Library:A History of the U.S.S.R./Part 3/Pre-revolution

The First Bourgeois-Democratic Revolution

The Eve of the Revolution

Russia's Transition to Imperialism

Tsarist Russia in the System of World Imperialism

By the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centurj', the development of capitalism had finally brought it to its highest and last stage, that of imperialism.

Under imperialism the concentration of lirodnction achieves its utmost development. Almost the entire industry of a given countrt^ is concentrated in a small number of gigantic enterprises. Individual capitalists and cajDitalist combines enter into agreement with each other to eliminate free competition, which is thus superseded by the rule of the monopolies. Lenin defined imperialism as monopolist capi- talism.

At the same time an intense centralization of capital takes place. A considerable part of the free capital of a country is concentrated in a few banks which, from humble intermediaries in the exchange process become transformed into all-powerful monopolies. The banks utilize their enormous capital for the purpose of promoting the development of industry. Bank capital merges with industrial capital. Lenin called this new form of capital, which by the beginning of the twentieth century became dominant in all the biggest capitalist coimtries, finance capital.

Under imperialism the struggle for markets leads to an acceleration of the export of capital to backward countries, colonies and semi-colo- nies. The capitalists strive to monopolize the sources of raw materials. This inevitably gives rise to a struggle for the redivision of the world, to a struggle for new territories . Comrade Stalin has defined this most impor- tant feature of imperialism in the following terms: “Imperialism is the export of capital to the sources of raw material, the frenzied struggle for monopolist possession of these sources, the struggle for a redivision of the already divided world, a struggle waged with particular fury bynew financial groups and Powers seeking a ‘place in ilic K\in’ against the old groups and Powers which cling tightly to what they Iiavo grasped” (J. Stalin, Problems of Leninism ^ Moscow, 1945, p, 15).

Imperialism intensifies all the contradictions of capitalism to the utmost degree; those contradictions can bo solved only by the proletarian revolution. Under imperialism the contradictious be- tween capital and labour become extremely intensified. The exploita- tion of the working class assumes such a character that it realizes that the only way out is to overthrow the rule of the imperialists.

The contradictions between the various financial groui)s aiui imperialist Powers also become so acute as to lead to armed con- flicts — imperialist wars. The contradictions between ruling nations and colonial and dependent peoples also become intensified to the utmost'. The inhuman oppression of the inhabitants of colonial and depen- dent countries compel these vast enslaved masses to fight for their independence and freedom.

The process of formation of the imperialist system was completed all over the world by the beginning of the 1900'a.

In Russia, too, capitalism dcvolo 3 )ed into imperialism, but in Russia imperialism boro numerous distinctive features, Lenin and Stalin called it militarist-feudal imperialism. Mililarisi-feudal impe- rialism bears all the characteristics of the imperialist system: in- tense concentration of production, formation of mono])olioB, export, of capital, the merging of bank capital with industrial capital, struggle for the division and rodivision of the world, and the extreme intensi- fication of class contradictions. Thus, militarist-feudal imperialism in Russia was, above all, imperialism, a part of the world imperial- ist system.

The distinctive feature of imperialism in tsarist Russia was that Russian imperialism was enmeshed in a close not of feudal survivals. Remnants of feudal relationships survived in both industry and in agriculture and influenced the development of the various classes in society as well as the entire system of society and of stale in twen- tieth century Russia.

Besides capitalist methods of exploitation, militarist and feudal methods wore employed in tsarist Russia. The country was ruled by the representatives of the big feudal landowners. Owing to the restrict- ed nature of the home market, the Russian landlords and capitalists strove to conquer foreign markets, and with this object they seized the best lands in the border regions of Russia and plundered the native inhab tants.

In describing the nature of militarist-feudal imperialism in Russia, Comrade Stalin wrote: "To begin with, tsarist Russia was the of every kind of oppression — capitalist, colonial and militarist — in its most inhuman and barbarous form. Who does not know that in Russia the omnipotence of capital coalesced with the despotism of tsarisiUa the aggressiveness of Russian nationalism with tsarism’s role of executioner in regard to the non-Russian peoples, the exploitation of entire regions — Turkey, Persia, China — ^with the seizure of these regions by tsarism, with wars of conquest? Lenin was right in saying that tsarism was ^militarist-feudal imperialism.’ Tsarism was the (ioncontration of the worst features of imperialism raised to the second power” (J. Stalin, Problems of Leninism, Moscow, 1945, pp. 16-17).

Industry in Russia was very highly concentrated, but the methods of ])roduction remained backward. As regards concentration of production, Russia, at the begiiming of the twentieth century, occupied one of the foremost places in the world. In 1900, seven huge plants in the south of Russia produced 37.6 per cent of the entire pig-iron output of the country. Five huge firms in Baku produced 42.6 per cent of the entire output of oil in Russia. Factories employing over a thousand workers (constituted 11 per cent of the total number of factories in the country, and they employed about 50 per cent of the total workers in Russia.

The high concentration of industry was facilitated by the development of banks and joint-stock companies. By the beginning of the twentieth (Century eight big banks controlled 55.7 per cent of the total bank capi- tal in Russia. The banks controlled 50 per cent of the capital invested ill the iron and stool industry, 60 per cent of that invested in the coal industry and 80 per cent of that invested in the electrical engineering industry. Bank capital merged with industrial capital.

Largo joint-stock companies occupied an important placse in the industrial life of the country. Trade, and to some extent industry, was controlled by syndicates, which began to arise in Russia at the end of the nineteenth century and were the typical form in this country of tho monopolist capitalist combine. Already at the end of the nineteenth (jentury the Sugar Syndicate compelled all the sugar manufacturers of the country to combine.

At the beginning of the twentieth century many of the Russian banks were under the control of West-European banks. In 1901, French banlrs established the Northern Bank in Russia. The Deutsche Bank, one of the largest banks in Germany, controlled the Russian Azov-Don Bank. West-European capitalists invested about a billion gold rubles in Russian industries and banks and began to concentrate in their own hands vital branches of industry, such as iron and steel, fuel, chemicals and also several branches of the transport industry.

Cheap labour power, high prices of manufactured goods in the home market and the system of subsidies and protection introduced by thci government ensured huge profits for both Russian and foreign capital, in the period from 1895 to 1904 foreign firms drew profits from Russia tio tho amount of over 830,000,000 gold rubles, a sum exceeding the capital they iuv^cfcifcecl during that decade. Kruiu iorcign linanciers, mainly French, the tHarist government obtained what for that tim<^ wore huge loans. In lOOJl tsarist Russia’s foreign debt stood at tlu? enormous sum of 3,000,000,000 gold rubles. Ink*, rest alone on thest* loans amounted to 130,000,000 gold rubles per annum, and this im- posed a heavy burden upon the working ])0ople of tlie cH)mitry. As a. result of the intense inlliix of foreign capital into llussia, llussjan tsarism and Russian capitalism became (l(*])cndeut upon West-Muro- ]}ean hnper ialism .

The Russian and foreign ca])italivsts, aided and supported by tsarist authorities, sid)jected the workers of Russia to monstrous ex 2 )loitation.

The Industrial Crisis at the Beginning of the 1900's

TiiC' economic crisi^which broke out in Western Europe at tlic cud of tht^ nineteenth and iDeginning of the twentieth century very soon spread to Russia, The influx of foreign capital sharply diminished. Owing to the poverty of the mfcses of the peasantry and tlie low wages earned by the workens, the purchasing power of tlie po])ulation w'as low. This aggravated the crisis. Production diminished c uis'dorably, ])arb]e.nlarly in the iron and steel and fuel industries: in 1002, the output of ■|)ig iron, for example, dropped 16 ])er cent below that of J00().Th<% crisis mosi- <lisasfcrously alTcetod.the more highly capital istieally-tlovoloped regions (the Douetz Basin and others), where as many as 3,000 plants were closed down. Railway construction greatly dim'inislied. Thtis, from 1805 bo 1900, ever 3,000 versts of railwa^'^ line were laid down annually, whereas in 1903 only 453 versts were laid down.

Only the largest entet'iJrises were able to sxirvive* thes t‘r.isis. During this period huge capitalist monopolies were formed in Russia under tlu^ control of foreign finance capital. In 1902 the Prodam ot was formed. This was a huge syndicate for tlio sale of the products of the iron and steel industry which controlled 80 per cent of the entire iron and steel industry of Russia. In the oil industry there were two iaonoj)olist* groups — Nobel Brothers and Rothschild. In this ]xeriod too a sewing- cotton syndicate wasfoimccl, consisting of only two firms which mouoj)- olized the Russian sewing-cotton market. Jn 1004 the Prodvagon Syn- dicate was formed which monopolized nearly the entire sale of railway cars in Russia.

Taking advantage of the droj) of share ]}ric;os during the (Jrisis, foreign banks bought up the shares of Russian enterprises and banks and thus became the owners of these enteiprises. This still further increased the clependeucc of Russian capitalism ui)on West- European imperialism.

During the j)oriod of the crisis the number of factory workers great- ly diminished. At some of the plants in the 'Donotz Basin more than half of the workers were discharged. This increase in unemploymont led to a worsening of the conditions of labour. The employers took advantage of the crisis to rob the workers of tlio gains they had won during the industrial boom. Every wliore piece rates were cut and the working day lengthened. Adult workers were rc])laccd by youths and children who received only a half, or a third, of the pay which adults had re- ceived. The steady influx into the towns of starving peasants who const’tutod cheap labour-power also served to woi^seil the conditions of the workers.

The Beginning of the Mass Political Struggle in Russia

The Political Awakening of the Working Class and the Part Played by Iskra

The crisis hastened the political awakening of the working class. Their want and lack of riglits, the unbridled tyranny of the employers, who always received the support of the police, and the oppression to which they were subjected by the tsarist autliorities set the workers thinking about the causes of their hard conditions and compelled them to seek a way out. Tlianks to the propaganda carried among them by the revolutionary Social-Democrats, they began to understand that tlie worst enemy of the 3iooplo was the autocracy, which supported and encouraged the oruolost exploitation of the work- ers by the capitalists. An enormous part in the political odneation of the working class and in the organization of its struggle against the autocracy was played by the all-llussian Sooial-Domoeratic newspa- per Ishra, which was founded by Lenin.

Lenin, while still in exile in Siberia, drew up a plan for the publication of a proletarian newspaper which was to help in building up a revolutionary Social-Democratic party, for without such a party the prole- tariat could not fight for its emancipation.

Emphasizing the important part a newspaper could play in the work of organizing a party,

Lenin, in an article entitled ‘‘Where to< Begin?” wrote: ‘‘A paper is not merely a collective propagandist and collective agi- tator, it is also a collective organizer” (V. I. Lenin, Select- ed Works, VoL II, Moscow,

1934, p. 21).

The newspaper was ceaselessly to expose the crimes of tsarism and the treachery of the liberals.

It was impossible, however, to publish such a newspaper in tsarist B/Ussia. Lenin therefore decided to publish the paper abroad, where, at that time, conditions were more favourable for conducting revolu- tionary activities. The first issue of Iskra appeared in December 1900. On its title page it bore the motto “The spark will kindle a flame, words taken from the reply which the Decembrists in exile made to Pushkin’s appeal to continue the struggle. This motto was Iskra^s pledge to carry to the end the revolutionary struggle that had been initiated by preceding generations.

Lenin edited Iskra in conjunction with Plekhanov and other Social- Democrats. It was printed on tissue paper, smuggled into Russia, and there distributed among the advanced workers. Workers caught read- ing Iskra were liable to imprisonment and exile, but this did not daunt the class-conscious workers. They became extremely devoted to Iskra, which they regarded as their guide in their political struggle. They impatiently awaited the appearance of every new issue of the paper, and when they received it they read and re-road it until it was literally worn to tatters. A weaver from St, Petersburg wrote to the paper saying: “When you read the paper you understand why the gendannes and the jx^bce are afraid of us workers and of those intollectiials whoso load we follow, • . . In the past every strike was a great event, but now everybody knows that strikes alone are nothing, that now we must win freodom by fighting for it” (Iskra No. 7).

Workers in different towns acted as J,s'7cm’.v corrospondonts. Among these wore I. V, Babushkin and other advanced workers whom Lenin had trained in Social-Democratic study circles in the 1890 ’s. In tlio beginning of 1901, copies of the first issue of Loniu’s lakra reached Tifiis (now Tbilisi). On Comrade Stalin’s proposal tho Tillis Committee of the Social-Democratic Party announced its solidarity with the policy of Iskra. In September 1901 tho first issue of an illegal Georgian newspaper entitled Brdzola {The Sfrvggle)^ edited by Comrade Stalin, appeared. This newspaper was printed in an underground printing plant that was set up in Baku by a colleague of Comrade Stalin, Lado Ketskhoveli. Brdzola was the best Iskra-ist newspaper in Russia. Pur- suing the political line advocated by Lenin’s Iskra, it undeviatiiigly fought for the unity of the working-class movement of Georgia with that of the whole of Russia.

After tho Tifiis Committoo had declared its solidarity with Iskra, other Social-Democratic Oomniittccs in Russia did tho same.

The First Political Demonstrations in 1900 and 1901

As a result of tho industrial crisis and thei)ropaganda (jouductod by tho revo- lutionary Sooial-Domoorats, tho mass working-class movoinont took another step forward and i)assod from economic strikes to political strikes and demonstrations.

The first to como into tho vStroots with rod Hags and the slogan ^"Down with the autocracy!” were tho workers and students of Kharkov. This demonstration occurred on May Day 1900 and created a profound impression upon the workers all over Russia. In August 1900, after a strike of the workers employed in tho Tifiis railway workshops, Com- rade Stalin issued a leaflet calling upon the workers to commenco an open revolutionary struggle. Tho first open revolutionary demonstra- tion of the Tillis workers was organized by Comrade Stalin in April 1901, and about 2.000 workers took part in it.

In 1901, May Day demonstrations and strikes took i)laoo all over the country. Of exceptional importance were tho events that occurred at the State Obukhov Munitions Plant, near St. Petersburg (now tho Bol- shevik Works), which have gone into history as the “Obukhov dofonco.”

On May 1,’ 1901, as a result of the propaganda conducted by the Social-Democrats, of the 6,000 workers employed at tho Obukhov Works, 1,200 stayed away from work. The management dis- charged the most advanced and active workers at tlio ])laixt. This gave xiso to a protest strike which commenced on May 7. Tho workers dc^- mauded the roinstatomont of tho discharged worktu's and tho dismissal of a number of foremen whom they detested. In answer to tins demand the assistant manager said with a couteini)tuous sneer: “Next thing, perhaps, yon will demand the discharge of the Cabinet Ministers!” “Not only the ministers, but also the tsar!” retorted the workers. Police and troops were called out against the strikers. To bar their way the workers oroctod barricades, and when the soldiers arrived they wore greeted with a hail of stones, logs of wood and chunks of iron. The police and tho troops could not take tlio workers’ living quarters exce])t by storm. An active part in tho defence was played by women, Tlie workers in neighbouring plants joined the strikers. The liglit lasted throe hours. The troops occupied all the streets and side streets adjacent to the fi^oto^y. Eight hundred workers wore arrested, of whom thirty-seven were put on trial. At the trial, the workers delivered vehement speeches denouncing .the autocracy. Several of them wore condemned to penal servitudck^d to terms of imprisonment; tho rest wore deported from the capital. These sentences evoked protests from workers all over Russia.

Appraising the “Obukhov defence” as a new form of the mass pro- letarian struggle, Lonin wrote: “Street fighting is possible, it is not the position of tho fighters but the position of tho government thfit is hopeless if it has to deal with larger numbers than those employed in a single factory” {V. I. Lenin, Golhoied Work^, Vol. IV, Book I, Now York, 1020, p. 121).

Political Strikes and Demonstrations in 1902 and 1903

The mass working-class movement to an incroasiiig dogroo assumed a po- litical character. In Transcaucasia tho political struggle of tho workers was led by Comrade Stalin. On tlio iiistrucjtions of the Tiflis Committees he went to Batmn (now Batumi), and taking up his quarters in thc» working-class suburbs ho conducted revolutionary activities among the Batum workers.

In Batnm, Comrade Stalin organized eleven study circles and formed a Social-Domncratic organization in that town. On tho night of December 31, 1901, in tho guise of a Now Year’s Eve party, tho first Social-Democratic Conference was hold in Batum; at this coniorono(? the Batum Committee of tho Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party was elected.

In January 1902 Comrade Stalin organized and led the first strikes at the Batum oil plants. In tho beginning of March 1902 a fire broke out in the storehouse of the Rothschild plant. The workers spent two days and nights extinguishing tho fire, but tho management refused to pay the workers for this time. Tho workers threatened to go on strike and the management yielded. Encouraged by this victory, the work- ers in other plants went on strike in support of economic demands. On tho night of March 7, tho police arrested thirty-two strikers. On March 9 a workers’ demonstratioix was hold in response to Comrade Stalin’s appeal. Tho workers marched in columns to the doT)ortatioa centre whore the arrested strikers were detained, and demanded, their roloaso, Soldiers, their rifles at the ready, barred the way of the demonstrators.

Comrade Stalin delivered an impassioned spooelx to the workers call- ing upon them to resist. Just thou volleys of rifle firo rang out; fifteen men wore killed and fifty-four wore wounded. The funeral of the vic- tims of this massacre that was hold next day developed into an immense political demonstration against tsarism. The j)C)lic(i arrested 450 work- ers and made intense efforts to find Copirado Stalin, but the workers concealed him in their homos. As ho moved from one worker *s homo to another, the press used for the printing of passion- ate appeals to the Batum workers anti to tho Ajar ])easants was re- moved also. From time to time ho arranged mootings in the cemetery, the watchman of which S3unpathized with tho working-class move- ment. Soon, however, it became impossible for Comrade Stalin to hide in Batum any longer and so, taking his printing press with him, he moved to. the village of-MalAmudia, near Batum, where an old Abkhazian peasant named Hasliim concealed him in his garret. Old Hashim was inspired with profound respect for tho young revolutionary and began to help him. Every day ho would take a large basket filled with vegetables and fruit, under which wore concealed pamphlets and leaflets, and taking up his stand at the factory gates to sell his produce he would wrap tho vegetables and fruit in those loalh^ts and hand them to workers whom ho know. Those, in turn, gave thorn a wide circulation. The m^^^sterious activities that wont on in Hashim ’s house attracted the attention of neighbouring peasants and one day they came to Comrade Stalin and asked him what ho was doing. Comrade Stalin answered: “I print leaflets in which I describe what hard lives you arc loading and how tho trouble can bo mended.” “That’s fine,” said the old peasants. “What you are doing is for our good. , . . Until today Hashim alone hid you . . . now wo shall all hide you and your work to the host of our power and ability.”

Nevertheless, in Aju’il 1002, tho police managed to discover Com- rade Stalin’s hiding place and arrested him. In November 1903 he was exiled to tho village of Novaya Uda, in tho Irkutsk Gubernia; but^two months later ho escaped from there and returned to Tiflis to resume his revolutionary activities.

/. j The political struggle of the proletariat in 1902 and 1903 assumed ^vide dimensions in other towns of Eussia too. In May 1902, a demon- stration was held in Sormovo, near Nizhni Novgorod (now called Gorky) . The demonstrators were arrested and tried. At the trial tho banner- bearer, a worker named Zalomov, delivered a passionate speech in which he described the conditions of tho workers and called upon them to wage a struggle against tho autocracy. Subsequently, this speech was illegally printed and distributed. The Sormovo demonstration is described in Maxim Gorky’s novel in which Zalomov figuros^

under the name of Pavel.

An important factor in the political education of the work- ing class was the railway strike in Rostov-on-Don in 1902, which developed into the first general strike in Russia. The workers of nearly all the trades and fac- tories in the city were involved. The conditions of the workers in the Central Workshops of the Vladikavkaz Railway were extremely hard. All the workers, even those who had worked there for over twenty years, were regard- ed as day workers, and according to the tsarist laws they could be discharged at any moment without notice. The payment of wages, low though they were, was systematically delayed. In the beginning of November 1902, the 4,000 workers put forward demands, drawn up for them by the Don Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., for a 9-hour day and a 30 per cent increase in wages.

The management rejected the cla m and the workers went on strike. The workers of other factories in Rostov joined the strike and about 30,000 were involved. The Don Party Committee organized meetings in a ravine outside the city at which Social-Democratic orators spoke and read out Social-Democratic leaflets. For the first time in the his-

tory of Russia the views of the Social-Democrats on the tasks of the working class wore openly proclaimed at public meetings. The workers displayed fine staunchness and solidarity. At one meeting a Colonel of Gendarmes appeared and ordered the workers to disperse. The speaker who was addressing the meeting asked: '“'Shall we obey this order?” “No, we shall not!” came the loud and unanimous reply, “In that case remain where you are and let us continue our talk,” said the speaker. Meetings continued to be held. The authorities were dis- concerted by the organized resistance of the workers and called out the Cossacks from the near-by villages. But when the Cossacks attempted to disperse the meetings the assembled workers and their wives and children lay ilat on the ground. The horses would not step upon the prostrate people and the Cossacks were obliged to retire.

Several days later soldiers fired upon a crowd assembled at a meet- ing and killed and wounded several workers. So incensed were the workers by this outrage that they turuod the funeral of the victims into a revolutionary domoiisiTation. Only after mustering troops from neighbouring towns did tho authorities succeed in suppressing the strike. The police arrested many of the advanced workers and deported them from Rostov.

Tho Rostov strike, which developed into a political demonstration, was an extromoly important fiictor in stimulating tho class conscious- ness of the workers. As Lenin wrote: “For tho iirst time tho proletariat is standing up as a class against all the other classes and tho tsarist government” (V. Gollecdcd VoL VII, Moscow, 1937,

Russ, ed., pp. 105-106).

The workers were 1 aught by their own oxporionco tliat an armed struggle against tsarism was necessary.

They were led to this conclusion also by tho general strikes in Transcaucasia and in the Uluraino, in tho summer of 1903. At tho end of May 1903, a strike broko out among tho oil workers in Baku, The workers in the engineering shops and railway depots joined the strike. In June, 45,000 workers wore involved in tho strike, now a general strike. Even the bakers, bootmakers and tailors went on strike; shops wore closed and no newspapers ap- peared. Tho workers demanded an B-hour day and an increase in wages. The strikes wore led by tho Baku Social-Domocjratio Committee. Meetings wore held at which political speeches wore deliv- ered and revolutionary leaflets wore distributed. As there wore few troops in Baku, tho employers resorted to a manoeuvre and protended to accede to tho workers’ demands; but as soon as more troops arrived they withdrew their concession. TIxo Caucasian Party Committee called upon the workers of Tiflis and of other towns to back the de- mands of the Baku workers by moans of a solidarity strike. On July 14, a general strike broke out in Till is which lasted ton days. Soon this strike spread to all tho industrial centres in Transcaucasia and over 100,000 workers were involved. In a number of places the workers came into collision with the Cossacks and the police. At Mildiailovo (now Stalinisi) the workers tried to stop a train but wore shot down by the soldiers who wero guarding tho railway. This massacre resulted in the outbreak of new protest strikes.

The general strike spread to the XJl?:raino — to Odessa, Kiev and Ekaterinoslav (now Dniep^’opetrovsk). Noting the characteristic features of this general strike of 1903, Lenin wrote: “The strikes aifoot an entire area^ over 100,000 workers are involved, mass political meet- ings are repeatedly held during strikes in a number of towns. One feels that we are on the eve of barricades, . . (V. I. Lenin, Coh

leoted Works^ Vol. VII, Moscow, 1937, Russ, od., p. 106.)

The working-class movement rousod other strata of tho popula- tion, From 1899 onwards, student unrest and strikes wore an annual occurrence, and at their meetings the students put forth political demands. Bogolepov, the Minister of Education, issued ‘Temporary Regulations” ordering that students who were involved in this unrest be conscripted for the army. Notwithstanding the repressive measures taken against them, the student movement grew. In 1901, following the example of the workers, the students and radical intelligentsia in St. Petersburg held a demonstration near the Kazafi Cathedral. The demonstrators were brutally assaulted by the police. In 1901-1902 a general students’ strike affected all higher educational establishments and 30,000 students were involved.

The Zubatov Stratagem

The tsarist government realized that it could not cope with the working class by means of repressive meas- ures alone. Scared by the steady growth of the revolutionary working- class struggle it tried to check the mass working-class movement with the aid of police-formed workers’ organizations. Playing upon the economic needs of the workers, agents of Zubatov, the Chief of the Moscow Secret Police, called meetings of the more backward sections of them and told them that the tsar would support their peaceful eco- nomic demands if they refrained from organizing strikes and took no part in political struggle.

Zubatov societies were formed in Moscow, Minsk and Odessa. In Mos- cow Zubatov ’s agents succeeded, on February 19 , 1902, the anniversary of the abortion of serfdom, in organizing a monarchist demonstration of workers to the monument of Alexander II. Soon, however, this insid- ious movement utterly collapsed. The revolutionary Social-Democrats, followers of Lenin, exposed the fact that the police were behind the Zubatov organizations. In spite of the opposition of Zubatov ’s agents, the workers backed their economic demands by strikes. Fearing that he would lose his influence over the workers, Zubatov sent police offi- cials to the factory owners and compelled them to make concessions to the workers. This roused the ire of the Moscow factory owners and they protested against Zubatov ’s activities. One of them, a Frenchman named Goujon, complained to the French Ambassador that Zubatov was supporting a strike at his plant. The ambassador communicated this complaint to the Russian government and soon after the Zubatov ' organizations in Moscow were dissolved.

The failure of the Zubatov stratagem as an attempt on the part of the government to “harmonize” the economic needs and demands of the workers with the “aims of the Russian autocracy" was most vividly revealed by the general strike in Odessa in 1903. Here an economic strilco which had been organized with the help of Zubatov agents devel- oped into a political strike. Even the most backward workers became convinced that the Zubatov organizations wore a police affair and began to go ovor to the side of Social-Democracy. Plehve, the Minister of the Interior, made haste to dissolve these organizations. The chief reason for the failure of tlio Ziibatov organizations, however, was tho growth of tho working-class movement, which was not to bo checked by means of a barrier like tho Zubatov stratagem.

The Peasant Movement in 1902, The revolutionary struggle waged by the workers aifocted tho peasantry, among whom discontent continued to grow. Tlio chief reason Ibr this discontent was that when they wore “liberated” in 18()1 the landlords do])rivod them of the best parts of tho land which they had cull/ivatod. Hence, tho ]ioasants were obliged to rent land from the landlords, mak ng iiayment in tho shaj)© of work on tho landlord’s estate or of half tho crop raised on tho land rented. Tho huge estates of tho landlords — ^tho latifundia — continued bo hinder tho dovolopment of peasant farming. As Lenin wrote: . .The sum and substance of tho matter is that at one pole

of Russian agriculture we have 10,500,000 households (about 50,000,000 inhabitants) with 75,000,000 desyatins of land and at the other polo we have thirty thousand families (about 150,000 inliabitants) with 70,000,000 desyatins of land” (V. I. Lenin, Golkcied Works, Yol. XII, Moscow, 1937, Russ, od., p. 224).

Thus, on the average, one peasant family had se\'en desyatins of land whereas the latifundia of a single squire amounted to 2,333 desyatins, i, e., 333 times as much. Tho old serf form of (^xjdoitation crushed and ruined tho peasants. After tho frightful famine of 1801-1802 the peasants, up to 1900, experienced another three famine years and two that were almost such. In the autumn and winter of 1001-1002 there was another famine , The kulaks took advantage of fcho liard straits of the peasantry to got tho poorer section of them into their clutches. In this way nearly hah' tho area of peasant lands, passed into their hands.

Owing to the growth of the peasant poxmlati on, the average peas- ant allotment by the beginning of tho twentieth century was only half the size it had boon in tho past. Tho land hunger of the ]ioasants increased and obliged them to rent land from the landlords and kulaks at exorbitant rents. In some places the rent oxcood- ed the income that could bo derived from tho land because, while rents, rose, income from the land dropped, particularly in bad harvest years.

The impoverishment of the bulk of the peasantry increased and this caused an increase in arrears in tho payment of taxes. In some counties the peasants were as much as three or four years in arrears. The ruined and impoverished peasantry began to fight for tho aboli- tion of landlordism.

In the spring of 1002 considerable peasant unrest broke out in the Ukraine — in the Kharkov and Poltava (jubemias whore tho jieasants’ land hunger was particularly acute. By tho beginning of the twen- tieth century the average peasant allotment in tho I’oltava Gubornia. had shrunk to one desyatin, whereas tho landlords owned as much as 60 per cent of the entire land in the gubernia. The industrial crisis still further aggravated the poverty of the peasants as it deprived them of the opportunity of finding work in the towns. The peasants rose in revolt, raided the landlords* estates and shared their grain stocks and cattle among themselves. Landlords were killed by peasants who set fire to their farm buildings and other property.

Troops were called out against the peasants. After a wholesale flogging many of them were put on trial and sentenced to long terms of imprisonment. Pines were imposed upon them for the benefit of the landlords amounting to 800,000 rubles. Notwithstanding the stern punishment that was infl cted upon the peasants in the Ukraine, the revolutionary peasant movement spread to other gubernias and was particularly intense in the Saratov Gubernia. Here the peasants fought the landlords by setting fire to their mansions, trespassing on their land, cutting down their trees, setting fire to their crops, and so forth. Peasant riots also broke out in the Tambov, Voronezh and Ekaterinoslav Gubernias, and also in the Caucasus.

In 1903 the peasant movement assumed an exceptionally mass and militant character in Guria where, influenced by the Transcaucasian Bolsheviks, it assumed a political character. The peasants refused to de- liver half their crops to the landlords, refused to pay the tithes for the maintenance of the clergy, refused to pay taxes, would not recog- nize the tsar*s officials and refused in a body to perform labour rent. To assist the Transcaucasian landlords the tsarist government sent in Cossacks who dealt cruelly with the peasants; it also deport- ed many of the peasants to Siberia -

Taken on the whole, however, the peasant revolt of 1902 did not yet assume the character of an organized mass movement. Lenin attrib- uted this failure to the following reasons: "The peasant revolt was crushed because it was a revolt of an ignorant, unconscious mass, a re- volt without definite and clear 'political demands, i. c., without de- mands for a change in the system of state. The peasant revolt was crushed because it took place withoiU 'preparation. The peasant revolt was crushed because the rural proletarians had not yet formed an alliance with the urban proletarians. These are the three rea- sons for the first failure of the peasants’’ (V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. V, Moscow, 1937, Russ, ed., p. 312).

Lenin dealt with the conditions of the peasants in Russia in his pamphlet To the Rural Poor in which he called upon the peasants to wage a determined struggle under the leadership of the workers against the tsar and the landlords.

The Struggle to Create a Revolutionary Proletarian Party

Preparations for the Formation of a Party of a New Type

In the epoch of iniporialiKin tho utter incapability of tho old Social-Democratic parties of Western Europe to organize tlio workers for a revolutionary struggle for tho proletarian revolution was clearly re- vealed. Hence, Lenin anjl his supporters launchod a struggle for tho formation of a party of a now typo.

As Comrade Stalin wrote subsequently, the conditions prevailing under imperialism reveal ‘^tho necessity for a new party, a militant party, a revolutionary party, one bold enough to load the proletar- ians in the struggle for power, sullicdontly oxporioncod to find its bearings amidst the complex conditions of the revolutionary situation and sufficiently flexible to steer clear of all submerged rocks in the path to its goal” (J. Stalin, Problems of Laninim,, Moscow, 1945, p. 81).

The new party that Lenin and Stalin and tlieir closest colleagues built up was armed with the weaj)on of Marxism-Loniiiism— tho most advanced revolutionary theory extant.

The most important task that confronted Lenin ’s Ishra was to draw up a program around which the Party was to unite. This ])rogram indicated first and foremost tlie ultimate aim of tlio proletarian class Struggle- Socialism. This was tho maximum program. It also formulated tho demands for which tho proletariat fought while on tho road to tlio ultimate goal. This was the minimum program.

Lenin unfolded his plan for building a party of a now typo in What Is To Be Done? In this work of genius he urged that tho nucleus of tho Party should consist of professional revolutionaries for whom Party work would be their main profession. Ajnidst the conditions prevailing under tsarism, theParty could not bo other than a strictly secret organization, but at the same time it must not isolate itself from the working class, of which it was the vanguard. The members of the Party must be united ideologically and organizationally; they must be united in their advocacy of Marxian theory, uphold the pro- gram and tactics of tho Party, take an active part in the work of the Party organization and maintain Party discipline. Lenin pointed out that the task of the Marxist party was to combine Socialism with tho working-class movement. Only by disseminating tho great teachings of Marx among the working class, urged Lenin and Stalin, could the Party infuse socialist consciousness into tho spontaneous working-class movement and make the proletariat understand its world historic mission to build the new socialist society.

The Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.

Mm rallied around itself a compact organization of professional revolutionaries led by Lenin and Stalin. Among Iskra^s agents, as the supporters of Lenin were then called, were N. E. Bauman and I. V. Babushkin. After winning the support of the majority of the Social-Democratic Committees in B.ussia, the Ishra organization set to work to prepare the Second Congress of the Party. This congress took place abroad in July and August 1903, (in Brussels, and later in London).

The congress adopted the Party program as presented by Ishra. The opportunists at the congress opposed this program, in particu- lar, the demand for the dictatorship of the proletariat. But Lenin answered them with crushing efiect. The sharpest disagreements at the congress arose over the formulation of point 1 of the Party Rules. Lenin’s formulation of point 1 read as follows: “A member of the Party is one who accepts its program, and supports it both financially and by his personal participation in the work of one of its organizations.” The formulation proposed by the opportunist Martov called merely for the acceptance of the program and the rendering of financial support, but did not make it obligatory to participate in the work of one of the Party organizations. Unlike Lenin’s formulation, the one proposed by Martov opened the door of the Party to unstable non-proletarian elements. With the object of preventing the Party from being swamped by petty-bourgeois elements the Leninists made strict demands on those who wished to join the Party.

In appraising the essence of that struggle Comrade Stalin wrote: ^'By their formula on Party membership the Bolsheviks wanted to set up an organizational barrier against the influx of non-prole- tarian elements into the Party. The danger of such an influx was very real at that time in view of the bourgeois-democratic character of the Russian revolution” (J. Stalin, Problems of Leninism ^ Moscow, 1946, p. 381).

The Leninists stood for a militant revolutionary proletarian party; the Martovites stood for a petty-bourgeois opportunist party.

At the elections of the central bodies of the Party, Lenin’s support- ers obtained a majority and from that time onwards were called Bolsheviks. The opportunist Martovites were left in the minority and were thenceforth called Mensheviks,* The Mensheviks, who took the place of the Economists, reflected the interests of the non-proletarian,

. petty-bourgeois strata of society.

The Second Congress of the Party played an extremely important role in the history of the Russian and international proletariat. At this congress was formed the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (R.S.D.L.P.)j revolutionary party of the working class in our country.

To combat tho efforts of tlie Menshevilcs to turn the Party back to the old road of amateur and study-circle methods, Lenin wrote that splendid book Om Step Forward, Two Steps Back, in which, for the &st time in tho history of Marxism, ho expounded tho doctrine that the Marxist party is the proletariat's chief weapon in its struggle for the proletarian revolution.

Tsarism and the Bourgeoisie on the Eve of the Revolution

The Bourgeois Liberal Opposition

Tho mass movement of the proletariat and the peasantry in the beginning of the twentieth century helped to rouse the bourgeois liberals and the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia to political activity.

The stronghold of the liberal landlords wore the Zemstvo achninis- trations which dealt with the local affairs of the rural population. The Zemstvo liberal landlords wore, connootod with tho liberal bour- geoisie and were almost merged with them, for they themselves wore beginning to introduce capitalist methods in agriculturo. Political groups of tho liberal bourgooisio arosc^ and in tho Hummer of 1903 those groups united to form tho lioague of KmancipaLion, which claimed as its object tho ostablishinent of a constitutional monarchy in RmsHia. They accused tho workers and peasants who wore fighting for thoir economic and political emancipation;, of displaying “class egoism,” and they attributed the poverty of tho peasants and the agrarian move- ment to the “ignorance of tho peasants,” Tho bourgeois liberals were hostile to revolution and wanted to achieve tho constitutional mon- archy by peaceful moans.

In the columns of Iskra Lenin constantly denounced tho treachery and cowardice of the bourgeois-liberal opposition.

As a result of the peasant movement, Narodnilc organizations began to spring up again among a section of the potty-bourgoois intelli- gentsia. In 1902 these groups united to form tho Socialist-Revolution- ary Party (known for short as tho S.R.s), which revived the tactics of individual terrorism against the tsar's ministers. In April 1902 tho Minister of the Interior Sipyagin was assassinated. His place was taken by the arch reactionary Plehvo, who for many years liad been at the head of tho secret political police. Tho terrorist tactics of tho Socialist-Revo- lutionaries caused enormous harm to the revolutionary movement, par- ticularly in view of the development of the mass struggle. The terrorist section of tho Socialist-Revolutionary Party was hoailod by Azof, who was subsequently proved to bo an agent provocatenr. Ho direotod tho ■ entire terroristic activities of tho Socialist-Revolutionary Party under the instructions and in the interest of the tsarist secret police and betrayed the participants in projected acts of terrorism to the gendarmes.

The Socialist-Revolutionary Party claimed to be a socialist party and to champion the interests of the “working people” as a whole, drawing no distinction between the peasant poor and the kulaks. Actually, the Socialist-Revolutionaries were not socialists at all, but represented the Left wing of the bourgeois democrats. The 'bour- geois liberals secretly supported and financed the terrorist activities of the Socialist-Revolutionaries.

In 1902, Lenin wrote that the Socialist-Revolutionary Party was a party of .“revolutionary adventurism” that stood apart from the working-class movement. He also said that “without the working people bombs are utterly useless.” The Socialist-Revolutionaries picked out and adhered to everything that was fallacious in the theory and practice of the former Narodniks.

The Second Congress of the. Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party adopted a 'resolution on the Socialist-Revolutionaries which stated that it “regards their activities as harmful not only to the polit- ical development of the proletariat but also to the general democratic struggle against absolutism.”

Tsarism in the Struggle against the Movement for National Liberation

Influenced by the development of capitalism and the pro- letarian class struggle at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century, the oppressed non-Russian nationalities which constituted 57 per cent of the entire population of Russia began to awaken to active political life. This awakening found expression in the formation of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois nationalist parties.

Tsarism cruelly suppressed the nascent movement for the libera- tion of the oppressed nations in Russia. Towards the begimiing of the twentieth century national oppression became still more intense: the remnants of the cultural institutions of the oppressed nationalities were destroyed, instruction in the native languages in schools was pro- hibited, and the national organizations of the non-Russian peoples were persecuted.

Characterizing the colonial policy of tsarism, Comrade Stalin wrote: “Tsarism deliberately cultivated patriarchal and feudal oppres- sion in the border regions in order to keep the masses in a state of slav- ery and ignorance. Tsarism deliberately settled the best areas in the border regions with colonizers in order to force the natives into the worst areas and to intensify national enmity. Tsarism restricted and at times simply suppressed the native schools, theatres and educational institutions in order to keep the masses in intellectual darkness. Tsar- ism frustrated the initiative of the host members of the native population. Lastly, tsarism siip])rcssod all activity on tlio part of the massoK of the border regions” (J. Stalin, Mamm avd the National and Colonial Question, Moscow, 10*40, p. 71).

In all the non-Tliissian national regions the tsarist govornmoni pursued a policy of forcible Russification. This ])o]ioy found most viv- id expression in the splicre of public education. Jn the Caiu^asus, at the end of the ninotoonth century, thoro was an average of one school for every 800 Russians, but the average for the native inliabit- ants was one for every 4,800 Georgians, one for every 5,400 Armenians and one for every 17,300 Azerbaijanians. Instriuition in clemonlary schools was conducted exclusively in Russian. Thoro wore villages in which the entire population was illiterate. Thoro wore no higher edu- cational establishments.

To crush the movement for national liberation the tsarist author- ities incited the various nationalities against each other. In Transcau- casia the tsarist police systematically fomented national strife between Armenians and Azerbaijanians. The Minister of the Interior Plohve took a direct hand in instigating bloody pogioras against the Jews. In April 1908 the police organized a frightful pogrom against the Jews in Kishinev. This crime of the tsarist clicpio evoked tlio loud protest of progressive people all over the world.

Finland was dein*ivod of her autonomy. By a law passed in I90J Finns were conscripted for the Russian anny and the Finnish national units wore abolished. Russian officials wore ap])ohitod to all ad- ministrative posts in Finland and they pursued a ])oli(‘y of Russifica- tion. In its struggle against the movement of the Finnish people for national liberation tho tsarist govornmont rtdied on the su})port of the Finnish and Swedish feudal landlords in l^'inland. The working- class movement in Finland was led by tlio Finnish Social- Democratic Party, of which the policy was similar to that of the Russian Mensheviks, and which was united in a bloc with tho Finnish bourgeoisie.

In Poland, in the middle of tho 1890’s, two nationalist parties were foimcd: a party of the bourgeoisie and nobility known as tho People’s Democratic Party ("‘Narodovtsi”) and tho petty-bourgeois Polish Socialist Party (P.P.S.). Fearing that if Poland became independent the Russian market would bo lost for Polish goods and that they would bo deprived of the support of Russian tsarism in their struggle against the workers and peasants of Poland, the "‘’Narodov- tsi” (known as ^‘Endeki”) gave xrp tho demand for indopondonce in favour of autonomy within tho Russian empire. The aim of tho Polish Socialist Party wto to establish a botirgeois Poland indopond- ent of Russia.

In Byelorussia a potty-bourgeois party knowii as tho Byelorus- sian Socialist Gromada was formed and was entirely under the iufluonoe of the' P.P.S. It demanded autonomy for Byelorussia and her amalgamation with Lithuania.

In 1897, a Social-Democratic league, known as the Bund, was formed among the Jewish artisans in Poland, Lithuania and Byelorussia. The Bund was represented at the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. and there it demanded recognition as the sole repre- sentative of all the Jewish workers in Russia, no matter where they resided. Had this nationalistic demand been conceded, it would have meant isolating the Jewish proletariat from the Russian pro- letariat and subordinating it to the influence of the Jewish bourgeoisie. The Second Congress rejected the demand and the Bund withdrew from the Party.

In 1900, thanks to the influence of the Ukrainian nationalist or- ganizations in Western Ukraine, a bourgeois nationalist party was formed in the Ukraine known as the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party (R.U,P.). This party demanded Ukrainian independence under the protectorate of Austria.

In Georgia there was a party of Georgian Mensheviks, headed by Noah Jordania, which advocated unity among all Georgians irre- spective of the class they belonged to.

All these bourgeois and petty-bourgeois nationalist parties adopted national-reformist programs, and wkile striving for increased political rights and privileges for their native landlords and bourgeoisie they fought against the workers and peasants of their respective na- tions. Only the Bolsheviks led the revolutionary mass struggle of the working people of all the oppressed nationalities in tsarist Russia and demanded the complete abolition of all national oppression. They issued the slogan of the right of nations to self- determination, including the right to secede from tsarist Russia and to form independent states.

The Bolsheviks incessantly maintained that the oppressed national- ities could achieve genuine national liberation only as the result of the overthrow of tsarism and the abolition of the power of the land- lords and cajpitalists. Hence, they called upon the working people of all the nationalities in Russia to rally round the Russian proletariat, the vanguard fighter and leader of the revolution- ary struggle of all the numerous nationalities inhabiting Russia. Lenin and Stalin denounced the efforts of the nationalist parties to turn the working people of the oppressed nationalities away from joint struggle with the entire Russian people for democracy and for Socialism.

The Russo-Japanese War and the First Russian Revolution (1904–1907)

The Russo-Japanese War

Preparations for the Russo-Japanese War

TJio dovolopmont of imperialisiu at the end of the nineteenth and tlie beginning of the twentieth century caused an extreme intonsificatiou of the struggle among the imperialist countries for a redivision of the world.

Particularly intense became the struggle for the command of the Pacific and for the partition of China, the territory of which had not yet been seized by the imperialists, A participant in this struggle was Russian tsarism, which came into conilict with Japanese imperialism in Manchuria. The beginning of the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway which would greatly strengthen Russia’s position in tlu^ Par East, prompted Japanese im])erialism to make liasto to carry out its long cherished designs of armed conquest at the expense of China.

In the Sino- Japanese War of 1804-lS!)r> China was defeated and was conipollod to sign a peace treaty whicjli obligated her to i)ay Jai)an an enormous indemnity and to code to her the whole of the south coast of Manchuria, together with Liao-tung Peninsula, including Port Arthur and Korea.

Russia, however, jointly with Germany and Prance, compelled .Japan to modify these oppressive terms and in the end Mancluiria with the Liao-tung Peninsula and Port Arthur, and also Korea remained under Chinese rule. In 1896, Witte, tho tsar’s Minister of Finances, concluded a treaty with China for tho construction of the Chi- * neso Eastern Railway, which was to run through North Manchuria to shorten tho route to Vladivostok. The construction of this railway facilitated tho seizure of Manchuria and Korea by tsarist Rus- sia. In 1898 Russia secured a lease of tho Liao-tung Peninsula, including Port Arthur, and thus secured an outlet to tho China Sea. Measures wore taken to speed up the construction of tho railway from Harbin through South Manchuria to Port Arthur.

Germany, by an agreement arrived at between Wilhelm II and Nicholas II, occupied tho port of Kiaochow, Groat Britain occupied the port of Weihaiwoi. Prance rounded off her Indo-Ohinoso posKses- sions at the expense of China. Tlio United States of America domandcKl the '‘open door” in China, that is to say, equal freedom for all the capitalist countries to exploit China.

The systematic plunder of China by tho imperialist countries gave rise, in 1900, to a mass popular revolt against tho foreign invaders. This revolt was Imown as the Boxer, or Big Fist, Rebellion. The united forces of the imperialists, including those of tsarist Rus- sia, were flung against the rebels, captured Peking and sacked the city. While crushing the rebellion, tsarist troops, on the pretext of protecting the Chinese Eastern Railway, occupied the whole of Manchuria, which the tsarist high government officials had already given the derisive nickname of “Yellow Russia.”

A group of adventurers belonging to the circle that was close to Nicholas II formed a company which obtained a timber concession on the Korean River Yalu bordering on Manchuria. This con- cession was intended to serve as a pZuce d^armes for the seizure of Korea, Port Arthur was converted into a naval fortress and base for the Russian Pacific Fleet, for the construction of which the tsarist government in 1899 allocated 90,000,000 rubles.

Meanwhile, Japan, which in 1902 concluded a military alliance with Great Britain against Russia, was actively preparing for war. Imperialist Japan strove not only to squeeze tsarist Russia out of Korea and Manchuria, but also to seize Sakhalin and the whole of the Russian Far East. British diplomacy set out to activize Russian policy in Europe and in the Near East, where the conflict between the German and Austro-Hungarian imperialists and Russia would inevitably bring about a rap]iroohoment between Russia and Great Britain against Germany. Wilhelm II, in his turn, tried hard to tempt Nicholas II with the prospect of the advantages to be gained from friend- ship with Germany, in the hope of intensifying Anglo-Russian antag- onisms and of destroying the alliance between Russia and Prance.

Among other things Russian tsarism regarded war as a means of diverting the attention of the workers and peasants of Russia from their real enemies, the landlords and capitalists. The police dictator Plehve said: “To avert a revolution in Russia we need a little victorious war.”

The Outbreak and the Course of the War

Knowing that Rus- sia was unprepared for war, Japan decided to strike a sudden blow. Spies provided the Japanese High Command with an exact plan of the disposition of the Russian warships in Port Arthur, On the night of January 26, 1904, when the entire commanding personnel of the Russian fleet were at a ball to celebrate the birthday of the wife of Admkal Stark, the Commander-in-Chief, Japanese destroy- ers, without a declaration of war, stole up under cover of darkness to the outer roadstead of Port Arthur where the Russian squadron was lying at anchor, and blew up three of the finest Russian warships; the battleships Retmzan and Cesarevich and the cruiser Pallada. In the morning of January 27 the Japanese bombarded Port Arthur from the sea and damaged four more warships. That same day a Japanese squad- ron damaged two Russian warships that were trying heroically to light their way out of the Korean port of Clio-ixiiihpo into the opoii sea. Notwithstanding the severe damage inflicted upon them, the two ships — the cruiser Varyag and tlio gunboat Koreyetz — entered into unequal combat with the Japanese squadron and perished heroically off the Korean coast. After weakening the [Russian (loot by this ti'cach- erous attack, Japan secured command of the sea.

Japan had prepared herself well for wa?*. She Kcciired for herself international syiupatliy, assistance from the U.S.A. in protecting her rear, and financial assistance from her ally, Croat Britain, German instructors helped to train the Japanese army, which was equipped with weapons of German pattern: machine guns and riilcs, field and mounted artillery, and heavy Kruj;)p siege guns.

Hostilities on land did not commence immediately on the out- break of war. Japan’s main object was to destroy the Russian fleet and gain complete command of the sea routes. She therefore tried to isolate the Vladivostok squadron from the Port Arthur squadron and to impose a complete blockade upon Port Arthur. Meanwhile, the Russian High Command slowly mustered its forc*<ns in Manchuria. The transportation of troops, arms, ammunition and pi’ovisions tens of thousands of kilometres across the Great Siberian Road was a long and difficult task. Tho railway ended at Lakc^ Baikal and men and freight had to bo shipped across in boats or ic-ebrea leers, and further on Rus- sian carts andhoims liad to struggle over the bad roads of Manchuria.

Tho army lacked mountain artillery and grenades, there was a shortage of machine guns, rifles and shells, and telegraph and tele- phone communication wore extremely ])oor.

From tho very beginning of tlio war tsarist Russia sustained defoai» after defeat. General Kuropatkin, tho Commander-in-Chiof of tlu^ Russian land forces, carried with him to tho front several carloads of small icons which he distributed among tho troops to raise their spirits, but there was a shortage of shells with which to conduot tho war. The aims of tho wav were alien to tho soldiers wlio had been transported 10,000 versts from tho heart of Russia. All this made the war extremely unpopular.

After the first battles the Russian squadron found itself shut up ill Port Arthur; the Japanese warships blockaded tho port from the sea. The other small cruiser squadron was in Vladivostok, out off from Port Arthur.

The talented Admiral Makarov was ajjpointod Oommander-iu- Chief of the Fleet in Port Arthur. The son of a sailor, his promotion was due entirely to his outstanding military capabilities. In Port Arthur he worked successfully to improve tho lighting efficiency of tho fleet with the object of engaging tho Japanese; but on March 31, 1004, as the fleet was glutting out to moot tho ommiy, his flagship, tlie battleship Pel/ito'pavlovsk, struck a mine and sank. Makarov ijorished together with 600 of the 700 men who constituted the crew. The famous Russian battle scene painter V. V. Vereshchagin, who was on board the Petropavlovsk at the time, perished too.

In April 1904, in a battle on the river Yalunear Chiu -Lien-Ch ’eng, a Russian force of 20,000 men that was barring the Japanese advance into Manchuria was defeated. In May the Japanese cut the lines of communication between Port Arthur and Manchuria and the fortress was thus invested on both land and sea. A Japanese army of 80,000 men conducted operations against Port Arthur and another army moved north into Manchuria. In August 1904 the Russian fleet that was blockaded in Port Arthur left the fortress and engaged the Japanese fleet in an endeavour to break through to Vladivostok. At first the battle went in favour of the Russians, but in the end the numerical superiority of the Japanese forces told and part of the fleet returned to Port Arthur, while those vessels which succeeded in breaking through made for neutral ports.

In Augusb 1904, a battle lasting several days was fought near Liao- Yang. The Russian troops repulsed all the furious attacks launched by the Japanese upon the main Liao- Yang positions. The Japanese command was already preparing to retreat southward when Kuropatkin,. having received false information to the effect that the Japanese were out flanking the Russian army on the left, himself ordered a retreat in spite of the fact that he still had two fresh a,Tmy corps ill reserve, whereas the Japanese had already expended all their reserves.

In September and October 1904, a second big battle took place near the river Shaho which lasted for nearly two weeks. The Rus- sian troops held their position, but this time too the Russian Command failed to take advantage of the situation to achieve victory.

Port Arthur continued its resistance for eleven months. The defence of the fortress was organized by the talented General Kondratenko, a military engineer, who was appointed chief of the land defence. On his initiative improved fortifications and blindages were erected and the manufacture of grenades and observation balloons was organ- ized on the spot. The guns and ammunition were removed from the sunken warships and utilized for the land defences, and the crews of these ships were transferred to the land. General Kondratenko appre- ciated the enormous political and military importance of Port Arthur and devoted all his skill and resourcefulness to the task of holding it. He was popular among the soldiers, roused their fighting spirit, and awarded military decorations to those who displayed heroism. General Stcssol, the Gommander-in-Chief of the fortress, how- ever, proved to bo a traitor and did all in his power to hinder the defence. On December 20, 1904, he treaclierously surrendered Port Arthur. During the period of the siege the defenders of the fortress inflicted heavy casualties upon the enemy amounting to about 130,000 killed and wounded. Considerable damage was also iu^l■i(^ted upon the Japa- nese coastal fleet by the Russian coastal artillery and mines.

In this war too the Russian soldiers and sailors displayed heroism and high fighting qualities. Characteristic of this was the case that occurred in February 1904, when the destroyer SiwgmhcM engaged four Japanese destroyers and cruisers and sank one of them* On being called upon to surrender the crow refused. When the Ja]iancso ships closed in on the vessel in order to capture it, two sailors whoso names have remained unknown, ran below and opened the valves and thus flooded the ship to prevent it falling into the hands of the enemy. A monument to the memory of these two heroes of the SieregmlicM now stands in Leningrad. Many feats of heroism wore i>orformod by the soldiers and sailors in the battles of Shalio, Liao- Yang and Mukden and during the defence of Port Aj’thur, but the blunders of the com- manders nullified the heroic efforts of the army and ileot.

Significance of the Fall of Port Arthur

The fall of Port Arthur signified the inglorious end of the war against Ja]mn, although the tsarist government still made cjfforts to continue it. Tsarist Russia had held Port Arthur for six yoai's and had s])cnt millions of rubles on its fortification, but this stronghold was capturod yitliin a few months.

The condition of the army and the situation on the various fronts wore a reflection of the general rotiouness of the tsarist regime. General Grippoiiburg, tlio commander of one of the armies, after fosing a battle, deserted the army and lied to St, Polersbuig. Other geiici*- als were concerned only with their own welfare. Gencial Stackle- berg, while at the front, thought more of his own comfort than of any- thing else. Ho had a special freight car attached to his train in which he kept a cow so that ho might have fresh cream with his morning coj’^ec . The officers of the army wore no bettor. Tho Commandcr-in-Chief Kuropatkiii wrote concerning them: ‘‘Large numbers of officers arc tired of the war, and many of them, oven those of high rank, feign sickness and try to get sent to tho roar.’’ In speaking of tlic- rank and file, Knropatkin could not help admitting that “the war is alien to them.” Embezzlement, theft and corruption were rife in tho army. The military equipment of tho tsarist anny was far inferior to that of the Japanese. Port Arthur did not even have a radio telegraph, although it had been invented by tho Russian scientist A. S. Popov as far back as 1895, A whole series of available military inventions were not employed in the tsarist army. Tho army and its rear tconu^d with Japanese spies and saboteurs. Certain Polish socialists rendered Japan direct assistance by acting as spies for her, and a similar rol<ik was played by certain members of the Finnish bourgeoisie who re- ceived financial assistance from Japan. In an article entitled ‘‘The Fall of Port Arthur” published on January 1, 1905, Lenin, summing up the military and political bank- ruptcy of tsarism, wrote: “The fleet and the fortress, the field forti- fications and the land forces proved to be obsolete and useless.

“The connection between the military organization of the country and its entire economic and cultural system has never been so close as it is at the present time” (V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. VII, Moscow, 1937, Russ, ed., p. 48).

Lenin drew the conclusion that the military defeat of Russia must become the starting point of a revolutionary crisis in the country and that the capitulation of Port Arthur was the prologue to the capitu- lation of tsarism. He directly connected the further development of the revolution with the defeat of tsarism. “The cause of Russian freedom and of the struggle of the Russian (and world) proletariat for Social- ism,” he wrote, “depends on the military defeats suffered by the autoc- racy” (V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. VII, Moscow, 1937, Russ, ed., p. 49). He called upon the revolutionary proletariat tirelessly to oppose the war. In this predatory and shameful wot, Lenin and the Bolsheviks stood for the defeat of the tsarist government, for such a defeat would facilitate the victory of the revolution over tsarism.

Comrade Stalin urged the need for the defeat of Russian tsarism in this war. In one of the leaflets he wrote against the war, he said: “We want this war to be more lamentable for the Russian autocracy than was the Crimean War. . . . Then it wras serfdom that fell, now, as a result of this war, we will bury the child of serf- dom — ^the autocracy and its foul secret police and gendarmes!” (Beria, On the History of the Bolshevik Organizations in Transcaucasia, Moscow, 1939, p. 46.)

The Revolutionary Crisis on the Eve of 1905

The Russo- Japanese War greatly aggravated the economic situation in Russia. The war called for the expenditure of enormous funds, and this expend- iture was met by foreign loans obtained on exorbitant terms and by the raising of indirect taxes. As a consequence the cost of living rose considerably. The calling up of the reserves for the army struck a heavy blow at the peasant farms, for it deprived them of man- power.

The industrial crisis became more acute, particularly in the textile industry. The capitalists cut wages. Strikes became more frequent.

The growth of the working-class movement and the defeat tsar- ism sujBFored in the Far East revived the opposition of the liberal bourgeoisie, because, for one thing, they were afraid that the govern- ment would not be able to cope with the gi^owing working-class and peasant movement. In 1904, Finnish nationalists assassinated Bobri- kov, the dictator of Finland. In July of that year Socialist-Revolu- tionaries assassinated Plehve. After its defeat in the battle of Liaoyang tlie tsarist govoruinout tried to win over to its side the moderate liberals, particularly the Zemstvo liberals, and in November 1904, it sanctioned the convocation of a Zemstvo congress. The majority at this congress ox])ressod itself in favour of the establishment of a parliament with legislative powers; the minority wanted a ])arliam(5nt with only advisory povVers. The Zemstvo liberals believed that the tsar would assemble the representatives of the Ziunstvos and town councils, who in their turn would form a })arliameut.

The Zemstvo liberals and bourgeois iiitelleetiials began l-o or- ganize banquets at which, proposing toasts drunk in eham])agno, they timidly expressed the desire to receive political rights. The Mensheviks supported these political banquets, but the Bolsheviks denounced the traitorous conduct of the liberals and the policy of compromise pursued by the Mensheviks. In a pamphlet ho wrote entitled The. Zeinsivo Campa.i(jn and the Iskra Plan, Lenin pointed out that the main task of the proletariat was not to iiid nonce the liberals, but to prepare for a decisive battle against tsarism. He called upon the workers to ann and prepare for insurrootioii.

In November and Douembor 1904, the Bolslieviks organized street demonstrations in St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kharkov and other cities under tlie slogans of ^‘Down witli the autocraty !*” 5 "\Dowu with the war!”

In that same ycuu* the Bolsheviks in TVanscaucasia developed considerable activity under Comrade Stalin’s leadcu’ship. In Decem- ber 1904, Comrade Stalin led a huge strike of the oil workers in Baku which lasted from December 13 to the end of the month and involved 8,300 workers employed in 21 plants. The Baku ])rolotarians drew up a series of demands which in the beginning of 1905 became the mili- tant program of all the revolutionary workers of Russia. At the head of this list were th(5 demands for the convocation of a Constituent Assembly and for an 8-hour working day. During the strike the workons held numerous demonstrations under the slogans: ‘‘Down with the autocracy !’% “Down with the war!”

The police tried to disrupt the strike by fomenting national strife between the Azerbaijan and Armoniaii workers, but all their efforts in this direction failed.

The Baku strike ended in a brilliant victory for the workers. For the first time in the liistory of Russia the workers compelled the capi- talists to conclude a collective agreement concerning the hiring of workers. The agreement established a 9-honr day (eight hours on the eve of holidays). “The Baku strike, ■"* wrote Comrade Stalin, “was the signal for the glorious actions in January aud February all over Russia” {History of the Communist Party of the /Soviet Union | Bol- sheviks], Short Course, Moscow, li)45, p. 50).

At the end of 1904, the government, in its dccrcn* of December 12f promised to make some slight concessions, but declared that it would not permit any changes in the autocratic state system. But tsarism was incapable of averting the revolution.

January 9, 1905—The Beginning of the Revolution

Bloody Sunday

The approach of the revolution compelled the tsarist government to seek every possible means of diverting the workers from the political struggle. One of their instruments for the achievement of this object was the priest Gapon, an agent provo- cateur, who, on the instruction of the secret police, attempted to repeat the Zubatov experiment and in 1904 formed the Assembly of Russian Factory Workers. This association organized pro- monarchist lectures, theatrical performances and concerts for workers.

On January 8, 1905, the management of the Putilov Works (now the Kirov Works) discharged four workers. Next day 12,000 of their fellow-employees came out on strike in protest against these dismissals. The workers of other plants in St. Petersburg joined the strike and on January 8 the strike became a general one, involving 150,000 workers.

To keep the workers away from the revolutionary struggle the priest Gapon put forward a treacherous plan to draw up a petition to the tsar in the name of the St. Petersburg workers and to get all the workers to march in a body to tlic Winter Palace to present it. He infoi’inocl the sc(*ret police of this plan and ibo latter approved of it. The government decided to shoot down ilio workers and to drown the growing revolutionary movcuneiit in blood.

Tho petition read as follows: “Wo, tbo workingmen of St. Peters- burg, onr wives, our ohildroii and our bolpk'ss old parents, have (jomo to Tlico, our Sovereign, to seek trtitb and ]>rotoetion. Wo are poverty-stricken, avo are o])pressed, wo are burdened with unendurable toil; wo suffer hiuuiliation and are not treated like human beings. . , . Wo have suffered in ]mtionce, but wo are being driven deeper and deeper into tho slough of poverty, lack of rights and ignorance; wo arc being strangled by despotism and tyranny, , . . Our patience is exhausted, Tho dreaded moment has arrived when we would rather die than bear these intolerable sufferings any longer ”

Then followed a series of economic and political demands for the workers, chief of which was the demand for tho convocation of a Constituent Assembly.

In the original draft of the petition there were no political demands whatever; they wore introduced on tho proposal of tbo Bolsheviks when the petition was discussed at workers’ mootings. TJie Bolsheviks urged tho workers to give up tho idea of marching in ])rocessiou to tho tsar and told them that freodoiu could not bo obtained by means of petitions, but a largo section of tho workers still believotl iii tho tsar. “Wo ’ll try. Tho tsar cannot reject our just demands,” they said.

Early in the morning on Sunday tlauuary 9 (22), 1005, 140,000 workei‘s carrying portraits of tho tsar, Hags and icons marched to the Winter Palace, ohautiug prayers on the way.

The tsarist government had decided to greet tho workers with bul- lets and bayonets. Tho entire city was divided U]) into military areas, and police, Cossacks and troops wore posted every whore. Troops posted at the city gates began to fire at the workers, to ])re- vent them penetrating into tho city. Nevertheless, large num- bers of workers reached tho Winter Palace Square. The brutal tsarist troox)s shot d 9 wn tho approaching crowds of peaceful workers, and what is more, picked off children, many of whom were perched on the trees in tho Alexander Park adjacent to the square. That day over a thousand workers were killed and over two thousand were wounded. The Bolsheviks marched with the workers and many of them were killed or wounded.

The workers gave to January 9 tho name of Bloody Sunday. On that day even tho backward workers lost all faith in the tsar. “Wo have no tsar,” said aged workers, destroying tho portraits of tho tsar that hung in their homes.

The Bolsheviks issued lea (lots headed: “To Arms, Comrades!” whereupon the workers raided gunsmiths’ shops and workshops and seized the arms. In the afternoon of January 9, the first barricades were erected on Vasilyevsky Island, a district of St. Peters- burg. The workers said: “The tsar gave it to us; weTl now give it to him !” Collisions with the police occurred in the streets. Cries were raised: ‘"Down with the autocracy!”

On January 9, 1905, the working class received a great lesson in civil war. As Lenin wrote: “. . . The revolutionary education of the proletariat made more progress in one day than it could have made in months and years of drab, humdrum, wretched existence” (V. I. Lenin, Selected Works, Vol. Ill, Moscow, 1934, p. 289).

Lenin heard of the events of Bloody Sunday in Geneva, where he was living at that time in exile. In an article entitled: “The Beginning of the Revolution in Russia,” he appraised these events in the following terms: “The eyes of the proletariat of the whole world are turned with feverish impatience towards the proletariat of the whole of Russia. The overthrow of tsarism in Russia, begun so valiantly by our working class, will be the turning point in the history of all coun- tries” \lhid,, p. 292). Lenin called upon the Party and the work- ing class immediately to commence preparations for an armed insurrection.

Protest Strikes Throughout the Country

This massacre of the workers by order of the tsar called forth protest strikes all over the country. In January alone 440,000 workers were involved in strikes, compared with only 430,000 throughout the whole of the preceding ten years. As Lenin wrote: “It is this awakening of tremendous masses of the people to political consciousness and revolutionary struggle that marks the historic significance of January 22, 1905” (V. I. Lenin, Selected Works, Vol. Ill, Moscow, 1934, p. 2),

On January 11, strikes broke out in Moscow whence they spread to the textile districts around Moscow and to Ivanovo-Voznesensk,

Strikes also broke out in Poland, Finland, the Ukraine, the Caucasus and Siberia. In one of the leaflets he issued in the beginning of 1‘905, Comrade Stalin wrote that as soon as the signal was heard from St. Petersburg the workers of all nationalities, “as though by common consent, responded with unanimous fraternal greeting to the call of the St. Petersburg workers and boldly challenged the autocracy” (Beria, On the History of the Bolshevik Ori^anizaiions in Transcaucasia, Moscow, 1939, p. 65).

On January 18, a general strike of the Tiflis workers commenced under Comrade Stalin’s leadership. Bolshevik agitators distributed among the strikers leaflets in the Georgian, Armenian and Russian languages, calling upon thorn to prepare for an armed insurrection. In response to the appeal of the Caucasian Fade* al Committee of the Party, the workers of Baku, Batum, Chiaturi and other industrial centres in Transcaucasia also came out on strike. Everywhere meetings and demonstratioiis wore held, during which tlioro %vcro c.olliBioiis with tho police and troops.

At tho head of tho revolutionary movciuont inarehod the motal workers, and they were followed by workers of tho textile and other industries, lii declaring their ])rotest. striki^s, tho workers also put forward economic doniands. This conibinai-ion of economic demands with political doniands lent the strikes tremendous for(^o.

The massacre of tho workers on January 0 roused the indignation among tho working people in Western E\iropo too. Tho workers of Paris, London, Vienna and Brussels demonstrated outside ihe Rus- sian embassies, their watchwords being: “Down with lsarisml’% "Down with the assassins !” "Long live tho revolution!"’ The workers of Prance and Italy sent the Russian 'w^’orkci's fratorjial greetings and promised them their assistance.

Tsarism and the Bourgeoisie after January 9

To combat the incipient revolution, the tsar ap]iointod Tro]mv, formerly Chief of Police in Moscow, Governor General of St. Petersburg. Practically, Trepov became the militajy dictator; ho lu’oclaiincd martial law in the capital.

The tsar received a deputation of "workers*’ wlio had boon espe- cially picked by tho i)olico and tol<l tluMii that, ho believed in tlu^ "unshakable devotion of tho working ])oo]d(^"’ and tlioroforo "forgave them.” This cynical statonicut of the assassin-tsar roused indignation even among tlv » most backward workoi's.

In tho endeavour to divert tho worktu’s from revolution, the tsarist clique resorted to downriglit clocoptiou. In rJaniiary 1005, a com- mission was set up, under the chairmanship of Senator Shidlovsky, to in- quire into the "causes of the discontent of tho workers in tho capital.*'*

It was intended to include several roprosoiitativos of the workers in this commission, in addition to government officials and capitalists. The Mensheviks wore ready to act on this tsar’s oomniission, but the workers, on tho proposal of the Bolsheviks, boycotted tho election of representatives to it. Tho Bolsheviks took part only in tho first stage of these elections in order to i)ut forward political demands. After revolutionary manifestations of tho workers, who would have nothing to do with tlie (commission, the government dissolved it.

In tho endeavour to split the raiiliS of tho revolutionary workers the tsarist axithorities deliberately fomented strife among tlio various nationalities in Russia. The result of this was the frightful Armoni- an-Azerbaijanian massacre in Baku on February 0 and 7, 1005. This pogrom was stopped by tho efforts of tho clasB-conscians workers undcjr the leadership of the Bolsheviks. In February, the ])olico, aided by hired bandits, organized an anti- Jo wish pogrom in Foodosia. In Kursk the police boat up high- school studontH in order to intimidate the radically-minded youth. But these pogroms and assaults only served to intensify popular hatred of tsarism -

In February 1905, tsarism sustained military 'defeat in the battle of Mukden. On this occasion, too, the tsarist army command failed to take advantage of a series of partial successes which the Russian troops had achieved in the battle. The Russian army lost 120,000 men (out of a total of 300,000) in killed, wounded and taken prisoner. It was evi- dent that tsarism had lost the war against Japan. Terrified by the steady growth of the revolution, and losing support even among the prop- ertied classes, which did not believe that tsarism was capable of coping with the revolution, the autocracy endeavoured to strike a bargain with the bourgeoisie by offering slight political con- cessions. In February 1905, a tsar’s rescript, addressed to Bulygin, the Minister of the Interior, was promulgated, instructing the latter to convene a conference to draw up a scheme for the establishment of an advisory Duma.

The liberal bourgeoisie readily entered into this deal with the gov- ernment and submitted its extremely moderate proposals for a con- stitution. The constitutional proposals of the ^‘Liberation” group and of the Zemstvo congress (held in April 1905), left the monarchist form of government intact and provided for the creation of a two-chamber parliament, the upper chamber to consist of representatives of the propertied classes. The liberals were willing to abandon universal suffrage. At the Zemstvo congress, 54 delegates out of the 120 voted against universal suffrage. *

Lenin denounced this “constitutional haggling,” as he described this bargaining between the liberals and tsarism, and again and again called upon the workers to prepare for an armed insurrection.

The Mass Revolutionary Movement in the Summer of 1905

The Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.

The effect of the disrup- tive tactics that were pursued by the Mensheviks was that at the deci- sive stage in the development of the revolution the Party was split in two and lacked a single leadership and a common Party line in tac- tics. Formally, the Party was imited, but actually the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks very much resembled two separate parties, each having its own central body and its own leading newspaper.

For the purpose of drawing up the Party’s tactics in the revolution and of setting up leading bodies for the Party, the Bolsheviks convened the Third Congress of the Party. This congress was held in London in April 1905. The Mensheviks convened a conference of their own which was at bottom the party congress of a section that had broken away from the R.S.D.L.P.

Before tlio Third Coiigross Lonin wrote series of articles in the Bolshevik news])aper Vpcryod {Forward) in wliieli lie explained the character and the driving forces of the Russian revolution. Ho said this was liie hist bonrgoois-democratic revolution to take place inthoo])och of imporialisni. Its main task was to destroy the Russian autocracy and its econoinic foundation, serf-based landlordism. Hence, the slo- gans of this revolution were: a democratic republic, confiscation of all landlords’ estates and thoir transfer to the ])oasauts for cultivation, and the introduction of an 8-hour day in industry.

The Russian bourgeois-democratic revolution of 1905 differed radically from all bourgeois revolutions that had taken place in Europe. Those revolutions wore led by the bourgeoisie; the peasantry constituted the reserves of the bourgeoisie, while the proletariat was still weak and could not act indopoiidently. The driving forces of the Russian bourgeois-democratic revolution, however, wore the proletariat and the peasantry, and its leader was the ])roletariat. The jpeasants wore the allies of the proletariat, for the proletariat alone could helj) the peasants to solve the agrarian problem in a revolutionary way. The Russian bourgeoisie was counior-revolut ionary; it feared tlio prole- tariat and wanted to strike a bargain with tsarism with a view to limiting the j)olitical rights and damaging the economic interests of the workers and peasants. It was therefore iKu^ossary to isolate the bourgeoisie from the masses of the ])easantry and to exi:)lain to the latter that the bourgeoisie were their cltiss cMioinios and that they were opposed to all the fundamental demands of the workers and peasants.

Lenin taught that after overthrowing tsarism, tlie i)rolotariat would not rest content with this victory, but would utilize it for the purpose of immediately passing, together with the i)oorost sec- tions of the peasantry, to the socialist revolution. “From the democrat- ic revolution,” he wrote, “wo shall at once, according to the dogroo of our strength, the strength of the class-conscious and organized prole- tariat, begin to pass over to the socialist revolution” (V. I. Lonin, lected Works, Vol. Ill, Moscow, 1934, p. 145). Basing itself on Lenin’s appraisal of the revolution in Russia, the Third Congress of the Party adopted a resolution “On the Provisional Revolutionary Government,” which affirmed tliat after the victory of the bourgeois-democratic revo- lution, this provisional revolutionary govermnent would become the organ of the revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. The task of this government was to carry the bour- geois-democratic revolution in Russia to complete victory. Lonin and Stalin taught that the rovolutionary-dcmooratio dicjtatorslup of thoso two classes alone could ousiiro fundamental revolutionary changes in Russia and help the proletariat to pass on to the socialist revolution.

The Third Congress also laid down the Party’s tactics, based on the Bolshevik appraisal of the character and prospects of the revolution. It resolved to sujiport the agrarian demands of the peasantry, including that for the confiscation of all the landlords’ land.

The congress called upon the peasants to set up peasant committees for the i)ur2)ose of seizing the landlords’ land in a revolutionary man- ner. It particularly emphasized the importance of the general strike as a weapon in the struggle. Urging the necessity of an armed insur- rection for the purpose of achieving the victory of the revolution, it called upon the Party organizations to proceed forthwith to prepare for such an insurrection.

The congress elected a Bolshevik Central Committee, headed by Lenin, and adopted the newspaper as the central organ of the

Party.

Thus, the Third Congress set up a Bolshevik general staff to lead the revolution, armed the Party with a strategical plan for developing the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist revolution, and formu- lated the main tactics of the proletarian party in the bourgeois-demo- cratic revolution. Herein lies the enormous historical importance of the Third Congress of the Party.

Lenin expounded the Bolshevik tactics in a work of genius Tioo Tactics of Social-Democracy iii the Democratic Eevohitioii, which ap- peared in July 1905.

The Mensheviks and Trotsky ite agents of the bourgeoisie tried to frustrate Lenin’s plan for developing the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist revolution.

The view spread by the Mensheviks was that as the revolution in Russia was a bourgeois revolution it must be led by the bouigeoisie, as had been the case previously in the West. The proletariat, asserted the Mensheviks, should ally itself not with the peasantry, but with the liberal bourgeoisie; it should march not at the head of the peasantry, but at the tail of the bourgeoisie.

Tsushima

Before Port Arthur fell the Baltic Fleet was sent on a long voyage to the Far Bast round the coast of Africa.

In an article entitled “A Debacle” Lenin wrote: ‘"A great armada, as huge, as unwieldy, as absurd, as impotent and as monstrous as the entire Russian empire itself, set out on its voyage, squandering heaps of money on coal and maintenance, and evoking universal ridicule in Europe” (V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. VII, Moscow, 1937, Russ, ed., p. 335). This “great armada” was destroyed by the Japanese fleet on May 14, 1905 (the anniversary of the coronation of Nicholas II) in a battle off the island of Tsushima, in the Korea Straits.

In tliis unequal battle, which was more like a massacre, the Russian sailors fought with unexampled staunchness and courage. The obsolete cruiser Dimitri Donskoy bravely held at bay ten up-to-date Japanese cruisers and put two of them out of action. It was called upon to surrender, but it refused, and continuing to bombard the enemy, it proudly sanlc into the depths of tlio sea.

The Revolutionary Struggle of the Proletariat In the Summer of 1905

The defeat which tsarism sustained at Tsushima gave an added impetus to the proletarian revolutionary struggle. Strikes broke out continuously all through the spring, summer and autumn. ]{lconomic strikes became interwoven with political strikes and dovolopod into mass revolutionary strikes. The lirst strike wave (January to Aj)ril) afFectod 659,400 workers. The second (in the spring of 1905) affected 362,600 workers. The third, covering the period from July to Sep- tember, affected 264,800 workers.

The rh’st of May celebrations worc>> accompanied by strikes affecting 220,000 workers and developed into a huge demonstration against the autocracy.

The vanguard of these political strikes and demonstrations consist- ed of the metal workers. The textile workers at first organized mainly economic strikes, but gradually they too entered the political struggle. A vivid example of this is provided by the strike of the textile workcu-s in Ivanovo-Voznesensk, lb began on May 12, 1905, with the presenta- tion of economic doniands and soon affected the whole of the Ivanovo- Voziiosousk textile region. The strike lasted a long time and about 70,000 workers, including many women, wore involved. To load the strike a Joint Strike Committee was oloctod in Ivanovo-Voznesensk, This ooiu- mitteo was called Council of Reprosontativos, and it was in facst thcr first Soviet of Workers’ Deputies in history. This eounoil formotl a workers’ militia to guard the textile mills, established a strike fund to assist the families of strikers, demanded the closing of vodka shops, undertook the supply of provisions for the workers and made a' range- ments for thisimrjjoso with the shopkeepers, and maintained order and discipline among the strikers. The strikers usually assembled on tlu*f bank of the river Tallca to hoar reports from members of tiio council on the progress of the strike. Here they also discussed political questions, and after the meetings they learned and sang revolutionary songs. One of their favourite speakers w^as the Bolshevik worker Dunay<n^ The general direction of the strike came from ilus Northern Commit- tee of the Party, headed by Comrade Frunze and Py odor Afanasyev, au old weaver who had been one of the speakers at the First of May demon- stration in St. Petersburg in 1891, and who was known as “Father.”

These meetings wore broken up by the police and troops, and in tlie collisions scores of workers wore killed and many wounded . The work- ers remained staunch, however, and continued tlio strike. Flungor alone comxiolled them to return to work, and this tJioy did in an or- ganized manner.

This strike steeled the workers; it served as a militant scliool for their political education. In a leaflet they issued at the end of the strike, the Social-Democratic workers summed up the struggle as fol- lows; "The strflse has taught us a great deal. Before it many of us were so ignorant that we did not want either to understand, to appreciate or to think about our conditions....

Do we not now see who is helping our enemies, the masters? We have realized that as long as power is in the hands of the tsar, who thinks only about the capitalists, we shall never be able to improve our con- ditions.”

A determined struggle against tsarism was also waged by the work- ers in the industrial towns of Po- land, The general strike which broke out in Lodz in June 1906, developed into an armed clash. Barricades were erected in the streets and for throe days a regular battle was fought between the workers and tho tsar’s trooi)s. Lenin regarded the Lodz battles as the first armed action of the workers of Russia. In August a collision between police and demonstrators occurred in Byelostok, during which thirty-six per- sons were killed and many were wounded. The strikers took to arms to wage a determined struggle against tsarism.

Thus, in the course of the strike movement the conditions were created for passing to the highest form of struggle — armed insurrection. The bourgeois-democratic revolution of 1906 was proletarian both in the methods by which the struggle was conducted and in the fact that the proletariat played the leading role in it.

The Peasant Movement

The strikes of the industrial workers aft- er Bloody Sunday stimulated the revolutionary movement in the rural districts. In the beginning of 1905, the Bolsheviks conducted extensive propaganda work among the peasants and widely distributed leaflets among them. The peasant movement broke out almost simultaneously in the central regions of Russia, in Georgia and in the Baltic Provinces. In Pebruary 1005, tho peasants in the Orel, Kursk, Chernigov and other gubernias began to seize the landlords’ estates. In the spring of 1905, the mass jioasant movement began to spread all over the country. The peasants wrecked landlords’ mansions, seized their meadows and hay crops, and ploughed up their lands. Often, at night, the tocsin wa& sounded, or a haystack burst into flames — ^this was the signal for general action. Hundreds of peasants, armed with axes and clubs, marched to the landlord’s estate, tore off the locks of the granary and took the corn, shared among themselves the landlord’s cattle and poultry, \\Tecked the estate offices and burnt the office books, particularly the records of the peasants’ debts and obligations. They burnt the land- lord's mansion and farm buildings so that the landlord should have no place to return to. In most cases this movement bore a spontaneous character.

The Tliird Congress of the Party called upon the Party organ- izations to conduct activities among the peasants, to hoi]) them in their struggle and to back their demands for the confiscation of the land- lords ’ land. The Party advised the peasants to seize the landlords ’ lands, to expel the tsar’s officials and to set up their own peasant committees, which were to be the embryo of the new revolutionary authority in thc^ countryside.

The struggle that was waged by the peasants in Guida under the leadership of the Bolsheviks was exceptionally determined and organ- ized. Comrade Stalin had conducted Social-Democratic activities among

Georgian peasants, particularly the Ourian and Ajar peasants, as eaSly| as 1002. The tsarist authorities had deported many of the x^f^^i^lcii^ants in the Batum strikes and deinonstrations ol' 1902 to their homos in Guria. On arriving homo the dejiortees formed Social-Democratic organizations and under tho leadership of those organizations the Ourian peasants began to drive put the tsar’s officials, refused to ])ay taxes and boycotted tho tsar’s courts. All disputes tliat arose were tried by elected people’s courts.

In March 1905, tho tsar’s government sent General Alikhanov- Avarsky to Guria with a force of 10,000 men of all arms to su])])r(^ss the revolt. At the same time a high official was sent to investigate tho causes of the revolt. The peasants everywhere |)resented the same demands to this official. The delegates from the village of Hidistavi said: ‘"Our demands can be expressed in tliree words: we want bread, justice and freedom. We are not asking for baked bread, all that wo are asking is that we should be allowed to enjoy the fruits of our labour.” In another village a j)easant delegate delivered an impassioned political speech in the course of which he said: “We expect nothing from the government. We know very well how cruelly it treated the St. Petersburg workers. We are not so naive as to place any hopes in the government after these atrocities.”

The punitive expedition headed by Alildianov-Avarsky failed to pacify Guria. At tho Third Congress of the Party tho delegate from the Caucasian Social-Democratic Federation, which ‘was led by (Comrade Stalin, proudly related the story of the heroic struggle that was being waged by the Gurian peasants. The Gurian peasant movement was tins most organized and most politioally-conscious peasant movement in Eiussia. The revolutionary struggle of the Abkhazian peasants in Gudauti was led by Orjonikidze.

During the spring ploughing, strikes broke out among the agricul- tural labourers. These strikes assumed particularly wide dimensions in Latvia, Estonia, Poland, and Byelorussia. The Latvian and Estonian labourers di*ove out the landlords, seized their estates and ploughed up the land for themselves. In the summer of 1905, the All-Russian Peasant Union was fonned. Notwithstanding the fact that the Socialist-Revolutionaries and lib- era Ls had succeeded in capturing the central leadership of this Peasant Union, Lenin held that it was of great importance for the organization of the peasants. . Before the victory of the peasant insiirreotion, and for such a victory, the Peasant Union is a powerful and vital organization,” he wrote. (V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, VoL IX, Mos- cow, 1937, Russ, ed., p. 129.)

The peasants joined the Union in whole villages. The Socialist-Rev- olutionaries wanted to subordinate the peasant movement to the lead- ership of the bourgeoisie, but the Bolsheviks combated their efforts to do so. The j)easant movement did not, however, spread all over tho country at that time; in the spring of 1905 it had developed in only 85 counties, one-seventh of the total number of counties in Russia.

The Revolt on the Battleship Potemkin

Tsarism had but one proj) left — ^the armed forces; but the defeat in the war and the revolutionary struggle that was being waged by the workers and peasants stimulated revolutionary temper in tho army and in the navy. The revolt of the crow of the battleship Potemkin of the Black Sea Elect clearly revealed that even this prop of tsarism was shaken. The sailors of the navy, among whom there were many industrial workers, were the most class - conscious and revolutionary section of the armed forces.

Li 1905 the Bolsheviks made energetic preparations for a general revolt in the Black Sea Fleet which was timed to break out during the assembly of the fleet for training purposes at the Island of Tendra, be- tween Odessa and Sevastopol. The revolt on the Potemkin, however, broke out spontaneously on June 14, 1905, before the whole fleet had assembled. Its immediate cause was the issue to the men of borshch cooked with decayed meat that teemed with maggots. The crew refused to eat the borshcli. The commander assembled tho ringleaders, ordered a tarpaulin to be thrown over them and then ordered them to be shot. In protest against this order the whole crew mutinied. A colli- sion occurred between tho officers and the men during which tho sailor Vakuliiichuk, tho leader of the mutiny, was killed by a senior ofidccr. Tho leadership passed to another revolutionary sailor named Matyushonko. Tho men killed many of tho officers and seized the bat- tleship.

The PoUmhin made for Odessa where a general strike was in prog- ress. The arrival of the revolutionary battleship flying the red flag stimulated the workers of Odessa to rise in armed revolt against tsarism, but the Mensheviks sabotaged the revolt and prevented tlie crew of the PoUmhin from landing a party to assist tjio workers. Tlio tsarist govern- ment ordered the whole of the remaining ]7art of the Black Sea Fleet to attack the Poiemhin. The revolutionary battlcsliip wont out boldly to meet the fleet with the red flag at its masthead. The gunners of the other sliips refused to fire at the Potnnldn, and one battlcshij), the Georgi Pohedonosyets, went over to its side. The petty officers on this ship, however, intimidated and demoralized the crew hj assuring them that the revolt was hopeless. They ran the battleship aground and the PoUmhin continued to fight alone.

The revolutionary warship sailed the Black Sea with the red flag at its masthead for a whole week, but failing to receive support from the shore owing to the treachery of the Mensheviks, and rumiing short of coal and provisions, it was obliged to make for the Rumanian coast and surrender to the Rumanian authorities. The latter, in 1906, handed the revolutionary sailors over to the tsarist authorities, who had them either executed or sentoncod to penal sorvitudo.

Lenin attributed immenHo imj)ortanec to the revolt on the PoUth- kin. ^‘Por the first time,” he wrote, “an importaiit unit of the armed forces of tsarism — an entire battleship — hm openly gone over to the side of the revolution” (V. I. Lenin, SelecUcl Works ^ Vol. Ill, Moscow, 1934, p. 311).

As soon as he received the first news of the revolt on the PoU7nhin, Lenin sent a Bolshevik to Odessa to give it guidance, but he arrived too late. The ship had already left for Rumania.

The revolutionary movement in the anny and in the navy contin- ued to grow. In 1905, cases of mutiny among the reserves increased and not infrequently these were accompanied by the killing of officers. This unrest revealed that the rank and file of the army wot*o wavering and wore becoming an unreliable pro]^ for the autocracy. The Bolsheviks formed military revolutionary organizations for the ])urpose of conduct- ing activities in the army with the object of uniting the soldiers with the workers and peasants and of leading them on to the armed insur- rection against tsarism.

The October General Strike

The Bulygin Duma

The rising tide of the revolutionary move- ment in the country forced the tsarist clique to manoeuvre. It was compelled, while continuing its policy of repression, to take a stop towards meeting the wishes of tlie bourgeoisie who, in their turn, were seeking an alliance with it. In other words, it was obliged to strike a bargain with the bourgeoisie. With this object the tsar’s government, on August 6, 1905, passed a law for the convocation of a State Duma. In conformity with this law the proposed State Duma was to be not a legislative but an advisory body; it was to have the right to express an opinion on the bills submitted to it by the government, but not to pass or reject them. Thus, the law of August 6 left the autocratic system com- pletely intact. This Duma was referred to as the Bulygin Duma, after Bulygin, the Minister who had drafted the law. The landlords, who were an insignificant minority in the country, were to receive 85 per cent of all the seats. The workers were given no electoral rights at all. The bourgeoisie welcomed this Bulygin Duma and called upon the people to take an active part in the elections. The Mensheviks supported the liberals. The Bolsheviks alone called upon the people to boycott the elections to the Bulygin Duma. The further development of the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat, led by the Bolsheviks, prevent- ed the convocation of this Duma.

The Peace of Portsmouth

After the rout of the tsar’s fleet at Tsushima, the international bourgeoisie, fearing the further growth of the revolution in Russia, strongly urged the tsar’s government to con- clude peace. In their opinion peace with Japan would help to restore ^‘internal peace” in Russia, particularly if the tsarist government made some moderate constitutional concessions to the people. On the other hand, the United States was apprehensive that Japan would become too strong and therefore urged the Japanese government to moderate its demands upon Russia.

Greatly exhausted and weakened by the war, Japan herself was interested in the speedy conclusion of peace.

At Japan’s request, Theodore Roosevelt, President of the United States, acted as mediator in the negotiations between Russig. and Japan.

To discuss the situation the tsar’s government, on May 24 (June 6), 1905, called a council of war over which the tsar presided. The majority of those present at the council were in favour of concluding peace. “In- ternal well-being is more important for us than victory. We are living in an abnormal condition: we must restore to Russia her internal repose,” they said.

The government consented fco open peace negotiations and appoint- ed a peace delegation, headed by Count Witte, who enjoyed the con- fidence of the bourgeois governments of Europe and America. The peace negotiations were opened in the small town of Portsmouth, Maine, in the United States.

Japan presented very harsh peace terms. She demanded the Liao- tung Peninsula, the South Manchurian Railway up to Harbin, the Is- land of Sakhalin, and complete control of Korea. In addition, she coimt- ed on receiving a large indemnity from Russia. The Russian delegation had received instructions not to yield' an inch of territory to the Japanes e and not to agre^ to the ]oaynient of any indemiiitios. The discussion of tho })eaco treaty became cxtrcnioly jn^otraotod . Roosevelt now exerted pressure upon tlio Japanese and now txpon the Russian delegation, urging tliem to make mutual concessions. At last, on August 23 (September 5), 1005, tho peace treaty was signed.

Tsarist Russia recognized Japan’s predominant economic, military and political interests in Korea , ceded to Japan her lease of Port Ai'thur and Dalni, pledged herself to run tho Chinese Eastern Railway exclu- sively for coininercial purposes and ceded to Japan tho southern part of SaHialin, with all its adjacent islands. In addition, she concluded a disadvantageous fishing convention with Japan. "‘As wo know,” said Comrade Stalin in an address to the people on September 2, 1945, “in the war against Japan, Russia was defeated. Jai:)an took advantage of tho defeat of tsarist Russia to seize from Russia the south- ern part ofSaklialin and establish herself on the Kuril Islands, thereby putting the lock on all our country’s outlets to the ocean in the East, which meant also all outlets to tho ports of Soviet Kani(‘.hatka and So- viet Chukotka. It was obvious that tlapan was aiming to (lo])rivo Russia of tho whole of her Ear East” (J. Stalin, On the Omit Palrwiic War of the Soviet Unio7b, Moscow, 1945, ]>]). 208-209).

As Comrade Stalin obsorvofl in the same speech, tho defeat of tsar- ist Russia in 1904-1905 . lay like a black stain upon our country.

Our people believed in and waited for tlio day when Japan would bo defeated and tho stain would bo wiped out.”

Tho war with Japan cost tho Russian people dear: 400,000 men were killed, wounded and taken prisoner, and tho expenditure amounted to over 3,000,000,000 rubles.

The conclusion of peace with Japan was of considerable assist- ance to the tsarist clique in its further struggle against tho revo- lution. But the revolution was not to be halted. In the autumn and winter of 1905 the revolutionary movement rose to its peak.

The All-Russian Political Strike

On September 19, 1906, a gen- eral printers’ strike broke out in Moscow. The bakers, tobacco work- ers and workers in other trades joined the printers. Cossacks and gen- darmes broke up revolutionary demonstrations. The workers fired at the police with revolvers and wounded many of thorn. On September 25 a regular battle was fought in Tverskaya Street (now Gorky Street) out- side Philippov ’s bakery , A troop of Cossacks charged tho crowd that was blocking the street. Tho workers rushed into tho bakery, climbed to tho roof of this tall building and from there pelted tho troops with stones. Tho trooi^s surrounded tho whole block where tho bakery was situated and laid regular siege to it. Eventually, two companies of infantry got in through the back of tho house whore tho workers liad not placed a guard. Two of the workers were killed, eight were wounded and 192 were arrested.

The September strikes in Moscow raised the struggle to a higher :age. Lenin stated that the events in Moscow marked the beginning f the insurrection. "^The outbreak of the insurrection has been crushed gain. Again: long live the insurrection!” he wi*ote (V. I. Lenin, GoU ‘Cted Works^ Vol. VIII, Moscow, 1937, Russ, ed., p. 282).

On October 7, the railwaymen on the Moscow-Kazanskaya Railway ent bn strike, and on October 8, the men on all the other railways in uussia joined them. On October 11, the railway strike developed into a ation-wido general strike in which the workers of all trades were in- olved. The intelligentsia — schoolteachers, office employees, lawyers, igineers and students — ^joined the workers. The strikers demanded the Dnvocation of a Constituent Assembly. The tsar’s government tried 3 suppress the strike by armed force. On October 14, Trepov, the Gov- :nor General of St. Petersburg and virtual dictator of Russia, issued 10 order: “Don’t fire blanli shot; spare no bullets.'” But the govern- lont was already powerless to stop the strilce.

Nearly a million industaual workers, not counting railwaymen, and weral hundred thousand office employees, were involved in the October political strike. Tlie entire economic life of the country was brought to a standstill. Trains and ships stopped running, factories were idle, the post and telegraph ceased to function, no newspapers or magazines a])pcared. In the towns street traffic ceased, shops and restaurants were closed. The universities and high scliools were closed. Only the water supply, city drainage and the hos]ntals functioned by order of tlie strike committees. On the railways only troop trains which were car-, rying demobilized soldiers who were hurrying homo from Manchuria were allowed to run.

The October strike x)aralyzed the forces of the government and at the same time demonstrated the strength of the proletariat as the vanguard fighter and organizer of the nation-wide struggle against the •autocracy. In a number of localities the general strike began to develop into armed insurrection.

In Kliarkov barricades wore erected around the University and as many as a thousand armed workers mustered to defend them. In the streets collisions occurred with troops. Artillery was called out. During the storming of the barricades and in street fighting 147 workers were killed.

In Ekaterinoslav the entire population of the working-class suburb ’of Chocholevka took part in building barricades. They threw down tel- egraph ])obs and erected barbed-wire ontanglemonts. The barricades wore demolished by troo])s. Collisions with troops also occurred in Odo.s- sa, Saratov, Rostov and other cities.

The strike wave (the fourth in that year) reached its peak in the -autumn and in tlie beginning of the winter of 1906. While about a million workers wore involved in October, in Doeembor only several hundred thousand wore affected.

The Tsar’s Manifesto of October 17

Scared by the general strike, the tsar, on October 17, issued a manifesto, which had been drawn up by Count Witte who, shortly before that, had been ap]')ointed Chairman of the Council of Ministers. In this manifesto the tsar promised to grant freedom of speech, press, association and assembly, extension of the franchise, etc. The State Duma was proclaimed a legislative body. But this manifesto was only intended to deceive the masses. The tsar hoped by means of it to gain time to muster his forces for the purpose of crush- ing the revolution. In appraising the tsar’s manifesto, and utteiing a warning against exaggerating its importance, Lenin wrote: ^‘The tsar’s concession is indeed a very great victory for the revolution, but this victory does not yet by a long way decide the fate of the entire cause of freedom. The tsar has not yet by any means capitulated. The autocracy has not yet ceased to exist. It lias only retreated, . . (V, I. Lenin, GoU

lected WorJes^ Vol. VIII, Moscow, 1937, Russ. ed., p, 362.)

The manifesto of October 17 fully satisfied tlio bourgeoisie who, frightened by the nation-wide strike and the incipient insiirroction, began openly to oppose the revolutionary masses. The big industrial and commercial bourgeoisie formed an organization called the Union of October Seventeenth (laiown as the Octobrists). The Eight- wing Zemstvo- ites and the various commercial and industrial ^^parties” that .sprang up in 1905 joined this organization.

The liberal Zemstvo-ites and the members of the Emancipation League officially inaugurated the abeady legally existing Constitution- al-Democratic Party (known as the Cadets). The Cadets expressed the strivings of those sections of the bourgeoisie which were less interested than the Octobrists in feudal methods of exploitation. Unlike theavow- ‘Odly reactionary Octobrist bourgeoisie, the Cadets tried to manoeuvre between the revolution and the autocracy. When the tsar’s manifesto was promulgated, the Cadets declared the revolution at an end and 'Called for co-operation with the Witte government.

The Mensheviks were also pleased with the manifesto of October 17 . The leaders of the Georgian Mensheviks in Tiflis even stated at meet- ings: ‘^There is no longer an autocracy, the autocracy is dead. Russia is entering the ranks of constitutional monarchist states.”

Comrade Stalin emphatically denounced this piece of Menshevik •deception. On the day the manifesto of October 17 was promulgated he said at a meeting in Tiflis: “What do we need in order to really win? We need three things: first — arms, second — ^arms, third — ^arms and arms again.”

Tlie Bolsheviks urged the masses to place no confidence in the tsar ’s Jinanifcsjo and to prepare for armed insurrection.

Stricken by mortal fear of tho revolution, Nicliolas II began to seek supjiort in Kaiser Germany and among the Baltic German barons. During tho general strike of October 1905 several Gorman destroyers appeared in tlu^ I’oadstcad off Fotorhof with tho objecrt of taking Ni- cholas II and his lamily to Germany in the event of tho revolution being victorious. At this time the tsarist government conducted negotiations with Germany for intervention in Bussia for tho ]mrpose of siijiprc^ssing tho revolution and of restoring tsarist absolutism. Tl^his cons])iracy against tho revolution was ex])osed and frustrated by tlio proletariat of St. Petersburg.

In Poland martial law was declared as a consequoneo of tho growth of tho revolutionary movement. German troops were moved to tho Bus- sian frontier in readiness to invade Bussia. Tho proletariat of St, Pe- tersburg retaliated to this threat on tho part of German imperialism to intervene in tho internal affairs of Bussia by declaring a general strike. The result was that martial law in Poland was rescinded and intervention was rendered impossible. The satirical journals at that time published a cartoon depicting tho Governor General of Warsaw, Scalone, who was a German, zealously cleaning tlio boots of an army ofHccr whoso face was concealed, l)ut wlmso figure could bo recognized as that of Williohii II. The ca’})tiou to tlie cartoon rea<i: ‘TTnfortunatoly wo had to rescind martial law, hut I shall continue to servo you ftiithfully and well.”

Immediately after tho manifesto of October 17 was promulgated revolutionary demonstrations ocoiUTcd all over Bussia. Street mootings wore held at which impassioned revolutionary speeches were deliv- ered. To combat tho revolution, tho government formed a hooligan or- ganization called the Union of Bussian People, which united tlie cor- rupt Black Hundreds which had already sprung U]) in many localities in tho beginning of 1905.

On tho direct instructions of tho tsar and the gendarmes tho Blade Hundreds, jointly with tho police, organized Jewish pogroms in over a hundred towns in all parts of tho country. Leaflets inciting to pogroms wore secretly printed in tho printing plants of tlie Department of Police. During a pogrom in Odessa several thousand Jewish working people were killed. In Tomsk, the Black Hundreds, with the blessing of the Bishop and in tho presence of the City Governor, surrounded the I'ail- way administration ofi&ces where a workers’ meeting was taking place and set fire to it. Many of the people present at the mooting perished in the flames, and it was only tlianlcs to tho heroic efforts of S . M. Kirov that some of tho revolutionaries were saved. In Tver (now Kalinin) tho Black Hundreds wrecked the promises of the Tver Zemstvo, which was a liberal body, and killed and injured many momberH of tlio ZcmiKstvo staff. In Ivanovo, the Black Hundreds brutally murdorod the veteran revolutionary worker and loader of tho textile strike, Fyodor Afanasyev, known as “Father.” In Moscow the Black Hundreds arranged the assassination of the prominent Bolshevik N. E. Bauman, who had only just been released from the Taganskaya prison. Bauman’s funeral devel- oped into a huge revolutionary demonstration in which several hundred thousand people took part. These arrests, pogroms and assassination of revolutionaries served as striking illustrations of what the masses could expect from the manifesto of October 17. About this manifesto

the people sang the ditty:

The tsar caught fright, issued a Manifest: Liberty for the dead, for the living — arrest.

Soviets of Workers’ Deputies

During the stormy days of the October general strike the working class created a new ty]>e of revolu- tionary organization which played a leading role in the revolution. These organizations were the Soviets of Workers’ Deputies. On OctoberlS, while the strike was in progress, the workers of St. Petersburg held meet- ings in their factories and works and elected representatives to a Coun- cil (Soviet) of Workers’ Deputies for the purpose of leading the strike. Formed originally as a Joint Strike Committee, the St. Petersburg Soviet rapidly became the embryo of a new revolutionary authority. Thus, in November, the Soviet on its own authority proclaimed the introduction of an 8-hour day; it had its own organ, Izvestia, which was printed in the biggest printing plants of St. Petersburg and ap- peared without the sanction of the tsarist censor. The Soviet began to in- terfere in the orders of the tsarist administration. While the j)Ost and telegraph employees were on strike government telegrams were sent off only with the Soviet’s sanction. The inliabitants of St. Petersburg came to the Soviet on every kind of business as if it were an official adminis- trative body. Nevertheless, the St. Petersburg Soviet failed to take the lead of the revolution. The reason for this was that, taking advantage of the absence from St. Petersburg of Lenin, who was living abroad in exile, the Mensheviks captured the leadership of the Soviet and did all in their power to prevent it from becoming an organ of revolu- tionary authority and, in particular, frustrated the preparations for armed insurrection.

Following the example of St. Petersburg, Soviets of Workers’ Deputies were formed in all the other big cities of Russia during the period of October to December 1905. The Moscow Soviet was led by Bolsheviks and, as a consequence, it became an organ for the prepara- tion of armed insurrection. In the Caucasus, in Latvia, and also in some parts of Central Russia (the Tver and Moscow Gubernia), representa- tives of the soldiers, i. e., peasants in military uniform, were members of the Soviets. Thus, Lenin’s idea of the revo ut ionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry began to take practi- (‘al shape.

When Lenin returned from abro<ad and studied the activities of the St, Petersburg Soviet, he pointed out to the Party the world his- torical importance of the Soviets as the embryo of a new revolutionary popular authority. But in order that the Soviets might play their revolutionary role, ho urged, it was necessary to prepare to overthrow the rule of tlio tsar by organizing an armed insurrection. Purtlicr , in tlio course of the revolution of 1J)05 the Bussian ])roletariat ereatod a form of organization that was new in the history of tlio revolutionary movement, a form of organization that was the prototype of Soviet power, the embryonic foim of the ])roletarian socialist static, i. 6., the dictatorshix) of the proletariat. Tho Soviets marked a stei> forward compared with the Paris Commune of 1871. Comrade Stalin expressed his high axipreeiation of the historic im^iortance of the Soviets in the revolution of 1005 in the words . . the movement for the Soviets of Workers’ Deputies begun in 1005 by the workers of Leningrad and Moscow led in the end to tho rout of cajiitalism and the victory of Socialism on one-sixth of the globe” (J. Stalin, Prohkms of Lenmism^ Moscow, 1045, ]>. 530).

The National-Liberation Movement of the Peoples of Russia in 1905

Finland's Fight for Autonomy

nio revolntiouary movement of the })rolotariat t‘.ompolled the tsarist autocracy to make certain concessions on the national (piesbion. After Bloody Sunday (January 0) the struggle against tsarism liared up with exceptional vigour in thc^ regions inhabited by tho ox)prossed nationalities. Tho workers of Helsingfors, tho capital of Finland, wore among tho first to organize a general strike of xirotest against tho atrocities perpetrated by Nicho- las II against the workers. The Fimiish bourgeoisie and its party of ^''active resistance” believed that tho tsarist autocracy would he eoin- pellod by tho workers to make concessions and restore tlio Finnish constitution, which had boon abolished in 1002.

The tsar’s government, however, made only slight concessions, for it calculated that the Finnish bourgeoisie wotilcl readily come to tenns in order to wage a joint struggle against the workers. Tho law of 1001 on comxiulsory military service was repealed and the regulation on the non-dismissal of judges was re-introduced. But these minor concessions failed to satisfy oven tho Finnish bourgeoisie. They <iemancled tho re:-torat’on of the Finnish Con-^titution.

The October x)olitical strike in Russia was backed by the Finnish worker, who xu'oclaimed a general strike in Finland. They formed a Rod Guard and x^i’oparcd for insurreebion.

The nation-wide strike of tho working class comptdled the tsarist autocracy to yield on the Finnish question as well. On October 22, 1 1)05, Nicholas II promulgated a manifesto restoring the constitution in Finland. The Finnish bourgeoisie was satisfied with this and began to make pieparations for the elections to the new Diet. The Finnish Mensheviks supported the bourgeoisie in everything; they spread constitutional illusions among the masses and assured the workers and peasants that the armed struggle against tsarism was over. Describ- ing the opportunist stand taken by the Finnish Mensheviks during the revolution of 1905, Lenin said that *^they are not genuine Social- Democrats.”

The Struggle for National Liberation in Poland

After January 9, strikes were continuously in progress in Poland. Numerous mass meetings were held in the towns and villages at which resolutions weie adopted demanding autonomy for Poland. The peasants refused to pay taxes or perform military service, and expelled the Russian government officials and schoolteachers.

The Polish nobility and the Catholic clergy came out under the leadership of the nationalist parties which advocated the achievement of autonomy for Poland by means of a deal with the Russian bourgeoisie.

In the autumn the national movement in Poland assumed wide dimensions. The population proclaimed a boycott of the tsarist schools, and the educational society known as Matitsa collected voluntary contributions from the people and opened Polish schools. After the October general strike the revolutionary struggle of the Polish people reached the verge of armed insurrection. This frightened the Polish bourgeoisie, who betrayed the movement by entering into an agreement with the Russian liberals.

In the autumn of 1905 the tsarist autocracy proclaimed martial law in Poland, but the political strike proclaimed by the St. Peters- burg workers compelled the government to rescind it. This demonstrated to the Polish people that the Russian proletariat alone was their faithful ally.

The National Movement in the Ukraine and in Byelorussia

Tlie revolutionary struggle of the workers of the Ukraine and Byelo- russia in 1905 developed in complete unison with the struggle waged by the Russian proletariat.

Taking advantage of the weakening of the autocracy as a result of the revolutionary movement, the UlLrainians succeeded in publishing books and newspapers in the Ulcrainian language. A section of the Ukrainian petty-hourgeois nationalists who had formed the Revo- lutionary Ula^ainian Party (R.U.P.) demanded autonomy for the Ukraine and the transfer of x:)Ower to an autonomous Ukrainian Sejm. In their program, which did not di.Ter from that of the Constitutional Democrats, they demanded the transfer of the land to the peasants with payment of compensation to the landlords. In addition to the R.U.P. thoro were in the Ukraine in 1005 the Ukrainian Social-Bomocratie Union, the Spilka (Loagno) wIiujIi was of a Menshevik trend, and the Ukrainian Socialist- Revolutionary Party.

The Ukrainian nationalists were actually agents of Austria, whicli promised to sujiport their struggle for the ‘'indopendonco” of the Ukraine. Th(^ nationalist slogans of those separatists {i, e., advocates of secession) found no favour among the Ukrainian workers and peasants wlio strove for the overthrow of Russian tsarism in fraternal alliance with tiic Russian workers.

In Byelorussia, the Byelorussian Socialist Oromada, which was supported by tlie kulak elements of the Byelorussian peasantry, tried to capture the leadership of the national movement. In January 1906, this party held a congress in Minsk at whicjh it demanded autonomy for Byelorussia and the formation of a federation consisting of Byelo- russia, Lithuania, Latvia and the Ukraine with a common Sej in in Vilna. This party also demanded the allotment of land to the peasants with payment of comjicnsation to the landlords.

Both in tho Ukraine and in Byelorussia an important part in the national movement was ])layo(l liy t.ho schoolteaelHU’s who formed their Spilki and Prosvity (eultiiral and educational societies). Tho Prosvity distributed litt'rafcure in tho Ukrainian and Byelorussian languages, opened village libraries and reading rooms ami organized theatrical performances, coiux^rts and literary evenings. Their main function was to conduct educational work in their native languages.

But tljose ])artios and gi'oipxs could not load tho broad movement for national liberation; they renounced the revolutionary straggle and a fighting allianco with tlio revolutionary Russian proletariat, and foiled to link tho aims of the national movomout with the struggle for land that was being waged by tho peasantry. While proclaiming the slogans of the national movement, they hid from tho masses the point that their chief enemy was tho tsarist autocracy , which could be ovei thrown only by tho joint efforts of tho workers and peasants of all nationalities.

The Revolutionary Struggle for Liberation of the Peoples of Transcaucasia

Tho national movement in Transcaucasia in 1905 assumed a more definitely class and revolutionary character than it did in the Ukraine and in Byelorussia. Thanks to the leadership of tho Social-Democratic organization, which had been trained by Com- rade Stalin, the workers’ and peasants’ movement in Georgia, and particularly in Guria, rose to a considerable height. 0]3en prepara- tions for an insurrection against tsarism wore made nob only in tlie towns, but also in tho rural districts.

All through 1905 mass strikes, demonstrations and meetings took place, funds wore collcotod for revolutionary purjioses and “Red Hundreds” and })oasant oommittoos wore formed in the villages, Tho peasants rose in revolt against the landlords and drove them from their estates. The landlords, assisted by the authorities, organized their armed squads known as “Black Hundreds.” In many parts of Georgia the inhabitants refused to recognize the tsarist courts and j)olice.

The attempts of the Georgian nationalists, including the Georgian ]\Iensheviks, to capture the leadership of the movement failed. In 1905 the workers and peasants of Georgia followed the lead of the Bolsheviks.

In Azerbaijan the movement for national liberation was led by the Baku Bolshevilcs, who formed for this purpose a special organi- zation known as Gummet (energy). This organization conducted extensive activities among the more backward and downtrodden section of the Azerbaijanian workers in Baku, As a result of the educa- tional work conducted by the Bolsheviks, the more class-conscious of the Azerbaijanian workers, jointly with the Russian workers, succeeded, in February 1905, in putting a stop to the Armenian-Azerbaijanian massacres. During the oil workers’ strike in August, the majority of the Azerbaijanian workers, for the first time, joined the strike, for they were beginning to understand that a united class movement was needed. The landlords and the rising local bourgeoisie tried to keep the Azerbaijanian workers and peasants away from the revolu- tionary struggle. Intense religious and nationalist agitation was conducted in the towns and villages by the Pan-Islamists, who advocated the amalgamation of all Moslems in an independent Moslem state which was to be governed by the bourgeois-feudal upper classes 4md the clergy. This Pan-Islamist agitation received support from Turkey. The Gummet constantly exposed the reactionary plans of the exploiters of the Azerbaijanian people that were covered up by the flag of religion.

In Armenia the bourgeois party known as the Dashnacktsutyun tried to capture the leadership of the movement for national liber- ation. In the endeavour to obtain the support of the Armenian bour- geoisie and the clergy in the struggle against the revolution in Trans- caucasia, the tsar’s government repealed the church property law, which limited the revenues of the Armenian Church.

The National Movement among the Peoples of the Volga Region and Siberia

The revolution of 1905 roused all the nationali- ties of Russia to political life. In the Volga Region and in Bashkiria the bourgeois nationalists formed a Moslem League, the object of which was to unite all Moslems. This league also extended its activities to some extent to the Moslem bourgeoisie in Central Asia and in Trans* caucasia. A prominent part in this league was played by the mullahs, who fomented religious strife between the Moslem and Russian popu- lations. At the end of 1905 the Tatar bourgeoisie convened in Kazan the first Mosloii congress, which in a loyal ]>otition to the tsar ploatlod for the abolition of all Moslem disabilities and for political, religions and civil rights equal to those enjoyed by tlic Ivusslan population.

Tlio Chuv«ash national movement in 1005 assumed the pui*cly peasant character of a struggle for land and freedom. Activities among the Clnivash and Mari ])opulations of the Cheboksari district on tlu- Volga wore conducted by members of the All-Russian Peasant Union. The peasants at their meetings passed decisions to seize the land of the landlords, and they also demanded the opening of schools to be conducted in their native language. TJie Buryats <umtinued tlieij* struggle against the })lunder of their lands by the tsarist govermnonl officials. A league of Siberian nationalities was formed. The awakening of the Yakuts was brought about by tlic Yakut League which was formed in 1905, but which was soon suppressed by the tsarist au- thorities. Such were the first steps in the awakening to political life of the Siberian peoples who were oppressed and downtrodden by tsarism.

Ill the 1905 revolution the Bolsheviks fought for Lenin’s ijrogi'anv on the national question. Comrade Stalin formulated this program in the following terms: ‘‘Complete (Uunocracy in the (‘oiiutry is tlie ba^sis and condition for the solution of the national problem. . . . Thr right of sdf-iUUrminaUon is an esmUml clcmiml in tlu^ solution of the national problem . . . . autonomy, antonomy for such erystiilized

units as Poland, Lithuania, the Ukraine, l.heOau(uisns,cte. . , . Nationa! e.gmiliiy in all forms {^ianguagv.^ schoo ,s’, vJ(\) is an cssvntml element in the solution of the national question*"' (rf. vStaliii, Marxism amf the National ami Colonial QwsHon^ Moscow, 3940, p]). 49-51).

The December Armed Insurrection

The Strike Develops into Insurrection

Experience taught the workers that they could not achieve victory over tsarism by strikes alone; they realized that armed insurrection was n(K’.essary for this.

The first to take to arms after the October wtrila^ were the sailors and artillerymen of Kronstadt. Por two days and nights — October 25- and 27 — ^Kronstadt was in the hands of the insurgents. But the sailors’ movement was unorganized, it was accoin])anied by the wrecking of shops j nd the living quarters of the officers, and it lacked a j^lan and clearly formulated aim. On October 28, the insurrection was crushed and 200 of the participants and leaders of the insurrection were court- martiallecl.

On November 1, 1905, the St, Potcu’sbnrg Sovic^t of Workers' Deputies proclaimed a general political strike in support of the demand for rescinding martial law in Poland and for the roloaso of the Kronstadt insurgents. Tho tsar’s government was obligcnl to yield to the demands of the workers of Kt. P(‘t(*rsburg. Martial law in Poland was rescinded, and instead of trying the ICronstadt sailors by court martial, which had iDower to pass sentence of deaths they were tried by a military court and received comparatively light sentences: nine were sentenced to penal servitude, 123 to imprisonment, and 83 were even acquitted.

The November general strike of the St. Petersburg workers saved the lives of the insurgent Kronstadt sailors and was of enormous iDolitical importance, for it vividly demonstrated to the soldiers and sailors that the working class alone was their true champion and leader of their struggle. The Mensheviks had opposed this second general strike. Instead of fraternization with the soldiers and revolutionary propaganda in the tsar’s army for the purpose of winning it to the side of the insurgent ]}eople they put forward the cotinter-revolutionary demand for the withdrawal of the garrison from St. Petersbiiig. Had this been done the soldiers would have been isolated from the St. Petersburg proletariat and left under tlie un- divided influence of the army officers.

The Naval Revolt in Sevastopol

The Bolsheviks continued Avitli their work of j)roparing for an armed insurrection in the Black iSoa Fleet after the suppression of the revolt on the battleship PotemMn. The insurrection was started on Novennber 14 by the crew of the cruiser Ochakov, On November 15, 6,000 sailors on other ships and the workers omplo;y'ed in the fortress of Sevastopol joined tho insnrrection. The battleship Poiemhin, renamed the Panlehimon, again hoisted ilio rod Hag. The Sevastopol revolt was led by Lieutenant Schmidt. Being a bourgeois democrat in liis convictions he, instead of launching a vigorous attack against tlie tsar’s forces, undertook no active operations whatever, but waited for the entire Hoot to join tho Ochakov, Naively believing that tlio tsar would make concessions, he oven sent tho latter a tolegi-am demanding political liberties. In spite of his confused political views, however, Lieutenant Schmidt was devoted to the revolution. On November 15, ho boarded the gunboat S^virepy and going fiom ship to sli p he urged the men to join the in- surrection. Many of them hoisted the red flag, but Lieutenant Schmidt was unable to organize them for joint and speedy operations.

Tho authorities recovered from their consternation and drew troops to Sevastopol. Late in the afternoon of November 16, the bat- teries and ships which had remained loyal to the govermnent opened fire on the Ochakov and the other revolutionary sliijis and continued all night. The OchuJeov caught fire. The crow tried to save themselves from the flames by swimming or rowing ashore, but they were shot down by machine guns that wore posted on tho beach. Schmidt and the other leaders of tho insurrection were captured and later court- martiallod and shot.

The insuiToction in Sevastopol roused now forces for tho struggle in tho array and in tho navy.

Gommenting on the weaknesses of the revolts among the armed forces Lenin said that tho soldiers and sailors ‘‘'lacked a clear under- standing of the fact that only the most vigorous continuation of the armed struggle, only a victory over all the military and civil authorities, only tho overthrow of tho government and tho seizure of power over tho whole state could guarantee the success of the revolution’’ (V. I. Lenin, Selected Works, Vol. Ill, Moscow, 1934, p. 10).

The Peasant Revolts

In November and December 1905, the struggle which the peasants waged against tho landlords became increasingly intense. Peasant revolts broke out in 170 counties, more than a third of the total number of counties in European Russia. In November there wert^ about 800 cases of peasants seizing landlords' estates. Of exceptional dimensions were the peasant revolts in the Saratov, Kursk and Tambov Gubernias and in tho Ukraine — in the Kharkov and Chernigov Gubernias, where tho peasants wrecked 272 landlords’ country-seats. In Latvia tho peasants organized several hun- dred revolutionary committees. In Guria the peasant “Red Hundn^ls” drove out all tho tsar’s oflioials and established revolutionary rule. The peasants’ struggle and preparation for armed insurrection in Trans- caucasia proceeded under the direct leadership of Comrade Stalin.

Preparations for Armed Insurrection

In November 1905 Lenin, compelled till then to live the life of an exile abroad, returned to Russia, took charge of the Party leadership of the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat and set to work to prepare for an armed insurrection. While engaged in the colossal task of reorganizing the Party to meet the altered conditions, he at the same time edited Novaya Zliizn^ the first legal Bolshevik newspaper, and wrote articles for it on the fundamental problems of the revolution and the tactics and or- ganization of the Party.

On Lenin’s instructions the Party organizations procured arms, formed workers’ fighting squads and organized their military training. The Bolsheviks also conducted extensive revolutionary propaganda among the armed forces.

In December 1905, a Bolshevik Party Conference was held in Tam- merfors, in Finland. Here Lenin and Stalin met for the first time. The conference discussed the question of armed insurrection.While the con- ference was in progress news was received of the outbreak of the insur- rection in Moscow. On Lenin’s proposal the conference broke up to allow the delegates to return to their respective localities in order to take the lead of the insurrection.

By tlie beginning of December the position of the tsarist autoc- racy had improved. By this time the more reliable regular army units had been transferred from Manchmua to European Russia. The foreign banlteis hastened to the aid of tsarism, for they feared they would lose the capital they had invested in Russia and that a victory of the Russian revolution would kindle the flames of socialist revo- lution in Europe, They helped the tsar’s government to meet the more urgent payments of interest on loans and promised another large loan for the suppression of the revolution.

The immense sweep of the revolution frightened the liberals who, therefore, began to support the autocracy in its struggle against the workers and peasants. The Mensheviks continued their treacherous tactics and frustrated the insurrection where preparations were being made for it, or where it had already commenced.

On December 2, the St. Petersburg Soviet of Workers’ Deputies adopted the so-called financial manifesto in which it called upon the inhabitants to demand their savings bank deposits and wages in gold. Next day the government arrested the Soviet. The St. Petersburg proletariat was unable to answer this challenge of the autocracy by an insurrection, for the treacherous policy which had been pursued by the Menshevilc and Trotskyite leadership of the Soviet had left them unprepared for such action.

The Armed Insurrection in Moscow

The Moscow/ Soviet, which was led by Bolsheviks, began actively to prepare for an armed insurrection from the very first day of its existence. As a result of the agilatiou c'oucliictod by t-lio ’JjolHlioviks, uiiroHi. broke out among tlu* troops of t.lio Moseovr garrison. Tlio iirsi to revolt was tho Jlostov llcgiinont. On Ooueinbei' !2, the men arreste<l their ohieors aiul clceted a HokUems’ CJoinmittco to eoiulnct tiie regiiuoiit s aifains. 'J'lio otha?* niiits of ilio Moscow garrison, ho\vev<n*, failed to sn])port the rovolt and it vras crushed by the evening of ])ec<unber -t.

On .December 5 a eonlereiic.e of Mos(U)vv 1 bolsheviks resolved to urge the Moscow Soviet to procla-ini a general strike with the view of doveloj)ing it into an armed insurreetion.

Tile general strike eommeneed in the morning of December 7. Owing to tho shortage of firearms tho workers in tiio faetorios forged cold-steel weapons. Abpnt !2,000 Avorkers (almost half of them Bolshe- viks) joined the lighting squads, ytreot demonstrations, meetings and collisions witii the police occurred in tiio working-class districts. The Astrakhan Bogiment came out in full fighting kit to assist tho insurgents, but it was intereex)t(^(l by the Cossaefe, completely sur- rounded and eain])clled to return to barraeks, TJie other regiments were also tionliiKul to barraeks because tliey were ‘hmreliable.” Thc‘ Moscow garrison Avavenul. Of tho 15,000 men avIio constituted tlii' garrison only 1,300 Dragoons were on the side of tlie autocracy; the Governor tlonoral of Mcjscoav s(‘iit urgent messages to St. Petersburg pleading for the dispatch of otluu* troojis. The revolutionaries allowed tlio op])(>rtunity to sli]) by and the gOA'crnmeut sucecodod in coping with iho unrest in tht^ Moscow garrison.

The men of the Nikolayevskaya Bail way (uoav the October Rail- way) did not join the strike. As a cousoqueneo, the tsarist goA^ci*umoiif was able to send ilie Semyouovsky Guards Regiment from St. Peters- burg and artillery from IVcr (now Kalinin) to sup]iro8s the insurrec- tion in Moscow. The police arrested the loader's of tho insurrection, wlio had been appointed by the Moscow Committee of the Party, and ilispersod a mass meeting that was being held in the Aquarium Park, by armed force.

In the ovening of December 9, troops surrounded Fiedler’s School, where the fighting squads were assembled, and bombarded it with artillery. The demolition of the school infuriated the masses. In re- sponse to the appeal of the fighting squads, and in many cases on their own accord, the peoj^le of Moscow erected barricades, using telegraph poles, sleighs, packing oases, barrels, wooden planks and so forth. That night Moscow was covered with barricades. On December 15, after the arrival of the troops from St. Petersburg, the barricades were bombarded by artillery; machine guns were posted on the belfries of the Moscow churches and monasteries. Unable to hold out against artillery and machine guns, the fighting squads retreated, but fought back, heroically defending every inch of ground, and concentrated in the Presnya District of Moscow (now called Krasnaya [E.ed* Presnya). The staff of the insurrection had its headquarters in a large textile mill knoAvn as the Trekhgornaya Mills, hut the leading body of the insuxTection — ^the Moscow Committee of the Party — had been arrested on the eve of the outbreak. Deprived of central leadership, the in- surrection deteriorated into isolated district fighting. The workers waged a guerilla fight against the troops; they hesitated to fight their way to the centre of the city, and confined themselves to the rlcfcnsivo. This was the main i*easoii for the weakness of the Moscow insurreotLon.

Nevcrthcdcss, Presnya held out against the tsar s troops anuod with artillery, machine guns and rifJos, for ten wliolo days. Q-lio district was subjected to continuous bombardinont. Houses burned and col- lapsed, but the workers remained siauncli. Fighting squads from other industrial centres in the Moscoav Itegion Jiastcncjd to i.ho aid of the Moscow revolutionaries. A workers’ squad led by M. V. Frunze arrived from Ivanovo-Voznesensk. Feasants su])])lied broad to the lighters, who were aided by the entire ]) 0 ])u]ation of the Presnya District. But the workers of the other towns, and of St. Petersburg in particular, proved unable to ensure the victory of tlie armed insurrection in Moscow.

Weighing up the situation, the Moscow Committee of the Party and the Moscow Soviet of Workers’ Deputies resolved to stop the armed insurrection on the night of December 18. In obedience to this order the squads operating in the Presnya District stopped fighting. Although all the railways were now occupied by tsarist troops, an engine driver named Ulvhtomsky offered to run a train carrying the fighters out of Moscow along the Kazanskaya Railway. The heroic railwayman, driving the train out of Moscow at terrific speed, through a hail of machine-gun and rifle I'ne, succeeded in saving the revolutionary fighters.

The tsar’s troops dealt frightfully with the ])oaceful popula- tion, the workers and their families, ilundroda of thorn wore shot without trial or investigation. Over a thousand workers perished in the ooui'so of the suppression of the insuiToction. A punitive expe- dition on the Mosoow-Kazanskaya Railway shot hundreds of workers acooiding to a list which had been previously drawn upbyth'^ gendarmes. Engine driver Ukhtoinsky was also shot. Years later, when Soviet rule was established, onj of the stations on the Mosoow-Kazanskaya Railway and thj adjacent district of the Moscow Region Wv-re named after him.

Insurrections in Other Towns

The workers also rose to over- throw tsarist rule in a number of other towns; and so too did the oppressed nationalities in Russia. In the Ukraine, the insurgent railwaymen, miners and metal workers in the Donotz Basin captured the extremely important Ekaterininskaya (now Stalin) Railway. In Gorlovka, the centre of the insurrection, the tsarist authorities were overthrown and replaced by representatives of the workers. The insurgents were armed with home-made swords and daggers and a small number of revolvers. Although so poorly armed, 4,000 revo- lutionaries heroically fought a 5-hour battle with Cossacks, losing 300 men during the encounter. Battles with police and troops took place all over the Donotz Basin. In Lugansk, fighting squads were formed and the strike was led by K. E. Voroshilov. Tim gendannos had arrested Voroshilov in the summer of 1905, but in December thousands of workers marched to the prison where he was confined and released their “Eed General,” as the workers, already at that time, called him.

In Novorossiisk power was captured by the local Soviet of Workers* Deputies, which was led by Bolsheviks. The City Governor and authorities fled. People’s courts were elected and were recognized by the whole population. The burden of taxation was placed entirely upon the propertied classes.

In Sochi, in the North Caucasus, the insurgent people capturedi the garrison and the tsarist administration; and in the rural districts of the Sochi Region power passed into the hands of the people. Soviets were set up in all centres. The people of Sochi were helped by ‘"'Red Hundreds” sent from Guria.

In Vladikavkaz, the Ossetinian cavalry unit rose in revolt in December 1905, and it was only with the aid of Cossacks that the revolt of this national-minority unit was suppressed.

In Guria, the insurgent people in many districts seized power and the landlords’ land. Here the insurrection was led by the Caucasian Bolsheviks, headed by Comrade Stalin.

In Tiflis, the Mensheviks, by arrangement with the tsar’s Viceroy, undertook to maintain *‘order” against the armed insurrection, and to enable them to carry out this police function the Viceroy provided them with 500 rifles and quantities of ammunition.

In Siberia — in Krasnoyarsk and Chita — troops joined the in- surgent workers and, as a consequence, seats in the Soviets of these two cities were also occupied by Soldiers’ Deputies. In Krasno- yarsk, the soldiers, jointly with the workers, barricaded themselves in one of the railway workshops, and fighting a regular battle, bravely repulsed the attacks of the troops which were sent to suppress the insurrection.

The insurrection on the Siberian Railway was brutally suppressed by two punitive expeditions. One expedition, under the command of General Moller-Zakomelsky, moved up from European Russia, while the other, under the command of General Rennenkampf, moved to meet the former from Harbin. Shootings without trial or investi- gation marked the trail of these punitive expeditions. One of those who were shot, by direct order of Moller-Zakomelsky, was the old Bolshevik and Lenin’s pupil I. V. Babushkin, who was caught while transporting arms.

Ruthless operations by punitive expeditions were also conducted in Central Russia, in the Ukraine, in Poland, Latvia, Estonia, Trans- caucasia and Siberia. ‘"Make fewer arrests, shoot more,” “Don’t argue, shoot,” such were the orders issued by those butchers, the tsar’s ministers, and by the tsar himself . Thousands were executed and tens of thousands were arrested and sentenced to penal servitude or exile. The peasants were subjected to wholesale flogging.

Tlio l>oiirgeoi,sio wolt'-oiiicd the su]>|)mswion of the iosurreobioii. The MonsheviliH ccoHiiml the inniurgont worhiM'H. Plokhanov wrote: "‘They should not h«avc taken to orins/’ To this Loniu rctortt^cl: “‘On tlio eontrary, we Hhould have taken to arniMmoro rowolutely, onergot- ically and aggi'OHsivtdy; w'c should have oxplaim^d to the masses that it was impossible to coniine oursclvc^s to a pc'atu'ful strila^ and that, a f<'a-rless iuul relentless arim'd light was indispensable'” (V. L Loiiin, Mected Works, Voi. HI, IMosoow, lOol-, p. lUS),

Tile l^cceinbor insurrection elided in defeat. 'Pho reasons i‘or the defeat were tlio following: the peasants faih^d to siqiport the insurrec- tion ill time. The major part of tJie army was on the side of tsarism. The insurrection was not sufficiently organized, and it broke out in different iilaccs at different ^times. The insnrgmits lacked suffioioni. arms. The insurgents pursuoci defonsiv'^e and not offensive tactics. Tho Mensheviks and Trotsky, together with tho Socialist-Revolutionaries, sabotaged tho insurrection and diil oveiything they could to hinder it. Tn the Caucasus — in Tillis — the Mensheviks openly helped tho tsarist authorities to suppress the insuri'cctiou.

Tlio December insurreetiou marked tho ‘jieak of tho revolution. .After its (hdeat the revolutionary tide gradually subsided.

Retreat of the Revolution

The Revolutionary Struggle in 1906

After tho defeat of the December insurrootion the second period of tho first Russian revolution commenced. Tho workers and the revolutionary peasants ret/roated slowly, fighting all the time. In JOOG, fresh strata of workers entorod tho struggle. Theso wore tho workers omployod in tho unskilled trades in tho industrial centres, and those in the less in<lustrially-devoloped districts who had taken little part in tlie struggle in 1905. The number of workers involved in strikes in 1906 cxcu^cded 1,000,000 and in 1907 it amouiitcd to 740,000. In 1006 and 1907 tho strike movement was weaker than in 1906, but it was on a much .higher level than in tho jieriod before 1905,

The strike struggle waged by the agricultural labourers bore a revolu- tionary character; the labourers organized a boycott of the landlords. Tho peasant movement spread very widely and affected about three hundred counties, including many that had not been affected by tho move- ment in 1005. In many cases the peasants drove the landlords from their estates.

In tho spring of 1906 umost became more frequent in tho army .as well, and oven affected tJio tsar’s guards.

Simultaneously with tlie X)easaut moviuncnt in nK)6, the movement for national liberation assumed wider proportions in the Ihiltic Provinces and iu Transcaucasia. Here regular battles took place between the peasants and the tsar’s forces.

The Elections to the First State Duma

While crushing the revolution by armed force, the autocracy also began, as Lenin put it. "‘to crush popular liberties bv means of a monarchist ‘constitu- tion.’”

On December 11, 1905, during the armed insurrection, a law was promulgated governing the elections to the State Duma. Th*s law was needed by the autocracy to deceive the people. It granted electoral rights mainly to the propertied classes — ^tlie landlords and the capitalists. As for the electoral rights received by the workers and peasants, they contained considerable restrictions. The suffrage was far fjom un*versal. Agricultural labourers, day labourers and many other categories of workers “were not granted the vote at all, nor were women, the men in the armed forces, students or persons under the age of twenty-five. The suffrage was not equal. For urban electors a high property qualification was fixed, which meant that they had to be in receipt of large incomes from the renting of liouses or from commercial or industrial enterprises. The voters were divided up into four curiae or voters’ groups: landowning (landlords), urban (the bourgeoisie), peasants and workers. The rate of rexire- sontation for the different curiae was not the same. The landowning groiij) could elect one elector for every 2,000 voters, the urban groui> could elect one for every 7,000 voters, the peasants’ group one for every 30,000 voters and the workers’ group one for every 90,000 voters. The elections were not direct, but went through a series of inter- mediary stages. For the peasants there were actually four stages. First, the peasants in each village elected electors to a volost meeting which elected two delegates to a county meeting. The county meeting elected electors to a gubernia election meeting, w^hich at last elected the deputies to the Duma. Voting was^ in fact not secret.

Witte calculated that with the aid of the peasants, who still re- tained some faith in the tsar, he would succeed in securmg the election of a monarchist State Duma, and therefore, in the electoral law he draft- ed he allowed the peasant electors 40 per cent of the total number of seats. In February 1906, the government issued a supplementary regu- lation governing the elections to the State Duma, which still further restricted the electoral rights of the workers and urban demoerati4* voters compared with the law of December 11 .

The elections to the State Duma took x>lace in March and April 1906, in an atmosphere of the most brutal police terrorism. The Bolshe- viks adhered to the decision which was adoiited by the xinited Central Committee of the Party to boycott the elections. Nevertheless, they ^poko at election meetings and exx>osed the decox)tioii perxietrated by the tsar and tlio troacliorons role played by the liberals, and agitated for armed insurrection. The organized class-conscious workers took no part in the voting. The Mensheviks in the Caucasus violated the Party’s boycott decision and secured the return of their leaders to the First State Duma. In BaJeu, however, the only largo industrial ceutro in tlu‘. Caucasus, the Bolsheviks cllecfccd the boycott of the election.

The Fourth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.

Working under the direct leadc^rship of Lenin, the St. Petersburg Committee of the Party steadily gained influence among the workers. Even tlic Mensheviks were obliged to admit that the proletariat had followed not their lead but that of the Bolsheviks during the December insurrectioiu The split in the Party, however, was preventing the establishment of working-class unity. And so, when the demand arose among the workers for Party unity it received the support of the Bolshe- viks. The Mensheviks, unable to resist the pressure of the masses of the workers, were also obliged to agree to unity. To this end, the Fourth Congress (known as the Unity Congress) of the R.S.D.L.P. was hold in Stockholm in April 1900, At this congress the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks formally united, but luaintainod their independ- ent organizational existence as two factions within the Party* The Bolshevik organizations had sufFcu’cd sovoroly from police raids and arrests after the December insurrection. The Menshe- viks, on tho other hand, had gained strerngth by accepting int<> their ranks numerous roprosentativos of tho petty-bourgeois intelli- gentsia who had nothing in common with tho proletariat. Tliat was why tho Mensheviks had a majority at this congress. When the congress discussed the agrarian question the Bolsheviks uphold Lenin’s program for the confiscation of the landlords* estates and the nationalization of all tho land. Tho Mensheviks, however, sup- ported a program for tho ‘‘municipalization of the land.” This was aimed at a compromise with the remnants of serfdom and with tsarism, for it proposed that the land should be transferred to thc^ existing Zemstvos, which were to rent it to tho peasants.

Taking advantage of their chance majority, tho Mensheviks secured the adoption of their agrarian program.

The First State Duma

Although the December insurrection was suppressed, the tsar’s government was compelled to convene the State Duma. The autocracy, 1 owevor, did all it could to restrict its powers. Thus, at the end of April 1906, three days before tho Duma was to open, so-called ‘‘Fundamental State Laws,” were published, in which it was affirmed that "‘supremo auto- cratic state power is vested in tho Emperor of all tho Russias.” The tsar retained the right to amend tho fundamental laws and to issue a number of exceptionally important laws without submitting them to tho Duma. Furthermore, the State Council was given equal powers with the Duma. The Council was reformed and made to consist half of high government officials appointed by the tsar and half of elected lepiesentatives of the nobility, the Zemstvos, the universities and the clergy. Bills passed by the Duma had to be passed by the State Council before they could be sent to the tsar. He, in his ,turn, had the final say as to whether to accept or reject them. Thus, the legislative rights of the Duma promised in the Manifesto of October 17, were almost nullified. Witte, with whose name the Manifesto of October 17 was associated, could not be used to carry out this avowedly reactionary policy and he was there- fore dismissed. Goremykin, a representative of the reactionary bu- reaucracy, became President of the Council of Ministers.

Nevertheless, although the rights of the electors and the scope of activity of the State Duma were severely restricted, the Duma did to some extent limit the powers of the tsarist autocracy.

The composition of the Duma after the elections also proved to hf‘ unfavourable for the tsar’s government. Of the 624 Deputies 204 were peasants, hut these were not the sort of peasants Count Witte had counted on. The majority of the peasant Deputies formed what was called the Trudovik group, or Group of Toil, which, at first, the workers' Deputies also joined. The Social-Democratic group in the Duma numbered 18 Deputies. The largest single group in the First State Duma was that of the Constitutional Democrats (Cadets) who numbered 179 D puties. In their hunt for peasant votes during the elections, the Cadets had described themselves as the “Party of Popular Freedom.” The Rights (from the Black Hundreds to the Octobrists) had 44 Deputies.

As a result of the constitutional illusions spread among them by the Cadets, Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, the peasants be- lieved that they would be able to get land by peaceful means through the Duma and had therefore elected their Deputies with keen expectations. The Cadets proposed that only a part of the landlords* land be trans- ferred to the peasants, and then only at a “fair assessment. ”The peasants kn^w from their own experience that the “fair assessment” of the land- lords was two or three times higher than the market price of the land, and as the attitude of the government and of the Cadets, as the leading party in the Duma, towards their urgent demands for land became clear, their constitutional illusions were dispelled. The awakening of the class- consciousness of the peasant Deputies was quickened by the unceasing propaganda of the Bolsheviks who, by their policy, enabled the work- ers’ Deputies in the Duma to take a correct proletarian class stand on a number of questions. ‘

Lenin and Stalin denounced the Cadets as enemies of the working peasantry and called upon the peasants to act in unison with the work- ers, to form and strengthen a proletarian and peasant alliance, for, they urged, only hucIi iin iilliioice conJd bring the p(JAsantM victory iii tlicir struggle for land . As a result of the ju’opagauda conducted by tlie Social- Democrats, the Trudovik group introduced a land bill in the Duma ’[)ro-. viding for the coni]>uls()ry alienation of all landlord laud; it proposed tlie uatioiialization of all the land, including peasant allotments. Tlio im])as- sumeds])ecehes delivered by the peasant Deputies during the discussion of the agrarian question in tlio Duma I'cvcTberatod tliroughout the country and had a rousing elTcct upon the ]u>asantry. In the ])eriod from May to August 1000, ])oasant unrest siiroad to 50 })cr cent of all the coun- ties in the country. The growth of revolutionary activity among the jicasants greatly alarmed the tsarist govennnont. It issued an official statement to the peasants in which it declared that while it would nev- er agi'oe to tlie comxuilsory alienation of tlie landlords* land, it was willing to buy at state expense plots 'of land voluntarily sold bv' landownersandrcselltlieseplotsto the peasants at a jirice within their means. In answer to this declaration of war -upon the peasantry the Tru- dovik grou]> tried to get carried through the Duma an a])peal to the peo- ple, but this was defeated .by the Cadets. The government was scared by the turn which the discussion of the land question liatl talnm and deeidod to disj)orso the Duma. On duly 8, 14)0(), it ])roclaiine(l the dissolution of the Dinna on tlio grounds that tiie peasants “in a number of gubernias, had taken the ])uth of o])eii plunder, the seizure of other jicoxile^sprop- <^rty and disobediencse to th(’> hw and the lawful authorities.’’ After the disioersion of the First State Duma, the Minister of the Interior Stolypiu was ap])ointcd Frosideut. of tlie Couneii of Ministers in ])lace of Goremykin, who was (umshlered incapable of waging a deter- mined struggle against the revolution, Lenin summed up Btolyjiin’s political biography iu the following brief terms: ‘"A landlord and a mar- shal of thonobilty, he was appointed governor in 1002, under Plelive. gained ‘fame* iu the eyes of the tsar and the reactionary court clique by his brutal rojirisals against tlie peasants ami the cruel punishment he meted out to them (in the Saratov Province), organized Black Hun- <ired gangs and pogroms in 1005 (the iiogrom in Balashov), became Min- ister of the Interior in JOOG and Presulent of tlio Council of Ministers after the dispersal of tlio First State Duma” ( V. 1 . Lenin, Selected W orks^ Two-Vol. ed., VoL I, Moscow, 1940, p. 486).

The situation in the country remained revolutionary. In the sum- • mor of 1006 large-scale revolts of soldiers and sailors broke out in »Sveaborg and Kronstadt. The Bolshevik military organization made extensive preiDaratious for an insuiTCction among the naval and military forces stationed in Finland, but the iusurrootioiH in Svoaborg and Kron- stadt broke out ^irematurely, before these ])reparations wore eomplotod. Warships and artillery were sent against the insurgent saihws and the insurrections wen^ crushed. The insurgents were eourt-juartialled and executed.

To punislitlie revolutionaries, Stolypin, in August 1906, instituted field courts-martial, which up to April 1907, sentenced over a thousand men to death. Execution on the gallows became a common practice.

In an, endeavour to split the ranks of the peasantry who had been united in their struggle for land during the revolution, Stolypin, on November 9, 1906, in the period between the First and the Second Du- mas, issued a decree granting the peasants the right to leave the peas- ant communities and to acquire definite ownership of their allot- ments.

Owing to the intensification of the peasants’ struggle for land, the tsar’s government again entered into negotiations with the govern- ments of Germany and Austria for their intervention in Russian affairs.

On July 7 (20), 1906, on the very eve of the dispersion of the First State Duma, the Bolshevik newspaper Echo published an article by Lenin entitled “The Plots of the Reaction and the Threats of the Po-' grom-mongers” in which he exposed the machinations of the tsar and of his German and Austrian friends. After quoting the rapture the govern- ment newspaper Eossiya had expressed over the forthcoming interven- tion, Lenin went on to say: “These measures consist in preparing the armed forces of Germany and Austria for the invasion of Russia if the cause of freedom is victorious or on the point of victory. The Berlin government is already in communication with the Austrian govern- ment on this question. Both governments have admitted that ‘under certain circumstances active intervention in the internal affairs of' Russia with the object of suppressing or restricting this [Lp., revolu- tionary] movement may become desirable and useful. . . .’

“Thus, there can be no doubt about the plot that is being hatched by international counter-revolution. The Russian government is call- ing in the aid offoreign troops against the Russian people. Negotiations for this have been and are being conducted, and have aheady resulted in a fairly definite agreement” (’V. I. Lenin, Collected Worhs, Vol. IX, Moscow, 1937, Russ, ed., p. 411).

This article helped still further to expose the counter-revolutionary designs of tsarism.

The Second State Duma

The experience of the First Duma showed that the Duma could be used as a platform from which to expose the crimes of tsarism and the treachery of the liberals, and also to fight for the leadership of the peasants. Consequently, on Lenin’s proposal, the Bolsheviks decided to take part in the elections to the Second State Du- ma.Theresult of the part^'cipation of the Left-wing parties in the elections was that the Second Duma was more radical than the First. The Cadets won only about half the seats they had held in the First Duma (98- as against 170). TheTrudovik group, together with the Socialist-Revolutionaries, bad 157 scats, compared with 94 in the First Duma. The

Sooial-Domocrats won 65 seats compared with 18 in the First Duma. But although the Second Duma was ihoro radical than the First, it was weaker than tlio latter .The revolutionary tide was subsiding. The Bolsheviks, however, sot tliomselves the task of utilizing the Duma to expose tsarism and the treacherous liberals. The activities of the Boh shovik Deputies in the Duma wore directed by Louin, and he formulated the main points of their speeches on the most important questions. The Mensheviks, however, wanted to engage in peaceful legislative work in alliance with the liberals, under the government of Stolypin, the hangman.

At the Fifth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. which was hold in London in April and May 1907, the Bolsheviks strongly denounced the treach- erous tactics which the Mcnshevilcs pursued in the Second State Duma. At this congress the Bolsheviks were in the majority, and the congress adopted the Bolshevik resolution calling for the systematic exposure *of the counter-revolutionary tactics of the liberals.

Tho election to the Second State Duma had shown that the ex- isting electoral law, oven though it did greatly restrict the franchise for tho working })eoplo, could not ensure tho election of a Duma that would satisfy the tsarist autocracy. Consequently, the government made preparations to dissolve tho Second Duma and to amend tho electoral law with tho object of still further restricting the franchise for the workers and peasants. To provide an excuse for dispersing the Duma, the tsar’s govornmont resorted to outright provocation, accusing the Social-Democratic group in the Second State Duma of hatching a “plot against tho state.” The char.^o was a deliberately false one, and had been fabricated by the secret police. On June 1, 1907, Stolypin demanded the impeachment of tho Social- Democratic Deputies. Tlie Cadets were already willing to yield to the government’s demand, but on Juno 3, 1907, the government dissolved the Duma and promulgated a now electoral law that was calculated to ensure a majority in the next Duma for a bloc of tho landlords and the big bourgeoisio. Since then that day has been known as tho coup d'itat of June 3, for tho tsar’s government had violated its own Manifesto of October 17, 1905, according to which no laws could be passed without the consent of the Duma. The Social-Dem- ocratic Deputies in the Second Duma were arrested and tried by a tsarist court and sentenced to penal servitude and exile.

Reasons for the Defeat of the Revolution of 1905

Tho coup d*4tat of Juno 3, 1907, signified the temporary defeat of tho revo- lution.

Already at that time the Bolsheviks attributed the defeat of the first Russian revolution to the fact that a linn alliance between the workers and peasants had not yet been formed. As Lonin wrote: “This alliance was si3ontaneous, not formulated, and often unconscious” (V. I. Lenin, Gollected Works, Vol. XIV, Moscow, 1937, Russ, ed., ]). 15). The peasants did not yet sufficiently understand that the tsar and the landlords constituted a smgle gang of the bitterest enemies of the people, and that in order to overthrow the landlords it was necessary to overthrow the tsar too. Nor did they yet realize that the only faithful ally and leader they had was the working class. As a consequence, a large section of the jieasantry failed to support the armed straggle of the workers against tsarism. Even those peasants who fought against the landlords and tsarism lacked sufficient political consciousness and organization.

The army, which consisted mainly of peasants and reflected the inadequate class consciousness of the peasantry, had not yet gone over to the side of the insurgents, and the bulk of it helped tsarism to crush the revolution.

Nor were the workers sufficiently united in their activities. The strike wave reached its peak in 1905, but the intensity of the strike * movement varied according to districts. While in industrial regions like St. Petersburg, Baku, Riga and other places, every worker went on strike no less than four or five times in 1905, in the districts of the Moscow Gubernia every worker went on strike only once in the year, and in a number of industrially less-developed gubernias, some work- ers had not struck at all. In 1906, the number of strikers dropped in the more-mdustrialized gubernias, whereas in the least-industrialized gubernias, the backwoods, as Lenin called them, the number of strikers rose. But by that time the vanguard of the working class had already been weakened.

In the period of 1905 to 1907, the working class still lacked the unity necessary for the victory of the revolution. At first the Party was split into two factions; later it united, bub only formally. The Bolsheviks pursued a consistent revolutionary policy, but the Men- sheviks still exercised influence among a certain section of the workers and retarded the development of the. revolution.

Thus, m the first Russian revolution its three main forces: workers, peasants and soldiers, had not yet merged in one common torrent.

The tsar’s government received the assistance of the foreign impe- rialists, who were apprehensive about the fate of their investments in Russia and feared that the revolution would spread to Western Europe.

In the spring of 1906, the French bankers granted the tsar loans amounting to a billion francs. Wilhelm II mustered a whole army to invade Russia in support of the tsarist autocracy. An important factor that helped tsarism was the conclusion of peace with Japan, which strengthened the position of the tsar’s government. Moreover, to suppress the revolution the tsar could use the military forces that were released from Manchuria.

The Significance of the Revolution of 1905–1907

The heroic struggle which the workers and peasants waged in the revolution of 1905-1907 dealt a heavy blow at tsarism, it sa])ped its foniKlations and compelled it to make concessions. All its iittcjiupts to restore the oonditious that had existed in llnssia hetoro tlu^ nwohd-ion ]>rovod futile, it could not recover from the blows which tlu^ revolution inflict- ed n])on it.

For the workers and iu\isauts of Itiissia, the revolution of 1005- 1907 served as a great schooling in ])olltical struggle, it roused millions of working people to political life and riw<ialed to them the relations of all classes to each other. The masses acquired enormous exjierionco in employing the general strike and armed in- surrection, and this they utilized in their subsequent struggles. The working class created the Soviets of Workers’ Deputies, the embryonic form of the dictatorship of the proletariat. This experience helped the workers and peasants to achieve victory twelve years later, in October .November 1917. Hence, the revolution of 1905 was the dross rehearsal of the Great October Socialist Rovolubiou.

The international signiiicaiieo of the revolution of 1905 was also very groat. The first Russian revolution took place thirty-five years after the sup])rossion of tlio Paris Oommnne. It took jilacc in the e])och of imiiorialisin. As Comrade Stalin wrote: ‘‘Tims, the revolution against tsarism verged on and had to pass into a revolution against imperialism, into a proletarian revolution” (J. Stalin, Problems of Leninisyn^ Moscow, 1945, p. 37). A direct result of the Russian revolu- tion was the development of the political struggle in Austria in October 1905, in Germany in January 1900, in France in May 1900, and in Asia (the i evolutions in Peasia, Turkey and China).

Millions of woikeis and peasants all over the world have boon and ai e being taught by the experience of the fii st Russian revolution of 1905.

The Stolypin Reaction (1908–1912)

The Third of June Monarchy

The Industrial Depression of 1904–1908

By the time of the defeat of the first Russian revolution the capitalist world was entering into another economic crisis (1907-1909), which followed on the heels of the temporary industrial revival of 1903-1907.

In tsarist Russia the crisis of the early 1000 ’s lasted much longer than the ordinary periodical crises in Europe, and in 1904 it was . followed by a depression.

Tte unsuccessful war against Japan, the falling o/f in government contracts and railway construction, and a series of crop failures which eaused the already restricted home market to shrink still further, had all served to prolong the industrial crisis of the early 1900’s. The new world economic crisis aggravated the industrial depression in Eussia.

The course of the crisis may bo illustrated by the output of pig iron in that period. Taking the output of pig iron in 1900 at 100, the index number of the output in 1903 was 84. As a consequence of the increased demand created by the war against Japan the index number rose in 1904 to 102, but in 1905-1906 it dropped again, to 93, and in the period of depression from 1907 to 1909 it did not rise above 97. Only in 1910, after a ten years’ state of crisis, did the output exceed that of the beginning of the century.

All the basic industries, including the oil industry, were in a state of stagnation. The coal industry of the Donetz Basin alone was some- what less aifected by the crisis and the depression. The textile industry, the output of which had risen somewhat by 1907, remained stagnant during the period of the depression.

After the revolution of 1905, important changes took place in industry. The concentration of industry increased. Capitalist com- bines — trusts and syndicates — ^grew rapidly. During the period of the industrial depression the big banlcs became more powerful and took a direct part in the reorganization of industry, strengthening and enlarg- ing some plants, closing down others, and combining and reorganizing still others. For the pimpose of financing Russian industry the French banlters promoted the formation of a banking S 3 mdicate known as the Russo-French Finance Company. Capitalism in Russia became in- creasingly monopolistic, imperialist capitalism.

In many cases the factory owners closed down their plants for a time in order to install new machinery, to reorganize the management and to combine with other plants. The unemployment that was created by the crisis assumed a spasmodic character, and this gave rise to a feeling of insecurity among the workers. Male workers were dismissed wholesale and!" replaced by cheap female and child labour. The material conditions of the workers sharply deteriorated. The employers tried to force the workers back to the conditions of labour that had existed before the revolution of 1905. The working day was lengthened to ten and even to twelve hours. Piece rates for all categories of work were re- duced, and fines again became the rule. The cost of living steadily rose.

The large federations of employers that sprang up in 1906 and 1907 in St, Petersburg and Moscow formed a united front with tsarism against the workers. The employers’ organizations discharged the more class-conscious and militant workers. These workers were blacklisted and could not fi.nd employment anywhere. The factory owners often practised wholesale dismissals of workers.

Counter-Revolution Rampant

After tlireo years of revolution, Russia passed thro\ijfj;li years of blootlshod and rani])aiit cpimtcr-rcv- olution. Lon ill described this period as years ‘‘of tiio black Duma, rampant violence and opju'essiou, the onslauglit of the ea])italists upon the workers, tJie Joss of tJio gains wliich ilu* workers had won'"' {V. 1. Lenin, Collected Ifo-rfe, Vol. XiV, Moscow, HKl?, Russ, cd., p. 391). TJio tsarist government, the landlonls an<l tlie capitalists wreaked vcngiaiice upon the vvorJeers and ])(^asants for the revolution.

In Siberia, in the Caucasus and in the Raltic rrovinccs, punitive expeditions continued their atrocities, sotting lire to and destroying scores of villages, killing thousands of Avorkers and ])oasants without trial, and flogging women and children . For a long time the tsarist government feared to return to tlieir regular stations the troops which had been sent to suppress the revolution. Tlio troops in the central gubernias wore reinforced with ti’oops drawn from the frontier regions, as the tsarist axitocraoy believed that the ‘"^internal enemy” was more dangerous than the foj’oigii foe.

Tlie field courts-martial that o])oratod in 1 000 and 1 907 Avere replaced by military courts. The entire country Avas dotted with gallows, which the people dubbed “^Stolypin ne<}kties,” iiftor the head of the tsar’s govo 3 'nment, Stolypin. Lenin wrote regarding this period; “There has never before been in Russia such rampant ])orsoeution by tsarism, and during these Jive years tlu^ gallows boat tlu^ record of three centuries of Russian history.” Rundmls of thousands of people Avero flung into prison, and there the revolutionaries wore siibjecsted to torture and limtal ill-treatment, I^or having j)articipatod in strikes or revolution- ary demonstrations woi'kors Avero sonteiieod to long years of penal servitude.

After the coup (Velai of June 3, the Black Hundreds, who were organized by the League of the Russian People, intonsiliod their pogrom activities. Black Hundred outrages Avore iiarticularly rife in Odessa, Avhere organized gangs of hooligans marched through the town carrying rubber truncheons and revolvers and boating up ])assers-by. Not a year passed but what the Black Hundred hooligans organized a bloody pogi‘om against the Jews. Throughout the country x^i^^datory raids by the police and gendarmes upon the workers’ organizations became more frequent. In 1907, 169 trade unions wore sujjprcssed, in 1908, over 100 wore sux)X)resscd, in 1909, 96 Avere siq^xwcssed. Workers’ newspapers and magazines were banned. The workers’ cultural and educational organizations that managed to survive dragged out a miserable existence.

Tsarism acted as the bitterest enemy of the jiooplo. In a general description he gave of tho 3rd of Juno monarchy, Lenin wrote; . The tsarist monarchy is tho rallying centre of that gang of Black Hundred landlords (first among whom is Romanov) which has turned Russia into the terror not only of Europe, but now also of Asia, the gang which has developed tyranny, robbery and embezzlement of state funds by government officials, systematic violence against the ^common people/ torment and torture of political opponents, etc., to absolutely excep- tional dimensions” (V. I. Lenin, Collected Worhs, Vol. XV, Moscow, 1937, Euss. ed,, p. 247).

The Third State Duma

The cou'p d’etat of the 3rd of June marked the opening of the offensive which tsarism launched against the gains won by the revolutionary masses; but it could not return entirely to the conditions that prevailed before the revolution. Although the revolution of 1905 sustained defeat, the revolutionary struggle which the working people had waged made it impossible for tsarism to rule by means of the old methods. After dispersing two Dumas, Nicholas II was obliged to convene the Third Duma. Another reason which dictated the necessity of maintaining the semblance of a representative institution in Russia was the growth of capitalism, the growing strength of the Russian bourgeoisie, and the unstable inter- national position of tsarism, wffiich was compelled to manoeuvre and give Europe the impression that Russia was a constitutional country. Above all, however, tsarism aimed at making the Third Duma a new class bulwark for itself by forming a bloc with the counter-revolu- tionary Russian bourgeoisie.

In the endeavour to ''retain power and revenues” for the rul- ing class of feudal landlords, tsarism — following the 1905 revolu- tion — took the second step (the first was taken in 1861) towards establishing a bourgeois monarchy, by consolidating the bloc with the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie. The political expression and embodiment of the 3rd of June bloc between the landlords and the bourgeoisie was the Third State Duma, convened on the basis of the new electoral law of June 3, 1907,

In conformity with this law, the landlords were allowed to elect one elector from every 230 voters, the bourgeoisie one from every thou- sand, the peasants one from every 60,000, and the workers only one from every 125,000. This law increased the number of landlord elec- tors almost fivefold, that of bourgeois electors sevenfold, compared with that provided for by the law of December 11, 1905, while the number of the worker and peasant electors was more than halved. The franchise for the non-Russian nationalities in Russia was still further restricted. The peoples of Central Asia were totally deprived of representation in the Duma. Poland was entitled to send only 12 Deputies instead of 35, and of these, two — ^the represent- atives of Waisaw and the Kholm Region — ^had to be Russians. European Russia was granted 403 seats in the Duma, but the “border regions” were given only 39,

Thus, the new electoral law ensured that the Third State Duma would consist of landlords and the bourgeoisie. In other words, it was not so much an olocted body as a body carefully chosen to suit the interests of tsarism. Of the members of the Tuird Duma, 202, or 46 per cent of the total, wore landlords.

The state of the parties rejircsontod in the. Duma also clearly proved that it was a bourgeois and landlord body. Tho Right-wing parties had 40 per cent of the seats, tho Octobrists 25 ])cr cent, the Cousti- tutional-Domoorata (Cadets) 23 per cent and tho Left-wing parties a little over 7 per cent. Tho rest of tho Deputies declared themselves to be non-party. No single party had an absolute majority in the Duma.

This latter fact enabled tlie tsarist government to manoeuvre and to base itself on the Black Hundred and Octobrist majority at one moment and on the Octobrist and Cadet majority at another, without having to fear serious op])osition from either of them. The obedient Octobrists voted for all the govoniinent projiosals either in alliance with tho Right-wing Black Hundreds or in alliance with the Cadets,

Tlio head of tho govormnnnt during tho 3rd of June bloc was Stoly- pin, one of tho most jmunincut rojirosontativos of the landed nobility, who were organized in the countor-rovoliitiouary organization known as tho Council of the United Nobility. With tho support of tho Octo- brists and Constitutioual-Domoorats, Stolypin launched an offensive against the workers and peasants and tJio working people in tho non- Russian national regions. The keynote of Stolyj)iii’s domestic policy was: “First pacification and then reforms.” Stotyxiin achieved “paci- fication” by moans of tho criiolost terrorism. Fearing another outburst of revolution, however, ho was obliged to introduce an agrarian refonn.

Stolypin's Agrarian Reform

The State of Agriculture

The agrarian, or laud question, was, as Lenin expressed it, the j^ivot of tho Russian boui*gcois-domocratic revolution. Tho problem was to break up tho vast landlord latifundia which were tho basis of the mediaeval bondage in which the peasants still found themselves and the major obstacle to tho development of caj)italism. After the revolution of 1905, 30,000 big landlords still owned 70,000,000 desyatins of land, while an almost equal amount belonged to 10,600,000 poor peasant households. The distribution of the land in this fashion kept agriculture in a state of extreme back- wardness.

Tlio landlords found it more profitable to rent land to tbo ])casants than to farm their land themselves on modern linos. Tho ])e.asants cultivated their own allotments and tho land which they rented from fjhe landlords with thoir primitive implements. As a rosuit, the general level of agriculture in Russia in the beginning of the twentieth century was as low as ever it was before. As far as yield is concerned, Russia stood almost at the bottom of the list of all the countries of the world. In the x^criod from 1909 to 1913 the average yield of grain in Russia was 45 xioods X)er dosyatin compared with 90 in France, 152 in Germany ajid 192 in Denmark. In respect to the mechanization of agriculture, Russia was equally far behind the advanced countries. The greater part of the peasants’ lands were ploughed with wooden ploughs, and grain was sown and threshed by hand. In 1910, there were employed in agriculture throughout the empire 3,000,000 primitive wooden ploughs, 7,000,000 wooden-handled ploughs, 6,000,000 wooden harrows and only 27,000 steam threshers. Tractors and electric ploughs were not even thought of.

After the revolution of 1905, the utter destruction of the old mediae- val system of landownei ship in Russia became particularly urgent. Still more acute than in 1861 became the struggle for one or the other of the two possible paths of development of capitalism in agriculture — the Prussian or the American. In 1907, Lenin wrote that there were two possibilities: “Either the Prussian type of evolution: the feudal landlord will become a Juiil?:er. The power of the landlords in the state will be consolulated for decades. Monarchy. ^A military despotism clothed in })arliamentary forms’ instead of democracy. The utmost inequality among the rural and among the rest of the population. Or the American tyx^e of evolution. Abolition of the landlord system. The peasant becomes a free farmer. Sovereignty of the people. A bourgeois-democrat- ic system. The utmost equality among the rural population as the stai‘ting point and condition for free capitalism” (V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. XI, Moscow, 1937, Russ, ed., p. 188).

The peasant revolts in the period of the revolution showed that the peasantry refused to tolerate their present conditions any longer, wanted to sweep away the old system of landownership by revolu- tionary means, and were in fact taking the American path of develop- ment of capitalism in agriculture.

The tsarist government, the landlords and the counter-revolu- tionary bourgeoisie wanted to bring about this change in a way that would serve the interests of the landlords, they wanted the Prussian way. The govermnent therefore decided to split the peasantry, even at the cost of ruining the countryside, and to encourage the rise of a pros- perous class of small landowners — “new landlords” who would fight for the protection of private property in land and for the preservation of the tsarist autocracy.

The government, therefore, abandoned its former policy of preserv- ing the village C' minunities and the mediaeval forms of land tenure connected with it, such as tying the peasants to the village community, collective rosiionsibility of the community for the payment of taxes, etc. The aim of the autocracy in destroying the village communities was to strengthen the position of the kulaks and to transform the buUc of the peasants into a vast reserve army of labour, thereby ensuring cheap labour power for large-scale industry and for the landlords estates.

While the “reform” (“emancipation of the serfs”) of 1861 enabled the landlords to rob the peasants of their land, the new reform provided the kulaks with the opportunity to do so.

Destruction of the Village Community

Stolypin devised three groups of measures with which he hoped to avert an agrarian revolu- tion and strengthen the rule of tsarism. These groups were: 1) destruc- tion of the village community, 2) introduction of ‘‘kiiufcor” and ^‘otrub” farms in the countryside, and 3) resettlement of the peasants in other regions.

Stolypin ’s ukase of November 9, 1906, which initiated the destruc- tion of the village community, became, after it was amended by the Third State Duma, the law of June 14, 1910, which was to complete this destruction. The ukase of November 9, 1906, granted the peasants permission to leave the village community if they so desired; the law of June 14, 1910, made it obligatory for them to do jo. In those village communities where there had been no redivision of the land since the time when the peasants were allotted land, the plots became the private property of householders. Where the land had been redisr tributed,. householders were allowed to run their allotments as separate farms.

The Stolypin land law destroyed the community system of land tenure. It allowed the peasant to leave the village community and to sell his allotment, which he had no right to do before. This enabled the rich peasants, or kulaks, to buy up the allotments of the ruined poor peasants at low prices. A peasant who broke with the village community could remain in the village and become permanent owner of his plots, which could be exchanged for one continuous plot, the “otrub.” Or he could transfer his home and his property to a plot of land outside the village, and set up a farm there, a “khutor.” In either case the setting up of a farm entailed expend- iture. The government granted loans io kulaks to purchase land and organize “khutor” farms. It demanded that thebest of the vil- lage community’s land be allotted to the kulak “khutor” -farmers. The establishment of “khutor” and “"otrub” farms was frequently ef- fected by force, with the help of the rural prefects. The tsarist govern- ment sent a whole army of mounted police to the rural districts and gave Provincial Governors power to send troops to suppress the peasants who resisted land assignment from community land. However, among “khutor” -farmers the kulaks were in a minority^ There was a majority of another category of “khutor ’’-farmers, the ruined and impoverished peasants who, having no means to escape from want, said: “There’s nowhere to go, so let’s take up a "khutor’ farm.” But having no means with which to make such farms work, they would sell their allotments to the kulaks. In this way the kulak farms within and without the villages grew into real estates where wage labour was employed on a large scale. The process of dijfferentiation of the peasantry into classes was acceler- ated. A section of the peasants who had been deprived of their land went to seek a livelihood in the towns and became proletarians.

During the ten years the Stolypin law was in operation over 2,000,000 householders, with an area of land amounting to 18,000,000 hectares, left the village communities and took over the land ls their private property. Of this number, 54.7 per cent set up “khutor” and “otrub” farms, but three- jfifths of these subsequently sold their allotments.

The buying and selling of land was transacted through the Peasant Bank. Prom 1906 to 1910 the peasants acquired through this bank a total of 6,000,000 hectares of land. The bank concerned itself exclu- sively with the setting up of “khutor” and “otrub” farms, and during the ten years it was in operation, from 1906 to 1916, it helped to form 200,000 of these. The Peasant Bank operated in the interests of the nobility and the kulaks. It purchased allotment land at a ridiculously low price compared with that of landlord land. Where landlord land was assessed at 121 rubles j)er hectare, allotment land was assessed at 79 rubles, but the bank sold the latter at 140 to 150 rubles i^er hectare. When it sold land to be paid for in instalments it demanded high interest on the mortgage. Frequently pleasant s who had become “khu- tor” -farmers fell into arrears in the payment of interest and principal on loans received from the bank. In such cases their property was sold under the hammer and they were compelled to seek a livelihood in the towns.

Stolypin also extensively applied the policy of resettlement. His aim was to form a class of “sturdy” and “prosperous” peasant owners in the Central regions of Russia and to shift the discontented poor and middle peasants further out — to Siberia and other border regions* From 1906 to 1910, 2,500,000 peasants were resettled in Siberia, the Far East, Central Asia and other outlying regions.

In the pursuit of political aims the Stolypin government rodi* roughshod over the interests of the settlers and the rights of the native inhabitants.

The task of carrying out the resettlement policy was entrusted to resettlement commissions, Prefects and Provincial Governors. The commissions packed off whole contingents of poor and middle peasants in cattle trucks which bore the inscription: “Forty persons, eight horses.” The settlers with their wives and children, healthy and sick, travelled for months to their new places of settlement, living in thesis cattle trucks, in which they cooked their food and did their washing; and when they reached their destination they were bundled out and left ill the open field, in the rain or snow. To create some shelter for themselves they hastily dug dugouts, and then began a veritable martyrdom in their quest for land and loans with which to start their farms. Most of the land that was allotted them was situated in remote and inconvenient places, where there was no water, meadows and no pastures. The loans that were granted were inadequate. What the settlers suffered, left to their fate in these remote districts, can be seen from the following excerpt from the report of Prince Lvov, whom the Z3m3tvos sent on a mission of inspection to the Far East. ‘Tsolabion from the world, living as if on an uninhabited island among the marshes in the dense taiga, in the marshy valleys and muddy hills, absolutely wild conditions of life, labour and sustenance, naturally crush the weak-spirited and poor settler. He becomes apathetic after exhausting his small stock of energy at the very beginning of his struggle against stern nature in building his wretched habitation. Scurvy and typhus attack his exhausted frame and carry him to the graveyard. In many settlomfiiits, in 1907, the death rate was posi- tively incredible, amounting to 25 and 30 per cent. In the settlements there are as many gravestones as there are households, and many of the settlements will have to bo shifted to new sections otherwise they will be transformed into graveyards.”

Miny of the settlers abandoned their newly acquired allotments in despair and returned to their former places of habitation utterly ruiued. Settlers who but recently had been middle peasants wore reduced either to working as agricultural labourers or going into the towns to seek work.

This settlement policy spread ruin among the native inhabitants of the border regions. The land intended for colonization was forcibly taken from the natives. The Kirghiz, for example, were driven wholesale from their winter pastures. The Caucasian highland- ers were pushed from their fertile lands into the rocky gorges. In Central Asia, magnificent orchards, that were situated in an area intended for cultivation by settlers, were simply destroyed.

The ruined and impoverished native inhabitants of the border regions became revolutionary and augmented the ranks of the fight- ers against tsarism.

The Result of Stolypin’s Agrarian Reform

When he introduced his agrarian reform Sbolypin stated that his object was to wi*est tlie peasantry out of the hands of revolution and to convert the kulaks into a class of “small landlords” which was to serve as a firm bulwark for the autocracy in its struggle against the revolution.

“Give me twenty quiet years and I will reform Russia,” he said.

In an article entitled “The Last Safety Valve,” Lenin showed that Sbolypin’s agrarian policy brought neither “reform” nor quiet.” In 1910, an outbreak o£ cholera in the south of Russia carried away 100.000 persons. Plague broke out in the steppes of Astrakhan. Ruination, poverty and starvation roused the anger of the peasants and imbued them with the spirit of revolution.

Another crop failure in 1911, and the famine which affected

30.000. 000 peasants showed that the Stolypin reform had not abol- ished the fundamental causes of the backwardness of agriculture. Tj^hus and other epidemic diseases ravaged the famine-affected areas.

Stolypin ’s reform did not abolish mediaeval landownership. The royal family, the landlords and the monasteries still retained over

150.000. 000 hectares of the best and most fertile land in the country. The landlords continued to keep the peasants in bondage, compelling them to cultivate their, the landlords’, land with their wretched horses and primitive implements. “This is not capitalism,” wrote Lenin, describing the state of landlord and peasant farming that resulted from Stolypin ’s reform. “This is not the European method of farming. . . . This is the old Chinese way. This is the Turkish way. This is the feudal waif^ (V. I. Lenin, Selected Works^ Voi. IV, Moscow, 1934, p. 239).

The reform did not even abolish the open-field system and other survivals of serfdom which reduced the productivity of the peasants’ labour. The peasants, with bitter irony, described Stolypin ’s policy of land settlement as “land unsettlement.”

Stolypin ’s reform merely postponed the doom of serfdom; it did not eliminate the profound contradictions that constituted the basis of the Russian bourgeois-democratic revolution. It still further accel- erated the process of differentiation among the peasantry and intensified the class struggle in the rural districts. The agrarian ques- tion, the fundamental question of, the Russian revolution, could be set- tled only by abolishing the landlord latifundia and by transferring the

70.000. 000 hectares of landlord land to the peasants without compen- sation. But only another revolution could do this.

The Working-Class Movement in the Period of Reaction

In the winter of 1907, the Stolypin government issued an order for the arrest of Lenin. The tsarist sleuths hmited high and low for the leader of the revolution. On the proposal of the Party, Lenin, who was living in Finland at the time, went abroad. To board the ship unobserved by the police he, one night, crossed the ice in the Gulf of Finland on foot to a near-by island, accompanied by two Finnish peasants. The Decem- ber ice was frail and Lenin was almost drowned in an icehole, out of which he managed to extricate himself with diifioulty. He got safe on board at last and left Finland for Switzerland. His second period abroad as an exile lasted nearly ten years.

While abroad, in February 1908, Lenin resumed the publication of the Bolsheviiv newRpax)er Proletary, in the colmnns of which he began to prepare the Party and the working class for another revolution.

In 1907, Comrade Stalin left Titiis for Baku, where he led the rev- olutionary struggle of the Baku ‘proletariat.

Under the blows of reaction the strike movement in Russia con- tinued to subside. In 1908, 176,000 workers were involved in strikes, in 1909, the number was 64,000, and in 1910, it was only 46,000. The strilces were of a defensive character. Only in Baku did the working- class movement, led by Comrade Stalin, bear a clearly expressed polit- ical character. To divert the workers from the revolutionary struggle, the oil employers invited the workers in the oil plants and oil fields to elect delegates to a conference with employers to discuss the terms of a collective agreement. The Bolsheviks called upon the workers to boycott this conference.

At the end of 1907, when reaction was raging throughout tlie coun- try, a sort of worl^ers ’ parliament was in session fur nearly two weeks in Baku, at which the workers drew up their demands to be presented to the oil employers. When these demands were rejected the Bolsheviks called for a general strike. During the preparations for this strike the twenty-two-year-old Azerbaijan worker Hanlar, a splendid orator and leader of the masses, was foully assassinated. Hanlar ’s funeral developed into a powerful political demonstration. Speaking at the graveside of the fallen fighter, Comrade Stalin called upon the Azer- baijan workers to continue the struggle. Hanlar, he said, was the first sacrifice the Azerbaijan people had made for the Russian revolution.

Commenting on the militant character of the Baku strikes, Lenin wrote: “In 1908, at the head of the list of gubernias showing a large number of strikes stands Baku with 47,000 strilters. The last of the Mohicans of the mass political strike!” (V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. XV, Moscow, 1937, Russ, ed,, p. 33.)

In March 1908, Comrade Stalin was arrested by the gendannes, but even in prison he continued to lead the movement and sent out articles for publication in the newspaper Qudok, One day a group of Bolsheviks was sent off from the prison to penal servitude. From his prison window Comrade Stalin called out to them as they went: “Keep your manacles, we shall want them for the tsar’s government!”

In the autumn of 1908, Comrade Stalin was sentenced to two years ’ exile in Solvychegodsk, but in tho summer of 1909, he escaped from there.

Ideological Confusion among the Intellectuals

Describing the po- litical life of Russia dining the period of the Stolypin reaction, Com- rade Stalin called it “an abomination of desolation.” “Fettered public opinion,’’ he went on to say, ^"general weariness and apathy, want and despair among the workers, a downtrodden and intimidated peasantry and with the police- landlord-cax)italist hounds running riot — such are the characteristic features of Stolypin’s Opacification.’” ("On the Occasion of the Tenth Anniversary of Pravda,‘'^ Stalin’s article pub- lished in Pravda No. 98 of May 5, 1922.)

The defeat of the revolution caused disintegration and degeneration among the intellectuals. Some of the bourgeois fellow-travellers of the revolution deserted to the camp of its open enemies. Others found jobs for themselves in the legal working-class organizations, condemned all revolutionary activity, and called upon the workers to adjust them- selves to reaction and reconcile themselves to tsarism. This section of the intellectuals believed that Stolypin’s reforms had already con- verted Russia into a bourgeois state and had made revolution super- fluous. More hostile to the revolution than any other section of the intellectuals was the bourgeois (Cadet) intelligentsia who united around the symposium entitled VeJcM (Lmidmarhs) which was published in 1909. The contributors to this symposium were prominent repre- sentatives of the bourgeois intelligentsia, former legal Marxists and Constitutional-Democrats. They proclaimed war on Marxism, re- nounced the struggle for democracy and called for conciliation with tsarism. VekJii advocated the doctrines of the Orthodox Russian Church, mysticism and obedience to God and the powders that be, and chamx3ioned the Great-Power and imperialist foreign policy which the Cadet bourgeoisie began to advocate after 1905.

Ideological confusion and collapse were particularly rife among the petty-bourgeois parties (Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries and others) in which numerous factions, groups and coteries were formed.

The Mensheviks were of the opinion that the revolution was over and that Stolypin had put Russia onto the path of bourgeois develop- ment. They tried to adjust themselves to the Stolj^in regime and urged that the old militant Social-Democratic Party, which tsarism had driven underground, should be liquidated. For this reason the Menshevilcs were called Liquidators. Lenin called the Liquidators the "Stolypin Labour Party” because they had become the servants and coadjutors of the 3rd of June monarchy.

The Socialist-Revolutionary Party split in two. The Right Social- ist-Revolutionaries had as early as 1906 formed a semi-Cadet Work- ing People’s Socialist Party and were referred to briefly as Popular Socialists. The Popular Socialists advocated the payment of compen- sation for landlords’ land alienated for the benefit of the peasantry and entered into a bloc with the Cadets. The "Left” wing of the Socialist- Revolutionary Party formed a semi-anarchist group known as the Maxi- malist Socialist-Revolutionaries. They proposed economic and political terrorism as the j)rincipal wea]ion in the struggle and soon deteriorated into an unprincipled group of exproiiriatora.

During tlie period of reaction and police terrorism treachery and provocation became widespread. Agents provocateurs wormed their way into the Party organizations and some of them, on the instructions of the secret police, engaged in political murder wliich brought scores of innocent people to the gallows. A sensational event of that period was the exposure of the agent provocateur Azof who, since 1903, had been at the head of the ‘hnilitant organization” of the Socialist-Revolu- tionary Party. The Azef a. 'fair vividly demonstrated that the terroristic tactics of the Socialist-Revolutionaries were useful to the secret police and harmful to the masses.

The Bolsheviks during the Period of Reaction

The Bolsheviks Fight to Preserve the Party

The Bolsheviks alone were able to retreat in perfect order. They were aware that the vic- tory achieved by tsarism was a temporary and unstable one and contin- ued to rally the forces for another revolution. They were fiercely persecuted by the tsarist government and were liable to be sentenced to penal servitude if caught by the police; but they wont underground and tirelessly continued their revolutionary activities. They formed Bolshevik cells in factories and, combining legal with illegal forms of activity, they made use of every legal possibility, such as trade un- ions, workers’ clubs, adult Sunday schools and co-operativo societies, for the purpose of maintaining contact with the masses. The Bolshevik Deputies in the State Duma utilized the tribune of the Duma to further the interests of the revolution. The aim of the Bolsheviks was still, as in 1905, to overthrow tsarism and to complete the bourgeois- democratic revolution in order to pass on to the socialist revolution. They continued to advocate the old and tried slogans: A democratic republic, conJBsoation of the landlords' estates, and an 8-hour day.

Amidst the stern conditions of the Stolypin reaction the Bolshe- viks waged a struggle on two fronts — against the Menshevik Liquida- tors and against the Otzovists. The latter term was applied to a section of former Bolsheviks who demanded the recall (i-n Russian — otozvat) of the workers* Deputies from the State Duma and the cessation of all work in legal organizations, Lenin called the Otzovists ‘‘Liquidators inside-out,” because their tactics would have resulted in the Party becoming isolated from the masses and, consequently, in the liquidation of the revolutionary Party. Por this reason the Otzo- vists were expelled from the Bolshevik organization,

Trotsky and the Trotskyites took a Liquidatorist stand on all ques- tions . Lenin said that Trotsky was more despicable and harmful than the avowed Liquidators because he deceived the workers by asserting that he was "‘above factions/’ whereas actually he supported the Menshe- vik Liquidators. It was in that period that Lenin called Trotsky “Judas Trotsky,” In 1912 Trotsky organized the so-called “August bloc,” which consisted of all the anti-Party elements which were united in their struggle against Bolshevism.

Trotsky was supported in his opposition to Lenin by Kamenev, Zinoviev and Pv.ykov. Concealing their alliance with Trotsky, they succeeded in getting the Bolshevik newspaper Proletary closed down and in securing support for Trotsky’s newspaper. Kamenev joined the editorial board of Trotsky’s newspaper and tried to turn it into the organ of the Central Committee of the Party.

Despondency and lack of faith infected a section of the intellectuals who regarded themselves as Marxists but who had never taken a firm Marxian stand. They launched a “criticism” of the theoretical prin- ciples of Marxism. Some of the intellectuals who had deserted Marx- ism even began to urge the necessity of creating a new religion (the so-called “God-seekers” and “God-builders”).

In his famous book Materialism and Empirio^Criticism, which ap- peared in 1909, Lenin trounced these degenerates in the sphere of Marxist theory and fully substantiated the basic theoretical principles of the Marxist party.

The Bolsheviks Form an Independent Marxist Party

The fight against the Liquidators, Otzovists and Trotskyites confionted the Bol- sheviks with the task of uniting all the Bolsheviks and forming them into an index^endent Marxistparty.This was necessary in order to be able to prepare the working class for a new upward swing of the revolution.

Por the purpose of forming the independent Bolshevik Party the Sixth All-Bussian Party Conference was held in Prague, in January 1912. This conference was equal in importance to a Party congress. The Prague Conference elected a Bolshevik Central Committee of the Parly, headed by Lenin. J. V. Stalin and Y. M. Sverdlov, who were in exile in Siberia at the time, were elected to the Central Committee in their absence.

The Bolshevik Party did not adopt a new name after defeating the Mensheviks both ideologically and organizationally, and after expelling them and the Otzovists from the Party; it retained the old name of Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party but added the word “Bolshe- viks” in brackets. This name it retained up to 1918.

In its decisions the Prague Conference pointed to the inevitability of another revolutionary upsurge and urged the necessity of intensifying activities among the masses. For th.r puipoae of diiecting the Par- ty’s revolutionary activities in Russia, a centre for practical work was set up known as the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee. This Bureau was headed by Comrade Stalin. On Lenin’s instructions. Sorgo Orjonikiclzc travelled to the })]ace where Comrade Stalin was in exile in order to infonn him of the conference’s decisions and to arrange for his escape. In February 3912, Comrade Stalin escaped from exile for the fourth time. Ho visited a number of cities in Russia and headed tiie growing revolutionary movement in iSt. Petersburg.

The Bolshevik Iron Guard

Under the guidance of Lenin and Stalin many of the Bolsheviks who were active underground during the stern period of reaction dcvclo])od into outstanding professional revolution- aries and Party leaders.

One of these was the indomitable revolutionary Yakov Mikhail- ovich Sverdlov, whom Lenin described as “the most finished type of lorofessional revolutionary.” Sverdlov commenced his underground revolutionary activities at the early age of fifteen among the workers of Nizhni Novgorod and Sermovo. In 1902, after organizing a polit- ical demonstration in Sormovo, he was arrested and imprisoned for the first time; after that the whole of his life consisted of strenu- ous revolutionary activity, ever dogged by danger, and frequently interrupted by arrests, exile and escape from exile. In 1905 ho engaged in Bolshevik activities in Kazan and in the Urals wliere he became the beloved leader of the masses of the workers. For two years after the defeat of the revolution ho was incarcerated in a fortress. His sentence expired during the period of reaction and soon after his release he was arrested again and exiled to the district of Maximkin Yar, in the Narjnn Region. Five times lie tried to escape from this remote place where even the mails wore received only twice a j^-oar. In the autumn of 1912, he tried to cross the river Yenisei in a canoe and was nearly drowned. At the end of 1912, he reached St. Petersburg.

Another staunch Bolshevik fighter was Mildiail Vassilyevich Frun- ze. In 1905, he led the strike of the Ivanovo-Voznesensk workers. In March 1907, he was arrested and put in prison to await trial on a charge that made him liable to sentence of death. At the trial his counsel said to him: “Renounce your proletarians and you will be pardoned forthwith.” Frunze indignantly told the court that he refused to have a lawyer like that to defend linn. The tsarist court sentenced him to ten years’ penal servitude.

In this period extensive Party work was also conducted by Sergei Mironovich Kirov. Kirov joined the Bolshevik Party in Tomsk when still a youth of eighteen and took a most active part in the revolution of 1905. He was arrested three times. On the third occasion he was arrested on the charge of conducting revolutionary activities and of organizing a secret printing i^lant. He was tried and sentenced to confinement in a fortress. Immediately he was released from prison he flung himself with his customary energy into Party work in Vladikavkas, WiiCre he organized and trained new cadres of revolutionary Bolsheviks.

A no less ardent and outstanding young revolutionary of that time was the pupil of Lenin and Stalin — Grigori Konstantinovich Orjonikidze, whose Party pseudon;VTn was Sergo. The son of a Georgian peasant' he commenced revolutionary activity at the age of seventeen. In 1903 he joined the Bolslicvik Party. During the first Russian revolution he took part in preparing the armed insurrection but was arrested in December 1905 wliilo unloading a eousignment of arms which had been received . He succeeded in esca]nng abroad but subsequently re- turned to Baku. In 1900, ho made his way into Persia and took part in tlic Persian revolution. After lepeated a. rests Sergo Orjonikidze went to Lon'n in Paris, where he attended a Party schooi organized by Lenin, At the Prague Conference he was elected a member of the Cen- ri*al Committee of the Bolshevik Party and he returned to Russia to conduct underground Bolshevik activity. He was arrested shortlv after this, however, and sentenced to three years ^ confinement in the Schliisselhurg Portress. In this }}eriod too, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov became a ]>rofessional revolutionary. He joined the Bolslicvik Party in 1006 while still a high-school student, and at the age of sixteen already conducted Marxist ])ropaganda among the student youth. This activity he continued during tlie ])eriod of reaction. At the age of ninotoeii, not having yet gimluatol from high sebooh he Wtis depoi’ictl to Vologda (hibeniia, but lie continued his revolu- tionary activities evi-n while in t^xile and cojiiliated the views of the iMcnslieviks and So(*ialist-Revolubionaries. Like the other Bolsheviks, V. M. Molotov sjient liis tinu^ in (‘xile inqiroving his knowledge of rev- olutionary theory and in studying the classical vwks of Marxism. In Vologda he established contact with and conducted revolutionary •jiropaganda among the railway w'orkers. When his iieriod of exile ex- })ircd he returneil to St. Pctcu'sburg to conduct underground Bolshevilv activity and took an ae,tivc part in all the im^iortant measures under- taken by the St. IV‘tersburg Bol lievik organization. During tlu'- ])criod of i'ea,(l.ion the w’orkingmen Bolsheviks Mikhail Ivanovich Kalinin and Kliment Efromovich Voroshilov worked as professional underground rovolutionarms. M. 1. Kalinin, a metal turner by ti*aclo, had led tlie arduous life of a professional rcvoliitiouary since the 1890 ’s and had known the in- side of many jirisous in tsarist Russia. Ho had been a member of the »St. Petersburg Li'agiio of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Work- ing Class and one of the active agents of Iskm. In 1910, after com- ])loting a prison stmtonco, bo went to work at an ordnance works in St. Petersburg, and in 1911, lie became the leader of the Bolshevik organi- zation in the Vyborg District of that city. At the Prague Conference he was eloctod as an alternate member of the Bolshevik Central 0onvmittt‘(^ of tlu* Pai’ty.

Equally arduous was the life of K. E. Voroshilov, who was a fitter in Lugansk. He started work in the factory at the age of fifteen and by the end of the 1890 ’s he was already an active participant in illegal meetings and workers’ demonstrations. In 1903, he joined the Bolshevik Party. During the 1905 revolution he prepared the workers of Lugansk for insurrection, formed fighting squads, procured arms, and taught the workers to handle firearms. At a meeting he addressed in 1906, he urged the workers to learn the art of armed fighting and to train their own commanders. One of the workers at the meeting called out: “We appoint you our Red General.” “You are going too far,” answered Voroshilov laughing. “I don’t know anything about military matters.” None of the workers, nor Voroshilov himself, then suspected that the “Red General” whom the workers appointed in 1906 would become a Marshal of the most powerful army in the world and a foremost expert in military matters.

Voroshilov was arrested after the revolution of 1905, and in 1907 he was exiled for three years. Three months later he escaped to Baku and together with Comrade Stalin took part in the strug- gle that was waged by the Baku workers. He was again arrested and deported to the Archangel Gubernia, but he escaped again and with great difficulty succeeded in reaching his native Donetz Basin in 1912,

Self-sacrificing and heroic work under the severest conditions of tsarist reaction was also conducted by other leaders of the Bolshevik underground in preparing the working class for another revolutionary upsurge.

The Foreign Policy of the Stolypin Government

The Anglo-Russian Agreement

The defeat of tsarism in the Russo- Japanese War led to a further decline of its international prestige and importance. After it had concluded the Portsmouth Peace Treaty with Japan, the autocracy wanted to muster its forces for the purpose of crushing the revolution, but it could do that only on two conditions: that it received a huge foreign loan, and that it secured itself against foreign attack. At first, Nicholas 11 placed his hopes upon an alliance with Germany which Wilhelm II was urging him to conclude. This plan, however, was frustrated by a group of Cabinet Ministers headed by Witte. Witte was aware that if Russia concluded an alliance with Germany, financial assistance from Prance would cease, the Pranco-Russian alliance would be broken, and Russia would become completely dependent upon Germany in Europe and upon Japan in the Par East. As a consequence of his opposition, the secret treaty which Nicholas 11 and Wilhelm n had signed in Bjdrke was annulled.

In 1906, Great Britain and JVance granted the tsarist autocracy loans amounting to 2,500,000,000 francs and thereby saved it from financial bankruptcy. These countries also helped the autocracy finally to settle its relations with Japan, which, on the pret xt of impl menting certain clauses of the Portsmouth Treaty, continued to present Russia with unacceptable demands and threatened to resume the war. After the recent losses, however, and after the demobilization of the Russian army in the Far East, tsarist Russia was totally inca- pable of waging another war with Japan. The British and French gov- ernments took advantage of Japan’s need of a foreign loan to compel her to make concessionsto Russia and to conclude, in the summer of 1907, an agreement guaranteeing the security of Russia’s Far Eastern fron- tiers. The tsarist government, in its turn, pledged itself to support France in her struggle against Germany over Morocco, and agreed to a demarcation of spheres of influence between Great Britain and Russia in the Middle East (Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet). Thus, simultaneously with the signing of the Russo-Japanese agreement, a political agreement between Russia and Great Britain was signed. By the treaty of 1907, Northern Persia, the most densely populated part of the country, was recognized as Russia’s sphere of influence, and Southern Persia, the strategical cover of the approaches to India, with its naval ports and rich oil deposits, was proclaimed Great Britain’s sphere of influence. Central Persia was proclaimed a neutral zone.

The Anglo-Russian agreement suppl mented the Franco-Russian Treaty of 1893 and the Anglo-French agreement of 1904 and thus con- summated the formation of the Triple Entente between Great Britain, France and Russia. Herein lay its immense political importance. This Triple Entente was directed against the Triple Alliance that was headed by Germany.

The Bosnia Crisis

The definite formation of these two coalitions brought the prospect of a European war very much nearer.

From the very outset Russian tsarism occupied a subordinate posi- tion in the Entente. Russia’s national interests called for the strengthen- ing of her influence in the Balkans and in the Near East to counter- balance the growing Austro-German menace. But Russia was hindered by the international treaties which prohibited Russian warships from passing through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. Russia failed to receive the diplomatic support of her allies, who preferred to leave the question unsettled in order to keep Russia dependent upon . them.

In May and June 1908, a meeting between the King of England and the Tsar of Russia took place in Revel at which the two monarchs agreed to make joint preparations for war against Geimany. They also agreed on the joint introduction of reforms in Macedonia, which, in fact, nieatit prej)iiriii!^ to wrest that rcg’ou from Turkey. As regards the question of the Htraits, however, the meeting in Jlcvel failed to produce t]\o results the Eussiau government desired.

First and foremost in accoieratiiig the outbreak of the European war wore Gornuiny, who w'as bc^tter ariued tlian any other country,, and her satellite Austria-Hungary. Tiio latter, a iiiulti- national state, was su'fering from internal disintegration and iioped i.o strengthen h(‘r position by pushing into the Balkan Peninsula,

Jn tlie autumn of 1908, a meeting took placid between tlie Eussian and Austro-Hungarian Foreign Ministers at whicli it was agreed that the tsarist govorranonb would raise no objecitioii to tlu^ annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary, who had occupied those regions since the Berlin Congress of 1878. In return for this, Austria-Hungary promised to support the Eussian government's dt‘- mand for the free ]>assage of Eussian warshi] is through the Turki'‘jli Straits.

Tsarism's claims in the Balkans, however, were strongly 0[)posed by Great Britain. Omijileicly ignoring her promise to llussia, Austria- Hungary hastened to pnic.laim the annexation of Bosnia aiul Herze- govina, which wore iiihahitod by Herbs. ^Jhis caused an outburst erf jiatriotio indignation in Serbia. Tsarist lliissia, whieb regardetl lierself as Serliia's prote(‘tress, demanded that the annexation of Bosnia an<l Herzegovina anrl the question of the Htiuits bo discussed at a con- ference of the Kiin)])eau Powers, but in March 1909 Germany intervened ill the conflict and in terms that sounded like an ultimatum demand- ed that Ivussia and Serbia should o'jficially recognize the u-iuiexation »if Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Bosnian crisis of 1908-1909 almost led to an armed confl ct biitween the Powers; but tsarism was imt ])re[>ared for another war and therefore gave way itself and compel let I Heiliia to do the same. The Eights in the Third Buma deseriheil this defeat sustained by tsarist diplomacy as a “diplomatic Tsushima/*’

Tsarism’s Policy in the Orient

The tsartst government also lost its independence iii pursuing its policy in ivlation to the eountries of tlu' Orient. In Persia, Turkey and Cliina, Eussian tsarism played the i’ea.e- tionary role of suppressor of movements f^ir national liberation anil oi’ revolutions.

The Eussian revolution of 1906-1907, the. first bourgois-democrat- ic revolution in the epoch of imperial ism , had wide rcpercuss ions among the colonial and somi-colonial peoples which wore o])i)ressed by impe- rialism, primarily among the Oriental peoples who lived in ]U'opiu(iuity to Eussia. Ill 1900, the bourgeois revolution in Persia began. Yield- ing to the demand of the people, the Shah of Persia instituted a parlia- ment (the Mejlis); but Eussian tsarism, whom the western imperialists allowed “freedom of action” in Persia, decided to (*rush the Persian revolution. In the summer of 1908, Colonel Lyakhov, who was in command of a Cossack brigade in Persia, bombarded the Mejlis with artillery and established a reign of White terror in Teheran. The tsarist government compelled the Shah to dissolve the Mejlis; many members of the Mej- lis were executed and others were flung into prison. But the Persian revolution continued in spite of this, and in 1909, the Shah was obliged to flee to Russia, leaving a boy successor. Great Britain and Rus- sia instituted a financial blockade of revolutionary Persia. In December 1911, the Persian reactionaries, supported by Great Britain and Rus- sia, carried out a counter-revolutionary coup. The Persian revolution was crushed. By agreement with Great Britain, Russia retained her troops of occupation in Northern Persia.

In 1908, a military coup, led by the party known as the Young Turks, was brought about in Turkey with the object of saving the integrity of the Turkish empire. This coup resulted in the introduction of a constitutional form of government. The flrst blow at the Young Turk revolution was struck by Austria-Hungary, which annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina. The tsarist government too helped to strangle the Young Turk revolution by the Balkan policy it pursued. In 1909 it consented to Italy's annexation of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, Turkey’s provinces in Africa. It also supported the claims of Prance and Great Britain to Arab territory. Under the leadership of Russia, a league of Balkan countries was formed to attack Turkey. All this served to weaken the Young Turk revolution and to turn the Young Turks towards rapprochement with German imperialism.

The biggest revolution in the Orient was the Chinese revolution of 1911, which was directed against the feudal rulers of China and against the foreign imperialists.

Russian tsarism also acted as the supp’^essor of the Chinese rev- olution by entering the bloc of six Powers (Great Britain, France, Russia, Germany, Japan and the United States), which subjected rev- olutionary China to a financial boycott and helped the counter-revolu- tionary President Yuan Shih-kai to suppress the revolution.

Tsarism, the Reserve ot Western Imperialism

Although Russian tsarism pursued its own imperialist aims in the world war that was in preparation, the subordinate and dependent place it occupied in the Triple Entente converted it into the military reserve of Western imperialism.

The operations of the tsar ’s army in the impending war were deter- mined by the military interests of Great Britain and Prance. At a con- ference of Chiefs of General Sta.Ts held in 1911, the representative of Prance saidt “The object which the Russian forces must pursue is to compel Germany to maintain the largest possible forces on the Eastern Front.” The Russian Army was to launch an o.Tensive against Germany simnltaueonsly with the Anglb-Prench offensive. At a conference of Chiefs of General Staffs held in 1912, France demanded that; in conformity with the Franoo-Russian military con- vention of 1892, Russia should concentrate no less than 800,000 men on the Austro-German frontier, and that she should launch an attack on the sixteenth day of mobilization irrespective of what the situation on the Anglo-French front might be. To transport troops to the Ger- man frontier. tsarist Russia was to build new strategical railways, and it was stipulated that the next loan to bo granted the tsarist government was to be used exclusively for this purpose.

All this indicated that tsarism was gradually losing its independence even in purely military matters.

Emphasizing Russia’s dependence upon the West- European im- perialists, Comrade Stalin wrote: ‘‘Tsarist Russia was an immense reserve of Western imperialism, not only in that it gave free entry to foreign capital, which controlled such basic branches of Russia’s national economy as the fuel and metal industries, but also in that it could supply the Western imperialists with millions of soldiers” (J. Stalin, Problems of Lenmism>^ Moscow, 1945, p. 17)

The Growth of National and Colonial Oppression during the Period of the Stolypin Reaction

Tsarism’s National Policy in the Period of Reaction

The law of June 3, 1907, drastically reduced the franchise of a number of non- Russian nationalities and the Third State Duma passed a series of laws which still further restricted their elementary rights. The Stolypin government decided first of all to restrict the rights of those “border regions” where the movement for national liberation was strongest at that time — ^Finland, Poland and the Caucasus. ♦

In 1910, the Third Ktate Duma, on the proposal of Stolypm, passed a law which i rovided that all fundamental questions affect- ing Finland should be discussed in the Duma, and that the meas- ures passed in conn otionwith them should receive the sanction of the tsar’s government. Thus, the Finnish Sejm was converted into a mere advisory b dy on matt* rs of legislation.

The Polish bourgeois nationalist parties in the Third State Duma had fo msd a separate Pol'sh bl-^o, but this bloc oiffeied only passive resistance to a bill introduced in the Duma frr the institution in the western gubernias of Zemstvos, in which the Russian landlords were to be predominant.

Tsarism was able to rob Finland and Poland of the liberties they had won thanks to the her ic struggle waged by the Russian proletariat in 1906 because of the treache ry of the Finnish and Polish bourgeoisie, whose hatred of the revolution united them with tsarism. As Lenin wrote; *‘The experience of the 1905 revolution showed that even in these two nations the ruling classes, the landlords and the bourgeoisie, are re- nouncing the revolutionary struggle for freedom and are seeking rap- prochement with the ruling classes in Russia and with the tsarist mon- archy out of fear of the revolutionary proletariat of Finland and Po- land” (V. I. Lenin, Collected Works^ VoL XVI, Moscow, 1937, Russ, ed., p. 508).

The Third State Duma also discussed a bill providing for the ex- tension to the Caucasus of the regulation of 1881, by which all peasants working under temporary obligation were released from serf labour with payment of compensation to the landlords.

Thus, serfdom in the Caucasus was abolished only in 1912; sur- vivals of it continued right up to the revolution of 1917.

In the period of reaction the tsarist autocracy dropped its former policy of protecting the Moslem clergy who cultivated ignorance and fanaticism in their schools. The Rights in the Third State Duma demand- ed that all Moslem schools be closed in order to “Russify all the non- Russians, and to bring all the unorthodox into the Orthodox fold.” The tsarist ofiS.cials and the Orthodox Church intensified their perse- cution of Moslems, and Moslem schools and charitable institutions were banned.

The Black Hundreds in the Duma also succeeded in depriving the Ukrainians, Byelorussians and Jews of the right to have schools con- ducted in their own languages. In the Ukraine all the “Prosvity” were closed, and concerts and theatrical performances in the Ukrainian lan- guage were prohibited. High-school teachers and college professors suspected of having a ‘TJkrainian trend of thought” were dismissed. Minstrels were even prohibited from singing Ukrainian folk songs at fairs. Exceptionally fierce, however, was the Stolypin government’s persecution of the Jews. It deliberately fomented anti-Semitism among the backward sections of the population. Six million Jews were herded in the “Pale,” or ghettos, and yet the Black Hundreds in the Third Duma let loose a campaign about “the impermissibility of giving equal rights to the Jews” and demanded still further restric- tions for the Jewish population in Russia. The pogrom-mongers among the higher tsarist officials staged the anti- Jewish trial known as the Beilis case. This case was framed up in the following way. In 1911, a gang of thieves in Kiev killed a Russian boy. The tsarist officials pounced upon this murder as a pretext for increasing the persecution of the Jews. The Public Prosecutor, supported by official experts who had been bribed for the purpose, charged a Jew named Beilis witn the murder, alleging that he had committed the crime for “religious ends.” This trial, which took place in 1913, roused a storm of protest among the entire progressive population of Russia and in all other countries. The jury acquitted Beilis.

Explaining why tsarism resorted to pogroms against the Jews and to the savage persecution of Jews, Lenin wrote: “The monarchy had to defend itself against the revolution; and the semi-Asiatic, feu- dal Russian monarchy of the Romanovs could not defend itself by any other but the most infamous, most disgusting, vile and cruel means. The only honourable way of combating the pogroms, the only rational way from the standpoint of a socialist and a democrat, is not to express high moral condemnation, but to assist the revolution selflessly and iti every way, organize the revolution for ihQ overthromal of this monarchy” (V. I. Lenin, Selected Works, Two-Vol. ed., Vol. I, Moscow, 1946, p, 488).

Years of Revolutionary Advance (1912–1914)

The New Upswing of the Revolutionary Movement

Growth of Monopolistic Capitalism in Russia

In 1910 the pro- longed depression in Russia began to give way to an industrial boom. This was brought about by the considerable accumulation of home capi- tal in the country and the growth of the home market due, partly, to th(^ operation of Stolypin’s agrarian reform. The kulak upper stratum of the peasantry which had established itself after the reform was intro- duced created an increased demand for iron goods, building materials, leather, textiles, sugar, etc. In 1909, a series of relatively good harvests began. Peasants’ savings-banlc deposits increased and from 1900 to 1914 rose by over a billion rubles.

The growth of the war industries, and of shipbuilding in particular, ensured the heavy industry of big government contracts. Prom 1905 to 1913, the government placed army contracts to the amount of 2,600,000,000 rubles; in two years of the boom period over 3,600 kilo- metres of railway were laid and a corresponding amount of rolling stock was built. Such were the main reasons for the industrial boom in Russia. The boom was also facilitated by the general economic re- vival in the western capitalist countries, due largely to the race for armaments and increase in war contracts.

During the period of the boom the monopolist organizations — trusts and syndicates — continued to grow and gain strength. The predominant form of monopolist organization in Russia was the syn- dicate. During the decade from 1900 to 1910, these syndicates gained control of the major part of the mining and metallurgical industiy in Russia. The Prodamet, which combined from twelve to fifteen of the largest metallui'gieal plants in the country, controlled two-thirds of the sales, of the entire metallurgical industry. The Produgol, the abbreviated name of the Russian Company for Trading in the Mineral Fuel of the Donetz Bn-sin, which was formed in 1906, gained control of about 60 per cent of the coal output of the Donetz Basin. The Prodarud Syndicate, which was formed in 1908, controlled four- fifths of the ore output of the south of Russia. The growth of syn- dicates in light industry was slower and feebler. In 1908 the syn- dicate known as the Cotton Manufacturers’ Company (in Moscow) con- trolled 4;7 cotton mills. The organization of syndicates was accompa- nied by a rise in the prices of the goods manufactured by the indus- tries they controlled.

The banks increasingly became the owners of the manufacturing enterprises. The small and medium banks merged and formed powerful banking combines. In 1908, for example, the St. Petersburg- Azov, the Orel, and the South Russian Banks combined to form the United Bank. In 1910, the Northern Bank merged with the Russo-Chinese and Russo- Asiatic Banks. More than half the total bank capital in Russia was controlled by seven big banks.

The concentration of industry and the banks was accompanied by the rapid fusion of bank capital with industrial capital. The banks financed joint-stock companies and helped them to reorganize. This had been exceptionally marked during the crisis. The biggest industrial and financial magnates were simultaneously chairmen of bank di- rectorates and directors of syndicates. Thus, Putilov, the owner of numerous metallurgical plants, was chairman of the Board of the big Russo-Azov Bank and also director of the Prodamet, to which his plants were affiliated. In the textile industry enormous influence was exercised by the finance capital magnates Ryabushinsky, Prokhorov, Morozov and others.

In this period too finance capital rapidly merged with the state ap- paratus. The financial magnates felt quite at home in the Ministries of Finance, Industry and Trade, while prominent government officials, and even members of the royal family, held shares in banks and in in- dustrial undertakings. Many retired ministers left then ministerial armchairs to take up positions* as directors of the banks and joint-stock companies of which they were shareholders.

The influence of foreign capital in the Russian banks and industry increased after the revolution of 1905-1907. By 1914, out of a total cap- ital amounting to 435,500,000 rubles belonging to eighteen of the chief joint-stock banks, 185,500,000 rubles, or 42.6 per cent, was foreign capital, divided as follows: German capital 17 per cent, SVench capital 21.9 per cent, and British capital 3 per cent. Thus, British and French capital tog 3 ther constituted the largest share. Foreign capital gained control of Russian industry by forming joint-stock companies through Biissian and sometimes directly through foreign banks. Foreign capital gained control of nearly the whole of tha Russian fuel industry and of the whole of the metallurgical industry.

The Economic Backwardness of Russian Industry

Although large- scale capitalist industry made considerable progress in Russia during the period of the boom, it nevertheless lagged behind the industry of Western Europe. As regards output of pig iron, Russia occupied fifth place in the world; as regards the technique of production and, in partic- ular, consumption per head of the population, she was almost at the bottom of the list. Describing the backwardness of Russia, Lenin wrote: ‘“During the half century that has passed since the peasants were liber- ated, iron consumption in Russia has increased fivefold, but still Rus- sia remains an incredibly, unprecedentedly backward country, poverty- stricken and half savage, equipped with modern implements of produc- tion to the extent of only one-fourth of that of England, one- fifth of Germany and one-tenth of America” (V. I. Lenin, Oollected Wo7*IcSt Vol. X^, Moscow, 1937, Russ, ed., p. 543).

One of the indices of the technical and economic backwardness of tsarist Russia was the state of railway transport. The total length of railways in Russia in 1913 was about 65,000 kilometres. Of this, 43,500 kilometres belonged to the state and over 19,000 kilometres belonged to private companies. As regards density of railways, Russia was almost at the bottom, of the list.

In 1910, the total industrial output in Russia was one-ninth of that of the United States, and the average wage of the Russian worker was one-fourth of that of the American worker.

Stolypin and the Minister of Finance Kokovtsev made it a practice to borrow from the Paris bankers and hospitably opened the door wide for foreign capital, for they hoped, with the aid of French and British gold, to save landlordism and the tsarist system in the country in which capitalism was rapidly developing. To pay the interest on these loans the tsarist government annually squeezed hundreds of millions of ru- bles out of the population. Before the First World War Russia *s national debt amounted to 8,800,000,000 rubles. Tsarist Russia’s chief creditor before the war was France.

In tsarist Russia a number of leading branches of industry, such as electr cal engineering, turb’ne building, machine-tool building, heavy -engineering, and the automobile and chemical industries, did not exist.

The oil industry was controlled by foreign capital, who stopped at nothing in exploiting the rich deposits of Russian oil, wastefully utilizing only "gushers” and eschewing deep boring, extensive explo- ration of new fields, etc.

The Lena Shootings

The industrial boom was accompanied by the growth of the Russian proletariat and of the working-class movement. The general upswing of the revolutionary proletarian struggle was stimulated by the events that occurred in the remote gold fields in Siberia that belonged to the Lena Gold Fields Company. This company was formed in 1908. Three-fourths of the shares belonged to British capitalists and the rest belonged to big Russian capitalists and high tsarist officials. Among the shareholders were capitalists like Putilov, bank directors like Vyshnegradsky, and a number of high St. Peters- burg dignitaries. The British and Russian shareholders in the Lena Gold Fields Company drew profits amounting to over 7,000,000 rubles per annum. The gold-field workers were cruelly exploited and, in addi- tion, were totally bereft of rights.

The gold fields were situated in the remote taiga, 1,700 kilometres from the railway. It was possible to get away from the place only during the navigation season on the river Lena. Ihe conditions of labour were fixed by harsh contracts, and although the workers had no right to leave their jobs before the expiration of the contract they could be discharged at any time. Wages were paid only on the expiration of the contract; the provisions issued to the men at the company stor3s on account of wages were of the worst quality. The working day was fixed by contract at 10 to 11^/2 hours, but it was often extended at the arbitrary will of the management. The workers were completely in the power of the management who, to keep the workers in hand, had at their command a police force paid by the company. The Lena Gold Fields Company behaved like a feudal ruler. Byelozerov, the manager of the Lena Gold Fields, was called the uncrowned king of the taiga. In 1912, the gold fields were, as Lenin described them, one of ‘‘those corners where it seems as though serfdom existed -but yesterday.”

The atrocious conditions of labour, the holding up of wages, the sale of bad-quality provisions at exorbitant prices and the violence and tyranny of the management and the police often gave rise to unrest in the gold fields.

At the end of February 1912, a strike broke out on one of the sec- tions where the conditions of the workers were exceptionally hard. It would have paid the management to close the section, but that would have meant breaking the contract, which was due to expire only in September. The management therefore set out to provoke the workers to break the contract themselves. The immediate cause of the strike was the issue of bad horse meat. The workers downed tools in protest and sent dele- gates to the other fields to bring the men out there. On March 1, the strike spread to a number of other sections. A strike committee was set up with the object of making the strike general. Strike committees were also set up in all the fields, and stewards were appointed in the living quarters. The Central Strike Committee opened negotiations with the management. Tulehinsky, the Regional Engineer, received the deputa- tion with great courtesy and persuaded the Menshevik delegates to agree to call off the strike. Tlic BoLshevik-niimlccl members of the Strike Committee condneted propaganda among the masses against calling off the strike. .

It was decided to settle the question by a secret ballot of the work- ers. In the morning of March 25, two sugar barrels were ])laeed opposite each other in one of the fields, one bearing the inscription “Will go back to work” and the other the inscription “Will not go back to work.” The workers filed between the barrels holding a pebble in one hand. As they passed they dipped their hands into both barrels and dropped the pebble into one barrel or the other. Soon the barrel bearing the inscription “Will not go back to work” was full to the brim. In the other barrel only seventeen pebbles were found.

On March 27, the strike became general and over 6,000 workers were involved. Under the leadership of the Bolslievik-minded workers the strike proceeded in a unanimous and organized manner; but notwith- standing the peaceful cliarfeicter of the strike the management called for troops, and a largo force was sent to the gold fields. For the delib- erate purpose of creating disorders Captain of Gendannes Tresliehenkov ordered the i^rrest of the members of the Strike Committee and told the troops not to hesitate to “use force” against the workers if they attempt- ed to release their comrades. On April 4 (17), 3,000 workers sigiaed a statement to the effect that they had gone on strike on their own ac- cord and had not been instigated to do so by anybody, and they marched in procession to the Nadczhdinsk Section of the gold fields to hand this statement to the local prosec'.uting attorney.

On this frosty morning of April 4, long lines of workers streamed from various parts of the gold fields » to Nadezhdinsk, and on nearing that centre they linked up in one long, dark ribbon stretching for three or four kilometres. The road along which the procession wended its way was flanked on the one side by the steep bank of the river Bodaibo and on the other by stacks of timber. Near Nadezhdinsk the road was blocked by a cordon of treoj^s in full fighting kit. Engineer Tulchinsky stepped out to the workers and told them to disperse. The workers at the head of the procession halted, but the rest, stretched out along the narrow road, continued to press forward. Suddenly shots rang out, volley after volley; 260 workers were killed and 270 were wounded.

This new atrocity committed by the tsarist autocracy roused a unanimous outburst of anger among the workers. A wave of protest strikes swept the country. Revolutionary demonstrations took place in the cities. On the demand of the Social-Democratic Deputies the State Duma was compelled to (liscuss the Lena events, but Makarov, the Minister of the Interior, explained the matter to the Duma in his own way. He said: “So it was, and so it will bo.”

This insolent statement of the tsar’s minister, was answered by the rise of an immense mass political movement of the working class in protest against the I/ena shootings. As Lenin wrote: “The Lena shootings . . . were an exact re fleet ion of the regime of the Third- of- June monarchy.” He went on to say that it was not the demand for certain particular rights but the general lack of rights that prompted the workers to enter into decisive struggle against tsarism. “It is precisely this general tyranny in Russian life,” he wrote, “it is pi ecisely the hopelessness and impossibility of waging a struggle for particular rights, precisely this incorrigibility of the tsar’s monarchy and of its entire regime, that stood out so clearly against the background of the Lena events that they fired the masses with revolutionary ardour” (V. I. Lenin, Selected Works, Two-Vol. ed., Vol. I, Moscow, 1946, p. 550).

Emphasizing the historical significance of the Lena events, Comrade Stalin wrote in the Bolshevik newspaper Zvezda in 1912:

“The Lena shooting has broken the ice of silence and the river of the people’s movement has begun to flow.

“The ice is broken! , . .

“All that was evil and pernicious in the present regime, all the ills of much-suffering Russia, were focussed in the one fact, the events on the Lena.

“That is why it was the Lena shootings that served as a signal for strik<='S and demonstrations.”

The Mass Revolutionary Movement During the Revival

The wave of political strikes called in protest against the shooting down of the workers in the I^ena gold fields swept over the whole country with ex- traordinary rapidity. Hundreds of thousands of workers downed tools. In St. Petersburg the strikes were accompanied by street demonstra- tions. The struggle of the St. Petersburg workers was led by Comrade Stalin, but soon he was again arrested. Protest strilces against the Lena diootings merged with a powerful First of May movement. The Lena events revealed that the working class had accumulated enormous rev- olutionary energy. In April 1912, over 300,000 workers were involved in strikes, but the First of May strike affected about 400,000 workers. The movement spread and affected even the most backward strata of the workers. Strikes took place in every district in the countiy. At the head of the stiike movement marched the revolutionary proletariat of St. Petersburg; then came the workers of the Baltic Provinces, Moscow, the Ukraine and the Caucasus. According to official figures, the total number of workers involved in strikes in 1912 was 726,000 and in 1913, 861,000, Actually, the number was considerably higher. Economic strikes were interwoven with the political strikes. Lenin described these mass strikes as revolutionary strikes, for they were directed against the autocracy and were of nation-wide importance. The strikes enjoyed the sympathy of the majority of the working population. They stimulated the peasants to fight against the landlords and tsarism. The factory owners retaliated to the strikes by lockouts. The police and the secret police intensified their persecution of the strikers.

The strikes proceeded under the Bolshevik slogans of: ‘‘An 8-hour day, confiscation of the landlords’ estates, and a democratic republic.” These slogans were calculated to rouse for the struggle against tsarism not only the workers, but also the peasants and the men in the army.

The peasant movement, which had subsided after 1907, began to flare up again. The introduction of the Stolypin reform accelerated the process of class diTerentiation among the rural population. The conditions of the rural poor still further deteriorated, partic- ularly after the famine of 1911 which a,Teoted about 30,000,000 peasants. The peasant movement directed against the landlords and the kulaks assumed the militant forms of incendiarism, trespass, tree felling, refusal to pay taxes, etc. Collisions between poor peas- ants and kulak “khutor^-farmers became more and more fre- quent.

Revolutionary outbreaks occurred also in the army. In 1912, a revolt broke out among the troops who were stationed in Turkestan, and fierce reprisals were taken against the mutineers. In June 1913, 62 sailors of the Baltic Fleet were tried by naval court-martial in Kronstadt on the charge of conspiring to cause a revolt. Strikes in protest against this trial of the revolutionary sailors broke out, and this indicated that the class-conscious working-class movement in tsar- ist Russia constituted a powerful political force.

As Comrade Stalin said, the mass revolutionary strikes showed that “. . . in Russia a tremendous popular revolution was rising, headed by the most revolutionary proletariat in the world, which possessed such an important ally as the revolutionary peasantry of Russia” (J. Stalm, Problems of Leninism^ Moscow, 1945, pp. 17*18).

The Bolshevik Pravda

The struggle that was waged by the pro- letariat was led by the Bolsheviks and proceeded imder Bolshevik slogans. The revolutionary upswing created the urgent need for a mili- tant daily political newspaper that could be read by the broad masses of the workers. Under the direction of Comrade Stalin, who had escaped from exile in Vologda, preparations were made for the publication of a popular daily newspaper, the Pmvda.

In January 1912, the workers began to contribute funds for the purpose of starting such a workers^ newspaper. Contributions came in from all parts of Russia. As Lenin wrote . the creation of Pravda remains outstanding proof of the class consciousness, energy and solidarity of the Russian workers” (V. I, Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. XVI, Moscow, 1937, Russ, ed., p. 46).

Tlio tilvt ir^aiio uf Pravda, vyhiclj Cojiirade Staliu edited, appeared on April 22 (May 5 new ntyle). That is why wo now o'.dcbrate May 5 as Workers' Press Day. The work of tht^ Pravda was gnided from abroad by Lenin. Its first editor was Comrade Staliu and its first editorial secr^taiy was V. M. Molotov, who devoted much time and energy to the paper. Among the mem hers of the staff wore K. E. Voroshilov, M. 1. Kalinin and Y. M. Sverdlov. Maxim Gorky also eontribiiied to tlie paper.

Fmvda was the organizer of the revoiutionary masses and directed all the mass campaigns that were organized by the Bolsheviks. Of considerable ijnportance among these eampaigtis was the insurance campaign. In Juno 1912, an act was ])assed to insure the workers in (5ase of sickness and accidents. The insurance Lmd was to be managed by insurance boards on which the workers wore to be represented. Notwithstanding the grave defects of this law, Pravda called ni)on the workers to take j)art in the election of the insurance boards and the elections ])assod n.T successfully. This insurance campaign was of gi*eat importance l>ecauso it helped to organize very wide masses for the revolutimmry siruggle.

Pm?Y/a. trained a whoh^ generation of worker-Bolshcvike who liel)>ed Ijenin and Wtaliu to rei^reate the mass Bolsluwik .Party in the pcwiod of the revohition.ary ujmwing. As Oomnide Staliu wrote: ‘'The old Pravda was undoubttully the hai'bingor of tlie coming of glorious victories of the Russian ] proletariat"" (“On the Occasion of the Tenth Anniversary of Pravda Stalin’s article publislied in PrnrdaNo. 08 of May T), 1922).

Pravda w^as eonstantly subjected to the ]Pcrsecution of the poli(ie. In the lirst year of its oxistonco the police raided the ] printing })lant and destroyed the current issue of the pa[)er no less than forty times. To prevent this, the workers would come to the jprinting plant at niglit and take the fi’eshty printed iicwsjpapcrs away b(‘fore the police arrived. The newspaper often had to change its name. In July 1914, just before the First World Wai*, Pmrda's jpremises wore wrecked and its staff was arrostfnL.

The Fourth State Duma

The Elections to the Fourth State Duma

In 1912, the fcerm of the Third State Duma expired. The tsar’s government dissolved it and appointed elections to tlie Fourth Duma. These elections took place in an atmosphere of repression and persecution, which had become exceptionally intense after the assassination of Stolyiiin in 1911.

The Bolsheviks decided to utilize the elections for the purpose ■of conducting a new mass campaign against tsarism. To be nearer to Eussia, and to direct the election campaign, Lenin, in the summer of 1912, removed from Paris to Cracow. In Eussia the Bolshevik election campaign was led by Comrade Stalin who, in Sep- tember 1912, had again escaped from exile and had returned. to St. Petersburg. The editorial ojSces of Pravda were used as stafr head- quarters for organizing the working class for the campaign. The Bolsheviks issued a document, drafted by Comrade Stalin, entitled “The Mandate of the Workingmen of St. Petersburg to Their Worker Deputy.”

At election meetings the Bolsheviks denounced and exposed the compromising tactics of the Liquidators, and emerged victorious at the elections. Often the police came to the assistance of the Liquida- tors and baimed meetings of workers’ representatives. The workers voted in their separate curiae, apart from the rest of the popula- tion. Pive Bolsheviks were elected by the workers to the State Duma — ^in the St. Petersburg, Moscow, Vladimir, Kharkov, Ekate- rinoslav and Kostroma gubernias. A sixth Deputy elected on the Bolshevik panel turned out to be an agent provocateur. The Menshe- viks secured the election of seven of their candidates, but these were in gubtrnias where there were no workers’ curiae.

Tiie Fourth State Duma, which assembled at the end of 1912, was as much a Black Hundred and Octobrist Duma as the Third Duma had been. Of a total of 410 Deputies, 170 were Eights. The Octobrists, who constituted the government party and had nearly 100 Deputies, were adherents of the Eights. The Cadets had 50 Deputies. They differed from the Octobrists only in that they indulged in “Lfffc^ phrases and in the Duma they acted jointly with the Octobrists. The petty bourgeoisie was represented by ten Trudoviki and seven Men- shevik.

The Bolsheviks in the Fourth State Duma

At first the Bol- sheviks in the Fourth State Duma formed a single group with the Mensheviks, but the latter, taking advantage of their majority of one vote, systematically prevented the Bolsheviks from speaking in the Duma. In conformity with the decision of the Central Committee of the Party, the Bolshevik Deputies left the joint group and formed an independent Bolshevik group. The group maintained close contact with the masses of the workers and conducted extensive activities among them; it received numerous letters, declarations, reso- lutions, instructions and greetings from workers in all parts of Eussia. One of the most effective means it employed for using the floor of the Duma was to interpellate the government in cases of acts of lawless- ness and tyranny. The Bolshevik Deputies conducted their activities in the Duma under the direction of the Party Central Committee and of Lenin. The Deputies used to receive directives from Lenin and on several occasions went abroad to consult with bim, Comrade Stalin, who was in St. Petersburg, directly guided the activities of the Bolshevik gi'oup in the Duma.

The Works of Lenin and Stalin on the National Question

The growth of jingoism among the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois nationalist parties duo to the intensification of national oppression during the period of reaction made it particularly necessary for the Bjlshevik Party to explain to the masses the essence of the national question and its role in the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat.

In 1913, two classical works on the national question appeared: Lenin’s Critical Notes on the National Question, and Stalin’s Marxism and the National Question. These two books provided the proletariat with the theoretical basis of the Bolshevik program on the national and colcnial problem.

In the autumn of 1913, Lenin convened a conference of the Central Committee in the village of Poronino, in Galicia, whe-re ho then lived, to discuss the national question. This conference adopted a resolution, which Lenin had drafted, and endorsed the slogan which had been substantiated in the works of Lenin and Stalin, namely, the right of nations to self-determination, including secession. The conference also emphasized that the preservation of the militant and solid Party of the proletariat, undivided by national barriers, was an essential condition for victory in the struggle for the liberation of the oppressed nations.

The Preparation of the World War

In the epoch of imperialism great changes took place in the relations between the capitalist coun- tries. As a result of the process of uneven economic development, Ge.Tnany, at the beginning of the twentieth century, outpaced France and Great Britain in the sphere of industry. The magnates of German finance capital, in conjunction with the Prusso-German mili- tarists, made energetic preparations for a European war. They dinned it into the minds of the German people that Germany’s powerful war industry, the superior armament of her vast army and her navy would make victory certain, and held out the prospect of Germany becoming the ruler of the world. Tlie Pan-Gkrman League, the imperialist organization which they formed, was convinced that Ger- many could achieve victory over France and Bussia as long as Russia was fettered by the autocratic system. The chief obstacle to German domination, particularly on the sea, in the opinion of the German imperialists, was Great Britain, and against that country they pre- pared for a ruthless naval war. On the other hand, the chief obje ct of Groat Britain’s foreign policy was to crush Germany’s might with the aid jDf . France, with whom she had concluded an agreement on this soQre’in 1904;.

in the forefront stood the conflict of interests of British and Ge^an imperialism, of which the latter was particularly aggressive.

Second^ to that came the conflict of interests of imperialist Ger- many and tsarist Russia.

^rman imperialism was driving towards the Near East, into Turkey. The German banks gained control of the building of the rail-^ way that was to link Germany with Turkey, and German military instructors directed the organization of Turkish military forces in preparation for war against Russia and Great Britain.

The growth of Germany’s economic and political influence in the Turkish empire would have placed her in control of the Black Sea Straits.

Ruling circles in Russia became increasingly imbued with the thought that “the road to Constantinople lies through Berlin, ” that is to say, through the destruction of the German empire.

Lenin described Great Britain, Germany and tsarist Russia as “three big highway robbers” and the chief factors in the world Wt'-.ir, while the other countries were merely “non-independent allies.” He emphasized that while the war for the redivision of the world affected the interests of all the imperialist powers, the chief instigator was Germany.

In the struggle for the redivision of the world all the participants in the world slaughter drew up predatory plans.

The plans of the German imperialists included the creation of a great German empire that was to embrace so-called “Middle Europe,” to seize the Baltic Provinces and Poland, dismember Russia, deprive her of the Ukraine, subjugate the Balkan Peninsula and Turkej^, deprive Great Britain of Egypt and India, and push France away from the English Channel, etc.

The plans of Austria, Germany’s ally, were, with the aid of Ger- many, to dismember Serbia, annex Russian Poland and to subjugate the Ukraine and the Balkan Peninsula.

Great Britain’s plans were to crush her principal rival, Germany, to destroy her navy and mercantile fleet, to seize the German colonies, and also to deprive Turkey of Mesopotamia and Palestine and finally annex Egypt.

The plans of France were to regain Alsace-Lorraine and seize the left bank of the Rhine, to crush Germany’s military power, share the German colonies with Great Britain, and take part in the partition of the Turkish empire.

The plans of tsarist. Russia were to gain possession of the Bospho- rus and the Dardanelles, to seize Turkish Armenia, to dis- member Austria-Hungary, and establish her influence in the Balkan Peninsula. . \

Japan’s plans were to take advantage of the war in Europe, to seize China with the assistance of Russian tsarism, and in the.^s^ent. of Russia’s defeat to seize the Russian Par East.

Notwithstanding fierce repression by the police and the gendarmes, the Baku workers, supported by the workers of St. Petersburg and other industrial centres, staunchly continued the struggle for two months.

In response to the appeal of the Bolsheviks, 90,000 workers in St. Petersburg struck work in solidarity with the Baku workers. On July 11, 200,000 workers were out on strike in that city. Meetings Avere continuously held under the slogans; ""Comrades of Baku, we arc with you!’*, "'Victory for the workers of Baku is victory for us,” etc. One such revolutionary demonstration ended in the shooting down of workers at the Putilov Works.

In retaliation to this outrage, the whole of the working class of St. Petersburg rose in protest; the workers of all the big plants downed tools and poured into the streets for a revolutionary demonstration. Collisions occurred between workers and troops which developed into barricade fighting. The caj^ital was transformed into a military camj). Pravda was suppressed.

When these events were at their height Poincare, President of France, arrived in St. Petersburg to conduct negotiations with the tsar. During these negotiations the tsarist government agreed that France and Russia should jointly counteract Austria-Hungary’s attack on Serbia, -which was likely to lead to a world war.

The Second Bourgeois-Democratic Revolution

Tsarist Russia during the First World War (1914–March 1917)

Russia's Part in the War

The Beginning of the World War

In July 1914, the world imperialist war, of which Germany was the instigator, broke out. This war was fought between two . groups of imperialist countries; one, headed by Germany, constituted the Quadruple Alliance (Ger- many, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey); the other, headed by the British and French imperialists, constituted the Triple Entente (Great Britain, France and Russia, and also Serbia and Belgium). In 1914, Japan joined the Triple Entente; Italy did the same in 1915, and the United States joined it in 1917. In alL 33 countries were involved in the war, and 74,000,000 men were mobilized for the various armies. The war cost 30,000,000 human lives and about 300,000,000,000 rubles in money.

As regards the number of cormtries that were involved all over the globe it was a world war, but in its aims it was an imperial- ist war, a war for the forcible redivision of the world.

As Lenin wrote: 'Tn its real nature this war is not a national but an imperialist war.

, The war is being waged between two groups of oppressors, between two robbers, to decide how to divide the booty, who is to plunder Turkey and the colonies” (V. I. Lenin, Collectf^d WorJcs^ Vol. XIX, Moscow, 1937, Russ, ed., p. 200).

This predatory war for the redivision of the world was prepared for in the course of decades and affected the interests of all the impe- rialist countries. Its immediate cause was Austria-Hungary’s plan to crush Serbia, a plan that was supported by Germany, who counted on securing a redivision of the world in her own favour as the result of the development of the Austro-Serbian war into a world war. The spark that ignited the conflagration of the world war was the assassination of the Austrian Crown Prince Francis Ferdinand in Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia. Mae assassination was committed on Juno 28, 1914, by a nineteen-year-old student named Gavrila Princip on tho instructions of a Serbian army officers’ nationalist organization. Austria-Hungary, instigated by Germany, presented Serbia wiiJi an ultimatum that was couched in terms that made its rejection by the Serbian government inevitable. On the advice of tlie Russian government, however, the Serbian government agreed to nearly all of the terms of the ultimatum, but in spite of this the Austrian Minister, who aheady had his trunlis packed, left Belgrade, and Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia. After receiving the assur- ances of President Poincare that France was ready to sujiport Russia and Serbia, the tsarist goveriunent intervened in tho conflict

Proclaiming her solidarity with Serbia, Russia began to mobilize. Germany called upon the tsarist government to stop mobilizing. Tlie tsarist government refused to do so, whereupon, Germany, on August 1, declared war on Russia. France began to mobilize. On August 3, Ger- many declared war on France, and on that same day German trooiis crossed the Belgian frontier. Next morning the British government presented an ultimatimi to Germany demanding lier withdrawal from Belgian territory, but without waiting for a reply fche British govern- ment, in tho aftenioon of August 4, issued an order to mobilize the British army. At midnight it declared war on Germany. Thus com- menced tho first world imperialist war of 3914-1918.

The War on the Eastern Front

At the very beginning of August three fronts were formed in belligerent Europe: a Western Front, which stretched from the North Sea to Switzerland; an Eastern or Russian Front, which* stretched from the Baltic Sea to Rumania, and the Balkan Front, which ran along the Danube. The Russian Front was split up into two almost independent operative sectors — the Northwestern and Southwestern sectors. The Northwestern Front ran from the Baltic Sea to the lower reaches of the river Bug, and tho Southwestern Front ran along the Russo-Austrian frontier to Rumania. On the Balkan Front the Serbian army fought the Austro-Hungarian army.

After violating the neutrality of Belgium the German army made a drive towards Paris. The French government called upon Russia forthwith to launch an offensive on the Eastern Front with the object of diverting the largest possible number of German troops from the Western Front. Accordingly, two Russian armies, under tho com- mand of Generals Samsonov and Rennenkampf, were sent to invade East Prussia. Rennenltampf’s army launched a successful offensive and won a big victory in the battle of Gumbinnen, but this victory was not followed up. Rennenkampf ’s army failed to develop its offensive and this enabled the German Command to throw the whole weight of its forces against General Samsonov’s army. The oj)er- ations of the two Russian armies were not co-ordinated. From inter- cepted and decoded telegrams sent by General Samsonov and Rennen- kampf, and also through its own spies, the German Command learned of all the movements of the Russian troops. A large part of General Samsonov’s army was surroimded by the Germans in the marshy and wooded region of the Masurian Lakes and was wiped out. Tens of thousands of Russian soldiers perished. General Samsonov com- mitted suicide.

After defeating Samsonov’s army, the Germans hurled their troops against Rennenkampf’s army, which had remained inactive. Rennenkampf retreated to Russian territory, losing 110,000 men. But Paris was saved. By taking the blow upon herself, Russia saved her ally France from defeat.

In August 1914, simultaneously with the unsuccessful offensive in East Prussia, four Russian armies launched an offensive against Austria-Hungary on the Southwestern Front. The armies commanded by General Brusilov and Ruzsky defeated the Austro-Hungarian armies, occupied Lvov and Gorlice and surrounded the fortress of Przemysl. Nearly the whole of Galicia was occupied by the tsarist forces.

In the middle of September the German armies came to the assist- ance of Austria-Hungary by launching a wide offensive from the foothills of the Carpathians. In the middle of December 1914, the offensive was halted on both sides.

In the autumn of 1914, a new front was formed — ^the Caucasian Front. Two German warships, the Ooehen and the Breslau, stole their way from the Mediterranean into the Black Sea and bombarded Foo- dosia and Odessa. After this, Turkey, who was bound by a military alliance with Germany, went to war against Russia. In December 1914, the Turkish army was defeated in the battle of Sari Quamish, after which the Russian troops on the Turkish Front slowly pushed forward. On the Austro-German Front, however, the belligerent sides were extremely exhausted and consequently passed over to trench warfare, meanwhile mustering forces for new decisive blows. At the end of April and the beginning of May 1916, a German army, under the command of General Mackenzen, supported on both flanks by Austrians, pierced the Russian Front between Gorlice and Tarnov thus compelling the Russian armies to beat a hasty retreat. The Austro- Hungarian troops occupied Przemysl and Lvov. In July, another German army occupied the fortress of Ivangorod. At the end of July German troops occupied Warsaw and Brest-Litovsk. The Germans developed their offensive and occupied Grodno and Vilna. Thus, by the autumn of 1916, Poland, Lithuania, part of tlie Baltic Provinces a.nd VoUiynia had fallen into the hands of Germaiiy and Austria-Hungary. From May to October 1915, the Russian army lost over 150,000 men in killed and more than 1,000,000 in wounded and pris- oners. Towa^rds the end of September 1915, operations on the Eastern Front were reduced to trench warfare. This front now stretched in an ahnost straight Ime from the river Dniester to the Gulf of Riga. Thus, in the first period of the world war tsarism sustained grave military defeats.

Military operations on the Eastern Front in 1914-1915 ended in the defeat of the Russian armies. This made the loss of the war by Russia a foregone conclusion. Thus, tsarist Russia’s unprepar- edness for war made itself felt at tlie very outset. The Russian ^army was inadequately supplied with ammunition, heavy artillery, air- craft, materials for chemical warfare and equipment. There were cases when men went to the front without weapons and had to pick up ibose left by the men who were killed in battle. Sometimes a unit had' only one rifle for every three men. The army was supplied with boots with rotten-lcathor soles, with greatcoats which bebame useless after the first downpour of rain, with provisions thaWiad gone bad, and so forth. All sorts of sliarpers and swindlers speculated in war contracts and made fabulous i)rofits. Military headquarters, army supply departments and munition plants swarmed with spies, adventurers, scoundrels and j)rofiteers, incompetent generals and downright traitors.

A German and Austrian espionage organization, headed by Colonel of Gendarmes Myasoyedov, was already operating in Russia before the war. Even the War Minister Suldiomlinov was accused of espio- nage. The effect of sabotage and espionage was severely felt at the very outset of the war. The stocks of military su]pplies were exhausted during the first month, and no new supplies were forthcoming. The Ministry of War had not supplied the army with shells and small- arms ammunition. Output in the government small-arms factories had been reduced by three-fourths and of the ordnance works by one- half. Treachery and espionage caused the death of thousands of men at the front. Sometimes vital orders were communicated by radio uncoded and were intercepted by the Germans, who were thus able to follow the movements of the Russian armies. Headquarters staffs were incompetent and the orders they issued only caused anarchy and confusion. But even under these conditions the Russian army, as always, displayed magnificent fighting qualities. The courage, endurance, heroism and initiative of individual soldiers and units often saved the situation and helped to extricate a force from encircle- ment in which it was threatened by complete extermination.

The Treachery of the Second International

From the very first days of the war the imperialist bourgeoisie in all the belligerent countries tried to deceive the masses and make them believe that the war had been caused by the aggression of the enemy and was there- fore a defensive war. The parties that were affiliated to the Second International betrayed the principles of internationalism and Sociah ism and helped the bourgeoisie to perpetrate this deception upon the masses. Playing upon the natural love of the common people for their country, they did all in their power to rally the masses for the impe- rialist war by concealing its true character and lU’ging the necessity of defending the bourgeois fatherland.

On August 4, 1914 j the German Social-Democrats, in defiance of the resolutions passed at international congresses of the Second International, voted with the German bourgeoisie in the Reichstag in favour gi war credits. That same day, the French Socialists also voted for the war credits. “We are being attacked, we are defending ourselves,” they assured the workers and peasants. In a number of countries ^(France, Belgium, Great Britain) the leaders of the socialist parties entered the upper ialist governments. Thus, as Lenin wrote:

Overwhelmed by opportunism, the Second International has died’’ (V. I. Lenin, Collected Worlds, Vol. XVIII, New York, 1930, p. 89). It broke up into separate social-chauvinist parties, engaged in war with one another. By the time the war broke out the opportunists degenerated into social- chauvinists.

The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries as the Vehicles of Chauvinism in Russia

At the beginning of the war chauvinist fever ran as high among the petty bourgeoisie in Russia as it did in other countries. In Petrograd, as St. Petersburg was renamed after the outbreak of war, university students who were called up for mili- tary service marched in procession to the Winter Palace to pay homage to the tsar. The Cadet-minded bourgeoisie called for the cessation of “internal controversy” for the duration of the war. At the very first session of the State Duma that was held after the outbreak of the war, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Trudoviki associated themselves with the solemn declaration made by the Octobrist Rodz- yanko, the President of the Duma, who called for “unity between the tsar and his faithful people.” Behind the guise of socialist phrases, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks helped the bourgeoisie to deceive the people by calling upon them to “defend the fatherland,” hence the term “Defencist” that was applied to the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. In the autumn of 1914, the Belgian Socialist Cabinet Minister Vandervelde sent a telegram to the Russian Socialists calling upon them to help in the prosecution of the war. In answer to this the Mensheviks wrote; “By our activities in Russia we are not hindering the prosecution of the war.” Thus, the Russian Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, like all the social-chauvinists of the Second International, openly spread chauvinistic propaganda among the masses. The most dangerous to the* cause of the proletariat were the concealed social-chauvinists, the so- called Centrists, like Kautsky, Martov, Trotsky and others, who, like the avowed social-chauvinists, stood for the defence of the hour- geois “fatherland,” called for the cessation of the class struggle against the bourgeoisie for the duration of the war and, deceiving the masses^ as regards the actual war criminals, covered up their own treachery with “Loft” phrases about fighting for peace.

The Bolsheviks' Fight against the War and the Social-Chauvinists

The only party in the International which saved the honour of the international proletariat was the Bolshevik Party, headed by Lenin and Stalin. Prom the very outset of the war the Bolsheviks ex- posed its imperialist character and the treacherous conduct of the Second International.

Lenin was in Austria when the war broke out. The Austrian im- perialists hastened to arrest the leader of the world proletariat and then deported him from the country. Lenin went to Switzerland and there launched a campaign to expose the predatory, imperialist char- acter of the war, and also the treachery of international social-chau- vinism.

“The Bolsheviks hold that there are two kinds of wars:

“a) Just wars, wars tliat are not wars of conquest but wars of liber- ation, waged to defend the people from foreign attack and from at- tempts to enslave them, or to liberate the people from capitalist slav- ery, or, lastly, to liberate colonies and dependent countries from the yoke of imperialism; and

“b) unjust wars, wars of conquest, waged to conquer and enslave foreign countries and foreign nations” {History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union [Bolsheviks]^ Short Course, Moscow, 1945, pp. 167-168).

Lenin regarded the World War of 1914 as an unjust war of conquest and called for a determined struggle against it to the extent of over- throwing the imperialist governments by means of revolution. Ho ad- vanced the slogan of transforming the imperialist war into civil war and called upon the proletarians of each country to wage a revolutionary struggle for the defeat of “their own” government. The slogan “Por the defeat of the tsarist government” issued by the Bolsheviks meant not only the 'fulfilment of their international duty as Socialists. The Bolsheviks* fight for their slogans was one to save their country, to preserve its independence, which could be guaranteed only if the workers and peasants won victory over tsarism and imperialism. The Russian social-chauvinists and the Centrists headed by Trotsky ' opposed Lenin’s slogan calling for the defeat of tsarism. Rebutting their arguments, Lenin said that . to justify participation in the imperialist war, to advance in this war the slogan ‘against defeat^ means to act not only as an anti-socialist, but also as an anti-national politician” (V. I. Lenin, Collected Worlcs, VoL XVIII, New York, 1930, p. 190).

From the very outbreak of the war Lenin set out to form a new. Third International in place of the Second International, which had suffered a shameful collapse.

Lenin’s poiicj’- of a complete rupture with the imperialists and of waging a determined struggle against the social-chauvinists and Centrists was vigorously carried out in Russia by the Bolshevik mem- bers of the Duma. They constituted the only legal group of Bolsheviks that had the opportunity of appealing to the masses, for with the out- break of the war all the Bolshevik newspapers were suppressed, the - prominent Partyworkers were arrested and exiled, the workers’ orga- nizations were wrecked and the more class- conscious and advanced workers were called up for military seivice and bent to the fiont. The five Bolshevik members of the Duma toured the country, visiting factories, holding tail^is with the workers and explaining to them the aggressive and predatory nature of the war. In the Duma itself the il^lslievik nicinhers openly proclaimed their opposition to the war and refused to vote for the war credits.

In November 1914, all the Bolshevik members of the Duma were arrested by the jiolice just when they were holding a secret conference with Party workers, and in February 1915, they were put on trial. At the trial they conducted themselves like staunch fighters for the cause of the proletariat. Only Kamenev, who had been arrested with the Duma Deputies, behaved at the trial like a renegade. He declared that he differed fundamentally with the Bolsheviks on the question of the war and that he agreed with the Defencists. On receiving a report of this trial Lenin expressed his approval of the conduct of the workers’ Duma Deputies and denounced the disgraceful, craven and despicable conduct of Kamenev.

The tsarist court sentenced the five Bolshevik members of the Duma to lifelong exile in Siberia.

But even while in exile the Bolsheviks continued to oppose the war and to combat social-chauvinism. Comrade Stalin who, in 1913, had been exiled (for the sixth time) to the remote Turukhansk Region, although cut off from Lenin and the central Party bodies, took Lenin’s stand on the question of war, peace and revolution.

Tho hamlet of Kureika, whore Comrade Stalin lived, was two hundred kilometres from tho nearest village of Monastyrskoye and newspapers arrived there very rarely; the mail came once in two or three months and letters from comrades were delivered with great difficulty. Nevertheless, at the end of 3914, Comrade Stalin received Lenin’s theses in which he formulated the Bolshevik attitude towards the war. In the summer of 1915, Comrade Stalin called a conference in Monastyrskoye of the Bolsheviks in exile. This conference denounced Kamenev’s craven and treacherous conduct at the trial. In 1916 Com- rade Stalin received copies of the Bolshevilc magazine Insurance Questions^ whereupon he sent greetings to the editorial staff of that magazine in which he emiDhasized that in his opinion the chief task of the Bolshevik press was ideologically to insure the working class of Russia against the corrupting, anti-proletarian, chauvinistic propa- ganda of the Menshevik Defencists.

A similar attitude of imcompromising opposition to opportunism in every form was displayed by Y. M. Sverdlov, who was in exile with Comrade Stalin, by G. K. Orjonikidze, who was serving a sentence of penal servitude, and by the other Bolsheviks.

Brusilov's Breakthrough

The Military-Strategical Situation in the Beginning of 1916

Germany’s plans for a blitzkrieg collapsed; the war became a prolonged one. Germany had less chance of winning a prolonged war than the Entente, as the latter possessed large resources of manpower and ma- teriel. In 1915, the 6e man High Command concentrated its main forces on the Eastern Front and strove to defeat the Russian army and compel Russia to conclude a separate peace. Its aim was to rid it- self, in this way, of the second front in the East and to concentrate all its forces for the struggle in the West. The Germans did succeed in capturing a large area of Russian territory, but they failed to rout the Russian armies and the second front was not liquidated.

By the autumn of 1915, the German High Command came to the conclusion that it was useless to continue active operations against Russia and therefore began to make preparations for decisive opera- tions on the Western Front. Leading Entente circles also realized that the respite the. Entente had received in 1915 at Russia's expense had ended, and they too began to prepare for the anticipated German offensive on the Western Front. The military situation comj)elled the Allies to decide to smash their opponents in the Western and Eastern theatres of war by a series of successive decisive blows.

In the beginning of 1916, tsarist Russia intensified military oper- ations on the Caucasian Front. In spite of the incredibly dijficult fighting conditions in mountain terrain the Caucasian army stormed and captured Erzerum in February and Trebizond in April. Another Russian army launched a drive in the direction of Persia. But the offensive against Turkey was not pressed home as the Allies did not wish Turkey to be utterly defeated by Russia.

The strategical position of the Entente countries had now consid- erably improved. Their military technical forces had grown. The French and British armies were equipped with splendid artillery, and having succeeded in organizing the mass production of shells they now had a plentiful supply of these. Particularly well equipped was the for- tress of Verdun, which covered the road to Paris. Lacking adequate forces for an offensive on other parts of the front the Germans, in Feb- ruary 1916, launched a drive precisely against this fortress in the hope of breaking through and gaining a decisive success. Within a short space of time the Germans fired against the Verdun fortifica- tions over 2,000,000 shells. At the crucial moment they even resorted to asphyxiating gases, for it was the Germans who first used poison gas in the First World War.

To divert some of the German forces from Verdun the Allies de- manded that the Russian armies should launch an offensive on the Eastern Eront. This offensive had the added object of preventing the defeat of Italy, against whom the Anstro-German command was preparing to strike a blow at Trent ino.

The Russian Army's Offensive on the Southwestern Front

In conformity with the plans of the Russian High Command the offen- sive operations wore to comniL'nce on the Russian Western Front from the region of Molodeczno and drive towards Oszmiana-Vilna. A supple- mentary blow was to be struck on the Northern Front in the region of Dvinsk. The Southwestern Front was to kcc]) on the defensive. But General Brusilov, who shortly before had been appointed Commander- in-Chief of the Southwestern Front, was stiongly opposed to this plan. At the conference held at General Headquarters in Mogilev on April 14, 1916, ho argued that all the fronts should launch an offen- sive, and do so simultaneously. The war, he said, could not be won by defensive tactics, and the Russian army and its allies now possessed all the facilities for launching a general and decisive offensive.

Brusilov, an outstanding loader in the Russian army in the period of the First World War, held the view that military objectives could be achieved only by active methods. In this iCvspcct he was ono of the last representatives of the Suvorov school in the old Russian army. What distinguished him as a military leader was his constant striving to employ new methods on the basis of a study of the oxperien.co of war. He demanded thorough preparation for an operation and a clear understanding of the general strategical tasks. Hd was of the opin- ion that preparations for an offensive should be made along the whole front and that blows should be struck on several sectors simultane- ously so that the enemy should not know where the main blow was to be struck.

Brusilov drew up the following plan of operation. He decided to strike the main blow in the Luck direction, on the right flank of his front, which was capable of rendering most assistance to the Russian Western Front where offensive operations wore about to begin. Making clever use of camouflage, he did all possible to ensure that his preparations were concealed from the enemy. All troop movements were performed at night. No conversations about the preparations were conducted over the telephone. Not a single person unconnected with the forthcoming operations knew anything about them. All this ensured not only thorough preparation but also that the enemy would be taken completely by surprise.

Brusilov’s army launched its offensive at dawn on June 4, 1916. After artillery preparation lasting twenty-nine hours, the infantry charged the Austro- German positions. After ten days’ fighting the enemy’s defensive system was breached on a front of ninety kilomelTcs and Luck was captured. Within a few days the army captured the whole of Bukovina and part of South Galicia and reached the passes of the Carpathian mountains. Brusilov’s successful offensive compelled the enemy to transfer his reserves from the Italian and French Fronts to the Eastern Front. The German High Command effected such a transfer.

Brusilov’s blow saved the Italians from defeat and eased the position of the French at Verdun. The whole Austro-German Front from Pole- sie to the Bumanian frontier was disorganized, and this created the possibility of inflicting decisive defeat upon the German coalition. But neither the Allies nor the Russian High Command followed up Brusilov’s success in time. The Anglo-French troops failed to pass to the offensive at this crucial moment for the German army, thus enabling the German High Command to transfer considerable forces from the Western to the Eastern Front. Failing to receive the support of the other armies, Brusilov’s offensive was checked, after fierce fighting involving heavy casualties, in the marshy terrain near the river Stokhod. This lack of co-ordination of active Allied operations v/as one of the factors which helped to prolong the war and to ease Germany’s position in 1916.

Growth of the Revolutionary Crisis

Economic Chaos in the Country

Despite the successes the Russian armies achieved on the Turkish and Southwestern Fronts it was already evident that tsarist Russia had lost the war. The main reason for the defeat of tsarism was Russia’s economic and technical backward- ness. The technically backward war industry was incapable of sup- plying the army with the munitions of war. In the rear, economic chaos reigned. Although the number of workers employed in industry almost doubled, the productivity of labour steadily declined.

Shortage of fuel led to the cutting down of production in the fac- tories and mills. In 1916, thirty-six blast furnaces were blown out. The steel mills produced only half the metal that was needed for the war industry and metal deliveries to plants were rationed.

The railways could not cope with the traffic. The transport system was dislocated, as a result both of repeated militar^’^ withdrawals and of the flood of refugees who poured from the regions occupied by the Germans into the hinterland of Russia. During hasty retreats large quantities of rolling stock were left in the hands of the enemy. Wrecked cars and locomotives blocked the roads. To allow trains to pass, trains ahead of them were sometimes thrown over the railway embank- ment. Owing to the lack of transport facilities even urgent supplies of war materiel obtained from the United States, Great Britain and France were not delivered on time. The military port of Archangel was so congested with war materiel that the lower oases literally sank into the ground under the weight of those on top of them.

The utter dislocation of the transport system intensified the food crisis. Over a billion poods of grain from preceding harvests lay rotting at remote railway stations while the population of the towns were living; on meagre bread rations. The army received only half the regu- lation rations. The price of bread rose over 50 per cent. In the autumn of 1916, fixed grain prices were introduced, but the landlords and kulaks ignored them. Profiteering in grain increased, while long queues of starving people lined up outside the bakeries.

■ Agricultural output dropped considerably during the period of the war. About 14,000,000, or 47 per cent, of the adult male popula- tion had been conscripted for the army, and it was the most able-bodied section of the rural population that was taken. Agriculture also suf- fered from the continuous requisition of horses and cattle; during the period of the war the number of horses in the coimtry was reduced by 5,000,000.

Tn 1916 the sown area in the country was 85 per cent of that of 1909. Landlord farming, deprived of the cheap labour of day labour- ers and peasants, deteriorated. The landlord farms were largely cul- tivated by prisoners of war, but their labour was very unproductive.

Particularly disastrous were the effects of the war upon the cur- rency of the country. The colossal expenditure entailed by the war was covered by the issue of paper currency. The value of the ruble dropped and the cost of living steadily rose. To meet the war expend- iture the tsarist government floated internal loans and also appealed again and again for loans to the Allies. To pay for war contracts placed abroad it received from Great Britain, France and the United States sums amounting to 7,769,000,000 rubles.

The defeats at the front and economic chaos at home roused the alarm of the bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie had been making unprece- dented profits out of war contracts. Since tsarism proved to be inca- pable of organizing a victorious war, the Russian bourgeoisie tried to take charge of the organization of the war effort and achieved great influence in affairs of state.

In the summer of 1915, the bourgeois representatives in rural and urban local government bodies formed an organization, known as the ‘‘Zemgor, ” which demanded a voice in the distribution of sup- plies for the army. At about the same time so-called War Industry Committees were set up which undertook to fulfil part of the war contracts. Proclaiming the slogan of “everything for the war, all for the war,” the bourgeoisie launched a campaign to increase output in the factories.

The bourgeois opposition during the war years was led by a body set up in the State Duma in August 1915, and known as the Progressive bloc. It included nearly all the bourgeois parties, the Octobrists, Progressives, Cadets and part of the Nationalists.

Backed by the Mensheviks and the Trudovik ^^roup, tliis bloc demanded the" formation of a “Cabinet of confidence,” that is to say, the ap- pointment of Cabinet Ministers who would enjoy the confidence of the bourgeois majority in the Duma. The tsarist government, however, refused to make any concessions and in September 1915, it issued a decree to prorogue the Duma “for recess.”

During the war Russia’s economic dependence upon British and French capital greatly increased. In return for credits amounting to 3,000,000,000 rubles, Great Britain demanded that the tsarist gov- ernment should transfer to London a part of Russia’s gold reserve as security for payment on war contracts. At the same time the Allies continuously kept demanding fresh reinforcements fiom^Russia. In April 1916, the French “Socialists” Albert Thomas and Viviani were sent to Russia to demand the despatch of 400,000 Russian soldiers to France. Only a proletarian revolution could save Riissia from being utterly converted into a colony of foreign imperialism.

The Revolutionary Situation in the Country

At the end of 1915, a revolutionary situation began to develop in iche country. The war and the economic chaos caused extreme discontent among the masses of the working people who were obliged to bear the whole brunt of the war. The conditions of the working class had greatly dete- riorated during the period of the war. The insignificant “war bonus”' was insufficient to cover the rising cost of living. High prices, shortage* of food and the eternal queues, particularly wore out the women workers who were obliged to maintain their children without the assistance of their husbands who were away at the front. About 40 per cent of the industrial workers had been conscripted for the war and it was the more class-conscious and j)rogrcssive workers, and also 3 ^oung workers, who were sent off first. Their j)laces in the factories were taken by work- ers from the rural districts and by women and juveniles. To compel the workers to work harder and to rouse their supportfor the war, the War Industry Committees formed "workers’ groups.” In September 1915, at a meeting of representatives of the workers of the factories of Petrogr«^.d, the Bolshevilis secured the adoj^tion of a resolution against the election of such a gi’oup to the Central War Industries Commit- tee. The result was that only an insignificant number of workers took part in the election of the "workers’ group” which took place in No- vember. The Menslievilvs, who advocated “class peace” between the workers and the bourgeoisie, supported the “workers’ group,” and the Menshevik Kuzma Gvozdev, an arrant Defencist, became the head of it.

Ill the spring of 1916, the strike movement began to assume wide proportions and the strikes in the central industrial region were exceptionally tiTrbulent, At the Novo Kostroma Linen Mills the work- ers demanded an increase in wages and marched in procession to the offices of the mill to present this demand. They were met by troops who fii’ed at them, killing and wounding scores of them. The Commander of the Cor])S of Gendarmes sent a telegi’amto the Governor of Kostroma stating; “Apiirove your action. Find ringleaders. Court-martial them.”

The same brulal treatment was meted out by troops and police to the workers of Ivanovo-Voznesensk who marched to the Town Hall to XDresent their demands. The shooting down of the workers in Kostroma and Ivanovo-Voznesensk called forth a wave of protest strikes. The strike of the workers of the Putilov Works, which was engaged on war orders, assumed a militant character, and was joined by the new work- ers, among whom the Bolsheviks employed at the ]3lant had been very active. The Putilov strike was supported by the entire proletariat of Petrograd. In the autumn, mass strikes began to spread all over the country.

January 9, 1916, the anniversary of Bloody Sunday, was com- memorated by the workers by a political strike. The political strike wave reached its peak in October 1916, when these strikes were accom- panied by demonstrations in which the workers carried the revolution- ary slogans: "Down with the war!”, "Down with the autocracy!”

The movement among the workers stimulated the struggle of the peasants. The imperialist war had finally divorced the peasants from the bourgeoisie, for it revealed to them how utterly groundless were their hopes of receiving land and peace from the tsar and his bourgeois allies. The impoverishment and ruin created in the countryside by the war strengthened anti-war temper in the most backward and remote villages. The Department of Police noted the growth of propaganda conducted by peasants against the further recruitment of soldiers for the war. One such rural propagandii^t is reported to have said: “Our tsar is throwing the people into the war like an extrava- gant cook throwing logs in the stove.”

Information rhout the disastrous condition of peasant farming reached the army. Worn out by the protracted war and enraged by the ruination of their farms at home the soldiers refused to go into action against the enemy, voluntarily surrendered, inflicted wounds upon themselves and deserted in masses. In 1916 the number of de- serters was estimated to have exceeded 1,500,000.

The Activities of the Bolsheviks During the War

The Bolshe- viks developed extensive activities in the aimy and in the navy. They formed underground military organizations m the army units and printed and distributed revolutionarj’- leaflets in which they called for fraternization between the soldiers of the belligerent armies and stressed that their common enemy was the imperialist bourgeoisie, and that the only way they could end the war was by turning their weapons against the bourgeoisie and their governments.

In the autumn of 1915, fraternization commenced at the front. The Bussian soldiers left their trenches to mingle with the enemy soldiers. Tlio soldiers of both sides treated each other to cigarettes and understood each other perfectly even though they did not know each other’s language. This fraternization strengthened the international unity of the working people in both lines of trenches.

By the end of 1916, the letters vrhich the soldiers sent home from the front reflected their growing hatred of the vrar and of tsar- ism. One soldier wrote: “The soldiers today are not what they were during the Japanese War; under the mask of slavish obedience there bums frightful anger. It is enough to light a tiny match for this mass to flare up.” The conscripted workers, many of whom had taken part in the revolution of 1905, conducted propaganda in favour of another revolution.

A number of leading Bolsheviks were active in the army. M, V. Frunze, who escaped from prison in 1915, secured a situation in the Union of the Zemstvos under the assumed name of Mikhailov. He formed an underground Bolshevik organization in Minsk and established close contacts with the soldiers on the Eussian Western Front. A. A, Zhdanov, mobilized into the armyj» conducted energetic Bolshevik propaganda among the troops. V. V. Kuibyshev was active in the pipe works in Samara, and S.M. Kirov was active in- the Caucasus, rousing the most backward and downtrodden highlanders for the struggle against tsarism. In Kiev, and later in Ekaterinoslav, L. M. Kaganovich conducted propaganda among the workers and soldiers. In the spring of 1915, V. M. Molotov arrived in Moscow to organize a Bolshevik conference. He was arrested and ex- iled to Siberia, but he escaped shortly afterwards, went to Petrograd, and there directed the preparations for a new revolution.

Never had the lives of the Bolsheviks working underground been so full of danger as during the imperialist war, when those conduct- ing revolutionary propaganda were liable to be coiirt-martialled and shot. But the Bolsheviks were not daunted by dijOSiculties or dangers; they knew how to be with, and at the head of, the masses, no ‘ matter what conditions prevailed.

In the endeavour to rally all the revolutionary forces for the struggle against the imperialist war the Bolsheviks conducted intense activity among the youths and workingwomen who had taken the places in industry of the men who had gone to the front.

The theoretical basis for the activities of the Bolsheviks during the period of the war was provided by Lenin’s works on imperialism. In 1916, he wrote that work of genius, Im'periaUsm^ the Highest Stage of Capitalism in which he showed that imperialism is the last stage in the development of capitalism and is the eve of the proletarian revo- lution. In this book, and in the articles he wrote in 1916-1916, he showed that imperialist wars weaken the forces of imperialism and ren- der possible the breaking of the chain of imperialism at its weakest link. In his articles “The United States of Europe Slogan” and "The War Program of the Proletarian Eevolution” he showed that it was quite possible for the proletariat to break the chain of imperialism at some one point, that Socialism could not be victorious in all coun- tries simultaneously, that it would iii’st achieve victory in a few coun- tries, or even in only one country, while the other countries would for a time remain bourgeois countries. This was a new and complete theory of the socialist revolution, a theory the fundamentals of which were outlined by Lenin as early as 1906. This theory opened up a revolutionary perspective for the proletarians of the various countries, taught them to utilize the war situation for a revolutionary onslaught upon the bourgeoisie in the given country, and strengthened their confidence in the victory of the world proletarian revolution.

The Revolt of the Peoples in Central Asia in 1916

The National Question During the Period of the War

The bourgeoisie in all eountries proclaimed the imperialist war a war for the protection of weak nations, but actually, during the war the oppressed nationalities were forced into, greater dependence than ever upon the imperialist bourgeoisie. The colonial peoples served, as the source from which the belligerent armies received replenishments of “cannon fodder.” During the period of the war the movement for national liberation was rapidly heading towards a revolutionary uprising against imperialism. Lenin and Stalin pointed out that the revolutionary movement for national liberation of the oppressed nationalities was a reserve of the proletarian revolution. The Bolsheviks waged a determined struggle against national oppression in Russia and in other oountries, and upheld the right of nations to self-determination and the international unity of the working class in its struggle for Socialism.

The Bolsheviks denounced the policy of national oppression pur- sued by tsarism and the imperialist bourgeoisie. As far as Russia

is concerned,” wrote Lenin at this time, “the war is doubly reaction- ary and hostile to national liberation” (V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. XVIII, New York, 1930, p. 226).

The Revolt in Central Asia and Kazakhstan

The war imposed great suffering upon the oppressed peoples of tsarist Russia, la its quest for fresh sources of revenue for the purpose of financing the war, the tsarist government imposed additional taxes on the inhab- itants of the outlying regions. The peoples of Central Asia were sub- jected to exceptionally cruel exploitation. In the settled cotton-grow- ing regions, the exploiters enmeshed the entire population in a net of enslaving contracts. During the period of the war the area under cotton increased 50 per cent, but the peasant growers could not enjoy the produce of their labour. They delivered the greater part of their crop to the landlords in payment for rent, and sold the remainder at ridiculously low prices fixed by the government to the disadvantage of the poor peasants . Meanwhile, the price of manufactured goods rose to an enormous extent. The Uzbek peasant cotton growers were threat- ened by famine, as they grew scarcely any grain themselves and little grain was shipped into the region owing to the dislocation of the railways.

Conditions in the nomadic and semi-nomadic regions of Central Asia and Kazakhstan were even worse. The government continued to drive the Kirghiz and Kazakh herdsmen from their pastures in order to provide land for Russian settlers. In 1915, 1,800,000 hectares of the best land of the Kazakh and Kirghiz were granted to Russian land- lords, government offtcials and kulaks. The continuous requisition of horses, cattle and wool for war purposes utterly ruined the herdsmen. The tyranny of the local authorities and the levies they imposed still further worsened the hard lot of the people.

The immediate cause of the extensive revolt of the working people in Central Asia was the order issued by the tsarist government in June 1916, conscripting the inhabitants from the age of nineteen to forty-three for the purpose of digging trenches and performing other work at the front, in spite of the fact that according to the laws of tsarist Russia the noii-Riissiau population was not liable to military service.

The Uzbeks, Ivazaldis, Kirghiz and Turkmen refused to obey thi.s harsh order, the more so that it was issued just when t]ie harvest was being taken in. The fii^st to rise in revolt were the peoples of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Crowds of excited Uzbeks in the towns and villages of the Tashlient and Samarkand counties attacked the rural admin- istration ofliccs and demanded that the conscription lists should be destroyed. By the middle of July 1916, the revolt had spread over the whole of Ferghana. Near Jizak, in the Samarkand Region, regular battles with the tsarist troops took place, in which the latter employed artillery. The rebels cut eommunications between Verny (now Alma-Ata) and Tashkent, caj^tured a trainload of arms that w^as being sent to be used against them , armed the peasants and entered into battle with the Russian troops. The revolt was suppressed only in October, after a punitive army had been sent against the rebels of the Somirechensk Region.

The revolt of the Kazakhs in the Turgai (now Aktyubinsk) Re- gion which broke out in September 1916 was exceptionally iirolonged and stubborn. The revolt was headed by Aniangeldy linanov. When the Kazakhs of the Turgai Region refused to obey the tsar’s conscription order, the Governor of the region went to them in person to jjorsiiade them to obey. Amangeldy turned to him and said: '‘Permit me, worthy chief, to put one question to you. In our ignorance we do not understand; whom shall we defend in this war?” The Governor ordered the arrest of Amangeldy, but he went into hiding among the poorest sections of the Kazakhs. Sliortly afterwards Amangeldy Imanov organized a large force of rebels which entered into battle with one of the punitive units at Lake Kizil-KuL The battle lasted a whole day and the troops were forced to retreat.

At the end of October 1916, the rebels headed by Amangeldy Imanov besieged the town of Turgai, but failed to capture it. Aman- geldy retreated from Turgai and fortified himself in the village of Batbakara. Here workshops were set up where armourers worked day and night making swords and other side arms. The Ka- zakhs were trained in the use of firearms and in military exercises. The local inhabitants supplied the rebels with food, and with fodder for their horses. A large punitive army was sent against Amangeldy, and in the middle of February 1917 this army captured Batbakara. The rebels retreated into the steppe. Later their brave leader Aman- geldy took part in the revolution, joined the Bolshevik Party and died like a hero in the Civil War.

The revolt in Turkmenistan also lasted a considerable time. Tlie Turkmen herdsmen, moving from place to place, easily evad- ed the tsar’s troops sent against them. A special punitive expedition of Cossack troops sent against them succeeded in forcing the rebels to cross the frontier into Persia. The revolt was suppressed with ruthless cruelty. The punitive army burned down the herdsmen’s encampments, and seized their property and cattle. In a number of counties more than half the population was wiped out. The Governor General, Kuropatkin, put 347 of the rebels on trial, and of these 51 were executed. In the case of the others sentence of death was commuted to penal servitude. Several hundred rebels were exiled without trial . After the revolt was sup- pressed many thousands of Khghiz and Kazakli refugees, with their families and herds, wandered into China and Mongolia, while the Turkmens crossed over into Persia. On leaving their habitations the refugees sold the remnants of their jjroperty to the rich and to the bai (kulaks) for a mere song; but in the countries in which they had taken refuge they were also subjected to persecution. After Soviet rule was established in Kussia many of the refugees returned home.

Education and Culture in Russia before the Revolution (1907–1917)

Education and Science

The revolution of 1905-1907 had roused among the masses of the people a tremendous thirst for knowledge. During the period of the revolution a large number of educational societies were formed, and adult schools and study coxirses, libraries, people’s universities, etc., were oj^ened. During the period of reaction, however, the tsarist government suppressed most of these educational societies and institutions. The first to suffer were the educational so- cieties which had been formed by the workers and the iion-Eussian nationalities. Among these were the Ehiowledge Is Strength Society, The Educational Society, The Self-Educational Society, The Voluntary High School, which had been organized by P. E. Lesgaft, a number of educational study courses, nearly all the People’s xmiversities, and many of the elementary educational societies. But the tsarist govern- ment was unable to crush the people’s desire for knowledge.

The needs of developing capitalism, the growing economic and political intercourse with the more cultured European countries, and lastly, the steps which the tsarist government itself was taking towards a bourgeois monarchy, compelled the government to increase the extremely insignificant funds hitherto allocated for education in Russia.

The industrial boom of 1912-1914 confronted the bourgeoisie with the need for training technical personnel which were practically non-existent in tsarist Russia. The number of students in technical colleges in 1914 was twice that in 1903.

With funds provided by the Zemstvo and private capitalists teclinioal and commercial schools, and trade and agricultural schools were opened-

Duriiig tho six years from 1907 to 1913 the ‘estimates of the Min- istry of Education were trebled, from 46,000,000 rubles to 137,000,000 rubles; but the latter was an insignificant sum considering the real needs of a civilized country. The tsarist government spent on educa- tion 65 kopeks per head i)er annum, whereas Great Britain, Prance and Germany spent three to four rubles, and the United States nine rubles per head per annum. On the eve of the war the number of pupils attending educational establishments of all types was about 7,000,000, which was less than 60 per 1,000 ofthe population. Only about one-fourth of the children of school age attended school. Accord- ing to official figures, before the revolution of 1917, only 21 per cent of the population of Russia was literate. In the non-Russian national regions the percentage of literacy was even lower: in Transcaucasia 12 per cent, in Central Asia about 5 per cent. Of Uzbek, Turkmen and Tadjik children only 42 per 1,000 attended school. This explains why entire nationalities, such as the Bashkirs, Kirghiz, Turkmens, Yakuts and many others were totally illiterate. As Lenin wrote: “No such barbarous country in which tho masses of the people have been so completely robbed of education, light and knowledge has remained in Europe except Russia” (V. I. Lonin, Oollected Works, Vol. XVI, Moscow, 1937, Russ, ed,, p, 410).

Lonin pointed to the conditions of schoolteachers as an index ofthe backwardness and barbarism of tsarist Russia. Teachers* salaries were miserably low, they wore continuously subjected to the carping crit- iciam and persecution of the higher officials, and were constantly harassed by the police and secret service agents.

The tsarist school, “the school of drilling and learning by rote” as Lenin called it, dinned into the minds of the children knowledge of which nine-tenths was useless, while the other tenth was distorted. High-school students were prohibited from forming self-educational circles.

After defeating the revolution of 1906, the tsarist government came down heavily on the universities. In 1910 and 1911, in connection with the death of Leo Tolstoy, the students resumed their political meetings and protest demonstrations. In retaliation to this the tsarist government issued an order iabolishing university autonomy which had been won by the 1906 revolution, and suppressing student organizations which hitherto had been permitted to exist. Largo numbers of students were expelled from the universities and deported for taking part in tho students’ movement. In 1910 the newly appointed Minister of Edu- cation, the reactionary Kasso, dismissed all the liberal and radical professors and he also discharged the Principal of the Moscow University and his assistants for failing to take adequate measures against the “mutinous” students. In protest against this act of bureaucratic tyraimy 125 professors and lecturers of the Moscow University, among whom were K. A. Timiryazev, Professor of Physics P. N. Lebedev, and others, resigned.

To combat the revolutionary student movement the government encouraged the formation in the higher educational establishments of Black Hundred student organizations, such as the Academic Union, and others, which were connected with the Union of Russian People.

The state of the universities to some extent detennined the state of science in Russia. The university chairs trained an inadequate num- ber of scientific research workers and there were few scientific research institutes in tsarist Russia. The Imperial Academy of Sciences pro- duced no works of any great scientific value, and the President of the Academy was the tsar’s uncle Konstantin Romanov, who knew nothing about science.

The genuine scientists who sprang from the ranks of the people received neither recognition nor assistance. The great genetics se- lectionist, I. V. Michurin, was not recognized as a scientific researcher, in spite of the fact that scientists from other countries came to him to study his methods. The same applied to another great scientist, K. E. Tsiolkovsky, who constructed a dirigible airship ten years before the Zeppelin appeared, and who formulated the principles of the jet- propelled engine; he was obliged to remain a teacher of mathematics in Kaluga and conduct his scientific researches with his own very modest resources. The outstanding mechanic, the father of Russian aviation, N. E. Zhukovsky, devoted himself to the study of aerial dynamics and the theory of the flight of aircraft, but the results of his work found application only under the Soviet regime. The first Russian airmen, Rossinsky, Utochkin and others, performed their flights at the risk of their lives in badly constructed aeroplanes provided by professional showmen for the purpose of public entertainment.

The plan proposed by the Arctic explorer, G. Y. Sedov in 1912, for an expedition to the Korth Pole was met with hostility and ridicule. It was only with great dijfiSlculty that Sedov, with the aid of private contributions, fitted out the St. Phoca and started out on his expedition, which was inadequately organized. Eventually, the ship was caught in the ice and Sedov, accompanied by two sailors, abandoned the ship and attempted to reach the Pole on foot, but they only succeeded in reacliing Rudolf Island, where, in the winter of 1914, the brave explorer died of hunger and cold. The remains of Sedov’s grave on Rudolf Island were only recently discovered.

Thus, scientific discoveries, research and expeditions were treated by the tsiirist govoriiiiient and the bourgeoisie with cold indifference, and sometimes oven with ignorant contempt.

Literature and Art

The ideological disintegration that set in among the bourgeois intelligentsia found most vivid rejection in the decadence that cliaraoterized the literary world in the last decade be- fore the revolution. Tlie Cadet proff^ssors and philosopliers, such as Bulgakov, Berdj^aev and others, intensified, in their philoso];>hical works, their attacks on Marxism and revolution and preached idealism and mysticism. Reactionary idealistic philoso])hy exercised considerable inlluenc(.’^ upon the Russian petty-bourgeois intelligentsia who frequently sought escape from reality in the world of abstract ideas and emotions. The individualist intellectual, disillusioned with life, became the lu’incipal hero in fiction. Social reaction opened the way for numerous literary trends such as the symbolists, futurists, acme-ists, etc., and while these various groups, schools and coteries were at loggerheads with each other, they all agreed in reimdiating realism in art. The predominating jirinciplc in literature was formalistic searching. The literature and poetry of that time was distinguished for its intellectual shallowness and }}essi- inistio moods. Thus, tho works of Leonid Aiidrcyov breathed profound }>essimism and fatalism. Life for him was “madness and horror” and man was “a plaything in tho hands of fate.” Artsybashev argued that a man “could do anything ho pleased since Death stood at everyone’s back.” Merezhkovsky and Zinaida Hippius advocated “seeking for a God” and denounced the Russian revolution. Undoubtedly talent- ed poets like Balmont, Theodore Sologub and others, withdrew from; public life and sanli into extreme individualism, or into the world of abstract fantasy, “from constricting borders into a wonderful world, to unlmown beauty” as Balmont wrote. Pessimism even affect- ed tho work of progressive poets like Alexander Blok and Valeri Bryusov. Tho Bolsheviks combated this state of decay in the literary world. Amidst the gloom of that period the wonderful stories that were written by the great proletarian author Maxim Gorky breathed cheer- ful confidence and strength. “Man — ^there is a proud ring about that word,” said Gorky. He had confidence in the new man and in his lofty mission as fighter for and builder of the new way of life. At that time Gorky came out as the bard of socialist democracy. In his novel Mother ^ he put into the month of his hero the following words about the new generation of Russian workers: ^VPhen you look at them you can see that Russia will be tho brightest democracy on earth.” Maxim Gorky became tho favourite author of tho proletariat, and from his works the proletarians imbibed new strength for the struggle. Lenin wrote that “Gorky is undoubtedly the greatest representative of proleia^'ian art, who has done a great deal for this art and is capable of doing still more in the future” (V. I. Lenin, Selected Worhs, Vol. IV, Moscow, 1934, p. 36). Another challenge to the old decaying world was the poetry of the young poet Vladimir Mayakovsky. His poem “Cloud in Pants,” written in 1914, was a hymn to life, love and the struggle, Mayakovsky proclaimed himself the “drummer boy of the revolution” and welcomed its coming. The call for the struggle for the new way of life was also sounded ill the works of the Ukrainian autlioress Lesj^a Ukrainlva, whose art reached its peak in the darkest years of reaction. The writer's fate was a tragic one: she was bedridden with tuberculosis in a severe form, but her work, which was strongly influenced by Puslikin's poetry, breathed ardent sjunpathy for the people who were rising against the autocracy, and sounded a call for the struggle against the oppres- sors. In 1913, untimely death carried away another great artist in the field of literature in the person of M. M. Kotsyubinsky. Kotsyubinsky commenced his literary career in the 1880 's and 1890 ’s by ruthlessly denouncing the liberal Narodnik intelligentsia and the monstros- ities of peasant life. In the period of the 1905 revolution he definitely became the mouthpiece of revolutionary peasant democracy. In his most important work, Fata Morgana, he describes with pro- found sympathy the revolt of the peasants and reveals his hatred for the landlords and the kulaks. In 1916, the most popular of Jewish authors, Sholem Alechem, the nom de plmne of Sholem Rabinovich, died. Maxim Gorky described him as an “artist in melanchol 3 ’’ and grave humour.” In his series of humorous tales: Tobias the MUhtnan, The Memoirs of a Commer- cial Traveller, and others, he described with great artistic realism and sincere sympathy the joyless life of the Jewish poor. Art in this period reflected the same ideas and moods as were reflected in literature. In painting, decorative themes came to the forefront (the “World of Art” group represented by Roerich, Benois and others). The same tendency to escape from realism into the world of inner emotions and external formalistic searchings was reflected in sculpture (P. P. Trubetskoy, Konenkov, and others). The work of the outstanding composer A. N. Scriabin (1871-1915)^ an innovator of musical form, contained elements of mysticism and' symbolism (“A Divine Poem,” and others).

The February Bourgeois-Democratic Revolution

Overthrow of Tsarism

Two Conspiracies

Hie last years of tsarism in Russia were the years of its utter decay and decomposition. During the period of the war, the rascal Gregory Rasputin, formerly a peasant from Siberia, gained exceptional influence at the tsar’s court. In his youth Rasputin had been a horse thief and later he roamed from monastery to monastery with pilgrims and alms-beggars. Skilfully posing as a “seer,^" he became extremely poxmlar among ignorant religious people and partic- ularly among women. Rumours about him and the ^’"miracles” he performed reached the tsar’s comt. The tsar and the tsarina who were extremely superstitious believed these rumours. The tsarina, who was fanatically religious, invited Rasputin to the court in the hope that he would bo able to cure the Crown Prince Alexei of the illness which the physicians had iDronounoed incurable. Rasputin was shrewd and brazen and gained enormous influence over the tsarina, and through her, over the tsar. The tsarina constantly induced Nicho- las II to follow the advice of Rasputin, to whom, she believed, “God reveals everything.” In obedience to Rasputin’s illiterate messages the tsar appointed and dismissed ministers. With his assistance shady businessmen, profiteers, swindlers and foreign spies obtained important posts, profitable concessions, enormous subsidies and lucrative war contracts. The ascendancy of Rasputin most vividly reflected the obscurantism, the superstition, the intellectual poverty and mor- al decay of the tsarist regime.

The defeats sustained at the front and the revolutionary situation in the country created panic in governmental circles. To have their hands free to crush the growing revolution, the tsar and the court clique wanted to conclude a separate peace with Germany, and arrange- ments for negotiations for such a peace were made by the tsarina through her Geiman relatives. The scheme to conclude a separate peace with Germany was also supported by Rasputin,

Rumours that the court was secretly preparing to conclude a sepa- rate peace with Germany leaked out and this, together with the fact that tsarism was obviously incapable of coping with the revolutionary movement in the country, stimulated the opposition of the bourgeoisie. At the Olid of 1915, the government began to meet with increasingly vigorous and sharp criticism in the State Duma. True, as Shulgin, one of the Deputies of the Right explained, this criticism was merely an attempt to transform ‘'the seething revolutionary energy into words" and to “substitute resolutions for revolution.” Nevertheless, bourgeois circles had lost their former “confidence” in the government. The government became panic-stricken and began to indulge in what was called “Ministerial leapfrog,” i, e., constantly dismissing ministers and replacing them by others. During the period of the war there were no less than four Presidents of the Council of Ministers, six Minis- ters of the Interior, four Ministers of War, three Ministers of Foreign Affairs, four Ministers of Agriculture and four Ministers of Justice. As was said in the Duma, the changes were so fast that it was impossible to “get a good look at the faces of the Ministers who fell.”

In November 1916, the Fourth State Duma reassembled after the summer recess in an atmosphere of extreme political tension. The revolutionary crisis in the country was growing with catastrophic speed. The time had come when the ruling classes could no longer govern in the old way and the working people would no longer live in the old way. In its report on the political situation in the country, the Department of Police was obliged to admit that “opiDosition tem- per has now reached such exceptional dimensions that it far exceeds that which prevailed among the broad masses in the turbulent period of 1905-1906.”

Even the Grand Dukes and the higher aristocracy sensed the im- pending collapse of tsarism and demanded the removal of Rasputin, whom they regarded as the chief cause of all the trouble in the country. On the night of December 17, 1916, Rasputin was killed by conspirators, among whom were relatives of the tsar, and his body was thrown into an ice hole on the river Neva. The assassination of Rasputin, however, could not, of course, alter the situation in the country. The tsarist government resolved to take drastic measures to crush the revolu- tionary masses. Its plan was to conclude a separate peace with Ger- many, dissolve the Duma, and then concentrate its main blow against the working class. It intended to draw troops, including artillery, to the capital and to do so in good time. The war factories were to be militarized in order to place the workers under military law. The Petrograd Military Area, which came within the area of the Northern Front, was formed into a separate military area under the command of General Khabalov, a most reactionary general. The police force in the capital was put on a war footing and supplied with machine guns. Maklakov, formerly Minister of the Interior, wrote to the tsar demanding that the sternest measures be taken to combat the revolutionary movement in order “to restore order in the state at all costs and ensure victory over the internal enemy who has long been becoming more dangerous, more fierce and more insolent than the external enemy.” Concurrently witli this plot, another plot was being hatched by the imperialist bourgeoisie and the militarists. Giving up all hope of reaching an agreement with tsarism, the bourgeois plotters decided that the best means of averting a revolution would be a palace revolution. They plofcted to capture the tsar’s train while it was on the way from Army Gonoral Headquarters in Mogilev to Tsarskoye Solo, compel the tsar to abdicate in favour of his son Alexei and appoint the tsar’s brother, J\Tiehacl Romanov, who sjuapathized with “English ways,” regent until Alexei came of age. A part in tliis plot to bring about a palace revolution was idaj^'ed by the British and French im- perialists who were afraid that the autocracy would conclude a separate ]3oace with Germany.

But neither the plot of the tsarist autocracy nor that of the bourgeoisie fructified. They could not avert revolution. The working class and the peasants in soldiers’ uniforms thwarted these plans by their mass revolutionary actions.

The Insurrection in Petrograd

At the beginning of 1917, the general crisis in the country became extremely acute. The railways almost ceased to function. The factories and mills failed to receive raw materials and fuel and came to a standstill. The food problem grew into an acute political problem. Ou January 9, 1917, the anniver- sary of Bloody Sunday, a huge anti-war demonstration took place in Petrograd. Similar demonstrations took place in Moscow, Baku, Nizhni Novgorod and other towns. In Moscow two thousand workers came into the streets carrying red flags and banners bearing the slogan “Down witli the war! ” Mounted police dispersed the demonstrators. In a number of towns strikes broke out, and in some, the people spontaneously began, to raid the baker shops. The government lost its head and began to intensify its measures of repression. The Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries tried to prevent the revolution from developing by calling upon the workers to organize a demonstra- tion in defence of the State Duma; but on February 14, the day on which the Duma was to open, a large section of the workers, in response to the call of the Bolsheviks, came into the streets, carrying the slogans “Down with the autocracy! ”, “Down with the war!”

In the latter half of February the revolutionary movement in Petrograd grew with exceptional rapidity. On February 18, 30,000 workers employed at the Putilov Works came out on strike.

In the morning of February 23 the Putilov workers came out in a demonstration and were joined by the workers of other plants and by women waiting in the queues outside the baker shops. The Petrograd Committoo of the Bolshevik Party had issued an appeal for February 23 (March 8 new style) — International Workingwomen’s Day — ^to be marked by a political strike. In all, 90,000 men and women workers struck work that day. The political strike began to develop into a general political demonstration against tsarism.

Next day, February 24, 200,000 workers were on strike. Revo- lutionary meetings were held in all parts of the city. The police occupied the bridges across the Neva, but the workers streamed towards the centre of the city over the ice. On February 25, the political strikes in the different districts of Petrograd developed into a general political strike of the workers of the whole city. From General Headquarters the tsar sent the officer commanding the Petro- grad Military Area the following order: ‘T command you to put a stop to the disorders in the capital not later than tomorrow.” The police began to fire upon the demonstrators with machine guns that were posted on the roofs of houses. The streets and squares in the centre of the city were occupied by troops. Large numbers of workers and Bol- sheviks were arrested and flung into prison, among them members of the Petrograd Committee of the Bolshevik Party. The revolt at that time was directed by the Bureau of the Central Committee headed by Comrade Molotov.

V. M. Molotov had returned to Petrograd in 1916, after escaping from the Irkutsk Gubernia, where he had been exiled in 1915. On Lenin’s instructions he was appointed to the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party, which was directing the preparations for the February revolution. It was he who edited the leaflet issued by the Petrograd Committee of the Bolshevik Party on February 25, the last before the revolution — openly calling for insurrec- tion. This leaflet ended with the words: '‘Ahead of us lies struggle, but victory awaits us. Let everybody rally under the Red flags of the revolution! Down with the tsarist monarchy!”

On February'’ 26, the Vyborg Side of Petrograd was entirely in the hands of the insurgent workers. The Vyborg District Committee of the Bolshevik Party called upon the workers to arm themselves by seizing the arsenals and disarming the police. Meanwhile the workers intensified their propaganda activities among the troops; they forced their way into the barracks and called upon the soldiers to join them. In the morning of February 26, some military units were still firing at the people, but by noon the soldieis w’ere firing not at the people, but at the mounted police who were attacking the workers. An important part in winning the soldiers over to the side of the people was played by the workingw'omen who ardently pleaded with the soldiers to help the workers to overthrow the hated autocracy.

On February 27, the troops in Petrograd began to go over to the side of the insurgents. Thg men of the Volhynsky and Lithuanian Regi- ments joined the workers in the Vyborg District. The workers captured an arsenal containiug 40,000 rifles and armed themselves. Political prisoners were liberated from the prisons.

General Khabalov proclaimed martial law in Petrograd, but the tsarist authorities were no longer capable of checking the revolution. The insurgent workers marched to the Taurida Palace, where the State Duma met. During these daysRodzyanko, the President of the State Duma, had been sending the tsar at General Headquarters in Mogilev telegram after telegram begging him to make concessions to the people and thus "save the country and the dynasty”; but the tsar regarded the Duma as the principal hotbed of the resolution and therefore, on February 26, had issued a decree dissolving the Duma. The members of the Duma submitted to the tsar’s decree, but they remained in the Taurida Palace.

The tsar at General Headquarters continued to receive reassuring telegrams from the tsaripa who was in the capital, "It is a hooligan movement,” the tsarina wrote, “young boys and girls are running about and screaming that they have no bread — only to excite. ...” The tsar ordered troops to be withdrawn from the front and sent to Petrograd, but a troop train under the command of General Ivanov scarcely managed to reach Tsarskoye Selo, near Petrograd, where the soldiers fraternized with the revolutionary soldiers and want- ed to arrest the General. The tsar left General Headquarters for Petrograd, but the royal train barely reached Dno, where it was obliged to turn and make ior Pskov, the Headquarters of the Northern Front.

Everywhere the troops went over to the side of the revolution.

The Dual Power

The Formation of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies

On February 27 (March 12 new style), the revolu- tion triumphed.

Armed workers and soldiers liberated political prisoners from the prisons. The victorious workers and soldiers marched to the Taurida Palace where the members of the dissolved Duma were gathered. Hardly had the fighting ended than Comrade Molotov, member of the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party, andved a-t the palace.

The idea of Soviets lived on in the minds of the people ever since the days of the 1905 revolution, and they put this idea into effect immediately on the overthrow of tsarism. Even while fighting was still in progress in the streets the workers in the factories and mills were already electing their first Deputies to the Soviets. Comrade Molotov sent Bolshevik soldiers to the various regiments of the Petrograd garrison with instructions to organize the election of Depu- ties to the Soviet from each military unit.

Thus, unlike what occurred in 1905, when only Soviets of Workers’ Deputies were formed, in February 1917, a joint Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies was formed. The &st meeting of the Petrograd Soviet took place in the evening of February 27.

The Petrograd Soviet and its Executive Committee proved to be under the control of representatives of the compromising parties — ^the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries — ^who managed to secure election while the Bolsheviks were in the streets leading the workers’ insurrection. Another factor that infiuencedthe elections was that most of the leaders of the Bolshevik Party were still in prison or in exile. Tsarism had tom the leaders of the Bolshevik Party out of the ranks of the working class: Lenin was a political emigrant abroad, Stalin was in exile in distant Siberia. The Mensheviks, however, had remained at large, and posing as the champions of freedom they deceived the workers and soldiers and got themselves elected to the Soviets as their representatives. The rate of representation also helped the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries to obtain a majority in the Soviets; the rate of representation for large plants was one Deputy per 1,000 workers, but plants employing less than 1,000 workers could also elect one Deputy. The result was that the big plants, where Bol- shevik influence was strongest, received only as many seats in the Soviet as the small plants in which Menshevik influence predominated. The army units, wliicli consisted largely of peasants, elected mainly Socialist-Revolutionaries or their sympathizers to the Soviet.

The Provisional Committee of the State Duma

On February 27, after backstairs negotiations between the bourgeois members of the Duma and the leaders of the Menshevik and Sooialist-Eevolutionary parties, a Provisional Committee of the State Duma was set up, headed by the President of the Fourth Duma, Eodzyanko. The latter en- tered into communication with General Headquarters with the view to obtaining the consent of Nicholas II to the formation of a Cabinet that would be responsible to the Duma. The bourgeoisie were still trying to save the monarchy. As Comrade Stalin wrote in appraising the stand that was taken by the bourgeoisie at the time of the Feb- ruary revolution, they “wanted a little revolution for a big war,” The first thing the Provisional Committee of the State Duma did was to issue an order to the troops to retmn to barracks immediately and obey their officers. At a meeting of the Soviet of Workers’ Deputies the soldiers’ representatives raised a protest against this order. Yield- ing to the pressure from the masses of soldiers the Soviet issued Or- der No. 1, which defined the rights of the revolutionary soldiers. It provided for the elect’on of Soldiers’ Committees in all units of the Petrograd garrison, abolished the rule of addressing officers and gener- als as “Your Honour,” “Your Excellency,” etc., prohibited officers from using the degrading form, “thou,” in addressing soldiers, and granted the latter the same political and civil rights as those enjoyed by officers.

Order No. 1 was an important factor in organizing the revolu- tionary forces of the army and in finally swinging the soldiers at the front to the side of the revolution.

The Revolution Victorious Throughout the Country

Follow- ing on the successful revolution in Petrograd, the revolution swept in triumph over the whole country. On February 27, the Moscow or- ganization of t e Bolshevik Party called upon the workers and soldiers in that city to support the revolution in Petrograd. In the morning of February 28, the workers of the biggest plants came out on strike and were joined by the soldiers of the Moscow garrison. In the evening of March 1, the workers liberated imprisoned Bolsheviks. Among these was F. E. Dzerzhinsky.

The victory of the revolution m Petrograd was the signal for a revolt against tsarism also in the city of Nizhni Novgorod. The workers of the Soxmovo and other plants started a general strike, liberated political prisoners, disarmed the police and marched to the barracks and fraternized with the soldiers.

On March 2, the workers employed at the small-arms and ammuni- tion factories in Tula rose in revolt, set up Soviets and arrested the local tsarist authorities. Similar scenes occurred in February and Marcli all over Eussia. As Lenin figuratively expressed it, the blood-and mud-stainerl cart of the Eomanov monarchy was overturned at one stroke.

The Provisional Government

The revolution was brought about by the workers and the peasants in soldier’s uniform, but they were robbed of the fruits of their victory. The Socialist-Eevolution- aries and the Mensheviks were of the opinion that the revolution was already over and that the main thing now was to set up a ‘"normal” bourgeois government. On the night of March 1, behind the backs of the Bolsheviks, they reached an agreement with the members of the Duma to form such a government. In the morning of March 2, the appointment of a Provisional Government headed by Prince Lvov, a big landlord, was announced. Among the members of this government was Milyukov, leader of the Cadet Party, prof3ssor of history, who was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs; Guchkov, leader of the Octobrist Party, a manufacturer and banker, head of the War Indus- try Committees, who was appointed Minister of War and Marine; Konovalov, member of the Progressive Party and textile mill ower, was appointed Minister of Commerce and Industry; and the millionaire sugar manufacturer Tereshchenko was appointed Minister of Finance, Of the eleven Ministers only one was a “Socialist,” the Peo- ple’s Socialist (later Socialist-Revolutionary) Kerensky, a lawyer, who received the minor post of Minister of Justice.

In his first “Letter from Afar,” Lenin described this government in the following words: “This government is not a fortuitous assem- blage of persons. They are representatives of the new class that has risen to political power in Russia, the class of capitalist landlords and bourgeoisie, the class that for a long time has been ruling our country economically. ...” (V. I. Lenin, Selected Works, Two-Vol. ed., Vol. I, Moscow, 1947, p. 739.)

The first steps the new bourgeois government took were directed towards saving the monarchy. Behind the back of the Petrograd So- viet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies, Guchkov and Shulgin went to the deposed tsar in Pskov, and in the name of the Provisional Govern- ment urged him to abdicate in favour of his son Alexei. The tsar con- sented to abdicate in favour of his brother Michael. The bourgeoisie were willing to accept even this new tsar. On his return to Petrograd Guchkov addressed a meeting of the workers in the railway workshops and after reading the manifesto announcing the abdication of Tsar Nicholas 11 he concluded with the cry: “Long live Emperor Mi- chael!” The indignant workers demanded Guchkov’s immediate arrest. “Horse-radish is no sweeter than radish,” they said.

Realizing that it was impossible to save the monarchy, the Provi- sional Government sent a deputation to Michael Romanov to request him to abdicate and transfer power to itself. On March 3, Michael Romanov signed iiis abdication, and in a manifesto to the people he called upon them to obey the Provisional Government.

The Class Nature of the Dual Power

At the very outset of the revolution a dual power arose in the country; the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, rej)resented by the Provisional Govemment; and the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, represented by the Soviets of Deputies. Both these powers existed side by side.

After victory was achieved over tsarism Soviets of Workers’ Depu- ties were set up in all the towns of Russia, even in the most remote parts of the country. Somewhat later, in the latter half of March, Soviets of Peasants’ Deputies began to spring up. At first, the Petro- grad Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies served as the all- Russian centre of the Soviets. The Soviets were virtually a second government. They controlled the armed forces of the revolution. Armed workers formed units of Red Guards. The Soviets enjoyed the undivided confidence and support of the army and of the masses of the working people. Nevertheless, the Soviets voluntarily surren- dered all state power to the bourgeoisie and its Provisional Government .

Lenin wrote the following: “The class origin and the class signifi- cance of this dual power consist in- the fact thab the Russian revolu- tion of March 1917 not only swept away the whole tsarist monarchy, not. only transferred the entire power to the bourgeoisie, but also approached very closely to the point of a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship , of the proletariat ' and peasantry. The Petrograd and the otW, the local, Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies represent precisely such a dictatorship (that is, a government power resting not on law but on the direct force of armed masses of the population), a dictatorship precisely of the above-mentioned classes” {V. I. Lenin, Selected Worlcs, Two-Vol. ed., Vol. II, Moscow, 1947, pp. 27-28).

The existence of a dual power in 1917 was due to the fact that Russia was a petty-bourgeois country. During the revolution, millions of people who had had no previous experience in politics were awak- ened to political life, and this petty-bourgeois tide swept to the political forefront the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary parties which entered into a compromise with the bourgeoisie.

As a class, the bourgeoisie was better organized than the workers and peasants, who had not had the same legal opportunities to organize as the bourgeoisie had enjoyed. After 1906, and particularly during the war, the capitalist class was able to build up for itself the machinery of its future power, and it easily set this machinery in motion at the time of the revolution.

During the war the petty-bourgeois stratum of the proletariat also gained in strength as a consequence of the fact that numerous small property owners, handicraftsmen, shopkeepers and kulaks had poured into the factorit-s in order to escape military service. It was this petty-bourgeois stratum of the workers, together with the small “labour aristocracy,” that served as the main prop of the Mensheviks and the Sooialist-E.evolutionaries.

The politically mature and most class-conscious section of the proletariat belonged to the Bolshevik Party; but during the war most of these were either in prison, in exile, or at the front.

The vast masses of the workers, soldiers and peasants, formerly downtrodden by tsarism, betrayed naive confidence in the Provisional Government, which, they believed, had been created by the revolu- tion, and in the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks, who were the worst enemies of peace and Socialism.

The Great October Socialist Revolution

Military Intervention. The Civil War

The Transition to the Peaceful Work of Economic Restoration

U.S.S.R.—Land of Socialism