themselves in a better position than the merchants, for they could put their serfs to work in the manufactories, obtaining the necessary raw materials such as iron ore, wool, flax, hemp, etc., from their farms and mines. These conditions stimulated the development of manufactories on the estates of the nobles, which competed effectively with those of the merchants. Some of the better off serf peasants grew rich by trad- ing and money-lending and established manufactories of their own, employing the labour of freemen and of peasants who tried to earn their obrok.

The labour of the manufactory workers was very hard and differed little from that of serfs on the land. The work premises were usually dark, damp and dirty. The workday lasted as a rule 14 and sometimes 16 hours. The wages were miserably low, and not paid regularly. The workers went hungry and were frequently ill. The lot of the ^‘posses- sional” peasants in the metallurgical factories was particularly hard. They had to work in factories located scores and even hundreds of miles away from their villages.

Outbreaks Among the Peasants and Manufactory Workers

Ruthless exploitation at the manufactories resulted in a mass move- ment of strikes and open uprisings of the working people in the middle of the 18th century. The largest uprisings were those among the peasants attached to the factories of the merchants Goncharov and Demidov in 1752. The factory peasants of the Goncharov sail- making establishment near the town of Maloyaroslavets defeated the military detachment sent to suppress the rising and even seized three of its guns. The same year an entire district attached to the Demidov iron foundries rebelled. A local retired soldier taught the peasants how to handle arms. The peasants routed a detachment of 600 soldiers sent out against them.

The uprisings at the Goncharov and Demidov factories were crushed only after a large detachment of tsarist troops consisting of three regiments of infantry and artillery was sent out against them. Iso* lated uprisings likewise broke out in the metallurgical works of the Urals in the ’sixties.

Disorders among the serf peasants showed a marked increase beginning with the ’forties. Peasants killed their landlords and bail- iffs, set fire to estates, and sometimeo rose in whole villages against the government detachments. The movement grew particularly strong after 1762, when the landlords, upon returning to their estates fol- lowing the edict of ‘‘liberties of the nobility,” began to oppress the peasants still more.

The Peasant War Led by Pugachev

The Beginning of the Uprisings

In the sixties of the 18th cen- tury outbreaks among the serfs became more frequent. There were close upon 40 uprisings in the central regions of Kussia alone.

The Volga peoples who were most outrageously exploited by both the landlords and the tsarist officials, found themselves in a partic- ularly grievous position. After the suppression of the Batyrsha uprising in Bashkiria, the seizure of Bashkirian lands was intensified. Russian merchants and manufacturers laid waste to the Bashkirian farms, cut down forests and built new factories. Fearing raids, they turned the factories into regular fortresses and supplied them with arms and gunpowder -

The Kalmucks, who until the seventies of the 18th century lived on either side of the Lower Volga, were in no better a position. In 1771, unable to bear the persecutions of the tsarist government any longer, a considerable section of the Kalmucks who had pitched their nomad camps on the left banks of the Volga migrated eastward towards tha Chinese border. The majority of the Kalmucks died on the way from hunger and in battle with the Kazakhs. The survivors settled in Chinese Eastern Turkestan. The only Kalmucks remaining in Russia were those who lived on the right bank of the Volga.

The unrest also spread among the Russian Cossacks living on the Vaik (Ural) River. By the middle of the 18th century the same social differentiation had taken place among the Yaik Cossacks as among the Zaporozhye and Don Cossacks before them. There were constant conflicts between the wealthy Cossacks and the mass of the rank-and- file. As a rule the government took the side of the wealthy Cossacks and their atamans and regarded all opposition to them as "mutiny.” During an uprising in the town of Yaitsk in 1772 the Cossacks killed General Traubenberg, and several Cossack atamans. Government troops sent out against the Yaik Cossacks quelled the uprising and occupied Yaitsk. Cossack self-government was abolished and a com- mandaut at the head of a military detachment was put in charge of the to^vn. Many of the Cossacks who had taken part in the uprising managed to escape persecution.

Attempts to send the Cossacks to the war against Turkey provoked outbreaks also among the Don Cossacks. At that time a rumour spread among the Don and Yaik Cossacks that Peter III was alive and hiding in their midst. Impostors claiming to be the tsar appeared on the scene. The people had but a vague idea of the life of Peter III. His violent death was ascribed to the revenge of the nobles for his alleged desire to ease the lot of the peasants.

Emelyan Pugachev

In the autumn of 1773 Emelyan Pugachev assumed leadership of the Cossack uprising. Pugachev was born and raised in the Don Cossack village of Zimoveisk, which also happened to be the birth- place of Stepan JRazin. He had participated in the Seven Years’ War, had been in Poland and seen active serv- ice during the war with Turkey. Sent home on sick leave, he did not return to the army but became a fugi- tive Cossack. He wandered about the Don, Volga and Yaik areas, where he met fugitive peasants and workers of the Ural factories, the Cossack poor and Old Be- .lievers. During these travels he became well acquainted with the temper and needs of the people.

In September 1773 Pu- gachev appeared on the Yaik with a small group of Cos- sacks. He passed himself 6fF as Em^ror Peter HI. Cos- sacks ^gan to rally around him, including many who had taken part in the uprising of 1772. Pugachev with a Cossack detachment went up the Yaik to- wards Orenburg. At Pugachev’s approach the garrison soldiers and Cossacks of the small, poorly- fortified outposts situated along the river banks killed or bound their officers and went over to his side. At the beginning of October 1773 Pugachev appeared before the walls of Orenburg, a strong fortress with a large garrison. Unable to take it by storm Pugachev began a siege which lasted about six months.

The Uprising of the Peasants and the Volga Peoples

The Pugachev uprising stirred up all the peoples of the Volga steppes. Kazakh nomad camps came up to 1 he Yaik and some of their detachments joined Pugachev’s army.

Kalmucks from the steppes between the Lower Volga and the Black Sea also began to join Pugachev’s army. Detachments of Tatars, Bashkirs and Cheremissi (Mari) marched to the upper reaches of the Yaik to meet Pugachev. The uprising also spread rapidly among the metallurgical workers and the Russian serf peasants of the mining and metallurgical areas. Every day new groups of peasants from the adjacent estates and workers from the metallurgical works joined Pugachev,

The Cossack uprising grew into a peasant war which roused both the Russian and non-Russian population of the Volga area; During the siege of Orenburg Pugachev and his lieutenants, who were men with military experience gained during service in the tsarist army, devoted their attention to forming peasant and Cossack detachments. The peasants and Cossacks were divided into regiments and com- panies. There were special regiments of Kalmucks, Bashkirs, Tatars, factory workers and others, every regiment having its own place in the camp. The men were very poorly and diversely armed. Only a few had muskets or pistols. Many were armed only with knives or merely clubs. An artillery was formed of captured cannon and put under the command of an ex-soldier. Additional guns were sent from the Urals works by the workers who made an attempt to restart the manufacture of guns and other weapons for the insurgents.

Discipline in the people’s army, despite Pugachev’s severity, was lax. Every regiment or detachment tried to operate independently in battle. The peasants fought bravely as long as they were near their own villages, but deserted the army when it moved elsewhere.

Pugachev issued ^‘manifestos” in the name of Emperor Peter III in which he promised the people ploughlands, woods, pasturage, waters, fisheries, salt deposits, etc. He promised to free the peasants from the “yoke of slavery” and give them back their freedom. He promised to relieve the entire population of the burdensome poll tax. He called the nobles villains and ordered them put to death. In rebel- ling against the landlords the peasants believed that a “good tsar” would rid them of serfdom, and in Pugachev they saw precisely such a “good tsar.”

Pugachev’s Successes

At the end of 1773 Pugachev defeated a government detachment sent under General Kar to relieve besieged Orenburg. This victory over the regular troops created a tremendous impression both in the rebel areas and in the rest of the country. The nobles were seized with panic. Even in localities hundreds of miles from the Volga landlords awaited with trepidation the appearance of the dreaded Pugachev. Large forces of the regular army under the command of General Bibikov were sent out against the insurgents.

The peasant war brought forth many gifted and valiant com- manders of people’s detachments. The gallant Salavat Yulayev led the Bashkir cavalry. Salavat Yulayev was a poet whose songs breathed boundless love for his native land, for its fields and forests and nomad camps. Another gifted commander, Ivan Beloborodov, came from the ranks of the Urals workers. Ataman Ivan Zarubin, a simple Yaik Cossack popularly called Chika, on more than one occasion de- feated tsarist troops. When Pugachev approached Orenburg he was met by a serf named Afanasi I^lopusha who had been sent by the governor of Orenburg to set fire to the powder stores of the insurgents and persuade the Cossacks to desert the uprising. But Khlopusha went over to the side of Pugachev and became one of. his closest asso- ciates. He was put in command of a detachment and his swift and sudden attacks spread terror among the nobles.

In March 1774 Pugachev was defeated near Orenburg and com- pelled to raise his siege of the city. Retreating from his pursuers, he moved to Bashkiria, where his ranks were once more reinforced by local metallurgical workers, Russian peasants and Bashkirs. This enabled Pugachev to turn toward the Kama and make for Elazan, the administrative centre of the entire Volga area, whose capture would have had an important influence on the further trend of the uprising.

Pugachev came up to Kazan in July 1774, Guns were brought up to the city under cover of a supply train with hay and straw. At the same time a body of unarmed factory peasants stealthily made its way through the gullies and suddenly attacked the town fortifications, driving off the tsarist soldiers practically with their bare hands. Then they turned a captured gun on the town and opened fire down the streets. The Bashkirs burst into the town from the other side. The tsarist garrison took refuge in an ancient fortress. Meanwhile a relief force of tsarist troops under Colonel Michelson had come up. Pugachev’s forces were routed in a pitched battle near Kazan and he himself with a small detachment fled to the right bank of the Volga.

Pursuit of Pugachev

His severe defeat, the approach of au- tumn, and difficulties in obtaining provision and fodder compelled Pugachev to make for the southern steppes. On the right bank of the Volga all that remained of his army was a small detachment . But when be arrived in the densely-populated districts where there were many landlords’ estates his ranks were swelled by a new influx of serfs. Soon the entire Volga area south of Nizhni Novgorod was up in arms. Towns surrendered without practically offering any resistance. Peasants rallied to Pugachev of their own accord, bringing along with them their landlords tied hand and foot. But these peasant reinforcements scattered as quickly as they rallied. The untrained peasants could not stand up against the regular troops, who pursued Pugachev relent- lessly, giving him no respite. After passing through Penza, Saratov and Kamyshin, Pugachev at the end of August drew near to Tsaritsyn (now Stalingrad). Michelson overtook him not far from this town and routed him completely. Pugachev and a few score Cossacks managed to cross the Volga and flee to the steppes, where surrounded on all sides by his pursuers, he sought in vain for a means of escape to the Yaik.

Demoralization set in among his following, the less staunch of his Cossacks complaining that their ataman was leading them to destruction. Pugachev was seized and bound by a group of Cossack elders who handed him over to the tsarist authorities. Chained hand and foot, Pugachev was conveyed in a wooden cage to Moscow, where he was executed in January 1775. A large number of Moscow noblemen gathered to witness his execution, which was regarded as a ‘‘genuine festival for the nobility.” However, the people have never forgotten Emelyan Pugachev, whose memory still lives in folk songs and legends.

The tsarist government took savage reprisals against the people who had taken part in the uprising.

The peasant uprising under Pugachev failed, as had those led by Bolotnikov, Stepan Razin and Bulavin, as well as the other, smaller, peasant uprisings. Pugachev’s peasant detachments fought stubbornly only near their own villages. They were poorly armed and lacked military training. The peasants nourished the belief that a “good tsar” would improve their lot. That is why Pugachev passed himself off as the tsar. The peasants could win only with the help of the workers; but there was no working class in Russia in the 18th century. “Peasant revolts can be successful only if they are combined with revolts of the workers and if the peasant revolts are led by the workers. Only a combined revolt led by the working class has any chance of achieving its aim.”*

Though unsuccessful the peasant war of 1773-1775 played a progressive role in that it dealt a severe blow to serfdom.

The Strengthening of the Dictatorship of the Nobles

The peasant war revealed to the nobility that the machine of feudal government was not strong enough to secure the landlords’ power over the masses of serf peasantry. Consequently, in 1775, after her victory in the peasant war, Catherine made an important reform in the local administration. The whole country was divided into 50 gubernias or governments, each with a population of about 300,000. The gubernias were subdivided into uyezds (counties) with about 30,000 inhabitants each. Governors subordinate to the supreme author- ity Were placed at the head of the gubernias. In some cases two or three gubernias were combined imder a single lord lieutenant. Administration was thus made more centralized. The uyezds were administered by chief constables and by councilmen elected from among the nobles. In addition to the power they wielded as landlords the nobles now received administrative power over the entire population of their districts. Local self-government by the nobles necessitated the establishment of gubernia and uyezd associations of the nobility.

In 1785 the nobles were granted a charter confirming their right to own land and serfs. It also confirmed all the privileges previously grant- edthem: such as immunity from corporal punishment and exemption from personal taxes. The nobles of every administrative district com- prised the respective gub Tnia and uyezd “associations of the nobility” which enjoyed self-rule. The nobles of each uyezd met once every three years to elect an uyezd marshal of the nobility. The nobles of each gubernia met to elect the gubernia marshal of the nobility from among the uye zd marshals, as well as to elect candidates for administrative offices. The nobles received the right to make their needs known to the governor-general and, through special deputies, to the Senate and the empress.

Municipal administration was also reorganized in 1785. Every town resident became a member of a general town association which was divided into six categories. The citizens elected a mayor and deputies to the city duma which had charge of municipal affairs. The municipal administration was controlled by the upper stratum of the merchants. Administrative power in the towns was wielded by the ^orodnichi (town bailiff) appointed by the government.

The government took special pains to increase the administrative power in the outlying provinces. Cbssack self'-government in the Don area was further restricted; what was left of the Zaporozhskaya Seek on the Lower Dnieper was done away with in 1775. The government paid particular attention to the Yaik Cossacks, who had taken an active part in the Pugachev uprising. Their name w’^as changed to Ural Cossacks.

The reforms of 1775-1785 further strengthened the dictatorship of the nobility. The nobles received an even more centralized and stronger administrative apparatus by which they were better able to keep in touch with the popular temper and take swift measures in suppressing peasant disturbances. Catherine II was glorified in verse as the “tsaritsa of the nobility.”

Russia's Foreign Policy after the Peasant War

Annexation of the Crimea

The terms of the Kuchuk Kainarji Treaty concluded with Turkey in 1774 considerably simplified the incorporation into Bussia of the steppes adjoining the Black Sea and the annexation of the Crimea. Both were essential to Bussia 's vital interests in the Black Sea. Although the Crimea had been recognized as an independent khanate it was not strong enough to maintain its own independence. Weakened by the war, Turkey was in no condition to give it timely assistance. The tsarist government astutely took advantage of the rivalry between the members of the ruling house of Girai. One of them, Shagin Girai, was proclaimed khan with the assistance of Russian troops brought into the Crimea. In 1783 Shagin Girai was deposed by the Russian government and the Crimea was annexed to Russia under the name of Taurida.

Following the incorporation of the Crimea, Russia recovered the fertile steppes adjoining the Black Sea, which area became known as Novorossia. Russian landlords pounced on the new regions and seized the best lands in the Crimea, particularly along the coast and in the fertile valleys. The population of the Tatar coastal villages were forced to the mountains. Many Tatars emigrated to Turkey. Within a short space of time large estates owned by high dignitaries and generals of the empress arose in the steppes adjoining the Black Sea. The steppes were settled quickly. Among the settlers were Russian peasants who had been forcibly transferred from the central districts, as well as Greeks, Armenians and local Tatars. General Potemkin, a favourite of the empress, was appointed governor-general to the newly-annexed territory, where he amassed great wealth. He diverted recruits from the army and settled them on his lands. New towns and fortresses arose in Novorossia and the Crimea. The city of Ekaterino- slav (now Dniepropetrovsk) was founded on the Lower Dnieper and was made the administrative centre of the territory. A naval base was built at Sevastopol in the Crimea. The fortress of Kherson was erected near the mouth of the Dnieper.

The Second Turkish War

Catherine realized that Turkey would not reconcile herself with the loss of the Crimea. In preparation for a new war with Turkey, the empress concluded an alliance with Austria.

Intensive fortification of the Crimea and the coast of the Black Sea, as wejl as the construction of a fleet, and of fortresses, hastened the outbreak of war with Turkey. Incited by France, who wished to Weaken Russia, Turkey declared war in 1787.

The war ojiened with an attempt by the Turks to seize the small Russian fort of Kinburn guarding the Dnieper estuary. In a bold at- tack Russian troops under the outstanding commander Suvorov drove a detachment of Turks which had landed in front of the fortress back into the sea. The following year Austria entered the war on the side of Riissia. At this time the Russian troops began their siege of the strong Turkish fortress of Ochakov. The Russian army operating against Turkey was under the command of Potemkin, an able but ambitious and irresolute man who even while at war permitted himself extrava- gant entertainments. Meanwhile the soldiers in their light coats were suffering keenly in the trenches before Ochakov from the severe frosts and shortage of food. Disease and death was taking heavy toll. After wasting several months in inactivity, Potemkin finally gave permission for the assault of Ochakov. The Russian troops stormed and captured the strong Turkish fortress during a heavy blizzard and a bitter frost.

The Siege and Assault of Ismail

In 1789 Suvorov inflicted two more defeats upon the Turks; first at Foc§ani, then at the Rym- nik. For his victory at Rymnik River he was granted the title of Count of Rymuik. Meanwhile, Austria, after a jjeriod of desultory action, concluded a separate peace with Turkey. Russia continued the war alone. In 1790 Russian troops besieged the very strong Turkish for- cress of Ismail at the mouth of the Danube. The Russian army found itself in serious difficulties, particularly with the onset of winter. The troops had no siege artillery or reserves of food and fuel. Disease be- came rife among the soldiers. At this stage Suvorov was sent to take over command of the troops besieging Ismail. Notwithstanding the numerical superiority of the Turkish- garrison, he immediately began to prepare for an assault of the fortress. On the eve of the assault Su- vorov sent the commandant of the Turkish fortress a brief note demand- ing surrender: ‘T have arrived here with my troops. You are free to reflect for twenty-four hours; my first shot means you are no longer free: assault will mean death. The Turkish commander-in-chief an- swered: “Sooner will the Danube stop in its pourse and the heavens fall to earth than I surrender Ismail.” At dawn, under a terrific fire from the. fortress, the Russian soldiers set up ladders and scaled the walls, in places 10 to 15 metres high. A fierce hand-to-hand fight raged all day. By evening Ismail was taken. The Turks lost about 26,000 in ki iled.

Victory of the Black Sea Fleet

Wliile the armed forces under Suvorov were achieving conspicuous successes on land the young Rus- sian Black Sea fleet under the command of Admiral Fyodor F. Usha- kov won several signal victories over the Turkish fleet. In his fight with the powerful enemy Ushakov followed Suvorov’s rule: to keep the initiative in his own hands, always and everywhere to seek out the enemy, attack him suddenly, with firm determination to finish the battle with the enemy’s defeat and utter destruction. Ushakov discarded the outworn tactics of naval warfare current at the time, and boldly employed new methods of warfare based on the wide use of manoeuvre tactics.

Ushakov rendered great assistance to the array on land during the siege of Ismail, \Yhen the Turkish fleet was concentrated at the mouth of the Danube Ushakov, who was closely following the enemy’s move- ments, decided to suddenly foil the Turks, who possessed consid- erable superiority in number and size of battleships. The Turks were caught unawares and bad no time even to deploy for battle. Seized with panic they began to hack away the anchor ropes and retreated in full sail to the Danube delta. Ushakov, however, compelled the Turkish fleet to accept battle and, after a hot engagement, the enemy took to his heels.

On the following day Ushakov continued his pursuit. The Turkish flagship, sef on fire by the Russian broadsides, sank, and another 66-gun battleship Lord of the Sea stirrendered with all its crew. The Turks* casualties were about 2,000 men killed and drowned, whil> Ushakov*s squadron had lost 21 men killed and 25 wounded. After this engagement the Turkish fleet no longer represented an obstacle to the land operations of the Russian army at Ismail.

By the spring of 1797 the Turks, having made good their losses in ships, still had numerical superiority over the Russian Black Sea fleet. The new Turkish naval commander gave his oath to the sultan that he would deliver “Ushak-pasha” (as the Turks called the Russian admi- ral) to him in a cage. By means of an excellent reconnaissance service Ushakov kept the enemy under constant observation. Upon receiv- ing information that the Tmkish fleet was concentrating off cape Ka- liakria under the protection of the shore batteries Ushakov decided to attack on the Mussulman holiday. Most of the Turkish crew, unaware of the Russians* approach, were enjoying themselves ashore. Ushakov suddenly appeared before the amazed Turks, sailed past under battery fire, and cut off the Turkish fleet from the shore. A panic broke out among the Turks some of whose ships began filing on each other and collided. Ushakov on board the flagship plunged into the thick of the fray and setting an example by his own personal valour poured volleys of grapeshot from his guns at close range. The Turkish fleet was once more routed.

Conclusion of Jassy Treaty

The capture of Ismail by Suvorov and Ushakov’s victory on the sea decided the issue of the war.

In 1791 a peace treaty was signed at Jassy, by which Turkey ceded to Russia the coast between the Southern Bug and the Dniester and agreed to recognize the incorporation of the Crimea into Russia. The Second Turkish War gave Russia complete supremacy on the northern coast of the Black Sea. Thus ended the century-old struggle for access to the ice-free waters of the Black Sea, essential to Russia’s economic development.. But Turkey still retained possession of the territory of present-day Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic, which like the Ismail region had been part of the Kiev state in ancient times.

The War with Sweden

Simultaneously with the Turkish war Russia waged a war against Sweden (1788-1790), Sweden had taken advantage of the Russo-Turkish war to attempt to deprive Russia of the Baltic coast. However, all the attempts of the Swedes to break through to St, Petersburg ended in complete failure. The war was terminated in 1790 with the conclusion of a peace under which both coun- tries retained their former borders.

The Ukraine in the 18th Century

Eastern Ukraine

Before the partition of Poland the Ukraine- had consisted of Eastern Ukraine (including Kiev) belonging to Russia, and Western Ukraine (west of the Dnieper), which was under Polish rule.

When Eastern Ukraine joined Russia, the land was confiscated from the Polish landlords, thereby accelerating the rise of a claso of Ukrainian landlords. The Cossack elders began to increase their hold- ings by occupying free lands and by purchasing and seizing lands of corporate Cossackdom, in addition to which they received crown grants.

The Cossack elders elected from their own midst a hetman, his assistants and all the other representatives of Cossack authority, who also acted as the general administrative authority over the people of. the Ukraine, However, the independence and power enjoyed by the Cossack elders was viewed with apprehension by the tsarist govern- ment, which strove to bring the administrative system of the Ukraine in line with that of the rest of Russia. In the course of the 18th century the tsarist government had several times abolished the office of Ukrainian hetman, which was superseded by the so-called Malorossia (Little Russia) College, i.e,, a commission of generals and officers sent from St. Petersburg. The office of hetman was finally abolished in 1764.

The system of military service of the Ukrainian Cossacks was also completely reshaped. At the beginning of the 18th century most of the Zaporozhye Cossacks had migrated from the Zaporozhskaya Seek to the lands of the Crimean khan around the estuary of the Dnieper. In 1733, before the outbreak of the war between Russia and the Crimea, the Zaporozhye Cossacks, not wishing to fight against Russia, had moved back to a district near the Old^ecAand formed a New 8ech, Throughout the war they helped the Russian army by conducting reconnaissance in the steppes and attacking Tatar cavalry detachments.

After Russia had obtained -a footing on the northern coast of the Black Sea the Zaporozhye Cossacks were no longer essential for the defence of the Lower Dniejier, The Crimean Tatars no longer ventured to attack the Russian borders, and, moreover, the Russian landlords who settled in the southern steppes feared having the unruly Zapo- rozhye freemen as their neighbours. Hence the tsarist government began more and more to restrict the rights of the Zaporozhye Cossacks^ depriving them of their lands and pursuits. In 1775 a body of tsarist troops suddenly occupied the Sech^ whereupon more than half of the Zaporozhye Cossacks took to their boats at night and sailed down the Dnieper to Tuikish territory. A few years after the breaking up of the Seek some of the Zaporozhye Cossacks were settled on the shores of the Azov Sea and along the lower reaches of the Kuban River. At the same time some of the Don Cossacks were also moved to the Kuban area. Thus was laid the foundation of the Kuban Cossackdorn, In 1780 Eastern Ulcraine received the same administrative divisions as the rest of Russia. With the introduction in the Ukraine of the poll tax in 1783 an ukase was issued which virtually enserfed the Ukrain- ian peasants. The ukase stipulated that “every peasant is to remain in the same village and in the same status as at the last registration.” The Ukrainian nobles received similar rights to those granted the Russian nobles under the charter of 1785.

The Haidamak Uprising Against Poland

At the beginning of the 18th century the Polish manorial estates in Western Ukraine, which remained under Polish rule, were restored. The substantial increase in Polish grain exports in the middle of the 18th century led the landlords to extend manorial tillage and increase the barskcMna services by the peasants. On some estates the peasants were deprived of all their arable land and livestock. Popular uprisings, however, continued to interfere with the complete consolidation of Polish rule over the Ukrainian lands. The peasants and Cossacks who participated in these uprisings were called Haidamaks.

The first big outbreak among the Haidamaks occurred in 1734 with vhe appearance in Western (Polish) Ukraine of Russian troops sent by the tsarist government to support King Augustus III, who had been elected by the Polish gentry. Rumours circulated among the peasants that the Russian troops had come to overthrow the rule of the Polish landlords. The tsarist government, fearing the spread of the peasant uprising, which had swept swiftly throughout the Pol- ish part of the Ukraine, ordered its troops in Poland to take a hand in its suppression.

Another large Haidamak uprising, provoked by the brutal and arbitrary treatment of the Ukrainian population by a predacious Polish gentry, broke out in 1768. The Polish gentry plundered the Ukrainian population and tortured the captive rebels. The Haidamak movement brought to the fore several brave commanders, including Maxim Zheleznyak of Zaporozhye and the Cossack officer Ivan Gonta. The Haidamaks, enraged by the bloodthirsty atrocities and outrages committed by the gentry, wreaked their vengeance on them by seiz- ing and devastating their hamlets and estates. Rebel detachments under Zheleznyak and Ivan Gonta captured even the well-fortified town of Uman, to which the gentry had fled in panic.

Poland was unable to cope with the Haidamaks and again solicited the aid of the tsarist go Yernmeni , whose troops crush- ed the uprising. Zheleznyak and Gout a were seized by a strata- gem. Zheleznyak y^s sent to^

Siberia and Qonta handed overto the Polish gentry, who tortured him to death. The savage repri- sals taken by the Polish pans and thegentry against the Ukrainian population exceeded all previ- ous atrocities. The Polish pans, as they themselves admitted, set out “to quench the Ukrain- ian flame in the blood of the peasants.*’ They addressed a proclamation to the peasants claiming that God had created the peasant to obey the pan

^questiomngly. Many peasants From a drawing of the 18 th century fled to Russian territory to

escape persecution. Polish rule in the Ukraine was completely done away with after the second partition of Poland in 1793.

Ukrainian Culture

Ukrainian culture was fiercely persecuted in the 18th century. The Ukrainians were prohibited from printing •books in their native language. This persecution, however, could not check the progress of Ukrainian culture. Stories of the struggle of the Cossacks against the Poles were woven into ballads simg in villages and towns to the accompaniment of the folk instruments. Short plays and comedies on historical themes were performed at public fairs and ixv the schools. In the absence of secular education an important role was played by the Kiev Ecclesiastical Academy, Many Ukrainian writers, including Grigori Skovoroda, the national poet, philosopher and outstanding scholar of ancient classical literature, graduated from the academy. Skovoroda was born of a poor Cossack family, and wan- dered all his life about the Ukraine with a walking stick and a bag slung over his shoulder, in which he carried several treasured books and manuscripts. Skovoroda had a first-hand knowledge of the life and sorrows of the poor Ukrainian peasant, and his poetry, which won swift 'popularity among the masses, Fas cited in proverbs, sayingsand songs.

Economic and oultuml rappro^ement between t^ Ukraine aid ; Busma Oontinued-thiougbout the 18 th century. U^ corn an well as th^ produOts of lUminiau industry were shipp^ in large quantity to the towns o{ Russia. J'rom Russia the Ukraine received cotton fabrics, ironware and other manufactures. The Russian language began to gain popularity in the towns of the Ukraine.

Education and Culture in the Second Half of the 18th Century

Education

A very negligible part of the population, primarily the children of the nobles, received school tuition in the 18th century. In the middle of the century there were only three gymnasia: one in St. Petersburg, belonging to the Academy of Sciences, and two attached to the university in Moscow. In the late ’fifties a gymnasimn was o;gened in Kazan. Noblemen’s children could also receive instruction, pri* marily on general subjects, at the Cadet Corps for Nobles. The Smolny Institute for girls was opened in St. Petersburg, with separate depart- ments for noblemen’s daughters and the daughters of burghers. The Academy of Artj> had been founded in St. Petersburg in Elizabeth’s reign. Under Catherine big plans were drawn up for establishing educar tional institutions in the provinces. Only a small part of these plana was realized. ‘‘Major public schools” were established in the gubernia cities, and “Minor public schools” in some of the uyezd towns.

, Enterprising people took advantage of the lack of educational institutions and organized private boarding schools in their homes. Wealthy nobles hired the services of foreign teachers and preceptors for their children. The increased demand for private teachers attracted^ to Russia a large number of uneducated foreigners, many of whom could barely read and write. They could pass on to their pupils only the spoken foreign language. In the middle of the 18th century French even began to replace Russian as the language of the nobility. Young noblemen spoke French fluently but had difficulty in making them- selves understood in their native tongue. Home education in the fam- ilies of noblemen was supplemented by the reading of foreign, pri- marily French, books. French literature consequently helped to spread French culture among the educated nobility.

The prevailing trend in the literatui^e and art of Western Europe in the late 17th and early 18th centuries was classicism, a trend which expressed itself in the imitation of the art and poetry of ancient Greece aiad Rome. The influence of French classicism penetrated into Russia as Well.

Literature

French influence was particularly strong in litera^ ture. Russian writers strove to imitate Ri^ine, Moli^re, Voltaire and the other outstanding Frendi writers of tlie 17th and 18th eehtitries^. Rosbian translations from the Greek and Latin began to appear. The study of olassieal and Western European literature served to broaden intblleciwl iirterests and gave Russian writers new ihenmst Lnitation of elassioal and French writers not infrequently took ea»g|^rated forms. An exponent of classicism in Russian literature in the middle of the 18th century was Alexander Petrovich Sumarokov (1718-1777).

Sumarokov was an advocate of the political enhancement of the middle nobility, whom he regarded as the bulwark of the Russian states He was hostile to t}ie higher court dignitaries, whose ignorance and arrogance he ridiculed in his works. Sumarokov wrote numerous work^ in the French style. Most notable were his historical tragedies; love lyrics, comedies and satires. Even in his tragedies on Russian histor- ical topics, the characters spoke and acted like Greek or Roman he- roes. Yet with all their defects, Sumarokov^s tragedies played a posi- tive role in that they furnished material for the ^st Russian theatre. Even more important were his comedies and satires, which paved the way for the development of satirical literature. Sumarokov had a high opinion of the social significance of literature. He said that Moscow, where “all the streets are jiaved seven feet high with igno- rance” needed **a hundred Moliferes” to combat ignorance.

After Sumarokov *8 day the influence of French literature began to wane. Comedies had to be on themes from Russian life if they were to be intelligible and entertaining. In the works of Denis Ivanovich Fonvizin (1745-1792) we find a closer approach to Russian actuality, to realism. He ridiculed the vices of the contemporary nobility. Fon- vizin ’s excellent comedies The Brigadier and The Minor present- ed such characters as the brigadier’s shrewish and greedy wife, the stupid and malicious Prostakova, the coarse Skotinin, and the lazy and ignorant Mitrofanushka, in all of whom the contemporary reader was able to recognize types from real life.

To Gavriil Romanovich Derzhavin (1743-1816), outstanding Russian poet of the late 18th century, goes great credit for simplify- ing the language of poetry. Derzhavin employed in his poems the native Russian idiom and showed how musical and forceful it was. Derzhavin was the poet of the nobles’ empire, the laureate of its glo- ries and military victories. At the same time he endeavoured to ex- pose the evils of strong rulers whose “wickedness shakes the earth, and whose inequity startles the heavens.” Derzhavin hoped, by de- nouncing these evils, to strengthen the feudal state.

• In the second half of the 18th century Western European senti- mentalism began to exercise its inSuenoe on Bu$«ian literature. The writers of this trend paid chief attention to the portrayal of the human emotions.

The foremost representative of Russian sentimentalism was Nik- blai Mikhailovich I&mmzin ^765-1826). Letters of a Bueebm Trov^ elfar, In which Karamzin d^iHbed his foreign ttatels and gare Riuisian society a pi^u^ of lifeUnd culture in Westei^ Europe, met ^th fresh sudcess. His Poor a ototf eoucerniug the uU^ppy lore 0 f a peasaat girl for a nobleman, ms espeoially popular. Later Karamzin gave up belles-lettres and devoted himself entirely to Rus- sian hietory.

Some Russian writers of the sentimental school were guilty of casting a false gloss and romantic air over the realities of the Russian countryside, where peasants and landlords were depicted amid idyllic surroundings of peace and goodwill. Two years after the suppression of the Pugachev uprising Vasili Maikov wrote a comic opera entitle^ Village Festival cmd Virtue Bewarded, in which a chorus of peasants sang “After pa3dng ohrok to the landlord, we lead a blissful life shel- tered by our master.”

The Theatre and Music

The rise of the Russian dramatic theatre was linked with the revival in literature. Until the middle of the 18th century performances had been staged almost exclusively by Italian, French and Oerman visiting actors. Under Elizabeth Petrovna the students of the Cadet Corps for Nobles, including the future writer Sumarokov, had given amateur performances at the palace. The found- er of the Russian professional dramatic theatre was Fyodor Volkov, the son of a Yaroslavl merchant.

Volkpv bepame acquainted with the theatre in St. Petersburg, where he attended performances of the Cadet Corps. When he returned to Yaroslavl, Volkov formed an amateur troupe and began to present French plays, Volkov’s acting won such renown that he and his troupe were summoned to St. Petersburg by Empress Elizabeth. In 1756 the Russian Theatre for the Performance of Tragedies and Comedies was opened in St. Petersburg. Sumarokov was appointed director; Volkov and his companions comprised the first troupe.

Volkov died in 1763, but the Russian dramatic theatre which had come into being during his lifetime continued to develop. Volkov ha^ been called the Father of the Russian Theatre; under him it became a permanent theatre with a professional Russian oast staging perform- ances for the public at large.

The rich landlords, imitating the nobility of the capital, organized ' on their estates small theatres with serf actori^. The serf actors, who were wholly at the mercy of their masters’ whims, led a difficult life. There were many gifted persons among them who had no opportunity to develop th^ir talents.

^ular music became very popular iu the 18th century. Italian operae were presented at the courts of Anna Ivanovna and Elizabeth Petrovna on festive occasions. Opera in those days was regarded as ap “art of the court.” The growing interest in music stimulated the ool- ieotion ez^d i^ptation of folk melpdies, which subsequently had a great influence on Russian musical culture. Russian composers je:aecatants began to make their appearance. Ma^ celeli^ted inusioianB frqm the common people, from the sprfs and the poor olaesss qf the townspeople* A hopse serf of Prince Potemkin named Ehandoshkin V7UQ a Gomposer aiid a violinist of amazing accomplishments, equal to any V<'8trTn virtuoso of his time. He wrote a number of fine compositions. Vevstignei Fomin, a soldier's son, and Mikhail Mat** insky, a serf owned by <Jouht Yagpzhinsky , were outstanding composers.

The late ^seventies saw the staging of the first Russian operas of any significanee: Matim^lcy's St. Petersburg Hos'd and Fomin's The C^j'urim JfiWsr. Both composers introduced into their operas scenes from town and country life and made exi ensive use of folk melo* dies. Prominent composer of piano music was Bortnyansky, who drew widely from the world's best compositions and laid the foundation for Russian instrumental music.

Painting and Architecture

The development of Russian paint* Ing brought forth several celebrated artists. Among them was Ivan Ar- gunov, a serf of Count Sheremetev, who had started his artistic career by painting the walls and ceilings of his master's palace. Levitsky and his pupil Borovikovsky achieved great mastery in portraiture, their principal subjects being rich courtiers and the higher nobility.

Important progress was also made by Russian architecture. Vasili Bazhenov, the son of a humble deacon in one of Moscow's churches, displayed unusuaj gifts and was educated in the g3mfinasium of Moscow University and in the Academy of Arts in St. Petersburg. He completed his artistic education in Prance and Italy, where he worked undeY the leading painters and architects of the time and studied lbs monuments of antiquity and outstanding works of art. Already during this period Bazhenov became known abroad as a great artist. He received lucrative offers to remain abroad, including one front the king of Prance. But Bazhenov returned to Russia and placed all his energies and his prodi* gioua gifts at the service of his homeland. One of the finest of the struc* tures erected according to his plans is the old building of the Lenin Li% brary (formerly the PaAkov mansion) in Moscow.

Another great Rus^n arohiteot of the 18th century and a contem* porary of Bazhenov wifcis Matvei Kazakov, the son of a poor Moscow un# der-cierk, Kazakov drew up the plans for many monumental buildup ings in Moscow which are noted for their perfection, simplicity an4 plasti<^y of line. Vasili Bazhenov and Matvei Kazakov were the found* ere of Russilin i n^chltotlitne.

Inventors

The ownere of serf manufactories were little concerned with lmpre;[Hi% the technique of production, since most of the work was performed not by machines but by hand. Consequently most Of the inventions made in the second half of the 18th century were not utilized,

IvanlvanovichPolzunovtthe inventor of the **fire-working enginet? was the son of a Ural garrison soldier (1728-1766). One could ha^ expected that the invention of the steam engine would have ccmpletely revolutionized industry. Mechanical energy was then obtained by utilizing water power, and hence factories were built near lakes or rivers. It would have lowered the cost of transporting raw material and Jighteped manual labour.

Basing himself upon the inveatigatiotis of his great contemporary Mikhail Lomonosov, Ivan Polzttnov designed and built an engine oper- ating on steam to supply driving power to factory machines. The in- ventor^s health had been undermined by his hard life, however, over- work led to a breakdown and Polzunov died just before the "fire- working engine” which he had built at Barnaul (in the Altai Mountains) was to be put into service. Tests had confirmed all of Polzunov ’s calcu- lations. Polzunov wao almost twenty-one years ahead of James Watt in inventing the world’s first steam engine for the direct operation of fac- tory machines. But his brilliant invention was forgotten. It remained for Soviet science to grant Ivan Polzunov his due as one of the world’s great thinkers and innovators in t|je field of engineering.

Another Russian inventor of the 18th century, Ivan Petrovich Kulibin (1735-1818), the son of a Nizhni Novgorod merchant, met ,the same sad fate. TVTiile still a boy Ivan Kulibin saw a clock on the wall of a friend’s house, and a few days later he made a similar clock out of wood. After the death of his father he ran the shop and made clocks in his spare time. Kulibin and his apprentice spent five years making a curio clock, which was then fashionable. The clock was the size of a goose egg, and every hour "gates of paradise” opened to reveal s,toall, moving figures of angels. Kulibin presented this watch to Empress Catherine 11, who by way of reward appointed him mechanic to the Academy of Sciences where he spent all his leisure and all his earnings on new inventions. His most outstanding work was an extraordinarily bold design for a single-span wooden bridge across the Neva. Kulibin built a large complete model of the bridge which wholly confirmed his plans. No practical results followed, however. The model was set up in the grounds of the Taurida Palace, where it gradually rotted away. Kulibin had many other inventions, but not one of them was applied. He died in poverty in his home town of Nizhni Novgorod (now (3orky).

Although serfdom acted as a drag on the progress of science and art, the 18th century, particularly the latter half, was a period of cultural advancement in Russia. The Russian people manifested their remark- able creative geniUs in literature, mu§io, painting, architecture an4 eufineerix^.

The Decline of Serfdom and the Birth of Capitalism

The Bourgeois Revolution in Europe and Tsarism at the End of the 18th Century

Catherine's Struggle against the Revolution

The French Bourgeois Revolution and Its Significance in World History

The victory of the bourgeois revolution in France at the end of the 18th century ushered in a period of the triumph and consolidation of capitalism in the advanced countries of Europe and America. After a thousand years of domination feudalism gave way to a new system , the cap! talist (bourgeois) syst em .

“The basis of the relations of production under the capitalist system is that the capitalist owns the means of production, but not the workers in production— the wage labourers, whom the capitalist can neither kill nor sell because they are personally free, but who are deprived of means of production and, in order not to dfe of hunger, are obliged to sell their labour power to the capitaliet and to bear the yoke of e:^loi«  tation.^'*

The bourgeois revolution of 1789 , made possible a more rapid de* velopment of firoductive forces than under leudaLabsolutism. In France the last vestiges of feudal service by the peasimts were being abolished. Conditions favourable to the development Of large-scale industry and the growth of the working class were ereated. ^he basis was laid for a new political regime— bourgeois democracy. The bourgeois system facilitated the organizatios and class education of the proletariat. The new social and economic order repiiesented significani progress as compared with feudalism andusliiit^ in a neto-epoch iU human history. The French revolution of 1789 was the mos# decisive of the bourgeois revolutions, but it did no more than substitute one form of exploitation, the feudal, by aether form of exploitation, the bourgeois.

It was not until the Great October Socialist Bevolution in October 1917 that exploitation of man by man was done away with and the way opened for mankind to a classless Communist society. Herein lies its fundamental difference from the French bourgeois revolution.

Tsarist Russia in the Bloc of Counter-Revolutionary Powers

While earlier bourgeois revolutions (in the Netherlands and in England) had not constituted a serious threat to feudalism in Europeas a whole, the French bourgeois revolution dealt a blow to absolutism and feu- dalism both in France and the rest of Europe. That is why the whole of feudal Europe came out against the French revolution. Tsarist Russia was an active participant in the European counter-revolution.

Catherine considered it to be the duty of all European monarchsl to intervene, in the revolutionary events in Prance. She entered into negotiations with the kings of Prussia, Austria and Sweden for a joint crusade against revolutionary France and energetically set about pre- paring for intervention under the slogan ‘*the cause of the French king is the cause of all kings.” She declared that she could not permit shoemakers anywhere to govern the state. After the execution of Louis XVI, Catherine was the first monarch in Europe to sever relations with the French republic. All Russian subjects living in Prance were recalled to Russia; Frenchmen — adherents of the revolution — were banished from Russia. French aristocrat 4migr6s were granted posts, pensions, palaces and estates. French teachers, governesses, cooks and craftsmen in the employ of Russian nobles were ma;de to take an oath renouncing the ‘‘rabid and villainous government of France.”

The trade agreement between Russia and France was abrogated. French ships were forbidden to enter Russian ports* Admiral Chicha- gov’s squadron was senMo the NcMh Sea “to curb the revolution” and to blockade France.

Radishchev

The French bourgeois revolution brought home to Catherine the connection that existed between the ideas of the philos- ophers joi the enlightenment and the revolution. She embarked on res«^ blute measures to counteract the “French plague.” Till then the works p{ the Frenck philosophers had enjoyed a wide circulation among the Russian nobility. Books by Voltaire, Dideroti*Rousseau and other phi- losophers were to be found in practically every nobleman’s library. They! wm read in the original, lor as a rule the young nobles knew foipob better than Rustian. more educated of sdhoolteaeiiers and private French tutors bed also helped to spread the ideas of the French enlightened school.

A representative of the pro- gressive young nobles brought up in the spirit of the enlight- enment was Alexander Nikola- yevich Radishchev. He was born in 1749 and received a good education for those days, study- ing at the Leipzig University. During his stay abi oad Radi- shchev became acquainted with the works of the French philos- ophers of the enlightenment which, on his return to Russia, he set about translating into his native tongue. He was especially attracted to the ideas of equal* ity and liberty as expressed in the works of Rousseau. In trans- lating the word ‘despotism,”: Radishchev wrote: “Autocracy is most odious to human nature*” In 1790 Radishchev. published his famous hook Voyage from 8t* Perersburg io Moscow, The book, which was published in a private edition of 650 copies, fell into the hands of the empress and roused her to great anger. She perceived in the author a “greater villain than Pugachev” and ordered him arrested, declaring that even “ten gallows would not be enough for him.” Radishchev’s book, which had so horrified Catherine, depicted with unprecedented power and passion the curse of serfdom and the infamy of the autocracy whidh supported it.

“1 looked about toe and my heart was seared by the sufferings of mankind,” wrote the author in the preface. He exposed the serfs* mal- treatment by their landlords: “Avaricious brutes, insatiable leeches^ what do we leave the peasant— only what we cannot take from him— the air he breathes. Yes, only air.” Further he drew a vivid picture of peasant poverty and subjection and the unlimited power wielded over them by the landlords. “In relation to the peasant the landlord is iawmal^r, judge and executor of his judgn^ent, and, at will, a claimant against whom the defendant dare not say a wdiid. ” Radishchev saw the direct connection between the autoomcy and serfdom and called for the dvarthrow of the tsars. In his ode lAber^y^ idiich he fnsei^d into tile FcycVCf he wrote that the people would rise as terrible avengm and destroy the "iron'throne.”

He demanded the abolition of serfdom^ the development of industry and agriculture, pop- ular education, and the wag- ing of a war against extor- tionate judges and the tyran- ny of officials. In his book I^dishchev came forth as the first revolutionary, republi- can and enlightener from among the nobility. He was an ardent exponent of Russia following the European path of bourgeois progress and education.

Catherine declared that the **author is steeped in and infected with French delu- sions,” and ordered him to be prosecuted for “spreading the French plague.” The court passed a sentence of death, which was commuted to ten years^ exile toSiberia. At the order of the empress Radishcbev^s book was burned.

In 1796, after Catherine’s death, Radishchev was allowed to return from Siberia by Emperor Paul I, who granted an amnesty to everyone his mother had persecuted. Radishchev, however, was, prohibited from coming to the capital, and he lived on his estate. Only under Alexander I did he receive permission to live in the capital. Despite everything, Radishchev continued to defend the ideals of freedom, equality and enlightenment. In the first year of Alexander’s Teign he drew iip a plan for state reforms based on freedom and the equality of.all before the law, regardless of status. The plan was rejected and Radishchev was once more threatened with exile. Ruined in health and broken in spirit, he could not bear up imder the new trials and took poison in 1802.

Novikov

atherine It peraecuted other *Tree thinkers” as well. In April 1792 she signed an ukase for the arrest of Nikolai Ivanovich Novii* kov, a prominent figure in the Moscow circle of Free-Masons.

Free-Bfasonry in Western Europe was essentially an eitpression of protest by the rising bourgeoisie against the oppression of the feudal church and the state. Free-Masonry was introduced into Russia in the middle of the l8th centmryand sinead among tlm higher nobility. The Moscow masonic circle carried on extensive edno^ic^l activitiFl R founded sdlMxolSt prlntsbi^ and a pubUshii^ JBm^4 Nikolai Novikov was an active member of the Moscow Free-Masona in the ’eighties. Bishop Platon, who investigated Novikov’s publica- tions on the instructions of Catherine, found that these were “most per- nicious books which corrupt good morals and contrive to undermine the pillars of the holy faith,” meaning the works of the Encyclopaedists. Novikov published eight books by ^usseau, fourteen by Voltaire, two by Diderot, and others.

Novikov opened a large number of bookshops, at one of which he organized a public library, the first in Moscow. He published a satirical magazine entitled Tra*en (The Drone) and later the magazines Zhu vopiaete (T^e Painter) and Koahelyok (The Purse). His satire had great social significance, exposing as it did the social ulcers on the body of Bussia. Novikov laid bare the reactionary conservatism, ignorance and arroganbe of the nobility, which considered the sciences to be “mere trifles unworthy of the attention of noblemen.” He ridiculed the fashion* able craze for everything foreign. He exposed the faults in administra- tion-^the bribery, peculation and red tape. Novikov gave a particular, ly trenchant and faithful description of the serfs, crushed by want and despotism.

In The Correa'pondence of a Master WVh the Peasants of His ViU lagSy and particularly in The Painter^ Novikov depicted the wretch- ed lot of the serfs.

Novikov’s pointed satire roused Catherine’s displeasure. And she considered the Masonic organization which he had activized to be even more dangerous than his magazines. Novikov was arrested and im- prisoned in the Schlusselburg Portress, the bookshops and press of the Moscow circle were closed, and his companions arrest^. Without benefit oftrial, simply at the fiat of the empress, Novikov was sentenced to 16 years’ imprisonment in the fortress. His property was confiscated by the state. The empress ordered “all the books published by Novikov to be handed over to the court one and all.” Novikov was released by Paul I. Ruined, ill and lonely, he died in 1818 at the age of 74.

The Second Partition of Rzecz Pospolita

Under the influence of the French bourgeois revolution the progressive elements of Polish society grew increasingly dissatisfied with the domestic and intemation. al position of their country, which was in the throes of a grave politi- cal crisis. With the development of caliitalism in Europe and in Poland itself, the Polish state could be saved from political extinction only by the abolition of serfdom and by a democratic reorganization of the state .

With the support of the rising bourgeoisie the progressive strita of the gentry formed a bloc of the gentry and the bourgeois^. Its lead^ convened the “great” or four-year Diet (1788-1791) which adopted a constitution on May 3, 1791. The constitution, drawn up undbt the in. tf uenie of the Preh^ bourgeois constitution of 1791, abolished the elec- tion of the king, rofiiealed the lib^m ism and eaiabMsh^ a ne# votii^ procedure under which questions were decided iu the Diet by a simple majority. However, the constitution did not afifect either the gentry privileges or serfdom, which remained intact. The constitution was op* posed by the Polish magnates who did not want to lose their old feudal privileges. They formed a Confederation in Targowica which appealed to Catherine for help *‘in the name of the protection and preservation of Bzecz Pospolita against those who have forgotten that they were born free gentry.” Catherine, fearing the influence of the French revo- lution in Poland, sent in an army of 100,000. The Diet called upon the Polish people to rise up in battle “for the altar, for freedom and for property.” But the weak Polish army of 30,000 men was no match for the Bussian army. State power was transferred to the magnates. Adher- ents of the May 3 constitution, including General Kosciuszko of the Polish army, emigrated.

Prussia, alarmed by the successes of the French revolution, which had gained sympathy in democratic circles in Poland and Prussia, sought an alliance with Russia against Poland. Prussian troops crossed the Polish border, and in January 1793 Prussia and Russia effected a second partition of Poland, by which Russia received part of Byelorus- sia, including Minsk, Volhynia and Podolia, a territory with a popula- tion of three million Byelorussians and tJkrainians. Prussia occupied Poznan, Kalisz, Czestochowa, Thorn and Danzig, localities with a predominantly Polish population.

The Third Partition of Rzecz Pospolita

The party of the bour- geoisie and the gentry, resenting the partition of Poland, formed a conspiracy against Russian tsarism. The conspiracy was headed by General Kosciuszko, who had secretly returned to Poland. Kosciuszko, who was a member of the Polish gentry, strove to create a strong and independent bourgeois Poland, He sympathized with the ideas of the French bourgeois enlighteners and had fought in the war waged by the English colonies in North America for their independence.

XJ})on his return to Poland Kosciuszko organized a rebellion in Cracow. The successful operations of the Polish rebel troops forced the tsarist army to retreat. A provisional government headed by Koscimzko was set up at Warsaw. But the uprising in Poland was not widely supported by the masses. The Polish peasants who had Joined the uprising in the hope of receiving land from the new revolutionary government, began to desert Kosoiuszko’s army, disappointed at the government ’s failure to provide them with land or even do away with landlordism.

The peasants who lived in the Byelorussian and Ukrainian parts o) Poland did not want to support their oppressors, the Polish squires, and did not join the uprising. In Lithuania the uprising assumed largejr propiortipns. A Lithuanian provisioi^l gpvemincnt was set up at Vilno,

H acted independently of Th^ irresolute and luftioxiary titctios of the leaders prevented the attainment of unity between the insurgent forces of Poland and Lithuania.

The tide of rebellion in Poland beginning to ebb, the tsarist troops laiiinched an offensive against Poland. In June 1794 revolutionary Cracow surrendered to the Prussian troops. In August the tsarist troops captured Vilno.

The revolutionary masses of Warsaw rose in rebellion, accusing the government of treachery. Kosciuszko ordered the leaders of the Warsaw, rebellion hanged. Soon after, Kosciuszko ’s army was defeated and he himself taken prisoner. On October 24, 1794, Russian troops under Su- vorov took Warsaw by storm.

The Kosciuszko uprising was defeated. It might have been success- ful only in conjunction with a peasant revolution, but the gentry were afi-^id of revolution and did not permit it to develop.

. After taking reprisals against the rebels, Russia, Prussia and Austria carried out a third partition of Poland (1795). Under the third partition the western paH of Volhynia, the western part of Byelorussia, Lithua- nia including Zhmudia, and Courland went to Russia; the northwestern part'**^f Poland, including Warsaw, went to Prussia, and the southwest- ern part, including Cracow, to Austria. Poland as an independent state ceased to exist.

The partitions of Poland were to have facilitated the united struggle of the feudal monarehs of Europe against revolutionary Prance. In 1796 tsarist Russia concluded an agreement with England against the French revolution. England promised a substantial subsidy. Cather- ine to send an army of 60,000 under the command of Suvorov fgainst Prance. Her death, on November 6, 1796, prevented the realization of these plans.

Paul I (1796–1801)

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Paul*!, Catherine’s heir, Was brought up by his '^iMtnother Elizabeth, who bad taken him from his parents at birth.

The relations between Catherine and her son turned from cool to hostile. Paul regarded the coronation of bis mother as a violation of his ri^s tis heir. Catherine feared her rival son and kept him away from ailkirs. Paul sharply criticized Catherine’s entire system of state administration; he particularly hated her favourites. Banned from participation in state affairs, Paul devoted himself wholly to military imrsuits at (latchina, an estate presented to him by his mother. He Oatuhlha into an army camp complete with gates, turnpikes and ban^ks, and' introduced the army reguiattons of Fredrick H, the Prussian army uniform and a rigorous stick discipline.

The first thing Paul did when he became emperor was to change all his mother^ arraugoments hB own way. Mrst of all he decided to take the guards and the artny in hand, and introduced strict Prussian unilitary drill. From early morning there were changes of the guards and military exercises in exact imitation of the Prussian style; the sol- diers were dressed in Prussian uniforms and wore curled hair and queues exactly like the Prussians. The capital itself resembled an army camp. Fntrance into and exit from the city was under strict control. Turn- pikes painted in black and white stripes were set up at the outposts.

Paul I wanted to introduce army barracks discipline into all phases of state activity. He regarded this as the best way of combating revolu- tion, which he hated no less than Catherine had.

He restricted the number of foreigners entering Russia and prohib- ited Russian nobles from going abroad to study in the universities. The importation into Russia of all books, "no matter in what language they be written, as well as music” was banned. Paul ordered all private print- shops closed down and established an ecclesiastical and secular censor- ship.

Paul’s endeavours were directed towards a strict centralization of power in the interests of the feudal nobility. As autocrat, he considered himself the sole source of power. His executive assistant was the procu- rator-general. "You and I, I and you— we alone will run things,” Paul said to one of his procurator-generals. When a nobleman passed the royal turnout on the street he had to get out of his own carriage and pay due homage. Like his predecessors, Paul defended the class interests of the serf •owning landlords. He gave generous grants of land and state peasants to those of the nobles who were in his good graces. In the four years of his reign he handed out more than 300,000 peasants, turning them into privately-owned serfs.

Paul regarded the nobility as the first estate in the realm, from whom he expected military service. In violation of the ukam on “liberties of the nobility,” which had abolished obligatory military service, he ordered the nobles to take up their duties in the regiments in which they had been registered and in whi<di they had received ranks without serving. Nobles who evaded state service were banished from the capital.

^ His policy in relation to the peasantry followed Catherine's serfage policy to the letter. At a parade in St. Petersburg the assembled .serfs handed the tsar a petition asking to be freed from the “tyranny of the landlords.” ^^udi insolence,” says Bolotov, a writer of the period, **wm mercilessly punished at the emperor ’s order by public flogging to instill fear in the hearts of others and to kee{» them from annoying him with sudi absurd requests.”

Peasant disturbances during Paul’s reign spread to 32 gubernias out of a total of 52. The tsar demanded that the peasant uprisings be crushed without mercy.

At the beginning of March 1797 Paul sent a military force under Field Marshal Repnin to suppress a peasant uprising in the village of BrasOvo (Orel Region), Shortly afterwards the tsar received a report announcing complete victory over the peasants: “Thirty-three cannon shots and 600 small arms shots were fired during the operations; a fire broke out and 16 houses were burned. Twenty were killed and seventy wounded.”

Fearing further outbreaks among the peasantry, Paul issued an order in April 1797 prohibiting the (corv6e) on Sundays and

recommending the landlords to confine themselves to three days of the barshchina a week. The landlords did not obey the order. They intensi- fied their exploitation of the serfs and made regular slaves out of their household serfs.

The government newspaper continued to print daily announcements of the sale and exchange of serfs. Here is one of the numerous advertise- ments; ^‘For sale: two household serfs, one of whom is a whip and bootmaker, 30 years old, married; his wife is a laundress and can tend cattle, and is 25 years old; the other is a musician and singer, 17 years old; plays on the bassoon and sings bass. Also a grey gelding, 3 years old, tall, English breed, not broken in. For price apply 17-1 Arbat, Apt. 1,”

Foreign Policy

When Paul came to the throne Russia was in a state of war with France, in pursuance of the Russian-English treaty of alliance of 1795. Russia had been engaged in ruinous, uninter- rupted warfare for almost forty years, in the course of which the Rus- sian empire had greatly extended its territory and now occupied an area of 331 , GOD square miles, with a 17,009 mile-long frontier. The pop- ulation of the empire had increased as a result of these conquests from 25,000,000 to 37,000,000 in a century. Almosthalf of the state budget was spent on the army, which by the end of Catherine ’s reign numbered 500,000 men.

On ascending the throne Paul declared that it was his intention to give Russia “the rest she so badly needs and desires. ” He revoked the new conscription announced by Catherine and informed the English ambass^or that the auxiliary corps she had promised against the French could not be sent. However, Paul promised his allies “to oppose in airways possible the rabid French republic, which threatens all Europe with complete destruction of law, rights and morality.”

The English government replied that it had no choice but to con-, tent itself with the Russian auxiliary squadron operating in the North Sea. At the same time England, together with Austria, sought for ways and means of drawing Russia into more active paHicipation in the wat against France. The English suggested that Paul occupy the Island of Corsica, calculating that there Russia would have to bear the brunt of the main Frencli drive. The Island of Malta, which Napoleon had seized on his way to Eg5^pt, was the most important strategic point in the Mediterranean Sea, The Maltese Order to whom the island belonged was connected with the court of the tsar, and appealed to Paul for help, bestowing on him the title of Grand Master of the Order. Like Catherine before him , Paul was desirous of ‘‘obtaining a firm foothold in the Medi- tenanean” while at the same time creating a fighting base against the French revolution, and so he promised to assist the Maltese Order. Fear- ing that Turkey would league herself with France, he ordered the na- val forces in the Black Sea to be reinforced and the fleet and coastal fortresses speedily prepared for war. ^Vhen Turkey saw that the objec- tive of Napoleon’s expedition was Eg3rpt, a part of the Turkish empire, she concluded a military alliance with Russia against France.

In August 1798 Admiral Ushakov, commander of the Russian Black Sea fleet, received orders to proceed with his squadron to the Bosporus and, if the occasion arose, “immediately to follow and assist the Turk- ish fleet against the French regardless of consequences.” Ushakov’s squadron consisted of 16 ships carrying 792 guns with a crew of 8,000 sailors and soldiers.

In the course of six weeks Ushakov occupied four small islands of the Ionian Archipelago, after which he set about to capture the fortress on the island of Corfu, considered to be an impregnable naval citadel. The French ganison of the fortress was about 3,000 strong with 650 guns. The Russian sailors, on the other hand, were handicapped by a shortage of the most necessary supplies, food and shells. Indeed, they Were starving. Ushakov wrote: “I know of no example in all ancient history where a fleet has been so far out without any supplies and in such an extremity as we are now.” The diflSculties, however, did not daunt Ushakov and his brave sailors. The men had the same implicit faith in their admiral as Suvorov’s soldiers had in their general. On February 18, 1799, after a fierce assault of the forward fortifications the French garrison on Corfu surrendered.

The swift capture of Corfu by the Russians created a deep impression in Europe and delighted Suvorov who jestingly declared that he was sorry he was not serving as a midshipman under Ushakov. Having oust- ed the French troops from the islands Ushakov introduced a republican form of government for the indigenous population.

Following the capture of Corfu a Russian naval descent was landed in Southern Italy, where the sailors supported the popular rising against Napoleon and occupied Naples and Rome. The Ionian expedition was Ushakov’s last accomplishment. He spent the rest of his life in retirement in the Tambov gubernia where he had been born. Ushakov died in 1817.

Uslialcov, like Suvorov, had never throughout his long fighting ex- perience lost a single battle. He was the founder of the Russian school of naval warfare which had i»iven Russia many brilliant admirals.

By the beginning of 1799 a new coalition consisting of Russia, Eng- land, Austria, Turkey and the kingdom of Naples had been formed against republican France. In January 1799 the French defeated the Neapolitan army and proclaimed a republic in Naples. Paul sent a corps of 11,000 men to the aid of the king of Naples, with orders to march through Austrian territory and join a corps of 20,000 that had been sent out previously to help Austria. A third corps (under Rimsky- Korsakov), which originally had been assigned to Prussia, was also or- dered to “restore the thrones and altars.*’

The Austrian archduke (the heir to the throne of Austria), a yoimg man with no military experience, was oommander-in-chief of the allied forces in Northern Italy. The Austrian government asked the Russian emperor to appoint Suvorov, the great Russian general, to act as the archduke’s “aide and guide.”

General Suvorov

Alexander Vasilievich Suvorov, the famous Rus- sian general, son of a former officer of the Preobrazhensky Regiment, was bom in Moscow in 1730. He was a weak, sickly child, and his father, contrary to the custom among the nobles of that time, did not enter him in a regiment at an early age and did not prepare him for military serv- ice. However, the boy early displayed an interest in military matters. He read the military books in his father’s library voraciously, and en- thusiastically fouglit imaginary engagements. To harden himself he took cold showers, refused to wear warm clothes in winter and would go horseback riding in the pouring rain.

At twelve he was entered on the rolls of the Semyonovsky Regiment as a private, and at seventeen he began military service as a corporal. His exceptional military gifts brought him promotion to high rank, and after his brilliant feats in the Turkish and Polish campaigns he was made a field marshal.

Suvorov was a military genius with a remarkable intellect and an iron will; in addition, he was exceptionally Industrious, and profound- ly interested in the history of wars. He constantly analysed his own campaigns and studied the operations of Caesar, Hannibal, Alexander the Great and other soldiers of world renown. Fighting continuously in the numerous wars of the 18th century — against the Germans, Turks, Poles and French — Suvorov independently worked out principles of the art of warfare which coincided on many points with the advanced military views of the period of the French bourgeois revolution.

Suvorov demanded that theory always be combined with practice. •TSo battle can be won in the study, and theory without practice is a dead letter,” he wrote in his autobiography. He compiled an excellent work entitled Th€ Science of Victory. This was a manual for soldiers and oi&oers which he wrote in Tulchin, where he was sent at the close of Catherine’s reign to command one of the soutTiern armies. The manu- al was written in concise, simple and clear language, and gave exact and easily remembered definitions. Suvorov demanded that soldiers be given thorough physical and military training. A soldier needs more than military bearing, Suvorov said. He should be trained not for the parade ground but for the battlefield. “Do things at manoeuvres as you would on campaign.” In 2^he Science of Victory he wrote: “Easy on the training ground, hard in battle; hard on the training ground, easy in battle.”

Suvorov trained his soldiers to be cool, courageous, and staunch in battle. He demanded that every soldier understand the purpose behind his actions and the military task which confronts him. “Every soldier must understand his manoeuvre,” he said. Suvorov’s strategy and tac- tics may be reduced to throe important rules of warfare: visual judg- ment, swiftness, attack. The essence of visual judgment is the ability correctly to deteiTnine the main enemy, to take the terrain into account and use it to good advantage, and to ascertain the enemy’s fighting qualities. When a correct plan of strategy has been drawn up, speed and attack are essential for its realization. Suvorov demanded that the enemy be attacked before he has a chance to collect his wits, rally his forces and prepare to resist. The soldier must be trained not for defence and retreat but to deal the enemy a bold and crushing blow. Suvorov had a high opinion of the bayonet charge and storming operations at the decisive moment in battle. “The bullet’s a fool, the bayonet’s the thing,” he said.

At the same time Suvorov demanded efficient utilization of musket and artillery fire. “Shoot rarely, but squarely,” Suvorov taught his men. “Look after your weapon and keep it clean, but do not burnish the iron — it is no good for the weapon and a waste of the soldier ’s time and labour. . . . Train the soldier to load quickly but accurately, to take exact aim and to fire correctly and rapidly. Teach him to run quickly, to crawl without attracting notice, to take cover in holes and depres- sions, to hide behind rocks, bushes and mounds, and to fire from cover, reloading on his back. . . With instructions like these Suvorov taught his soldiers proficiency and the art of practical warfare. He had a high opinion of the fighting qualities of the Russian soldiers and was ever solicitous of their welfare. “A soldier must be healthy, brave, firm, determined, truthful and pious,” he declared.

Whereas the entire tsarist military system regarded tiie soldier as an automaton, Suvorov looked upon the Russian soldier as a man en-^ dowed with reason and acumen, and demanded of him initiative and resourcefulness .

Suvorov lived in close contact with the soldiers, ate the same soup and gruel, trpre a simple uniform, and rode a Cossack mount*. The soldiers were wholeheartedly devoted to their commander and never suffered defeat un- der him.

Suvorov’s views on the science of warfare and his treatment of the soldiers me with opposition from the officers who were for the most part members of the landed gentry brought up on the outmoded Prussian sys- tem of Frederick II. Engels criticized this system se- verely: “Frederick, besides laying the foundation for that pedantry and martinet ism which have since distin- guished the Prussians , actual- ly prepared them for the un- paralleled disgrace of Jena ^ y guv^orov

and Auerstadt.”

Emperor Paul was a particularly ardent admirer of the automa- tism of the Prussian military system. “The soldier is simply a machine, stipulated by the regulations,” he declared.

Under Paul I the old Prussian uniform was reintroduced into the army: the soldiers were obliged to wet their hair with kvass^ sprinkle it with flour and allow it to harden; 14-inch iron rods were fastened to the back of their heads to shape pigtails; false locks were worn over the tem- ples. Petty punctuality and blind obedience were demanded. Suvorov ridiculed these Prussian practices as unsuitable for a real, fighting army. ^*Hair powder is not gunpowder, false locks are not guns, and pigtails are not sabres, and I am not a German but a born Russian,” he said. Suvorov did not comply with the new regulations and continued to train his men according to his own system. Amidst the prevalent at- mosphere of mute servility Suvorov’s conduct was a bold challenge to the tsar. In 1797 Paul banished Field Marshal Suvorov to his impover- ished estate of Konchanskoye and kept him under humiliating surveil- lance.

The Alpine Campaign

On the insistence of his English and Austrian allies Paul recalled Suvorov from exile at the beginning of 1799 and appointed him commander-in-chief of the allied forces oper- ating against the French who had occupied Italy and Switzerland.

In three and a half months the Russian troops under Suvorov defeat- id the armies of the best French generals. All of Northei^ Ital7 was cleared of the French. Austria, PauPs ally, wanted undivided rule in Italy and decided to transfer Suvorov to Switzerland, ostensibly to relieve the Russian army under Rimsky. Korsakov. Suvorov left Italy for Switzerland, making for the town of Altdorf via the St. Gothard Pass, whence he was to go on to join Rimsky-Korsakov’s troops. Scaling the almost perpendicular mountains* under a biting wind, Suvorov’s men launched a frontal attack on St. Gothard. Bagration’s column outflanked the French. St. Gothard was captured in September. Beyond St. Gofhard the road fell away to the Reuss, a mountain river, spanned at a height of 75 feet by a flimsy structure known as Devil’s Bridge.

As they retreated before the onslaught of Suvorov’s men the French destroyed part of the bridge. Russian soldiers crawled up to the broken bridge piles, bound some logs together with scarfs and belts and threw them over the gap. The soldiers ran across the logs to the other side un* der a hail of bullets. Meanwhile other dauntless men had waded across the turbulent river. The Russians went into a bayonet charge and drove back the French. Beyond Altdorf the St. Gothard road came to an end at the shore of Lake Lucerne, which was under the control of the French. Before the Russian army towered the sheer slopes of another almost im» passable mountain ridge, but there was no choice. Exhausted and hun- gry, Suvorov’s men began thediiBScult climb of an even steeper moun** tain. They reached the valley to learn that Rimsky. Korsakov ’s army had been defeated and was retreating, and that the French held the valley. Suvorov’s army was in a trap. The French had 60,000 men, while Su- vorov had less than 20,000. Besides, the Russians had no provisions, no ammunition and no artillery. Suvorov realized that his army, sur- rounded in the mountains by enemy forces, was in a critical position. But at the council of war he declared; “What shall we do? To go back would be a disgrace: I have never yet retreated. To proceed to Schwyz is impossible. Massena has over 60,000 men, while we have barely 20,000. Moreover, we have no provisions, ammunition or artillery. . . . Wft cannot expect assistance from anywhere. . . . We have only one hope . . . the courage and self-sacriflce of my troops. We are Russiansl” After beating off the French, Suvorov’s army, on the night of October 4 began the final stage of its march across the Alps by way of the di®* cult snow-capped Panixer Pass.

The mountain was high and steep, cut frequently by deep preci- pices. In places the soldiers crawled on all fours arlong the icy crust under the sleet and snow. Suvorov went among his men, encouraging them: “Never mind, never mind! A Russian fellow isn’t yellow, we’ll get through.” On one of the slopes there was not a single tree or protrud- ing rock to offer support. Thousands of men seated themselves on the icy edge of the slope and, hugging their rifles, slid down. No more then 16,000 meu reiRaiwed of Suvorov’s army after the orossiug of the Panixer Pass* Engels subsequently described it as the most outstanding crossing of the Alps in modern times. As one old soldier aptly expressed it, “the Russian bayonet broke through the Alps.’*

Suvorov was going on 70 then. Left in the lurch by his Austrian allies, he stayed on in Switzerland until Paul broke off the alliance with Austria.

The Change In Paul’s Foreign Policy and the Conspiracy of March 11, 1801

Suvorov’s victories in Italy intensified the antagonisms within the Anglo-Austro-Russian coalition. The Austrians began secret peace negotiations with the French. Whenever the French approached, the Austrians betrayed the Russians by leading their own army off into the rear. After finally “ousting Suvorov” (as he expressed it himself) from Northern Italy which he had recaptured, the Austrians seized the territory of the king of Sardinia, to whom the Russian army had given military support, and made the Russian navy leave Italian waters. After a series of such perfidious acts on the part of his Austrian allies, Paul wrote the Austrian emperor a letter announcing his withdrawal from the alliance: “I shall in future cease to concern myself with j’-our interests and shall look after my own and those of my other allies.” Paul ordered Suvorov to start on his return march to Russia: “You were to have saved kings,” he wrote, “now you must save the Russia’s warriors and the honour of your sovereign.” Suvorov overcame great difficulties in leading the Russian troops out of Switzerland. The title of generalissimo of all the armed forces of Russia was bestowed on him as a reward. Later Suvorov again fell into the tsar’s disfavour. He returned to Russia completely broken in health.

As he neared St. Petersburg Suvorov learned that all preparations that had been made for his triumphal reception had been cancelled. He was to arrive in the capital at night to avoid a demonstration of public welcome. The tsar prohibited Suvorov from appearing at court. His illness grew worse, and on May 18, 1800, the great Russian general died in solitary humiliation,

Suvorov was accompanied to his last resting place by his old com- panions-in-arms and a vast cortege. After the funeral the famous poet Derzhavin wrote a poem on the death of Suvorov in which he said, “The lion’s heart, the eagle’s wings, are no longer with us. How are we to fight?”

Meanwhile relations between Paul and England grew more strained. When the English occupied Malta, the exasperated Paul announced the confiscation of all British ships and cargoes in Russian ports. Napoleon lost no time in turning the discord between the allies to his own advantage. He declared his readiness to cede Malta to Paul after it was captured from the English and to release all his Russian prisoners with full equipment and without demanding any prisoners in exchange. In December 1800 Paul and Napoleon began a personal correspondence concerning peace terms and a joint struggle against England. In a memorandum outlining the principles of Paul’s new foreign policy, the rupture with England is explained by the fact that England “by her envy, cunning and wealth was, is, and will be, not the rival , but the villainous enemy of France. ” The memorandum stated further, “By means of threats, intrigue and money England set all the powers against France” (here Paul I added, “and us sinners as well”).

Through an alliance with Napoleon Paul also hoped to stifle the French revolution, for Napoleon had set up a military dictatorship in France after the coup d^4tat of November 9 (18 Brumaire) 1799. The overthrow of English rule in India was one of the joint measures to be undertaken by Russia and France. In January 1801 Paul ordered a detachment of Don Cossacks to proceed through Orenburg “via Boldiara and Khiva straight to the Indus River.” This tovally unpre- pared Indian campaign was called off by the new emperor, Alexander I, soon after the death of Paul.

During the last months of his life Paul began to display more interest in Transcaucasia, as a possible route to Persia and India. On January 18, 1801, he issued a manifesto announcing the voluntary union of Georgia with Russia.

Paul’s belligerent measures caused no little anxiety in England. The British ambassador at St. Petersburg supported the organization of a conspiracy by the upper nobility who were discontented with Paul’s policy and his cruelty and follies.

The Russian landlords, interested as they were in restoring economic relations with England, to whom they sold grain and other Russian produce, were particularly dissatisfied with the anti-English turn in Paul ’s foreign policy. On the night of March 11 , 1801 , the conspira- tors, with the connivance of Alexander, the crown prince, broke into the emperor’s chamber and assassinated him.

Tsarism during the Napoleonic Wars

The Domestic and Foreign Policy of Alexander I (up to 1812)

Alexander I (1801–1825)

The accession of Alexander I was hailed with joy by the entire nobility, who hoped to find him a more consistent and more tractable medium for their policy than his highly imbalanced father. “Silenced is the roar of the North Wind, closed is the awful, fearsome glance,” the poet Derzhavin wrote of the assassinated tsar in a panegyric on Alexander's accession. The new tsar had received a European education under the supervision of his grandmother, Catherine IT. She placed him under the tutelage of a Swiss moderate republican named Laharpe, who discussed liberal topics with Alexander. Alexander had also devoted much time to the parade ground and to the subtleties of Prussian military art. In his youth he had become friendly with General Arakcheyev, Paul’s favourite, a brutal advocate of serfdom, who had exercised no less influence on the heir apparent than Laharpe. Contemporaries had good reason for saying that the new emperor was “half a citizen of Switzer- land and half a Prussian corporal.”

Under the dual influence of Catherine’s court with its intrigues, subterfuge and favouritism, and of Paul’s “little court” at Gatchina where Catherine was cordially detested, Alexander developed his characteristic traits of duplicity, hypocrisy, cowardice and cruelty, concealed beneath an outward air of affability and liberalism. Alexander was suave and amiable in his dealings with people. Contemporaries relate that the tsar prepared for his receptions and public appearances like a clever actor, rehearsing elegant bows and gracious smiles.

Pushkin called Alexander “a weak and sly ruler upon whom gloiy unexpectedly smiled."

The Decline of Serfdom

Alexander’s reign commenced at a time when the industrial revolution was making further progress in Europe and serfdom was declining in Russia.

Since the last quarter ofthe 18th century the wholesale impoverish- ment of the peasantry became particularly manifest. Peasants aban- doned their run-down farms to follow other pursuits elsewhere. In the non-black-earth regions there was a rise in the peasant crafts, while in the black-earth regions the production of grain for the market increased. The landlords extended their cultivated area, as did the more well-to-do serfs and state peasants. The expansion of the domestic market was accompanied by a growth in the foreign market. The Russian landlords became suppliers of agricultural produce for export, chiefly to England.

The development of home and foreign trade necessitated improve- ment of the means of communication, chiefly river and sea routes. In 1803 the North Catherine Canal joining the Kama and Northerii Dvina rivers was built. In 1804 the Oginsky Canal, which linked the Baltic and Black seas, was completed. The first decade of Alexander’s reign saw the completion of the Mariinsk and Tikhvin canal systems, which facilitated the transportation of goods along the rivers linking inland Russia with the Baltic Sea. The decline of feudal economy, which was of a self-sufficient character, increased the demand for iqio]ie7 ci^atad a no^ for regulation of exchange operations. To this end the State Loan Bank was established in St. Petersburg in 1786 and the Commercial Bank in Moscow in 1807. At the ojjening of the 19ih century banking houses were established in Moscow, Arch- angel, Taganrog and Feodosiya.

New industrial enterprises arose to meet the demands of the home market. In 1804 seven sugar refineries were in operation; in 1812 there were 30, In 1808 the first cotton spinning mill was established. By 1812 manufactories operated by merchants constituted 62% of all the enterprises, landlords owning only 16%. The workers at most of the manufactories, however, were serf-peasants paying obroh (quit* rent) to their landlords.

The productivity of forced peasant labour was low both in industry and in agriculture. Peasant cultivation of manorial lands was of a poor quality. Crop yields were low. To obtain more grain the landlords increased the harahchimi and other services by the peasants. Intensified exploitation of the serfs led to peasant uprisings, which assumed particularly large proportions in the Baltic regions, where capitalism had begun to develop earlier than in Central Russia. In the autumn of 1802 the peasants on a number of estates in the Liflandia Region refused to render manorial services, and engaged in regular skirmishes with the soldiers sent to subdue them.

Alexander’s Domestic Policy

Fearing revolution, Alexander considered certain state reforms essential in order to avoid it. In a letter to Laharpe while still heir apparent he had stated that when he became tsar he would **grant the country freedom and thereby prevent it from becoming a toy in the hands of madmen.”

Upon his accession Alexander declared that he would rule in accord- ance "with the laws and the spirit” of his grandmother, Catherine IT. He immediately restored all the privileges of the nobles, reinstated all the nobles who had been exiled by his father, lifted the ban on the import of goods and boolcs from abroad, permitted foreign travel and issued an ukase abolishing torture and the secret police.

In the early years of Alexander's reign the circle of "young friends” of the emperor (Stroganov, Novosiltsev, Kochubey, Czartoryski) attained great influence and constituted the Private Committee for the Drafting of State Reforms. These drafts did not really aim at cardinal reforms, since they were motivated by a desire to preserve the system of serfdom and the autocracy and*to make only superficial changes in the feudal state in keeping with the spirit of the times. Thus, an ukase of December 12, 1801, allowed merchants, burghers and state peasants to purchase unsettled land, without in any way affecting the serf basis of land tenure by the nobility. Another ukase (February 20, 1803) "on free tillers” permitted landlords to release peasants with land singly or in entire villages on terms to be fixed by voluntary agreement with the peasants. But few peasants were able to benefit by this ukase: in all 47,153 persons, or less than one* half per cent of the serf population of the empire were freed. According to the ukase the serfs had to pay huge redemptions — sometimes as much as 6,000 rubles— for their emancipation. Thus, although the solutions found for the peasant question were called forth by the development of bourgeois relations, they in no way shook the foundations of serfdom.

The establishment in 1802 of eight ministjies to replace the Petrine colleges abolished by Catherine was the only effectual consequence of the extensive reformist plans of the Private Committee. Ministries of the army, the navy, foreign affairs, home affairs, justice, finance, commerce and public instruction were instituted. A Committee of Ministers was set up. As distinct from the practice under the colleges, the ministers had complete personal charge of affairs in the ministries, reporting on all important matters to the tsar. The establishment of ministries made for further centralization of tsarist Russia’s state machine. The Senate was reorganized and made the supreme judicial body of the empire; it was to be the custodian of the laws and guardian of general "peace and order.” All important state matters were sub- mitted for consideration to the State Council, established in 1810. On the whole this system of administration remained in force through- out the 10th century. ^

Amona tjie more significant of the reforms introduced in the early years of Alexander’s reign was the establishment of a new educational system which provided for three types of schools: the gymnasium (with four grades), the district school (with two grades) and the parish school (with one grade). The same Regulations of 1804 granted self- government to the universities: the rector and deans were elected by the general meeting of professors and the universities were allowed to confer degrees, etc.

Numerous deviations from the regulations soon took place, however. Since the nobles were reluctant to enroll their sons in the g 3 niinasia, the government founded for them the Tsarskoye Selo and Richelieu lyceums outside the general school system.

‘‘ At the beginning of the 19th century there were only two universi^ ties: in Moscow and Dorpat. In 1805 universities were founded in Kharkov and Kazan. The Central Pedagogical Institute in St. Peters^ burg was reorganized into a university in 1819.

The Ministry of Public lastruction, Education of Youth and Diffu- sion of Science was instituted to supervise educational activities. The ministry, however, was more concerned with the political bona fides of the teachers and pupils, than with education as such.

In 1804 censorship of manuscripts before publication was introduced.

Thus, Alexander, in his domestic policy, did nothing whatsoever to break resolutely with the policy of serfdom which his predecessors had pursued.

The War Against Napoleon (1805–1807)

Alexander prosecuted his foreign policy at a time when the French revolutionary wars had been superseded by the Napoleonic wars of conquest.

Lenin stressed the fact that the wars waged by France during the period of the Napoleonic empire had changed in character, being no longer defensive revolutionary wars but predatory campaigns of conquest. “It was not in 1792 1793, but many years later, after the victory of reaction within the country, that the counter-revolutionary dictatorship of Napoleon transformed the wars on France’s part from defensive wars into wars of conqueFt.” ♦

Another important feature of the Napoleonic wars was the growing antagonism between bourgeois France and England over the division of markets. Russian tsarism was interested in trade with England and took her side. Upon ascending the throne Alexander immediately restored friendly relations with England, released the British ships which had been detained in Russian ports and permitted the import of British goods. In 1801 Russia and England signed a convention of amity, Alexander nevertheless did not break ofF relations with Na- poleon. As Russia’s ally England was compelled to make peace with Napoleon (in 1802, at Amien.^. The Treaty of Amiens was not long, lived, for Russia and Englana had concluded a military pact earlier, in March 1801. A new coalition headed by England and including Russia, Austria and Sweden was organized against France. England promised to subsidize her allies and demanded that they immediately begin hostilities. The object of this anti -French coalition was not only to check Napoleon’s conquests but also to restore the Bourbons to the French throne.

In August 1805 a Russian army under Kutuzov was sent to aid Austria. The entry of the Russian troops into Europe frustrated Napo. Icon’s plans for a forced crossing of the channel and saved England from invasion by a Napoleonic army of 150,000 standing ready for that purpose.

Kutuzov effected a forced march under diflScult conditions to the Bavarian town of Braunau, upon reaching which he learned that the main forces of the allied Austrian troops under General Mack had capitulated at the fortress of Ulm. Kutuzov had one-fifth of Napoleon’s numerical strength, and he had no option but to retreat. Napoleon ordered his ablest generals to cut off Kutuzov’s retreat. Bagration received orders from Kutuzov to hold up Murat •s corps which was pursuing the Russian army. The Austrian troops moving along in front betrayed their allies and entered into, negotiations with Murat, Bagration’s little force of 6,000 was surrounded by the French troops numbering 30,000. A battle between the Russian and the French took place at Scbdngraben and lasted all day and half the night. During the night fighting Bagration succeeded in breaking through the enemy’s circle. All the survivors of the Schongraben battle received arm-bands with the inscription: “One versus five,” indicating the fivefold superi- ority of the French over the Russians.

The retreat of the Russian troops, by tiring out the enemy, effected a change in the scales. By the middle of November Kutuzov had brought over 86,000 men into action at Olmiitz and Napoleon had concentrated 90,000 here. The Russian army was poorly supplied and worn out with fatigue. Alexander I, who had meanwhile arrived at the army inspired with dreams of military glory and of defeating Napoleon, would not hear of giving the men a rest. The Austrian Emperor Francis I and his generals also insisted on giving general battle immediately. The war council, despite Kutuzov’s opposition, decided in favour of a pitched battle. The Russo-Austrian armies occupied positions on a large hilly plateau near the village of Austerlitz (Bohemia). On a misty autumn morning of December 2 (new style), 1805 three columns of Russian troops attempted to overcome the right flank of the French, but this ended in failure, since the allied troops were spread out. The French inflicted a heavy blow on the scattered allied forces at Auster- litz. The Russian soldiers fought heroically but were unable to with- stand the furious onslaughts of a numerically stronger foe. Napoleon paid tribute to the heroism of the Russian soldiers. “At Austerlitz,” he said, “the Russians displayed greater valour than in any other battle against me.”

The defeat at Austerlitz was due to the interference of the Austrian and Russian emperors in the command of military operations. The defeat induced Austria to conclude peace with France. Napoleon took Vienna and began preparations for continuing the war in Europe, first and foremost against Prussia,

In the autumn of 1806 Alexander sent troops to the aid of his ally Prussia. Napoleon surrounded the Prussians in a lightning attack at Jena and routed them. Berlin surrendered to the French without battle and remained in their hands for two years, from 1806 to 1808. Napoleon concentrated forces on the Vistula, from where he threatened to launch an oiFensive against Russia. In January 1807 he entered Warsaw, In the Battle of PreuSisch Eylau (in East Prussia) a month later, the Russian army displayed its prowess. Napoleon did not win a victory here and began to prepare for a decisive battle. The Battle of Friedland in the summer of 1807, during which the Russian army lost almost one-fomth of its men, decided the outcome of the entire campaign.

By the Treaty of Tilsit signed in June 1807 Russia had to recognize all Napoleon’s conquests and Napoleon himself as emperor, and con- clude a defensive and offensive alliance with him. Most important of all, however, she had to join the continental blockade, ».e.,the economic war against England.

By isolating England from the rest of Europe Napoleon hoped to destroy her commercial supremacy. In 1806 he proclaimed the continental system, under which all countries dependent on the Napo- leonic empire were prohibited from trading with England. Rus-la also undertook to stop the export of corn to England and the import of British goods. The blockade, however, was a serious economic blow to Russia. It ruined many Russian landlords. The price of corn fell. Trade dropped. The blockade led to a financial crisis in the country.

The Russian nobility were opposed to the Treaty of Tilsit. Alexan- der’s closest friends — Kochubey, Czartoryski and Novosiltsev — re- signed, Mikhail Speransky, who was regarded as a partisan of the pro-French faction, became the tsar’s intimate adviser.

M. M. Speransky (1772–1839)

Besides their discontent with the continental blockade the landlords were strongly opposed to the plans for state reforms, whose most dangerous exponent was held to be Sj)eransky.

Speransky, the son of a village priest, was educated at the ecclesi- astical seminary in St. Petersburg. He advanced rapidly from the posi- tion of clerk in the olSfice of the procurator-general to that of State Secretary. After the Treaty of Tilsit he became Alexander’s first ad- viser. In 1809 Speransky completed a draft for reforms entitled Codifi- ca io% of Sfa'e This was nn extensive project of reforms aiming

to adapt the feudal monarchy to the rising bourgeois relations, Speran- sky advocated protection for “science, commerce and industry.” He did not put forward an open demand for emancipation but he wanted the peasants to be granted “personal freedom.” “There is not a single case in history of an enlightened and commercial nation long remaining in slavery,” be declared in his draft.

Speransky proposed the convention of a State Duma consisting of property owners regardless of what estale they belonged to. In every volost the owners of real estate were to elect a volost duma. These in turn were to elect deputies to the okrug dumas, thence to the gubernia dumas, and the latter were to elect deputies to the State Duma. The elections were thus to pass through four stages. No law was to be passed without the approval of the State Duma and the State Council. Exec- utive power was to be placed in the hands of ministers responsible to the Duma. Speransky ’s draft was progressive for those days.

The majority of the landlords were incensed by Speransky’s proj- ects. They called him a “villain,” a “revolutionary” and a “Crom- well.” The uproar among the nobility was so great that Alexander was forced into a resolute rejection of all plans for constitutional re- form, All he did was to establish in 1810 a State Council of members appointed by the emperor. This was an advisory body to the tsar and such it remained until 1906. The number of ministers was increased to 11 by the establishment of ministries of the Police, Communica- tions and State Control.

The nobility in opposition emphatically demanded withdrawal from the blockade and Speransky’s resignation. The most forceful exponent of the temper of the serf-owning landlords was N, M. Ka- ramzin, the well-known historian, whose Notes on Old and New aia formulated their chief demands. Instead of limiting the autocracy Karamzin proposed the selection of 50 *‘good” governors who were to be entrusted with the administration of the state. The reactionary opposition from among the nobility wanted serfdom to remain invio- lable, trade resumed with England, the Treaty of Tilsit repudiated, a war against Napoleon, and the dismissal of “the dangerous reformer** Speransky.

The Russo-Swedish War of 1808–1809 and the Annexation of Finland

The Treaty of Tilsit altered international relations in Europe. Napoleon strove to utilize Russia in the interests of his policy of conquest, primarily in his struggle against England. At his insist- ence Russia broke off diplomatic relations with England. He also urged Russia into a war against Sweden, who had refused to join the continental system and had concluded an alliance with England. The war with Sweden was to give Alexander the right to annex Finland. Russia had important strategical reasons for contesting Finland: the Finnish border ran close to St. Petersburg, the Russian capital, which had to be safeguarded against attack from the north. In Feb- ruary 1808 Russian troops crossed the frontier, occupying the Aland Islands in March and the Island of Hogland in April. By the end of 1808 the war shifted to Swedish territory when the Russian troops launched an offensive under difficult winter conditions. Barclay de Tolly’s detachment made its famous march from Vaasa across the frozen Gulf of Bothnia to Sweden. The Russian troops heroically surmounted the difficulties of the march over hummocky ice and through knee-deep snow and reached the Swedish coast.

On March 16, 1809, during the height of the offensive against Swe- den, Alexander convened the Finnish Diet in the town of Borga. The previous day Finnish autonomy had been recognized by official enact- ment. The tsar promised the Diet that he would “preserve the Consti- tution of Finland inviolable and unalterable/’ Finland was proclaimed a Russian province.

While the Diet sat in session Russia and Sweden started peace negotiations which resulted in a treaty signed at Fredrikshamn on September 5, 1809. Sweden ceded to Russia the whole of Finland, which had been conquered by Russian troops. The king of Sweden joined the continental blooka^.

Napoleon’s Preparations tor the Invasion of Russia

Napo*

leon’s government, as Stalin said, was a “bourgeois government which stifled the French revolution and preserved only those results of the revolution which were of benefit to the big bourgeoisie.”

Napoleon waged his wars of aggrandizement in Europe and beyond it in the interests of France’s big bourgeoisie, who were competing with English capital. By force of arms he compelled all the European countries he had conquered to join the continental blockade against England. Notwithstanding the Tilsit peace treaty, Napoleon made intensive preparations for a war of conquest against Russia, to which he was provoked by several motives. In the first place he was dis- pleased with Russia’s frequent violations of the continental block- ade; he was disturbed by the massing of tsarist troops on the western border, constituting a threat to Poland; finally, he was troubled by Russia’s policy toward Prussia, a policy which hindered him from becoming master of the Rhine Confederation. The Rhine Confederation of 16 German states had been created by Napoleon in June 1806 and was a French protectorate.

In making his preparations for war Napoleon collected informa- tion about Russia, studied her economy, sent spies into the country and even counterfeited Russian paper currency. At the same time h© established a springboard for his offensive against Russia in Poland. Under the terms of the Treaty of Tilsit, Napoleon in 1807 created a new Polish state called the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, out of the Polish provinces which Prussia had acquired as a result of the parti-^ tions. Subsequently Austrian Galicia was annexed to this new state. To make sure of the support of the Polish gentry Napoleon prom** ised to restore Poland’s old borders, i.e., to give her Lithuania, Byelorussia and part of the Ukraine. Acting on Napoleon’s advice Poland in 1807 abolished serfdom. The peasants received their person- al freedom, but the land remained the property of the Polish landlords.

The tsarist government was extremely disturbed by the situation in Poland. Alexander demanded that Napoleon abstain frogi support- ing and regenerating the Polish state, and that he agree to Russia’s seizure of the Dardanelles and Constantinople. Napoleon rejected these demands. Relations between the allies became strained.

Meanwhile complications were setting in in Europe. In Spain the national war for liberation against the French usurpers was gathering momentum, and the Spaniards had defeated the French in a series of major engagements. Austria had begun to arm herself and sought an alliance with Russia. Prussia began to reorganize her army. Another meeting between Napoleon and Alexander took place at Erfurt in the autumn of 1808^ at which Napoleon, in order to keep Russia on his side, consented to her annexing Moldavia and Walachia. Napoleon continued to make conquests despite stiffening resistance in Europe. In 1810 he annexed to his empire Holland, the Hanse towns and the Duchy of Oldenburg, which was ruled by a relative of Alexander. The Russian emperor registered a strong protest* Napoleon demonstratively refused to accept the Russian note of protest.

Russians internal situation was another factor that caused Alex- ander to break with Napoleon. The continental blockade threatened the country with economic ruin. Before he had broken with Napoleon, Alexander launched what was virtually a tariff war against him by raising the duties on French goods. British cargoes arrived in Russia under neutral flags.

Meanwhile the higher nobility had had its way with Speransky, whom everyone regarded as an advocate of the alliance with Napoleon. The State Secretary was removed from office, accused of treason and exiled, first to Nizhni Novgorod and later to Perm.

War with Turkey (1806–1812)

Russia’s preparations for a war with France hastened the end of hostilities against Turkey, whicli had been in progress since 1806. The Turks tried to take advantage of the defeats of the Russian army on the battlefields of Europe to drive the Russian troops out of Western Transcaucasia and re-estab- lish their domination on the Black Sea. Turkey was supported by France. Russia’s efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement failed. Al- though the main forces of the Russian army were engaged in Europe, Russian troops in November 1806 invaded the Danube principalities which were under Turkish rule and soon occupied all of Bessarabia, Moldavia and Walg-chia. Their advance was checked only at the Dan- ube, where there were strong Turkish fortresses.

The Russian command decided to launch an offensive against ihe Turks from Transcaucasia. While both sides were preparing for large-scale offensive operations the news of the signing of the Treaty of Tilsit arrived. Napoleon acted as mediator between Russia and Turkey to put an end to hostilities. During the Erfurt meeting Alex- ander had secured Napoleon’s consent to the annexation of the Danube principalities by Russia, to the proclamation of Serbian independence and the recognition of a Russian protectorate over Georgia. Turkey refused to negotiate peace under those terms. In March 1809 hostil- ities between Turkey and Russia were resumed* Russian troops laid siege to a number of Turkish fortresses, gained a firm hold on the right bank of the Danube and reached the foothills of the Balkans. In September 1810 they took Rustchuk, and at the end of 1811 Akhal- kalaki, a large Turkish fortress in Transcaucasia* These defeats com- pelled the Turks to enter into negotiations.

By the Treaty of Bucharest, concluded on May 8, 1812, Turkey ceded to Russia l^ssarabia including the fortresses of I^otin, Bender, Akkerman and Ismail. Russia returned Poti and Akhalkalaki to Turkey.

The Treaty of Bucharest was a great victory for Russia. She was now free to transfer her army from the Danube to fight Napoleon.

The Patriotic War of 1812

Napoleon's Invasion of Russia

Besides the main forces of his own army Napoleon hurled against Russia the armies of all the conquered countries of Europe.

In May 1812 Napoleon set out in state from Dresden to join the Orande Armee which was moving toward the Niemen River.

On the morning of June 12 (24), 1812, Napoleon invaded Russia without a declaration of war. Four columns of troops in an endless stream began the passage of the Niemen. Napoleon was among the first to cross the river, and together with the old guard he hastened to a nearby woods in expectation of the opening encounter with the Russian troops. But he found himself amidst deserted fields and vast, silent forests. There was not a single dwelling or human being in sight. The Russian troops had withdrawn.

The Russian army numbered 180,000 men in all. An army under Barclay de Tolly lay grouped about the border, on the Niemen; another, under Bagration, was in Southern Lithuania, and the third, a reserve force, under Tormasov, was stationed in Volbynia. Taking into account the movements of the scattered Russian armies Napoleon decided to attack and defeat them piecemeal. His army of over 600,000 was overwhelmingly superior to the Russian in numbers.

The defimencies of the Russian army, inherent in the general weaknesses of feudal Russia, were the incompetence of a considerable section of the military command, a brutal system of discipline, and pilfering and peculation on the part of army officials and commissariat officers at the expense of the soldiers.

But Napoleon’s army no longer resembled the French army of twenty years before. It was no longer a French army but a huge all- European army made up of forcibly recruited men of diflFerent nation- alities speaking different languages and fighting for the alien objec- tives of a French conqueror. The Germans, Italians, Swiss, Croatians and, above all, the Spaniards hated Napoleon as the enslaver of their countries, the soldiers were out for loot, and they started pillaging as soon as they set foot on Russian soil.

When Napoleon’s army of half a million men invaded Russia Bar- clay decided to retreat without accepting battle and to join Bagration's army, which had already set out to meet him. From Vilno Barclay retired to an entrenched camp at the hamlet of Drisa on the Dvina. This camp had been built by General Fulle, an incompetent foreigner with the approval of Emperor Alexander, who himself was poorly versed in military matters. It was situated between two highways, pre- sumably to check Napoleon if he marched either on St. Petersburg or Moscow. Actually its location made it a trap for the Russian army, which could easily be encircled there. Barclay therefore abandoned Drisa and withdrew to Vitebsk via Polotsk, leaving the protection of the St. Petersburg road to a detached corps under Wittgenstein, who successfully warded off Marshal Oudinot^s onslaught.

Bagration, hotly followed by Marshal Davout with an army of 50,000 and Napoleon’s brother Jerome with an army of 60,000, was in extremely difficult straits . Davout and Jerome tried to surround Bagration’s little army and cut off his retreat, but he managed to elude the French pincers. His retreat was covered by a cavalry detachment under the command of Platov, Davout occupied Minsk and then proceed- ed to the Berezina River, again hoping to cut off Bagration. Meanwhile Bagration was withdrawing his forces along defiles in the marshes. Cut off from the main forces and thrust far to the south, Bagration’s army crossed the Berezina and the Dnieper and again evaded en- circlement. After waiting in vain for Bagration at Vitebsk Barclay put out a rearguard and quietly withdrew from camp with lights extinguished.

Retreating imder extremely difficult conditions, harassed by the enemy, suffering from the torrid heat, lack of drinking water, hunger and disease which took heavy toll on account of the absence of any kind of medical aid, the two Russian armies finally succeeded in mak- ing junction at Smolensk. Napoleon reached Smolensk in August and ordered it to be taken by storm. He bombarded Smolensk for thir- teen hours; the whole town was in flames. Barclay ordered the powder magazines to be blown up and then abandoned the burning city. The residents set fire to their homes and property in order not to leave anything to the enemy, and evacuated the town together with the army. The Russian troops put up a spirited fight at Smolensk. However, Barclay realized that the numerical superiority of the French threat- ened him with rout and refused to let himself be drawn into the pitched battle which Napoleon was so set on.

Barclay had the strength of will and firmness to carry out method, ioally his plan of retreat, which was the only means of saving the army from a smashing defeat. As Marx pointed out, the Russian plan of retreat was no longer a matter of free choice but of stern necessity.

The terror-stricken nobility, however, was strongly opposed to the retreat. Barclay de Tolly was accused of cowardice and even treachery. The relations between Barclay and Bagration, the two commanders, grew more and more strained. Bagration averred that "Barclay is leading the guests straight on to Moscow.” A disciple of Suvorov and a man of reckless courage, Bagration was thirsting for battle. He claimed that the surrender of Smolensk had been too hasty, and demanded a change of command.

At the demand of the army and the nobility, Alexander appointed 67-year-old Field Marshal Kutuzov Commander-in-chief*

Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov, a man of great courage, was Su- vorov’s favourite pupil and one of Russia’s most talented soldiers. He came from old noble stock. At 29 a Turkish bullet deprived him of an eye in a battle in the Crimea. He was twice seriously wounded, but both times returned to the ranks. He enjoyed the love and esteem of his men. Suvorov, who was a great admirer of Kutuzov’s mind and talents, said of him: “He’s astute 1 Clever, clever! Nobody can trick him!”

In all his battles Kutuzov displayed exceptionally able and resource- ful leadership, personal bravery and remarkable stratagem. Like his teacher Suvorov, Kutuzov hated martinetism and Draconian disci- pline. He loved the Russian soldier of whose valour and heroism he had a very high opinion.

Kutuzov was well-educated and knew many foreign languages. He kept abreast of Russian and foreign literature, particularly of a military nature. In 1795 he was appointed director of the Higher Army School, where he lectured on the history of warfare and on tactics.

Kutuzov cordially detested the spirit of servility, flattery and venality that reigned at the tsarist court. Nor was he himself liked at the court. Tsar Alexander also disliked Kutuzov, particularly after the Battle of Austerlitz, which he lost after disregarding Kutu- zov’s warning.

When he appointed Kutuzov Commander-in-chief in 1812 the tsar told his retinue: . “The public desired his appointment , so I have ap- pointed him. But personally I wash my hands of him.”

On learning of Kutuzov’s appointment as Commander-in-chief Napoleon said, “The sly fox of the North!” WTien this was reported to Kutuzov, he replied, “I shall try to prove to the great soldier that he is right."

The People’s War

The farther Napoleon’s army advanced into the interior the worse its position became. The Oranie Amde grew manifestly weaker as it spread over the vast territory of Russia leaving garrisons behind it in the towns; communications became precarious; the supply trains lagged behind, and there were break- downs in the supply of food and fodder. Everywhere they met a hostile population. The Lithuanian and Byelorussian peasants were the first to take up arms against the invaders. Napoleon occupied all of Lithua- nia and Byelorussia and set up a government of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania composed of landloids. In a speech to the nobles in Mogilev Marshal Davout assured them that the “peasants will remain, as here- tofore, in subjection to their landlords.” Now the peasants had to bear not only persecution and oppression by their landlords but the additional affliction of national humiliation, robbery, pillage, requisi- tions and endless imposts levied by the French invaders.

The war against Napoleon instantly assumed the character of a people’s war. ‘This is not an ordinary war but a people’s war,” wrote Bagration. The population hunted out French scouts and spies, they refused to furnish supplies for the invading army, and, when the French approached, set fire to their homes and corn and went into the forests to wage guerilla warfare. The regular troops displayed won- derful feats of heroism. A Bashkir division, Kalmuck soldiers, Tatars and men of other nationalities fought bravely side by side with the Russians, Ukrainians and Byelorussians.

The people’s war in Russia, which inflicted heavy losses on Napo- leon’s army, incensed the conqueror, who had never met that kind of opposition anywhere in Europe. On September 23, 1812, he sent a protest to the Russian command against the “barbaric and unusual” ;petho4s of warfare and proposjsd ••c^ssatipn” of the war by the people* On another occasion he presented the following demand through General Lauriston: ^‘Military operations should conform to the established rules of warfare,” to which Kutuzov replied: “The people liken this war to a Tatar invasion and, consequently, consider all means to rid themselves of the enemy to be not only not repreh^ensible but praise- worthy and sacred*”

The Battle of Borodino

Kutuzov was well aware of the strength of the enemy, and though he approved of Barclay de Tolly’s tactics, he shared Bagration’s opinion regarding the need for substan- tially strengthening the rearguard. Kutuzov appointed Konovitsyu to head the rearguard. Rearguard actions between August 27 and Sep- tember 5 checked the French advance. Kutuzov declared that the enemy could be overcome only with the fi»id of time and space. He argued that Moscow was not the whole of Russia and that it might have to be sur- rendered to save Russia.

Napoleon wanted at all costs to force Kutuzov into fighting a de- cisive battle. He followed hot upon the heels of the Russians, waging incessant action against the rearguard. On the night of August 23 Na- poleon drew up to the Russian redoubt at the village of Shevardino. A small number of men defended the Shevardino redoubt with supreme heroism. They beat off the violent attacks of the French infantry and cavalry from four in the afternoon until dark, and only then did they retreat to the main positions. After the Battle of Shevardino a pitched battle became both possible and inevitable. At dawn on August 26 (September 8) the Russian and French armies finally met near the village of Borodino, 90 kilometres from Moscow.

Barclay de Tolly, with 76,000 men including reserves, held the right flank and the centre of the Russian army.

Bagration, Suvorov’s favourite and Kutuzov’s friend, was on the left flank. Peter Ivanovich Bagration, a Georgian by extraction, began military service at 17 as sergeant in a rifle regiment in the Caucasus. One of Suvorov’s most able pupils, he possessed boundless courage, and under his leadership the Russian soldiers worked wonders in the most dangerous operations. Napoleon, who held the opinion that “Ba- gration is the best general in the Russian array,” sent his most experi- enced marshals against him.

Napoleon planned to deal his main blow at the ‘‘Bagration flfeches,” a group of Russian field works in front of the village of Semyonovskaya. The “Bagration flfeches” being rather poorly constructed, Napoleon counted on an easy capture, particularly since Bagration had a small army of little more than 36,000. In all there were about 112,000 Rus- sian regular troops at Borodino, besides 7,000 Cossacks and a 10,000 popular levy from Moscow and Smolensk.

When Napoleon reached Borodino he had an army of only 130,000 men and 687 guns.

The battle opened with an attack on the village of Borodino, which was captured by the French. A fierce battle raged around the “Bagration filches,” which were furiously defended. The flfeches changed hands several times and were strewn with dead men and horses. A French general who took part in this engagement relates that the French charged the “Bagration flfeches” eight times and were thrown back each time, leaving piles of corpses at the approaches. “Bagra- tion’s troops, reinforced constantly by new arrivals, advanced with wonderful valour over the bodies of the fallen to regain the lost posi- tions. Before our eyes the Eussian columns moved at the command of their leaders in serried ranks of glittering steel and fire. On open terrain they suffered terrible losses from our case shot and our cavalry and infantry charges. But these brave warriors, making a supreme exer- tion, still went on attacking.”

At a critical moment, while over 400 French guns were pounding away at the left wing of the Russian front, Kutuzov sent reinforcements to Bagration. The Russians had about 300 guns, which made a total of some 700 thundering away within an area of a single square kilo- metre. The bravery of the Russian artillerymen amazed the French. One of the participants in the battle states in his memoirs: “The Rus- sian gunners were faithful to their duty. They took redoubts, they pro- tected the guns With their bodies and did not surrender them. Often a gunner wounded in one hand would continue firing with the other.” The sky was hidden by a dark pall of powder smoke lightened up by red flashes of grenades. The village of Semyonovskaya had been set on fire from all sides and was blazing. Napoleon threw fresh reserves into battle. Bagration counter attacked. A participant in the fighting relates: “The charge was horrible. • • . A frightful carnage ensued in which superhuman bravery was displayed on both sides. . . . Although the enemy had superior numbers the Russians showed up well until an accident changed the entire situation.”

During this engagement Bagration was mortally wounded. He made an effort to get up but dropped down and the soldiers carried their heroic commander off the battlefield. He fought back excruciating pain as he gave his last orders. His last words before losing consciousness were: “How are my men?” The answer was, “Sticking fast.”

The brave Dokhturov took over command. He succeeded in check- ing the confusion that had broken out among the troops when they heard that Bagration had been mortally wounded. “Dm if we must, but not one step back!” he commanded. Nonetheless the left flank of the Russian front was borne down, and the French took the “Bagra- tion flfeches.”

Napoleon then turned his guns on Rayevsky battery in the centre, Almost M the defenders of the h^tt^ry perished in the fierce fighting which ensued. Rayevsky’s battery was taken. Still the Russian army continued to stand its groimd.

In his Borodino the great Russian poet Lermontov described

the tenseness of the battle and the heroism of the Russian soldiers:

That day the foeman learned aright

The way we Russian soldiers flght-^

Fierce hand to hand,

Horses and men together laid,

And still the thundering cannonade;

Our breasts were tremblhig, as it made Tremble the land.

Then darhness fell in hill and plain;

Yet we were game to fight again, . . .

In the evening Napoleon ordered his troops to withdraw from

the field of battle. The Russian army, though it sustained heavy casu- alties, withdrew from Borodino to Moscow in perfect order. In the Battle of Borodino the Russian nation once more demonstrated to the world the heroism and self-sacrifice of which it was capable when the defence of its country and national independence were at stake. In an appraisal of this great battle Napoleon admitted just before his d ’iath: "‘Of all the battles I eVer fought the most terrible was that of Moscow. The French showed themselves worthy of victory; the Rus- sians won the right to be invincible.”

The Fire of Moscow

Kutuzov retreated from Borodino to Mozhaisk and thence to Moscow. On September 1, 1812, he called a council of war in the village of Fili, near Moscow, at which the question was discussed as to whether the Russian army should accept battle again or retreat from Moscow. The generals were in favour of giving battle again. Kutuzov cut the conference short and announced his command for a retreat. “The loss of Moscow does not mean the loss of Russia,” said Kutuzov.

Early in the morning of September 2 (14) the Russian army marched through Moscow in a continuous stream. Muscovites left the city together with the army; they departed with their possessions, carrying bundles and sacks, on foot and in carriages, jamming all the roads. When Murat’s cavalry entered Moscow by way of the long and narrow Arbat Street the city was silent and deserted. There remained only the foreigners and the inhabitants who had not had time to leave.

That night fires broke out in Moscow. The wind scattered the sparks over the wooden buildings, which flared up one after another. Dwell- ings, warehouses, shops and the stalls on Red Square burned down. The French soldiers and marauders rushed into the buildings and pillaged whatever the flames had not consumed. The fire lasted six days, during which night could not be distinguished from day. The people themselves made no effort to fight the fires. ‘‘Let everything perish so long as it does not go to the enemy,” they said , as they deserted the city.

The Defeat of Napoleon

Napoleon’s army, worn out by its long and arduous march, hungry, badly clothed and demoralized, remained in burning Moscow. Napoleon made peace overtures. He wanted the peace treaty to be signed in Moscow in order to save his prestige in Europe.

He made several peace proposals to Alexander. In a personal letter tothetsar sent through Yakovlev (the father of Herzen), he asked Alex- ander to restore their friendship. Alexander did not reply to any of the peace offers. Meanwhile winter was approaching. There were no provisions in Moscow, but there was still plenty of wine in the cellars, and the French soldiers indulged in drunken orgies. They turned into drunken marauders. Robbery and murder were rife.

Kutuzov retreated from Moscow along the Ryazan road and then swerved sharply toward Tarutino. This remarkable flanking movement w^s |;he beginning pf an offensive against Napoleon’s army and its encirclement from the south. Only now did Napoleon fathom Kutuzov’s tactics. He decided to abandon Moscow at once.,

Napoleon began his retreat from Moscow at 7 o ’clock in the morn- ing of October 6 (18). At his orders an attempt was made to blow up the Kremlin. One of the towers and a section of the Kremlin wall were destroyed. The destruction was not as great as Napoleon had in- tended because rain wet the fuses of the mines that had been planted.

Napoleon decided to break through to the Ukraine via Kaluga, where the Russian army had food stores. But Kutuzov outflanked him and blocked his path.

A decisive action was fought at Maloyaroslavets, which changed hands many times and where the French were thoroughly worsted. Napoleon turned off on the Smolensk road. The French army passed through devastated towns and villages, burning everything that still remained intact. Famine assumed catastrophic proportions in the army. There was nothing to eat but horse flesh. The Smolensk highroad all along its length was strewn with the bodies of men and horses.

The peasants waged guerilla warfare and hampered the retreat of the French by numerous sudden attacks.

One of the organizers of the guerilla detachments was LieUtetiaUt Colonel Denis Davydov. A Hussar and poet, Denis Davydov Was the son of a cavalry officer. Since early childhood he had dreamed of military glory. As a boy of nine he had attracted the attention of Su- vorov, who foretold a brilliant military future for him. After that the great Suvorov was Davydov’s cherished ideal. At the beginning of the war of 1812, when the Russian army was retreating to Moscow, Davydov, then a lieutenant colonel in the Akhter Hussar Regiment, told Bagration of his plan for guerilla warfare behind the enemy’s lines with the active support of the mass of the people. Kutuzov imme- diately saw the advantages of Davydov’s plan and approved it. He suggested that Davydov organize a small detachment of 60 Hussars and 150 Cossacks as an experiment. Soon after, this detachment went into action south of Gzhatsk. Davydov established contact with the peasant volunteer detachments, with whose support he began effective operations in the French rear. His detachment grew quickly. Kutuzov summoned Davydov to him and thanked him for his excellent serv- ice. Embracing Davydov, Kutuzov said, “Your successful experi- ments have shown me the value of guerilla warfare, which has inflicted, is inflicting and will continue to inflict much damage on the enemy.”

Subsequently Davydov summed up his rich experiences in a book entitled Experience in the Theory of Ouerilla Action, Describing “real guerilla warfare,” Davydov said that it “covers and cuts off the entire area of the opposing army from its rear to its natural base; by striking at the most vulnerable points, it tears up the roots of the enemy’s existence, exposes him to the blows of our own army, de- prives him of food supplies and ammunition, and bars the enemy’s retreat. This is guerilla warfare in the full sense of the word.” Davydov prophesied a big role for guerilla action in future wars of liberation waged by the Russian people.

The guerillas attacked and made sudden raids on warehouses and food trains all along the French line, as well as on messengers carrying documents. Soldiers and peasants were frequently the organ- izers of guerilla detachments. Yermolai Chetvertakov, a soldier in a dragoon detachment, who escaped from French captivity, mustered a guerilla detachment in the villages around Gzhatsk. A guerilla officer named Figner more than once made his way into Napoleon’s camp disguised as a French army man. A guerilla named Seslavin once cap- tured a French reconnaissance officer and brought him back across his saddle.

Gerasim Kurin formed a detachment of peasants and armed it with weapons captured from the French. Vasilisa Kozhina, the wife of a village elder of Smolensk Region, killed many merratiding sol^ diers of Napoleon’s army with pitchfork and scythe.

The Berezina and the Destruction of the "Grande Armée"

After tremendous hardships the Grande Armie finally reached Smo- lensk where it hoped to find food and rest. But like Moscow Smolensk had been burned down. Horses perished for lack of fodder. The last provisions were stolen by hungry soldiers who broke into the stores. The French army was by now completely out of hand. To crown all, severe frosts had set in. The soldiers used carriages, carts, and furni- ture left in the houses to build bonfires on the squares. No fewer than 30,000 soldiers were ill. But it was not the “Russian frosts” that caused the defeat of the Grande Armde, In a work entitled Did the Frosts Destroy the French Army in 1812% Denis Davydov says the weather was mild during Napoleon’s retreat. His army was already at Yelnya when the first snow fell. The temperature did not drop below minus twelve degrees, and the frost lasted no more than three or five days. “Is it possible,” wrote Davydov, “that an army of 150,000 could lose 65,000 men because of frosts that lasted from three to five days? The far more severe cold of 1795 in Holland, in 1807 during the Eylau campaign, which held about two months in succession, and in 1808 in Spain, which held throughout the winter campaign in the mountains of Castile, touched the surface, so to speak, of the French army, but did not penetrate it . ” It was the spirit of the Russian nation , the magni- ficent heroism and staunchness of the Russian army, supported by the whole nation, which encompassed Napoleon’s defeat in the Great Patriotic War.

With great difficulty Napoleon reached the Berezina River, which he had to cross. Warding off the attacks of the Russian troops, Napo- leon began the passage with the wreck of his ‘"grand” army. The crossing proceeded under a hail of cannon balls and bullets. Bridges crashed into the river together with the men. Many were crushed by horses; others were struck down by the bullets and balls or drowned during the crossing. No less than 10,000 Frenchmen lost their lives at the Be- rezina. About 60,000 crossed the river, but their ranks continued to thin. At the end of December there were barely 30,000 survivors of the “grand” array. Napoleon abandoned his defeated army and left for Paris.

The War of 1812 was a righteous war, a patriotic war, and, as such, occupies a place of great importance in Russian history. It was a war that asserted the national independence of Russia and of the Russian people. The heroism of the soldiers, the operations of the guerillas and the peasants, and the unity of the entire Russian people in fighting the foreign invaders, all helped Russia to defeat Napoleon, one of the most powerful conquerors in histor}^

Tsarism at the Helm of European Reaction

The European Campaign of Alexander I

In January 1813 the Russian army, pursuing Napoleon’s army, entered Poland and Prus- sia. The peoples of Europe rose up against Napoleon the conqueror in a struggle for national liberation. The national-liberation movement of the European peoples subjugated by Napoleon contributed to the mili- tary successes of the coalition fighting him. But the feudal monarchs utilized the War of the peoples for national liberation not to emancipate them but to restore the feudal regime in Europe.

In the autumn of 1813 Napoleon was defeated in the “Battle of the Nations” at Leipzig. The allied armies with Alexander I at their head entered Paris in March 1814. The Bourbon monarchy which the revolution had overthrown was restored in Prance. Napoleon was dethroned and exiled to the Island of Elba. A congress of the European monarchs was called in Vienna to divide the territories taken from Prance. In May 1816 the general act of the Congress of Vienna was signed, which gave Russia the greater part of the Duchy of Warsaw in “perpetuity.”

While the Congress was sitting at Vienna Napoleon escaped from Elba and returned to Paris. He fought to recover the power about one hundred days before he was conclusively defeated by English and German troops at Waterloo. The allied army again occupied Paris. Napoleon was exiled to the Island of St. Helena, where he died in 1821 . Louis XVIII, brother of Louis XVI who was guillotined during the revolution, ascended the throne of Prance.

To combat revolution in Europe three reactionary monarchs — the Austrian, Prussian and Russian — entered into what they called the Holy * Alliance in 1815. The leader and inspirer of the Holy Alli- ance was Alexander I. After the victory over Napoleon and the Con- gress of Vienna tsarist Russia’s influence in European affairs increased tremendously. Marx called the Holy Alliance “only a mask for the hegemony of the tsar over all the governments of Europe.’’

At the congresses of the Holy Alliance measures to combat the revolutionary movements in Italy. Spain and other countries of Europe were drafted under the direction of the Russian tsar. Russian tsarism became an international gendarme.

The Arakcheyev System

Alexander made the counter-revolu- tionary program of the Holy Alliance the basis of his domestic policy as well. The foremost exponent of this policy was Arakcheyev, friend and adviser to the tsar. A poorly-educated artillery ojfficer, Arakcheyev rose to the post of Minister of War and wielded exceptional influence and power. He made and unmade governors and the highest officials. The police force was in his hands. His name was a byword for a system ot administration that was utterly depraved and permeated with bribery and corruption, sycophancy, despotism and brutality. Arakcheyev was called “half-emperor.” He had blanks signed by the emperor which he used as he saw fit. His treatment of the serfs was particularly sav- age. A permanent feature of his estate at Gruzino were casks contain- ing pickle in which he kept switches for flogging the serfs. Women and children were made to wear spiked collars for weeks on end for the slightest misdemeanor . Even intimates of the tsar called Arakcheyev such names as “damned viper” and “savage fiend.” When Paul I had made Arakcheyev a count he inscribed on his coat of arms the device: “i^es le$ti predan^* (faithful without flattery). In society these words were changed to read “J5e5, lesti predan^* (the devil, faithful to flattery). The universal hatred for Arakcheyev was excellently expressed by ]^shkin

in his epigram On Arakcheyev.

He grinds all Russia with his heel,

At the rack he knows how to turn the wheel.

Governor, and Lord of the Privy Seal.

To the Tsar — a friend, a very twin.

Full of vengeance, full of spite.

Brainless, heartless, honourless quite,

Who is this ""true unflattering knighV^%

A soldier he, not worth a pin.

Arakcheyev was especially hated for the army settlements which he

organized at Alexander’s initiative. This was a name given to the vil- lages and volosts of state peasants which had been turned over to the Ministry of War for the purpose of establishing a standing army. The peasants in the army settlements were converted into permanent and hereditary soldiers. At the same time they continued to till the. land. The army was thus self-supporting. The soldiers were formed into companies and battalions, lived in barrack huts, and did everything according to a strict schedule; besides reveille there were bugle and drum signals for going to the fields to work, for sitting down to meals, and going to sleep. Every day they received an assignment from their commander. If they did not do it or did it badly they were beaten with sticks and even made to run the gauntlet. Running the gauntlet was a brutal punishment: the offender was stripped to the waist, and with his hands tied to rifle butts, he was led between two rows of soldiers who beat him with ramrods. The army settlers were ruthlessly exploit- ed. They received meagre rations of bad food. But when the tsar visit- ed the settlements he invariably saw a platter with a fried goose and roast pig in every hut. This platter was rushed from hut to hut by the back door while the tsar made his rounds down the main street.

The lot of the soldiers’ children, who were called cantonists, was a miserable one. They were enrolled in the army at the age of eight and given uniforms to wear. They were trained and drilled in special com- pany schools by non-commissioned officers who brutally punished them for the slightest misdemeanor.

At the beginning of the ’twenties there were as many as 376,000 state peasants in army settlements, which were located along Rus- sia’s western border: in Novgorod gubernia and in the Ukrainian gu- bernias (in Chuguyev and other places).

The peasants stubbornly resisted transfer to the army settlements. Particularly large disturbances broke out among the Novgorod and Ukrainian settlers.

In 1819 a big uprising of army settlers occurred in Chuguyev, in the Ukraine, which was supported by the local peasants. The uprising spread to Taganrog and assumed large proportions. Two battalions of infantry and artillery were sent out against the rebellious Chuguyev settlers. The “mutineers” were court-martialled, Arakcheyev himself attending the trial. He ordered forty of the “ringleaders” to be given 10,000 strokes each with ramrods in the presence of their families. The condemned men and their families bore up manfully. The majority died during the flogging. Arakcheyev also condemned 29 women who had participated in the uprising to be publicly flogged. Hundreds of army settlers were exiled to penal servitude in Siberia.

When it was once suggested to Alexander I that the army settle- ments were unnecessary, he answered sharply: “Army settlements will continue to exist imder all circumstances, even if I have to cover the entire road from St. Petersburg to CShudovo with corpses.” (Chu- dovo, 73 kilometres from St. Petersburg, was where the zone of army settlements began.)

The Peoples of Tsarist Russia and the Colonial Policy of Tsarism in the First Quarter of the 19th Century

Tsarist Policy in Poland, the Ukraine, Byelorussia and the Baltic Provinces

The Kingdom of Poland

By the decision of the Vienna Congress (1815) the major part of the Polish lands of the Duchy of War- saw was ceded to Russia as the kingdom of Poland. Alexander I pro- claimed himself hereditary king of Poland, and appointed a viceroy to rule in his absence. Taking into account the decisions of the Vienna Congress and anxious to consolidate his influence among the Polish gentry, Alexander granted Poland a ^‘constitutional charter.” Under the constitution of 1815 the Polish Diet could convene to discuss bills submitted by the tsar, but could not introduce bills itself. The Diet, and indeed all political activity in the country, was directed by the gentry, who enjoyed the support of the rising Polish bourgeoisie.

Capitalism was developing faster in Poland than in Russia, and the tsar had to create the requisite conditions there for the growth of capitalist industry. Thus, free trade was established between Russia and Poland in 1819, Prohibitive tariffs were imposed to protect Polish and Russian manufacturers from Prussian goods which were penetrat- ing into Russia by way of Poland. Polish manufacturers, particu- larly those in the woollen and cotton goods industries, were granted various privileges. Foreign entei’prises were also encouraged in Po- land. A Polish bank was established in 1829. To consolidate the country's finances special commissions were instituted in Poland to collect tax arrears and new taxes were introduced. With the Russian market at their disposal, the Polish gentry and the bourgeoisie grew rich. At the same time the Polish peasants, overburdened by taxes and deprived of land, were being impoverished and ruined. They deserted the villages and became an abimdant source of cheap labour. Since prices on agricultural produce were rising, the landlords strove to extend their cultivated area. They drove the peasants from their old plots and either cultivated their fields with the help of hired hands or turned them into pasture land for sheep, from which they obtained wool for sale to the mills. The landless peasants worked for the landlords as hired labourers under slave conditions. Under the double burden of national oppression by tsarism and exploitation by their own landlords the Polish peasants were in a continuous state of unrest.

As their economic position strengthened the Polish gentry and the rising bourgeoisie strove for complete political independence. They demanded that Poland’s borders of 1772 be restored; i, e., they sought the return of Byelorussian and Ukrainian lands. The Polish gentry also strove to rid themselves of the viceroy. The movement in Poland against Russian tsarism had the secret suppoi*t of English diplomats. The sessions of the Diet revealed a growing opposition from among a considerable part of the gentry. Bills submitted by the tsarist gov- ernment were rejected by the Diet. This irritated Alexander, who demanded that the Diet be made to realize that the Constitution of 1815 did not give it the right to criticize the actions of the tsarist government. The repressions and restrictions which followed merely had the effect of stirring up the movement for national liberation within the country. Secret societies having as their aim the restoration of Po- land’s political independence sprang up within the country.

Lithuania and Byelorussia

Lithuania and Byelorussia which had become a colony of Russian tsarism after the partition of Po- land, were subject to the same administrative regulations as those enforced in Russia. The new gubernias and uyezds were placed under the jurisdiction of tsarist officials. The Lithuanian and Byelorussian nobility had at first hoped to preserve their independence. They had demanded that neither Russian troops nor Russian administration be allowed on the territory of Lithuania and Byelorussia. These demands were rejected. On the contrary, the tsarist government began to grant land in the new colonies to Russian nobles in order to create a bul- wark there for the tsarist autocracy.

The war of 1812 seriously affected the economic position of Lith- uania and Byelorussia. The population became impoverished and its number was reduced by one-third. The cultivated area was reduced by half. The peasants lost almost all their livestock.

After the war of 1812 the landlords restored their estates by means of still greater exploitation of the peasantry. In 1820 and 1821 Byelo- russia experienced a terrible famine. The starving Byelorussian peas- ants abandoned the land and migrated to the central regions of Russia to seek employment on canal construction jobs and in the new fac- tories.

About 70 per cent of the urban population of Byelorussia and Lithuania were Jews. The Jewish agricultural population was insignificant. In the towns the Jews engaged in trade and in the crafts.

In 1796 a law was passed in the interests of the Russian landlords and merchants, establishing a Jewish pale of settlement, by which the domicile of Jews was confined to Byelorussia and the Kiev, Po- dolsk, Volhynia, Ekaterinoslav and Taurida gubernias. Even here they were not admitted to all the gubernia centres. In 1823 an order was issued to evict all Jews from the villages of Byelorussia.

Impoverished and persecuted Jewry formed national-religious organizations. The Jewish poor were totally dependent upon the Jewish bourgeoisie.

The Baltic Provinces

The Baltic provinces of Liflandia and Esthland contiguous with Lithuania and Byelorussia had been annexed to Russia during the Northern War. The Courland province had been incorporated into Russia under the third partition of Poland in 1795. The Baltic regions were administered by Russian governors, and economically dominated by large landlords — German barons — who were supported by tsarism.

The Baltic landlords became staunch supporters of the tsarist throne. They furnished courtiers and high officials for tsarist Russia right up to the Revolution of 1917.

Capitalism in the Baltic regions developed earlier than in the other parts of the Russian empire. The Baltic landlords readily abandoned unproductive and unprofitable serf labour for the free hire of landless labourers who became entirely dependent upon them economically. At the insistence of these landlords Alexander I issued an ukase freeing the Baltic peasants from personal serf dependence.

The peasants of Esthland were emancipated in 1816, of Courland in 1817, and of Liflandia in 1819; but all the land remained in the hands of the German barons. The Estonian and Lettish peasants Were not even granted complete personal freedom, howeveri They were not free to seek a livelihood in the towns without the consent of the landlords. The landlords retained the right to administer justice and punishment. The Baltic peasants fell under a double yoke: that of the German landlords and of Russian tsarism.

Finland

After incorporation into 'Russia, Finland was trans- formed into the Grand Principality of Finland and Tsar Alexander I added to his title of Emperor of all Russia and King of Poland the title of Grand Prince of Finland.

A Committee of Central Administration consisting of 12 local inhabitants headed by a governor-general appointed by the tsar was set lip to administer Finland. The governor-general wielded full admin- istrative power. He supervised the enforcement of the laws and dispensation of justice. Knland received autonomy: she had her own court of law and her own army, and draft laws were discussed in the Diet. But the tsarist government systematically violated the consti- tution of Finland and restricted the economic and cultural develop- ment of the Finnish people. Industry did not begin to develop until the first quarter of the 19th century. The bulb of the population con- dsted of peasants who had practically no land of their own. The land remained in the hands of the Finnish and Swedish landlords. Peasants who rented laud on loiig-teim leaaes were known as toryari and were obliged to work off their rent by tilling the landlords " fields a certain number of days. Particularly hard was the lot of the Karelian peasants, who carried on a primitive agriculture on stony plots wrested from forest clearings. They also engaged in hunting and fishing. The dual yoke imposed by tsarism and by the Finnish and Swedish landlords not in- frequently led to peasant uprisings, which were put down by the joint efforts of the tsarist government and the landlords.

The Ukraine

The colonization of the Ukrainian steppes which had begun in the 18th century was continued in the first half of the 19th century. The Ukraine was rapidly becoming the granary of Eui'ope as well as of Russia. From five to six times more grain and agricultural raw materials were now being exported to England from the Ukraine than in the middle of the 18th century. The growing urban population in Russia and the Ukraine likewise increased the demand for Ukrainian corn. The price of land was high and the landlords strove to secure for themselves gratuitous labour. They increased the bar- shchina to five and six days per week. The peasants, men, women and children, worked on manorial lands from sunrise to sunset. At the end of the first quarter of the 19th century the peasants were sometimes completely employed on the landlord’s estate in the capacity of labour- ers, receiving monthly payment in kind. This form of exploitation was called mesyachina (from the Russian word meayataj meaning month).

The state peasants in the Ukraine had to pay high taxes which absorbed as much as 40% of their annual income. Frequently they were unable to meet the taxes and state dues and abandoned their plots to work as wage labourers for the landlords or to seek seasonal employment elsewhere. Most of them became carters transporting salt from the Crimea, fish from the Don, and grain and goods to the ports and fairs. Other occupations, such as carpentry, pottery making, coal mining, tar distillation, lumbering and other trades also devel- oped.

The first capitalist manufactories in the Ukraine arose in the first quarter of the 19th century. They were small enterprises making hats, leather, soap, rope and fats, which employed freely hired labour and Were owned, as anile, by merchants. The cloth manufactories as well as the distilleries and sugar factories remained in the hands of the land- lords. The distilling industry made rapid progress. Fairs were becom- ing ever more popular and widespread. At the Kiev commercial fairs contracts were concluded for the sale of corn, the leasing of estates, the marketing of handicraft wares, etc.

The Ukraine was becoming a growing market for the sale of Russian goods. In the first quarter of the 19th century almost a third of the entire output of the Russian textile industry was sold in the Ukraine.

The Black Sea ports of Odessa, Nikolayev and Kherson became centres of Russian trade with Western Europe and the countries of the East.

The second half of the 18th century witnessed a further increase in the Ukraine's colonial dependence on Russia, attended at the same time by a development of economic and cultural ties between the two countries.

Western Ukraine, which had been relinquished to Austria under the partition of Rzecz Pospolita, received the name of Galicia. The Austrian government strove to Germanize the population of Galicia for which purpose a German university was opened in Lwow at the end of the 18th century. Under Austrian rule Galicia remained an agrarian, economically backward country, vnih the land practically monopolized by the Polish landlords. The Polish gentry strove to preserve serfdom, and as a result peasant uprisings were frequent in Galicia.

Transcaucasia in the First Quarter of the 19th Century

Eastern Georgia Under Russia

In the 18th century Trans- caucasia was split up into a number of small feudal states. Eastern Georgia was subject chiefly to Persia, while Western Georgia was under the domination of Tuikey. Sanguinary wars between Persia and Turkey led to the even greater dismemberment of Caucasian and Transcaucasian territory.

In the 18th century the peasants of Georgia suffered from frequent attacks by foreign enemies as well as from feudal internecine strife and feudal exploitation. The interminable conflicts between the Geor- gian feudal lords contributed to the debasement and ruin of the coun- try. The Turkish conquerors forcibly converted thousands of Georgi- ans to MohamrAedanism. Every year thousands of inhabitants of Trans- caucasia were sold into slavery by the Turks and the Persians. Espe- cially did the slave trade flourish in Circassia. Both Turkey and Persia plundered and devastated the lands they had seized in Transcaucasia.

The wars waged in the second quarter of the 18th century by Shah Nadir of Persia against the Turks and Daghestanians for possession of Transcaucasia and Daghestan bled the country white. The "extraordi- nary tax” levied on the population of Georgia by Shah Nadir in connec- tion with his Indian campaign led to a number of peasant uprisings which were brutally suppressed. Only after the death of the Persian conqueror did Georgia begin to revive.

An Eastern Georgian kingdom independent of both Persia and Turkey was founded under King Heraclius 11.

Heraclius II was an indefatigable ruler and a brave warrior. In his determination to create a strong Georgian state, he waged effective war both against the feudal lords and the raiding Daghestan tribes.

The king also promoted education, establishing seminaries in Telav and Tiflis (Tbilisi), and endeavoured to develop the handicrafts, trade and industry in Georgia. He invited miners from Greece to de- velop the copper deposits. In these activities he was supported by the Armenian bourgeoisie. The peasants, ruined by the preceding wars, Were not able to pay their taxes, and Heraclius had to use armed force to collect them. The Georgian feudal lords robbed and ruined the peas- ants, who rose up in arms against their exploiters. In 1770 mass upris- ings broke out among the monastery peasants against the Bodbiisk Monastery in Kaklietra, Eastern Georgia. Particularly serious were the peasant uprisings in Kartalinia in 1719, 1743 and 1744. In 1773 there were also big uprisings against the feudal lords in the hill-country of Pshavia. In 1775 there was an outbreak among the peasants of the Portant Monastery followed the next year by the peasants of Bishop Justine of Arbin. In the eighties of the 18th century peasant uprisings spread throughout Kakhetia.

At the beginning of the 18th century the so-called “Laws of King Vakhtang” were issued to combat the peasant movement. King Heracli- us II was also compelled to take up the peasant question. He tried to ease the burden of serfdom by issuing a law which allowed serfs return- ing from foreign captivity to choose their lords at their own free will, and another law which prohibited the sale of peasants apart from the land or singly. He limited to thirty years the period during which fugi- tive serfs could be sought and returned; if they remained at large after this period they were to receive their freedom.

With three big countries — Persia, ^Turkey and Russia — vying for supremacy in Transcaucasia , the kingdom of Georgia found itself in a difficult position. This led Heraclius II to seek outside help, primarily from Russia. Fearing a new invasion by the Persians and Turks, he signed a treaty in 1783 accepting a Russian protectorate over Georgia. Tsarist Russia availed herself of this treaty to entrench herself in Trans- caucasia, The Russian army built a fortress at the starting point of the mountain road leading to Georgia and gave it the significant name of Vladikavkaz (Rule the Caucasus). At the cost of great effort and many lives Russian soldiers built the Georgian Military Highway through the Daryal Gorge.

Persia and Turkey, Georgia’s ancient enemies, were infuriated by the treaty which made Georgia a protectorate of Russia, In 1796 the hordes of Khan Aga Mahommed, the Persian shah, invaded Azer- baijan, but met here with strong resistance. In September of the same year they attacked Georgia. Such a terrible invasion of the country had not been witnessed since the days of Genghis Khan and Tamerlane. Tiflis was razed to the ground and over 10,000 Georgian captives were led off to Persia.

At the beginning of 1798 Heracluis II died at a venerable age, leaving his kingdom despoiled and helpless. His son, the feeble-minded George XII, became king of Georgia. Bitter intestine strife flared up again. All the members of George XII large family owned appanages and mercilessly plundered the peasants.

George XII took an oath of allegiance to Russia as her vassal and sent an embassy to St. Petersburg with a petition that Georgia be an- nexed to Russia. He died at the end of 1800, before Paul I issued his manifesto on the incorporation of Georgia. Paul issued the manifesto on January 18, 1801, but owing to his death it was not put into force. In September 1801 the new Russian emperor, Alexander I, issued a manifesto on the incorporation of Georgia “in order to rid the Georgian people of their sorrows.” Eastern peorgia became a Russian region, subsequently called the Tiflis gubernia. That Georgia became a colony of tsarist Russia, was the least of all evils. Weakened and devastated by endless wars and rebellions, Georgia was experiencing a grave so- cial and economic crisis and was unable to defend herself against her enemies. Georgia’s annexation to such a powerful country as was the Russian Empire saved the Georgian people from being complete- ly absorbed by Persia or Turkey. Between Russia and Georgia there existed a religious and cultural kinship, and under those historical conditions Russia was the only progressive power capable of ensuring the further development of Georgia’s productive forces.

The Conquest of Transcaucasia

After Eastern Georgia was annexed to Russia in 1801 the tsarist government embarked upon the conquest of all Transcaucasia. The most energetic exponent of the tsar- ist policy of conquest was Prince Tsitsianov, the*son of an ancient Georgian noble family who had received his education in Russia. He was a crafty, subtle and cruel tsarist satrap. In a letter to Joseph Stalin

the working people of Georgia described this enslaver as follows:

And the satrap of the despot tsar,

Tsitsianov, a Georgian prince,

Marched with armies against the Caucasus

To burn and hang us.

At the end of 1802 Tsitsianov was appointed Commander-in-chief

and began to carry out a ruthless policy of conquest in Transcaucasia. He annexed to Russia Mingrelia, Guria and Imeretia. This “rounding off” of Russia’s Transcaucasian possessions was effected not only by force of arms but also by subtle diplomacy and bribery.. Tsitsianov adroitly made use of the incessant conflicts among the feudal lords and the peasant uprisings against them to consolidate tsarist Russia ’s power in Transcaucasia.

Some of the Georgian feudal lords strove to recover their feudal privileges and restore the Georgian kingdom under the protectorate of Persia. Prince Alexander, a son of Heraclius II and the most irreconcilable of the feudal lords, left for Persia together with other discontented princes to muster forces for a struggle against Russia,

In 1804 Tsitsianov began the conquest of the Erivan khanate. After besieging the fortress of Erivan for two months he was com- pelled to withdraw. At the end of 1805 he started a campaign against the Baku khanate. Possession of the Baku khanate was important because it offered an outlet to the Caspian and also because it could be used as a stepping stone for subsequent action against Persia. Tsits- ianov invested the fortress of Baku and demanded that the keys of the fortress gates be surrendered to him. The khan of Baku pretended to give in, but half a mile from the town Tsitsianov was billed by a shot from behind. His head was sent to Persia as a present to the heir of the shah.

The Baku khanate was subjugated in the autumn of 1806, after the death of Tsitsianov. The adjacent khanate of Kuba was conquered at the same time.

All the conquered khanates of Azerbaijan were formed into two gubernias — the Elizavetpol and the Baku.

Persia and Turkey, supported by England and France, refused to cede the Caucasian and Transcaucasian territories to the Russian tsar. The English and French governments gave them assistance with money and instructors and incited them to make war on Russia.

Persia declared war on Russia in 1805, and Turkey at the end of 1806. Both wars dragged on for many years. Persia received help from Napole- on, who sent army instructors and engineers. England likewise pursued a policy of inciting Persia and Turkey against Russia. But not withstand- ing their overwhelming numerical superiority and the assistance ren- dered by the French and English instructors, the Persian and Turkish armies suffered a series of severe defeats. In a treaty concluded with Russia, Persia renounced all claim to Daghestan and Georgia and prom- ised not to maintain warships in the Caspian. Russian merchants were granted privileges for trade with Persia. The war against Turkey was fought on two fronts: in Transcaucasia and in the Balkans. It ended with the signing of the Treaty of Bucharest in May 1812, under which Turkey returned the ancient Russian lands of Ismail and Bessarabia to Russia.

In Asia the former frontiers between Russia and Turkey were re- stored. Turkey renounced her claims to Western Georgia, which sub- sequently became the Kutais gubernia.

The war between Russia and Persia lasted until 1813. England act- ed as mediator in bringing the war to a close, her aim being to achieve, in alliance with tsarist Russia, a speedy termination of the war against Napoleon.

The victories of the Russian army in Transcaucasia compelled Persia to conclude the Treaty of Gulistan (1813) by which the khan- ates located on the territory of present-day Azerbaijan were incor- porated into Russia “in perpetuity.”

Transcaucasia After Incorporation Into Russia

The security from foreign invasion that Georgia received as a result of her union with Russia saved the Georgian people not only from extermination but from the forcible inculcation of the Moslem faith and customs. The inclusion of Transcaucasia into the Russian empire gave it a new impetus towards capitalist development.

On the eve of the 19th century natural economy predominated in Georgia. The peasant family produced not only corn but all its cloth, footwear and household articles. The towns of Georgia had not yet become centres of industry. Only Tiflis had any industry at all, and that in an embryonic stage: ordnance, gunpowder and glass works, print- shops and a mint.

In the years immediately following incorporation into Russia, Georgian trade developed very slowly owing to the lack of roads, con- stant internal uprisings and the wars that were waged on her borders. Trade was chiefly carried on by Armenian merchants, who shipped raw silk and wool to Moscow and to the fair at Makaryev. To stimu- late local trade the Russian authorities abolished the inland toll- gates.

Favourable tariffs on foreign goods made Tiflis a medium for French and German trade with Persia. The tariffs in force in Transcaucasia, however, were detrimental to the Russian merchants and manufactur- ers, who in 1831 succeeded in having them abolished.

“Commandant’s administration” was introduced in the conquered khanates of Azerbaijan. The name khanate was changed to province and Russian officers were placed at their head as commandants. A syhitem of feudal oppression of the popuktion, paiticularly of the peas- antry , was established in all the subjugated khanates.

The tsarist government strove to gain the support of the Georgian landlords and required absolute submission to them on the part of the peasants. Peasant uprisings were quelled by armed force. The peas- ants had to bear not only intensified feudal oppression but a colonial yoke as well. Like the princes of old who had travelled about with their retinues robbing the countryside, Russian and Georgian officials and officers now lived off the Georgian peasantry for weeks on end while on hunting trips. The courts and administration were conducted in Russian, a language which the peasants did not understand, and they had nowhere to turn for protection. The extortionate demands for de- liveries of supplies and means of transport, and the forced labour on road building led to incessant peasant disturbances and revolts.  

In the spring of 1804 an uprising broke out among the peasants rendering road services in the mountains, on the Georgian Military Highway, The rebels seized the entire highway. The uprising lasted several months and was crushed only after troops had been called in from the Caucasian foitifications.

The methods used to quell the uprising can be judged from the instructions given to the army commanders, who were told ‘%o be ruth- less, to hack with sword and bayonet, burn down the villages, abandon all thought of mercy to the villains and barbarians.”

A peasant uprising which broke out in 1809 in South Ossetia last- ed a whole year. But the most formidable uprising was that which took place inKakhetia in 1812-1813. Here the peasants were compelled to supply cattle, carts and men for the army transport system. This completely disorganized their farming. A terrible famine and the plague filled the cup of the peasants’ misery.

The uprising broke out in January 1812 in the village of Akhmeti, Telav district. The peasants rose up to a man in response to the tocsin which served as a signal. Within a few days the uprising had spread to three districts. “Better death than such a life” was the slogan of the rebels.

Two weeks later the uprising was crushed, but in the autumn of 1812 it flared up again and was put down with difficulty only in 1813.

The Peoples of the Volga, Bashkiria and Siberia in the First Quarter of the 19th Century

The Peoples of the Volga

The Russian landlords who had firmly entrenched themselves on the Middle Volga as well as the native landlords from among the Christianized murzi (Tatar nobles) and princes continued to seize the black-earth lands of the local peasants in the forest and steppe districts. The Chuvashes and the Mari were trans- ferred to the woodland districts. The Tatars and the Mordvinians were driven into the steppe, where land was still being settled. The peasants were dispossessed of the best lands lying on the banks of the rivers. Under the “general demarcation act” of 1765 the land of the local -peas- ants was allocated to Russian landlord-colonizers. In numerous peti- tions to the governor of Kazan the Tatar, Chuvash and Mari peasants complained of encroachments on their pastures, meadows and plough- land.

Forcible conversion of the Volga peoples to Christianity had be- gun in the second half of the 18th century. Sometimes the tsarist author- ities would drive entire villages of Chuvashes and Mordvinians down to the river and baptize them en masse. Sometimes they would be tempt- ed with presents, each convert receiving a cross, a ruble and a white shirt. The unchristened Tatar murzi and sultans were deprived of their serfs by a special order of the government.

The government colonized the Lower Volga with Tatar, Mord» vinian and Chuvash settlers forcibly removed from the Middle and Upper Volga. Together with the Russians these peoples laid the founda- tion for the economic and cultural development of the Lower Volga. In the second half of the 18th century villages of German colonists sprang up along both banks of the Volga, around Saratov and farther south. To develop the vast steppes more rapidly the government of Catherine II had issued a manifesto in 1763 inviting foreigners to settle in Russia. In response to this invitation more than 20,000 settlers came from France, Sweden and particularly from Germany, where the peasantry had been ruined by the Seven Years ^ War, and settled on the Volga. The foreign settlers received 30 dessiatins (about 80 acres) of land per family and loans to set themselves up.

Settlements of Ukrainian carters brought over from the Ukraine to break aud transport salt from Lake Elton sprang up on the Lower Volga. Beyond Tsaritsyn lay the lands of corporate Cossackdom who protected the Volga area against inroads by the nomad Kalmucks and Kazakhs.

The growth of the home market and corn exports increased the demand upon the landlords for corn. The landlords, in quest of new tillage, were particularly vigorous in colonizing the steppes adjoining the Volga. In the last quarter of the 18th century and the first quarter of the 19th century all the vacant government-owned land in the Volga area was distributed among the nobles and various servitors, A partic- ularly large amount of laud was distributed during the reign of Pauli, who granted one of his favourites, Naryshkin, more than half a million dessiatins. Scores of thousands of dessiatins were distributed among other landlords right up to 1820, when an ukase was issued prohibiting the grant of lands along the hilly west bank of the Volga.

The landlords who colonized the Lower Volga also seized land that had been previously allotted to the peasant settlers of various nationalities.

The colonial oppression and ruthless exploitation of the peoples of the Volga led to peasant uprisings. The biggest uprisings in this period were those of the Moiivinians in Nizhni Novgorod Region (1808-1810).

The Mordvinian peasants of Tyureshev district raided the land- lord’s office, killed the manager and seized the harvest on the landlord’s fields. They routed the tsarist detachment that had been sent out to suppress them. At secret gatherings held in the woods the Mordvin- ians discussed ways of freeing themselves from the oppression of the Russian landlords. Kuzma Alexeyev, a Mordvinian serf, headed the movement.

The government arrested all the leaders of the uprising. The accu- sation brought against Alexeyev was that he had demanded that the Mordvinians bo allowed to wear their national costume and live in accordance with their own native customs. The tsarist court sentenced him to the whipping post and to exile to Siberia.

The Bashkirs

In the first half of the 19th century most of the Baslikiis (a Turkic people) lived in the Orenburg region. Their chief occupation was cattle breeding, but they had already begun to engage in agriculture as well. By the beginning of the 19lh century they had gone over from a nomadic to a semi -nomadic life; they roamed in summer and lived in permanent dwellings in winter. A law issued in 1798 converted the Bashkirs into a military estate. Together with the Orenburg Cossacks they had to carry out sentry duty along the Orenburg border fortifications, from Tobol to the Caspian Sea. The men sent off to serve on this line had to possess four army horses and their own arms and ammunition. For unsatisfactory fulfilment of their duties Bashkirs were forced to work at state-owned factories and mines in the Urals. A law was passed in 1832 providing for the demarca- tion of land between the Bashkirs and tenants who had been allowed to settle Bashkirian lands under various conditions. The purpose of the law was to restrict Bashkir land tenure. Demarcation served as a pretext for new seizures of Bashkirian lands. The Bashkirs rose re- peatedly against their oppressors; throughout the first half of the 191h century they waged a constant struggle for liberation; many Bashkirs, it will be remembered, had fought in Pugachev's detachments in the 18th century.

The Peoples of Siberia

Siberia knew neither landlord ten- ure nor serfdom, but patriarchal slavery prevailed here up to the first quarter of the 19th century. Slavery was prohibited in Siberia only in 1826. The forms of colonial oppression were very similar to slavery. The numerous peoples inhabiting this vast territory were under the power of an absolute and uncontrolled oflScialdom,

In 1819 M. M. Speransky, who had been in disfavour since 1812, was appointed governor-general of Siberia, where he introduced a num- ber of administrative and economic ^'reforms.”

Speransky drew up the so-called "Aliens Regulation,” which out- lined a new system of administrating the subjugated peoples of Siberia, The Siberian tribes, which up to then had been called "the heterodox” and yaanchniye (payers of yasak, or tribute in pelts) were now called "aliens.” They were divided into settled, nomad and vagrant tribes. The "Aliens Regulation” consolidated the dominant position of the upper stratum of feudal lords and upheld the most backward customs. Speransky took measures to assure uninterrupted receipt of the yasak. The extent and quality of the land consigned to the "aliens” depended on the amount of yasak they paid.

The taxes and dues imposed upon the people at large became more and more intolerable. At the beginning of the 19th century the "aliens” were assessed according to the census of 1763, i.c., they paid taxes both for themselves and their deceased clansmen. There were cases when a group which had decreased to one-fourth of what it had been in 1763 paid taxes according to the old census. The land of native in- habitants was frequently seized by the Russian kulaks, or rich peas- ants, who settled in Siberia. The local population was crowded back to less favourably situated lands. The. Evenki, for example, were driven away from the river banks, and their best hunting grounds were turned into ploughlands and meadows by Russian settlers.

Brutal colonial exploitation led to impoverishment, famine, dis- ease and to the extinction of the masses of the working people. During a famine in the Turukhan territory at the beginning of the 19th century there were many instances of cannibalism. Between the middle of the 18th and middle of the 19th century the number of Itelmens (Kamcha- dales) dwindled from 20,000 to 2,000.

The late twenties of the 19th century saw the beginning of a forcible conversion of the peoples of Siberia to Christianity. Missionaries re- sorted to both threats and promises in order to convert the Siberian peoples.

Nobody was concerned with spreading literacy among the local population. Schools existed only in the towns, and the “aliens” had virtually no access to them. When the governor asked permission to send several especially capable Yakut boys to the St. Petersburg Tech- nological Institute, the Ministry of Education suggested that they be sent instead to some local workshop. Only the well-to-do were able to acquire an education, and not in all cases.

Expeditions and Voyages In the First Quarter of the 19th Century. At the beginning of the 19th century large expeditions were fitted out to the northeastern and northern shores of Siberia, most of them on business connected with the Russian-American Company founded in the reign of Paul I. This company, which enjoyed “the royal patronage,” had a monopoly on fur hunting and exploitation of all the resources of North America, Asia, Southern Sakhalin and the mouth of the Amur River.

The first and most significant expedition was Adam Ivan von Kruirenstern’s voyage around the world in 1803-1806. At that time the Russian fur trade with China was carried on overland via Kyakhta. Krusenstern came to the conclusion that it could be conducted more profitably by sea. An expedition was fitted out in the summer of 1803 to carry out his plan. Krusenstern crossed the Atlantic Ocean, rounded South America and entered the Pacific Ocean. After reaching the shores of Kamchatka and Japan he rounded Asia and Africa from the south and came back to the Atlantic. This expedition explored the east- ern shores of Sakhalin, Kamchatka, the Kurile and Aleutian Islands, and the northwestern coast of North America. Krusenstern described his journey in detail in his book Voyage Round the World of the Ships *"Nadezhdd^ and "^Neva^ in 1803-1806 Under the Command of Krusenstern.

In 1809-1811 an expedition under Hedenstrom explored the New Siberian Islands in the Arctic Ocean. In 1810 a member of the expedi- tion named Sannikov reached the northernmost island of the New Si- berian group and reported land north of this island. The existence of “Sannikov Land,” however, has been refuted by later expeditions un- dertaken by the Soviet government. Between 1815 and 1818 an expe- dition on the ship Rurik explored Kamchatka, Chukotsk and Bering Strait. The first map of Kamchatka and Chukotsk was compiled by the well-known navigator Litke, who explored the northeastern coast of Siberia in 1821-1824. The expedition under Wrangel in 1820-1824, which investigated the northern coast of Siberia from the Lena estuary to Bering Strait, had great significance.

The Decembrists

The Revolutionary Movement in the First Quarter of the 19th Century

The Birth of Industrial Capitalism

Capitalist development started in tsarist Russia later than in other countries. By the middle of the 18th century serf labour had gone out of existence in England, where the industrial revolution was replacing hand labour by steam- driven machinery. Serfdom in France was swept away by the bour- geois revolution of 1789-1794. At the beginning of the 19th century Prussia, then a more backward country than England or Prance, had also started to abolish serfdom. Russian economics were still governed by the system of serfdom. Nevertheless, in the first quarter of the 19th century, Russia too entered upon the path of industrial capitalism. The increase in the number of factories, and particularly the em-* ployment of hired labour, were undeniable signs of progress in capi- talist industry. In 1804 Russia had 2,423 factories employing 96,000 workers, of whom 46,000 were freely hired. By 1826 the number of •factories had grown to 6,261 and the number of workers to 211,000, of whom 114,000 were freely hired.

Thus already half of all the workers engaged in the factories were freely hired. Some enterprises, the cotton mills for example, were based primarily on freely hired labour. True, the majority of the freely hired workers were serf peasants who worked in the factories frequently at their landlords’ orders so as to be able to pay them dbroh (money rents). The spread of the o5roA; system on the landlords’ estates at the begin- ning of the 19th century was a concomitant of industrial development. The tens of thousands of o6roifc-paying peasants who had gone to work in the factories and mills constituted the bulk of the industrial workers.

Peasant domestic industry developed side by side with the capital- ist manufactories employing hired workers. At the beginning of the 19th century the centre of capitalist manufacturing which developed out of peasant domestic industry was the village of Ivanovo. Factors and distributors supplied yarn to the peasant domestic workshops and bought up their cloth, which was finished at the factories. By exploit- ing their fellow- villagers some of the serf peasants grew rich and were able to set up manufactories of their own.

But industry could not develop properly under serfdom. Serfdom hampered the rise of an industrial proletariat and retarded the proletar- iiuiization of the village. The oftroi-paying peasants employed in industry could be recalled to the village by their landlord at will. The workers had to turn over practically all their earnings to their land- lords, and were consequently not interested in their work and performed it badly. Their labour was of conspicuously low productivity*

The development of capitalist industry required an adequate home market, but with the self-sufficient peasant economy satisfying all local demands, tlie home market was restricted. Hence the demand for goods grew slowly, although steadily. Finally, serfdom prevented the free accumulation of capital available for investment in industry. And without a constant influx of capital, industry could not develop.

Mass Movement in the First Quarter of the 19th Century

The demand for corn on the home and foreign markets stimulated an in- crease in the cultivation of marketable corn, which the landlords en- deavoured to accomplish by intensifying the exploitation of their serfs. They increased the barshchina to 5 and 6 days per week and raised the obrok to 75 rubles per household. The peasants rebelled at the intensi- fied exploitation. The landlords brutally quelled the rebels with armed force. The biggest uprising took place on the Don in 1820 and spread throughout the Don region and the adjoining districts of the Ekaterinoslav gubernia. This uprising was an expression of protest against the attempt of landlord-officials to enthrall the peasants who had migrated to the Don area from other parts of Russia and settled on the vacant lands, and regarded themselves as freemen. The uprising was crushed by armed force.

The mass movement was particularly wide in the Urals indus- trial regions, notably at Kyshtym, where the workers and peasants re- volted against deferred wage payments and the high price of bread in the factory stores. The workers of the adjacent area of Ufalei joined the Kyshtym workers. The rebels chose Klimenti Kosolapov, a Kysh- tym worker, as their leader. Troops were sent to put down the Kyshtym and Ufalei workers. Kosolapov and his 12 associates were seized and brought to Ekaterinburg. The workers were flogged.

Unrest was rife in the army as well. Military service lasted for a term of twenty- five years. The soldiers were subjected to brutal corpor- al punishment for the slightest offence. “I’m the country’s defender, but my back is always tender,” ran the words of a popular soldier’s song of the time.

Upon their return home after victory over Napoleon the members of the popular levy hoped to receive freedom, but the old oppression by the landlords awaited them instead. “We have shed our blood,” they complained, “and we are again compelled to sweat on the ftarsA- ckina. We have rid our country of a tyrant, and again our master tyran- nizes us.”

The biggest revolt in the army broke out in the Semyonovsky Guards Regiment at St. Petersbuig in October 18^0. It was provoked by the brutal treatment of the soldiers by Regimental Commander Schwarz, who had established a system of terror intolerable even in Arakcheyev’s times. A company mutinied and was supported by the whole battalion. The soldiers behaved peaceably, although they had arms. The rebels of the Semyonovsky Regiment had the sympathies of the entire garrison. The men, however, lacked leaders and the rebellion was savagely suppressed. Six hundred men were beaten, some of them to death, with ramrods.

At the end of October 1820 copies of a proclamation dealing with the events in the Semyonovsky Begiment were found in the barracks of the Preobrazhensky Begiment. The leaflet said: “There is nothing to be expected from the tsar; he himself is just a powerful robber.” This was the first political leaflet against the tsar distributed among the soldiers.

The Revolutionary Nobles

The beginnings of capitalism in Russia brought progressive men to a realization of what an obstacle serfdom constituted to the development of the country’s productive forces. They were also becoming convinced of the need for changing the autocratic political system, under which millions of people were turned into slaves. The people’s war of 1812 also spurred many progres- sive minds to the realization that a struggle against serfdom was inev- itable. It caused them to ponder over the grievous plight of an enslaved people, who had so heroically defended their homeland, and to seek for a way out. The progressive ideas of the French bourgeois revo- lution also served as a powerful impetus in awakening the political con- sciousness of the finest section of the educated Russian nobility.

The patriotic young officers who had fought in the war of 1812 and in the campaigns abroad studied the ideas of the Encyclopaedists; they eagerly read the political essays of Montesquieu, Rousseau and other progressive writers.

Paris, which was then the centre of political activity,* exercised a great influence on these officers. In Paris Russia’s educated youth became acquainted with various political trends, read pamphlets and newspapers of diverse tendencies; they began to think politically and were fired with a desire to act. The young revolutionary nobles studied the bourgeois constitutions of various countries, discussing their advantages and their applicability to Russia.

The movement for national liberation and the revolutionary events in Europe — in the Balkans, Italy and Spain — made an even greater impression on the minds of the progressive officers. “From one end of Europe to another,” wrote Pestel, “one and the same thing is happening. From Portugal to Russia, in every country without exception, not even England or Turkey — those two opposites — the spirit of reformation, the spirit of the times, is compelling, so to speak, minds to seethe everywhere.”

Riego, the leader of the Spanish “zealots of freedom^” was to the revolutionary nobles of Russia a symbol of heroic struggle for freedom. His execution in 1823 aroused among them a storm of indigna- tion and protest.

The young officers were particularly struck by the sharp contrast between bourgeois Europe and serf Russia when they returned home from their foreign campaigns. In bourgeois Europe industry was growing, trade was developing, the sciences were flourishing, and the population enjoyed a certain measure of freedom. In feudal Russia they saw appalling conditions of economic backwardness, serf slavery, universal ignorance, despotic rule. They were especially disgusted over the wretched lot of the peasants and the urban population. The progressive nobles drew the conclusion that “the attachment of the peasant to the land is the cause of all our internal troubles.”

They described the insufferable life of the soldier, a doomed slave condemned to serve twenty-five years with no hope of ever returning to his family, subjected to harsh drill and ill-usage and living a himgry life. Yet while they had been abroad “both the officers and the lower ranks had seen their fill of foreign ways, had seen that there the troops enjoyed big privileges and great respect” (from the testimony of the Decembrist Zavalishin).

The Uprising of December 14, 1825

Secret Societies of the Revolutionary Nobles

The revolu- tionary nobles organized secret political societies with the aim of changing the order of things in Russia. Many Russian revolu- tionary nobles were at first members of religious-ethical associations, the Masonic lodges, which they used to advance their political purpose.

The first secret political society of revolutionary nobles was founded in 1816. It was called the Society of the True and Loyal Sons of the Fatherland, or the League of Salvation. Colonel Alexander Muravyov was the founder of the society, which had 20 members. Its aim was to emancipate the peasants from serfdom and to establish a constitu- tional monarchy in Russia. Two trends, on© moderate and the other militant, took shape within the society. The militants were headed by Colonel Pavel Ivanovich Pestel (1793-1826).

Two years later the League of Prosperity (1818-1821) was founded. This was not such a narrow conspirative society and had 200 members with local branches. The most revolutionary was the Southern Branch, organized by Colonel Pestel in the Ukraine (in Tulchin). Under the influence of Pestel the League of Prosperity declared itself in favour of a republic.

At a congress of the League held in Moscow in January 1821 sharp differences of opinion were revealed. The moderate members announced the League disbanded,

Pestel did not agree with the decision of the congress and in 1821 foimded a new organization, the Southern Association (1821-1825), among whose prominent meml3ers were Pestel, the leader of the associa- tion, Bestuzhev-Ryumin, Sergei Muravyov* Apostol and Davydov. Pestel was a well-educated man of broad intellect and masterful character. Pushkin wrote of him: “Pestel is a clever man in every sense of the word. He is one of the most original minds I know,”

Pestel had fought gallantly against Napoleon in 1812 and was wounded in the Battle of Borodino.

He had also fought in the Russian army’s foreign campaigns of 1813- 1815. Ever since his youth Pestel had been interested in the social sciences and had studied the works of Voltaire, Diderot, Rousseau and many other European philosophers.

The revolution in the West, his indignation at the system of serf- dom and despotism that reigned in Russia, and his reading of political literature made Pestel an ardent champion of revolution and a re- public.

Pestel drew up a program for

the constitutional reformation of Russia which he named Busshaya Pravda (Russian Truth).

According to Pestel’s plan Russia, as the result of a coup d*dtat, was to become an “indivisible republic” with a strong centralized government. He proposed to kill ofF all the members of the royal family. After the overthrow of the monarchy the dictatorship of a Provisional Supreme Administration was to be proclaimed. There were to be three supreme bodies of authority: a legislative body called the Narodnoye Veche (Popular Assembly); an executive body called Derzhavnaya Duma (State Duma); and a supervising body, the Verkhovny Sohor (Supreme Assembly), which was to control proper execution of the laws. Pestel proposed that the republic be organized along democratic lines: the abolition of the division of society into estates, and the gra/nting of equal rights and equal liberties to all citizens. The right to vote was not to be restricted by property or educational qualifications.

The Russkaya Pravda proclaimed the emancipation of the peas- ants with land, without any compensation to the landlords. All the arable land was to be divided into two sections. Half of the land was to constitute a public fund made up of estates confiscated from the landlords, from which every citizen could receive a plot. This fund was to be under communal ownership and could neither be bought nor sold. The other half was to consist of state land and such privately-owned lands as had not been confiscated by the state. These were designated for ‘"abundance” and could be bought and sold. Thus, Pesters agrarian project seriously undermined landlord ownership without entirely abolishing it.

In 1822 the Nothern Association was founded in St. Petersburg. It existed up to 1825 and among its members were the poet Ryleyev, Pushchin and Yakushkin. The head of the association was Nikita Muravyov (1795-1826), an officer of the guards. In 1812 young Muravyov ran way from home to join the army, and had fought in the foreign campaign. ^Vhile in Paris he witnessed an election campaign. There he also collected a good library of revolutionary books. After his return to Russia he became one of the organizers of the secret Northern Association.

Muravyov studied all the European constitutions and even the constitutions of the 23 states of North America. He laid many of their features at the basis of a constitution which he drafted. According to his draft Russia was to remain a monarchy. The emperor’s power w^as to be limited by a Narodnoye Veche (Popular Assembly) consist- ing of two chambers: an upper chamber called the Supreme Duma, and a lower, the Chamber of People’s Representatives. Only property owners were to have the right to elect and be elected to the Popular Assembly, particularly to the Supreme Duma. Serfdom was to be abolished but the land left in the hands of the landlords. The jjeasants were to receive only a cottage, a plot of land around it, livestock and implements. Muravyov’s final draft granted every serf peasant a plot of two dessiatins upon emancipation.

The draft was criticized by the radical members of the Northern Association.

“The main thing is to settle the question of land ownership;” said Pestel. “It is essential to turn over the land to the peasants: only then will the aim of the revolution be achieved.”

The poet Kondrati Fyodorovich Ryleyev (1795-1826) played an important part in the Northern Association. He too had fought in the war against Napoleon and in the campaign abroad. Army life did not satisfy him, however, and he retired. In 1823 Ryleyev began to publish the magazine North Star in collaboration with Bestuzhev. This magazine and Ryleyev ’s poetry had a great influence on the young nobles. In 1820 Ryleyev won popularity as the .first man who dared to expose Arakcheyev, the tsar’s favourite. Ryleyev joined the Northern Association in 1823 and took an active part in the prepara- tions for the uprising of December 14, 1826. Ryleyev said of himself: “I am not a poet but a citizen.” His poetry was permeated with humani- tarian ideas, with love of freedom apd hatred for slavery. Ryleyev Tms one of the most ardent ohamjHons of a struggle against tsarism. He knew that this might entail defeat, but he was imbued with a passionate faith in the ultimate victory of a righteous cause. These sentiments have been excellently expressed in his poem Confession of Nalivaiko,

Simultaneous with the found- ing of the Northern and South- ern associations there arose in Volhynia (Ukraine) another secret society, called the Association of United Slavs, founded by the Bor- isov brothers, who were army offi- cers, Gorbachevsky and other men.

Its membership consisted of petty officers of humble origin and no- bles who were not in army service.

The Association of United Slavs had no outlined program but was very emphatic about the need of abolishing tsarist rule and serfdom, and stood for the organization of a federal democratic republic of all the Slav countries. T^ereas the members of the Northern and

Southern associations advocated a military revolution organized by a close circle of conspirators, the members of the Association of United Slavs endeavoured also to carry on propaganda among the masses of soldiers. In the summer of 1825 the Association of United Slavs accepted PestePs program and united with the Southern Association.

The Decembrist Uprising

In November 1825 Alexander I died suddenly in Taganrog. Being without issue, his brother, Konstantin, was to have succeeded him. But Konstantin had renounced the throne during Alexander’s lifetime. The throne was to have been ascended by Alexander’s third brother, Nicholas, but he renounced it in favour of Konstantin. In the end it was Nicholas and not Konstantin who became emperor. During the interregnum, while the brothers were engaged in a correspondence, and messengers plied between St. Peters- burg and Warsaw (where Koi^stantin was living at the time) the mem- bers of the Northern Association took advantage of the confusion reigning in ruling military circles and decided to bring troops out onto the street on December 14 (26) — ^the day appointed for taking the oath of allegiance to Nicholas — ^with the object of refusing to take the oath and demanding a constitution.

On the morning of December 14, 1825, the regiments commanded by Decembrists marched to Senate Square. Over three thousand rebel soldiers and sailors formed a square around the monument to Peter I, but they remained inactive. Proper preparations had not been made for the uprising and the leaders were irresplute. At the last minute 8ergei Trubetskoi, who had been appointed dictator, had qualms as to whether the rebels would be able to cope with the situation, and did not come out onto the square. Left without leadership, the revolt lost its organized character. By 12 o’clock Nicholas I had brought up reliable troops and artillery to the square. A crowd of serfs, artisans and poor town-dwellers streamed to Senate Square. The workmen engaged in building the St. Isaac Cathedral threw blocks of wood at the tsarist troops. At the tsar’s orders the cavalry made several charges but the rebel soldiers repulsed them with a hail of bullets. Neither the persuasions of the commanders nor the exhortations of the Metro- ]>olitan could break the revolutionary will of the rebel soldiers. When Miloradovich, the governor-general of St. Petersburg, tried to persuade the rebels to disperse he was mortally wounded by Kakhovsky, one of the more resolute officers. The rebels opened up miming rifle fire at the approaching tsar. But the actions of the Decembrists were not in the nature of an offensive. The tsar was extremely scared and feared that the unrest would spread to the “rabble.” He gave the order to open fire with grapeshot. The artillery fire dispersed the rebel columns. Senate Square, the Neva embankment and the streets were strewn with bodies. In the night holes were made in the ice of the frozen Neva and both the dead and the wounded were let down into them. The leaders of the uprising were aixcsted.

A rising of the Chernigov Regiment in the Ukraine, which began on December 29, 1825 (January 10, 1826) was also defeated. On the eve of the events in St. Petersburg, Pestel was betrayed by an ag^enf provocatei^r and arrested. Sergei Muravyov- Apostol he^ed the uprising. Like the St. Petersburg rebels, those in Chernigov did not dare to take up the offensive.

The more resolute members of the Association of United Slavs proposed sending a rebel regiment to capture Kiev, where sjunpa- thetic army units were stationed. But the moderate leaders of the Decem- brists, headed by Sergei Muravyov- Apostol, adopted a policy of mark- ing time. Instead of attacking Kiev, Sergei Muravyov- Apostol led the troops from Vasilkov to Belaya Tserkov and then to Zhitomir in the expectation that units headed by members of the Southern Association would join them. But his hopes did not materialize. The rebel regiment encountered government troops at the village of Kovalyovka on January 3 (16), 1826, and was fired upon with grapeshot.

The uprising was crushed and Nicholas I took ruthless reprisals against the rebels. On July 13 (25), 1826, five Decembrists— Pestel, Ryleyev, Kakhovsky, Muravyov-Apostol and Bestuzhev-Ryumin — were hanged. Owing to the inexperience of the hangmen the rope broke during the execution and three of the condemned men, Ryleyev, Kakhovsky and Muravyov-Apostol, had to be hanged a second time.

Many of the participants in the uprising were sentenced to penal servi- tude in Siberia. The soldiers who had taken part in the rising were made to run the gauntlet and exiled to the Caucasus. A soldier by the name of Anoichenko, whom the court sentenced to 12,000 strokes of the ramrod, died.

The rising of the Decembrists ended in failure. The revolution. • ary nobles had no contact with the masses and had not counted on a mass rising. They had put their faith in an army conspiracy and feared a movement of the masses. That was the reason why they were defeat- ed. The Decembrist revolt, however, which was the first open armed uprising against tsarism cannot be underestimated. Hitherto Russia had only known sporadic peasant rebellions. The slogans of the Decem- brists inspired Russianrevolutionariesfor decades to come. “The circle of these revolutionaries was a narrow one,” Lenin wi*ote of the Decem- brists. “They were frightfully removed from the people. But their work was not in vain.” *

In appraising this period in the history of the struggle for liber- ation in the 19th century, and the role of the Decembrist uprising in it, Lenin wrote: “This was the epoch from the Decembrists to Herzen. Serf Russia was downtrodden and passive. An insignificant minority of the nobles, impotent, without the support of the people, voiced a protest. But the best men among the nobles helped to awak- en the people.”

The Crisis of Serfdom

The Monarchy of Nicholas I

The Autocracy of Nicholas I (1825–1855)

Emperor Nicholas I, whose ascension to the throne was marked by the brutal suppression of the Decembrist uprising, made the chief task of his reign the con- solidation of the autocracy and serfdom.

“A conceited mediocrity, whose horizon never exceeded that of a company oflRcer, a man who mistook brutality for energy, and obstina- cy in caprice for strength of will, who prized beyond everything the mere show of power, and who, therefore, by the mere show of it, could be got to do anything,” was how Engels described the new Russian emperor. Nicholas* tutor had been a native of Courland named M. von LambsdorfF, who filled him with admiration for Prussian military dis- cipline and a military-police organization of the state. Frederick William III of Prussia, the father of his wife, Charlotte, was another of the tsar’s friends and advisors. Partiality for Prussian militarism was deeply ingrained in the tsarist family, and Nicholas showed the greatest predilection for it. Even as a youth he had been ruthless in drilling the soldiers under his command. Nicholas himself declared that he was happy only in the barracks. He said: “Here the rules are strict, there is complete order, and no conceit or contradictions. Every- thing is in its proper place. No one gives orders until he has first learned to obey them.”

A cruel, slow-witted and conceited man who had never read a book, Nicholas I adhered closely to the system introduced by Arakche- yev. When one of the governors proposed to sentence two smugglers to death, Nicholas wrote the following order: “The guilty are to run the gauntlet of 1,000 men twelve times. Thank God, we have no capital punishment in Hussia, and it is not for me to introduce it.” The guilty men were beaten to death. The people aptly dubbed the tsar Nicholas Palkin (from the word palka, meaniug stick).

Nicholas I continued the struggle his predecessors had waged against revolution. After crushing the Decembrist uprising, the emperor described his political program as follows : “The war against conspirators and the leaders of a conspiracy will be most pitiless and ruthless. I shall be inexorable: it is my duty to teach this lesson to Russia and Euiope.”

He resorted to a system of brutal terror and reinforced the po- lice bureaucratic machine as a means of upholding the autocratic power.

He established the so-called special “Third Section” at the Imperial Chancery for political investigation. At the head of the “Third Section” stood General Benkendorf, chief of the gendarmes, who organized a corps of gendarmes and a secret political police. All Russia was divided into seven gendarme areas, each headed by a general of the gendarmes. The gendarmes, by means of their numerous secret agents, were required to “penetrate” into the state of people’s minds, take notice of those who expressed themselves too freely or disparagingly on religion and authority, and to ferret out new secret societies.

A purge was carried out in the army to “stifle the designs of the enemies of the existing order,” All officers suspected of being connected with the Decembrists were discharged from the army.

Nicholas I strove to make the bureaucratic machinery of gov- ernment still more centralized. He meddled in every trifle and detail of state administration. Russia resembled a vast army barracks, where all independence of initiative was crushed and all criticism silenced by fear. A foreign observer wrote: “Everything here is run like in a military school, except that the pupils do not graduate until their very death.” Under Nicholas I the role of government officials assumed greater importance in all branches of the administration. Half of all the state revenue was spent on the army and the police, and no more than one per cent on education. Bribery, corruption, extortion and red tape, and the bureaucratism of the judges and officials of the times of Nicholas I have become a byword.

At first Nicholas had intended to “bring order” into the system of state institutions. To this end he set up a “Special Secret Committee” on December 6, 1826, with V. P. Kochubey, president of the State Council, at its head.

M. . M. Speransky , who had been recalled from exile by Alexander I, was put in charge of organizing this work. The committee existed for several years and used up a vast quantity of paper, but it accomplished no changes whatsoever.

The Reactionary Policy of Nicholas I In the Field of Education

The fact that many young nobles had been involved in the Decem- brist uprising induced Nicholas to pay particular care to the educational system. School regulations were introduced in 1828 which strictly enforced the principle of social status. The parish elementary schools were designated for the “lowest orders,” the district schools for the children of merchants and craftsmen, and the gymnasia and universities for the nobility. All the activities of the educational institutions were to conform “to the spirit of Orthodoxy, Autocracy and Nationality.” This formula was an ideological expression of the struggle against the progressive and revolutionary ideas of the times. Tuition fees and corporal punishment were restored. The main subjects taught in the gymnasia were religion and Greek and Latin. So-called ‘Wealniye classes” were organized at some of the gymnasia and district schools in which more attention was devoted to mathematics and physics.

After the Decembrist uprising university self-government was reduced to nil. In 1835 a new university statute was published plac- ing the universities under the jurisdiction of the local educational superintendents. A uniform was introduced for students. Theology was made a compulsory subject in all the departments. The best pro- fessors and instructors were dismissed and the number of students decreased. The tuition fee was raised “in order to check the influx of young people born into the lower social orders for whom a higher education is useless, being a needless luxury that displaces them from their sphere without profit to themselves or to the state,” That is how Uvarov, the minister of education, motivated this measure.

The Further Decline of Serfdom

Development of the Home Market and Foreign Trade

In the second quarter of the 19th centuiy feudal economy in Russia continued to decline at a rapid rate. The buying and selling of products nn the market became an essential factor in the life of the country. Lenin pointed out that “the production of grain for sale by the landlord, which developed particularly in the latter stages of the existence of serfdom, was the harbinger of the collapse of the old regime.” *

After the repeal of the corn laws, Le., the import duty on grain in England in 1846, Russian corn exports mounted sharply. By the end of the ’fifties corn constituted 35% of Russia’s total exports, ris- ing in some years to 50%. Russia also exported hemp, flax, rope, bristles, fats, hides, etc. She imported luxury articles as well as commod- ities which she did not produce herself, such as raw cotton, cotton yarn, cotton and leather manufactures, chemical products, tools and machines.

The domestic market being limited by the prevailing serf system Russian manufacturers sought a market for their goods in foreign countries, such as Turkey, Persia and Central Asia.

England who was the leading industrial country in the middle of the 19th century, being called the “workshop of the world,” claimed a monopoly on these markets. In the ’thirties and ’forties Russia and England contended for the markets of the Near East and Central Asia.

In the second half of the ’forties Russia concluded trade agreements with almost all the countries of Europe. The volume of Russia’s for- eign trade increased 275 per cent. But compared to the trade turnover of other countries it was still insignificant, constituting only 3.6% of the total volume of international trade.

Capitalism in Russia developed on the basis of a slow but steady growth of the internal market. The demand for corn, agricultural raw materials and manufactured goods increased. The rise in demand stimulated an increase in domestic trade. This was particularly notice- able in the growth of the local and all-Russian fairs in the first half of the 19th century. The Nizhni Novgorod fair, which had been transferred to that town from the village of Makaryev, played a very important role in the national economy of Russia. A large volume of trade was also done at the Ukrainian fairs.

[pages 156–7 missing]

among them a reform in the administration of state-owned estates waa introduced by Count Kiselyov, a prominent statesman. A special Ministry of State Realties was established as a sort of guardianship over the state peasants; it delved into all aspects of their economic and social life. The peasants elected to office in the villages and the districts were subordinated to a huge staff of officials. Measures were carried out to demarcate land boundaries, to grant allotments to peas- ants with little land and resettle them, to set up mutual aid funds, etc. The tsarist officials continued to oppress and plunder the peasants, whose condition was but little improved by Kiselyov/s reforms.

The Economic Policy of Nicholas I

The development of trade and industry was also fostered by the economic policy of Nicholas I. While striving to preserve the dictatorship of the feudal landlords inviolate, he was compelled at the same time to support and conciliate the merchants and the manufacturers. This policy was dictated by the need to improve the country’s economic and financial position. The government supported commerce and industry by protective and prohibitive tariffs. A tariff law was introduced in 1822 prohibiting the import of 3,110 and the export of 21 items. With slight changes this law remained in force during the reign of Nicholas I as well.

Special educational institutions^ among them an Institute of Tech- nology and a Timber Institute, were founded to meet the demands of industry for trained personnel. From time to time industrial exposi- tions were organized. In 1851 Bussian manufactures were sent for the first time to a world exhibition, held in London.

To stabilize the exchange value of the Russian ruble Finance Minister Kanlcrin carried through a reform restoring the circulation of metal currency in the country. In the first half of the 19lh century a tremendous quantity of paper assignats had been issued, and the paper ruble was barely equal to a quarter of the value of the silver ruble. The government redeemed the depreciated assignats and after withdrawing them from circulation established a new monetary unit, the silver ruble. Now treasury notes wore issued which were exchanged for the silver rubles at face value.

In the interests of industry and trade the government began to develop transport and improve the roads. The first railroad, running from St. Petersburg to Tsarskoye Selo (now the town of Pushkin), was built in 1837. The rails, locomotives and all the equipment were imported from England. The first railroad of economic significance was the line between St. Petersburg and Moscow (now the October Line). It took nine years to build and was opened in 1851. By 1855 the total length of the Russian railroads was 980 versts, which was one-fifth of the French and one-sixth of the German mileage. The government also made an attempt to utilize waterways. In the ^forties freight shipping began to develop on the Volga, and in the following decade a passenger service. By the middle of the century 20 steamships were plying the Volga. The first shipyard for building steam vessels was established in this period.

The Technical and Economic Backwardness of Tsarist Russia

Tsarist Russia increasingly lagged behind the advanced countries of Western Europe in technical and economic development. This backwardness becomes particularly manifest when Russia’s economic development is compared with that of England. The policy pursued by tsarism tended to increase the country’s technical-economic backwardness and retarded its crdtural and sociopolitical develop- ment.

At the end of the 18th century Russia and England were produc- ing an equal amount of pig iron — 8,000,000 poods a year. During the first half of the 19th century Russia doubled output to 16,000,000 poods, while England increased her pig iron production by almost 30 times, turning out 234,000,000 poods in 1859. By the middle ’fifties England was producing 15 times as much pig iron as Russia, and France three times as much. Other branches of Russian industry, as well as commerce and rail and water transport lagged similarly behind Western Europe. The basic Russian industries did not use machinery and employed serf labour. Production technique was extremely backward at the iron works in the Urals.

This constantly increasing backwardness paved the way to the inevitable catastrophe of feudal Russia and primarily to a military catastrophe.

The Mass Movement for National Liberation in the 'Thirties

The Polish Rising of 1830-1831

Throughout the first half of the 19th century a relentless struggle was being waged in Russia {igainst serfdom and tsarist autocracy. Nicholas I strove throughout his reign to suppress the two forces which constituted the greatest danger to him: the peasant uprisings within the country and the bour- geois revolution in Europe.

A new upsurge of the bourgeois revolution in Europe was called forth by the victory of the July revolution of 1830 in France. When Nicholas learned of the July revolution he ordered an army of 250,000 to be prepared for a campaign against France. France was saved from tsarist intervention by an uprising which broke out in Poland.

In the late twenties of the 19th century students of a school for en- signs had organized a secret society in Warsaw. Inspired by the ideas of the French revolution of 1830 and hoping to receive help from it, they rose in rebellion in November 1830. Warsaw was in the hands of the reb- els who had seized the arsenal and armed the population of the city.

General Chlopicki, a man of very moderate views, became dictator. He belonged to a section of the gentry which held high offices of govern- ment in Poland and was opposed to the separation of Poland from Russia. Soon General Chlopicki renounced the title of dictator. Anew national government was formed in which were incorporated represent- atives of the democratic strata of the petty gentry.

A new Diet was convened in December 1830. Its most resolute act was to proclaim the deposition of Nicholas I, who, besides being the emperor of Russia, was, according to the constitution of 1816, king of Poland.

Nicholas sent a large army under General Diebitsch to quell the uprising in Poland, For seven months the Polish army, recruited to a total strength of 100,000 men, successfully beat back the tsarist army. Diebitsch died of the cholera before long, and General Paskevich was sent to Poland with another army.

On August 26, 1831 , Paskevich took Warsaw by storm and brutally punished the rebels. Five thousand families of the gentry were exiled to the Caucasus and their lands confiscated, 260 sti]^nt8 were forcibly enrolled in the army, and 30 Wom^ who had taken j^art in the uprising were put into a nunnery.

At the beginning of 1833 General Paskevich, who had been appoint- ed lord lieutenant in Poland, reported to the tsar: “Fear has already been instilled in the country.”

The Polish rising of 1830-1831 ended in utter defeat. One of the main reasons for this defeat was that the national movement was not combined with a peasant movement. Since the gentry had not wanted to give the peasants land, they failed to win their support .Writing of the Polish uprising of 1830 Engels said: ‘Tn plain language, the uprising of 1830 was neither a national revolution (it excluded three-quarters of Poland) nor a social or political revolution; it changed nothing in the internal position of the people; it was a conservative revolution.”*

The uprising found no support among the masses and was routed. The constitution of 1815 was repealed, the Polish army disbanded, and the University of Warsaw closed down. A strict censorship was intro- duced and all the works of Polish writers were banned. The leaders of the uprising emigrated abroad to escape persecution.

The tfprisings In Byelorussia and the Ukraine* From Poland the uprising spread to Lithuania, Byelorussia and the Ukraine, but nowhere did it assume a mass character.

The oommander of the Bussian armies promulgated an ukase prom^ • ising freedom from serfdom to all who helped the tsarist army fight the insurgents. Peasants believed this promise and began to go over to* the side of the tsarist government. The uprisings were crushed here too. The lands of all the nobles who had taken an active part in*the upris- ings Were confiscated, and the order promising Emancipation to the- peasants was declared illegal.

In the Ukraine the uprising affected only the border area of Kiev and Podolsk gubernias, west of the Dnieper, and only a small number of the Polishized gentry took part in it. The Ukrainian peasants regarded t he uprising as the concern of the Ukrainian-Polish gentry and did not support it. Neither did the big Ukrainian and Russian landlords, whose* economic interests tsarism fully satisfied.

The Peasant Movement in the Ukraine

In the thirties of the 19th century a wide peasant movement developed in the Ukraine, called forth by the growing burden of feudal and colonial oppression. The peasants refused to perform barahchina services and other compulsory duties. The peasants ’struggle against the landlords and the tsarist au- thorities was of a particularly stubborn character in Podolia, where it fvssumed the form of guerilla warfare. An outstanding leader of the peasant movement against the Polish, Ukrainian and Russian land- Jords was XJstim Karmelyuk.

Karmelyuk was the son of a poor serf. He had worked as a house- hold servant in a manor. Given away into the arniy for some minor offence, he deserted, and organized a small peasant detachment, which attacked the landlords and rich homesteaders. In 1814 Karmelyuk waa caught, received 600 strokes of the ramrod and sent to a disciplinary battalion in the Crimea. Together with four soldiers he again ran away and continued the struggle against the landlords. Arrested again, he* was sentenced to death by the tsarist court , the sentence being commut- ed to ten years’ penal servitude. Karmelyuk escaped once more and r esumed the struggle in Podolia, where he headed a peasant detachment a nd destroyed the estates of the landlords.

In the summer of 1827 the landlords again seized Karmelyuk. ^Vhen the peasants, at the order of the landlords, began to bind him,, Karmelyuk turned on them with an impassioned speech: ‘*Why do* you not tie them up (the squires)? It is they who oppress you I” He urged the peasants not to bear the yoke of slavery submissively. Seven hun^ dred and fifty peasants were put on trial together with KarmeljTik. Three hundred of them were flogged and sent to Siberia; 180 were given» to the army.

In 1830 Karmelyuk escaped from penal servitude in Siberia for th^ seventh time and again headed the struggle against the landlords. Kar- melyuk ’s amazing popularity among the peasantry helped him to baffli^ his pursuet^. He could find protection and shelter In any hui. In Sepiember 1835, during a round.up organized by the landlords to catch Karmelyuk, he was shot down by one of the gentry.

However, the wave of peasant rebellions against the landlords raised by Karmelyuk, did not abate for a long time.

The Cholera Riots and Mutinies in the Army

The peasant masses rose against the yoke of serfdom all over Bussia, In 1830-1831 a widespread epidemic of cholera broke out in the country. Starting in the Caucasus, it spread to Moscow and Petersburg. Bumours to the effect that the landlords were poisoning the peasants with a deadly poison led to an outbreak of riots. Crowds of people in the villages and the cities attacked the hospitals and not infrequently killed the doctors.

In the summer of 1831 a rebellion broke out among the military settlers of the Novgorod gubernia. As a consequence of this uprising the military settlements were gradually liquidated.

A widespread rebellion of sailors, soldiers, handicraftsmen and "'other lowly i)eople” took place in Sevastopol in the summer of 1830. The cause of the uprising was the intolerably oppressive conditions of life in the tsarist army and navy. When the plague broke out in the army in the Caucasus and Bessarabia a strict quarantine was established in the city of Sevastopol and in the navy. No person was allowed to leave his house. A famine broke out in the city. In June 1830 the people, driven to despair, sounded the tocsin and rose in iiebellion under the command of a sailor named Timofei Ivanov. The workmen and sailors of the naval crews joined the uprising. The city fell into the hands of the rebels.

Nicholas I put down the Sevastopol ‘"mutineers” with a brutal hand. As many as 1,680 soldiers, sailors and workmen were court-martialled. Every tenth man was sentenced to death; some were sentenced to 3,000 strokes each of the ramrod, which was tantamount to a death sentence j 375 women— the wives and daughters of the sailors and soldiers — were sentenced to penal servitude and exiled.

The peasant movement in the ’thirties spread to 26 gubernias, and was exacerbated by the crop failure, famine and fires which broke out in a number of cities and villages on the Volga. The peasants regarded the landlords and officials as the incendiaries and wreaked their venge- ance on them.

The spread of the mass movement was a sign of ever-growing discon- tent of the masses with serfdom. The chief of the gendarmes, Benken- dorf, reported in alarm to the tsar: "‘The people are bent on one thing — emancipation.” He advised the tsar to make concessions to the peasants. In 1842 an ukase was promulgated which gave the landlords the right to grant their peasants personal freedom but obliged the peasants to ren- der harshchina services or pay the landlord ohrok^ The new law changed nothing in the position of the peasantry, who continued to manifest their discontent and to demand emancipation from seif bondage. The number of outbreaks steadily increased: in 1826-1834 there were 145, while in 1845-54 they rose to 348. The peasants fled in increas- ing numbers, sometimes in whole villages, to the outlying districts.

Conquest of the Caucasus and the Struggle of the Mountaineers for Independence

The Conquest of the Caucasus

After the victorious outcome of the war with Napoleon in 1812 tsarist Russia entered upon the uonquest of the Noi iiiern Caucasus. In 1816 A. P. Yermolov was ap- pointed as chief in command of the Caucasus, where he applied mili- tary and administrative measures of a very drastic nature.

Military fortifications were set up during 1817-1821 throughout the Eastern and Western Caucasus with such awe-inspiring names as ‘‘The Dread,” “The Wicked Trench,” etc.

These served as a base for Yermolov's incessant military expe- ditions against the mountain population who were forced into sub- mission by means of arms and hunger. Yermolov ordered forests to be cut down, and clearings made, avowing that the axe would play no less an important role than the rifle and bayonet in pacifying the region.

Tsairist Russia’s venture at the systematic conquest of the Cauoa- 8US was fraught with the most serious foreign political complications.

Wars with Persia (1826–1828) and Turkey (1827–1829)

Eng. land and France had repeatedly tried to incite Persia and Turkey to hostilities against Russia.

In the summer of 1826 a war broke out between Russia and Per- sia. Persian troops occupied Azerbaijan and marched on Daghestan and Chechen. Paskevich, appointed commander of the Caucasian army in the spring of 1827, defeated the Persians. The war with Per- sia ended in the winter of 1828 with the signing of the Turkmanchai Treaty by which Persia ceded Nakhichevan and Erivan, i.e., a con- siderable part of Armenia, to Russia.

Russia waged a simultaneous war for Caucasian lands against Turkey (1827-1829), Nicholas I strove not only to consolidate Russia’s hold over Transcaucasia but also to seize Constantinople and the straits. In 1827 the Russian fleet defeated the Turkish squadron at Navarino Bay (off the Morea Peninsula). In 1828 tsarist troops^ with Constantinople as their objective, occupied Moldavia and Walachia, crossed the Balkans and seized Adrianople. Here, in 1829 was signed a peace treaty which gave Russia the entire Caucasian seaboard, with the exception of Batum. Turkey was forced to recognize all tsarist conquests in Transcaucasia.

Having thus won a free hand, Russian tsarism decided to com* plete the subjugation of the Caucasus. Paskevich, the commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, received orders from Nicholas I to ‘Opacify the mountaineer peoples for all time or exterminate those who would not submit.”

The Mountaineers of the Caucasus in Their Struggle for Independence

Eussian tsarism in the Northern Caucasus found itself confronted with a small and scattered population.

The mass of the Chechen pop- ulation consisted of independ- ent, free villagers— the uzdena, besides whom there were also slaves. The landless and impover- ished uzdens (peasants) and slaves were exploited by the tri- bal aristocracy and the clergy who had seized the communal lands and acquired large herds of sheep. Conflicts frequently arose among the population over land lots and pasturages. All disputes

and litigation were settled by ^ ,

common law-the adat. „ ^ Imeretia.

Daghestan, l 3 dng adjacent to by K. p: Begrov

North Caucasus, was also divided

into* petty semi-feudal and feudal domains, the largest of which were located on the seaboard. The dominant element were the khans and

begs (princes), upon whom the uzdens were dependent. The begs also owned slaves. With the conquest of the Caucasus by tsarism the khans and begs entered the Eussian service, and under the protection of the tsarist army, usurped the lands of the tribal communities and reduced the uzdens to bondage. The latter were compelled to render feudal services to their lords and supply them with various products. The tsarist generals, supported by the begs and the khans, ruthlessly exploited and exterminated the mountain people,

EoUsed by these persecutions, the mountaineers in the late twenties of the 19th century, rose in a struggle for their independ^ euce against Eussian tsarism and its myrmidons— the khans and begs.

Colonial oppression by tsarism led to a number of spontaneous, uprisings among the mountaineers*

In 1818 most of the villages of Daghestan rose in rebellion. Numerous guerilla detachments in Chechen were led by Bey-Bulat who succeeded in mustering a large force and proclaimed a holy war against Russian tsarism. In 1826 the rebel detachments of Bey-Bulat were defeated, and he himself was killed by Russian agents.

At the end of the ’twenties the freedom-loving mountaineers began to unite for a struggle for their independence. This movement Was led until 1832 by an imam (a Mohammedan priest) Kazi-Mullah, who preached a religious doctrine known as muridism. Until the con- quest of the Caucasus by the Russians, muridism had been a kind of religious order or fraternity in Islam, which widely preached the doctrine of "moral perfection and renunciation of earthly blessings.” At the end of the ’twenties muridism assumed a political character, its chief tenet now being proclaimed the holy war. Under this banner Kazi-Mullah mustered thousands of murids whom he led against the detachments of the tsarist army and the local khans and begs in the service of the Russian generals. His disciple and follower was Shamyl.

The Struggle of the Mountaineers tor Independence under the Leadership of Shamyl (1834–1859)

After Bey-Bulat was killed Shamyl became leader of the mountaineers in their struggle for in- dependence. Shamyl was born in the family of a well-to-do hillman. While still a boy, Shamyl made a serious study of the works of Moham- medan writers. His teacher and friend— fmaw Kazi-Mullah exercised a great influence over him. After the latter’s death the Daghestan murids chose Shamyl in 1834 as their secular and spiritual ruler— the irtvam and leader of the holy war.

Shamyl was an outstanding political leader and brave captain. His secretary describes him in the following words: "Shamyl was a learned, pious, and shrewd man, courageous, resolute and at the same time unrivalled as a horseman, marksman, swimmer and runner. He Well knew his people and his native Daghestan when still under the tutelage of Kazi-Mullah, There was not a design which he was not capable of putting into execution.”

Shamyl was a fine orator. It was said that his speeches always produced the effect he meant them to have. But above all Shamyl revealed himself as a talented organizer of the moimtaineers’ state and military leader in the struggle against tsarist colonizers.

Shamyl intrenched himself in his military residence of Akhulgo, in Daghestan, where Russian and Polish fugitive soldiers had built him a house in the European style. A large military force was sent out against him and after a siege of three months Shamyl lost almost all his best men, while he himself made good his escape by a miracle of fortitude and perilous adventures.

In August 1839 Shamyl withdrew into the mountain fastnesses of Chechen. In the beginning of the •forties, Shamyl, supported by the mass movement of the mountaineers of Chechen and Daghestan, won a number of important victories over the Russian troops. Shamyl*& fame resounded throughout the Caucasus. Nicholas I appointed a new commander of the troops in the Caucasus,* M. S. Vorontsov, of whom he demanded that he **rout, if possible, the bands of Shamyl, penetrate into the heart of his domains and intrench there.”

Vorontsov’s military expedition at the head of a large army, suffered defeat at the hands of Shamyl, and Vorontsov himself barely escaped being taken prisoner.

Realizing that the scattered tribes of mountaineers could not attain victory unless they were united, Shamyl applied himself to this task by setting up an independent state on the territory which was in their hands. The state was headed by Shamyl himself, who wielded full political and military power.

Each region was placed in the care of Shamyl’s lieutenants, called naiha^ and a civil and ecclesiastical authority was set up in every re^ gion. The power of the begs and khans was everywhere dissolved.

Shamyl ordered the naiba to form infantry and cavalry units. All who distinguished themselves received awards of arms, horses and money, as well as medals and stripes on their turbans. Stripes were also sewn on for cowardice in battle— bits of felt on the back or on the right arm. These marks of disgrace were removed as soon as the wearer had vindicated his reputation by an act of bravery. !

Shamyl formed a small artillery, and even organized the castinjj of guns. The moxmtaineers called them the "thousand warriors.” The guns were made from iron scrap by a blacksmith named Jabrail, and proved on test to pass muster, though the first one had exploded. The mountaineers also used grenades which they had captured from the Russian soldiers. Shamyl organized the production of gunpowder^ but shared it out only to the mwida and the most practised shots* Skilled workmen — fugitive Russian soldiers — acted as instructors! and helped Shamyl to organize the production of arms. For the pur- pose of conducting war, Shamyl put the finances in order, created a single state treasury, organized the proper collection of taxes, encour-r aged trade, granted various privileges to the merchants and stimu- lated handicraft. The native blacksmiths, gunmakers, carpenters and other handicraftsmen went through a course of training under Russian and Polish soldiers who had deserted and come over to Shamyl. Sha- myl freed a considerable part of the slaves. The nucleus of the new state Were the murida who, in the capacity of spiritual and political advisers, directed all the affairs of the country. Shamyl ’s activities were of a democratic, progressive nature, being directed at this peripd against both tsarism and the local feudal lords.

But after the successes achieved during 1840-1 845 Shamyl ’s state experienced great internal difficulties. The country was economically at a Very low ebb. Shamyrs lieutenants, the naihs, imposed heavy taxes on the population. The mountain peas- antry, particularly in Chechen, began to murmur. The ranks of Shamyrs army began to thin. The naihs and the murids, who had grown rich, ever more frequently went over to the tsarist troops. In combating Shamyl the Rus- sian generals had now changed their tactics. Instead of attacking the refrac- tory mountain villages, they now began to cut down the woods, lay out convenient roads for l^he troops, build forts and invest the villages, breaking the mountaineers’ resistance by star- vation.

In 1859 Shamyl, with a small detach- ment of murids and one gun, put up a brave resistance against the Russians in his last stronghold— the fortress of Gunib iu Daghestan.

On August 25, 1859, the commander-in-chief of the Caucasian army sent in his report: "‘Gunib has fallen, Shamyl taken captive.*^ The captive Shamyl was sent to Petersbuig and then seitled in Ka- luga. Shamyl died at Medina during a pilgrimage on which he set out a year before with the permission of the tsarist government.

The Struggle of the Mountaineers of Western Caucasus for Their Independence

After the defeat of Shamyl, tsarism sent mili- tary forces to subdue the Western Caucasus, the Kuban and the Black Sea coast from Anapa to SuldiUm. The struggle in the Western Cau- casus against Russian tsarism was headed by Shamyl’s assistant— Mohammed-Emmin. After Shamyl had been taken prisoner, tsarism threw its troops against Mohammed-Emmin who was compelled to- surrender.

In November 1859 most of the villages of Western Caucasus were burnt down and pillaged. The Caucasian tribes were dispossessed of the best lands.

In the beginning of the ’sixties the warlike tribes of the North- western Caucasus were everywhere driven out of their strongholds.

The local uTban population was driven out of the Northwestern Caucasus. From 1858 to 1864 about 400,000 mountaineers were thus evacuated. The mountaineers sold their cattle and belongings for a apng and migrated to Turkey, As their boats pulled out of their native shores the mountaineers fired their rifles in a farewell salute.

The tsarist government resettled Russian peasants and Gossaoks, in the Northern Caucasus, allotting to them the lands that had belongfsd to the mountaineers. “The policy of tsarism, the policy of the land* lords and the bourgeoisie,” wrote J. V, Stalin, ‘Vas to settle these parts with the greatest possible number of kulaks from among the Russian peasants and the Cossacks, and to make the latter a reliable basis for Great-Power ambitions.”

The Peoples of Central Asia and the Advance of Tsarism in Kazakhstan and Central Asia

Central Asiatic Khanates

The formation of the three Central Asiatic khanates of Bokhara, Khiva and Kokand, at the end of the 18th century, was an important step towards the political unification of the numerous warring feudal independencies of Central Asia. The ^ree khanates ruled over the Uzbeks, Tajiks, Kirghiz and a section of the Turkomans. A considerable part of Turkmenia was considered to be under the sovereignty of Persia, The nomad economy of the Turkomans lacked a stable fodder base and adequate water supply. The Turkomans were frequently driven by dire poverty to make raids on the settlements of Bokhara, Afghanistan and Persia. The tribal aristocracy, who provided themselves with the best lands and irriga- tion canals, exploited the population of Turkmenia.

The greater part of present-day Tajikistan had also, at the begin- ning of the 19th century, retained its formal independence and was administered by local rulers.

The khanates of Central Asia waged constant war with the object of conquering the neighbouring lands. The greatest expansion was achieved by the Kokand khanate, which, at the beginning of the 19th century had conquered Tashkent, an important trading and strategic centre in Central Asia. The possession of Tashkent enabled Kokand to reduce the surrounding steppe regions of Kazakhstan and Kirghi- zia.

In order to consolidate their power, the khans of Kokand studded the south 'Kazakh districts and < Kirghizia with fortresses, built mosques and madrasaa (Mussulman universities), and implanted Mussul- man education. Trading and -urban settlements of handicraftsmen grew up around the fortresses: Ak-Mechet, Auliye-Ata, Pishpek and others. In the thirties of the 19th century the Kokand khanate was the largest state in Central Asia, stretching from the foothills of the Pamir to the Lower Syr Darya and Western China. By subjecting the neighbouring lands of the Kazakhs, Turkomans and Karakalpaki, the Khiva khanate too considerably extended its frontiers in the beginning of the 19th century. The Khiva feudal lords adroitly fomented inter-tribal feuds among the Turkomans, The bor- ders of the Bokhara khanate, on the contrary, contracted in the first decade of the 19lh century, as a result of the aggrandizement of the Kokand and Khiva khanates.

Turkestan, which had been under the protection of Bokhara, and many fortresses passed over to Kokand. Some Turkoman domains passed over to Khiva. In spite of its political weakness, Bokhara still continued to play a prominent economic role in the middle of the 19th century. The mass of the handicraftsmen lived in Bokhara, and their cotton jand silk wares competed successfully with all other cities.

The class structure and administration of the various khanates Were similar. They were headed by the Uzbek feudal lords and the higher Mussulman clergy. The latter did not cult ivate^ their lands but leased them out to peasants on share-cropping terms. The main pro- ducers were the peasants who engaged in agriculture and cattle rais- ing. Water supply, without which land in Central Asia is valueless, played an exceptional role in the economy. If any one irrigated for- mer "dead” lands, these lands became his property.

The Kazakhs In the Second Quarter of the 19th Century

The territory of modern Kazakhstan was inhabited in the first half of the 19th century by three states, known as the Small, Medium and Great Hordes.

The Small and Medium Hordes had become subjects of Bussia in the first half of the 18th century, and the colonization of this region began in the twenties of the 19th century. Tsarism founded a number of forts in the Kazakh steppes as a means of keeping the Kazakhs in subordination, and commencing its conquest of the states of Central Asia.

In 1835-1837 V.A. Perovsky, governor-general of Orenburg, started the construction of a line of forts between Orsk and Troitsk, alienat- ing for this purpose an area of 10,000 sq. km. rich in pastures, rivers and forests. The Kazakhs were pushed out to poorer lands, and the right to graze in the districts of the fort area was restricted. This creat- ed bitter feeling among the Kazakhs, who began to prepare for an armed struggle against the tsarist colonizers.

To reduce the resistance of the Kazakh people, tsarism had, daring the reign of Paul I, earned out of the Small Horde the pastoral lands of Bukei Khan and founded a separate Bukei khanate, subor- dinate to tsarist Bussia. Part of the Caspian coast where the pastoral lands of the Kazakhs of the Bukei khanate were located, were pro- claimed the property of Bussian landlords. The latter exacted exorbitant rents from the Kazakhs for the use of the pasture lands. The increased burden of taxation and exploitation by the elders who were appointed by the khan and supported by tsarism, and the usurpation of lands by the khans and the sultans, led to a widespread popular uprising that began in 1836. Its leaders were the elders — Batyr Isatai Taimanov and the minstrel {akyn) Makhambet Utemisov^ They besieged the headquarters of the khan, burnt much property belonging to the sultans, and turned over their pastoral lands to the needy Kazakhs. The uprising bore the character of a peasant war directed simultaneously against tsarism and its colonial policy. It was suppressed by the joint efforts of the khans, sultans and the tsar- ist authorities.

A protracted struggle of the Kazakh people broke out at this time against tsarism in the Medium Horde. The construction of new forts, the seizure of lands for Russian Cossack settlements, curtailment of pasture lands and the introduction of a new system of administration in 1822, aroused universal discontent among the Kazakhs. The Kaz- akh people, headed by sultan Kenesari Kasymov and his intrepid Captain Naurazbey, rose in defence of their independence. Kenesari was elected khan by all the Kazakh Hordes, and he aspired to unite the Kazakhs and create an independent Kazakh khanate. As a result of the national movement of the Kazakh people for liberation, tsarism was compelled to mitigate the system of administration.

In 1845 Russian tsarism built new fortifications in the heart of the Kazakh steppes. Kenesari retreated to the eastern part of the steppes, where he continued his struggle against the tsarist troops ad- vancing toward the River Hi. Shortly afterwards, Kenesari ’s detach- ment was surrounded in one of the passes of the Ala-Tau by Kirghiz mana'pa (feudal lords) who had formed a league with Kokand and tsarism against the Kazakh rebels. Kenesari and Naurazbey were taken prisoners and tortured to death. The names of these heroes and indomitable champions of Kazakh independence still live in the mem- ory of the Kazakh people.

Preparations for the Conquest of Central Asia

While en- gaged in the struggle against Kenesari Kasymov, Russian tsarism was also making preparations for the conquest of the Central Asiatic khanates. Its object was to use the Kazakh steppes as a base from which to embark on the conquest of Central Asia, the possession of which as a colony of Russia had long been tsarism’s cherished plan.

Governor-general Perovsky formed a small army, reinforced with Cossack, Bashkirian and Kazakh cavalry, with which he set out from Orenburg in the autumn of 1839 on a campaign against EJhiiva. Pifteen thousand camels accompanied the detachment through the desert steppes carrying provisions and water for the expedition. However^ snow blizzaids and severe frosts killed the camels and the horses, and Perovsky, after suffering heavy losses was compelled to retreat. After this failure Perovsky began new preparations for an expedition by way of the steppes of Kirghizia. The country was reconnoitred for roads, wells were sunk, and fortifications built. Fort Aralsk was put up on the River Syr Darya. It was soon to become the centre of a large Russian agricultural colony on the shores of the Aral Sea, on which steamboat flotilla was built. Regular communication was estab- lished between Orenburg and the Aral Sea.

In the spring of 1853 Perovsky moved upstream with a large force, and crossed into the domains of the khan of Kokand. He be- sieged the Kokand fortress of Ak-Mechet, killed off all its defenders and turned it into a Russian fortress called Perovsk. Perovsky built five new forts on the Syr Darya, the so-called Syr Darya Line. The tsarist troops seized the cities of Pishpek, Tokmak and others. These cities (in “the Chuisk Valley of Kirghizia) belonged to the khanate of Kokand, and Were inliabited by Kirghiz. However, Kirghizia, a moun- tainous land difficult of access, was not completely subjugated by tsarist Russia until the ’seventies.

Kazaklistan, too, was being methodically reduced. In 1854 the fort of Vernoye, later known as the city of Verny (now Alma-Ata)* was founded.

In 1854 Perovsky set out against Khiva from his base on the Syr Darya, but the khan of Khiva sent his envoys to the Russian camp and concluded a treaty, recognizing the supremacy of Russia and grant- ing her privileges in the trade with Khiva.

Thus, by the end of the ’fifties a continuous line of fortifications had been erected from Syr Darya to Semipalatinsk. The Kazakh and Kirghiz steppes fell completely under the sway of tsarism.

The complete subjection of the Central Asiatic khanates of Khiva, Kokand and Bokhara was iiow only a question of time.

Tsarism—The Gendarme of Europe

The Foreign Policy of Nicholas I

The Eastern Question

The rebellion of the Dacembrists, which Nicholas I attributed chiefly to the influence of the revolutions in Europe, induced the tsar from the very first days of his reign to reject the cautious, ambiguous and dilatory policy of Alexander I and to proclaim “new principles” of the imperial foreign policy baaed on: ener- gy, resolution, drive* The aims of Nicholas I’s foreign policy were essentially the same as those of Alexander I, but his immediate object was to establish the supremacy of tsarist Bussia in the Near East. Russia, being the leading power in the Black Sea, was interested in the unrestricted use of the straits which were the sole gates to the Black Sea, and the establishment in them of such a regime as would not allow states hostile to Russia to use them for attacking Russian domains in the Black Sea region. But Russia had powerful opponents in the Near East: England, Prance and Austria, Austria’s aim was to secure con- trol of shipping on the Danube and obtain an economic foothold in the northwestern part of the Balkan Peninsula (in the Turkish provinces of Moldavia and Walachia). Prance strove to wrest Egypt from Turkey ^ while England ’s aim was to reduce Turkey to a semi-colony and use her as a barrier against Russian advance to the Mediterranean and the East. England and Prance therefore strove to gain control over the straits.

Thus there arose in the Near East a bloc of rival powers' (England^ Prance and Austria), all supporting Turkey against Russia, Russia’s increasing economic and technical backwardness enabled a more ad- vanced country like England to steadily crowd its feudal rival out of the markets. In the ’twenties England succeeded in destroying Russia ’s trade monopoly in the northern part of the Pacific. While Russia was waging war against Turkey and Persia for possession of Transcaucasia, England was busy undermining Russia’s position. England was partic- ularly jealous of Russia’s claims in Asia. The Near and Middle East thus became the major issues of international antagonisms and the source of fierce political contention between tsarist Russia and her rivals.

In the early years of his reign Nicholas I tried to consolidate his influence in the ^Ikan Peninsula by espousing the cause of Greek inde- pendence against Turkey.

Tsarism, however, was frustrated by England who by aid of her ties with the Greek bourgeoisie and loans t© the Greek government snatched Greece out from imder Russian influence.

During the wars with Persia (1826-1828) and Turkey (1827-1829), tsarist Russia regained its influence in the Near East.

The treaties of Turkinanchai and Adrianople were the culmination of Nicholas I’s foreign policy. The treaty concluded in 1828 at Turk- manchai between Russia and Persia, enabled Russia to consolidate her position on the Caspian Sea.

Pearing the increase of Russian influence in Persia and throughout the Near East, England did her best to frustrate it. Within a year an uprising* which was actively supported by the English residents in Teheran, broke out against Russia during which almost the entire Russian mission, including the ambassador and poet, A. S. Griboye- dov, were killed.

The Treaty of Adrianople concluded with Turkey in 1829 was favouf able* to Russia. The Bosporus and the Dardanelles were proclaimed free to Russian and foreign mercantile marine. The right of Russian subjects to trade freely within the Ottoman empire (Turkey) was recognize* Greece, Serbia, Moldavia and Walachia were grant^ extensive autonomous rights. As a matter of fact the Danubian principalities were occupied by the Russian army. The European powers, particularly England, could not reconcile themselves to the idea of Russian suprem- acy in Turkey.

Turkey’s position became more complicated when the Pasha of Egypt, Mehemet Ali, with the support of France, began a war with^ her. The sultan of Turkey appealed for assistance to Nicholas I.

A Russian squadron under Admiral Lazarev left Sevastopol foi* the shores of Turkey. In February 1833 Russian warships entered the- Bosporus.

Alarmed by this new development, England and France hastenedj to restore peace between the recent enemies— the Turkish sultan an<f the Egyptian ^asha— and demanded the withdrawal of the Russian squadron from Turkish waters.

In her endeavours to secure the annulment of the treaties which gave Russia considerable advantages in the Balkans, England convened a conference of the interested powers in London in the summer of 1840; at which an agreement was signed on the question of Turkey between England, Austria, Prussia and Russia. The London Convention took Turkey under the ‘‘collective protection” of the four signatory powers. Tsarist Russia was compelled to abandon her dominant position in Turkey.

The growing revolutionary movement in Europe again enhanced tsarism’s leading role in international politics. All the governments ol Europe sought help and protection against revolution from the “gen- darme of Europe”—Nicholas I.

In the autumn of 1833 Adstria, Russia and Prussia concluded an alliance of mutual aid in the event of foreign aggression or of revolu- tion. This virtually signified a revival of the “Holy Alliance” by three feudal mpnarchs of Europe against the bourgeois revolution. When an armed uprising of Polish revolutionaries broke out in Cracow in 184fi, Austria and Russia sent troops to Cracow and crushed the rebellion. But in February 1848 a revolution which began in France quickly assumed a widespread European character.

The Revolution of 1848 in Europe and Russian Intervention in Hungary

The Leaders of the World Proletariat

Karl Marx and Frederlcft fingel8« The first independent action to be undertaken by the work- ing class of Europe (the uprisings of the weavers of Lyons, Prance, in 1831 and 1834, and Chartism in England in the first half of tho 19th century) ended in failure* The first civil war between tho working class and the bourgeoisie in the summer of 1848 in Paris likewise ended in the defeat of the proletariat. The working class at this period was eveiywhere still young, and badly organized. In Russia both the working class movement and capitalist industry were in their infancy. However, the birth of a nev^ social class — the proletariat — ushered in a new and important epoch in human history. The leaders of the proletariat in the middle of the 19fch century were Karl Marx iind Frederick Engels.

Marx was born on May 5, 1818 in Germany, in the town of Treves in the province of the Rhine. Engels was born on November 28, 1820, inthetownof Barmen, in the same province. The two great proletarian revolutionaries first met in 1844, since when, for almost 40 years, they worked hand in hand for the liberation of the workers and toilers of the whole world.

Marx and Engels, the great teachers of the working class, discovered the world-historical role of the proletariat as the creator of Communist ^society. In 1847 Marx and Engels organized the first Communist Party— The Communist Leajue, Under their leadership proletarian parties were organized in various countries which directed the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat. In 1847-1848 Marx and Engels drafted the program of the international party of the proletariat— TAs Manifesto of the Gommxmist Party. The basic idea underlying the manifesto of scientific Communism consists in the inevitability of the overthrow of the bourgeoisie and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat for a struggle for the abolition of classes and for the building up of a classless, Communist society. The Manifesto concludes with the appeal; ^‘Working men of all countries, unite!”

The Revolution of 1848 and Nicholas I

News of the revolution in Paris in February 1848 reached Nicholas I dm-ing a court ball. Fum- ing with rage at these tidings, the gendarme of Europe turned to his courtiers and said: ‘^Saddle your horses, gentlemen; there is a revolution in Paris.”

Nicholas I helped the Austrian reaction crush ihe revolution of 1848 in Vienna. He gave Austria 6 million rubles to combat the nation- al liberation movement in Italy. Nicholas I opposed the unification of disunited Germany, which was demanded by the progressive German bourgeoisie.

After the defeat of the Paris workers in June 1848 there remained in Europe a single revolutionary centre upon which all the revolution- ary forces of Europe, particularly of Poland, based their hopes. This was revolutionary Hungary which had broken away from Austria. Nicholas I decided to stifle this last bulwark of the European bouigem^ revolution as well. The existence of an independent democratic Hup.- jgary constituted a threat to the interests of tsarism on the 3)anube^i;td in the Balkans, and was moreover a potential source of revolution in Eastern Europe.

The revolution in Hungary had the character of a national liberation movement. Liberated Hungary was proclaimed an independent state* The leader of the Hungarian people’s struggle was Lajos Kossuth, whom Marx described as a “truly revolutionary character,” who had launched a desperate struggle against the whole of reactionary Europe for the salvation of his people. Nicholas 1 sent Paskevich, the suppressor of Poland and the Caucasus, against little Hungary with an army of 140,0[)0. In his instructions to Paskevich, Nicholas wrote: “Show no mercy to the scoundrels.” Surrounded by Austrian and Russian troops t he Hungarian army of 23,000 was compelled to surrender (1849).

The defeat of Hungary signified the triumph of feudal-monarchio, military reaction in Europe. It also signified that the Russian tsar had become the decisive factor in European politics. With his help counter- revolution was victorious in Prussia, Austria and France.

Marx and Engels, who had returned to Germany during the revo- lution of 1848, indefatigably roused all the revolutionary and democrat- ic forces of Europe against Russian tsarism, since the European revo- lution could not succeed unless the feudal monarchy of Russia was destroyed. The defeat of Hungary by tsarist Russia and suppression of the last hearth of bourgeois-democratic revolution in Europe 9 Marx and Engels regarded as an event no less decisive for Eastern and Central Europe (i.e., for Russia, Poland, Austria, Italy (and Germany), than Were the June battles in Paris for the West.

The Crimean War

The International Situation on the Eve of the War

The triumph of European reaction, strengthening as it did the role of tsarism in international politics, impelled Nicholas I to avail himself of this favourable opportunity for restoring .his lost positions in the Near East.

Capitalist England, bent at all costs on gaining a strong footing in the Near and Middle East, could not suffer Russian enhancement in the Balkans, or agree to her control of the Dardanelles and the Bosporus, those gateways to the eastern markets. The Bosporus and the Dardan- elles, as Marx said, were ^‘military positions of first rank,” In the hands of Russia they would have constituted a threat to England ’s sea suprem- acy.

The French bourgeoisie, which had long been a rival of Russia in Constantinople, was also afraid of Russian influence in the Near East. In the middle of the 19th century Turkey had become increasingly de-" pendent upon French loans and Frenoh military aid. France xha^ it known that in the event of Moldavia and Walachia being invaded by the Russian troops, she was prepared to go to war.

Nicholas I counted on the support of his old allies, the Austrian emperor and the Prussian king, whom he had rendered considerable assistance in their struggle against the revolution of 1848-1849. But Austria was resolved not to allow Russia to occupy the Danubian principalities, since that would jeopardize her own trade on the Danube.

Prussia, resentful of tsarist opposition to the unification of Ger- many, likewise expressed no desire to help tsarism. The Russian tsar had still another opponent— European democracy — which regarded Russian tsarism as an international gendarme, ard the main obstacle on the path of European progress.

Such was the international situation on the eve of the Crimean War* The Progress and Character of the Crimean War (1853'1856)* The question of the “Holy Places” in Palestine (Palestine belonged to Turkey) served as a pretext for a new military conflict between Russia and Turkey. Early in 1853 an Extraordinary Embassy was sent from St. Petersburg to Constantinople which demanded that the sultan grant the Orthodox church the right to the keys of the Bethlehem Temple in Palestine, which according to the treaty between Turkey and France, had formerly been the prerogative of the Catholics. The sultan, count- ing on the support of France and Great Britain, rejected Russia’s ul- timatum. Diplomatic relations between Russia and Turkey were bro- ken off. In June 1853 a Russian army of 80,000 men entered Moldavia and Walachia.

Representatives of the great powers called a conference in Vienna to settle the “eastern crisis.” Turkey, backed by Great Britain, re- fused to enter into negotiations unless the Russian troops were first with- drawn from the Danubian principalities. This demand not being conced- ed to, the ' Turkish army began its offensive on the Danube, on the frontiers of Asia and the Caucasian coast.

The first big engagement took place off the southern shores of the Black Sea, at Sinope. In November 1853 Admiral Nakhimov ’s squadron attacked and destroyed a Turkish squadron caught unawares in the har- bour. Turkish admirals and officers were made prisoners. The battle of Sinope displayed the high naval skill of Admiral Nakhimov. The de- struction of the Turkish fleet precipitated Britain’s and France’s inter- vention in the conflict. The combined British and French fleets enlered[ the Black Sea with the object of preventing further operations by the Russian fleet. Prussia and Austria refused Russia their support. Tsar- ist Russia was left to fight alone against Turkey, Great Britain and France, as well as Sardinia who had joined them. At the 'demand of Austria, tsarism was obliged to withdraw from the Danubian princi- palities in the sunimer of 1864. The allied fleet bombarded Odessa on April 1, 1864, and in the summer they seized the Aland Islands, opened fire on the Solovetsk Monas- tery in theWhite Sea and eVen bombarded Petropavlovsk in Kamchat- ka. But all these operations were merely in the nature of military dem- onstrations. The English bourgeoisie, fearing the growth of European revolution in the event of “Europe’s gendarme” being done away with, did not desire the complete defeat of tsarism. The strategic plans of Great Britain and France were therefore not calculated to be too far- reaching. The allies tried to localize the conflict, and, indeed, the East- ern War was soon concentrated, for the most part, on the Crimean front. By its very nature the Eastern, or Crimean, War waged by tsarism was an unjust war, a war of conquest. No less unjust and predatory was it on the part of Great Britain and France. The CrimeaiFWar demonstrat- ed once more to all the world the bravery of the Russian soldier, the heroism and self-sacrifice of the Russian people.

The Defence of Sevastopol

Sevastopol, a sea fortress and naval base, Russia’s bulwark on the Black Sea, was the immediate object of the allies’ attack. At the beginning of September 1864 the Anglo- French fleet landed troops at Eupatoria in order to take Sevastopol from the north. Not meeting any resistance, the British, French and Turkish army of 62,000 moved along the coast to Sevastopol. The Rus- sian troops tried to bar the way of the allied army, and engaged it in battle at the River Alma. The Russians, who had less than half the enemy’s strength in men and artillery, made such fierce onslaughts and bayonet charges that the British, though the field was theirs, suf- fered very heavy losses. “Another victory like that and England will have no army,” one of the British commanders was compelled to admit. After the defeat at the Alma, the road to Sevastopol lay open. But the further advance of the Anglo-French troops was checked by an outbreak of cholera in the army.

The defenders of Sevastopol utilized this time to fortify the city.

The Black Sea sailing fleet could not engage the allied steam fleet, and it was therefore sunk at the mouth of Sevastopol harbour, thus blocking the way to the allied fleet. The garrison of Sevastopol was reinforced by the naval crews and gunners of the Black Sea fleet.

The Russian Defence Chief, Admiral Kornilov, and his impiediate assistants, Vice-Admiral Nakhimov and Rear-Admiral Istomin, displayed extraordinary energy and bravery during the defence of Sevastopol. Thanks to the initiative and inventiveness of the talented engineer Todleben, Sevastopol was transformed into a formidable for- tress. The entire population came out to defend the city. In two weeks Sevastopol was belt^ by menacing bastions and redoubts. All the popu- lation of the fortress was mobilized for the work. Armed with picks and spades, thousands of people dug trenches day and night, and carried sand and earth in saclm and baskets mider fire, in oMer to reinforce the weaker spots. On arriving at Sevastopol, the enemy army, which had counted on swiftly taking the fortress by storm was confronted by a powerful line of defence works. Doubting' the feasibility of taking it by storm, the Anglo-French troops skirted Sevastopol from the north and broke camp in the southeast, occupying Balaklava and the Fedyu- khin Heights. Instead of storming the positions they were compelled to settle down to a long siege.

Thus began the eleven months* heroic defence of Sevastopol. The army in the field was meanwhile repulsing the attacks of the Anglo- French troops in battles at Balaklava, Inkerman and the River Cher- naya. In February 1855 Nicholas I died. The Crimean army was in a very serious position. In the spring of 1855 the new commander of the French army decided to cut off the food supplies for the Russian army coming from the Azov Sea. With this in view the allied squadron en- tered the Azov Sea and devastated the coast.

The brave soldiers and sailors meanwhile defended Sevastopol heroically. Malakhov Kurgan was the key position of the fortress. The defenders of Sevastopol repelled several assaults of the enemy, but the conditions for the defence of the fortress were very hard. The enemy bombarded the city from land and sea with 1 ,800 guns. Under a deadly rain of bombs, grapeshot, rockets and shells the garrison answered ener- getically and with telling effect, although they had only 118 guns. The ruined positions were immediately restored. The men and officers dis- played amazing fearlessness and stubborn loyalty. Kornilov died the death of the brave during those days.

The bombardment failing to achieve its aims, the enemy directed all their efforts to creating new lines of offensive positions which were to belt Sevastopol and grip it in an iron ring.

, Bad weather set in with the winter. Heavy rains had turned the ground into a mire. The Russian soldiers in their light uniforms suf- fered greatly from cold. There was a shortage of ammunition, and food supplies and fodder arrived at irregular intervals. The wounded died for lack of medical aid and medicines. Despite all these hardships the spirit of the defenders did not fall, and they continued manfully to resist their assailants. The streets of the city were covered with barri- cades aijd many of the houses had been turned into strongholds. The sol- diers undertook daring night attacks and audacious sorties. At night hundreds of volunteers crept out of the fortress, occupied all the depres- sions, built shelters and subjected the enemy to a deadly fire. Fierce bayonet fights often took place outside the fortress line. Sailor Koshka, for example, displayed amazing courage. During these eleven weary months of siege, the Russian soldiers displayed an indotuitable courage <md staunchness, quietly and efficiently performing their duty without murmur or complaint. Among the defenders of Sevastopol was the fu- ture great writer Leo Tolstoy. His ToZes o/ Sevaefopol give a graphic and faithful picture of the heroic days of the defence of Sevastopol. N. I. Pirogov, the future outstanding Russian scientist , played an active part in Sevastopol in the capacity of surgeon and medical service organ* izer. Dasha Sevastopolskaya was the first nurse in the world to tend the wounded at the war.

At the beginning of 1855 the fighting was renewed with still greater vigour. In March and May the allies subjected the fortress to terrific new bombardments as a preliminary to an assault of Sevastopol, Having received reinforcements in men and guns, the enemy began to storm Malakhov Kurgan. By means of demolition work, the allied troops were able to approach the Russian fortress at a much shorter range, and shelled Sevastopol from a distance of 150 metres. The besieged fought heroically, losing daily from 500 to 700 men. The best organizers of the defence— Istomin and Nakhimov — were killed one after the other; Todleben was seriously wounded. At the beginning of August the fifth bombardment began and on August 27 (September 8), after a new hur- ricane of fire, powerful assault forces swarmed up the Malakhov Kurgan. After reducing almost all the fortifications by their artillery fire, the French succeeded in capturing Malakhov Kurgan, all the slopes of which Were covered with dead bodies. Though Malakhov Kurgan was taken, the other bastions continued to hold out, until realizing the hopelessness of their position, the garrison moved to the northern side, first blowing up the powder magazines and the city buildings. After a glorious defence of 349 days the defenders of Sevastopol retreated froni the city destroying all the military supplies and sinking the last ships of the fleet.

Operations against Turkey on the Caucasian battle front were pro. grossing successfully. The Russian army had taken Kars by storm, thus opening the way to Erzerum. But the Caucasian theatre of war could have no decisive influence on the outcome of the war. The Crimean War

lost.

In February 1856 the International Congress opened in Paris, attend, ed by Russia, Great Britain, Prance, Austria, Turkey and Sardinia. Great Britain, who held the most irreconcilable position at the congress, demanded that Russia undertake not to restore the military fortresses on the Aland Islands and on the Black Sea, that she destroy the naval arsenal at Nikolayev, and keep no war fleet on the Black or Azov seas; France position was more conciliatory, since she did not want Eng. land to grow more powerful at the expense of Russia.

The peace treaty signed in Paris in 1856 deprived Russia of the right to maintain warships in the Black Sea and fortresses on the coast. The integrity and independence of the Ottoman empire was guaranteed. The former frontier between Russia and Turkey was restored. Serbia* Moldavia and Walachia were placed under the protection of the Euro- |)ean powers. The Dardanelles and the Black Sea were declared neutral and open to the commercial flags of all countries. Tsarist Russia lost its dominant position in international politics.

The Causes of Russia’s Defeat in the Crimean War

Russia’s losses in the Crimean War were tremendous. Military expenditures too were very great, and the devastation wrought by the war was consider- able. Russia’s foreign trade dropped to almost one-fourth. Agricul- ture and industry were disorganized.

The defeat of tsarist Russia in the Crimean War was due to deep- lying economic causes. According to Marx and Engels the Crimean War was a hopeless struggle of a nation with a backward mode of production against nations with more progressive forms of social and economic relations. War brought to light the superiority of capitalism over the feudal-serf system .

Tsarism lost the Crimean War because of Russia’s economic, political and military backwardness. At the outbreak of the Crimean War neither Russia nor the allies were prepared for war. By the spring of 1856 the allies had already reorganized their forces, whereas disorgan- ization in the Russian army proceeded from bad to worse. Tsarist Russia did not possess an adequate war industry. The armament factory built in Kerch in the ’forties was at a standstill. The projected iron foundry in Moscow had not even been started. The Kamensk War Works in the Urals produced cannon which blew up during tests.

Russia had practically no railways at the time of the Crimean War. Transportation was effected by horse-drawn carts requisitioned from the peasants. It took months to deliver grain to Sevastopol from Pere- kop. The allies, on the other hand, laid a railway line from Balaklava to Sevastopol and thus ensured the swift transportation of troops and supplies.

Russian armament too was inferior to that of the allies, Russian soldiers used firelocks with an effective range of 600 paces. To reload his gun (through the muzzle) the soldier had to stand upright. THe cannon could fire grapeshot at 300 paces and cannon balls at 600 paces. The internal organization of the army in Nicholas’ days was also far behind the times. The recruits had their heads shaven and were escorted to their military unit like convicts. The term of military service was 26 years. The soldier was given a furlough and could visit his family only after he had served 15 years. The regiments were imwieldy and ill-fit for military operations. Whereas the allied armies had already introduced extended order, the tsarist army still went into battle in serried columns, presenting an easy target to the enemy guns.

The Crimean War was waged at a time when the administration and leadership of the Russian army was in an appalling state of internal disorganization. The bureaucratic military machine issued contradic- tory commands. The troops in the Crimea did not even have maps or plans. Corruption, peculation, outright plimdering of army rations and the men ’s equipment by the commissaries and the military officials, lack of medical care and medicaments— all this completed the picture of tsar- ism ’s utter unfitness in a war against the advanced capitalist armies*

Another cause of the defeat was the profound discontent that reigned in the country and in the army. Peasant unrest was rife in the country throughout the Crimean War. In 1854 the peasant movement had spread to ten provinces. In the spring of 1855 an enlistment was announced for the army. Hundreds of thousands of peasants enlisted on the grounds of a rumour that volunteers would receive their emanci- pation. This rumour not being corroborated, rebellions broke out among the peasantry.

Lenin wrote that the “Crimean War showed how rotten and impo. tent was serf Russia.”*

The Crimean defeat brought with it a realization that serfdom in tsarist Russia had to be abolished.

Russia ’s defeat in the Crimean War diminished the importance of Russian tsarism in Europe, depriving it of the leading role it had played from 1815 to 1853. “The distinguishing feature of the Russian empire in this period was that, owing to its backwardness, there were no pro- found contradictions in its military-feudal system. This gave Russia strength and secured for her a leading position on the European conti- nent. Unlike the Western countries, Russia had no developed and polit- ically mature bourgeoisie. The working class as a revolutionary force did not yet exist. The millions of Russian serf peasants, who formed an inexhaustible source of man power for the state, represented an ignor- ant, uncivilized and downtrodden mass. The isolated peasant revolts that did occur could not seriously weaken the power of the tsarist police, army and bureaucracy. Tsarist Russia, vdth its obedient army and di- plomacy, was the gendarme of Europe, the bugbear of the revolutionary and national liberation movements in Europe. In the reign of Nicholas I this reactionary influence of Russia reached its apex."

Tsarism in the Far East

The defeat of tsarism in the Crimean War, which had deprived Russia of the possibility of consolidating herself in the Near East, revived the problem of the Pacific Ocean. As far back as the early forties the ex- pedition of Middendorf , sent by the Academy of Sciences into North- eastern Siberia, had penetrated the Amur region, made certain that it was not occupied by China, and entered into relations with the native population of the Amur— the Gilyaks. The Russian- American Company was charged to explore the mouth of the Ainur, but the representatives of this company, like the head of foreign affairs during the reign of Nicholas I— Nesselrode— -were disinclined to consolidate Russian influx once on the Amur,

The expedition did not reach the mouth of the Amur. On the basis of this perfunctory expedition, Nesselrode reported to the tsar: “Sakha- lin is a peninsula. The Amur is of no significance whatever to Russia.” The question of the Amur, alleged to have no connection with the southern seas of the Pacific, was, onthe basis of this report, shelved.

But at the end of the ’forties Nevelsky, a Russian naval officer supported by Muravyov, the governor-general of Eastern Siberia, fitted out an expedition and sailed from Petropavlovsk on the brig Baikal for the eastern shores of Sakha lin. In September, when the brig had been given up as lost, it showed up in Bay Ayan, on its way back from the Island of Sakhalin. “Sakhalin is an island. Big ships can enter the Amur from the north and south. The delusions under which we have laboured for ages have been dissipated,” leported Nevelsky. Instead of eliciting the government’s approval for his discovery Nevelsky was prosecuted and degraded to the ranks for having violated the tsarist order forbidding the expedition. Only after the intercession of Muravyov was Nevelsky permitted to found a winter station on the southeastern shores of the Sea of Okhotsk and to raise the Russian military flag at the mouth of the Amur. This was the beginning of a vigorous colonization of the Amur, Towns sprang up and Cossacks and peasants began to settle here.

In 1858 the Chinese commander-in-chief on the Amur signed a treaty in the town of Aigun ceding the left bank of the Amur to tsarist Russia: the Ussurian region was.left to the joint disposal of Russia and China. In 1858 the city of Khabarovsk was founded. In the winter of 1860 the Aigun Treaty was confirmed by the Treaty of Peking which gave tsarist Russia vast lands lying between the river Ussuri and the Pacific Ocean. The fortress of Vladivostok was erected (1860) on the coast of the Pacific, and the fleet transferred there.

The tsarist government at the same time negotiated with the United States of America for the sale of its American colonies, Alaska and the Aleutian Islands. Tsarism considered it unprofitable to exploit these remote colonies, which presented difficulties in the way of defence. In 1867 the tsarist government sold Alaska and the Aleutian Islands to the United States for seven million dollars.

The Formation of Ideological Tendencies and the Social Movement between the 'Thirties and 'Fifties

The struggle of Nicholas I Against the Ideological Influence of the European Bourgeois Revolution

The European revolution had a powerful ideological influence on Russian life. During this his- toric epoch, when the old feudal relations imderwent radical changes end were being displaced by new, bourgeois, capitalist relations, the progressive bourgeois-revolutionary ideas of European writers played a very great role in the formation of the ideas of Eussia’s advanced men. These ideas not only helped to give an understanding of the grandeur of the historical changes that were taking place in Europe, but engendered the desire to introduce similar changes in backward, feudal Eussia. The ideas of the French bourgeois revolution— freedom, equality, fraternity — ^were expressed, under Eussian conditions — in a revolutionary demand for the abolition of serfdom and the overthrow of the tsarist autocracy* Such was the program which formed the basis of the rather diverse ideo* logical trends characteristic of social life in Eussia during the reign of Nicholas.

Nicholas I carried on a struggle against the revolution not only with the help of military and diplomatic resources in Europe, not only by open repressive measures, exile and arrests in Eussia, but also with the help of ideological weapons. The tsarist government put forward the theory of “official nationality” to counteract revolutionary, progressive ideas and theories. This formula, the author of which was S. S. Uvarov, Minister of Education from 1833 to 1849, claimed that the Eussian people were inherently religious, had always been loyal to the tsar and regarded serfdom as a natural state. Such was the meaning of the Uva* rov formula; “Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality.” The theory of the “official nationality” counterpoised “stable” feudal Eussia to the “de- caying” West. This reactionary theory, profoundly inimical to the progressive ideas of the time, served as the basis for a bitter struggle against all progressive and revolutionary ideas and men.

Circles of Stankevich and Herzen

The bourgeois revolutions of 1830-1848 in Europe and the peasant uprisings in Eussia confronted the progressive men of Eussia with the basic question: “Whither is Eussia going? What is to be the course of her social progress?”

The educated, progressive representatives of the Eussian nobility closely studied the political theories of bourgeois France and classical German philosophy, seeking therein an answer to the question regarding the paths and prospects of Eussia ’s development.

The centre of ideological-political life during the period from the ^thirties to the 'fifties was the Moscow University where many future talented writers and public men were studying. The early 'thirties saw the formation of a circle by the young student-philosopher, Nikolai Vladimirovich Stankevich, a man of profound education and great intellect. The members of this circle were keenly interested in the German philosophy of Fichte, Schelling, and above all Hegel Chernyshevsky wrote of this circle: “These people lived decidedly on philosophy alone, discussed it day and night, whenever they met. They regarded everything and decided everything from the philosophic oal po^t of view/' But many of the progressive public men, chiefly the revolutionary youth, were not content with this departure into the realm of abstract ideas. Carried away by the theories of the French utopian socialist, Saint-Simon, they demanded a change from speculative philosophy to political activity and the propaganda of the ideas of socialism. The exponent of the interests and demands of this section of the progressive youth was the circle of Herzen and Ogaryov. The members of this circle of Herzen’s regarded themselves the “children of the Decembrists,” whose mission it was to continue their struggle against the autocracy and serfdom.

A. I. Herzen (1812–1870)

Alexander Ivanovich Herzen was born in 1812. His father was a rich Russian landlord by the name of Yakov- lev, his mother, a native of Wlirttemberg, Louisa Haag. Their marriage not having been legalized, their son was surnamed Herzen (from the <}erman word Berz meaning Heart).

Herzen received an excellent education at home. His father’s rich library of French and German books was the source of information for the inquisitive and capable boy. His French tutor bred in Herzen a veneration for the French revolution and republican forms of govern- ment. Another teacher, a seminary student, supplied Herzen with rev- olutionary poems by Ryleyev and Pushkin. Ryleyev’s Meditations made a profound impression on Herzen. “The execution of Pestel and his associates finally roused my soul from its childish sleep,” Herzen later wrote about the Decembrists.

In 1825 Herzen met the future poet Ogaryov with whom he contract- *ed a lifelong friendship. During one of their walks through Moscow they took “Hannibal’s Oath” on the Vorobyovi Gori, vowing to de- vote their lives to the revolutionary struggle. They remained loyal to this pledge to the end of their days. On entering the Moscow University Herzen became the centre of a circle of the revolutionary youth. He was shortly afterwards arrested and spent several years in ^xile.

On his return to Moscow Herzen and Belinsky together embarked upon extensive literary-publicist activities. Lenin wrote of Herzen of those days:

“In feudal Russia of the forties of the 19th century he rose to a height which made him the equal of the greatest thinkers of his time.”*

In 1847 Herzen went abroad. He travelled through revolutionary France and Italy. The revolution of 1848 foimd Herzen in Paris. The defeat of the Paris proletariat, the cowardly conduct of the petty-bourgeois leaders, the reprisals of the counter-revolutionary ’bourgeoisie against the workers, filled Herzen with a profound pessimism.

Disillusioned with the European : revolution, Herzen placed all his hopes on the Russian peasant community.

He became the founder of peasant utopian socialism in Russia. He ; fought for the emancipation of the peasants from tsarism and serfdom, and hoped that Russia would avoid the bourgeois system, that it would arrive at socialism by making use of the village community as the nucleus of the socialist system of organization.

Herzen was subject to vacillation and errors. At times he placed his hopes . on reforms and not on revolution. But ; his vacillations were transient and : not of long duration, and he always | remained a revolutionary democrat.

Lenin attributed Herzen’s mistakes to the conditions of the transition period in which he lived: “Herzen’s A. I. Herzen in the ’thirties,

spiritual drama was a*» product and From a portrait by Vitberg

reflection of that epoch in world his- tory when the revolutionism of the

bourgeois democracy was already passing away (in Europe), and the revolutionism of the Socialist proletariat had not yef ripened.”* Herzen’s love for the Russian people and his hatred of serfdom and tsarism deepened when he found himself in a foreign land. Having been deprived of Russian citizenship, Herzen adopted Swiss citizenship and eventually migrated to London. In 1853 he founded in London the “Free Russian Press” and started publishing a revolutionary magazine Polyarnaya Zvezda (Polar Star), The magazine covers carried the por- traits of the executed Decembrists. The very name Polar Star (which was the name of the almanac of the Decembrists Ryleyev andBestuzhev) symbolized Herzen’s determination to continue the work of the Decern- brists. From 1857 to 1867 Herzen published abroad the famous magazine KoloTcol (The Tocsin), Under the motto “I Appeal to the Living” he ealled upon men to struggle against serfdom. Herzen was awakened by the Decembrists, and he became the first teacher of a new, revolutionary generation — the Raznochintsi ** of the ’sixties, foremost among them Chernyshevsky.

V. G. Belinsky (1811–1848)

The first revolutionary Raznochinets^ Vissarion Gri- goryevich Belinsky, was a contemporary of Herzen, His friends called him “Vissarion Furioso” for his passionate nature and vehement sincer- ity. Belinsky was the son of a naval surgeon. His read- ings of Pushkin, Zhukovsky, Derzhavin developed in Be- linsky at an early age a pas- sionate love of literature. While still a student at the Moscow University, Belin- sky wrote a dramatic novel Dimitri Kalinin, which, though poor in literary merit, was remarkable for the force and vehemence of its protest against serfdom. The story was considered by the author- ities to be a mischievous and

disgraceful misdemeanor in a student. Young Belinsky stood in danger of being exiled to Siberia. The university authorities expelled Belinsky from the univer- sity with the following certificate: “Dismissed on account of ill* health combined with ineptitude.”

Thus did Belinsky in the gloomy epoch of Nicholas start on a literary career filled with hardships and deprivations. Belinsky was the founder of Russian critical literature. His criticism played a tremendous role in the development of Russian realistic literature. His opinion was the final judgment for many Russian writers whose talents he discovered and carefully nurtured with his suggestions. Belinsky looked upon his literary activities as service to the people, as a means for its revolution* ary enlightenment. Belinsky’s views on the social significance and the high role of a writer in Russia were most strikingly reflected in his fa- mous letter to Gogol— a strong impeachment of the latter’s attempt to betray the people’s cause and take sides with tsarism. As Lenin said, it was “one of the best of the writings that appeared in the uncensored democratic press. This was the manifesto of revolutionary democracy of the ’forties, expressing the passionate protest of progressive people and the struggle of the peasants against serfdom. In this letter, which was privately circulated in hundreds of written copies, Belinsky sharply criticized the reactionary nature of Gogors articles published under the title of Selec ed Passages from My Corres'pondence with My Friends, Belinsky wrote Gogol that Russia’s salvation lay not in preach- ings or prayers but in the abolition of serfdom, the awakening in the people of its sense of human dignity and in its enlightenment .

Belinsky was one of the first revolutionary enlighteners. The cen- sorship shackled and stifled the thought and word of the writer, but be overcame the censorship bans by cleverly- worded articles expound, ing the most revolutionary ideas. Belinsky himself wote bitterly of the persecution of the censorship: ^‘Nature condemned me to bark like a dog and howl like a jackal but circumstances compel me to mew like a cat and wave my tail like a fox. ’’Belinsky was a revolutionary democrat, inspired with a fierce hatred of serfdom and every form of oppression, an ardent champion of enlightenment. He loved his country passionately, and believed that a great future lay before it. A century ago, not long before his death, Belinsky wrote: ‘We envy our grandchildren and great-grandchildren who are predestined to see Russia in 1940 standing at the head of an educated world, establishing laws in science and art and accepting the reverential tribute of enlightened mankind.”

Belinsky died in 1848 of tuberculosis. Death saved him from the Fortress of Peter and Paul where he was to have been imprisoned on the order of the tsar.

The Westerners and Slavophiles

The outstanding Bussian thinker, Nikolai Vladimirovich Stankevich, died in 1840 at the age of 27. Two literary-political trends— the Westerners and Slavophils— took form at this time. At the head of the circle of the Westerners stood Belinsky and Herzen. The nucleus of the circle of Westerners consisted of Belinsky, Herzen, Ogaryov, Granovsky, Bakunin and others. The circle of their ideological opponents— the Slavophils — numbered among its members Khomyakov, the Kireyev brothers, the Aksakov brothers and others.

The Westerners and the Slavophils were divided by their pro. foundly different attitudes to the past and future of Russia, and by the different estimation of the significance of Western Europe for Russia. The Westerners strongly criticized the existing feudal system and advocated Russia ’s need for European civilization. The Slavophils, on the contrary, condemned the imitation of European culture that had started since the days of Peter I. They postulated for Russia an original path of development to be based on the Russian obshchina (village community) and claimed that serfdom should be abolished only from above, and by a gradual process. The Slavophil political ideal was a union of all Slavs around Russia. They demanded the convocation of the Zemsky Sohor, upon which they placed no revolu- tionary tasks. ‘‘To the government— the power of authority, to the people— the power of opinion,^’ said the Slavophils. Belinsky, Herzen, Ogaryov, Gianovsky, and other , of the Westerners were resolute opponents of the Slavophils. They proved the reactionary nature of the views of the Slavophils, who were monarchists idealizing the reactionary survivals of the past and fearing radical changes in the social system of Russia.

The final rupture between the Westerners and the Slavophils took place in 1844-1845. There was no unanimity, however, in the circle of the Westerners either. Belinsky and Herzen headed the con- sistently democratic wing of the Westerners. A liberal group of Western- ers including Chicherin, Granovsky and others took form. This group were opposed to revolution and socialism. Their ideal was a constitu- tional monarchy and liberal-bourgeois reforms.

The Circle of Petrashevsky

A revolutionary circle of utopian- socialists headed by M. V. Petrashevsky was formed in St. Petersburg in the middle of the forties of the 19th century. This circle consisted of progressive young Raznochintai united by their hatred of the autocracy and serfdom, and was attended by Dostoyevsky, Saltykov-Shchedriu and other writers.

Mikhail Vasilyevich Butashevich-Petrashevsky, born in 1821, the son of a nobleman, was the organizer and ideological leader of the circle. Petrashevsky was a clever and courageous man. He had received a good education and regarded 'himself as the disciple and follower of the famous French utopian-socialist Fourier (1772- 1837).

His circle met regularly every Friday at his apartment and dis- cussed the main principles of Fourier’s doctrine as well as cur- rent political topics which were agitating society.

Belinsky’s letter to Gogol was read and discussed with sympathy in Petrashevsky ’s circle. Petrashev- sky compiled and edited a Pocket Dictionary of Foreign Words where- in, ostensibly with the object of explaining “foreign words,” he outlined the doctrine of the utopian, socialists of Western Europe. Petrashevsky, like Fourier, was an advocate of introducing socialism by peaceful means.

The Western European revolutions of 1848 strongly influenced the members of the circle. Some of them were no longer satisfied with* speeches and readings, -and began to seek ways and means of working for the revolution. Speshnev took up a revolutionary position in Petra, shevsky’s circle. He was in favour of conspirative tactics, demanded the organization of a secret society and the preparation for an uprising against tsarism. The propaganda of the Petiashevskians did not assume wide proportions.

The Petrashevskians were arrested in 1849, on the report of a secret police agent. Investigations failing to reveal the existence of an organ- ized secret society, the committee of enquiry accused them of a “con. spiracy of ideas” which “corrupted men’s minds.” For sympathizing with communist and republican ideas 15 men out of the 34 arrested, including F. M. Dostoyevsky, the future great Russian writer, were condemned to death; the rest were sentenced to penal servitude and' exile in Siberia. The condemned were taken from the Fortress of Peter and Paul and brought to the square where a high black scaffold had been erected. Troops surrounded them, and a crowd of people had gathered. Petrashevsky and two other members of his circle were tied to the posts and their faces covered with white hoods. The soldiersr took aim. The drums beat. The condemned lived through the horrors of imminent death. Then suddenly the drums grew silent and they heard the annouacamont of the ‘^mercy’^ of the tsar— the commutation of their death sentence to panal servitude for life. Such were the methods employed by Nicholas I against “audacious thoughts,”

Science, Literature, and Art in the First Half of the 19th Century

Science

The centres of scientific life in feudal Russia in the first half of the 19th century were the Academy of Sciences, the uni- versities and scientific associations. The government allotted trivial appropriations for scientific research, but despite extremely unfavour- able conditions, science made big strides in the first half of the 19th century, Russia produced a number of great scientists.

One of the greatest mathematicians of the 19th century was Ni- kolai Ivanovich Lobachevsky (1793-1856), who lectured in the fCazan University on celestial mechanics and the theory of numbers. The young professor-mathematician, Lobachevsky, arrived at a new system of geometry, “non-Euclidian geometry.” A new conception of space was born, other than as treated by Euclid. The work of Lobachevsky was published in 1829. The famous English mathematician Sylvester called Lobachevsky the “Copernicus of geometry,” but Russia of the day failed to appreciate him and some magazines of the capital even ridiculed his work. Only later did his work in geometry receive the recognition it merited.

Russian scientific thought penetrated the most advanced branches of science and engineering. Russian scientists and inventors achieved their most significant successes in the field of electrical engineering, but the fate of these inventors was a sad one.

The well-known Russian physicist, Vasili Vladimirovich Petrov (1762-1834), the son of a provincial Russian priest, discovered elec- trolysis (1802-1803), the basis of modern electro-chemistry, independ- ently of the English scientists Nicholson and Carlisle. He created the Voltaic arc several years before Davy. Yet this remarkable invention was given to the world as the work of the Englishman Davy while the Russian inventor was forgotten. The works of Petrov received the recognition they deserved only half a century after his death.

Russian scientists and inventors were the first to make practical use of electric current. Schilling constructed the first electro-magnetic telegraph in the world at Petersburg in 1832, installing it between the buildings of the Ministry of Communications and the Winter Palace. But that is where the matter ended. A similar apparatus was invented several years later by the Englishmen Wheatstone and Cooke, and was used throughout the world.

Another outstanding Russian scientist, Jakobi (1801-1874) discovered galvanoplastics. He built the first power engine, and his electric boat carried passengers along the Neva in 1838. Only half a century later did a similar invention appear on the Thames, arousing the amazement of contemporaries who had no idea of the existence of the long-forgotten Russian invention.

In 1833 the Russianjmechan- ic Cherepanov built the first Russian steam engine of original design in the Urals. However, it had no effect whatever on the development of engineering in Russia, which continued for a long time to import steam en- gines from abroad.

At the end of 1830 the well-known Russian astronomer,

Vasili Yakovlevich Struve (1793- 1864), founded the famous Pulkovo Observatory near St. Peters- burg. In the first half of the 19th century the noted scientist N. N. Zinin made a number of world-important discoveries in the field of chemistry, laying the foundation for the Russian school of chemistry.

In the field of medicine the famous Russian physician and surgeon, scientist and teacher, Nikolai Ivanovich Pirogov (1810-1881), achieved fame with his new methods of surgery and anatomy. In 1856, in an article Questions of Life, Pirogov opposed the old forms of educa- tion, and called for the education of new people with honest, democrat- ic convictions.

One of the greatest naturalists of the first half of the 19th century, the founder of embryology, Karl Baer, worked in the Academy of Sciences in St, Petersburg. He undertook an energetic study of the nat- ural resources of Russia, made a number of expeditions and took an active part in the foundation of the Geographical Society which included an Ethnographic Museum,

In 1819-1821 the Russian expedition of Lazarev sailed tohigh south- ern latitudes where it discovered many new islands, and, forcing its way through the ice, arrived at the shores of the Antarctic. The honour of discovering this southern continent belongs to the Russians. The Pa- cific Ocean is studded with islands bearing Russian names, such as Suvorov Island, Kutuzov Island, Beregis (Beware) Reef, and others.

Russian historiography made great advances in the early 19th century. The History of the Russian State by Karamzin was pub- lished as far back as the reign of Alexander I and was an important event at the time. In the words of Pushkin, Karamzin discovered Russian history as Columbus had discovered America. Karamzin’s History of (he Russian Stale, however, bears obvious traces of serf-owner ideology. In history, according to Karamzin, “everything depends on the will of the autocrat who, like a skilled mechanic, sets masses in motion by the move of a finger.”

Literature

Literature played a tremendous social role in the period of the disintegration of the old feudal-serf relations and the growth of new, capitalist relations.

The writers, critics and publicists of the ’thirties and ’forties, in addition to being exponents of the progressive ideas of their times were champions of a new, free life. Herzen, dealing with literature and its significance in that epoch, wrote in his work On the Development of Revolutionary Ideas in Russia: “Literature, with a people that does not possess political liberty is the only tribune from which it can make its cry of indignation and its voice of conscience heard.”

Tsarism ruthlessly persecuted progressive writers and poets. The tsarist censorship expunged from books the slightest hint of criticism against the existing order. The Censorship Committee, established in 1849, banned many books and magazines which did not conform to the trend of “official nationality.”

Tsarism, however, did not stop at mere persecution of literary activity. Herzen writes of the tragic fate that befell the progressive men of the days of Nicholas and cites a brief but expressive list of the crimes committed by the monarchy of Nicholas in regard to Russian

writers and poets:

Ryleyev, hung by Nicholas.

Pushkin, killed in a duel, at the age of 38.

Griboyedov, assassinated in Teheran.

Lermontov, killed in a duel ... in the Caucasus.

Venevitinov, killed by society, at the age of 22.

Koltsov, killed by his family, at the age of 33.

Belinsky, killed at the age of 35 by hunger and poverty.

Baratynsky, died after 12 years of exile.

An outstanding work of Russian letters, Wit Works Woehj

Griboyedov (1795-1829) was a biting satire on the upper aristocracy, the ruling bureaucracy and the arrogant military. This comedy played an important social role. Belinsky wrote that “while still in manu- script Wit Works Woe had been learned by heart by the whole of Russia.”

When asked during cross-examination 'Ivhich of all the ’works he had read contributed chiefly to the development of his liberal views, the Decembrist Steingel listed along with the works of Voltaire and Radishchev Wit Works Woe. Banned by the tsarist censorship this book circulated from hand to hand for a long time in man- uscript form, and copies were distributed throughout the provinces. Qribpyedov was all the more dangerous to tsarism in that he was asso- ciated with the Decembrists, although he was not in complete agree- ment with their views. That is why Nicholas I decided to rid himself of Griboyedov. He sent the poet, against his wishes, as ambassador to Teheran, where the Russian dramatist was shortly afterwards killed by a fanatic mob worked up into a fury over the persecutions of Rus- sian tsarism.

Another victim of Nicholas* reign was the talented Russian writ- er and , philosopher, Pyotr Yakovlevich Chaadayev (1796-1 86G), friend of Pushkin. The great poet dedicated three remarkable “Epis- tles” to Chaadayev. In 1836 Chaadayev *8 famous Fhilosophical Letter sharply criticizing past and present feudal Russia was published in the Telescope. On reading Chaadayev ’s article Nicholas 1 wrote: “Having read the article, 1 find that its contents are a mixture of brazen nonsense worthy of a madman.” The tsar had Chaadayev cer- tified as insane and ordered him to be kept under constant medical surveillance and all his manuscripts to be confiscated. Nicholas I or- dered the young poet Polezhayev, author of the poem Dashka, con- scripted into the army, where, after severe manhandling, he died in a military hospital. But the most tragic and irretrievable loss to Russia was the death of her poet genius, Alexander Sergeyevich Push- kin. Greatest of Russian poets, a genius of world literature, the founder of Russian realism and the creator of a Russian literary language, A. S. Pushkin is the pride and glory of the Russian people. Pushkin was a nobleman but, in the apt words of the great proletar- ian writer Gorky: “For him the interests of the whole nation stood higher than the interests of the nobility, and his personal experience was broader and deeper than the experience of the class of nobles.” Pushkin was not only a great poet but a great citizen, who reflected to a certain degree the revolutionary aspirations of the people.

Pushkin was born in Moscow in 1799, in the family of a high- born impecimious nobleman. With the assistance of his uncle’s and father’s friends Pushkin was admitted into the newly.founded aristo- cratic Lyceum of Tsarskoye Selo. The French Encyclopaedists exerted a great influence on Pushkin in his youth. From them he acquired his strivingufter enlightenment and his critical attitude to the antiquated feudal system. From the revolutionary writers and poets of Western Europe he drew his hatred of tyrants. As early as 1815 the sixteen- year-old Pushkin expressed his hatred of slavery in his poem To Li» einius. In 1817 Pushkin graduated from the Lyceum. The stark reali- ties of feudal Russia deeply affected the impressionable youx^ poet.

Following the example of Radii^chev he wrote an ode and gave it the same name as Radishchev’s — Liberty, But whereas Radishchev had dreamed of “a rising of warlike hosts to arm all with hope,” and bring the tsar to the block, Pushkin called for an uprising against the tsar: ‘‘Arise, ye fallen slaves!”

His challenge to the autocracy rang with anger and hatred.

Miscreant autocrat^ hear my hate Of you, your sceptre and your throne,

Your children's death, your own black fate I enjoy with a heart as hard as stone.

Pushkin in his poems attacked the adherents and preachers of absolutism, branded Arakcheyev, the tsar’s favourite, called the reactionary Minister of Education, Golitsyn, “persecutor of educa- tion,” and the inspirer of reaction, the archimandrite Photi us a semi- fanatic and a semi-rogue who made “the curse, the sword, the cross and whip,” his weapons. In his poem 2^he Country, Pushkin speaks of “savage gentry which know no sentiment, no law.”

The revolutionary verses of the great poet could not go unpunished in the Russia of those days. Pushkin was exiled to the south, but the poet continued even in exile (in Kishinev and Odessa) to write poems and verses expressing his love of liberty. From Odessa the poet was banished to the village of Mikhailovskoye, to his father’s estate, and his father was commissioned to keep an eye on his son. Here the poet worked on his great masterpiece Eugem Onegin, completed his poem Gypsies and wrote the tragedy Boris Godunov, which Benkendorf, in his report to the tsar, described as presenting the “tsarist power in a horrible light.” The tsar was of the same opinion and Boris Godunov was proscribed for a number of years.

Pushkin was closely connected with the Decembrists, many of whom were his friends, but he himself did not belong to their secret society. When, in 1S26, shortly after the execution of the Decembrists, Nicholas I summoned Pushkin from exile and asked him: “What would you have done if you had been in St. Petersburg on December 141” Pushkin retorted: “I would have joined the ranks of the rebels.” The tsar appointed himself Pushkin’s sole censor and withheld the publi* cation of his works for a long time.

A painful atmosphere of spying, slander, degradation and perse* cution was created around Pushkin.

In 1837 Pushkin died of a mortal wound received in a duel with the officer D’Anth^s, the adopted son of the Dutch ambassador. Thou- sands of people emaged by the dastardly murder, came to accompany the body of the great poet to his last rest. At the tsar’s orders gendarmes secretly removed the poet’s body at night and buried it in the Svyatogorsk Monastery, near Pushkin’s estate.

Another great Russian poet of the days of Nicholas — ^Mikhail Yuryevich Lermontov (1814-1841) — condemned the instigators of Pushkin’s murder in a virulent poem On the Death, oj a Poet, for which the author was exiled to the Caucasus. In 1841, at the age of 27, in the prime of his great gifts Lermontov was killed in a duel. The poetry of Lermontov, permeated with the spirit of rebellion and lib- erty, profoundly artistic and Ijnrical in quality, won the poet immense popularity. Such works of Lermontov as A Hero of Our Time, Mtsyri, Masquerade, Demon, and others won world fame,

^5^en the news of Lermontov’s death reached Nicholas he mali- ciously exclaimed: “A dog — a dog’s death!”

The harsh conditions created during the reign of Nicholas affected the personal and creative life of the great Russian writer Nikolai Va- silyevich Gogol (1809-1852). His remarkable works — Inspector O^ral, De^ Souls, Old-World Oentlefolks, and others are a scathing satire in forceful and vivid style on the utter depravity of the landed nobility. '^Dead Souls staggered all Russia/’ said Herzen, writing of the im- pression created by this work. “Contemporary Russia needed such an indictment. It is the history of a disease written by a master hand. Gogol’s poetry is the cry of horror and shame emitted by a man, degraded by foul living, when he suddenly catches sight of his brutalized face in a mirror.”

Of Gogol’s earlier works mention may be made of Eve- nings in a Farm Near Dikan^ ka, and Taras Bulba of the Mirgorod series.

Evenings in a Farm Near Dikanka, which brought Gogol wide popularity, are poetical sketches of the Ukraine, full of charm and beauty and scintillating humour. They are, in the words of Belinsky “the gay comicality, the smile of youth greet- ing the lovely world.”

No less vivid and picturesque is his historical tale Taras Bulba in which Gogol describes the valiant deeds of Ukrainian Cossackdom in the 16th century in their fight against foreign invaders — ^the Poles.

Belinsky enthusiastically described this tale as an episode of a great national epos and compared Taras Bulba to Homer’s Iliad.

In these works Gogol is seen as a great artist of the romantic school.

Gogol died in the heyday of his tremendous creative power. He fell a prey to mental disease at the end of his life, and during a nerv- ous attack destroyed the concluding part of his great poem Dead Souls, over which he had worked for many years.

A notable artistic record of the period were Herzen’s brilliant works. His memoirs Byhye % Dumy represent a faithful chronicle both of Herzen’s own life and that of the best progressive men of his day, and depict the growth of Russian social thought in the gloomy days of the reaction under Nicholas. The hero of Herzen’s novel Whose FauW — ^the honest, talented, courageous Vladimir Beltov, could find no place for himself in life: he became the ^superfluous man” — ^the typical figure of Russian classical literature of the 19th century.

Russian literature in the first half of the 19th century was inseparably bound up with the social-political life of the country. It was steeped in the advanced ideas of its times and chose the path of artistic real- ism, fleeing itself from the tem- porary influence of the senti- mental and romantic trends.

The founders of the school of artistic realism were the great Russian writers A. S. Pushkin,

A. S. Griboyedov, N. V. Gogol and I. A. Krylov.

The literary creations* of these writers are immortal: apart from being a true and vivid expression of the life of their times, they are permeated with a passionate faith in a better future for the great Russian people.

Our country deeply reveres the memory of its great writers and poets. Pushkin is the most be- loved poet of the peoples of the Soviet Union. The j^rophetio words ofthe great poet, written not long before his death, in his remark- able poem Monnmentum have come true.

“And I shall for long years he loved by all nation Because for noble passions with my lyre I call.

Because in pitiless days I prayed for liberation,

Ashed clemency for those who fall.**

Art. The profoundly progressive ideas of national self-conscious- ness, the national pride of a people awakening to social life were also mirrored in art, which, like literature, became realistic.

In the reign of Nicholas I battle-painting, Uie portrayal of mili- tary life, etc., enjoyed special patronage. Exact reproduction of all details of uniform, arms and regimental insignia was held to be the most essential featrure of this type of art. The official, academic school of painting was represented by K. P. Bryullov (1799-1862). His picture,

Last Day of Porwpeii^ exhibited in 1830, met with great success.

"And the ^Last Day of Pompeii^ Become the first day for the Bussian brush**

a contemporary poet wrote of this picture. Its success was due not only

to ihe painter’s artistic skill but to his lavish use of light and colour effects (fire, lightning), which made a profound impression on the spectator. The quest for realism found its expression in the works of the noted Russian painter A. A. Ivanov whose picture The Apjpear* artce of Christ Among the People was the work of nearly 30 years.

One of the first realist-painters was A. G. Venetsianov. The son of a pie-vendor, his observations, from early childhood, of life of work- men, handicraftsmen and peasants gave his work a realistic trend. His big picture Threshing Floor and various scenes from peasant life were somewhat glossed, but the very idea of putting the peasant on canvas was a bold one in those days.

At the end of 1840 the remarkable genre-painter, F. A. Fedotov, exhibited his first picture. The Academy of Art awarded Fedotov the title of academician for his picture The Major^s Betrothal, The votaries of classic traditions in painting scorned Fedotov’s pictures because they were done in the popular spirit.

Among the most distinguished portrait painters were the serf Tro- pinin^ who made excellent portraits of Karamzin and Pushkin, and the fine romantic artist Kiprensky, who won renown for his admir- able portraits of Krylov, Pushkin and portraits of himself.

A. Voronikhin was a distinguished architect of the early 19th cen- tury. His Oathedral of Kazan, built in St. Petersburg in the style of St. Peter’s in Rome, is one of the finest monuments of the latest church architecture in Russia.

The founder of Russian opera and symphonic music, M. I. Glinka (1809-1867), drew lavishly on native folk melodies which he com- bined with the experience of West European music, Glinka asserted the world significance of the Russian national musical art. Glinka’s works are characterized by their profound ideological nature, realism and pop- ular character. The Russian aristocracy regarded the works of Glinka with hostility, condemning his use of folk melodies. Nor was his great opera, Tvan Susanin, on a theme of popular patriotism, understood by the ruling classes who called it "coachmen’s music.” Glinka’s classic opera Ruslan and Ludmila presenting the element of Russian folklore in a new light was also withdrawn a year after its premiere, and was never again performed during the composer’s lifetime. Glinka included Russian, Byelorussian, Ukrainian,'' Finnish, Polish, Geor- gian, Spanish and other melodies in his compositions. Glinka’s admir- able symphonic compositions Spanish Overture (based on popular Spanish melodies), and Kamarinshaya (for symphony orchestra) stood out against the background of West European musical art for their bold- ness and originality and were the basis for the further powerful devel- opment of Russian symphonic works. The great Russian composer Chaikovsky wrote subsequently that the entire Russian symphonic school is imbedded in Glinka’s Kamarinshaya . . like an oak in an acorn.”

Unappreciated in his own country and weary of persecutions, Glinka went abroad and there ho died.

Glinka was followed by the composer Dargomyzhsky (1813-1869), to whom, as to Glinka, the basic principle of Russian musical art w^s high artistic realism. Dargomyzhsky’s career as a composer was also set with thorns. Busalka, Dargomyzhsky’s best opera, was fairly coldly received at its first performance and it was not until 10 years later that it became one of the most popular operas.

The Stone Quest, composed by Dargomyzhsky on the unrevised text of Pushkin’s titlepiece, is remarkable for its delineation of the characters of the play. In this opera and in his romanzas Dargomyzhsky asserts the truth and naturalness of dramatic declamation and creates new types of lyrical, satirical and comic songs. “I want the sound to express the word directly, I want the truth,” wrote Dargomyzhsky at the end of his life.

In the first half of the 19th century the Russian theatre attained remarkable success in art. The Bolshoi (Grand) Theatre in Moscow had originally been built in 1780 on Petrovka Street and was then called the Petxovka Theatre. In 1805 this theatre, grand for its time, w^as destroyed by fire and rebuilt twenty years later, in 1825, by the architect Bova. Fire destroyed the

Bolshoi Theatre again in 1853 but it was soon after restored. Russian opera achieved a high degree of perfection in this epoch.

The Maly Theatre was opened in Moscow in 1824 and soon became the centre of theatrical talent. The greatest Russian actor of the past century, the founder of real- ism on the stage, was Mi- khail Semyonovich Shchep- kin (1788-1883). The son of a serf peasant, he bought his freedom only at the age of 33. Shchepkin worked for many years in the Maly Theatre, creating immortal characters in the plays of Griboyedov, Gogol and many others. Shchepkin associated with all the leading figures of the social movement of his days.

A remarkable Russian tragedian on the stage of the Moscow Maly Theatre was P. S. Mochalov (1800-1848), who won fame -by his Shakespearean performances.

The Cultures of the Peoples of Tsarist Russia in the First Half of the 19th Century

Ukrainian Literature

Tsarism hindered the formation of independent nations in the outlying regions of Russia and forcibly retarded the cultural development of the oppressed peoples. Fighting for their national existence the oppressed peoples built up their own culture and strove to preserve their native tongues.

The many-millioned Ukrainian people stubbornly continued to create in their native and rich language despite persecution. ^

One of the distinguished creators of the new Ukrainian literatme was I. P. Kotlyarevsky (1769-1838), whoso three books in Ukrain- ian; Aeneid, Natalka-Poltavka and Moskal-Oharimik^ won for him great popularity, Kotlyarevsky laboured thirty years on the adaptation of VirgiPs Aeneid, In this work he satirizes the serf-owning nobility and tsarist bureaucracy, and depicts with a touch of elegiac regret the old life and customs under the hetmans.

Th3 Kharkov University, the first in the Ukraine, had a great in- fluence on Ukrainian cultural life, although the government did its utmost to make it the tool of its Russification policy. A group of tal- ented Ukrainian writers — Gulak- Artemovsky, Kvitka-Osnovyanenko, Grebinka and others grew up around this young university,

6. F. Kvitka is regarded as the founder of Ukrainian prose. His Mahrussian S'.ories are written in a sentimental moralizing vein.

E. Z. Grebinka (1812-1848) was an outstanding Ukrainian poet of the first half of the 19th century. Grebinka translated into Ukrain- ian Poltava by Pushkin, who was a friend of his. Grebinka’s fables Prikazhi, admirable for their language and vivid portrayal of the hard life of the Ukrainian peasantry, occupy a place of honour in Ukrainian literature . Grebinka is regarded as a classic of Ukrain- ian letters.

A true poet of the Ukrainian people was Taras Grigoryevich Shev- chenko (1814-1861). Shevchenko was the son of a serf who belonged to the rich landlord Engelhardt (whose estate was in the former Zve- nigorod uyezd, Kiev province). After losing his mother and then his father, little Shevchenko went to live with a church-chanter at the school where he was learning to read and write. He read the psalter for him “for the departed souls of the serfs” for which he received a tenth of a kopek, "by way of encouragement,” as Shevchenko later recalled. Shevchenko quite early displayed a gift for drawing. He ran away from the chanter and went to the house painters who were decorating the church, but could learn nothing from them. Shevchenko also worked as a shepherd and then as a servant-boy to a landlord. His master ordered the coachman to whip him more than once after finding him at his drawings. Shevchenko came to St. Petersburg with his master and there he was sent to a school for painting for guild artisans. In 1836 Shevchenko was introduced by another Ukrainian painter to the writers Zhukovsky and Grebinka, as well as to the famous painter Brjnillov. To give Shevchenko’s native talent a chance to de- velop Bryullov paint^ a portrait of the poet Zhukovsky which he sold by lottery and with the proceeds (2,600 rubles) purchased Shev- chenko’s freedom. Shevchenko thereupon entered the Academy of Arts. At this period he wrote his first verses. In 1840 the first collection of his poems, Kobzar, was published. Shevchenko’s best poems are Naimichka, the story of a mother’s sufferings; Katerina, a story of ill-fated love; Baidamaks — an epic portrayal of the revo- lutionary struggle of the peasants against the Polish gentry in 1768. His poem A Dream is permeated with hatred against tsarism. It pictures the tsar, Nicholas I (in the shape of a bear), and the crowd of his court lickspittles with great satirical ^orce, T?he poem Caucasus is a passionate appeal- for an open struggle of the toilers of all nations against colonial oppression, for a ruthless struggle against

the tsarist “prison of the peoples,” where

From the Moldavians to the Finns All are dumb in all tongues.

In April 1847 Shevchenko was arrested for “revolutionary activ-

ity.” A secret organization, “The Kirill-Methody Fraternity,” organ- ized in 1840, was disclosed in Kiev. The program of the “Frater- nity” drawn up by the historian Kostomarov advocated the creation of a federated republic, demanded the abolition of serfdom and the extensive dissemination of education. The “Fraternity” was connected with the Russian Slavophils. Shevchenko was close to the left, demo- cratic wing of the “Fraternity.” He demanded that it engage in active revolutionary work. In 1847 the members of the “Fraternity” were arrested, Shevchenko along with them. His sentence read: “The paint- er Shevchenko, for his writing of outrageous and highly impudent verses, as possessing robust health, is to be sent as rank-and-file soldier to the Orenburg Special Corps.” Nicholas I added to this his resolu- tion: “To be kept under strict surveillance and prohibited from writ- ing and drawing.”

Not until 1857, after having spent ten years in the tsarist bar- racks and experiencing the harsh discipline and ill-usage of army life, was Shevchenko freed. Exile, far from breaking the spirit of the poet-revolutionary, made him more militant than ever. In his new poems he called upon the peasants not to place faith in the tsar, not to wait for him to give them their freedom but to fight for it them- selves with arms in hand.

In July 1858 Shevchenko was again arrested at his home place and brought to Kiev. He had to leave the Ukraine and return to St. Peters- burg under supervision of the .police. In St, Petersburg Shevchenko became friends with the great Russian revolutionary writers — Cher- nyshevsky and Dobrolyubov. '

The leaders of Russian revolutionary democracy, Chemyshevsky and Dobrolyubov, had a high opinion of Shevchenko as their associate and companion-in-arms. Dobrolyubov wrote of Shevchenko; “He is absolutely a poet of the people. ... He came from the people and lived among the people and is bound up with it by the close ties of both intellectual and living kinship.”

Shevchenko hated the Russian tsar and the Russian landlord serf- owners. But he had a profound love for the Russian people, Russian writers and revolutionaries who fought, as he did, for the freedom of the jpeople. He revered the memory of the Decembrists, was intimate with the Petrashevsky circle, was interested in Herzen’s mag- azines, Polyamaya Zvezda and the Kohkol, and was a friend of Chernyshevsky and Dobro- lyubov with whom he fought hand in hand for a new life “without the slave and with- out the landlord.” An important influence in the development of Shevchenko’s poetical genius was exercised by the distinguished works of Russian literature.

The great Ukrainian poet of the people, the revolutionary- democrat Shevchenko, belongs to the best classics of world • literature. Like the great Rus- sian poet Pushkin, Shevchenko is one of the best-loved poets of all the Soviet people.

The cherished dream of thepoet has come true. In his remarkable pooxn Zapovit, Shevchenko

calls upon the people:

. . . rise up

And break your chains in glee!

And with the oppressors^ evil blood sprinkle liberty!

And when thq^t great new family *s born^

The family of the free,

0 have a kindly and peaceful word

With which to remember me.

Ukrainian art was moulded under the influence of the great cultur-

al heritages of Russia and Western Europe, preserving, however, all its original national characteristics. Ukrainian culture, notwithstand- ing constant persecution by tsarism, continued to develop in all fields, revealing the powerful creative forces of the Ukrainian, people everywhere and in all things: in architecture, painting, sculpture, music and literature.

In the 18th and beginning of the 19th century the Ukrainian land- lords had organized orchestras, choirs, and theatrical troupes consist- ing of serf peasants.

In 1812 the writer Kvitka-Osnovyanenko organized the first per«  manent Ukrainian troupe in Poltava. Immense popularity was enjoyed by the musical theatre which performed the first Ukrainian operas NatalkorFollavka by Kotlyarevsky, the Enyagemenl in Ooncha» rivlsi by Kvitka, Zaporozhets beyond the^ Danube by Gulak-Artemov- sky^ and others.

Ukrainian musical works were based on Ukrainian folk songs. Many Russian composers, as for example, Glinka, who came to the Ukraine, also made use of Ukrainian folk songs. Shevchenko played an important part in the development of ait in the Ukraine. Uis play Nazar Siodolya (1S44) made it clear that the Ukrainian theatre had come to stay. He was the author of many librettos and themes for Ukrainian musical woiks.

The Culture of the Peoples of Transcaucasia

The national awakening of the peoples of Georgia, Aimenia and Azerbaijan made vigorous strides.

A great Georgian poet of the early 19th century was A. Chavcha- vadze, a contemporary of Pushkin. An aristocrat by birth, Alexander Chavchavadze was one of the first representatives of romanticism in Georgian poetry. Georgia’s enslavement by Russian tsarism cast an infinite sadness on all the poet’s works.

The most talented representative of romanticism in Georgian literature was Nikolai Baratashvili, whose works, while being pessi* mistic in tone, voice a protest against the harsh realities of life in Geor* gia. Nikolai Baratashvili is called the “Byron of Georgia.”

, Georgi Eristavi was the founder of the realistic trend in Georgian literature. In spite of his princely origin, Eristavi was an opponent of serfdom in Georgia. He was Georgia’s greatest playwright in the first half of the 19th century and one of the initiators and active organizers of the Georgian dramatic theatre in Tifiis.

i The hard lot of the Georgian peasantry and its struggle were por- trayed by Daniil Ghonkadze, who himself was a serf peasant by origin. His story The' Fortress of Suram, published in 1859, was the first voice raised in Georgian literature against serfdom. This story was very popular among the Georgian people and had a great influence on later Georgian revolutionary literature.

The national awakening of Armenia, dismembered by Turkey, Persia and Russia, began with particular force after 18284829. Many Armenians emigrated to Russia from the regions under Persian and Turkish rule. Tifiis, where the Armenians were an important economio factor, became the centre of the ideological and political life of the rising Armenian bourgeoisie.

The first writer of note in Armenia was Khachatur Abovyan. His splendid novel Wounds of Armenia^ dealing with the Russo-Persian War, played an important role in the history of the national litmture of Armenia, laying the foundation for a new literary language. This novel of Armenian reality, written with patriotic fervour, depicted in vivid colours the sad lot of the Armenians under Persian rule. The book was privately circulated in manuscript before publication, being read in Armenian social circles and contributing to the awakening of the national self-consciousness of the Armenian people. Abovyan had been educated at Derpt (Yuriev) University. He was an enemy of the reactionary Armenian clergy and founded the first secular school in Armenia. Rating Russian culture highly, Abovyan advocated ideological and political rapprochement with Russia. He and his adherents acquainted the Aimenian readers with the best woiks of Russian and West European literature.

The first half of the 191 h century also saw the rise of a new Azer- baijan literature. Its founder, Mirza Aldiundov (1812-1878), one of the best writers of his country and age, has been called the “Mussulman Molifere.” In his comedies he, like Molifere, pitilessly flayed the clergy and exposed its hypocrisy and cupidity (in the comedy Alchemist Mola Ibrahim Halil). Akhundov was the first in Turkic literature to sharply criticize the absence of rights for women, to demand bour- geois reforms and to call for the enlightenment and the Europeani- zation of Azerbaijan. He strove to simplify the Turkic language and proposed reforms for the Arab-Turkish alphabet. Akhundov was edu- cated in a Russian school, and Russian literature exercised a great and beneficial influence on his literary works. Akhundov wiote an elegy on the death of Pushkin in which he spoke of his love for the fallen poet. He frequently mentions the founder of the Russian literary language— Lomonosov.

The Development of Capitalism in Tsarist Russia

Bourgeois Reforms of the 'Sixties

Preparation of the Peasant Reform

The Peasant Reform Fight

Alexander II (1825-1881), the new emperor, ascended the throne during the Crimean War. "W^ile still heir-apparent he had declared himself in favour of the preservation of serfdom and the champion of the interests of the nobility. However, at the very outset of his reign, Alexander II was obliged to adopt a course of bourgeois reforms aiming primarily at the abolition of serfdom.

These reforms were necessitated by the entire trend of Russia’s economic development. By the middle of the 19th century the econom- ic disadvantages of forced serf labour both in industry and in agri- culture became clearly apparent. The fuither development of the country’s productive forces was impossible without the abolition of serfdom. The Crimean War, too, had proved how urgent was the need for bourgeois reforms, and the determined abolition of serfdom. Fur- thermore, the widespread growth of peasant unrest, especially during the Crimean War, pointed to the existence of a profound crisis within the country and called imperatively for the elimination of the main cause of this crisis — serfdom.

The peasant movement began to assume ominous proportions as a result of the Crimean* War. Peasant economy declined during the war, while landlord exploitation of the serf peasants increased. The class struggle between the peasants and the landlords after the Crimean War became acute. The Third Section registered 86 outbreaks in 1858, 90 in 1850 and 108 in 1860. These outbreaks were now directed against the entire serfage system and not against individual iand^ lords as hitherto. The peasants everywhere refused to perform the barshchina and pay obrok^ and offered resistance to the authorities and troops sent out to suppress the disturbances.

A revolutionary situation ripened in the country. The peasant movement, however, did not develop into a revolution. “The people, enslaved to the landlords for hundreds of years, were not in a con- dition to rise to a widespread, open, conscious struggle for freedom.”* The woiking class was still in its nascency and could not lead the peasantry to the assault of absolutism and serfdom.

The mass struggle of the peasantry provided a stimulus to the bourgeois.liberal movement. The liberal bourgeoisie and landlords began to speak oxienly of the need for abolishing serfdom. They wrote memoranda to the government and letters to the tsar, drew up schemes of reform, made speeches at private meetings, dinners and banquets. The liberal bourgeoisie and the landlords also criticized the feudal state apparatus with its attendant bribery, arbitrary rule, the cen- sorship, etc.

The menace of a peasant revolution compelled the government to begin preparation for a peasant reform. The need for the abolition of serfdom became apparent even to the tsar and the serf-owning^ landloids upon whom his power rested.

In 1856 Alexander 11 made the following statement to the nobles of the Moscow gubernia: “The existing system of the ownership of souls cannot remain unchanged. It is better to begin the abolition of serfdom from above, than wait until it begins to abolish itself from below.”

In 1857-1858 gubernia committees of noblemen were organized for the puipose of drafting a law on the abolition of serfdom. Their proposals were sent to St. Petersburg to central commissions organized by the government whose function was to diaw up the general law of the reform. These commissions were made up of officials appointed by the government and were presided over by the reactionary Oeneral Rostovtsev, notorious in his day for having reported the Decembrists to Nicholas I. After Rostovtsov’s death, another reactionary, Duke Panin, was appointed in his place as president of the commissions^ Nikolai Milyutin, a representative of the liberal bureaucracy, took very active part in the diafting of the reform.

All the woik of reform was directed by “The Chief Committee of Peasant Affairs,” consisting of higher government officials and big' serf-owning landlords. These bureaucratic deliberations lasted several years (1857-1860).

The big landlords, who owned almost half the serfs in the country, proposed freeing the peasants without giving them allotments other than the land on which their houses stood and with the retention for all time of compulsory services in favour of the landlords.

The nobles who owned middle-sized estates wore interested in the bourgeois development of agriculture. These landlords, constitut- ing half of all the nobility, owned most of the serfs. They consisted of two basic groups: the owners of barahchina and ohrok peasants. Their interests were different. The ohrok economy predominated in the non- black-earth regions where not so much the land as serf-ownership was the principal source of income. The landlords allowed their serfs to go and work in the factories or engage in seasonal occupations in return for ohrok. Therefore, the liberals, such as, for example, the landlords of Tver, proposed the emancipation of peasants with the land, but at a high redemption price, which was to include the serf’s personal ransom fee (the Unkovsky draft). For the landlords of the black-earth zone, on the contrary, the greatest value lay in the fertile land on which they carried on their economy by means of the harshchim. With a view to retaining the land in their own hands and converting the emancipated peasants into hired labourers, the owners of the barahchina estates agreed to the emancipation of the peasants without land. Such was the draft submitted by the landlords of Poltava. Pear- ing a general uprising of peasantry, the government favoured the allotment of small plots of land to the peasants at a high redemption price.

Despite divergence of interests among the various landlord groups, this was nonetheless a conflict within one and the same class. Both the serf-owners and the liberals were equally interested in averting a peasant revolution and in steering the Russian village, at the price of concessions and compromise, along the peaceful road of gradual bourgeois reforms, while keeping the power and the land in the hands of the landlords.

Such had been the path taken by the Prussian Junker-landlords who had arranged for the gradual evolution of their large feudal econo- mies into bourgeois economies. With the abolition of serfdom in Prussia the landlords appropriated to themselves the peasants’ lands. The peasants, deprived of the land, were compelled to work for the landlords as hired labourers on enslaving conditions and sell the scraps of land left them to the rich peasants. The agricultural labourers in Prussia had no rights whatever and were suled by the landlords on the basis of the Menials’ Regulations. The path of development of capitalism in agriculture which preserved the economic and political dominance of the landlords Lenin called the ^Trussian” path. It wal^ precisely along this ^Trussian” path of capitalist development that the Blissian liberals wanted to steer agriculture*

The Bussian peasaDts fought spontaixeotialy but stubbornly for the revolutionary path — for the division of the large landlord estates and the resolute **elearing’^ of the land of the last vestiges of feudalism, a(^ was the case in the United States of America, where, after the aboli- tion of slavery, capitalism began to develop rapidly in agriculture; capitalist farms developed in place of the former slave-owning planta- tions and on the vacant lands from which the Indians had been driv«  en oflF. Owing to the complete absence of feudal survivals the rela- tions between the farmers and the agricultural labourers bore a cleerly expressed character of class relations as between capitalists and proletarians. The newly-organized American farms made use of machines and artificial fertilizers. This path of capitalist development in agriculture Iienin called the ^‘American path' of development.”

N. G. Chsrnyshevsky (1828–1889)

The peasants, who were chiefly concerned in the abolition of serfdom, were allowed to take no part whatever in the preparation of the reform. Nikolai Gavrilovich Qbiemyshevsky — the great Bussian writer-democrat and great Socialist of the pre-Marxian period, as Lenin called him, championed the in- terests of the serf peasants in a program of revolutionary democ- racy.

Chernyshevsky, the son of a priest, was born in Saratov. He received his early schooling in a chur<^ seminary and later in the university of St. Petersburg. Chernyshevsky hated the tsarist autocracy which oppressed the Bussian people. While still a youth he sought an answer to the tormenting question of society’s reorganization in the works of Western and Bussian revolutionary writers. Chernyshevsky became a Socialist but his Socialism was of the pre-Marxian, utopian kind. Ghranyshevsky mastered the progressive historico-philosophical doc- trines of his times and became the follower of the materialist Feuer- bach, an immediate predecessor of Marx.

C^rnyshevsky held the utopian-socialist belief that the exist- ing peasant obshchina would enable Bussia to avoid capitalism and pass directly to Socialism. But in order that the obshchina fulfil this role, claimed Chernyshevsky, the peasantry must receive, at its emanci- pation, sufficient land to satisfy its needs. Chernyshevsky could not foresee that the victory of Socialism would he encompassed only as a result of the development of capitalism and the proletariat, through the class struggle of the workers. He ^^did not succeed in rising, or, rather, owing to the backwardness of Bussian life, was unable to rise to the level of the dialectical materialism of Marx and Engels.”

Chernsrshevsky "s sooia list views are fully expounded in his novel What la To Be Done^ written during his imprisonment in the Fortress of Teter and Paul.

‘‘But Chernyshevsky was not only a utopian socialist/’ Lenin wrote of him. “Ho was also a revolutionary democrat; he was able to lend all political events of his epoch a revolution- ary spirit, propagandizing the idea of the peasant revolution, the idea of the struggle of the masses for the overthrow of all old powers, overcoming all the obslaclcs and barriers set up by the censorship."

A disciple and successor of the great revolutionary enlightener, Belinsky, Chernyshevsky

in 1863 became a contributor to the magazine Sovremennik (Contemporary) and afterwards its virtual leader. Under him this magazine became the mouthpiece of revo- lutionary democracy.

In his articles on the peasant question in the Sovremennik^ Cherny- dievsky elaborated the progiam of peasant revolution. He demanded the complete abolition of serfdom and the granting to the peasants of personal freedom and all the land without redemption. Chernyshevsky closely Watched the progress of the reform and showed that the “emanci- pation” which tsarism was planning was virtual deception and robbery of the peasants.

He was particularly vehement in his exposure of the liberals who had struck a bargain with the “emperor’s party,” Chernyshevsky said that no matter who freed the peasant— whether the serLowning landlords or the liberals, “the result would be equally vile.” Cherny- shevsky called upon the peasants to rally to the revolution.

Nikolai Alexandrovich Dobrolyubov

Dobrolyubov and Nekra^ sov— Chernyshevsky 's political associates and collaborators on the Sovremennik^ fought hand in hand with him for a peasant revolu# tion and denounced the treachery of the liberals. Dobrolyubov (1 836-1 861 ) was a revolutionary democrat and a great Russian literary critic. His critical articles gave a deep analysis of the sociopo- litical purport of progressive works of literature, and he was an advocate of realism and a social aim in art. Like Chernyshevsky, Dobrolyubov was an adherent of the ma- terialist philosophy. In his articles Wha^ ia ^'Oblomovah- thina*^.^ When Will ihe Day .Cornel f The Realm of Dark^ ness, he branded landlord society and the autocratic form of government . Dobrolyubov ^s satirical verses bitingly ex- posed and flayed the treachery* of the Russian liberals. These verses were printed in the satirical supplement to Sovre*

mennikf called Svistok (The Whistle). Dobrolyubov died of tubercu- losis at the age. of twenty-five in the zenith of his great liter- ary talent. His health had been undermined by feverish, tireless work, Nekrasov, in his poem In Memory of Dobrolyubov,

Wrote:

Oh, what a lamp of reason ceased to hum, : Oh, what a heart then ceased to Oirobl

Nikolai Alexeyevich Nekrasov

The great Russian petet, N. A. Ne- krasov (1821-1877), also lived and worked in the days of the peasants* struggle against serfdom. Nekrasov was the son of a landlord, but while still a child he was fill^ with hatred for serfdom. He broke with his father, who was a serf-owner, and went to St, Petersburg “where he lived in great hardship in the squalid dwellings of the poor. Early in the ^forties Nekrasov was introduced to Belinsky *8 literary Circle and; be^nning with 1846, published the /SovremcTimfc— that militant organ of the revolutionary democracy. Belinsky was the leading light in this magazine.

-The years of his collaboration with Belinsky had a decisive in- Suenoe'on^ Nekrasov. At the end of the* ’fifties Nekrasov broke with hie fiMimer^friends, the Wester^^ moderate liberals — and joined the raiiks of the resolute iSghters for the peasant revolution. Nekrasov was the bard of the long-sufferii^ peasantry. His muse of “revenge and grief” flayed the old Bussia of the serf-owners and called upon men to flight for a better life for the people. Nekrasov’s ver- ses and poems: Poet and Citizen, Thoughts ai the Front Door, Songs to YeremutMea, Knight for an Hour, Orina — the Soldier'' s Mother, koi-Nose Frost, Qrand- •pa. Who Lives WM in Rds, Rus- sian Women and others, enjoyed great popularity. Nekrasov ewer- ciied a great influence on all the subsequent trend of Russian N. A. Nekrasov poetry.

A. I. Herzen and the Reform Preliminaries

Herzen’s “revolutionary agitation” (as Lenin expressed it) played a tremendous part in the social upsurge on the eve of the reform. In every issue of the Polyamaya Zvezia which Herzen was publishing abroad since 1866, followed in 1867 by the well-known magazine Kolokol, Herzen exposed the atrocities of the serf-owners and the tyranny oi the bureaucrats. The Kolohol printed notes, letters and the drafts of the reform bills drawn up by the liberals in Russia i

Herzen’s program of immediate demands was mediate: it called for the emancipation of the peasants with land, freedom of the press, and the abolition of corporal punishment. Herzen believed at the time that the new tsar, Alexander IE, would abolish serfdom and give the peasants land and freedom. Butin spite of these temporary liberal vacillations, Herzen remained a firm champion of the interests of the peasantry. His position differed radically from that of the liberals who expected the peasants “to be emancipated” only “from above.” Herzen declared: “Whether it be emanoipatkm 'from above,* ta ‘from below’ we are for it.” lliese temporary vaoillationli on the jpatt of Herzen and his reliance on tsarist reforms led to disagreement Vfith the revolutionary democrats. Ghernyshevsky and his associates vshe* mently condemned the mistaken portion taken up by Haezen. 13ie letter of “A Rusdan Man” to Heczmi, which Cherayskevnky hinnnlf or someone, in his circle is sup^xaed to hatn Written^ ctmtaiocd direct appeal to revolution: “Call Riis to take up the axe! FareweU^ and remember that belief in the good intentions of the tsars has been Russia’s ruin for centuries.”

The Abolition of Serfdom

"The Act of February 19"

Serfdom was abolished in 1861 at a time when the peasant class struggle against the landlords was at its height. The peasant movement, however, was sporadic and spontaneous. That explains why the serf-proprietors were able to put through the abolition of serfdom in a way that protected their own interests. The manifesto and act abolishing serfdom were signed by Alexander II on February 19, 1861.

This act reflected the bourgeois nature of the reform whidb was introduced by the serf-owners themselves. The peasants were proclaimed personally free. The landlord could no longer buy, sell or exchange serfs. The landlord could no longer prohibit the peasant from marrying, nor could he interfere in his family aiSFairs. The peasant received the right to make contracts in his own name, to engage in trade and other occupations, own real estate and personalty, and prosecute lawsuits in his own name. Ihe peasant was free to change his social status and become a burgher or a merchant.

The peasant who had been a slave, became juridically a free man, -Without, however, possessing full civic rights. The peasant’s personal dependence upon the landlord was done away with. Non-economic or feudal coercion was replaced by economic, bourgeois, coercion. Herein lay the essential diiFerence between the peasant ’s new status and his former condition of enslavement and total lack of rights. But the “Act of February 19” retained many vestiges of feudalism in the village and thus ensured the landlord a semi -serf exploitation of the peasantry. The peasant had to pay for the use of his former allotment as before either by personal labour or rent until a redemption con- tract had been concluded between him and his landlord. Meanwhile the peasants were considered **under temporary obligation.” It was not until twenty years after the reform, on December 28, 1881, that a law was passed making the redemption of these peasants’ allotments obligatory.

For the purpose of ascertaining the amount of land requircMl for allotmmt to the peasantry under the •^Act of February 19” the Gh^t Russian, Byelorussian and Ukrainian gubernias were divided into three sones. The non-black-earth gubernias comprised the first zone, the black-earth gubernias — ^the second, and tl^ steppe gubernias—^ the third. In each of these localities the tsarist government estabUidied two of allotments —a maximum and minimum rate.

In the rich black-earth zone the peasant received less land than he had had before the reform. The reform deprived the peasants of the black-earth provinces of almost a quarter of the land they had previously cultivated. In some districts the area of peasant tenure con- tracted still more after the reform: for exam pie, in the Samara gubernia— it was curtailed by 44 per cent; in the Saratov — ^by 41 per cent and in the Poltava province — by 40 per cent. On the other hand, in the non-blach-earth regions the peasants lost less land, and in the distant northern provinces, where the land was of no great value to the land- lord, the peasant received additional plots. For example, in the Vologda gubernia they increased their allotments by 14 per cent ; in the Vyatka gubernia by 16.5 per cent and in the Olonetsk gubernia by 18.3 per cent. The landlords increased the land allotments to the peasants only in order to obtain more from them by way of rents.

The best lands went to the landloids as did the watering places, pasture and woodlands, etc., which before the reform had been hold in common with the peasants. Throughout Bussia the landlords de- prived the peasants of more than one-fifth of all their lands. These lands were called otrezki (cuts).

The average allotment was only 3.3 dessiatina per peasant (per so-called census head) after the reform.

According to a clause included in the *"Aot of February 19” on the proposal of the serf-owner Gagarin, the landlords could, by agree- ment with the peasants, make over to them a fourth of the “normal allotment” without compensation and keep the remaining three- quarters for themselves. This was known as the gift or pauperis allot- ment and amounted, on the average, to about 0.6 of a dessiatin. The gift allotment represented an attempt on the part of the landlord to enslave the peasant.

The landlords deliberately retained a system under which the peas- ants’ land was scattered in strips throughout their own. Not infrequent- ly the landlord’s lands cut right into the peasant allotments which they split into parts and the peasant was compollcd to lease these land- lord wedges at rack-rents.

The peasants had to pay the landlord redemption payments for their freedom and allotments. The value of the land allotted by the landlords to their peasants was approximately 650,()00,000 rubles, < whereas the peasants had to pay 900,000,000 rubles. The state paid the landlords, while the peasants had to refund this loan to the state with interest in annual instalments over a period of 49 years. Bedemp- tion payments by the peasants up to the revolution of 1905 amount^ to over 2,000,000,000 rubles. This huge sum thus included both the TOiue of the land and the peasants’ ransom fee*

Ocmununal land tenme prevailed over the greater part of Bnsaia- All tile alM^uexiti of land were keld to belong to the oeii^iinit|r was now the village oommnnity that periodically redistributed it among the various peasant households for cultivation^ Gommuna] landownership hampered peasant incentive. Ihe redistribution of communal lands did not provide the peasants with a stimulus for making appreciable out* lays on improvements of the lands allotted to them. The peasant could leave the obdhehina and take complete possession of the plot only after he had paid down, ina lump sum, his share of the redemption loan. The peasants were bound by mutual responsibility, i.e., they were respon* Bible for each other with their property for the paymeni of taxes. Unless he obtained the permission of the authorities, the peasant could not leave the village in order to earn money on the outside. Upon receiving permission to leave for work outside the village he was granted a pass* port valid for net more than one year, after which he was obliged to re- turn to the village. Until 1870 the peasant had no right to give up his allotment. All these measures kept the peasant attached to the cbshchina and thus ensured the landlords a 8up]dy of cheap, enslaved labour- power. The reform of February 19, 1861 freed over 10,000,000 landlord peasants from serfdom.

The “Act of February 19” also formed the basis of land settlement for the mfcZmye (appanage) and state peasants. There weie slightly over a million appanage peasants at the time of the refoim. All the lands which they had been cultivating were made over to them (in 1863) as their property on the basis of obligatory redemption. The a ppanage peas- ants received 4.2 dessiatina cf land per “soul.” Thfey had to pay the royal family a total sum of 61,000,000 rubles in redemption payments.

The state peasants numbered over 9,600,000. All the land which they had been cultivating was made over to them for their use in perpetu- ity (according to the act of 1866). They received an average allotment of 6.7 dessiatina per “soul” and had to pay the state 1 ,060,000,000 rubles in compensation. The land settlement for the state and appanage peas- ants was more generous than f 01 the former landloid seifs. The smallest sum of redemption payments was paid out by appanage peasants.

In all, 21,279,000 male peasants were emancipated. Women peasants were freed without ransom, but no land was allotted to them.

The abolition of serfdom was a turning point in Russia’s history. The country’s economy was becoming capitalistic. Industrial oapitaK ism in Russia developed faster than it had before 1861, in spite of the existing vestiges of serfdom which retarded its progress. The state sys- tem of feudal tsarist Russia underwent a slow and steady process of bourgeois reformation. Herein lay tbe progressive significance of the reform of 1861. “Thiswas,” wroteLenin,“asteptowardsthetran8forma^ tion of Russia into a bourgeois monarchy.”* But since tbe reform was carried out by the serf*owaerS| they tried to retain as many of their privileges as possible. Bobbed by the landlords, the peasants found themselves entangled in a new form of enslavement, that of economio thrall to the landlords.

The Struggle of the Peasants after the Reform of 1861

The reform of Febj uary 19 did not satisfy the peasantry, which demanded the transfer to them of all landlord lands without compensation and complete emancipation from the power of the landlords. After the pro- mulgation of the E mancipation Act a peasant movement spread through- out the length and breadth of Bussia. In two years alone, 1861 over 2,000 peasant outbreaks were registered. In 400 cases the peasants ofiered resistance to the troops and were brutally put down. Hundreds of peasants were killed and wounded, thousands received sentences of imprisonment or penal servitude, and tens of thousands were pimished by whipping. Bumours spread among the peasants that the **Act of Feb- ruary 19” was not genuine and that the officials and the nobles had hushed up the “real emancipation.” Ihe peasants refused to perform their services for the landlords and rejected the “charter rules” which established the extent of the allotment and services. The largest upris- ings on these grounds broke out in the villages of Bezdna, in the Kazan gubernia, and Kandeyevka, in the Penza gubernia.

In the Kazan gubernia over one-third of the land had been out off from the peasants for the benefit of the landlords. The village Bezdna, Spassky uyezd, became the centre of the uprising. The uprising was headed by a peasant named Anton Petrov. The peasants brought the “Act of February 19” to him, since he was the only literate man in the vilkge. Anton Petrov locked himself up in his hut and after spending sleepless nights poring over the act, he declared to the peasants that they must obtain from the tsar the real emancipation which the landlmds had bushed up and in the meantime refuse to perform their labour serv- ices or pay obrok. The peasants of three uyezds rose up under PSetrov’s leadership, and began to seize the landlords’ lands. The movement last- ed a whole month. A big punitive expedition was sent out against the rebels under ihe command of the tsar’s aide-de-camp, Count A{»mkBin. He demanded that Petrov be given up.The peasants surrounded Petrov’s hut and refused to allow the soldiers to approach it. Apraksin shot the peasants down killing over a score and wou^ng 350. Anton Petrov was court- martialled and shot.

The landlords of the Penza gubernia cut off for themselves a quarter of all the peasant lands. The uprising inthe village d Kandeyevka began under the slogan; “All the land is ours.” The rebel peasants rode through the neighbouring villages with a red banner, calling upon the othm to join them, movement spread ov^ three uyei^ of the Penza gubernia and to part of the Tambov gubamia* I^oops were sent out against the rebels. The punitive detachments surround the peasants in the village of Kandeyevka ai.Ud dbot three rqupds. OAmmimhom crowds: diall all die to a man but shall not submit.” Nor could the wholesale whipping resorted to break their resistance. ”Even if you kill us,” said the peasants, ”we wonHgoto waik,and don*t want to pay oftrofc.” Eight peasants were killed in E^andeyevha, 27 wounded, and 108 beaten with ramrods, sentenced to penal servitude or exiled.

The Revolutionary "Raznochintsi” of the 'Sixties

Thestruggle of the peasants for land and freedom was supported by the revolution- ary movement of the intellectuals, the democratic JRaznochintai who h^ come to take the place of the revolutionary nobles. The Baznochintsi Were the children of the burghers, petty officials, the lower strata of the clergy and ruined nobles. The "Act of February 19” (1861) aroused great indignation among these democratic elements. Demonstrations of protest were organized by the university students of St. Petersburg and Kazan in the summer and particularly in the autumn of 1861. The alarmed authorities saw in this activity of the youth the beginning of a revolution. The military were resorted to to suppress the meetings of students at the St. Petersburg University. About 300 students were ar- rested and imprisoned in the fortress of Kronstadt. Bevolut ionary sen- timent waxed stronger. Secret revolutionary circles for struggle against tsarism were organized among the youth.

The leaders of the revolutionary movement of the Baznochinteu democrats were Chemyshevsky and Dobrolyubov. The Sovremennik (Contemporary)^ a magazine edited by Chemyshevsky, was the ideolog- ical organizing centre of this movement. Ihe mighty revolutionary words of the great writer-democrat roused the best people of the 'six- ties to a struggle against the feudal autocracy. In 1861 a proclamation was issued by Chemyshevsky *s circle, written in a simple, popular style, entitled "Greetings to the Manorial Peasants from Their Well- Wishers.” The proclamation exposed the deal which the tsar had made with the landlords and called upon the peasants to rally together and make organized preparations for an uprising against them. At the same time (Jhernyshevsky's friend, N. V. Shelgunov, wrote a proclamation "To the Soldiers.” Neither of these proclamations were printed because they fell into the hands of the Third Section in manuscript form.

Another proclamation addressed **To the Young Generation,” writ- ten by N. V. Shelgunov and printed in Herzen’s London printshop, was eirculated by Chemyshevsky ’s revolutionary circle. This proclamation called upon the youth to carry on revolutionary propagan<]b among ihe peasants and soldiers. The well-known poet, M. L. Mikhailov, was mrrest ed and sentenced to a term of penal servitude for distributing this proclamation. In the spring of 1862 the proclamation "Young Russia,” written by the student revolutionary Zaidmevsby, was issu^ in Mos- cow, Like Shelgunov, Zaidmevsky visualized the revolutionary youth as the main force of tl^ revolution and called upon it to rise in arms aaid destroy the ruling classes. In the beginning of the *sixtieB (1861 -1863) 1 he first big revolutionary secret society Zemlya i Volya (Land and Freedom) was organized. Its founders were a group of writers associated with the Soorem&nnik^ the revolutionary-democrats Serno-Solovyovich, Obruchev, Slfi|itBOv and Others, all members of Chernyehevky’s circle.

Chernyshevsky was the ideological leader and fount of inspiration for the entire revolutionary-democratic movement in the country dur- ing the period of preparation and enforcement of the peasant reform. The tsarist government resorted to a whole system of provocation and falsification to frame a case against Chem 3 ^shevsky on the charge of being the author of the proclamation to the “Manorial Peasants/’ and chiefly for his “adherence to materialist and revolutionary ideas/’ Aft- er keeping Chornyshevsky confined for two years in the Forlrc^ of Peter and Paul the government condemned this iiTcconcilablc fighter against autocracy, the leader of the peasant revolution, to 14 yciars* penal servitude and perpetual banishment to Siberia. Before Chemy- shevsky was sent offto servo his sentence he was subjected to the modie- vaJ rite of civil execution on May 19, 1864. The hangmen led Cherny, shevsky to the scaflFold on IVIytninskaya Square in St. Petersburg, made him kneel down, broke a swoid over his head and then chained hjm to the pillory. Chernyshevsky stood calmly under the rain waiting for this mockery to come to an end. When he was being led down from the scaffold a girl in the crowd threw him some fiowers and was immedi- ately arrested for it^

Chernyshevsky was sent to the Nerchinsk convict prison. When his term of penal servitude, which had been rtduccd to seven years, cam4 to an end , Chernyshevsky, at the direct orders of Alexander II, was again imprisoned in the remote Siberian town of Vilyuisk. in 1883 be was taken from the Vilyuisk prison to Astrakhan. And only twenty-seven years after his arrest, in 1889, was Chernyshevsky permitted to return to his native city of Saratov, He was already past sixty then. His health broken by prison and exile, N. G. Chernyshevsky died in October 1889 in Saratov. The great Bussian revolutionary-democrat Chernyshevsky had spent almost half of his life confined in a fortress, a convict prison, the Vilyuisk prison and in exile. Thus did tsarism avenge itself on its irreccmcilable enemy,

N. G. Chernyshevsky was a great Bussian patriot who gave up bis whole life to bis country and his people. While still a youth Gh^erny* shevsky wrote: *‘To contribu^ to the eternal^ intransi^t glory of my eountry and to the good of humanity — ^what could be greater and more desirable!” All his life he selflessly served those ends. /

Chernyshevsky wi^ a great scholar and demoeret, a passionate propagandist of scientific knowledge^ Marx and Engels regarded (3iemyshevsky as a great Bussian soiratist; They wrote that his economic works “do real honour to Bussia.“ Chernyidiev^

marks on the P< litical Economy of Mills was highly appraised by Marx. Lenin also regarded Chernyshevsky as a ‘^remarkably profound critic of capitalism.” Cfaernysheysky was also a literary critic and one of the authors of the materialist theory of aesthetics* Ihe books of Chernyshev, sky were withdrawn from circulation by the tsarist autuorities after he had been sentenced.

Lenin called the revolutionaries of the /forties to the ’sixties — Belinsky, Herzen, Chernyshevsky, Dobrolyubov, Pisarev and others— enlighteners, because their literary activity contributed to the political enlightenment of Russia, in the period when the working class of Russia Was still in its infancy and had, therefore, not come forward as the van- guard of revolution, the enlighteners were fighters against tsarist au- tocracy and serfdom.

Zemstvo and Municipal, Judicial and Military Reforms

After the abolition of serfdom tsarism was compelled to introduce other bourgeois reforms designed to adapt the autooratio-police system of Russia to the needs of capitalist evolution. The elective zemstvos and municipal dumas get up by the government admitted represent* atives of the bourgeoisie and peasantry besides the nobility. Lenin^ writing, about the zemstvos and the municipal dumas said that they were “the begimiiiig of local representative institutions of the bourgeoisie.”

In 1864 uyezd and gubernia zemstvos were established, being argans of local self-government which handled purely local a&irs ccmiwiaed with the rural population (road building, the building of hospitals, sdiools, etc.)« !nie uyezd and gub^ia zemstvos consisted of a repressaM- ative council called the zem^hcye so&faa^e and an executive board, the zemakaya uprava elected by the former and presided over by a represent** ative of the landed nobility. Representation on the zemstvo was reatiiot- ed by qualidoations of land-ownendiip which placed the zemstvo oioma* pletely under the control of the big landowners.

Ti^ uyezd zemstvo deputies were elected by the landloids and thh peasants as well as by propertied burghers, j.e., by the bourgeoiBi#% The delegates elected at the village assemblies elected deputies from the peasants. The peasants were usually compelled under administra- tive pressure to elect the kulaks^ t. e.,the rural bourgeoisie, as deputies. The gubernia deputies were elected by the uyezd zemstvo councils. The zemstvo executive board and its chairman were elected at zemstvo meetings and con&'med by the governor. The zemstvo was controlled by the landed nobility in its own class interests. A striking illustration of this is the fact that the peasants paid twice as much as the landlords in zemstvo taxes per dessiatin of land.Roads were built in the landlords’ interests and medical services were opened in the vicinity of their estates.

There were no good local roads at all before the zemstvo reform, only wretched country lanes. The roads laid by the zemstvos contributed to the growth of capitalism. The zemstvos in the ’seventies started the building of railways and the establishment of banks, thus further contri- buting to the development of capitalism. All the activities of the zemst- vos as elective organizations were imder the constant supervision of the governors.

In 1870 municipal dumas consisting of the municipal deputies elected by owners of houses, merchants and manufacturers, as well as high taxpayers in the towns, replaced the municipal duma of six deputies established under Catherine II. The municipal dumas were controlled by the bourgeoisie and operated in its class interests. This was strikingly borne out by the wretched housing conditions in the quarters where the city poor lived. The municipal duma elected its exec- utive body— * the municipal executive board called the gorodahaya upram — headed by a mayor. The munidpal dumas were under the su- pervision of the governors.

In 1864 the judicial system was also reformed. The former, pre-re- form feudal court, with its complete absenoe of publicity and oral ja^ocedure, was replaced by a new, bourgeois court. Hearings were now held in public, and procedure was conducted orally at the court sittings. A jury consisting of members of the nobility, and the urban and rural bourgeoisie was introduced for criminal eases on the circuit courts. The accused were defended by lawyers, and the suit was carried on by a public prosecutor. Petty cases were handled by courts of justices of the peace. The municipal dumas and the zemstvos elected the justices of the peace from among the big landlords and house-owners. Volost courts were established in the coimtryside for peasants only and these courts could inflict corporal punishment on the peasants. Civil cases were also decided publicly with the participation of both parties, t.e., of representatives of the plaintiff and the defendant. The civil courts were governed by new laws which protected property rights on the instruments and means of production both of the landlords and the capitalists.

The judicial reform introduced by the government was based on models of West Eurox>ean bourgeois courts and was the most bourgeois of all the reforms of the 'sixties, since the new courts protected the in- terests of the bourgeoisie.

Political cases were handled by the Svdehnaya Palata and the Sen- ate, as Well as by the military tribunals. More often than not, however, political cases were decided administratively: arrested revolutionar- ies Were summarily exiled to Siberia or to the north of Russia without trial or examination.

In 1874 the tsarist government carried out a military reform. Com- pulsory military service for all estates was introduced in place of the former recruiting system. Youths were called up on reaching the age of 21 . Part of the conscripted men were enrolled for military service; others (depending on domestic circumstances) were kept in the reserve. The term of service was set at six years, after which the soldier was trans- ferred to the reserve. For those who had received an education (i.c., primarily representatives of the propertied classes — the land- lords and the bourgeoisie) the term of service was considerably re- duced.

Though protecting the interests of the landlords, the bourgeois re- forms of the 'sixties at the same time opened wide the road to the devel- opment of capitalism in Russia.

Tsarist Russia took the first steps towards its transformation into a bourgeois monarchy.

Obliged as it was against its will to introduce the bourgeois reform of the 'sixties, tsarism nevertheless did not relinquish its reactionary policy, which was especially pronounced in the field of education. In 1S?I, at the direction the reactimiary Minister of Education, Count B; Tolstoy, the classical gymmrium was founded, with the dead Ian- gMges (i^iii and Greek) as its principal subjects. The teaching of ziatural sciences was completely banned in the gymwmum^ while the curriculum of mathematics and Russian were greatly curtailed. The primary zemstvo schools and their teachers were under the strict police surveillance of the government school iitspectom.

The Rising of 1863 in Poland

Poland on the Eve of the Uprising

Poland in the middle of the 19th century experienced an economic and social upsurge. Capi- talism made considerable progiess. Big factories sprang up. Industrial centres grew up in Warsaw, 2yrard6w and Ldd£. The D^browa coal district developed rapidly. Polish landlords introduced industrial crops in agriculture: potatoes for distilling purposes and beet lor the sugar industry.

The agrarian question grew very acute* in Poland in the ’fifties. The Polish peasants had been deprived of land since 1807, the year of their emancipation from serfdom. The dearth of land induced the I>easants to leave en masse for the cities in quest of a livelihood, a movement which was especially intensified in the ’fifties and ’sixties. The industrial crisis at the beginning of the ’sixties led to the closing down of many factories and mills, with an attendant rise in unemploy* ment, and growth of the revolutionary temper of the Polish workers and peasants. At the same time there was a growth of the revolutionary movement among the Polish gentry and the rising bourgeoisie, who chafed under the burden of their dependency on tsarist Russia. The defeat of tsarism in the Crimean War intensified the revolutionary movement in Poland still more.

In 1861-1862 an extensive national movement developed in Po- land. Demonstrative public requiems were held in memory of the leaders of the Polish uprising of 1830-1831. The streets of Warsaw became the scenes of patriotic demonstrations. Some of them ended in the shooting down of the demonstrators by tsarist troops, which still more enraged the Poles against tsarism.

In 1862 a “Cenlralny Komitet Narodowy” was formed in Warsaw, which was supported by a revolutionary organization called the **B6d Party.” This party consisted of representatives of the ruined petty gentry and the petty bourgeoisie. Another active political organization of the Polish landlords was the so-called “White. Party.” Contention for the leadership of the uprising and the nature ol the uprising /lU sell^its progiam and tactics-— l^ame the objects of a bitter struggle between the “Reds” and the “Whites.”

In order to remove the revolutionary elements the tsarist goy^* ment enrolled the young men in the cities in a special reesruit Jnent Isst^,, To avoid conscription the nsvolutionaiy youth iooh;^ to tbo woodS, where they organized guerilla detachments. Workers and artisans took an active part in these detachments.

The Rising of 1863

After the publication of the recruitment uhase an uprising broke out simultaneously in 15 places in Poland in January 1863. The *‘Centralny Komitet Narodowy” which led the uprisings proclaimed itself the revolutionary government (Rz%d Na- rodowy). An underground revolutionary government of Poland existed in Warsaw for a period of fifteen months. At the end of January 1863 it issued a manifesto transferring to the peasants all the landlord lands which they had previously cultivated. Simultaneously it issued a decree for the organization of a popular levy. The Polish i}easants enthusiastically joined the partisan detachments. However, the new government,’ consisting for the most part of the gentry, were scared jat the prospect of a peasant war, and revoked the decree concerning the popular levy, ordering the peasants to return to their homes. This counter-revolutionary measure considerably weakened the uprising. The Polish gentry placed all their hopes on the intervention of Na- poleon III and other states in defence of Poland. But they did not receive the promised assistance either from Prance or Austria. Alexan- der II came to an agreement with the king of Prussia for their j’oint suppression of the Polish uprising, and, mustering a huge army, he moved against rebellious Poland.

The uprising spread froni Poland to Lithuania, Byelorussia and the adjacent regions of Ukraine. A Lithuanian-Byelorussian Chervoni (Red) Rz%d was organized in Vilno to lead the uprising. Here, as in Poland, the gentry in the government hampered the movement. The peasants of Lithuania and Byelorussia, armed with scythes and axes, came out against the landlords, both Russian and Polish. The organizer and leader of the peasant uprising in Byelorussia was Kastus Kalinov- sky. He appealed in the Byelorussian language directly to the Byelo- russian peasants, wronged and oppressed by the landlords and tsarist authorities, Kalinovsky demanded a democratic system of government for a free Byelorussia and agrarian reforms for the peasants. Another of Kalinovsky ^s merits was the fact that he propagandized in every way the Byelorussian language. He championed the right of the Byelo- russian peasants to absolute political equality with the landlords. That is why the "\^tes” turned KalinoVA;y over to the tsarii^t hang- men. Standing at the gallows listening to his sentence in which he was called **Squire Kalinovsky,” he exclaimed indignant ly^ ‘^There are no squires among us — ^we are all equal.”

The attempt to start a rebellion in the Ukraine failed because the Ukrainian peasants refused to support the Polish gentry.

The u|»riBixig in Lithuania and Byelorussia was suppressed by the notorious Muravyov4he<*hatig^ With ruthless^ executions and reprisals. During the suppression of the Polish uprising of 1830-1831 he had said of himself that he was not one of the Muravyovs who are hanged but one of those who do the hanging. The nickname ^Tianger’" clung to this executioner of the Polish, Lithuanian and Byelorussian people for all time. He crushed the uprisings in Lithuania and Byelo- russia by executions, exile to Siberia, the confiscation of estates and the burning of villages. He put to death the leader of the rebel Zhmud (Lithuanian) peasants, Serakovsky, a friend and associate of Cherny shevsky, and the leader of the rebel Byelorussian peasants, Kastus Kalinov^y, as well as hundreds of participants in the uprising.

The suppressors of Poland adopted the same methods as Muravyov, the-hanger. The rebels carried on guerilla warfare against the tsarist troops, who wreaked savage reprisals on the revolutionaries when they fell into their hands. Wroblewski and Dqfbrowski-.— the future defenders and heroes of the Paris Commune— were among the out- standing revolutionary officers.

Only by the end of April 1865, 28 months after the uprising started, did the tsarist troops wipe out the last rebel detachment. One thousand five hundred people were executed during the suppression of the upris- ing in Poland. Many thousands of Poles were sent to Siberia and 30,000 rebels were killed in battle.

The Bussian officials in Poland pursued an inflexible policy of forcible Kussification. Tsarism even tried to erase the very name of Poland by changing it to the Warsaw General-Governorship, or the Provinces of the Vistula.

While all the forces of Bussian and European reaction were directed to crushing the uprising in Poland, Bussian revolutionary democrats headed by Herzen gave their ardent support to the struggle of the Polish people for liberation. Not wishing to take part in the suppression of the uprising some Bussian officers retired from the army. Others took part in the armed struggle of the Poles against tsarism. The secret society Zemlya i FoZya leagued itself with the Lithuanian-Byelo- russian Bed Bz^d for a joint struggle against tsarism under the slogan: "Tor Your Freedom and Ours. ” Herzen in the Kolokol staunchly championed the cause of freedom for Poland, and castigated her tor- turers, executioners and hangmen.

Western European workers, led by Marx and Engels, enthusias- tically hailed the struggle of the Polish people for fre^om and inde- pendence. Marx and J^gels wrote in 1881: “The Polish uprising of 1863, which led to the joint protest of the English and French worh^s against the international crimes of their governments, served the starting point of the International which was founded with the par- ticipation of the Polish exiles.

The Peasant Reform in the National Regions

Peasant Reform in Lithuania, Byelorussia, Ukraine and Poland

Serfdom in Lithuania and Byelorussia was abolished in 1861. A special local **Act of February 19” was promulgated for Lithuania and Byelorussia which took into consideration the specific features of serfdom in these gubernias. Preparatory to the abolition of serfdom the landlords — ^for the most part the Poles — ^took away the land from many Byelorussian and Lithuanian peasants and rented it out. On the abolition of serfdom the landlords left the serf peasants with very little land. Such was the situation until the uprising of 1863.

To win over the peasants of Lithuania and Byelorussia during the uprising of 1863 tsarism carried out an agrarian reform. The oblig. atory redemption of allotments at lowered rates was introduced. The allotments became the property of the peasants. All peasant liabilities to the landlords were cancelled. Thus the peasant allotments in Lithuania and Northern Byelorussia were considerably increased at the expense of the Polish landlords.

This reform was further extended to cover the rest of Byelorussia and Western Ukraine where very large Polish landholdings existed. Redemption payments were reduced by half.

After crushing the Polish uprising, the tsarist government intro- duced, in 1864, a peasant reform in Poland. This reform differed considerably from that of 1861 in Russia. All compulsory services by the peasant for the landlord were abolished and all suits for recov- ery of arrears from the jieasants were discontinued. The land which the peasants had been cultivating before the refoim now became their personal property. All land which had been taken away from the peasants by the landlords since 1846 was likewise turned over to the peasants. The landless peasants were also provided with land. The landholdings of the Polish peasants increas^ by 30 per cent.

The Polish landlords received compensation for the land which had been turned over to the peasants directly from the state treasury. There was no direct redemption of the land received by the peasants in Poland. Instead the tsarist government practically doubled the rates of taxation payable by the peasants. Fewer vestiges of feudalism were retained in Poland after the reform than in Russia. The Polish landlords, however, still remained big proprietors of land while the bulk of the Polish peasantry was left in direct economic dependence upon them.

Peasant Reform in Transcancasla and the Northern Caucasus

In the second half of the 19th century tsarism embarked on the extensive economic development of the Northern Gaucasus and Transcaucasia, With the develc^iment of commodity- money relations and the incessant peasant disturbances the liquidation of serfdom in this colony of tsarism became a pressing need. In 1867 a widespread peasant uprising, under the leadership of the blacksmith Utu Mikav, broke out in Mingrelia. The peasants fought against the colonial oppression of tsarism and feudal exploitation. Alarmed by the uprising in Mingrelia the tsarist government was compelled to introduce a peasant reform in Georgia. The Georgian feudal landlords did their utmost to obstruct the introduction of the reform. The abolition of serfdom in Transcaucasia, and especially in Georgia, was carried out to the advantage of the landlords and with ruinous results to the peasants. The petty landed nobles in Georgia were released entirely of any obligation to provide the peasants with allotments, and the otrezU (cuts) were very great throughout Georgia. Thus in the gubernia of Tiflis the x)easants were deprived of more than 40 per cent of the land. The meagre peasant plots were scattered in strips throughout the landlords’ holdings. The peasants were deprived of woodlands and pasturage for their cattle. In the arid regions the peasants could not use the water without the permission of the landlords. The peasants were compelled to pay high redemption prices for the scraps of land which they received after the reform. Until the redemption contract had been concluded the peasants were under a temporary obligation to render services to the landlords and were compelled to yield the prince-landlord one-quarter of their harvest of grain and grapes and one-third of their hay crop. The peasant had to pay annual rent on his farm amounting to 6 per cent its value. Most of the peasants of Georgia remained temporarily obligated to the landlords right up to 1912 when a law was passed making redemption compulsory.

Thus, after the reform, the pewswts of Georgia continued to pay rents and render forced labour services to the landlord. In addition, they Were obliged to make gifts to the landlord and work on his estate several days in the yeax. If the peasant did not make his payments in due time the landlord took away whatever property he had and sometimes his plot of land as well.

The peasantry of Guria suffered most of all by the abolition of serfdom. A Guria peasant aptly described his position in the following words: *‘When I go to sleep my head rests in the estate of one landlord prince and my feet in that of another.”

The peasant reforms of the ’sixties did not affect the khizam (the fugitive peasants), and the mountaineers who had, since time imme- morial, descended into the valleys and settled on the lands of the landlords. The khizans paid the landlords from one-tenth to OUe- sixth of their oro]^. After the reform the landlords, in dOrmeotion with the rise in lease values, tried to raise rentals and modify the t^ms of contract with the khizane. Frequently the landlords drove theih out of their old homesteakhi.

The peasants of Abkhazia refused to be reconciled to the alienation of the best lands by the landowners for whom they were compelled to perform labour services, and in 1866 rose in a rebellion which soon spread throughcmt the country. The rebels^ liearing red flags, captured the city of Sukhum. The tsarist government sent out a force of 8,000 sol - diers against the rebel Abkhazians, and the rising was crofilied with great brutality. This uprising compelled tsarism in 1870 to introduce a peasant reform in Abkhazia as well. By the law of 1870 every land- lord received up to 250 dessiatins of land while the peasants received an allotment only of 3 to 7 dessiatins per household, in which was included inarable land. The result of this ‘‘reform” was to create an acute land hunger among the Abkhazians. Even the tsarist offi» cials were compelled to admit that only the mountain rocks and swamps had been left to the Abkhazian peasants.

In 1870 the tsarist government also abolished serfdom in Azer- baijan and in the greater part of Armenia. The Act of 1870 obligated the landlords to provide the peasants with the use of a farmstead, tillage and pasturage, the landlord, however, being entitled to retain for himself a considerable part of the old allotments (the otre^). The peasants had the right to redeem the allotments without the con- sent of the landlords, but they did not receive a government loan, as the peasants had in Bussia. The peasant could, if he wicked, refuse to take any allotment at all, a thing that was not permitted in Russia,

The uprising of the Chechen in 1867 compelled the tsarist govern- ment to abolish serfdom and slavery among the mountaineers of the Caucasus. This “reform” was tantamount to absolute robbery of the peasant mountaineers in favour of the feudal princes. Though the slaves and serfs w^e freed, this emancipation was carried tlnough without the allotment of land, and for a ransom of 250 rubles. Until this ransom had been paid both slaves and serfs were obliged to per- form labour services for the landlord which sometimes ran into five days out of the week.

The result of this “reform” was to leave the peasant-mountaineers mere scraps of land around their houses, amounting to from 0.25 to 0.4 dessiatins. The landlords deprived the peasants of all pasture lands which, in the Caucasus, constituted the main source of existence for the mountaineers. Thus the former serf peasants and slaves again found themselves in thrall to their former landlords.

The Cendition of the Peasants in Other National Regions

Not even this kind of “reform^* was introduced everywhere in Russia. In the Kalmuck regions serfdom was retained until 1882, while in Central Asia, Khiva and Bokhara, the survivals of serfdom and slav- ery existed until the establishment there of the Soviet goverzunent.

The zemstvo and judicial reforms of the ’sixties were not applied in the naticmal regions. Govarnment-a;^inted law courts fuuctior^ in these regions, where trial by jury was unknown. Local courts in the Mussulman regions were left in the hands of judges from among the priesthood, whose judgments were based on the Koran, Proceedings were carried on in Eussian. Not even the zemstvo was introduced here.

All power in the outlying regions was wielded by the tsarist offi- cers and colonizers. In the Caucasus and Central Asia the administra- tion pursued a policy of ruthless terrorism and the plundering of the local national peasant population. In this they were assisted by the local feudal lords. These types of tsarist colonizers were stigmatized by the great Russian satirist, Saltykov-Shchedrin, in his book Meaara, Tashhentsi.

The Development of Capitalism in the 'Sixties and 'Seventies

Capitalism in Agriculture and Industry after the Peasant Reform

Specific Features of Capitalist Development after the Reform

During the first decades following the reform capitalism in Russia developed rather slowly both in industry and agriculture. Compared to the other capitalist countries ox Europe and America tsarist Russia was extremely backward technically and economically. The relics of serfdom that remained in the village after the reform of 1861 retarded the development of capitalism, as did also the obsolete autocratic state system of the nobility.

Agriculture after the Reform* The reform of 1861 left intact the root of agriculture’s economic backwardness — the landlord lati* fundia, i,e,, vast estates run mainly on semi -feudal lines.

After the peasant reform the peasant found himself land-starved. This and the fact that his allotment was cut up into strips, that he was deprived of meadowlands and overburdened by tsarist taxes, forced the peasant to rent tillage, pasture lands and hayfields from the landlord. In return he was compelled to work the landlords’ tilths with his own implements. This was the old feudal system of barahehim in the new guise of oirabotka (labom rent). Another form of this system was ispolshchina (share-cropping) under which the peasant paid the landlord half ot his crop in kind for the land rented.

Taking advantage of the destitution of the peasants the land^ lords and the kulaks hired them as labourers in the middle of the winter when most of the peasants were running short of corn. Receiving an advance of grain or flour or a deposit on account of his wretchedly low wages the peasant would sell himself out in winter to do all the summer field work.

The bulk of the peasantry (the poor and middle peasants) were so heavily exploited by the landlords that they could do nothing at all to improve their own farms. The landlords' economy amass- ing as it did huge profits through the semi-serf exploitation of the peai^nts evolved very slowly into a capitalist economy.

The otrabotka system of economy still prevailed in the central provinces of Russia when capitalist agriculture began to develop in the Ukraine and the Volga region. The lands of the ruined landlords were bought up by the urban bourgeoisie and the kulaks. Within twenty years (1861-1881) the bankrupt landlords had sold more than 16,600,000 dessiatins of land. The natural economy of the peasants was transformed into a petty commodity economy. The peasants were compelled to sell corn, frequently by reducing the amount of their own consumption. Property inequality increas^ in the villages with an attendant increase in class differentiation. A small group of rural bourgeoisie — the kulaks — sprang up from the ranks of the middle peasantry. The greater part of the middle peasantry were reduced to ruin and joined the ranks of the rural proletariat and semi-proletariat, a ‘‘class of hired workers with a plot of land,” as Lenin called them. By the beginning of the 'eighties no less than half of all the peasant households consisted of poor peasants with no horses or one horse. The periodic famines which recurred about once in every three years augmented the numbers of the village poor by ruined middle peasants.

The peasant bourgeoisie or the kulaks accumulated capital by money-lending and exploitation of the peasant poor. In the autumn when tax payments fell due the poor and middle peasants would take their corn to market and naturally the price of grain would drop. The kulaks took advantage of this to buy up corn cheaply. By January the poor peasant ran short of com and would resort to the kulak for a loan. For each sack of com borrowed he had to return two or more in the autumn or else cultivate a patch of the kulak's land. Frequent- ly loans were given at an annual interest of 600 to- 800 per cent. The poor peasant found himself hopelessly enslaved to the kulak. The credit received by him in the kulak's shop and pothouse involved him still more. On such predatory exploitation of the peasant poor did the Kolupayevs and Razuvayevs described by Saltykov-Shchedrin, the great Russian satirist, build up their fortunes. capital thus accumulated was invested either in trade and industry or applied to promoting capitalist agriculture. The kulak made extensive use of hired labour and up-to-date agricultural implements (the plough, the reaper, the thresW) on his farm.

The abolition of serfdom contributed to the penetration of capi- talism into the Xlkrainian village as well. The peasantry there was also undergoing a process of class dijBFerentiation and formation of a rural bourgeoisie— the kulaks.

The kulak farms in the XJkrainian steppelands extensively em- ployed machines and hired labour.

The landlords preferred to lease large tracts of land to the kulaks for a term of several years, and the latter, in turn, rented it out in small plots to the landless peasants, usually for a year. Thus the Ukrainian peasant found himself imder a double yoke — that of the landlords and of the kulaks. The peasant was obliged to pay a fixed number of oornricks for every dessiatin of land he rented. This was called skopshchiruit a form of share-cropping, and sometimes amount- ed to as much as three-quarters of the crops.

Particularly hard was the lot of the Ukrainian peasants in the territories west of the Dnieper where, after the abolition of serfdom, they lost the use of woodlands, waters and pasture lands.

Capitalism made considerably slower progress during the ’sixties and ’seventies in the agriculture of Byelorussia. Bjere, as in the rest of Russia after the peasant reform, large landlord tenure prevailed, represented for the greater part by Polish landownera. It differed however from the rest of Russia in that Byelorussian large landlord tenure quickly adapted itself to the new economic conditions, and Jandownership not only did not decrease but expanded still further at the expense of the middle and small landlords, becoming a capitalist agricultural enterprise of the Prussian type. The absence of i^ustry or other means of employment aggravate the position of the Byelo- russian peasants still more* The only occupations available outside the oppressive work on the landlords’ estates were lumbering or tim- ber-floating.

Capitalism also struck root in agriculture in Georgia after the reform. The contradictions between the mass of the peasantry and the kulaks in the village grew more acute, and the process of differentia- tion among the peasants proceeded apace.

In some uyez^ in Georgia as much as 80 to 90 per cent of all the sheep were concentrated in the hands of the rural bourgeoisie. The peasants, being in constant need of money, borrowed loans from the money-lenders who exacted as much as 200-300 per cent in interest. The Georgian village was on the verge of extinction. A tsarist general sent to ]^hhetia to ascertain the causes of the peasant unrest was obliged to admit that the peasants were absolutely pauperised. myself know,” he wrote, “a great maaber of peasant famiUp which eat bxmd only every other day in winter and sometimes once in three.days because they have no oom of their own and Jbivf 40 live from hand to mouth.”

Lenin in his great work Th& Development of Capitalism in Russia showed that after 1861 capitalism developed both on the landlord estates and peasant farms.

It could develop in two different ways: either by the transforma- tion of the landlord economies into bourgeois economies retaining the system of oppressive exploitation of the peasants (as in Prussia), or by the revolutionary abolition of landlord tenure and the free development of peasant economies along farmer lines (as in the case of America). The landlords and the bourgeoisie steered the advance of capitalism along the Prussian evolutionary path. The peasantry, on the other hand, struggled spontaneously for the American , revolutionary path.

The Development of Capitalism in Industry

Capitalism developed at a much faster rate in industry than in agriculture after the reform of 1861. However, good means of communication were an essential requisite for the development of capitalism and there were but few of these in feudal Russia. Suffice to say that in 1861 there was a total of only 1 ,488 versts of railway lines throughout the vast Russian empire . In the ffist decade after the reform two-thirds of available capital were invested in railway construction. From 1861 to 1881 — a period of twenty years — 19,600 versts of railways were built. The ^sixties and ’seventies witnes^ a groat railway boom. Granted concessions by the government, i.e., monopoly rights to build railways, important officials or landlords resold the^ concessions to Russian and foreign capitalists for large sums. Thus, French capital held a monopoly on the construction of railways in the ’fifties and organized in Russia a special railway company which at one time was granted the right to exploit all existing railroads.

Notable progress was made after 1861 in the textile industry. The production of textile goods incs'eased threefold betwew 1861 and 1881. Large-scale machine industry won the race against capitolist manufactories, and weaving mills forced handicraft weaving out of the field.

Heavy industry developed more slowly than the textile indus- try. An impetus to its development was given by railway construc- tion. 33x6 &st blast furnace, built by British capital, was blown in at Yuzovka (now Stalino) in 1871. The southern worb, built chiefly by foreign capital, began to manufacture rails and other railway equipment which had previously been imported. In the forty years following the reform — ^from 1861 to 1900 — pig-iron produc- tion and petr^um output inoxeased very considerably — almost t«fold.

Metallurgy in the Ukraine was still taking its first steps in the ’sevauties. Goal output in the Ukraine increased considerably for this pmod^fifteeulold betwe^ 1861 to 1881.

The sugar refineries and distilleries were the leading branches of industry in the Ukraine at the time. The area under potatoes for distilling purposes on the landlord estates west of the iSnieper was enlarged. There was also a considerable increase in beet cultivation for the sugar refineries. Seasonal '*sugar” employment, as well as seasonal '^steppe” employment in the capacity of agricultural labourers were at that time the main sources of the peasants’ miserable earnings in the Ukraine.

Industry in Transcaucasia developed rather slowly. There were only some small enterprises in the gubernia of Tiflis. The first meohan- ioal factory in Tiflis was founded by the Englidi. In 1866 the first large textile mill was built.

The construction of the Transcaucasian railway was of great econom- ic importance to Georgia and to Transcaucasia as a whole. The first railway traffic was opened in 1872 between Poti and Tiflis.

Lenin pointed out that the development of capitalism in Russia proceeded on an intensive and extensive scale. Intensive development of capitalism signified the further growth of capitalist industry, capi- talist agriculture and of the internal market in the main central area of Russia. Its extensive development signified the spread of capitalism to new territories, to the colonies.

Tsarism did its utmost, in the interests of the Russian manufacturers and millowners, to hamper the development of industry in its oolo- nies — ^the national regions. In this way it kept the markets open for Russian manufactures and pumped the raw material out of the colonies.

Lenin emphasized the fact that capitalism’s intensive develop- ment was retarded by the colonization of the outlying regions. The existing survivals of serfdom and poverty of the population narrowed the internal market and thus made a search for foreign markets im- perative. *‘If Russian capitalism,” wrote Lenin, *Vere unable to expand beyond the limits of the territory it has occupied since the beginning of the post-Reform period, this contradiction between capital- ist large-scale industry and the archaic institutions in rural life (the tying down of the peasant to the land, etc.) would very soon have led to the abolition of these institutions and to the complete clearing of the path of agricultural capitalism in Russia. But the possibility of seeking and ^ding a market in the outlyirg regions which are being colonized (for the manufacturer), the possibility of moving to new territories (for the peasants) softens this contradiction. ... It, goes without sajdng,” Lenin added, "that such a retardition of the growth of capitalism is tantamount to preparing for an even greater and more extensive growth in the near future.” This prognosis of Lenin :wbs wholly confirmed by the whole subsequent course of Russian history.

The Formation of an Industrial Proletariat

Simultaneously with the development of industry there grew an industrial proletariat, formed out of the landless and impoverished peasant masses and the urban craftsmen.

Lenin, in his book The Development of Oapitaliam in Rueaia, de- scribes the process by which the peasant was torn away from the land and turned into a hired worker. The ruined peasant was compelled to seek employment on the railways and at the new factories and mills. The factory workers’ links with the land weakened from year to year. By the ’eighties the factories had become the principal means of livelihood for half of all the workers in Bussia. Most of the peasant handicraftsmen were ruined either by falling into the clutches of dealers or else they threw up their crafts and went to work in the fac- tories and mills. ‘‘The forty years that have elapsed since the reform,*' wrote Lenin, “have been marked by this constant process ... of *de- poasanting.’”

By the middle of the ’eighties an industrial proletariat had grown up in Russia. Between 1861 and 1881 the number of workers doubled, amounting in 1881 to 668,000 men. With the increasing process of concentration in industry the big-scale enterprises accounted for over half the total number of workers employed. Thel*e were large enterprises such as the Krenholm Mills near Narva which employed as many as 9,000 workers.

The industrial proletariat was a new social class, called to life by the development of industrial capitalism. The industrial proletariat, unlike the serf workers and the petty handicraftsmen, was mussed in the large factories and mills and 'united by a spirit of solidarity. This facilitated its struggle against the capitalists and tsarism.

The Conditions of the Workers

The workers in the ’sixties and ’seventies were ruthlessly exploited. The labour of women and children was extensively employed. Ghili^en were sent from the orphan homes to work in the factories, mills', and mines.

, The working day was not regulated by law and usually amounted to fourteen and sometimes as much as sixteen and even nineteen hours a day* Adolescents Woi^ed at the Krenholm Textile Mills from four b’dc^ in the mornings till eight in the evening, sixteen hours ja da^. The nxmhm: of accidents was fety liigh as 6, result of fatigue kndt ^he absence of protect^x© rogulations-^the 'machinery not ]5eing brovided with safety-guartfe and nsually'^ hfeing cleaned while in motion*

Ixte workem reoeited m^rably Idw wages for long hours of work. AdoleleentS working 4t the itrenholm Mills earned fomr ruWesa m<mth fienr A iixteen^umr day, but they actually received in cash not more than eight kopeks a month. The millowner oharged 6 rubles 50 kopeks a mon^ for their maintenance, thus leaving them in debt to him at the end of the month to the amount of 2 rubles 68 kopeks. The worker had to work many yeais to pay off this debt. The average wage of a Russian worker was 14 rubles 16 kopeks a month for adult men and 10 rubles 35 kopeks for adult women. Many workers received a wage of 7 to 8 rubles a mcnth. In some districts wages were still lower. The wages of an adult worker in the Urals averaged only 4 rubles 80 kopeks a month.

But even this wretched wage was never received by the workers in full or all at once. Sometimes they were paid only two or three times a year. There were no fixed periods for wage payments. Part of the wages (from one-quarter to one-half) was deducted to cover fines which the employers imposed in the most imsorupulous and arbitrary fashion. The employers, moireover, frequently cheated the workers when calculating their wages. The workers were compelled to take bad food products on credit in the factory shops at prices twice or three times above market prices. The workers lived from hand to mouth, on a diet of potatoes, cabbage and rye bread. They never saw butter, meat or sugar.

Housing conditions were exceedingly bad. The workers were forced to live in factory dwellings on the factory grounds. Some ten to tFolve j>er8ons were crowded together in a tiny room in the workers’ barracks. This, too, became a source of profit for the employers who deducted exorbitant rents from the workers* wages. Begulations were diawn up for the tenants who were then fined outrageously for any violations. The workers were under constant surveillance and could not leave the factory grounds even after work hours or on holidays without obtain- ing permission from their overseers. The textile workers who had not yet broken their ties with the village, working in the mills only in winter and returning to the village in the spring to till the fields, were in the worst position of all.

The monstrous exploitation of the workers yielded the manu- facturers huge profits. In Russia, as everywhere else, capitalism bat- tened on the bones and blood of the workers.

Foreign Policy of Tsarism in the 'Sixties and 'Seventies

Tsarism’s International Position after the Crimean War

The

failure of the Crimean War put an end to tsarism's supremacy in Eu- ropean politics. Though still maintaining its role of Europe’s gendarme tsarism gradually became the instrument of West European capital. It no longer held a commanding position among the Western European slates.

Russia’s foreign policy was aimed at casting off the humiliating clauses of the Treaty of Paris of 1856, under which she was not allowed to maintain a war fleet in the Black Sea, build military naVal yards, arsenals and coastal fortifications. Counting on German help, tsarism in 1863 concluded a convention with Prussia which had supported Alexander II during the uprising in Poland. In turn the alliance with Russia helped Prussia win the wars against Austria and Prance and create a united German empire in 1871.

The tsarist government took advantage of France’s defeat in the Pranco-Prussian War of 1870 to declare itself no longer bound by the limitations of Russia’s right of securing her defences in the Black Sea imposed by the Treaty of Paris (1850). England’s protest against the breach of the Treaty of Paris was not supported by the other coun- tries. The London Conference of Powers in 1871 annulled those clauses of the Paris Treaty to which Russia objected (with the exception of the convention on the Aland Islands prohibiting the construction Of fortresses on them which remained in force until 1914).

A reactionary alliance of Russia, Germany and Austria was formed in 18t3 to combat the international revolutionary movement which had become a serious menace to the capitalist world after the Paris Commune.

Tfe alliance of the three emperors, hoWever, was , necessarily of brief duration owing to the serious contradictions which existed among its signatories. Most acute in this period was the conflict of interests between Bussia and Austria in the Balkans which both powers were striving to turn into their own sphere of influence.

The Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878

Bussia in the 'seventies continued to strengthen her influence in the Balkans where she endeavoured to establish a Arm economic and military base. The Black Sea and the Mediterranean could no longer remain the home- waters of a single Asiatic (Turkey) or European (Great Britain) power. Bussia, as a Black Sea power, was vitally interested in the free- dom of the straits, fearing lest any strong power, such as Great Brit- ain, take possession of the straits and lock Bussia up in the Black Sea.

Bent on the realization of her political and strategical ends tsarist Bussia supported the movement for national liberation of the Balkan Slavs against Turkish domination. One such movement broke out in

1875 in two Turkish provinces — ^Bosnia and Herzegovina. The majority of the population in these regions consisted of Serbians. In the follow, ing year another Slavonic nation, the Bulgarians, revolted against the Tui'ks. The risings for national liberation among the Slavonic nations wore crushed by Turkey with incredible ferocity. The population of entire villages that had taken part in the revolts were exterminated wholesale and massacred by the Turks.

Not wishing to begin a war with Turkey, the tsarist government lent its support to Serbia and Montenegro who declared war on Turkey in the summer of 1876. The Serbian army was commanded by a Bussian general, Chernyayev. A public campaign was launched in Bussia against Turkey in support of the Slav peoples. For this purpose a Slav (Committee was organized, which began to recruit volunteers for the war against Turkey.

Despite the aid of Bussia Serbia was defeat<5d by Turkey in October

1876 and compelled to sign peace. Little Montenegro continued the struggle alone.

The Turkish sultan, encouraged by British diplomacy, refused to make any concessions to the rebel Slav nations. It was not in Great Britain's interests that Bussia should gain control over the straits. Making preparations for war against Turkey Alexander U concluded an agreement with Austria-Hungary through the instrumentality of Germany providing for the division of Turkish territories. Austria- Hungary promised Russia to maintain neutrality in the war, in exchange for which she demanded the consent of tsarist Bussia to the seizure of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Bussia declared war on Turkey in the spring of 1877. The war revealed how totally unprepared Russia was both teohnieaUy and economically. The Bussian troops went to war under field regulations which bad been issued before the Crimean War. Their armament was considerably inferior to that of the Turks, who were supplied with new guns produced at the Krupp works in Oerznany. The Bussian soldiers, on the other hand, were ordered to “use bullets sparingly” and to make the bayonet charge their chief object in battle on account of the shortage of cartridges.

The Bussian army crossed the Danube in the summer of 1877. The soldiers displayed miracles of heroism and courage, especially during the famous defence of the Shipka Pass across the Balkans, when, under the rigorous conditions of winter, in trenches and snow.built fortifications, the Bussian soldiers repulsed an assault of the Turks and thus saved the army from imminent defeat. But the men’s heroism was offset, more often than not, by the incapacity of their generals. The Bussian command failed to make proper provision for protecting the flanks and lines of communications of the advancing army. A large Turkish army under General Osman Pasha operating in the vicinity of the strong Turkish fortress of Plevna represented a particular menace. Unless Plevna was taken the tsarist army could not make the passage of the Balkans. The Bussian troops three times attempted the storm of Plevna, but owing to insufficient preparation the assault failed each time. The Bussian command then invested Plevna which it subject- ed to a long siege. After the fall of Plevna the Bussian troops crossed the ice-clad moimtain ridges amid blizzards and frost and drew up to Constantinople. England, however, had brought her fleet into the Sea of Marmora and tlneatened to make war on Bussia if she attempted to take Constantinople. Austria, supported by Germany, also took up a hostile attitude. Simultaneously with war on the European front, military operations against Turkey were also in progress in Transcau- casia. Here the Turks were severely defeated by the Bussians who took the fortress of Ardahan and Kars.

A preliminary treaty of peace was signed at San Stefano (near Constantinople) in February 1878, imder which Bussia received the mouth of the Danube, thus establishing direct connection between Bussian territory and the Balkan Peninsula. A Slav Bulgarian piinci- pality was formed in the Balkans. Turkey was compell^ to recognize the independence of Serbia, Montenegro and Bumania. The Transcauca- sian cities of Ardahan, Ears, Bayazit and Bati m were ceded to Bussia. Tsarism was to receive from Turkey an indemnity of 310,000,000 rubles.

The San Stefano Treaty, which strengthened Bussia, ran counter to the interests of Austria and England who demanded the treaty’s revision at a European congress.

At the congress held in Berlin in 1878 tsarist Bussia was compelled to ipalre conpcssioiis, for die could not possibly fight both Austria and England. Following the decisions of the Berlin Gemgress Bosnia and Hmegovina were occupied by Austro-Hungarian troops; Bulgaria wad dismembered: the principality ol Bulgaria was formed to the north of the Balkans in vassal dependence on Turkey and the southern part of Bulgaria (Eastern Rumelia) was given back to Turkey. The northern part of the Danube delta was left to Russia and the rest tuxxied over to Rumania. Russia recovered the southern part of Bessarabia, and Batum and Ears in Transcaucasia.

Thus the results of Russia’s victorious war were. reduced practically to nought by the Berlin Oorgress. This created disappointment and discontent in Russia. The reactionary press defended tsarism’s diplomat- ic failure by trying to place the blame on the "treachery” of the German Chancellor Bismarck who had indeed had a hand in modifying the peace terms to the disadvantage of Russia and the peoples of the Balkans.

Germany, after her victories over Prance and Austria, had less need than before of an alliance with tsarism, whereas an alliance with Austria offered her greater advantages in the Balkans. In 1879 Germany concluded a treaty of alliance with Austria. This was the first landmark in the future world war of 1914-1918.

The Conquest of Central Asia

Tsarism tried to make up for a restricted home market fettered by the survivals of serfdom after the reforms of 1861, by new territorial conquests. The landlords and the bourgeoisie were particularly attracted to Central Asia which was a potentially profitable consuming market and a rich source of raw cotton for the Russian textile industry.

Three large feudal states had existed in Central Asia ever since ihe 18th century: the Kokand khanate, the Bokhara emirate and the Khiva khanate. They were constantly at war with each other. The Uzbek, Tajik, Kirghiz and Turkmen peasants were in complete depend- ence upon the khans, beys and the mullahs. The rich feudal-landlords had seized the land and the water. Wars, plunder and dire exploitation had greatly impoverished the people. All this facilitated the conquesc of Central Asia by the tsarist troops. Armed ss they were with flint looks, the troops of these khanates could not put up effective resist-^ ance to the tsarist artillery and infantry. Tsarism’s advance in Central Asia, which had been temporarily checked by the Crimean War, was renewed in the summer of 1864. General Chernyayev defeated the Kokand khanate and in 1865 took possession of its chief eco- nomic centre, Tashkent. Russian merchants, following upon the heels of the tsarist troops, began to trickle into the conquered territory.

Governor-General Kaufman launched a campaign against Bokha* lain 1808. The tsarist troops defeated the emir’s army and sdzed 8a- marfcanil^th© religious Mussulman centre, formerly the of

Tamerlane. An uprising against the Busman ocRujmsTdrs iMke Samarkand where only a small BtUssian ganrison had been stationed:; The mullahs proclaimed a holy war (hazavat) against the Bussians. The rebels stormed the fortress for seven days but were repulsed and the uprising was soon brutally crushed. The insurgents who were arrest- ed were summarily shot on Kaufman’s orders.

After his defeat the emir of Bokhara became a vassal of the tsar.

In the spring of 1873 the tsarist army marched against Khiva. The khan of Khiva surrendered without giving battle, and his king- dom was likewise converted into a Russian dependency.

The peoples of Central Asia continued their struggle against tsar- ism. One of the first uprisings took place in 1876-1876 in Kokand where the mullahs had proclaimed a holy war. It was led by Abdurrakh- man-Avtobachi but was quickly and ruthlessly suppressed by General Skobelev and its leaders executed. The Kokand khanate was annexed to Russia and renamed the Kerghan region. A few years later, unable to bear the intolerable oppression of the tsarist officials, the poor people of Ferghan rose again in rebellion only to be crushed again by the tsarist forces.

Turkmenia was conquered in 1880-1884. The nomad Turkomans’ camps were pitched between the Caspian Sea and the Amu Darya. In 1880 Skobelev seized the oasis of Akhal-Tekke. He took the adobe fort of Geok-Tepe by storm and in the following year occupied Asbkhab- ad. In 1884 the rich oasis of Merv was occupied. With the taking of the Afghan fortress of Kushka in 1886 tsarism completed its conquest of Central Asia.

Central Asia became a colony of tsarism. Vast lands fell into the possession of the tsarist family, the generals and officials. The institu- tions of slavery and serfdom were retained in the subjugated Central Asian regions by tsarism. However, the tsarist generals and officials did not come alone. With them came Russian workers, scientists, doctors, agronomists and teachers. These were a tremendous cultural and revolutionizing influence in the life of the peoples of Central Asia.

Increased Exploitation of the Masses In the Colonies

After the abolition of serfdom in Russia, the exploitation of the peasants in the colonies increased. Government taxes were much higher there than in Russia. The peasants became increasingly impoverished.

The hard lot of the peasants was aggravated by the fact that they enjoyed no political rights and were subjected to national oppression. There were, for example, no organs of local self-government (zemstvos) in Georgia. A country with a thousand-year-old civilization was not given a judicial system with trial by jury on the pretext that such a court was suited only to a cultural and developed country which, from the point of view of the tsarist bureaucrats, was not true of Geor^ gia. All power in the Georgian villages was in the hands of the elders and scriveners who were appointed by arrangement with the local landlords. Arbitrary power, lawlessness, bribery and violence were rife throughout the village administration.

The colonization of Georgia and Transcaucasia proceeded apace in the second half of the 19th century. The best lands were handed over to the Russian colonists to the detriment of the local peasants who were left practically landless. The royal family occupied the richest vineyards in Kakhetia. The Caucasian viceroy, a brother of Alexander , seized the famous health resort of Borzhom while the tsar himself took possession of the health resort, of Abbas-Tnman.

The peasants of Georgia stubbornly resisted the tsarist colonizers and Georgian landlords. They refused to pay ohrok or to perform their barshchina services, killed the most unpopular of the landlords, the kulaks and representatives of the tsarist government authorities.

In the second half of the 19th century mass disturbances broke out among the peasants in Georgia. In 1875-1876 an uprising broke out in free Svanctia which had never known serfdom before and refused ‘to submit to the tsarist officials. A punitive expedition was sent to Svane- tia and it brutally suppressed the uprising, arresting and exiling its leaders to Siberia.

Tsarism placed the best lands of Transcaucasia, particularly along the seacoast, under the control of the appanage department and shared them out to the Russian military and the big bureaucracy.

The Russian landlords seized the best lands in the Northern Cauca- sus as well, cultivating them with non-local labour.

Tsarist colonizers also took possession of the lands in Bashkiria. The allotment of a Bashkir herdsman was fixed at 30 dessiatins, the rest being turned over to a state reserve fimd. The tsarist officials, headed by the governor-general, made short work of this fund. More- over, they forced the Bashkirs ‘*to sell” their lahd to the Russian land- lords and capitalists. The Bashkirs “were paid” from eight to ten kopeks for a dessiatin of rich blaqk earth. This plundering of the Bashkirian lands under the guise of a ‘‘purchase deal” is strikingly described by Leo Tolstoy in his story How Much Land Does a Man Bequirel

The Russian buyers of pelts would supply the peoples of Siberia and the Far North with liquor and obtain their furs for a mere song. Ruined by this predatory exploitation, the peoples of Siberia and the Far North were dying out under tsarism.

Tsarist Russia was a prison of the peoples. Tsarism was the execu- tioner and tyrant of the non-Russian peoples. The numerous non- Russian peoples were entirely devoid of political rights and were sub- jected to mercileiM exploitation, insult and humiliation. The non- Russian peoples were officially called inorodtsi (aliens). The slightest manifestation of national independence was ruthlessly crushed.

This colonial policy of tsarism, however, met with no gfympathy or support among the Russian people. Tsarism was not representative of the Russian nation. Its true representatives were those best Russian men and women who considered it their patriotic duty to rally ail the peoples around the Russian nation in order to wage a joint struggle against the common enemy — ^tsarism. The friendship of the peoples was at that time a dream of the most progressive elements in Russia , That dream became reality only after the victory of the October Social- ist Revolution of 1917.

The Revolutionary Movement of the 'Seventies

The Narodnik Movement of the 'Seventies

In the ’sixties and ’seventies the peasantry, thoroughly dissatisfied with the refoim of 1861 , continued its struggle for land. It demanded a “black redistribu- tion,” i.e., the abolition of landownership by the landlords and the transfer of all the land to the peasants.

Until the appearance of Marxist grou])s revolutionary work in Russia both among the woikers and the peasants was carried on by the Narodniks (the Populists). They failed, however, to appreciate the leading role of the working class. They tried to rouse the peasants to a struggle for land and freedom against the landlords and tsarism and gave themselves up utterly, and frequently their lives as well, to this struggle. But all their efforts were fruitless, fer they had taken the wrong road.

The Narodniks were opponents of Marxism. The major eirors of the Narodniks were the following:

^Tirst, the Narodniks asserted that capitalism was something ‘accidental’ in Russia, that it would not develop, and that theie- fore the proletariat would not grow and develop either,

“Secondly, the Narodniks did not regard the working class as the foremost class in the revolution. They dreamed of attaining Social- ism without the proletariat. They considered that the principal revolu- tionary force was the jieasantry — led by the intelligentsia — and the peasant commune, which they regarded as the embryo and foundation of Socialism.

“Thirdly, the Narodniks* view of the whole course of human history was erroneous and harmful. They neither knew nor understood the laws of the economic and political development of society. In this respect they were quite backward. According to them, history was made not by classes, and not by the struggle of classes, but by out- standing individuals — ‘heroes’ — ^who were blindly followed by the masses, the ‘mob,’ the people, the classes.”

In pursuance of these erroneous premises the revolutionaries were determined to seek the support of the masses, or, as it was termed, "going to the people.” Dressed up as peasants, they went into the villages in the spring of 1874 to carry on revolutionary propaganda. This ‘‘going to the people,” is what gave them the name of Narodniks (narod meaning people). The peasants lent a willing enough ear to the Narodniks when they called upon them to take away the land from the landlords but remained deaf to the appeals to overthrow the tsar. The Narodniks did not win a following among the peasantry, for they did not really know the peasant or understand him. The Narodnik propagandists were hunted down by the police with the aid of the reac- tionary clergy and thf kuIaRs and the “going to the people” movement ended in complete failure. The Narodniks then resolved to fight against tsansm single-handed, without the people, by means of individual terrorist acts. And this led to even more serious mistakes.

The Narodniks who had escaped arrest organized in 1876 a central- ized secret organization called Zemlya i Volya (Land and Freedom). Among its founders were G. V. Flekhanov, V. N. Figner, Natanson and S. Perovskaya. The Zemlya i Volya adopted a Narodnik program based on the anarchist theory of Bakimin which denied that any benefit might accrue to the people from political liberties and a democratic system.

M. A. Bakunin (1814-1876) came of an old family of the landed gentry. He emigrated in the ’forties. In this period Bakimin advocated the liberation of all Slav peoples and the organization of a Slav feder- ated state with tsarist Russia at the head.

After his arrest for taking part in the revolutionary movement in Germany and Austria in 1848 Bakunin was extradited by the Austrians and imprisoned by the tsarist government in the Schlusselburg Fortress. He was released in 1857 after he had sent a penitent “Confession” to Nicholas I attributing his revolutionary enthusiasms to “immaturity of mind and heart,” and another penitent letter to Alexander 11. In 1861 Bakunin, who had been bani^ed to Siberia, managed to escape and go abroad.

There, influenced by the theories of Proudhon, Bakunin became an anarchist. He founded a secret revolutionary society, “The Interna- tional Alliance of Socialist Democracy,” with an anarchist program. Later he joined the First International founded by Marx and Engels. On the insistence of Marx, Bakunin proclaimed the “Alliance” dissolved, but in actual fact he retained his secret organization in order to fight against Marx and the international working-class movement of which Marx was the leader.

Bakunin was an enemy of the working class and a disorganize! of the international labour movement. His disruptive activities con- tributed to the downfall of the First International.

Bakunio also exercised an influence on the Russian revolutionary 2movement. He believed that the Russian masses were ripe for revolu- tion and all they needed was the spark of agitation to kindle the flames of a “general mutiny.” As an anarchist and a “rebel” Bakimin disavowed the need for the proletariat and the peasantry waging a political struggle and establishing a dictatorship of the proletariat. He demanded the immediate abolition of all government. His program and tactics were fallacious and harmful.

P. L. Lavrov (1823-1900), also the son of a rich landlord, was another theorist of the Narodniks. He was arrested in the ’sixties and exiled. His Historical Letters (written under the pseudonym of Mirtov) were published in 1869, in which he gave an idealistic interpreta- tion of history, making the “critically-thinking individual” the centre of the historical process, 6., he counterpoised the “hero” to the passive masses, to the people, to the “mob. ” Lavrov preached the false Narodnik doctrine attributing to the intelligentsia the leading role in history. In March 1870 Lavrov fled from his place of exile and went abroad. He had no understanding of Marxism and tried to prove that Russia could arrive at Socialism by obviating capitalism, since the Russian peasant was allegedly prepared for Socialism by the “political tradi- tion of the village community and the artel.” Unlike Bakunin, Lavrov advocated a peaceful propagandizing of Socialism. His preach- ings about the debt that was to be repaid to the people to whose labours civilization owed its existence, were popular among the noblesse revolu- tionary youth of the ’seventies and served as the theoretical basis for its “going to the people.”

A third theorist of Narodism was P. N. Tkachov (1844-1885) who asserted that the tsarist autocracy had no social mainstay, that it was “suspended in mid-air.” The task of the revolutionaries, accord- ing to Tkachov, was the violent seizure of power by a small group of conspirators who would then introduce revolutionary measures from above and shower benefits on the people. According to Tkachov such a group of conspirators could, by themselves, reorganize the whole social system. His views regarding the role and significance of the village community as the basis for a socialist revolution in Russia were sharply criticized by Engels in his article Social Rdationa in Russia i in which he exposed the reactionary natxure of the Narodniks’ idealization of the artels and the village community. Engels pointed out that the village community was everywhere the natural bulwark of despotism.

After the movement of “going to the people” had failed the members of the Zemlya i Volya decided to organize the settlement of revolution- aries in the countryside where they were to work permanently among the peasants as teachers, doctors, doctors’ assistants, volost scribes, etc. This attempt failed as signally as the movement for “going to the people.” In the middle of the ’seventies hundreds of Narodniks were sentenced to penal servitude and exile.

Narodism In the Ukraine and Georgia

Narodnik ideas and organizations spread to the Ulcraine and to Georgia. The ’seventies witnessed an intensification of the peasants’ struggle for land in the Ukraine. The landlords at the time were marking their bounds off from the peasant lands, in the process of which they deprived the peasants of the best lands and gave them waste plots instead. The Ukrainian peasants, like the Russians, demanded a general redistribution of the land and its allotment to them.

The Ukrainian raznochintsi set up revolutionary Narodnik circles in the towns. The Bakunin followers formed the so-called “Kiev Com- mune” which calculated on an immediate revolution in the village. The failure of the “going to the people” and the “settlement ” movements induced the Kiev rebels to resort to terrorism.

The Ukrainian rebels even decided to resort to deception and exploit the peasants’ faith in the tsar. They circulated in the name of the tsar a “Golden Charter” printed in an illegal Narodnik printshop in the Chigirin uyezd of the Kiev gubernia. This charter urged the peasants to organize secret organizations and promised them, in the name of the tsar, all the lands belonging to the landlords. The police and the gendarmes broke up this organization. The Narodniks acted as demagogues in the case of Chigirin, speculating on the political backwardness of the masses. The peasants soon realized the decep- tion that had been practised on them and turned away from the Na- rodniks.

Narodnik ideas in the ’seventies were likewise current among the Georgian democratic youth. Georgia did not have a village com- munity, but the Georgian Narodniks, following in the tread of their Russian associates, demanded the organization of artels and the institu- tion of commmial land ownership in the belief that the village commu- nity represented the only path to Socialism.

In 1876 the Georgian Narodnik organization was suppressed by the gendarmes. Some of the Georgian Narodniks took part in the all- Russian Narodnik movement but others were opposed to a common struggle in cooperation with the Russian people and advocated the organization of an independent Transcaucasian Federation beyond the confines of Russia. A tendency began to take form among the Georgian Narodniks in 1880 repudiating revolutionary methods of struggle and advocating the use of legal methods only.

Narodnaya Volya (The People’s Will). The failure of the “go- ing to the people” movement gave rise to heated controversy in the Narodnik organization Zemlya i Volya in 1878. Whf^jb was to be done further? Some of the Narodniks advocated that the struggle for land should be abandoned and terrorism be adopted as the sole method of struggle, their primary object being the assassination of the tsar. Another section tried to cling to the old Narodnik platform. In the autumn of 1879 the adherents of initial Narodism organized ihe“ Black Redistribution” party which, however, soon ceased to exist owing to the utter impossibility of continuing the struggle in the old forms.

The advocates of terrorism organized the Narodnaya Volya l>arty in St. Petersburg, headed by Zhelyabov, Sophia Perovskaya and V. N. Pigner. It was the aim of this party to assassinate Alexander II, on whose life several attempts were made. The most important of these was the attempt made in February 1880 in the Winter Pal- ace. Here the Narodnik, Stepan Khalturin, a worker, arranged an explosion which did not, however, injure the tsar. After this attempt Alexander appointed General Loris-Melikov with dictatorial power to combat the revolutionary movement, placing all the ministries and the Third Section (Secret Police) imder his control. Contemporaries of Loris-Melikov characterized his policy in the following words: ^‘Foxtail and wolf ’s jaws.” Loris-Melikov made some small concessions to the bourgeoisie: relaxed the severity of the censorship for the bour- geois-liberal press, and secured the resignation of the hated Minister of Education, Count D. Tolstoy, These measures made him a liberal in the eyes of the bourgeoisie. Under him, however, the persecu- tions and executions of the revolutionaries increased. Loris-Melikov closed the Third Section but instituted in its place a Police Department under the Ministry of the Interior which served the same purpose. Loris-Melikov promised to convene a conference of representatives of the zemstvos with the government officials for a preliminary dis- cussion of new legislation. This plan came to be known as “Loris- Melikov "s Constitution.”

On March 1, 1881 members of Narodnaya Volya assassinated Alex- ander II. Terrorism did not stimulate the mass movement but, on the contrary, weakened it. The tactics of individual terrorism were profoundly erroneous and extremely harmful. It was based on the fallacious Narodnik theory of active “heroes” and a passive “mob,” which were supposedly waiting for their salvation at the hands of the individual “heroes.” The “mob,” according to the Narodniks and members of the Narodnaya Volya, was the people, i.e., the peasants and the workers. Themselves they regarded as the “heroes.”

The terrorism practised by the Narodniks (members of the Zemlya i Volya and the Narodnaya Volya) impeded the revolutionary struggle of the masses, scattered the forces of the workers and peasants and intensified the government reaction.

The historical merit of the Narodniks of the ’seventies was their selfless struggle against tsarism and the landlords, their struggle for the transfer of all the land to the peasants. But this struggle had no socialist aims — in fact the Narodniks maintained a bourgeois-democratic platform. Lenin called the Narodniks of the 'seventies petty-bourgeois Utopian Socialists.

Marxism arose and gained ground in Russia in the fight against fallacious Narodnik theories and their most harmful tactics of terrorism which left no room for the organization of the mass struggle of the prole- tariat and the peasantry and retarded the creation of an independent party of the proletariat.