Library:A History of the U.S.S.R./Part 3/Pre-revolution

The First Bourgeois-Democratic Revolution

The Eve of the Revolution

Russia's Transition to Imperialism

Tsarist Russia in the System of World Imperialism

By the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centurj', the development of capitalism had finally brought it to its highest and last stage, that of imperialism.

Under imperialism the concentration of lirodnction achieves its utmost development. Almost the entire industry of a given countrt^ is concentrated in a small number of gigantic enterprises. Individual capitalists and cajDitalist combines enter into agreement with each other to eliminate free competition, which is thus superseded by the rule of the monopolies. Lenin defined imperialism as monopolist capi- talism.

At the same time an intense centralization of capital takes place. A considerable part of the free capital of a country is concentrated in a few banks which, from humble intermediaries in the exchange process become transformed into all-powerful monopolies. The banks utilize their enormous capital for the purpose of promoting the development of industry. Bank capital merges with industrial capital. Lenin called this new form of capital, which by the beginning of the twentieth century became dominant in all the biggest capitalist coimtries, finance capital.

Under imperialism the struggle for markets leads to an acceleration of the export of capital to backward countries, colonies and semi-colo- nies. The capitalists strive to monopolize the sources of raw materials. This inevitably gives rise to a struggle for the redivision of the world, to a struggle for new territories . Comrade Stalin has defined this most impor- tant feature of imperialism in the following terms: “Imperialism is the export of capital to the sources of raw material, the frenzied struggle for monopolist possession of these sources, the struggle for a redivision of the already divided world, a struggle waged with particular fury bynew financial groups and Powers seeking a ‘place in ilic K\in’ against the old groups and Powers which cling tightly to what they Iiavo grasped” (J. Stalin, Problems of Leninism ^ Moscow, 1945, p, 15).

Imperialism intensifies all the contradictions of capitalism to the utmost degree; those contradictions can bo solved only by the proletarian revolution. Under imperialism the contradictious be- tween capital and labour become extremely intensified. The exploita- tion of the working class assumes such a character that it realizes that the only way out is to overthrow the rule of the imperialists.

The contradictions between the various financial groui)s aiui imperialist Powers also become so acute as to lead to armed con- flicts — imperialist wars. The contradictions between ruling nations and colonial and dependent peoples also become intensified to the utmost'. The inhuman oppression of the inhabitants of colonial and depen- dent countries compel these vast enslaved masses to fight for their independence and freedom.

The process of formation of the imperialist system was completed all over the world by the beginning of the 1900'a.

In Russia, too, capitalism dcvolo 3 )ed into imperialism, but in Russia imperialism boro numerous distinctive features, Lenin and Stalin called it militarist-feudal imperialism. Mililarisi-feudal impe- rialism bears all the characteristics of the imperialist system: in- tense concentration of production, formation of mono])olioB, export, of capital, the merging of bank capital with industrial capital, struggle for the division and rodivision of the world, and the extreme intensi- fication of class contradictions. Thus, militarist-feudal imperialism in Russia was, above all, imperialism, a part of the world imperial- ist system.

The distinctive feature of imperialism in tsarist Russia was that Russian imperialism was enmeshed in a close not of feudal survivals. Remnants of feudal relationships survived in both industry and in agriculture and influenced the development of the various classes in society as well as the entire system of society and of stale in twen- tieth century Russia.

Besides capitalist methods of exploitation, militarist and feudal methods wore employed in tsarist Russia. The country was ruled by the representatives of the big feudal landowners. Owing to the restrict- ed nature of the home market, the Russian landlords and capitalists strove to conquer foreign markets, and with this object they seized the best lands in the border regions of Russia and plundered the native inhab tants.

In describing the nature of militarist-feudal imperialism in Russia, Comrade Stalin wrote: "To begin with, tsarist Russia was the of every kind of oppression — capitalist, colonial and militarist — in its most inhuman and barbarous form. Who does not know that in Russia the omnipotence of capital coalesced with the despotism of tsarisiUa the aggressiveness of Russian nationalism with tsarism’s role of executioner in regard to the non-Russian peoples, the exploitation of entire regions — Turkey, Persia, China — ^with the seizure of these regions by tsarism, with wars of conquest? Lenin was right in saying that tsarism was ^militarist-feudal imperialism.’ Tsarism was the (ioncontration of the worst features of imperialism raised to the second power” (J. Stalin, Problems of Leninism, Moscow, 1945, pp. 16-17).

Industry in Russia was very highly concentrated, but the methods of ])roduction remained backward. As regards concentration of production, Russia, at the begiiming of the twentieth century, occupied one of the foremost places in the world. In 1900, seven huge plants in the south of Russia produced 37.6 per cent of the entire pig-iron output of the country. Five huge firms in Baku produced 42.6 per cent of the entire output of oil in Russia. Factories employing over a thousand workers (constituted 11 per cent of the total number of factories in the country, and they employed about 50 per cent of the total workers in Russia.

The high concentration of industry was facilitated by the development of banks and joint-stock companies. By the beginning of the twentieth (Century eight big banks controlled 55.7 per cent of the total bank capi- tal in Russia. The banks controlled 50 per cent of the capital invested ill the iron and stool industry, 60 per cent of that invested in the coal industry and 80 per cent of that invested in the electrical engineering industry. Bank capital merged with industrial capital.

Largo joint-stock companies occupied an important placse in the industrial life of the country. Trade, and to some extent industry, was controlled by syndicates, which began to arise in Russia at the end of the nineteenth century and were the typical form in this country of tho monopolist capitalist combine. Already at the end of the nineteenth (jentury the Sugar Syndicate compelled all the sugar manufacturers of the country to combine.

At the beginning of the twentieth century many of the Russian banks were under the control of West-European banks. In 1901, French banlrs established the Northern Bank in Russia. The Deutsche Bank, one of the largest banks in Germany, controlled the Russian Azov-Don Bank. West-European capitalists invested about a billion gold rubles in Russian industries and banks and began to concentrate in their own hands vital branches of industry, such as iron and steel, fuel, chemicals and also several branches of the transport industry.

Cheap labour power, high prices of manufactured goods in the home market and the system of subsidies and protection introduced by thci government ensured huge profits for both Russian and foreign capital, in the period from 1895 to 1904 foreign firms drew profits from Russia tio tho amount of over 830,000,000 gold rubles, a sum exceeding the capital they iuv^cfcifcecl during that decade. Kruiu iorcign linanciers, mainly French, the tHarist government obtained what for that tim<^ wore huge loans. In lOOJl tsarist Russia’s foreign debt stood at tlu? enormous sum of 3,000,000,000 gold rubles. Ink*, rest alone on thest* loans amounted to 130,000,000 gold rubles per annum, and this im- posed a heavy burden upon the working ])0ople of tlie cH)mitry. As a. result of the intense inlliix of foreign capital into llussia, llussjan tsarism and Russian capitalism became (l(*])cndeut upon West-Muro- ]}ean hnper ialism .

The Russian and foreign ca])italivsts, aided and supported by tsarist authorities, sid)jected the workers of Russia to monstrous ex 2 )loitation.

The Industrial Crisis at the Beginning of the 1900's

TiiC' economic crisi^which broke out in Western Europe at tlic cud of tht^ nineteenth and iDeginning of the twentieth century very soon spread to Russia, The influx of foreign capital sharply diminished. Owing to the poverty of the mfcses of the peasantry and tlie low wages earned by the workens, the purchasing power of tlie po])ulation w'as low. This aggravated the crisis. Production diminished c uis'dorably, ])arb]e.nlarly in the iron and steel and fuel industries: in 1002, the output of ■|)ig iron, for example, dropped 16 ])er cent below that of J00().Th<% crisis mosi- <lisasfcrously alTcetod.the more highly capital istieally-tlovoloped regions (the Douetz Basin and others), where as many as 3,000 plants were closed down. Railway construction greatly dim'inislied. Thtis, from 1805 bo 1900, ever 3,000 versts of railwa^'^ line were laid down annually, whereas in 1903 only 453 versts were laid down.

Only the largest entet'iJrises were able to sxirvive* thes t‘r.isis. During this period huge capitalist monopolies were formed in Russia under tlu^ control of foreign finance capital. In 1902 the Prodam ot was formed. This was a huge syndicate for tlio sale of the products of the iron and steel industry which controlled 80 per cent of the entire iron and steel industry of Russia. In the oil industry there were two iaonoj)olist* groups — Nobel Brothers and Rothschild. In this ]xeriod too a sewing- cotton syndicate wasfoimccl, consisting of only two firms which mouoj)- olized the Russian sewing-cotton market. Jn 1004 the Prodvagon Syn- dicate was formed which monopolized nearly the entire sale of railway cars in Russia.

Taking advantage of the droj) of share ]}ric;os during the (Jrisis, foreign banks bought up the shares of Russian enterprises and banks and thus became the owners of these enteiprises. This still further increased the clependeucc of Russian capitalism ui)on West- European imperialism.

During the j)oriod of the crisis the number of factory workers great- ly diminished. At some of the plants in the 'Donotz Basin more than half of the workers were discharged. This increase in unemploymont led to a worsening of the conditions of labour. The employers took advantage of the crisis to rob the workers of tlio gains they had won during the industrial boom. Every wliore piece rates were cut and the working day lengthened. Adult workers were rc])laccd by youths and children who received only a half, or a third, of the pay which adults had re- ceived. The steady influx into the towns of starving peasants who const’tutod cheap labour-power also served to woi^seil the conditions of the workers.

The Beginning of the Mass Political Struggle in Russia

The Political Awakening of the Working Class and the Part Played by Iskra

The crisis hastened the political awakening of the working class. Their want and lack of riglits, the unbridled tyranny of the employers, who always received the support of the police, and the oppression to which they were subjected by the tsarist autliorities set the workers thinking about the causes of their hard conditions and compelled them to seek a way out. Tlianks to the propaganda carried among them by the revolutionary Social-Democrats, they began to understand that tlie worst enemy of the 3iooplo was the autocracy, which supported and encouraged the oruolost exploitation of the work- ers by the capitalists. An enormous part in the political odneation of the working class and in the organization of its struggle against the autocracy was played by the all-llussian Sooial-Domoeratic newspa- per Ishra, which was founded by Lenin.

Lenin, while still in exile in Siberia, drew up a plan for the publication of a proletarian newspaper which was to help in building up a revolutionary Social-Democratic party, for without such a party the prole- tariat could not fight for its emancipation.

Emphasizing the important part a newspaper could play in the work of organizing a party,

Lenin, in an article entitled ‘‘Where to< Begin?” wrote: ‘‘A paper is not merely a collective propagandist and collective agi- tator, it is also a collective organizer” (V. I. Lenin, Select- ed Works, VoL II, Moscow,

1934, p. 21).

The newspaper was ceaselessly to expose the crimes of tsarism and the treachery of the liberals.

It was impossible, however, to publish such a newspaper in tsarist B/Ussia. Lenin therefore decided to publish the paper abroad, where, at that time, conditions were more favourable for conducting revolu- tionary activities. The first issue of Iskra appeared in December 1900. On its title page it bore the motto “The spark will kindle a flame, words taken from the reply which the Decembrists in exile made to Pushkin’s appeal to continue the struggle. This motto was Iskra^s pledge to carry to the end the revolutionary struggle that had been initiated by preceding generations.

Lenin edited Iskra in conjunction with Plekhanov and other Social- Democrats. It was printed on tissue paper, smuggled into Russia, and there distributed among the advanced workers. Workers caught read- ing Iskra were liable to imprisonment and exile, but this did not daunt the class-conscious workers. They became extremely devoted to Iskra, which they regarded as their guide in their political struggle. They impatiently awaited the appearance of every new issue of the paper, and when they received it they read and re-road it until it was literally worn to tatters. A weaver from St, Petersburg wrote to the paper saying: “When you read the paper you understand why the gendannes and the jx^bce are afraid of us workers and of those intollectiials whoso load we follow, • . . In the past every strike was a great event, but now everybody knows that strikes alone are nothing, that now we must win freodom by fighting for it” (Iskra No. 7).

Workers in different towns acted as J,s'7cm’.v corrospondonts. Among these wore I. V, Babushkin and other advanced workers whom Lenin had trained in Social-Democratic study circles in the 1890 ’s. In tlio beginning of 1901, copies of the first issue of Loniu’s lakra reached Tifiis (now Tbilisi). On Comrade Stalin’s proposal tho Tillis Committee of the Social-Democratic Party announced its solidarity with the policy of Iskra. In September 1901 tho first issue of an illegal Georgian newspaper entitled Brdzola {The Sfrvggle)^ edited by Comrade Stalin, appeared. This newspaper was printed in an underground printing plant that was set up in Baku by a colleague of Comrade Stalin, Lado Ketskhoveli. Brdzola was the best Iskra-ist newspaper in Russia. Pur- suing the political line advocated by Lenin’s Iskra, it undeviatiiigly fought for the unity of the working-class movement of Georgia with that of the whole of Russia.

After tho Tifiis Committoo had declared its solidarity with Iskra, other Social-Democratic Oomniittccs in Russia did tho same.

The First Political Demonstrations in 1900 and 1901

As a result of tho industrial crisis and thei)ropaganda (jouductod by tho revo- lutionary Sooial-Domoorats, tho mass working-class movoinont took another step forward and i)assod from economic strikes to political strikes and demonstrations.

The first to como into tho vStroots with rod Hags and the slogan ^"Down with the autocracy!” were tho workers and students of Kharkov. This demonstration occurred on May Day 1900 and created a profound impression upon the workers all over Russia. In August 1900, after a strike of the workers employed in tho Tifiis railway workshops, Com- rade Stalin issued a leaflet calling upon the workers to commenco an open revolutionary struggle. Tho first open revolutionary demonstra- tion of the Tillis workers was organized by Comrade Stalin in April 1901, and about 2.000 workers took part in it.

In 1901, May Day demonstrations and strikes took i)laoo all over the country. Of exceptional importance were tho events that occurred at the State Obukhov Munitions Plant, near St. Petersburg (now tho Bol- shevik Works), which have gone into history as the “Obukhov dofonco.”

On May 1,’ 1901, as a result of the propaganda conducted by the Social-Democrats, of the 6,000 workers employed at tho Obukhov Works, 1,200 stayed away from work. The management dis- charged the most advanced and active workers at tlio ])laixt. This gave xiso to a protest strike which commenced on May 7. Tho workers dc^- mauded the roinstatomont of tho discharged worktu's and tho dismissal of a number of foremen whom they detested. In answer to tins demand the assistant manager said with a couteini)tuous sneer: “Next thing, perhaps, yon will demand the discharge of the Cabinet Ministers!” “Not only the ministers, but also the tsar!” retorted the workers. Police and troops were called out against the strikers. To bar their way the workers oroctod barricades, and when the soldiers arrived they wore greeted with a hail of stones, logs of wood and chunks of iron. The police and tho troops could not take tlio workers’ living quarters exce])t by storm. An active part in tho defence was played by women, Tlie workers in neighbouring plants joined the strikers. The liglit lasted throe hours. The troops occupied all the streets and side streets adjacent to the fi^oto^y. Eight hundred workers wore arrested, of whom thirty-seven were put on trial. At the trial, the workers delivered vehement speeches denouncing .the autocracy. Several of them wore condemned to penal servitudck^d to terms of imprisonment; tho rest wore deported from the capital. These sentences evoked protests from workers all over Russia.

Appraising the “Obukhov defence” as a new form of the mass pro- letarian struggle, Lonin wrote: “Street fighting is possible, it is not the position of tho fighters but the position of tho government thfit is hopeless if it has to deal with larger numbers than those employed in a single factory” {V. I. Lenin, Golhoied Work^, Vol. IV, Book I, Now York, 1020, p. 121).

Political Strikes and Demonstrations in 1902 and 1903

The mass working-class movement to an incroasiiig dogroo assumed a po- litical character. In Transcaucasia tho political struggle of tho workers was led by Comrade Stalin. On tlio iiistrucjtions of the Tiflis Committees he went to Batmn (now Batumi), and taking up his quarters in thc» working-class suburbs ho conducted revolutionary activities among the Batum workers.

In Batnm, Comrade Stalin organized eleven study circles and formed a Social-Domncratic organization in that town. On tho night of December 31, 1901, in tho guise of a Now Year’s Eve party, tho first Social-Democratic Conference was hold in Batum; at this coniorono(? the Batum Committee of tho Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party was elected.

In January 1902 Comrade Stalin organized and led the first strikes at the Batum oil plants. In tho beginning of March 1902 a fire broke out in the storehouse of the Rothschild plant. The workers spent two days and nights extinguishing tho fire, but tho management refused to pay the workers for this time. Tho workers threatened to go on strike and the management yielded. Encouraged by this victory, the work- ers in other plants went on strike in support of economic demands. On tho night of March 7, tho police arrested thirty-two strikers. On March 9 a workers’ demonstratioix was hold in response to Comrade Stalin’s appeal. Tho workers marched in columns to the doT)ortatioa centre whore the arrested strikers were detained, and demanded, their roloaso, Soldiers, their rifles at the ready, barred the way of the demonstrators.

Comrade Stalin delivered an impassioned spooelx to the workers call- ing upon them to resist. Just thou volleys of rifle firo rang out; fifteen men wore killed and fifty-four wore wounded. The funeral of the vic- tims of this massacre that was hold next day developed into an immense political demonstration against tsarism. The j)C)lic(i arrested 450 work- ers and made intense efforts to find Copirado Stalin, but the workers concealed him in their homos. As ho moved from one worker *s homo to another, the press used for the printing of passion- ate appeals to the Batum workers anti to tho Ajar ])easants was re- moved also. From time to time ho arranged mootings in the cemetery, the watchman of which S3unpathized with tho working-class move- ment. Soon, however, it became impossible for Comrade Stalin to hide in Batum any longer and so, taking his printing press with him, he moved to. the village of-MalAmudia, near Batum, where an old Abkhazian peasant named Hasliim concealed him in his garret. Old Hashim was inspired with profound respect for tho young revolutionary and began to help him. Every day ho would take a large basket filled with vegetables and fruit, under which wore concealed pamphlets and leaflets, and taking up his stand at the factory gates to sell his produce he would wrap tho vegetables and fruit in those loalh^ts and hand them to workers whom ho know. Those, in turn, gave thorn a wide circulation. The m^^^sterious activities that wont on in Hashim ’s house attracted the attention of neighbouring peasants and one day they came to Comrade Stalin and asked him what ho was doing. Comrade Stalin answered: “I print leaflets in which I describe what hard lives you arc loading and how tho trouble can bo mended.” “That’s fine,” said the old peasants. “What you are doing is for our good. , . . Until today Hashim alone hid you . . . now wo shall all hide you and your work to the host of our power and ability.”

Nevertheless, in Aju’il 1002, tho police managed to discover Com- rade Stalin’s hiding place and arrested him. In November 1903 he was exiled to tho village of Novaya Uda, in tho Irkutsk Gubernia; but^two months later ho escaped from there and returned to Tiflis to resume his revolutionary activities.

/. j The political struggle of the proletariat in 1902 and 1903 assumed ^vide dimensions in other towns of Eussia too. In May 1902, a demon- stration was held in Sormovo, near Nizhni Novgorod (now called Gorky) . The demonstrators were arrested and tried. At the trial tho banner- bearer, a worker named Zalomov, delivered a passionate speech in which he described the conditions of tho workers and called upon them to wage a struggle against tho autocracy. Subsequently, this speech was illegally printed and distributed. The Sormovo demonstration is described in Maxim Gorky’s novel in which Zalomov figuros^

under the name of Pavel.

An important factor in the political education of the work- ing class was the railway strike in Rostov-on-Don in 1902, which developed into the first general strike in Russia. The workers of nearly all the trades and fac- tories in the city were involved. The conditions of the workers in the Central Workshops of the Vladikavkaz Railway were extremely hard. All the workers, even those who had worked there for over twenty years, were regard- ed as day workers, and according to the tsarist laws they could be discharged at any moment without notice. The payment of wages, low though they were, was systematically delayed. In the beginning of November 1902, the 4,000 workers put forward demands, drawn up for them by the Don Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., for a 9-hour day and a 30 per cent increase in wages.

The management rejected the cla m and the workers went on strike. The workers of other factories in Rostov joined the strike and about 30,000 were involved. The Don Party Committee organized meetings in a ravine outside the city at which Social-Democratic orators spoke and read out Social-Democratic leaflets. For the first time in the his-

tory of Russia the views of the Social-Democrats on the tasks of the working class wore openly proclaimed at public meetings. The workers displayed fine staunchness and solidarity. At one meeting a Colonel of Gendarmes appeared and ordered the workers to disperse. The speaker who was addressing the meeting asked: '“'Shall we obey this order?” “No, we shall not!” came the loud and unanimous reply, “In that case remain where you are and let us continue our talk,” said the speaker. Meetings continued to be held. The authorities were dis- concerted by the organized resistance of the workers and called out the Cossacks from the near-by villages. But when the Cossacks attempted to disperse the meetings the assembled workers and their wives and children lay ilat on the ground. The horses would not step upon the prostrate people and the Cossacks were obliged to retire.

Several days later soldiers fired upon a crowd assembled at a meet- ing and killed and wounded several workers. So incensed were the workers by this outrage that they turuod the funeral of the victims into a revolutionary domoiisiTation. Only after mustering troops from neighbouring towns did tho authorities succeed in suppressing the strike. The police arrested many of the advanced workers and deported them from Rostov.

Tho Rostov strike, which developed into a political demonstration, was an extromoly important fiictor in stimulating tho class conscious- ness of the workers. As Lenin wrote: “For tho iirst time tho proletariat is standing up as a class against all the other classes and tho tsarist government” (V. Gollecdcd VoL VII, Moscow, 1937,

Russ, ed., pp. 105-106).

The workers were 1 aught by their own oxporionco tliat an armed struggle against tsarism was necessary.

They were led to this conclusion also by tho general strikes in Transcaucasia and in the Uluraino, in tho summer of 1903. At tho end of May 1903, a strike broko out among tho oil workers in Baku, The workers in the engineering shops and railway depots joined the strike. In June, 45,000 workers wore involved in tho strike, now a general strike. Even the bakers, bootmakers and tailors went on strike; shops wore closed and no newspapers ap- peared. Tho workers demanded an B-hour day and an increase in wages. The strikes wore led by tho Baku Social-Domocjratio Committee. Meetings wore held at which political speeches wore deliv- ered and revolutionary leaflets wore distributed. As there wore few troops in Baku, tho employers resorted to a manoeuvre and protended to accede to tho workers’ demands; but as soon as more troops arrived they withdrew their concession. TIxo Caucasian Party Committee called upon the workers of Tiflis and of other towns to back the de- mands of the Baku workers by moans of a solidarity strike. On July 14, a general strike broke out in Till is which lasted ton days. Soon this strike spread to all tho industrial centres in Transcaucasia and over 100,000 workers were involved. In a number of places the workers came into collision with the Cossacks and the police. At Mildiailovo (now Stalinisi) the workers tried to stop a train but wore shot down by the soldiers who wero guarding tho railway. This massacre resulted in the outbreak of new protest strikes.

The general strike spread to the XJl?:raino — to Odessa, Kiev and Ekaterinoslav (now Dniep^’opetrovsk). Noting the characteristic features of this general strike of 1903, Lenin wrote: “The strikes aifoot an entire area^ over 100,000 workers are involved, mass political meet- ings are repeatedly held during strikes in a number of towns. One feels that we are on the eve of barricades, . . (V. I. Lenin, Coh

leoted Works^ Vol. VII, Moscow, 1937, Russ, od., p. 106.)

The working-class movement rousod other strata of tho popula- tion, From 1899 onwards, student unrest and strikes wore an annual occurrence, and at their meetings the students put forth political demands. Bogolepov, the Minister of Education, issued ‘Temporary Regulations” ordering that students who were involved in this unrest be conscripted for the army. Notwithstanding the repressive measures taken against them, the student movement grew. In 1901, following the example of the workers, the students and radical intelligentsia in St. Petersburg held a demonstration near the Kazafi Cathedral. The demonstrators were brutally assaulted by the police. In 1901-1902 a general students’ strike affected all higher educational establishments and 30,000 students were involved.

The Zubatov Stratagem

The tsarist government realized that it could not cope with the working class by means of repressive meas- ures alone. Scared by the steady growth of the revolutionary working- class struggle it tried to check the mass working-class movement with the aid of police-formed workers’ organizations. Playing upon the economic needs of the workers, agents of Zubatov, the Chief of the Moscow Secret Police, called meetings of the more backward sections of them and told them that the tsar would support their peaceful eco- nomic demands if they refrained from organizing strikes and took no part in political struggle.

Zubatov societies were formed in Moscow, Minsk and Odessa. In Mos- cow Zubatov ’s agents succeeded, on February 19 , 1902, the anniversary of the abortion of serfdom, in organizing a monarchist demonstration of workers to the monument of Alexander II. Soon, however, this insid- ious movement utterly collapsed. The revolutionary Social-Democrats, followers of Lenin, exposed the fact that the police were behind the Zubatov organizations. In spite of the opposition of Zubatov ’s agents, the workers backed their economic demands by strikes. Fearing that he would lose his influence over the workers, Zubatov sent police offi- cials to the factory owners and compelled them to make concessions to the workers. This roused the ire of the Moscow factory owners and they protested against Zubatov ’s activities. One of them, a Frenchman named Goujon, complained to the French Ambassador that Zubatov was supporting a strike at his plant. The ambassador communicated this complaint to the Russian government and soon after the Zubatov ' organizations in Moscow were dissolved.

The failure of the Zubatov stratagem as an attempt on the part of the government to “harmonize” the economic needs and demands of the workers with the “aims of the Russian autocracy" was most vividly revealed by the general strike in Odessa in 1903. Here an economic strilco which had been organized with the help of Zubatov agents devel- oped into a political strike. Even the most backward workers became convinced that the Zubatov organizations wore a police affair and began to go ovor to the side of Social-Democracy. Plehve, the Minister of the Interior, made haste to dissolve these organizations. The chief reason for the failure of tlio Ziibatov organizations, however, was tho growth of tho working-class movement, which was not to bo checked by means of a barrier like tho Zubatov stratagem.

The Peasant Movement in 1902, The revolutionary struggle waged by the workers aifocted tho peasantry, among whom discontent continued to grow. Tlio chief reason Ibr this discontent was that when they wore “liberated” in 18()1 the landlords do])rivod them of the best parts of tho land which they had cull/ivatod. Hence, tho ]ioasants were obliged to rent land from the landlords, mak ng iiayment in tho shaj)© of work on tho landlord’s estate or of half tho crop raised on tho land rented. Tho huge estates of tho landlords — ^tho latifundia — continued bo hinder tho dovolopment of peasant farming. As Lenin wrote: . .The sum and substance of tho matter is that at one pole

of Russian agriculture we have 10,500,000 households (about 50,000,000 inhabitants) with 75,000,000 desyatins of land and at the other polo we have thirty thousand families (about 150,000 inliabitants) with 70,000,000 desyatins of land” (V. I. Lenin, Golkcied Works, Yol. XII, Moscow, 1937, Russ, od., p. 224).

Thus, on the average, one peasant family had se\'en desyatins of land whereas the latifundia of a single squire amounted to 2,333 desyatins, i, e., 333 times as much. Tho old serf form of (^xjdoitation crushed and ruined tho peasants. After tho frightful famine of 1801-1802 the peasants, up to 1900, experienced another three famine years and two that were almost such. In the autumn and winter of 1001-1002 there was another famine , The kulaks took advantage of fcho liard straits of the peasantry to got tho poorer section of them into their clutches. In this way nearly hah' tho area of peasant lands, passed into their hands.

Owing to the growth of the peasant poxmlati on, the average peas- ant allotment by the beginning of tho twentieth century was only half the size it had boon in tho past. Tho land hunger of the ]ioasants increased and obliged them to rent land from the landlords and kulaks at exorbitant rents. In some places the rent oxcood- ed the income that could bo derived from tho land because, while rents, rose, income from the land dropped, particularly in bad harvest years.

The impoverishment of the bulk of the peasantry increased and this caused an increase in arrears in tho payment of taxes. In some counties the peasants were as much as three or four years in arrears. The ruined and impoverished peasantry began to fight for tho aboli- tion of landlordism.

In the spring of 1002 considerable peasant unrest broke out in the Ukraine — in the Kharkov and Poltava (jubemias whore tho jieasants’ land hunger was particularly acute. By tho beginning of the twen- tieth century the average peasant allotment in tho I’oltava Gubornia. had shrunk to one desyatin, whereas tho landlords owned as much as 60 per cent of the entire land in the gubernia. The industrial crisis still further aggravated the poverty of the peasants as it deprived them of the opportunity of finding work in the towns. The peasants rose in revolt, raided the landlords* estates and shared their grain stocks and cattle among themselves. Landlords were killed by peasants who set fire to their farm buildings and other property.

Troops were called out against the peasants. After a wholesale flogging many of them were put on trial and sentenced to long terms of imprisonment. Pines were imposed upon them for the benefit of the landlords amounting to 800,000 rubles. Notwithstanding the stern punishment that was infl cted upon the peasants in the Ukraine, the revolutionary peasant movement spread to other gubernias and was particularly intense in the Saratov Gubernia. Here the peasants fought the landlords by setting fire to their mansions, trespassing on their land, cutting down their trees, setting fire to their crops, and so forth. Peasant riots also broke out in the Tambov, Voronezh and Ekaterinoslav Gubernias, and also in the Caucasus.

In 1903 the peasant movement assumed an exceptionally mass and militant character in Guria where, influenced by the Transcaucasian Bolsheviks, it assumed a political character. The peasants refused to de- liver half their crops to the landlords, refused to pay the tithes for the maintenance of the clergy, refused to pay taxes, would not recog- nize the tsar*s officials and refused in a body to perform labour rent. To assist the Transcaucasian landlords the tsarist government sent in Cossacks who dealt cruelly with the peasants; it also deport- ed many of the peasants to Siberia -

Taken on the whole, however, the peasant revolt of 1902 did not yet assume the character of an organized mass movement. Lenin attrib- uted this failure to the following reasons: "The peasant revolt was crushed because it was a revolt of an ignorant, unconscious mass, a re- volt without definite and clear 'political demands, i. c., without de- mands for a change in the system of state. The peasant revolt was crushed because it took place withoiU 'preparation. The peasant revolt was crushed because the rural proletarians had not yet formed an alliance with the urban proletarians. These are the three rea- sons for the first failure of the peasants’’ (V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. V, Moscow, 1937, Russ, ed., p. 312).

Lenin dealt with the conditions of the peasants in Russia in his pamphlet To the Rural Poor in which he called upon the peasants to wage a determined struggle under the leadership of the workers against the tsar and the landlords.

The Struggle to Create a Revolutionary Proletarian Party

Preparations for the Formation of a Party of a New Type

In the epoch of iniporialiKin tho utter incapability of tho old Social-Democratic parties of Western Europe to organize tlio workers for a revolutionary struggle for tho proletarian revolution was clearly re- vealed. Hence, Lenin anjl his supporters launchod a struggle for tho formation of a party of a now typo.

As Comrade Stalin wrote subsequently, the conditions prevailing under imperialism reveal ‘^tho necessity for a new party, a militant party, a revolutionary party, one bold enough to load the proletar- ians in the struggle for power, sullicdontly oxporioncod to find its bearings amidst the complex conditions of the revolutionary situation and sufficiently flexible to steer clear of all submerged rocks in the path to its goal” (J. Stalin, Problems of Laninim,, Moscow, 1945, p. 81).

The new party that Lenin and Stalin and tlieir closest colleagues built up was armed with the weaj)on of Marxism-Loniiiism— tho most advanced revolutionary theory extant.

The most important task that confronted Lenin ’s Ishra was to draw up a program around which the Party was to unite. This ])rogram indicated first and foremost tlie ultimate aim of tlio proletarian class Struggle- Socialism. This was tho maximum program. It also formulated tho demands for which tho proletariat fought while on tho road to tlio ultimate goal. This was the minimum program.

Lenin unfolded his plan for building a party of a now typo in What Is To Be Done? In this work of genius he urged that tho nucleus of tho Party should consist of professional revolutionaries for whom Party work would be their main profession. Ajnidst the conditions prevailing under tsarism, theParty could not bo other than a strictly secret organization, but at the same time it must not isolate itself from the working class, of which it was the vanguard. The members of the Party must be united ideologically and organizationally; they must be united in their advocacy of Marxian theory, uphold the pro- gram and tactics of tho Party, take an active part in the work of the Party organization and maintain Party discipline. Lenin pointed out that the task of the Marxist party was to combine Socialism with tho working-class movement. Only by disseminating tho great teachings of Marx among the working class, urged Lenin and Stalin, could the Party infuse socialist consciousness into tho spontaneous working-class movement and make the proletariat understand its world historic mission to build the new socialist society.

The Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.

Mm rallied around itself a compact organization of professional revolutionaries led by Lenin and Stalin. Among Iskra^s agents, as the supporters of Lenin were then called, were N. E. Bauman and I. V. Babushkin. After winning the support of the majority of the Social-Democratic Committees in B.ussia, the Ishra organization set to work to prepare the Second Congress of the Party. This congress took place abroad in July and August 1903, (in Brussels, and later in London).

The congress adopted the Party program as presented by Ishra. The opportunists at the congress opposed this program, in particu- lar, the demand for the dictatorship of the proletariat. But Lenin answered them with crushing efiect. The sharpest disagreements at the congress arose over the formulation of point 1 of the Party Rules. Lenin’s formulation of point 1 read as follows: “A member of the Party is one who accepts its program, and supports it both financially and by his personal participation in the work of one of its organizations.” The formulation proposed by the opportunist Martov called merely for the acceptance of the program and the rendering of financial support, but did not make it obligatory to participate in the work of one of the Party organizations. Unlike Lenin’s formulation, the one proposed by Martov opened the door of the Party to unstable non-proletarian elements. With the object of preventing the Party from being swamped by petty-bourgeois elements the Leninists made strict demands on those who wished to join the Party.

In appraising the essence of that struggle Comrade Stalin wrote: ^'By their formula on Party membership the Bolsheviks wanted to set up an organizational barrier against the influx of non-prole- tarian elements into the Party. The danger of such an influx was very real at that time in view of the bourgeois-democratic character of the Russian revolution” (J. Stalin, Problems of Leninism ^ Moscow, 1946, p. 381).

The Leninists stood for a militant revolutionary proletarian party; the Martovites stood for a petty-bourgeois opportunist party.

At the elections of the central bodies of the Party, Lenin’s support- ers obtained a majority and from that time onwards were called Bolsheviks. The opportunist Martovites were left in the minority and were thenceforth called Mensheviks,* The Mensheviks, who took the place of the Economists, reflected the interests of the non-proletarian,

. petty-bourgeois strata of society.

The Second Congress of the Party played an extremely important role in the history of the Russian and international proletariat. At this congress was formed the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (R.S.D.L.P.)j revolutionary party of the working class in our country.

To combat tho efforts of tlie Menshevilcs to turn the Party back to the old road of amateur and study-circle methods, Lenin wrote that splendid book Om Step Forward, Two Steps Back, in which, for the &st time in tho history of Marxism, ho expounded tho doctrine that the Marxist party is the proletariat's chief weapon in its struggle for the proletarian revolution.

Tsarism and the Bourgeoisie on the Eve of the Revolution

The Bourgeois Liberal Opposition

Tho mass movement of the proletariat and the peasantry in the beginning of the twentieth century helped to rouse the bourgeois liberals and the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia to political activity.

The stronghold of the liberal landlords wore the Zemstvo achninis- trations which dealt with the local affairs of the rural population. The Zemstvo liberal landlords wore, connootod with tho liberal bour- geoisie and were almost merged with them, for they themselves wore beginning to introduce capitalist methods in agriculturo. Political groups of tho liberal bourgooisio arosc^ and in tho Hummer of 1903 those groups united to form tho lioague of KmancipaLion, which claimed as its object tho ostablishinent of a constitutional monarchy in RmsHia. They accused tho workers and peasants who wore fighting for thoir economic and political emancipation;, of displaying “class egoism,” and they attributed the poverty of tho peasants and the agrarian move- ment to the “ignorance of tho peasants,” Tho bourgeois liberals were hostile to revolution and wanted to achieve tho constitutional mon- archy by peaceful moans.

In the columns of Iskra Lenin constantly denounced tho treachery and cowardice of the bourgeois-liberal opposition.

As a result of the peasant movement, Narodnilc organizations began to spring up again among a section of the potty-bourgoois intelli- gentsia. In 1902 these groups united to form tho Socialist-Revolution- ary Party (known for short as tho S.R.s), which revived the tactics of individual terrorism against the tsar's ministers. In April 1902 tho Minister of the Interior Sipyagin was assassinated. His place was taken by the arch reactionary Plehvo, who for many years liad been at the head of tho secret political police. Tho terrorist tactics of tho Socialist-Revo- lutionaries caused enormous harm to the revolutionary movement, par- ticularly in view of the development of the mass struggle. The terrorist section of tho Socialist-Revolutionary Party was hoailod by Azof, who was subsequently proved to bo an agent provocatenr. Ho direotod tho ■ entire terroristic activities of tho Socialist-Revolutionary Party under the instructions and in the interest of the tsarist secret police and betrayed the participants in projected acts of terrorism to the gendarmes.

The Socialist-Revolutionary Party claimed to be a socialist party and to champion the interests of the “working people” as a whole, drawing no distinction between the peasant poor and the kulaks. Actually, the Socialist-Revolutionaries were not socialists at all, but represented the Left wing of the bourgeois democrats. The 'bour- geois liberals secretly supported and financed the terrorist activities of the Socialist-Revolutionaries.

In 1902, Lenin wrote that the Socialist-Revolutionary Party was a party of .“revolutionary adventurism” that stood apart from the working-class movement. He also said that “without the working people bombs are utterly useless.” The Socialist-Revolutionaries picked out and adhered to everything that was fallacious in the theory and practice of the former Narodniks.

The Second Congress of the. Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party adopted a 'resolution on the Socialist-Revolutionaries which stated that it “regards their activities as harmful not only to the polit- ical development of the proletariat but also to the general democratic struggle against absolutism.”

Tsarism in the Struggle against the Movement for National Liberation

Influenced by the development of capitalism and the pro- letarian class struggle at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century, the oppressed non-Russian nationalities which constituted 57 per cent of the entire population of Russia began to awaken to active political life. This awakening found expression in the formation of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois nationalist parties.

Tsarism cruelly suppressed the nascent movement for the libera- tion of the oppressed nations in Russia. Towards the begimiing of the twentieth century national oppression became still more intense: the remnants of the cultural institutions of the oppressed nationalities were destroyed, instruction in the native languages in schools was pro- hibited, and the national organizations of the non-Russian peoples were persecuted.

Characterizing the colonial policy of tsarism, Comrade Stalin wrote: “Tsarism deliberately cultivated patriarchal and feudal oppres- sion in the border regions in order to keep the masses in a state of slav- ery and ignorance. Tsarism deliberately settled the best areas in the border regions with colonizers in order to force the natives into the worst areas and to intensify national enmity. Tsarism restricted and at times simply suppressed the native schools, theatres and educational institutions in order to keep the masses in intellectual darkness. Tsar- ism frustrated the initiative of the host members of the native population. Lastly, tsarism siip])rcssod all activity on tlio part of the massoK of the border regions” (J. Stalin, Mamm avd the National and Colonial Question, Moscow, 10*40, p. 71).

In all the non-Tliissian national regions the tsarist govornmoni pursued a policy of forcible Russification. This ])o]ioy found most viv- id expression in the splicre of public education. Jn the Caiu^asus, at the end of the ninotoonth century, thoro was an average of one school for every 800 Russians, but the average for the native inliabit- ants was one for every 4,800 Georgians, one for every 5,400 Armenians and one for every 17,300 Azerbaijanians. Instriuition in clemonlary schools was conducted exclusively in Russian. Thoro wore villages in which the entire population was illiterate. Thoro wore no higher edu- cational establishments.

To crush the movement for national liberation the tsarist author- ities incited the various nationalities against each other. In Transcau- casia the tsarist police systematically fomented national strife between Armenians and Azerbaijanians. The Minister of the Interior Plohve took a direct hand in instigating bloody pogioras against the Jews. In April 1908 the police organized a frightful pogrom against the Jews in Kishinev. This crime of the tsarist clicpio evoked tlio loud protest of progressive people all over the world.

Finland was dein*ivod of her autonomy. By a law passed in I90J Finns were conscripted for the Russian anny and the Finnish national units wore abolished. Russian officials wore ap])ohitod to all ad- ministrative posts in Finland and they pursued a ])oli(‘y of Russifica- tion. In its struggle against the movement of the Finnish people for national liberation tho tsarist govornmont rtdied on the su})port of the Finnish and Swedish feudal landlords in l^'inland. The working- class movement in Finland was led by tlio Finnish Social- Democratic Party, of which the policy was similar to that of the Russian Mensheviks, and which was united in a bloc with tho Finnish bourgeoisie.

In Poland, in the middle of tho 1890’s, two nationalist parties were foimcd: a party of the bourgeoisie and nobility known as tho People’s Democratic Party ("‘Narodovtsi”) and tho petty-bourgeois Polish Socialist Party (P.P.S.). Fearing that if Poland became independent the Russian market would bo lost for Polish goods and that they would bo deprived of the support of Russian tsarism in their struggle against the workers and peasants of Poland, the "‘’Narodov- tsi” (known as ^‘Endeki”) gave xrp tho demand for indopondonce in favour of autonomy within tho Russian empire. The aim of tho Polish Socialist Party wto to establish a botirgeois Poland indopond- ent of Russia.

In Byelorussia a potty-bourgeois party knowii as tho Byelorus- sian Socialist Gromada was formed and was entirely under the iufluonoe of the' P.P.S. It demanded autonomy for Byelorussia and her amalgamation with Lithuania.

In 1897, a Social-Democratic league, known as the Bund, was formed among the Jewish artisans in Poland, Lithuania and Byelorussia. The Bund was represented at the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. and there it demanded recognition as the sole repre- sentative of all the Jewish workers in Russia, no matter where they resided. Had this nationalistic demand been conceded, it would have meant isolating the Jewish proletariat from the Russian pro- letariat and subordinating it to the influence of the Jewish bourgeoisie. The Second Congress rejected the demand and the Bund withdrew from the Party.

In 1900, thanks to the influence of the Ukrainian nationalist or- ganizations in Western Ukraine, a bourgeois nationalist party was formed in the Ukraine known as the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party (R.U,P.). This party demanded Ukrainian independence under the protectorate of Austria.

In Georgia there was a party of Georgian Mensheviks, headed by Noah Jordania, which advocated unity among all Georgians irre- spective of the class they belonged to.

All these bourgeois and petty-bourgeois nationalist parties adopted national-reformist programs, and wkile striving for increased political rights and privileges for their native landlords and bourgeoisie they fought against the workers and peasants of their respective na- tions. Only the Bolsheviks led the revolutionary mass struggle of the working people of all the oppressed nationalities in tsarist Russia and demanded the complete abolition of all national oppression. They issued the slogan of the right of nations to self- determination, including the right to secede from tsarist Russia and to form independent states.

The Bolsheviks incessantly maintained that the oppressed national- ities could achieve genuine national liberation only as the result of the overthrow of tsarism and the abolition of the power of the land- lords and cajpitalists. Hence, they called upon the working people of all the nationalities in Russia to rally round the Russian proletariat, the vanguard fighter and leader of the revolution- ary struggle of all the numerous nationalities inhabiting Russia. Lenin and Stalin denounced the efforts of the nationalist parties to turn the working people of the oppressed nationalities away from joint struggle with the entire Russian people for democracy and for Socialism.

The Russo-Japanese War and the First Russian Revolution (1904–1907)

The Russo-Japanese War

Preparations for the Russo-Japanese War

TJio dovolopmont of imperialisiu at the end of the nineteenth and tlie beginning of the twentieth century caused an extreme intonsificatiou of the struggle among the imperialist countries for a redivision of the world.

Particularly intense became the struggle for the command of the Pacific and for the partition of China, the territory of which had not yet been seized by the imperialists, A participant in this struggle was Russian tsarism, which came into conilict with Japanese imperialism in Manchuria. The beginning of the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway which would greatly strengthen Russia’s position in tlu^ Par East, prompted Japanese im])erialism to make liasto to carry out its long cherished designs of armed conquest at the expense of China.

In the Sino- Japanese War of 1804-lS!)r> China was defeated and was conipollod to sign a peace treaty whicjli obligated her to i)ay Jai)an an enormous indemnity and to code to her the whole of the south coast of Manchuria, together with Liao-tung Peninsula, including Port Arthur and Korea.

Russia, however, jointly with Germany and Prance, compelled .Japan to modify these oppressive terms and in the end Mancluiria with the Liao-tung Peninsula and Port Arthur, and also Korea remained under Chinese rule. In 1896, Witte, tho tsar’s Minister of Finances, concluded a treaty with China for tho construction of the Chi- * neso Eastern Railway, which was to run through North Manchuria to shorten tho route to Vladivostok. The construction of this railway facilitated tho seizure of Manchuria and Korea by tsarist Rus- sia. In 1898 Russia secured a lease of tho Liao-tung Peninsula, including Port Arthur, and thus secured an outlet to tho China Sea. Measures wore taken to speed up the construction of tho railway from Harbin through South Manchuria to Port Arthur.

Germany, by an agreement arrived at between Wilhelm II and Nicholas II, occupied tho port of Kiaochow, Groat Britain occupied the port of Weihaiwoi. Prance rounded off her Indo-Ohinoso posKses- sions at the expense of China. Tlio United States of America domandcKl the '‘open door” in China, that is to say, equal freedom for all the capitalist countries to exploit China.

The systematic plunder of China by tho imperialist countries gave rise, in 1900, to a mass popular revolt against tho foreign invaders. This revolt was Imown as the Boxer, or Big Fist, Rebellion. The united forces of the imperialists, including those of tsarist Rus- sia, were flung against the rebels, captured Peking and sacked the city. While crushing the rebellion, tsarist troops, on the pretext of protecting the Chinese Eastern Railway, occupied the whole of Manchuria, which the tsarist high government officials had already given the derisive nickname of “Yellow Russia.”

A group of adventurers belonging to the circle that was close to Nicholas II formed a company which obtained a timber concession on the Korean River Yalu bordering on Manchuria. This con- cession was intended to serve as a pZuce d^armes for the seizure of Korea, Port Arthur was converted into a naval fortress and base for the Russian Pacific Fleet, for the construction of which the tsarist government in 1899 allocated 90,000,000 rubles.

Meanwhile, Japan, which in 1902 concluded a military alliance with Great Britain against Russia, was actively preparing for war. Imperialist Japan strove not only to squeeze tsarist Russia out of Korea and Manchuria, but also to seize Sakhalin and the whole of the Russian Far East. British diplomacy set out to activize Russian policy in Europe and in the Near East, where the conflict between the German and Austro-Hungarian imperialists and Russia would inevitably bring about a rap]iroohoment between Russia and Great Britain against Germany. Wilhelm II, in his turn, tried hard to tempt Nicholas II with the prospect of the advantages to be gained from friend- ship with Germany, in the hope of intensifying Anglo-Russian antag- onisms and of destroying the alliance between Russia and Prance.

Among other things Russian tsarism regarded war as a means of diverting the attention of the workers and peasants of Russia from their real enemies, the landlords and capitalists. The police dictator Plehve said: “To avert a revolution in Russia we need a little victorious war.”

The Outbreak and the Course of the War

Knowing that Rus- sia was unprepared for war, Japan decided to strike a sudden blow. Spies provided the Japanese High Command with an exact plan of the disposition of the Russian warships in Port Arthur, On the night of January 26, 1904, when the entire commanding personnel of the Russian fleet were at a ball to celebrate the birthday of the wife of Admkal Stark, the Commander-in-Chief, Japanese destroy- ers, without a declaration of war, stole up under cover of darkness to the outer roadstead of Port Arthur where the Russian squadron was lying at anchor, and blew up three of the finest Russian warships; the battleships Retmzan and Cesarevich and the cruiser Pallada. In the morning of January 27 the Japanese bombarded Port Arthur from the sea and damaged four more warships. That same day a Japanese squad- ron damaged two Russian warships that were trying heroically to light their way out of the Korean port of Clio-ixiiihpo into the opoii sea. Notwithstanding the severe damage inflicted upon them, the two ships — the cruiser Varyag and tlio gunboat Koreyetz — entered into unequal combat with the Japanese squadron and perished heroically off the Korean coast. After weakening the [Russian (loot by this ti'cach- erous attack, Japan secured command of the sea.

Japan had prepared herself well for wa?*. She Kcciired for herself international syiupatliy, assistance from the U.S.A. in protecting her rear, and financial assistance from her ally, Croat Britain, German instructors helped to train the Japanese army, which was equipped with weapons of German pattern: machine guns and riilcs, field and mounted artillery, and heavy Kruj;)p siege guns.

Hostilities on land did not commence immediately on the out- break of war. Japan’s main object was to destroy the Russian fleet and gain complete command of the sea routes. She therefore tried to isolate the Vladivostok squadron from the Port Arthur squadron and to impose a complete blockade upon Port Arthur. Meanwhile, the Russian High Command slowly mustered its forc*<ns in Manchuria. The transportation of troops, arms, ammunition and pi’ovisions tens of thousands of kilometres across the Great Siberian Road was a long and difficult task. Tho railway ended at Lakc^ Baikal and men and freight had to bo shipped across in boats or ic-ebrea leers, and further on Rus- sian carts andhoims liad to struggle over the bad roads of Manchuria.

Tho army lacked mountain artillery and grenades, there was a shortage of machine guns, rifles and shells, and telegraph and tele- phone communication wore extremely ])oor.

From tho very beginning of tlio war tsarist Russia sustained defoai» after defeat. General Kuropatkin, tho Commander-in-Chiof of tlu^ Russian land forces, carried with him to tho front several carloads of small icons which he distributed among tho troops to raise their spirits, but there was a shortage of shells with which to conduot tho war. The aims of tho wav were alien to tho soldiers wlio had been transported 10,000 versts from tho heart of Russia. All this made the war extremely unpopular.

After the first battles the Russian squadron found itself shut up ill Port Arthur; the Japanese warships blockaded tho port from the sea. The other small cruiser squadron was in Vladivostok, out off from Port Arthur.

The talented Admiral Makarov was ajjpointod Oommander-iu- Chief of the Fleet in Port Arthur. The son of a sailor, his promotion was due entirely to his outstanding military capabilities. In Port Arthur he worked successfully to improve tho lighting efficiency of tho fleet with the object of engaging tho Japanese; but on March 31, 1004, as the fleet was glutting out to moot tho ommiy, his flagship, tlie battleship Pel/ito'pavlovsk, struck a mine and sank. Makarov ijorished together with 600 of the 700 men who constituted the crew. The famous Russian battle scene painter V. V. Vereshchagin, who was on board the Petropavlovsk at the time, perished too.

In April 1904, in a battle on the river Yalunear Chiu -Lien-Ch ’eng, a Russian force of 20,000 men that was barring the Japanese advance into Manchuria was defeated. In May the Japanese cut the lines of communication between Port Arthur and Manchuria and the fortress was thus invested on both land and sea. A Japanese army of 80,000 men conducted operations against Port Arthur and another army moved north into Manchuria. In August 1904 the Russian fleet that was blockaded in Port Arthur left the fortress and engaged the Japanese fleet in an endeavour to break through to Vladivostok. At first the battle went in favour of the Russians, but in the end the numerical superiority of the Japanese forces told and part of the fleet returned to Port Arthur, while those vessels which succeeded in breaking through made for neutral ports.

In Augusb 1904, a battle lasting several days was fought near Liao- Yang. The Russian troops repulsed all the furious attacks launched by the Japanese upon the main Liao- Yang positions. The Japanese command was already preparing to retreat southward when Kuropatkin,. having received false information to the effect that the Japanese were out flanking the Russian army on the left, himself ordered a retreat in spite of the fact that he still had two fresh a,Tmy corps ill reserve, whereas the Japanese had already expended all their reserves.

In September and October 1904, a second big battle took place near the river Shaho which lasted for nearly two weeks. The Rus- sian troops held their position, but this time too the Russian Command failed to take advantage of the situation to achieve victory.

Port Arthur continued its resistance for eleven months. The defence of the fortress was organized by the talented General Kondratenko, a military engineer, who was appointed chief of the land defence. On his initiative improved fortifications and blindages were erected and the manufacture of grenades and observation balloons was organ- ized on the spot. The guns and ammunition were removed from the sunken warships and utilized for the land defences, and the crews of these ships were transferred to the land. General Kondratenko appre- ciated the enormous political and military importance of Port Arthur and devoted all his skill and resourcefulness to the task of holding it. He was popular among the soldiers, roused their fighting spirit, and awarded military decorations to those who displayed heroism. General Stcssol, the Gommander-in-Chief of the fortress, how- ever, proved to bo a traitor and did all in his power to hinder the defence. On December 20, 1904, he treaclierously surrendered Port Arthur. During the period of the siege the defenders of the fortress inflicted heavy casualties upon the enemy amounting to about 130,000 killed and wounded. Considerable damage was also iu^l■i(^ted upon the Japa- nese coastal fleet by the Russian coastal artillery and mines.

In this war too the Russian soldiers and sailors displayed heroism and high fighting qualities. Characteristic of this was the case that occurred in February 1904, when the destroyer SiwgmhcM engaged four Japanese destroyers and cruisers and sank one of them* On being called upon to surrender the crow refused. When the Ja]iancso ships closed in on the vessel in order to capture it, two sailors whoso names have remained unknown, ran below and opened the valves and thus flooded the ship to prevent it falling into the hands of the enemy. A monument to the memory of these two heroes of the SieregmlicM now stands in Leningrad. Many feats of heroism wore i>orformod by the soldiers and sailors in the battles of Shalio, Liao- Yang and Mukden and during the defence of Port Aj’thur, but the blunders of the com- manders nullified the heroic efforts of the army and ileot.

Significance of the Fall of Port Arthur

The fall of Port Arthur signified the inglorious end of the war against Ja]mn, although the tsarist government still made cjfforts to continue it. Tsarist Russia had held Port Arthur for six yoai's and had s])cnt millions of rubles on its fortification, but this stronghold was capturod yitliin a few months.

The condition of the army and the situation on the various fronts wore a reflection of the general rotiouness of the tsarist regime. General Grippoiiburg, tlio commander of one of the armies, after fosing a battle, deserted the army and lied to St, Polersbuig. Other geiici*- als were concerned only with their own welfare. Gencial Stackle- berg, while at the front, thought more of his own comfort than of any- thing else. Ho had a special freight car attached to his train in which he kept a cow so that ho might have fresh cream with his morning coj’^ec . The officers of the army wore no bettor. Tho Commandcr-in-Chief Kuropatkiii wrote concerning them: ‘‘Large numbers of officers arc tired of the war, and many of them, oven those of high rank, feign sickness and try to get sent to tho roar.’’ In speaking of tlic- rank and file, Knropatkin could not help admitting that “the war is alien to them.” Embezzlement, theft and corruption were rife in tho army. The military equipment of tho tsarist anny was far inferior to that of the Japanese. Port Arthur did not even have a radio telegraph, although it had been invented by tho Russian scientist A. S. Popov as far back as 1895, A whole series of available military inventions were not employed in the tsarist army. Tho army and its rear tconu^d with Japanese spies and saboteurs. Certain Polish socialists rendered Japan direct assistance by acting as spies for her, and a similar rol<ik was played by certain members of the Finnish bourgeoisie who re- ceived financial assistance from Japan. In an article entitled ‘‘The Fall of Port Arthur” published on January 1, 1905, Lenin, summing up the military and political bank- ruptcy of tsarism, wrote: “The fleet and the fortress, the field forti- fications and the land forces proved to be obsolete and useless.

“The connection between the military organization of the country and its entire economic and cultural system has never been so close as it is at the present time” (V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. VII, Moscow, 1937, Russ, ed., p. 48).

Lenin drew the conclusion that the military defeat of Russia must become the starting point of a revolutionary crisis in the country and that the capitulation of Port Arthur was the prologue to the capitu- lation of tsarism. He directly connected the further development of the revolution with the defeat of tsarism. “The cause of Russian freedom and of the struggle of the Russian (and world) proletariat for Social- ism,” he wrote, “depends on the military defeats suffered by the autoc- racy” (V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. VII, Moscow, 1937, Russ, ed., p. 49). He called upon the revolutionary proletariat tirelessly to oppose the war. In this predatory and shameful wot, Lenin and the Bolsheviks stood for the defeat of the tsarist government, for such a defeat would facilitate the victory of the revolution over tsarism.

Comrade Stalin urged the need for the defeat of Russian tsarism in this war. In one of the leaflets he wrote against the war, he said: “We want this war to be more lamentable for the Russian autocracy than was the Crimean War. . . . Then it wras serfdom that fell, now, as a result of this war, we will bury the child of serf- dom — ^the autocracy and its foul secret police and gendarmes!” (Beria, On the History of the Bolshevik Organizations in Transcaucasia, Moscow, 1939, p. 46.)

The Revolutionary Crisis on the Eve of 1905

The Russo- Japanese War greatly aggravated the economic situation in Russia. The war called for the expenditure of enormous funds, and this expend- iture was met by foreign loans obtained on exorbitant terms and by the raising of indirect taxes. As a consequence the cost of living rose considerably. The calling up of the reserves for the army struck a heavy blow at the peasant farms, for it deprived them of man- power.

The industrial crisis became more acute, particularly in the textile industry. The capitalists cut wages. Strikes became more frequent.

The growth of the working-class movement and the defeat tsar- ism sujBFored in the Far East revived the opposition of the liberal bourgeoisie, because, for one thing, they were afraid that the govern- ment would not be able to cope with the gi^owing working-class and peasant movement. In 1904, Finnish nationalists assassinated Bobri- kov, the dictator of Finland. In July of that year Socialist-Revolu- tionaries assassinated Plehve. After its defeat in the battle of Liaoyang tlie tsarist govoruinout tried to win over to its side the moderate liberals, particularly the Zemstvo liberals, and in November 1904, it sanctioned the convocation of a Zemstvo congress. The majority at this congress ox])ressod itself in favour of the establishment of a parliament with legislative powers; the minority wanted a ])arliam(5nt with only advisory povVers. The Zemstvo liberals believed that the tsar would assemble the representatives of the Ziunstvos and town councils, who in their turn would form a })arliameut.

The Zemstvo liberals and bourgeois iiitelleetiials began l-o or- ganize banquets at which, proposing toasts drunk in eham])agno, they timidly expressed the desire to receive political rights. The Mensheviks supported these political banquets, but the Bolsheviks denounced the traitorous conduct of the liberals and the policy of compromise pursued by the Mensheviks. In a pamphlet ho wrote entitled The. Zeinsivo Campa.i(jn and the Iskra Plan, Lenin pointed out that the main task of the proletariat was not to iiid nonce the liberals, but to prepare for a decisive battle against tsarism. He called upon the workers to ann and prepare for insurrootioii.

In November and Douembor 1904, the Bolslieviks organized street demonstrations in St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kharkov and other cities under tlie slogans of ^‘Down witli the autocraty !*” 5 "\Dowu with the war!”

In that same ycuu* the Bolsheviks in TVanscaucasia developed considerable activity under Comrade Stalin’s leadcu’ship. In Decem- ber 1904, Comrade Stalin led a huge strike of the oil workers in Baku which lasted from December 13 to the end of the month and involved 8,300 workers employed in 21 plants. The Baku ])rolotarians drew up a series of demands which in the beginning of 1905 became the mili- tant program of all the revolutionary workers of Russia. At the head of this list were th(5 demands for the convocation of a Constituent Assembly and for an 8-hour working day. During the strike the workons held numerous demonstrations under the slogans: ‘‘Down with the autocracy !’% “Down with the war!”

The police tried to disrupt the strike by fomenting national strife between the Azerbaijan and Armoniaii workers, but all their efforts in this direction failed.

The Baku strike ended in a brilliant victory for the workers. For the first time in the liistory of Russia the workers compelled the capi- talists to conclude a collective agreement concerning the hiring of workers. The agreement established a 9-honr day (eight hours on the eve of holidays). “The Baku strike, ■"* wrote Comrade Stalin, “was the signal for the glorious actions in January aud February all over Russia” {History of the Communist Party of the /Soviet Union | Bol- sheviks], Short Course, Moscow, li)45, p. 50).

At the end of 1904, the government, in its dccrcn* of December 12f promised to make some slight concessions, but declared that it would not permit any changes in the autocratic state system. But tsarism was incapable of averting the revolution.

January 9, 1905—The Beginning of the Revolution

Bloody Sunday

The approach of the revolution compelled the tsarist government to seek every possible means of diverting the workers from the political struggle. One of their instruments for the achievement of this object was the priest Gapon, an agent provo- cateur, who, on the instruction of the secret police, attempted to repeat the Zubatov experiment and in 1904 formed the Assembly of Russian Factory Workers. This association organized pro- monarchist lectures, theatrical performances and concerts for workers.

On January 8, 1905, the management of the Putilov Works (now the Kirov Works) discharged four workers. Next day 12,000 of their fellow-employees came out on strike in protest against these dismissals. The workers of other plants in St. Petersburg joined the strike and on January 8 the strike became a general one, involving 150,000 workers.

To keep the workers away from the revolutionary struggle the priest Gapon put forward a treacherous plan to draw up a petition to the tsar in the name of the St. Petersburg workers and to get all the workers to march in a body to tlic Winter Palace to present it. He infoi’inocl the sc(*ret police of this plan and ibo latter approved of it. The government decided to shoot down ilio workers and to drown the growing revolutionary movcuneiit in blood.

Tho petition read as follows: “Wo, tbo workingmen of St. Peters- burg, onr wives, our ohildroii and our bolpk'ss old parents, have (jomo to Tlico, our Sovereign, to seek trtitb and ]>rotoetion. Wo are poverty-stricken, avo are o])pressed, wo are burdened with unendurable toil; wo suffer hiuuiliation and are not treated like human beings. . , . Wo have suffered in ]mtionce, but wo are being driven deeper and deeper into tho slough of poverty, lack of rights and ignorance; wo arc being strangled by despotism and tyranny, , . . Our patience is exhausted, Tho dreaded moment has arrived when we would rather die than bear these intolerable sufferings any longer ”

Then followed a series of economic and political demands for the workers, chief of which was the demand for tho convocation of a Constituent Assembly.

In the original draft of the petition there were no political demands whatever; they wore introduced on tho proposal of tbo Bolsheviks when the petition was discussed at workers’ mootings. TJie Bolsheviks urged tho workers to give up tho idea of marching in ])rocessiou to tho tsar and told them that freodoiu could not bo obtained by means of petitions, but a largo section of tho workers still believotl iii tho tsar. “Wo ’ll try. Tho tsar cannot reject our just demands,” they said.

Early in the morning on Sunday tlauuary 9 (22), 1005, 140,000 workei‘s carrying portraits of tho tsar, Hags and icons marched to the Winter Palace, ohautiug prayers on the way.

The tsarist government had decided to greet tho workers with bul- lets and bayonets. Tho entire city was divided U]) into military areas, and police, Cossacks and troops wore posted every whore. Troops posted at the city gates began to fire at the workers, to ])re- vent them penetrating into tho city. Nevertheless, large num- bers of workers reached tho Winter Palace Square. The brutal tsarist troox)s shot d 9 wn tho approaching crowds of peaceful workers, and what is more, picked off children, many of whom were perched on the trees in tho Alexander Park adjacent to the square. That day over a thousand workers were killed and over two thousand were wounded. The Bolsheviks marched with the workers and many of them were killed or wounded.

The workers gave to January 9 tho name of Bloody Sunday. On that day even tho backward workers lost all faith in the tsar. “Wo have no tsar,” said aged workers, destroying tho portraits of tho tsar that hung in their homes.

The Bolsheviks issued lea (lots headed: “To Arms, Comrades!” whereupon the workers raided gunsmiths’ shops and workshops and seized the arms. In the afternoon of January 9, the first barricades were erected on Vasilyevsky Island, a district of St. Peters- burg. The workers said: “The tsar gave it to us; weTl now give it to him !” Collisions with the police occurred in the streets. Cries were raised: ‘"Down with the autocracy!”

On January 9, 1905, the working class received a great lesson in civil war. As Lenin wrote: “. . . The revolutionary education of the proletariat made more progress in one day than it could have made in months and years of drab, humdrum, wretched existence” (V. I. Lenin, Selected Works, Vol. Ill, Moscow, 1934, p. 289).

Lenin heard of the events of Bloody Sunday in Geneva, where he was living at that time in exile. In an article entitled: “The Beginning of the Revolution in Russia,” he appraised these events in the following terms: “The eyes of the proletariat of the whole world are turned with feverish impatience towards the proletariat of the whole of Russia. The overthrow of tsarism in Russia, begun so valiantly by our working class, will be the turning point in the history of all coun- tries” \lhid,, p. 292). Lenin called upon the Party and the work- ing class immediately to commence preparations for an armed insurrection.

Protest Strikes Throughout the Country

This massacre of the workers by order of the tsar called forth protest strikes all over the country. In January alone 440,000 workers were involved in strikes, compared with only 430,000 throughout the whole of the preceding ten years. As Lenin wrote: “It is this awakening of tremendous masses of the people to political consciousness and revolutionary struggle that marks the historic significance of January 22, 1905” (V. I. Lenin, Selected Works, Vol. Ill, Moscow, 1934, p. 2),

On January 11, strikes broke out in Moscow whence they spread to the textile districts around Moscow and to Ivanovo-Voznesensk,

Strikes also broke out in Poland, Finland, the Ukraine, the Caucasus and Siberia. In one of the leaflets he issued in the beginning of 1‘905, Comrade Stalin wrote that as soon as the signal was heard from St. Petersburg the workers of all nationalities, “as though by common consent, responded with unanimous fraternal greeting to the call of the St. Petersburg workers and boldly challenged the autocracy” (Beria, On the History of the Bolshevik Ori^anizaiions in Transcaucasia, Moscow, 1939, p. 65).

On January 18, a general strike of the Tiflis workers commenced under Comrade Stalin’s leadership. Bolshevik agitators distributed among the strikers leaflets in the Georgian, Armenian and Russian languages, calling upon thorn to prepare for an armed insurrection. In response to the appeal of the Caucasian Fade* al Committee of the Party, the workers of Baku, Batum, Chiaturi and other industrial centres in Transcaucasia also came out on strike. Everywhere meetings and demonstratioiis wore held, during which tlioro %vcro c.olliBioiis with tho police and troops.

At tho head of tho revolutionary movciuont inarehod the motal workers, and they were followed by workers of tho textile and other industries, lii declaring their ])rotest. striki^s, tho workers also put forward economic doniands. This conibinai-ion of economic demands with political doniands lent the strikes tremendous for(^o.

The massacre of tho workers on January 0 roused the indignation among tho working people in Western E\iropo too. Tho workers of Paris, London, Vienna and Brussels demonstrated outside ihe Rus- sian embassies, their watchwords being: “Down with lsarisml’% "Down with the assassins !” "Long live tho revolution!"’ The workers of Prance and Italy sent the Russian 'w^’orkci's fratorjial greetings and promised them their assistance.

Tsarism and the Bourgeoisie after January 9

To combat the incipient revolution, the tsar ap]iointod Tro]mv, formerly Chief of Police in Moscow, Governor General of St. Petersburg. Practically, Trepov became the militajy dictator; ho lu’oclaiincd martial law in the capital.

The tsar received a deputation of "workers*’ wlio had boon espe- cially picked by tho i)olico and tol<l tluMii that, ho believed in tlu^ "unshakable devotion of tho working ])oo]d(^"’ and tlioroforo "forgave them.” This cynical statonicut of the assassin-tsar roused indignation even among tlv » most backward workoi's.

In tho endeavour to divert tho worktu’s from revolution, the tsarist clique resorted to downriglit clocoptiou. In rJaniiary 1005, a com- mission was set up, under the chairmanship of Senator Shidlovsky, to in- quire into the "causes of the discontent of tho workers in tho capital.*'*

It was intended to include several roprosoiitativos of the workers in this commission, in addition to government officials and capitalists. The Mensheviks wore ready to act on this tsar’s oomniission, but the workers, on tho proposal of the Bolsheviks, boycotted tho election of representatives to it. Tho Bolsheviks took part only in tho first stage of these elections in order to i)ut forward political demands. After revolutionary manifestations of tho workers, who would have nothing to do with tlie (commission, the government dissolved it.

In tho endeavour to split the raiiliS of tho revolutionary workers the tsarist axithorities deliberately fomented strife among tlio various nationalities in Russia. The result of this was the frightful Armoni- an-Azerbaijanian massacre in Baku on February 0 and 7, 1005. This pogrom was stopped by tho efforts of tho clasB-conscians workers undcjr the leadership of the Bolsheviks. In February, the ])olico, aided by hired bandits, organized an anti- Jo wish pogrom in Foodosia. In Kursk the police boat up high- school studontH in order to intimidate the radically-minded youth. But these pogroms and assaults only served to intensify popular hatred of tsarism -

In February 1905, tsarism sustained military 'defeat in the battle of Mukden. On this occasion, too, the tsarist army command failed to take advantage of a series of partial successes which the Russian troops had achieved in the battle. The Russian army lost 120,000 men (out of a total of 300,000) in killed, wounded and taken prisoner. It was evi- dent that tsarism had lost the war against Japan. Terrified by the steady growth of the revolution, and losing support even among the prop- ertied classes, which did not believe that tsarism was capable of coping with the revolution, the autocracy endeavoured to strike a bargain with the bourgeoisie by offering slight political con- cessions. In February 1905, a tsar’s rescript, addressed to Bulygin, the Minister of the Interior, was promulgated, instructing the latter to convene a conference to draw up a scheme for the establishment of an advisory Duma.

The liberal bourgeoisie readily entered into this deal with the gov- ernment and submitted its extremely moderate proposals for a con- stitution. The constitutional proposals of the ^‘Liberation” group and of the Zemstvo congress (held in April 1905), left the monarchist form of government intact and provided for the creation of a two-chamber parliament, the upper chamber to consist of representatives of the propertied classes. The liberals were willing to abandon universal suffrage. At the Zemstvo congress, 54 delegates out of the 120 voted against universal suffrage. *

Lenin denounced this “constitutional haggling,” as he described this bargaining between the liberals and tsarism, and again and again called upon the workers to prepare for an armed insurrection.

The Mass Revolutionary Movement in the Summer of 1905

The Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.

The effect of the disrup- tive tactics that were pursued by the Mensheviks was that at the deci- sive stage in the development of the revolution the Party was split in two and lacked a single leadership and a common Party line in tac- tics. Formally, the Party was imited, but actually the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks very much resembled two separate parties, each having its own central body and its own leading newspaper.

For the purpose of drawing up the Party’s tactics in the revolution and of setting up leading bodies for the Party, the Bolsheviks convened the Third Congress of the Party. This congress was held in London in April 1905. The Mensheviks convened a conference of their own which was at bottom the party congress of a section that had broken away from the R.S.D.L.P.

Before tlio Third Coiigross Lonin wrote series of articles in the Bolshevik news])aper Vpcryod {Forward) in wliieli lie explained the character and the driving forces of the Russian revolution. Ho said this was liie hist bonrgoois-democratic revolution to take place inthoo])och of imporialisni. Its main task was to destroy the Russian autocracy and its econoinic foundation, serf-based landlordism. Hence, the slo- gans of this revolution were: a democratic republic, confiscation of all landlords’ estates and thoir transfer to the ])oasauts for cultivation, and the introduction of an 8-hour day in industry.

The Russian bourgeois-democratic revolution of 1905 differed radically from all bourgeois revolutions that had taken place in Europe. Those revolutions wore led by the bourgeoisie; the peasantry constituted the reserves of the bourgeoisie, while the proletariat was still weak and could not act indopoiidently. The driving forces of the Russian bourgeois-democratic revolution, however, wore the proletariat and the peasantry, and its leader was the ])roletariat. The jpeasants wore the allies of the proletariat, for the proletariat alone could helj) the peasants to solve the agrarian problem in a revolutionary way. The Russian bourgeoisie was counior-revolut ionary; it feared tlio prole- tariat and wanted to strike a bargain with tsarism with a view to limiting the j)olitical rights and damaging the economic interests of the workers and peasants. It was therefore iKu^ossary to isolate the bourgeoisie from the masses of the ])easantry and to exi:)lain to the latter that the bourgeoisie were their cltiss cMioinios and that they were opposed to all the fundamental demands of the workers and peasants.

Lenin taught that after overthrowing tsarism, tlie i)rolotariat would not rest content with this victory, but would utilize it for the purpose of immediately passing, together with the i)oorost sec- tions of the peasantry, to the socialist revolution. “From the democrat- ic revolution,” he wrote, “wo shall at once, according to the dogroo of our strength, the strength of the class-conscious and organized prole- tariat, begin to pass over to the socialist revolution” (V. I. Lonin, lected Works, Vol. Ill, Moscow, 1934, p. 145). Basing itself on Lenin’s appraisal of the revolution in Russia, the Third Congress of the Party adopted a resolution “On the Provisional Revolutionary Government,” which affirmed tliat after the victory of the bourgeois-democratic revo- lution, this provisional revolutionary govermnent would become the organ of the revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. The task of this government was to carry the bour- geois-democratic revolution in Russia to complete victory. Lonin and Stalin taught that the rovolutionary-dcmooratio dicjtatorslup of thoso two classes alone could ousiiro fundamental revolutionary changes in Russia and help the proletariat to pass on to the socialist revolution.

The Third Congress also laid down the Party’s tactics, based on the Bolshevik appraisal of the character and prospects of the revolution. It resolved to sujiport the agrarian demands of the peasantry, including that for the confiscation of all the landlords’ land.

The congress called upon the peasants to set up peasant committees for the i)ur2)ose of seizing the landlords’ land in a revolutionary man- ner. It particularly emphasized the importance of the general strike as a weapon in the struggle. Urging the necessity of an armed insur- rection for the purpose of achieving the victory of the revolution, it called upon the Party organizations to proceed forthwith to prepare for such an insurrection.

The congress elected a Bolshevik Central Committee, headed by Lenin, and adopted the newspaper as the central organ of the

Party.

Thus, the Third Congress set up a Bolshevik general staff to lead the revolution, armed the Party with a strategical plan for developing the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist revolution, and formu- lated the main tactics of the proletarian party in the bourgeois-demo- cratic revolution. Herein lies the enormous historical importance of the Third Congress of the Party.

Lenin expounded the Bolshevik tactics in a work of genius Tioo Tactics of Social-Democracy iii the Democratic Eevohitioii, which ap- peared in July 1905.

The Mensheviks and Trotsky ite agents of the bourgeoisie tried to frustrate Lenin’s plan for developing the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist revolution.

The view spread by the Mensheviks was that as the revolution in Russia was a bourgeois revolution it must be led by the bouigeoisie, as had been the case previously in the West. The proletariat, asserted the Mensheviks, should ally itself not with the peasantry, but with the liberal bourgeoisie; it should march not at the head of the peasantry, but at the tail of the bourgeoisie.

Tsushima

Before Port Arthur fell the Baltic Fleet was sent on a long voyage to the Far Bast round the coast of Africa.

In an article entitled “A Debacle” Lenin wrote: ‘"A great armada, as huge, as unwieldy, as absurd, as impotent and as monstrous as the entire Russian empire itself, set out on its voyage, squandering heaps of money on coal and maintenance, and evoking universal ridicule in Europe” (V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. VII, Moscow, 1937, Russ, ed., p. 335). This “great armada” was destroyed by the Japanese fleet on May 14, 1905 (the anniversary of the coronation of Nicholas II) in a battle off the island of Tsushima, in the Korea Straits.

In tliis unequal battle, which was more like a massacre, the Russian sailors fought with unexampled staunchness and courage. The obsolete cruiser Dimitri Donskoy bravely held at bay ten up-to-date Japanese cruisers and put two of them out of action. It was called upon to surrender, but it refused, and continuing to bombard the enemy, it proudly sanlc into the depths of tlio sea.

The Revolutionary Struggle of the Proletariat In the Summer of 1905

The defeat which tsarism sustained at Tsushima gave an added impetus to the proletarian revolutionary struggle. Strikes broke out continuously all through the spring, summer and autumn. ]{lconomic strikes became interwoven with political strikes and dovolopod into mass revolutionary strikes. The lirst strike wave (January to Aj)ril) afFectod 659,400 workers. The second (in the spring of 1905) affected 362,600 workers. The third, covering the period from July to Sep- tember, affected 264,800 workers.

The rh’st of May celebrations worc>> accompanied by strikes affecting 220,000 workers and developed into a huge demonstration against the autocracy.

The vanguard of these political strikes and demonstrations consist- ed of the metal workers. The textile workers at first organized mainly economic strikes, but gradually they too entered the political struggle. A vivid example of this is provided by the strike of the textile workcu-s in Ivanovo-Voznesensk, lb began on May 12, 1905, with the presenta- tion of economic doniands and soon affected the whole of the Ivanovo- Voziiosousk textile region. The strike lasted a long time and about 70,000 workers, including many women, wore involved. To load the strike a Joint Strike Committee was oloctod in Ivanovo-Voznesensk, This ooiu- mitteo was called Council of Reprosontativos, and it was in facst thcr first Soviet of Workers’ Deputies in history. This eounoil formotl a workers’ militia to guard the textile mills, established a strike fund to assist the families of strikers, demanded the closing of vodka shops, undertook the supply of provisions for the workers and made a' range- ments for thisimrjjoso with the shopkeepers, and maintained order and discipline among the strikers. The strikers usually assembled on tlu*f bank of the river Tallca to hoar reports from members of tiio council on the progress of the strike. Here they also discussed political questions, and after the meetings they learned and sang revolutionary songs. One of their favourite speakers w^as the Bolshevik worker Dunay<n^ The general direction of the strike came from ilus Northern Commit- tee of the Party, headed by Comrade Frunze and Py odor Afanasyev, au old weaver who had been one of the speakers at the First of May demon- stration in St. Petersburg in 1891, and who was known as “Father.”

These meetings wore broken up by the police and troops, and in tlie collisions scores of workers wore killed and many wounded . The work- ers remained staunch, however, and continued tlio strike. Flungor alone comxiolled them to return to work, and this tJioy did in an or- ganized manner.

This strike steeled the workers; it served as a militant scliool for their political education. In a leaflet they issued at the end of the strike, the Social-Democratic workers summed up the struggle as fol- lows; "The strflse has taught us a great deal. Before it many of us were so ignorant that we did not want either to understand, to appreciate or to think about our conditions....

Do we not now see who is helping our enemies, the masters? We have realized that as long as power is in the hands of the tsar, who thinks only about the capitalists, we shall never be able to improve our con- ditions.”

A determined struggle against tsarism was also waged by the work- ers in the industrial towns of Po- land, The general strike which broke out in Lodz in June 1906, developed into an armed clash. Barricades were erected in the streets and for throe days a regular battle was fought between the workers and tho tsar’s trooi)s. Lenin regarded the Lodz battles as the first armed action of the workers of Russia. In August a collision between police and demonstrators occurred in Byelostok, during which thirty-six per- sons were killed and many were wounded. The strikers took to arms to wage a determined struggle against tsarism.

Thus, in the course of the strike movement the conditions were created for passing to the highest form of struggle — armed insurrection. The bourgeois-democratic revolution of 1906 was proletarian both in the methods by which the struggle was conducted and in the fact that the proletariat played the leading role in it.

The Peasant Movement

The strikes of the industrial workers aft- er Bloody Sunday stimulated the revolutionary movement in the rural districts. In the beginning of 1905, the Bolsheviks conducted extensive propaganda work among the peasants and widely distributed leaflets among them. The peasant movement broke out almost simultaneously in the central regions of Russia, in Georgia and in the Baltic Provinces. In Pebruary 1005, tho peasants in the Orel, Kursk, Chernigov and other gubernias began to seize the landlords’ estates. In the spring of 1905, the mass jioasant movement began to spread all over the country. The peasants wrecked landlords’ mansions, seized their meadows and hay crops, and ploughed up their lands. Often, at night, the tocsin wa& sounded, or a haystack burst into flames — ^this was the signal for general action. Hundreds of peasants, armed with axes and clubs, marched to the landlord’s estate, tore off the locks of the granary and took the corn, shared among themselves the landlord’s cattle and poultry, \\Tecked the estate offices and burnt the office books, particularly the records of the peasants’ debts and obligations. They burnt the land- lord's mansion and farm buildings so that the landlord should have no place to return to. In most cases this movement bore a spontaneous character.

The Tliird Congress of the Party called upon the Party organ- izations to conduct activities among the peasants, to hoi]) them in their struggle and to back their demands for the confiscation of the land- lords ’ land. The Party advised the peasants to seize the landlords ’ lands, to expel the tsar’s officials and to set up their own peasant committees, which were to be the embryo of the new revolutionary authority in thc^ countryside.

The struggle that was waged by the peasants in Guida under the leadership of the Bolsheviks was exceptionally determined and organ- ized. Comrade Stalin had conducted Social-Democratic activities among

Georgian peasants, particularly the Ourian and Ajar peasants, as eaSly| as 1002. The tsarist authorities had deported many of the x^f^^i^lcii^ants in the Batum strikes and deinonstrations ol' 1902 to their homos in Guria. On arriving homo the dejiortees formed Social-Democratic organizations and under tho leadership of those organizations the Ourian peasants began to drive put the tsar’s officials, refused to ])ay taxes and boycotted tho tsar’s courts. All disputes tliat arose were tried by elected people’s courts.

In March 1905, tho tsar’s government sent General Alikhanov- Avarsky to Guria with a force of 10,000 men of all arms to su])])r(^ss the revolt. At the same time a high official was sent to investigate tho causes of the revolt. The peasants everywhere |)resented the same demands to this official. The delegates from the village of Hidistavi said: ‘"Our demands can be expressed in tliree words: we want bread, justice and freedom. We are not asking for baked bread, all that wo are asking is that we should be allowed to enjoy the fruits of our labour.” In another village a j)easant delegate delivered an impassioned political speech in the course of which he said: “We expect nothing from the government. We know very well how cruelly it treated the St. Petersburg workers. We are not so naive as to place any hopes in the government after these atrocities.”

The punitive expedition headed by Alildianov-Avarsky failed to pacify Guria. At tho Third Congress of the Party tho delegate from the Caucasian Social-Democratic Federation, which ‘was led by (Comrade Stalin, proudly related the story of the heroic struggle that was being waged by the Gurian peasants. The Gurian peasant movement was tins most organized and most politioally-conscious peasant movement in Eiussia. The revolutionary struggle of the Abkhazian peasants in Gudauti was led by Orjonikidze.

During the spring ploughing, strikes broke out among the agricul- tural labourers. These strikes assumed particularly wide dimensions in Latvia, Estonia, Poland, and Byelorussia. The Latvian and Estonian labourers di*ove out the landlords, seized their estates and ploughed up the land for themselves. In the summer of 1905, the All-Russian Peasant Union was fonned. Notwithstanding the fact that the Socialist-Revolutionaries and lib- era Ls had succeeded in capturing the central leadership of this Peasant Union, Lenin held that it was of great importance for the organization of the peasants. . Before the victory of the peasant insiirreotion, and for such a victory, the Peasant Union is a powerful and vital organization,” he wrote. (V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, VoL IX, Mos- cow, 1937, Russ, ed., p. 129.)

The peasants joined the Union in whole villages. The Socialist-Rev- olutionaries wanted to subordinate the peasant movement to the lead- ership of the bourgeoisie, but the Bolsheviks combated their efforts to do so. The j)easant movement did not, however, spread all over tho country at that time; in the spring of 1905 it had developed in only 85 counties, one-seventh of the total number of counties in Russia.

The Revolt on the Battleship Potemkin

Tsarism had but one proj) left — ^the armed forces; but the defeat in the war and the revolutionary struggle that was being waged by the workers and peasants stimulated revolutionary temper in tho army and in the navy. The revolt of the crow of the battleship Potemkin of the Black Sea Elect clearly revealed that even this prop of tsarism was shaken. The sailors of the navy, among whom there were many industrial workers, were the most class - conscious and revolutionary section of the armed forces.

Li 1905 the Bolsheviks made energetic preparations for a general revolt in the Black Sea Fleet which was timed to break out during the assembly of the fleet for training purposes at the Island of Tendra, be- tween Odessa and Sevastopol. The revolt on the Potemkin, however, broke out spontaneously on June 14, 1905, before the whole fleet had assembled. Its immediate cause was the issue to the men of borshch cooked with decayed meat that teemed with maggots. The crew refused to eat the borshcli. The commander assembled tho ringleaders, ordered a tarpaulin to be thrown over them and then ordered them to be shot. In protest against this order the whole crew mutinied. A colli- sion occurred between tho officers and the men during which tho sailor Vakuliiichuk, tho leader of the mutiny, was killed by a senior ofidccr. Tho leadership passed to another revolutionary sailor named Matyushonko. Tho men killed many of tho officers and seized the bat- tleship.

The PoUmhin made for Odessa where a general strike was in prog- ress. The arrival of the revolutionary battleship flying the red flag stimulated the workers of Odessa to rise in armed revolt against tsarism, but the Mensheviks sabotaged the revolt and prevented tlie crew of the PoUmhin from landing a party to assist tjio workers. Tlio tsarist govern- ment ordered the whole of the remaining ]7art of the Black Sea Fleet to attack the Poiemhin. The revolutionary battlcsliip wont out boldly to meet the fleet with the red flag at its masthead. The gunners of the other sliips refused to fire at the Potnnldn, and one battlcshij), the Georgi Pohedonosyets, went over to its side. The petty officers on this ship, however, intimidated and demoralized the crew hj assuring them that the revolt was hopeless. They ran the battleship aground and the PoUmhin continued to fight alone.

The revolutionary warship sailed the Black Sea with the red flag at its masthead for a whole week, but failing to receive support from the shore owing to the treachery of the Mensheviks, and rumiing short of coal and provisions, it was obliged to make for the Rumanian coast and surrender to the Rumanian authorities. The latter, in 1906, handed the revolutionary sailors over to the tsarist authorities, who had them either executed or sentoncod to penal sorvitudo.

Lenin attributed immenHo imj)ortanec to the revolt on the PoUth- kin. ^‘Por the first time,” he wrote, “an importaiit unit of the armed forces of tsarism — an entire battleship — hm openly gone over to the side of the revolution” (V. I. Lenin, SelecUcl Works ^ Vol. Ill, Moscow, 1934, p. 311).

As soon as he received the first news of the revolt on the PoU7nhin, Lenin sent a Bolshevik to Odessa to give it guidance, but he arrived too late. The ship had already left for Rumania.

The revolutionary movement in the anny and in the navy contin- ued to grow. In 1905, cases of mutiny among the reserves increased and not infrequently these were accompanied by the killing of officers. This unrest revealed that the rank and file of the army wot*o wavering and wore becoming an unreliable pro]^ for the autocracy. The Bolsheviks formed military revolutionary organizations for the ])urpose of conduct- ing activities in the army with the object of uniting the soldiers with the workers and peasants and of leading them on to the armed insur- rection against tsarism.

The October General Strike

The Bulygin Duma

The rising tide of the revolutionary move- ment in the country forced the tsarist clique to manoeuvre. It was compelled, while continuing its policy of repression, to take a stop towards meeting the wishes of tlie bourgeoisie who, in their turn, were seeking an alliance with it. In other words, it was obliged to strike a bargain with the bourgeoisie. With this object the tsar’s government, on August 6, 1905, passed a law for the convocation of a State Duma. In conformity with this law the proposed State Duma was to be not a legislative but an advisory body; it was to have the right to express an opinion on the bills submitted to it by the government, but not to pass or reject them. Thus, the law of August 6 left the autocratic system com- pletely intact. This Duma was referred to as the Bulygin Duma, after Bulygin, the Minister who had drafted the law. The landlords, who were an insignificant minority in the country, were to receive 85 per cent of all the seats. The workers were given no electoral rights at all. The bourgeoisie welcomed this Bulygin Duma and called upon the people to take an active part in the elections. The Mensheviks supported the liberals. The Bolsheviks alone called upon the people to boycott the elections to the Bulygin Duma. The further development of the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat, led by the Bolsheviks, prevent- ed the convocation of this Duma.

The Peace of Portsmouth

After the rout of the tsar’s fleet at Tsushima, the international bourgeoisie, fearing the further growth of the revolution in Russia, strongly urged the tsar’s government to con- clude peace. In their opinion peace with Japan would help to restore ^‘internal peace” in Russia, particularly if the tsarist government made some moderate constitutional concessions to the people. On the other hand, the United States was apprehensive that Japan would become too strong and therefore urged the Japanese government to moderate its demands upon Russia.

Greatly exhausted and weakened by the war, Japan herself was interested in the speedy conclusion of peace.

At Japan’s request, Theodore Roosevelt, President of the United States, acted as mediator in the negotiations between Russig. and Japan.

To discuss the situation the tsar’s government, on May 24 (June 6), 1905, called a council of war over which the tsar presided. The majority of those present at the council were in favour of concluding peace. “In- ternal well-being is more important for us than victory. We are living in an abnormal condition: we must restore to Russia her internal repose,” they said.

The government consented fco open peace negotiations and appoint- ed a peace delegation, headed by Count Witte, who enjoyed the con- fidence of the bourgeois governments of Europe and America. The peace negotiations were opened in the small town of Portsmouth, Maine, in the United States.

Japan presented very harsh peace terms. She demanded the Liao- tung Peninsula, the South Manchurian Railway up to Harbin, the Is- land of Sakhalin, and complete control of Korea. In addition, she coimt- ed on receiving a large indemnity from Russia. The Russian delegation had received instructions not to yield' an inch of territory to the Japanes e and not to agre^ to the ]oaynient of any indemiiitios. The discussion of tho })eaco treaty became cxtrcnioly jn^otraotod . Roosevelt now exerted pressure upon tlio Japanese and now txpon the Russian delegation, urging tliem to make mutual concessions. At last, on August 23 (September 5), 1005, tho peace treaty was signed.

Tsarist Russia recognized Japan’s predominant economic, military and political interests in Korea , ceded to Japan her lease of Port Ai'thur and Dalni, pledged herself to run tho Chinese Eastern Railway exclu- sively for coininercial purposes and ceded to Japan tho southern part of SaHialin, with all its adjacent islands. In addition, she concluded a disadvantageous fishing convention with Japan. "‘As wo know,” said Comrade Stalin in an address to the people on September 2, 1945, “in the war against Japan, Russia was defeated. Jai:)an took advantage of tho defeat of tsarist Russia to seize from Russia the south- ern part ofSaklialin and establish herself on the Kuril Islands, thereby putting the lock on all our country’s outlets to the ocean in the East, which meant also all outlets to tho ports of Soviet Kani(‘.hatka and So- viet Chukotka. It was obvious that tlapan was aiming to (lo])rivo Russia of tho whole of her Ear East” (J. Stalin, On the Omit Palrwiic War of the Soviet Unio7b, Moscow, 1945, ]>]). 208-209).

As Comrade Stalin obsorvofl in the same speech, tho defeat of tsar- ist Russia in 1904-1905 . lay like a black stain upon our country.

Our people believed in and waited for tlio day when Japan would bo defeated and tho stain would bo wiped out.”

Tho war with Japan cost tho Russian people dear: 400,000 men were killed, wounded and taken prisoner, and tho expenditure amounted to over 3,000,000,000 rubles.

The conclusion of peace with Japan was of considerable assist- ance to the tsarist clique in its further struggle against tho revo- lution. But the revolution was not to be halted. In the autumn and winter of 1905 the revolutionary movement rose to its peak.

The All-Russian Political Strike

On September 19, 1906, a gen- eral printers’ strike broke out in Moscow. The bakers, tobacco work- ers and workers in other trades joined the printers. Cossacks and gen- darmes broke up revolutionary demonstrations. The workers fired at the police with revolvers and wounded many of thorn. On September 25 a regular battle was fought in Tverskaya Street (now Gorky Street) out- side Philippov ’s bakery , A troop of Cossacks charged tho crowd that was blocking the street. Tho workers rushed into tho bakery, climbed to tho roof of this tall building and from there pelted tho troops with stones. Tho trooi^s surrounded tho whole block where tho bakery was situated and laid regular siege to it. Eventually, two companies of infantry got in through the back of tho house whore tho workers liad not placed a guard. Two of the workers were killed, eight were wounded and 192 were arrested.

The September strikes in Moscow raised the struggle to a higher :age. Lenin stated that the events in Moscow marked the beginning f the insurrection. "^The outbreak of the insurrection has been crushed gain. Again: long live the insurrection!” he wi*ote (V. I. Lenin, GoU ‘Cted Works^ Vol. VIII, Moscow, 1937, Russ, ed., p. 282).

On October 7, the railwaymen on the Moscow-Kazanskaya Railway ent bn strike, and on October 8, the men on all the other railways in uussia joined them. On October 11, the railway strike developed into a ation-wido general strike in which the workers of all trades were in- olved. The intelligentsia — schoolteachers, office employees, lawyers, igineers and students — ^joined the workers. The strikers demanded the Dnvocation of a Constituent Assembly. The tsar’s government tried 3 suppress the strike by armed force. On October 14, Trepov, the Gov- :nor General of St. Petersburg and virtual dictator of Russia, issued 10 order: “Don’t fire blanli shot; spare no bullets.'” But the govern- lont was already powerless to stop the strilce.

Nearly a million industaual workers, not counting railwaymen, and weral hundred thousand office employees, were involved in the October political strike. Tlie entire economic life of the country was brought to a standstill. Trains and ships stopped running, factories were idle, the post and telegraph ceased to function, no newspapers or magazines a])pcared. In the towns street traffic ceased, shops and restaurants were closed. The universities and high scliools were closed. Only the water supply, city drainage and the hos]ntals functioned by order of tlie strike committees. On the railways only troop trains which were car-, rying demobilized soldiers who were hurrying homo from Manchuria were allowed to run.

The October strike x)aralyzed the forces of the government and at the same time demonstrated the strength of the proletariat as the vanguard fighter and organizer of the nation-wide struggle against the •autocracy. In a number of localities the general strike began to develop into armed insurrection.

In Kliarkov barricades wore erected around the University and as many as a thousand armed workers mustered to defend them. In the streets collisions occurred with troops. Artillery was called out. During the storming of the barricades and in street fighting 147 workers were killed.

In Ekaterinoslav the entire population of the working-class suburb ’of Chocholevka took part in building barricades. They threw down tel- egraph ])obs and erected barbed-wire ontanglemonts. The barricades wore demolished by troo])s. Collisions with troops also occurred in Odo.s- sa, Saratov, Rostov and other cities.

The strike wave (the fourth in that year) reached its peak in the -autumn and in tlie beginning of the winter of 1906. While about a million workers wore involved in October, in Doeembor only several hundred thousand wore affected.

The Tsar’s Manifesto of October 17

Scared by the general strike, the tsar, on October 17, issued a manifesto, which had been drawn up by Count Witte who, shortly before that, had been ap]')ointed Chairman of the Council of Ministers. In this manifesto the tsar promised to grant freedom of speech, press, association and assembly, extension of the franchise, etc. The State Duma was proclaimed a legislative body. But this manifesto was only intended to deceive the masses. The tsar hoped by means of it to gain time to muster his forces for the purpose of crush- ing the revolution. In appraising the tsar’s manifesto, and utteiing a warning against exaggerating its importance, Lenin wrote: ^‘The tsar’s concession is indeed a very great victory for the revolution, but this victory does not yet by a long way decide the fate of the entire cause of freedom. The tsar has not yet by any means capitulated. The autocracy has not yet ceased to exist. It lias only retreated, . . (V, I. Lenin, GoU

lected WorJes^ Vol. VIII, Moscow, 1937, Russ. ed., p, 362.)

The manifesto of October 17 fully satisfied tlio bourgeoisie who, frightened by the nation-wide strike and the incipient insiirroction, began openly to oppose the revolutionary masses. The big industrial and commercial bourgeoisie formed an organization called the Union of October Seventeenth (laiown as the Octobrists). The Eight- wing Zemstvo- ites and the various commercial and industrial ^^parties” that .sprang up in 1905 joined this organization.

The liberal Zemstvo-ites and the members of the Emancipation League officially inaugurated the abeady legally existing Constitution- al-Democratic Party (known as the Cadets). The Cadets expressed the strivings of those sections of the bourgeoisie which were less interested than the Octobrists in feudal methods of exploitation. Unlike theavow- ‘Odly reactionary Octobrist bourgeoisie, the Cadets tried to manoeuvre between the revolution and the autocracy. When the tsar’s manifesto was promulgated, the Cadets declared the revolution at an end and 'Called for co-operation with the Witte government.

The Mensheviks were also pleased with the manifesto of October 17 . The leaders of the Georgian Mensheviks in Tiflis even stated at meet- ings: ‘^There is no longer an autocracy, the autocracy is dead. Russia is entering the ranks of constitutional monarchist states.”

Comrade Stalin emphatically denounced this piece of Menshevik •deception. On the day the manifesto of October 17 was promulgated he said at a meeting in Tiflis: “What do we need in order to really win? We need three things: first — arms, second — ^arms, third — ^arms and arms again.”

Tlie Bolsheviks urged the masses to place no confidence in the tsar ’s Jinanifcsjo and to prepare for armed insurrection.

Stricken by mortal fear of tho revolution, Nicliolas II began to seek supjiort in Kaiser Germany and among the Baltic German barons. During tho general strike of October 1905 several Gorman destroyers appeared in tlu^ I’oadstcad off Fotorhof with tho objecrt of taking Ni- cholas II and his lamily to Germany in the event of tho revolution being victorious. At this time the tsarist government conducted negotiations with Germany for intervention in Bussia for tho ]mrpose of siijiprc^ssing tho revolution and of restoring tsarist absolutism. Tl^his cons])iracy against tho revolution was ex])osed and frustrated by tlio proletariat of St. Petersburg.

In Poland martial law was declared as a consequoneo of tho growth of tho revolutionary movement. German troops were moved to tho Bus- sian frontier in readiness to invade Bussia. Tho proletariat of St, Pe- tersburg retaliated to this threat on tho part of German imperialism to intervene in tho internal affairs of Bussia by declaring a general strike. The result was that martial law in Poland was rescinded and intervention was rendered impossible. The satirical journals at that time published a cartoon depicting tho Governor General of Warsaw, Scalone, who was a German, zealously cleaning tlio boots of an army ofHccr whoso face was concealed, l)ut wlmso figure could bo recognized as that of Williohii II. The ca’})tiou to tlie cartoon rea<i: ‘TTnfortunatoly wo had to rescind martial law, hut I shall continue to servo you ftiithfully and well.”

Immediately after tho manifesto of October 17 was promulgated revolutionary demonstrations ocoiUTcd all over Bussia. Street mootings wore held at which impassioned revolutionary speeches were deliv- ered. To combat tho revolution, tho government formed a hooligan or- ganization called the Union of Bussian People, which united tlie cor- rupt Black Hundreds which had already sprung U]) in many localities in tho beginning of 1905.

On tho direct instructions of tho tsar and the gendarmes tho Blade Hundreds, jointly with tho police, organized Jewish pogroms in over a hundred towns in all parts of tho country. Leaflets inciting to pogroms wore secretly printed in tho printing plants of tlie Department of Police. During a pogrom in Odessa several thousand Jewish working people were killed. In Tomsk, the Black Hundreds, with the blessing of the Bishop and in tho presence of the City Governor, surrounded the I'ail- way administration ofi&ces where a workers’ meeting was taking place and set fire to it. Many of the people present at the mooting perished in the flames, and it was only tlianlcs to tho heroic efforts of S . M. Kirov that some of tho revolutionaries were saved. In Tver (now Kalinin) tho Black Hundreds wrecked the promises of the Tver Zemstvo, which was a liberal body, and killed and injured many momberH of tlio ZcmiKstvo staff. In Ivanovo, the Black Hundreds brutally murdorod the veteran revolutionary worker and loader of tho textile strike, Fyodor Afanasyev, known as “Father.” In Moscow the Black Hundreds arranged the assassination of the prominent Bolshevik N. E. Bauman, who had only just been released from the Taganskaya prison. Bauman’s funeral devel- oped into a huge revolutionary demonstration in which several hundred thousand people took part. These arrests, pogroms and assassination of revolutionaries served as striking illustrations of what the masses could expect from the manifesto of October 17. About this manifesto

the people sang the ditty:

The tsar caught fright, issued a Manifest: Liberty for the dead, for the living — arrest.

Soviets of Workers’ Deputies

During the stormy days of the October general strike the working class created a new ty]>e of revolu- tionary organization which played a leading role in the revolution. These organizations were the Soviets of Workers’ Deputies. On OctoberlS, while the strike was in progress, the workers of St. Petersburg held meet- ings in their factories and works and elected representatives to a Coun- cil (Soviet) of Workers’ Deputies for the purpose of leading the strike. Formed originally as a Joint Strike Committee, the St. Petersburg Soviet rapidly became the embryo of a new revolutionary authority. Thus, in November, the Soviet on its own authority proclaimed the introduction of an 8-hour day; it had its own organ, Izvestia, which was printed in the biggest printing plants of St. Petersburg and ap- peared without the sanction of the tsarist censor. The Soviet began to in- terfere in the orders of the tsarist administration. While the j)Ost and telegraph employees were on strike government telegrams were sent off only with the Soviet’s sanction. The inliabitants of St. Petersburg came to the Soviet on every kind of business as if it were an official adminis- trative body. Nevertheless, the St. Petersburg Soviet failed to take the lead of the revolution. The reason for this was that, taking advantage of the absence from St. Petersburg of Lenin, who was living abroad in exile, the Mensheviks captured the leadership of the Soviet and did all in their power to prevent it from becoming an organ of revolu- tionary authority and, in particular, frustrated the preparations for armed insurrection.

Following the example of St. Petersburg, Soviets of Workers’ Deputies were formed in all the other big cities of Russia during the period of October to December 1905. The Moscow Soviet was led by Bolsheviks and, as a consequence, it became an organ for the prepara- tion of armed insurrection. In the Caucasus, in Latvia, and also in some parts of Central Russia (the Tver and Moscow Gubernia), representa- tives of the soldiers, i. e., peasants in military uniform, were members of the Soviets. Thus, Lenin’s idea of the revo ut ionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry began to take practi- (‘al shape.

When Lenin returned from abro<ad and studied the activities of the St, Petersburg Soviet, he pointed out to the Party the world his- torical importance of the Soviets as the embryo of a new revolutionary popular authority. But in order that the Soviets might play their revolutionary role, ho urged, it was necessary to prepare to overthrow the rule of tlio tsar by organizing an armed insurrection. Purtlicr , in tlio course of the revolution of 1J)05 the Bussian ])roletariat ereatod a form of organization that was new in the history of tlio revolutionary movement, a form of organization that was the prototype of Soviet power, the embryonic foim of the ])roletarian socialist static, i. 6., the dictatorshix) of the proletariat. Tho Soviets marked a stei> forward compared with the Paris Commune of 1871. Comrade Stalin expressed his high axipreeiation of the historic im^iortance of the Soviets in the revolution of 1005 in the words . . the movement for the Soviets of Workers’ Deputies begun in 1005 by the workers of Leningrad and Moscow led in the end to tho rout of cajiitalism and the victory of Socialism on one-sixth of the globe” (J. Stalin, Prohkms of Lenmism^ Moscow, 1045, ]>. 530).

The National-Liberation Movement of the Peoples of Russia in 1905

Finland's Fight for Autonomy

nio revolntiouary movement of the })rolotariat t‘.ompolled the tsarist autocracy to make certain concessions on the national (piesbion. After Bloody Sunday (January 0) the struggle against tsarism liared up with exceptional vigour in thc^ regions inhabited by tho ox)prossed nationalities. Tho workers of Helsingfors, tho capital of Finland, wore among tho first to organize a general strike of xirotest against tho atrocities perpetrated by Nicho- las II against the workers. The Fimiish bourgeoisie and its party of ^''active resistance” believed that tho tsarist autocracy would he eoin- pellod by tho workers to make concessions and restore tlio Finnish constitution, which had boon abolished in 1002.

The tsar’s government, however, made only slight concessions, for it calculated that the Finnish bourgeoisie wotilcl readily come to tenns in order to wage a joint struggle against the workers. Tho law of 1001 on comxiulsory military service was repealed and the regulation on the non-dismissal of judges was re-introduced. But these minor concessions failed to satisfy oven tho Finnish bourgeoisie. They <iemancled tho re:-torat’on of the Finnish Con-^titution.

The October x)olitical strike in Russia was backed by the Finnish worker, who xu'oclaimed a general strike in Finland. They formed a Rod Guard and x^i’oparcd for insurreebion.

The nation-wide strike of tho working class comptdled the tsarist autocracy to yield on the Finnish question as well. On October 22, 1 1)05, Nicholas II promulgated a manifesto restoring the constitution in Finland. The Finnish bourgeoisie was satisfied with this and began to make pieparations for the elections to the new Diet. The Finnish Mensheviks supported the bourgeoisie in everything; they spread constitutional illusions among the masses and assured the workers and peasants that the armed struggle against tsarism was over. Describ- ing the opportunist stand taken by the Finnish Mensheviks during the revolution of 1905, Lenin said that *^they are not genuine Social- Democrats.”

The Struggle for National Liberation in Poland

After January 9, strikes were continuously in progress in Poland. Numerous mass meetings were held in the towns and villages at which resolutions weie adopted demanding autonomy for Poland. The peasants refused to pay taxes or perform military service, and expelled the Russian government officials and schoolteachers.

The Polish nobility and the Catholic clergy came out under the leadership of the nationalist parties which advocated the achievement of autonomy for Poland by means of a deal with the Russian bourgeoisie.

In the autumn the national movement in Poland assumed wide dimensions. The population proclaimed a boycott of the tsarist schools, and the educational society known as Matitsa collected voluntary contributions from the people and opened Polish schools. After the October general strike the revolutionary struggle of the Polish people reached the verge of armed insurrection. This frightened the Polish bourgeoisie, who betrayed the movement by entering into an agreement with the Russian liberals.

In the autumn of 1905 the tsarist autocracy proclaimed martial law in Poland, but the political strike proclaimed by the St. Peters- burg workers compelled the government to rescind it. This demonstrated to the Polish people that the Russian proletariat alone was their faithful ally.

The National Movement in the Ukraine and in Byelorussia

Tlie revolutionary struggle of the workers of the Ukraine and Byelo- russia in 1905 developed in complete unison with the struggle waged by the Russian proletariat.

Taking advantage of the weakening of the autocracy as a result of the revolutionary movement, the UlLrainians succeeded in publishing books and newspapers in the Ulcrainian language. A section of the Ukrainian petty-hourgeois nationalists who had formed the Revo- lutionary Ula^ainian Party (R.U.P.) demanded autonomy for the Ukraine and the transfer of x:)Ower to an autonomous Ukrainian Sejm. In their program, which did not di.Ter from that of the Constitutional Democrats, they demanded the transfer of the land to the peasants with payment of compensation to the landlords. In addition to the R.U.P. thoro were in the Ukraine in 1005 the Ukrainian Social-Bomocratie Union, the Spilka (Loagno) wIiujIi was of a Menshevik trend, and the Ukrainian Socialist- Revolutionary Party.

The Ukrainian nationalists were actually agents of Austria, whicli promised to sujiport their struggle for the ‘'indopendonco” of the Ukraine. Th(^ nationalist slogans of those separatists {i, e., advocates of secession) found no favour among the Ukrainian workers and peasants wlio strove for the overthrow of Russian tsarism in fraternal alliance with tiic Russian workers.

In Byelorussia, the Byelorussian Socialist Oromada, which was supported by tlie kulak elements of the Byelorussian peasantry, tried to capture the leadership of the national movement. In January 1906, this party held a congress in Minsk at whicjh it demanded autonomy for Byelorussia and the formation of a federation consisting of Byelo- russia, Lithuania, Latvia and the Ukraine with a common Sej in in Vilna. This party also demanded the allotment of land to the peasants with payment of comjicnsation to the landlords.

Both in tho Ukraine and in Byelorussia an important part in the national movement was ])layo(l liy t.ho schoolteaelHU’s who formed their Spilki and Prosvity (eultiiral and educational societies). Tho Prosvity distributed litt'rafcure in tho Ukrainian and Byelorussian languages, opened village libraries and reading rooms ami organized theatrical performances, coiux^rts and literary evenings. Their main function was to conduct educational work in their native languages.

But tljose ])artios and gi'oipxs could not load tho broad movement for national liberation; they renounced the revolutionary straggle and a fighting allianco with tlio revolutionary Russian proletariat, and foiled to link tho aims of the national movomout with the struggle for land that was being waged by tho peasantry. While proclaiming the slogans of the national movement, they hid from tho masses the point that their chief enemy was tho tsarist autocracy , which could be ovei thrown only by tho joint efforts of tho workers and peasants of all nationalities.

The Revolutionary Struggle for Liberation of the Peoples of Transcaucasia

Tho national movement in Transcaucasia in 1905 assumed a more definitely class and revolutionary character than it did in the Ukraine and in Byelorussia. Thanks to the leadership of tho Social-Democratic organization, which had been trained by Com- rade Stalin, the workers’ and peasants’ movement in Georgia, and particularly in Guria, rose to a considerable height. 0]3en prepara- tions for an insurrection against tsarism wore made nob only in tlie towns, but also in tho rural districts.

All through 1905 mass strikes, demonstrations and meetings took place, funds wore collcotod for revolutionary purjioses and “Red Hundreds” and })oasant oommittoos wore formed in the villages, Tho peasants rose in revolt against the landlords and drove them from their estates. The landlords, assisted by the authorities, organized their armed squads known as “Black Hundreds.” In many parts of Georgia the inhabitants refused to recognize the tsarist courts and j)olice.

The attempts of the Georgian nationalists, including the Georgian ]\Iensheviks, to capture the leadership of the movement failed. In 1905 the workers and peasants of Georgia followed the lead of the Bolsheviks.

In Azerbaijan the movement for national liberation was led by the Baku Bolshevilcs, who formed for this purpose a special organi- zation known as Gummet (energy). This organization conducted extensive activities among the more backward and downtrodden section of the Azerbaijanian workers in Baku, As a result of the educa- tional work conducted by the Bolsheviks, the more class-conscious of the Azerbaijanian workers, jointly with the Russian workers, succeeded, in February 1905, in putting a stop to the Armenian-Azerbaijanian massacres. During the oil workers’ strike in August, the majority of the Azerbaijanian workers, for the first time, joined the strike, for they were beginning to understand that a united class movement was needed. The landlords and the rising local bourgeoisie tried to keep the Azerbaijanian workers and peasants away from the revolu- tionary struggle. Intense religious and nationalist agitation was conducted in the towns and villages by the Pan-Islamists, who advocated the amalgamation of all Moslems in an independent Moslem state which was to be governed by the bourgeois-feudal upper classes 4md the clergy. This Pan-Islamist agitation received support from Turkey. The Gummet constantly exposed the reactionary plans of the exploiters of the Azerbaijanian people that were covered up by the flag of religion.

In Armenia the bourgeois party known as the Dashnacktsutyun tried to capture the leadership of the movement for national liber- ation. In the endeavour to obtain the support of the Armenian bour- geoisie and the clergy in the struggle against the revolution in Trans- caucasia, the tsar’s government repealed the church property law, which limited the revenues of the Armenian Church.

The National Movement among the Peoples of the Volga Region and Siberia

The revolution of 1905 roused all the nationali- ties of Russia to political life. In the Volga Region and in Bashkiria the bourgeois nationalists formed a Moslem League, the object of which was to unite all Moslems. This league also extended its activities to some extent to the Moslem bourgeoisie in Central Asia and in Trans* caucasia. A prominent part in this league was played by the mullahs, who fomented religious strife between the Moslem and Russian popu- lations. At the end of 1905 the Tatar bourgeoisie convened in Kazan the first Mosloii congress, which in a loyal ]>otition to the tsar ploatlod for the abolition of all Moslem disabilities and for political, religions and civil rights equal to those enjoyed by tlic Ivusslan population.

Tlio Chuv«ash national movement in 1005 assumed the pui*cly peasant character of a struggle for land and freedom. Activities among the Clnivash and Mari ])opulations of the Cheboksari district on tlu- Volga wore conducted by members of the All-Russian Peasant Union. The peasants at their meetings passed decisions to seize the land of the landlords, and they also demanded the opening of schools to be conducted in their native language. TJie Buryats <umtinued tlieij* struggle against the })lunder of their lands by the tsarist govermnonl officials. A league of Siberian nationalities was formed. The awakening of the Yakuts was brought about by tlic Yakut League which was formed in 1905, but which was soon suppressed by the tsarist au- thorities. Such were the first steps in the awakening to political life of the Siberian peoples who were oppressed and downtrodden by tsarism.

Ill the 1905 revolution the Bolsheviks fought for Lenin’s ijrogi'anv on the national question. Comrade Stalin formulated this program in the following terms: ‘‘Complete (Uunocracy in the (‘oiiutry is tlie ba^sis and condition for the solution of the national problem. . . . Thr right of sdf-iUUrminaUon is an esmUml clcmiml in tlu^ solution of the national problem . . . . autonomy, antonomy for such erystiilized

units as Poland, Lithuania, the Ukraine, l.heOau(uisns,cte. . , . Nationa! e.gmiliiy in all forms {^ianguagv.^ schoo ,s’, vJ(\) is an cssvntml element in the solution of the national question*"' (rf. vStaliii, Marxism amf the National ami Colonial QwsHon^ Moscow, 3940, p]). 49-51).

The December Armed Insurrection

The Strike Develops into Insurrection

Experience taught the workers that they could not achieve victory over tsarism by strikes alone; they realized that armed insurrection was n(K’.essary for this.

The first to take to arms after the October wtrila^ were the sailors and artillerymen of Kronstadt. Por two days and nights — October 25- and 27 — ^Kronstadt was in the hands of the insurgents. But the sailors’ movement was unorganized, it was accoin])anied by the wrecking of shops j nd the living quarters of the officers, and it lacked a j^lan and clearly formulated aim. On October 28, the insurrection was crushed and 200 of the participants and leaders of the insurrection were court- martiallecl.

On November 1, 1905, the St, Potcu’sbnrg Sovic^t of Workers' Deputies proclaimed a general political strike in support of the demand for rescinding martial law in Poland and for the roloaso of the Kronstadt insurgents. Tho tsar’s government was obligcnl to yield to the demands of the workers of Kt. P(‘t(*rsburg. Martial law in Poland was rescinded, and instead of trying the ICronstadt sailors by court martial, which had iDower to pass sentence of deaths they were tried by a military court and received comparatively light sentences: nine were sentenced to penal servitude, 123 to imprisonment, and 83 were even acquitted.

The November general strike of the St. Petersburg workers saved the lives of the insurgent Kronstadt sailors and was of enormous iDolitical importance, for it vividly demonstrated to the soldiers and sailors that the working class alone was their true champion and leader of their struggle. The Mensheviks had opposed this second general strike. Instead of fraternization with the soldiers and revolutionary propaganda in the tsar’s army for the purpose of winning it to the side of the insurgent ]}eople they put forward the cotinter-revolutionary demand for the withdrawal of the garrison from St. Petersbiiig. Had this been done the soldiers would have been isolated from the St. Petersburg proletariat and left under tlie un- divided influence of the army officers.

The Naval Revolt in Sevastopol

The Bolsheviks continued Avitli their work of j)roparing for an armed insurrection in the Black iSoa Fleet after the suppression of the revolt on the battleship PotemMn. The insurrection was started on Novennber 14 by the crew of the cruiser Ochakov, On November 15, 6,000 sailors on other ships and the workers omplo;y'ed in the fortress of Sevastopol joined tho insnrrection. The battleship Poiemhin, renamed the Panlehimon, again hoisted ilio rod Hag. The Sevastopol revolt was led by Lieutenant Schmidt. Being a bourgeois democrat in liis convictions he, instead of launching a vigorous attack against tlie tsar’s forces, undertook no active operations whatever, but waited for the entire Hoot to join tho Ochakov, Naively believing that tlio tsar would make concessions, he oven sent tho latter a tolegi-am demanding political liberties. In spite of his confused political views, however, Lieutenant Schmidt was devoted to the revolution. On November 15, ho boarded the gunboat S^virepy and going fiom ship to sli p he urged the men to join the in- surrection. Many of them hoisted the red flag, but Lieutenant Schmidt was unable to organize them for joint and speedy operations.

Tho authorities recovered from their consternation and drew troops to Sevastopol. Late in the afternoon of November 16, the bat- teries and ships which had remained loyal to the govermnent opened fire on the Ochakov and the other revolutionary sliijis and continued all night. The OchuJeov caught fire. The crow tried to save themselves from the flames by swimming or rowing ashore, but they were shot down by machine guns that wore posted on tho beach. Schmidt and the other leaders of tho insurrection were captured and later court- martiallod and shot.

The insuiToction in Sevastopol roused now forces for tho struggle in tho array and in tho navy.

Gommenting on the weaknesses of the revolts among the armed forces Lenin said that tho soldiers and sailors ‘‘'lacked a clear under- standing of the fact that only the most vigorous continuation of the armed struggle, only a victory over all the military and civil authorities, only tho overthrow of tho government and tho seizure of power over tho whole state could guarantee the success of the revolution’’ (V. I. Lenin, Selected Works, Vol. Ill, Moscow, 1934, p. 10).

The Peasant Revolts

In November and December 1905, the struggle which the peasants waged against tho landlords became increasingly intense. Peasant revolts broke out in 170 counties, more than a third of the total number of counties in European Russia. In November there wert^ about 800 cases of peasants seizing landlords' estates. Of exceptional dimensions were the peasant revolts in the Saratov, Kursk and Tambov Gubernias and in tho Ukraine — in the Kharkov and Chernigov Gubernias, where tho peasants wrecked 272 landlords’ country-seats. In Latvia tho peasants organized several hun- dred revolutionary committees. In Guria the peasant “Red Hundn^ls” drove out all tho tsar’s oflioials and established revolutionary rule. The peasants’ struggle and preparation for armed insurrection in Trans- caucasia proceeded under the direct leadership of Comrade Stalin.

Preparations for Armed Insurrection

In November 1905 Lenin, compelled till then to live the life of an exile abroad, returned to Russia, took charge of the Party leadership of the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat and set to work to prepare for an armed insurrection. While engaged in the colossal task of reorganizing the Party to meet the altered conditions, he at the same time edited Novaya Zliizn^ the first legal Bolshevik newspaper, and wrote articles for it on the fundamental problems of the revolution and the tactics and or- ganization of the Party.

On Lenin’s instructions the Party organizations procured arms, formed workers’ fighting squads and organized their military training. The Bolsheviks also conducted extensive revolutionary propaganda among the armed forces.

In December 1905, a Bolshevik Party Conference was held in Tam- merfors, in Finland. Here Lenin and Stalin met for the first time. The conference discussed the question of armed insurrection.While the con- ference was in progress news was received of the outbreak of the insur- rection in Moscow. On Lenin’s proposal the conference broke up to allow the delegates to return to their respective localities in order to take the lead of the insurrection.

By tlie beginning of December the position of the tsarist autoc- racy had improved. By this time the more reliable regular army units had been transferred from Manchmua to European Russia. The foreign banlteis hastened to the aid of tsarism, for they feared they would lose the capital they had invested in Russia and that a victory of the Russian revolution would kindle the flames of socialist revo- lution in Europe, They helped the tsar’s government to meet the more urgent payments of interest on loans and promised another large loan for the suppression of the revolution.

The immense sweep of the revolution frightened the liberals who, therefore, began to support the autocracy in its struggle against the workers and peasants. The Mensheviks continued their treacherous tactics and frustrated the insurrection where preparations were being made for it, or where it had already commenced.

On December 2, the St. Petersburg Soviet of Workers’ Deputies adopted the so-called financial manifesto in which it called upon the inhabitants to demand their savings bank deposits and wages in gold. Next day the government arrested the Soviet. The St. Petersburg proletariat was unable to answer this challenge of the autocracy by an insurrection, for the treacherous policy which had been pursued by the Menshevilc and Trotskyite leadership of the Soviet had left them unprepared for such action.

The Armed Insurrection in Moscow

The Moscow/ Soviet, which was led by Bolsheviks, began actively to prepare for an armed insurrection from the very first day of its existence. As a result of the agilatiou c'oucliictod by t-lio ’JjolHlioviks, uiiroHi. broke out among tlu* troops of t.lio Moseovr garrison. Tlio iirsi to revolt was tho Jlostov llcgiinont. On Ooueinbei' !2, the men arreste<l their ohieors aiul clceted a HokUems’ CJoinmittco to eoiulnct tiie regiiuoiit s aifains. 'J'lio otha?* niiits of ilio Moscow garrison, ho\vev<n*, failed to sn])port the rovolt and it vras crushed by the evening of ])ec<unber -t.

On .December 5 a eonlereiic.e of Mos(U)vv 1 bolsheviks resolved to urge the Moscow Soviet to procla-ini a general strike with the view of doveloj)ing it into an armed insurreetion.

Tile general strike eommeneed in the morning of December 7. Owing to tho shortage of firearms tho workers in tiio faetorios forged cold-steel weapons. Abpnt !2,000 Avorkers (almost half of them Bolshe- viks) joined the lighting squads, ytreot demonstrations, meetings and collisions witii the police occurred in tiio working-class districts. The Astrakhan Bogiment came out in full fighting kit to assist tho insurgents, but it was intereex)t(^(l by the Cossaefe, completely sur- rounded and eain])clled to return to barraeks, TJie other regiments were also tionliiKul to barraeks because tliey were ‘hmreliable.” Thc‘ Moscow garrison Avavenul. Of tho 15,000 men avIio constituted tlii' garrison only 1,300 Dragoons were on the side of tlie autocracy; the Governor tlonoral of Mcjscoav s(‘iit urgent messages to St. Petersburg pleading for the dispatch of otluu* troojis. The revolutionaries allowed tlio op])(>rtunity to sli]) by and the gOA'crnmeut sucecodod in coping with iho unrest in tht^ Moscow garrison.

The men of the Nikolayevskaya Bail way (uoav the October Rail- way) did not join the strike. As a cousoqueneo, the tsarist goA^ci*umoiif was able to send ilie Semyouovsky Guards Regiment from St. Peters- burg and artillery from IVcr (now Kalinin) to sup]iro8s the insurrec- tion in Moscow. The police arrested the loader's of tho insurrection, wlio had been appointed by the Moscow Committee of the Party, and ilispersod a mass meeting that was being held in the Aquarium Park, by armed force.

In the ovening of December 9, troops surrounded Fiedler’s School, where the fighting squads were assembled, and bombarded it with artillery. The demolition of the school infuriated the masses. In re- sponse to the appeal of the fighting squads, and in many cases on their own accord, the peoj^le of Moscow erected barricades, using telegraph poles, sleighs, packing oases, barrels, wooden planks and so forth. That night Moscow was covered with barricades. On December 15, after the arrival of the troops from St. Petersburg, the barricades were bombarded by artillery; machine guns were posted on the belfries of the Moscow churches and monasteries. Unable to hold out against artillery and machine guns, the fighting squads retreated, but fought back, heroically defending every inch of ground, and concentrated in the Presnya District of Moscow (now called Krasnaya [E.ed* Presnya). The staff of the insurrection had its headquarters in a large textile mill knoAvn as the Trekhgornaya Mills, hut the leading body of the insuxTection — ^the Moscow Committee of the Party — had been arrested on the eve of the outbreak. Deprived of central leadership, the in- surrection deteriorated into isolated district fighting. The workers waged a guerilla fight against the troops; they hesitated to fight their way to the centre of the city, and confined themselves to the rlcfcnsivo. This was the main i*easoii for the weakness of the Moscow insurreotLon.

Nevcrthcdcss, Presnya held out against the tsar s troops anuod with artillery, machine guns and rifJos, for ten wliolo days. Q-lio district was subjected to continuous bombardinont. Houses burned and col- lapsed, but the workers remained siauncli. Fighting squads from other industrial centres in the Moscoav Itegion Jiastcncjd to i.ho aid of the Moscow revolutionaries. A workers’ squad led by M. V. Frunze arrived from Ivanovo-Voznesensk. Feasants su])])lied broad to the lighters, who were aided by the entire ]) 0 ])u]ation of the Presnya District. But the workers of the other towns, and of St. Petersburg in particular, proved unable to ensure the victory of tlie armed insurrection in Moscow.

Weighing up the situation, the Moscow Committee of the Party and the Moscow Soviet of Workers’ Deputies resolved to stop the armed insurrection on the night of December 18. In obedience to this order the squads operating in the Presnya District stopped fighting. Although all the railways were now occupied by tsarist troops, an engine driver named Ulvhtomsky offered to run a train carrying the fighters out of Moscow along the Kazanskaya Railway. The heroic railwayman, driving the train out of Moscow at terrific speed, through a hail of machine-gun and rifle I'ne, succeeded in saving the revolutionary fighters.

The tsar’s troops dealt frightfully with the ])oaceful popula- tion, the workers and their families, ilundroda of thorn wore shot without trial or investigation. Over a thousand workers perished in the ooui'so of the suppression of the insuiToction. A punitive expe- dition on the Mosoow-Kazanskaya Railway shot hundreds of workers acooiding to a list which had been previously drawn upbyth'^ gendarmes. Engine driver Ukhtoinsky was also shot. Years later, when Soviet rule was established, onj of the stations on the Mosoow-Kazanskaya Railway and thj adjacent district of the Moscow Region Wv-re named after him.

Insurrections in Other Towns

The workers also rose to over- throw tsarist rule in a number of other towns; and so too did the oppressed nationalities in Russia. In the Ukraine, the insurgent railwaymen, miners and metal workers in the Donotz Basin captured the extremely important Ekaterininskaya (now Stalin) Railway. In Gorlovka, the centre of the insurrection, the tsarist authorities were overthrown and replaced by representatives of the workers. The insurgents were armed with home-made swords and daggers and a small number of revolvers. Although so poorly armed, 4,000 revo- lutionaries heroically fought a 5-hour battle with Cossacks, losing 300 men during the encounter. Battles with police and troops took place all over the Donotz Basin. In Lugansk, fighting squads were formed and the strike was led by K. E. Voroshilov. Tim gendannos had arrested Voroshilov in the summer of 1905, but in December thousands of workers marched to the prison where he was confined and released their “Eed General,” as the workers, already at that time, called him.

In Novorossiisk power was captured by the local Soviet of Workers* Deputies, which was led by Bolsheviks. The City Governor and authorities fled. People’s courts were elected and were recognized by the whole population. The burden of taxation was placed entirely upon the propertied classes.

In Sochi, in the North Caucasus, the insurgent people capturedi the garrison and the tsarist administration; and in the rural districts of the Sochi Region power passed into the hands of the people. Soviets were set up in all centres. The people of Sochi were helped by ‘"'Red Hundreds” sent from Guria.

In Vladikavkaz, the Ossetinian cavalry unit rose in revolt in December 1905, and it was only with the aid of Cossacks that the revolt of this national-minority unit was suppressed.

In Guria, the insurgent people in many districts seized power and the landlords’ land. Here the insurrection was led by the Caucasian Bolsheviks, headed by Comrade Stalin.

In Tiflis, the Mensheviks, by arrangement with the tsar’s Viceroy, undertook to maintain *‘order” against the armed insurrection, and to enable them to carry out this police function the Viceroy provided them with 500 rifles and quantities of ammunition.

In Siberia — in Krasnoyarsk and Chita — troops joined the in- surgent workers and, as a consequence, seats in the Soviets of these two cities were also occupied by Soldiers’ Deputies. In Krasno- yarsk, the soldiers, jointly with the workers, barricaded themselves in one of the railway workshops, and fighting a regular battle, bravely repulsed the attacks of the troops which were sent to suppress the insurrection.

The insurrection on the Siberian Railway was brutally suppressed by two punitive expeditions. One expedition, under the command of General Moller-Zakomelsky, moved up from European Russia, while the other, under the command of General Rennenkampf, moved to meet the former from Harbin. Shootings without trial or investi- gation marked the trail of these punitive expeditions. One of those who were shot, by direct order of Moller-Zakomelsky, was the old Bolshevik and Lenin’s pupil I. V. Babushkin, who was caught while transporting arms.

Ruthless operations by punitive expeditions were also conducted in Central Russia, in the Ukraine, in Poland, Latvia, Estonia, Trans- caucasia and Siberia. ‘"Make fewer arrests, shoot more,” “Don’t argue, shoot,” such were the orders issued by those butchers, the tsar’s ministers, and by the tsar himself . Thousands were executed and tens of thousands were arrested and sentenced to penal servitude or exile. The peasants were subjected to wholesale flogging.

Tlio l>oiirgeoi,sio wolt'-oiiicd the su]>|)mswion of the iosurreobioii. The MonsheviliH ccoHiiml the inniurgont worhiM'H. Plokhanov wrote: "‘They should not h«avc taken to orins/’ To this Loniu rctortt^cl: “‘On tlio eontrary, we Hhould have taken to arniMmoro rowolutely, onergot- ically and aggi'OHsivtdy; w'c should have oxplaim^d to the masses that it was impossible to coniine oursclvc^s to a pc'atu'ful strila^ and that, a f<'a-rless iuul relentless arim'd light was indispensable'” (V. L Loiiin, Mected Works, Voi. HI, IMosoow, lOol-, p. lUS),

Tile l^cceinbor insurrection elided in defeat. 'Pho reasons i‘or the defeat were tlio following: the peasants faih^d to siqiport the insurrec- tion ill time. The major part of tJie army was on the side of tsarism. The insurrection was not sufficiently organized, and it broke out in different iilaccs at different ^times. The insnrgmits lacked suffioioni. arms. The insurgents pursuoci defonsiv'^e and not offensive tactics. Tho Mensheviks and Trotsky, together with tho Socialist-Revolutionaries, sabotaged tho insurrection and diil oveiything they could to hinder it. Tn the Caucasus — in Tillis — the Mensheviks openly helped tho tsarist authorities to suppress the insuri'cctiou.

Tlio December insurreetiou marked tho ‘jieak of tho revolution. .After its (hdeat the revolutionary tide gradually subsided.

Retreat of the Revolution

The Revolutionary Struggle in 1906

After tho defeat of the December insurrootion the second period of tho first Russian revolution commenced. Tho workers and the revolutionary peasants ret/roated slowly, fighting all the time. In JOOG, fresh strata of workers entorod tho struggle. Theso wore tho workers omployod in tho unskilled trades in tho industrial centres, and those in the less in<lustrially-devoloped districts who had taken little part in tlie struggle in 1905. The number of workers involved in strikes in 1906 cxcu^cded 1,000,000 and in 1907 it amouiitcd to 740,000. In 1006 and 1907 tho strike movement was weaker than in 1906, but it was on a much .higher level than in tho jieriod before 1905,

The strike struggle waged by the agricultural labourers bore a revolu- tionary character; the labourers organized a boycott of the landlords. Tho peasant movement spread very widely and affected about three hundred counties, including many that had not been affected by tho move- ment in 1005. In many cases the peasants drove the landlords from their estates.

In tho spring of 1906 umost became more frequent in tho army .as well, and oven affected tJio tsar’s guards.

Simultaneously with tlie X)easaut moviuncnt in nK)6, the movement for national liberation assumed wider proportions in the Ihiltic Provinces and iu Transcaucasia. Here regular battles took place between the peasants and the tsar’s forces.

The Elections to the First State Duma

While crushing the revolution by armed force, the autocracy also began, as Lenin put it. "‘to crush popular liberties bv means of a monarchist ‘constitu- tion.’”

On December 11, 1905, during the armed insurrection, a law was promulgated governing the elections to the State Duma. Th*s law was needed by the autocracy to deceive the people. It granted electoral rights mainly to the propertied classes — ^tlie landlords and the capitalists. As for the electoral rights received by the workers and peasants, they contained considerable restrictions. The suffrage was far fjom un*versal. Agricultural labourers, day labourers and many other categories of workers “were not granted the vote at all, nor were women, the men in the armed forces, students or persons under the age of twenty-five. The suffrage was not equal. For urban electors a high property qualification was fixed, which meant that they had to be in receipt of large incomes from the renting of liouses or from commercial or industrial enterprises. The voters were divided up into four curiae or voters’ groups: landowning (landlords), urban (the bourgeoisie), peasants and workers. The rate of rexire- sontation for the different curiae was not the same. The landowning groiij) could elect one elector for every 2,000 voters, the urban groui> could elect one for every 7,000 voters, the peasants’ group one for every 30,000 voters and the workers’ group one for every 90,000 voters. The elections were not direct, but went through a series of inter- mediary stages. For the peasants there were actually four stages. First, the peasants in each village elected electors to a volost meeting which elected two delegates to a county meeting. The county meeting elected electors to a gubernia election meeting, w^hich at last elected the deputies to the Duma. Voting was^ in fact not secret.

Witte calculated that with the aid of the peasants, who still re- tained some faith in the tsar, he would succeed in securmg the election of a monarchist State Duma, and therefore, in the electoral law he draft- ed he allowed the peasant electors 40 per cent of the total number of seats. In February 1906, the government issued a supplementary regu- lation governing the elections to the State Duma, which still further restricted the electoral rights of the workers and urban demoerati4* voters compared with the law of December 11 .

The elections to the State Duma took x>lace in March and April 1906, in an atmosphere of the most brutal police terrorism. The Bolshe- viks adhered to the decision which was adoiited by the xinited Central Committee of the Party to boycott the elections. Nevertheless, they ^poko at election meetings and exx>osed the decox)tioii perxietrated by the tsar and tlio troacliorons role played by the liberals, and agitated for armed insurrection. The organized class-conscious workers took no part in the voting. The Mensheviks in the Caucasus violated the Party’s boycott decision and secured the return of their leaders to the First State Duma. In BaJeu, however, the only largo industrial ceutro in tlu‘. Caucasus, the Bolsheviks cllecfccd the boycott of the election.

The Fourth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.

Working under the direct leadc^rship of Lenin, the St. Petersburg Committee of the Party steadily gained influence among the workers. Even tlic Mensheviks were obliged to admit that the proletariat had followed not their lead but that of the Bolsheviks during the December insurrectioiu The split in the Party, however, was preventing the establishment of working-class unity. And so, when the demand arose among the workers for Party unity it received the support of the Bolshe- viks. The Mensheviks, unable to resist the pressure of the masses of the workers, were also obliged to agree to unity. To this end, the Fourth Congress (known as the Unity Congress) of the R.S.D.L.P. was hold in Stockholm in April 1900, At this congress the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks formally united, but luaintainod their independ- ent organizational existence as two factions within the Party* The Bolshevik organizations had sufFcu’cd sovoroly from police raids and arrests after the December insurrection. The Menshe- viks, on tho other hand, had gained strerngth by accepting int<> their ranks numerous roprosentativos of tho petty-bourgeois intelli- gentsia who had nothing in common with tho proletariat. Tliat was why tho Mensheviks had a majority at this congress. When the congress discussed the agrarian question the Bolsheviks uphold Lenin’s program for the confiscation of the landlords* estates and the nationalization of all tho land. Tho Mensheviks, however, sup- ported a program for tho ‘‘municipalization of the land.” This was aimed at a compromise with the remnants of serfdom and with tsarism, for it proposed that the land should be transferred to thc^ existing Zemstvos, which were to rent it to tho peasants.

Taking advantage of their chance majority, tho Mensheviks secured the adoption of their agrarian program.

The First State Duma

Although the December insurrection was suppressed, the tsar’s government was compelled to convene the State Duma. The autocracy, 1 owevor, did all it could to restrict its powers. Thus, at the end of April 1906, three days before tho Duma was to open, so-called ‘‘Fundamental State Laws,” were published, in which it was affirmed that "‘supremo auto- cratic state power is vested in tho Emperor of all tho Russias.” The tsar retained the right to amend tho fundamental laws and to issue a number of exceptionally important laws without submitting them to tho Duma. Furthermore, the State Council was given equal powers with the Duma. The Council was reformed and made to consist half of high government officials appointed by the tsar and half of elected lepiesentatives of the nobility, the Zemstvos, the universities and the clergy. Bills passed by the Duma had to be passed by the State Council before they could be sent to the tsar. He, in his ,turn, had the final say as to whether to accept or reject them. Thus, the legislative rights of the Duma promised in the Manifesto of October 17, were almost nullified. Witte, with whose name the Manifesto of October 17 was associated, could not be used to carry out this avowedly reactionary policy and he was there- fore dismissed. Goremykin, a representative of the reactionary bu- reaucracy, became President of the Council of Ministers.

Nevertheless, although the rights of the electors and the scope of activity of the State Duma were severely restricted, the Duma did to some extent limit the powers of the tsarist autocracy.

The composition of the Duma after the elections also proved to hf‘ unfavourable for the tsar’s government. Of the 624 Deputies 204 were peasants, hut these were not the sort of peasants Count Witte had counted on. The majority of the peasant Deputies formed what was called the Trudovik group, or Group of Toil, which, at first, the workers' Deputies also joined. The Social-Democratic group in the Duma numbered 18 Deputies. The largest single group in the First State Duma was that of the Constitutional Democrats (Cadets) who numbered 179 D puties. In their hunt for peasant votes during the elections, the Cadets had described themselves as the “Party of Popular Freedom.” The Rights (from the Black Hundreds to the Octobrists) had 44 Deputies.

As a result of the constitutional illusions spread among them by the Cadets, Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, the peasants be- lieved that they would be able to get land by peaceful means through the Duma and had therefore elected their Deputies with keen expectations. The Cadets proposed that only a part of the landlords* land be trans- ferred to the peasants, and then only at a “fair assessment. ”The peasants kn^w from their own experience that the “fair assessment” of the land- lords was two or three times higher than the market price of the land, and as the attitude of the government and of the Cadets, as the leading party in the Duma, towards their urgent demands for land became clear, their constitutional illusions were dispelled. The awakening of the class- consciousness of the peasant Deputies was quickened by the unceasing propaganda of the Bolsheviks who, by their policy, enabled the work- ers’ Deputies in the Duma to take a correct proletarian class stand on a number of questions. ‘

Lenin and Stalin denounced the Cadets as enemies of the working peasantry and called upon the peasants to act in unison with the work- ers, to form and strengthen a proletarian and peasant alliance, for, they urged, only hucIi iin iilliioice conJd bring the p(JAsantM victory iii tlicir struggle for land . As a result of the ju’opagauda conducted by tlie Social- Democrats, the Trudovik group introduced a land bill in the Duma ’[)ro-. viding for the coni]>uls()ry alienation of all landlord laud; it proposed tlie uatioiialization of all the land, including peasant allotments. Tlio im])as- sumeds])ecehes delivered by the peasant Deputies during the discussion of the agrarian question in tlio Duma I'cvcTberatod tliroughout the country and had a rousing elTcct upon the ]u>asantry. In the ])eriod from May to August 1000, ])oasant unrest siiroad to 50 })cr cent of all the coun- ties in the country. The growth of revolutionary activity among the jicasants greatly alarmed the tsarist govennnont. It issued an official statement to the peasants in which it declared that while it would nev- er agi'oe to tlie comxuilsory alienation of tlie landlords* land, it was willing to buy at state expense plots 'of land voluntarily sold bv' landownersandrcselltlieseplotsto the peasants at a jirice within their means. In answer to this declaration of war -upon the peasantry the Tru- dovik grou]> tried to get carried through the Duma an a])peal to the peo- ple, but this was defeated .by the Cadets. The government was scared by the turn which the discussion of the land question liatl talnm and deeidod to disj)orso the Duma. On duly 8, 14)0(), it ])roclaiine(l the dissolution of the Dinna on tlio grounds that tiie peasants “in a number of gubernias, had taken the ])uth of o])eii plunder, the seizure of other jicoxile^sprop- <^rty and disobediencse to th(’> hw and the lawful authorities.’’ After the disioersion of the First State Duma, the Minister of the Interior Stolypiu was ap])ointcd Frosideut. of tlie Couneii of Ministers in ])lace of Goremykin, who was (umshlered incapable of waging a deter- mined struggle against the revolution, Lenin summed up Btolyjiin’s political biography iu the following brief terms: ‘"A landlord and a mar- shal of thonobilty, he was appointed governor in 1002, under Plelive. gained ‘fame* iu the eyes of the tsar and the reactionary court clique by his brutal rojirisals against tlie peasants ami the cruel punishment he meted out to them (in the Saratov Province), organized Black Hun- <ired gangs and pogroms in 1005 (the iiogrom in Balashov), became Min- ister of the Interior in JOOG and Presulent of tlio Council of Ministers after the dispersal of tlio First State Duma” ( V. 1 . Lenin, Selected W orks^ Two-Vol. ed., VoL I, Moscow, 1940, p. 486).

The situation in the country remained revolutionary. In the sum- • mor of 1006 large-scale revolts of soldiers and sailors broke out in »Sveaborg and Kronstadt. The Bolshevik military organization made extensive preiDaratious for an insuiTCction among the naval and military forces stationed in Finland, but the iusurrootioiH in Svoaborg and Kron- stadt broke out ^irematurely, before these ])reparations wore eomplotod. Warships and artillery were sent against the insurgent saihws and the insurrections wen^ crushed. The insurgents were eourt-juartialled and executed.

To punislitlie revolutionaries, Stolypin, in August 1906, instituted field courts-martial, which up to April 1907, sentenced over a thousand men to death. Execution on the gallows became a common practice.

In an, endeavour to split the ranks of the peasantry who had been united in their struggle for land during the revolution, Stolypin, on November 9, 1906, in the period between the First and the Second Du- mas, issued a decree granting the peasants the right to leave the peas- ant communities and to acquire definite ownership of their allot- ments.

Owing to the intensification of the peasants’ struggle for land, the tsar’s government again entered into negotiations with the govern- ments of Germany and Austria for their intervention in Russian affairs.

On July 7 (20), 1906, on the very eve of the dispersion of the First State Duma, the Bolshevik newspaper Echo published an article by Lenin entitled “The Plots of the Reaction and the Threats of the Po-' grom-mongers” in which he exposed the machinations of the tsar and of his German and Austrian friends. After quoting the rapture the govern- ment newspaper Eossiya had expressed over the forthcoming interven- tion, Lenin went on to say: “These measures consist in preparing the armed forces of Germany and Austria for the invasion of Russia if the cause of freedom is victorious or on the point of victory. The Berlin government is already in communication with the Austrian govern- ment on this question. Both governments have admitted that ‘under certain circumstances active intervention in the internal affairs of' Russia with the object of suppressing or restricting this [Lp., revolu- tionary] movement may become desirable and useful. . . .’

“Thus, there can be no doubt about the plot that is being hatched by international counter-revolution. The Russian government is call- ing in the aid offoreign troops against the Russian people. Negotiations for this have been and are being conducted, and have aheady resulted in a fairly definite agreement” (’V. I. Lenin, Collected Worhs, Vol. IX, Moscow, 1937, Russ, ed., p. 411).

This article helped still further to expose the counter-revolutionary designs of tsarism.

The Second State Duma

The experience of the First Duma showed that the Duma could be used as a platform from which to expose the crimes of tsarism and the treachery of the liberals, and also to fight for the leadership of the peasants. Consequently, on Lenin’s proposal, the Bolsheviks decided to take part in the elections to the Second State Du- ma.Theresult of the part^'cipation of the Left-wing parties in the elections was that the Second Duma was more radical than the First. The Cadets won only about half the seats they had held in the First Duma (98- as against 170). TheTrudovik group, together with the Socialist-Revolutionaries, bad 157 scats, compared with 94 in the First Duma. The

Sooial-Domocrats won 65 seats compared with 18 in the First Duma. But although the Second Duma was ihoro radical than the First, it was weaker than tlio latter .The revolutionary tide was subsiding. The Bolsheviks, however, sot tliomselves the task of utilizing the Duma to expose tsarism and the treacherous liberals. The activities of the Boh shovik Deputies in the Duma wore directed by Louin, and he formulated the main points of their speeches on the most important questions. The Mensheviks, however, wanted to engage in peaceful legislative work in alliance with the liberals, under the government of Stolypin, the hangman.

At the Fifth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. which was hold in London in April and May 1907, the Bolsheviks strongly denounced the treach- erous tactics which the Mcnshevilcs pursued in the Second State Duma. At this congress the Bolsheviks were in the majority, and the congress adopted the Bolshevik resolution calling for the systematic exposure *of the counter-revolutionary tactics of the liberals.

Tho election to the Second State Duma had shown that the ex- isting electoral law, oven though it did greatly restrict the franchise for tho working })eoplo, could not ensure tho election of a Duma that would satisfy the tsarist autocracy. Consequently, the government made preparations to dissolve tho Second Duma and to amend tho electoral law with tho object of still further restricting the franchise for the workers and peasants. To provide an excuse for dispersing the Duma, the tsar’s govornmont resorted to outright provocation, accusing the Social-Democratic group in the Second State Duma of hatching a “plot against tho state.” The char.^o was a deliberately false one, and had been fabricated by the secret police. On June 1, 1907, Stolypin demanded the impeachment of tho Social- Democratic Deputies. Tlie Cadets were already willing to yield to the government’s demand, but on Juno 3, 1907, the government dissolved the Duma and promulgated a now electoral law that was calculated to ensure a majority in the next Duma for a bloc of tho landlords and the big bourgeoisio. Since then that day has been known as tho coup d'itat of June 3, for tho tsar’s government had violated its own Manifesto of October 17, 1905, according to which no laws could be passed without the consent of the Duma. The Social-Dem- ocratic Deputies in the Second Duma were arrested and tried by a tsarist court and sentenced to penal servitude and exile.

Reasons for the Defeat of the Revolution of 1905

Tho coup d*4tat of Juno 3, 1907, signified the temporary defeat of tho revo- lution.

Already at that time the Bolsheviks attributed the defeat of the first Russian revolution to the fact that a linn alliance between the workers and peasants had not yet been formed. As Lonin wrote: “This alliance was si3ontaneous, not formulated, and often unconscious” (V. I. Lenin, Gollected Works, Vol. XIV, Moscow, 1937, Russ, ed., ]). 15). The peasants did not yet sufficiently understand that the tsar and the landlords constituted a smgle gang of the bitterest enemies of the people, and that in order to overthrow the landlords it was necessary to overthrow the tsar too. Nor did they yet realize that the only faithful ally and leader they had was the working class. As a consequence, a large section of the jieasantry failed to support the armed straggle of the workers against tsarism. Even those peasants who fought against the landlords and tsarism lacked sufficient political consciousness and organization.

The army, which consisted mainly of peasants and reflected the inadequate class consciousness of the peasantry, had not yet gone over to the side of the insurgents, and the bulk of it helped tsarism to crush the revolution.

Nor were the workers sufficiently united in their activities. The strike wave reached its peak in 1905, but the intensity of the strike * movement varied according to districts. While in industrial regions like St. Petersburg, Baku, Riga and other places, every worker went on strike no less than four or five times in 1905, in the districts of the Moscow Gubernia every worker went on strike only once in the year, and in a number of industrially less-developed gubernias, some work- ers had not struck at all. In 1906, the number of strikers dropped in the more-mdustrialized gubernias, whereas in the least-industrialized gubernias, the backwoods, as Lenin called them, the number of strikers rose. But by that time the vanguard of the working class had already been weakened.

In the period of 1905 to 1907, the working class still lacked the unity necessary for the victory of the revolution. At first the Party was split into two factions; later it united, bub only formally. The Bolsheviks pursued a consistent revolutionary policy, but the Men- sheviks still exercised influence among a certain section of the workers and retarded the development of the. revolution.

Thus, m the first Russian revolution its three main forces: workers, peasants and soldiers, had not yet merged in one common torrent.

The tsar’s government received the assistance of the foreign impe- rialists, who were apprehensive about the fate of their investments in Russia and feared that the revolution would spread to Western Europe.

In the spring of 1906, the French bankers granted the tsar loans amounting to a billion francs. Wilhelm II mustered a whole army to invade Russia in support of the tsarist autocracy. An important factor that helped tsarism was the conclusion of peace with Japan, which strengthened the position of the tsar’s government. Moreover, to suppress the revolution the tsar could use the military forces that were released from Manchuria.

The Significance of the Revolution of 1905–1907

The heroic struggle which the workers and peasants waged in the revolution of 1905-1907 dealt a heavy blow at tsarism, it sa])ped its foniKlations and compelled it to make concessions. All its iittcjiupts to restore the oonditious that had existed in llnssia hetoro tlu^ nwohd-ion ]>rovod futile, it could not recover from the blows which tlu^ revolution inflict- ed n])on it.

For the workers and iu\isauts of Itiissia, the revolution of 1005- 1907 served as a great schooling in ])olltical struggle, it roused millions of working people to political life and riw<ialed to them the relations of all classes to each other. The masses acquired enormous exjierionco in employing the general strike and armed in- surrection, and this they utilized in their subsequent struggles. The working class created the Soviets of Workers’ Deputies, the embryonic form of the dictatorship of the proletariat. This experience helped the workers and peasants to achieve victory twelve years later, in October .November 1917. Hence, the revolution of 1905 was the dross rehearsal of the Great October Socialist Rovolubiou.

The international signiiicaiieo of the revolution of 1905 was also very groat. The first Russian revolution took place thirty-five years after the sup])rossion of tlio Paris Oommnne. It took jilacc in the e])och of imiiorialisin. As Comrade Stalin wrote: ‘‘Tims, the revolution against tsarism verged on and had to pass into a revolution against imperialism, into a proletarian revolution” (J. Stalin, Problems of Leninisyn^ Moscow, 1945, p. 37). A direct result of the Russian revolu- tion was the development of the political struggle in Austria in October 1905, in Germany in January 1900, in France in May 1900, and in Asia (the i evolutions in Peasia, Turkey and China).

Millions of woikeis and peasants all over the world have boon and ai e being taught by the experience of the fii st Russian revolution of 1905.

The Stolypin Reaction (1908–1912)

The Third of June Monarchy

The Industrial Depression of 1904–1908

By the time of the defeat of the first Russian revolution the capitalist world was entering into another economic crisis (1907-1909), which followed on the heels of the temporary industrial revival of 1903-1907.

In tsarist Russia the crisis of the early 1000 ’s lasted much longer than the ordinary periodical crises in Europe, and in 1904 it was . followed by a depression.

Tte unsuccessful war against Japan, the falling o/f in government contracts and railway construction, and a series of crop failures which eaused the already restricted home market to shrink still further, had all served to prolong the industrial crisis of the early 1900’s. The new world economic crisis aggravated the industrial depression in Eussia.

The course of the crisis may bo illustrated by the output of pig iron in that period. Taking the output of pig iron in 1900 at 100, the index number of the output in 1903 was 84. As a consequence of the increased demand created by the war against Japan the index number rose in 1904 to 102, but in 1905-1906 it dropped again, to 93, and in the period of depression from 1907 to 1909 it did not rise above 97. Only in 1910, after a ten years’ state of crisis, did the output exceed that of the beginning of the century.

All the basic industries, including the oil industry, were in a state of stagnation. The coal industry of the Donetz Basin alone was some- what less aifected by the crisis and the depression. The textile industry, the output of which had risen somewhat by 1907, remained stagnant during the period of the depression.

After the revolution of 1905, important changes took place in industry. The concentration of industry increased. Capitalist com- bines — trusts and syndicates — ^grew rapidly. During the period of the industrial depression the big banlcs became more powerful and took a direct part in the reorganization of industry, strengthening and enlarg- ing some plants, closing down others, and combining and reorganizing still others. For the pimpose of financing Russian industry the French banlters promoted the formation of a banking S 3 mdicate known as the Russo-French Finance Company. Capitalism in Russia became in- creasingly monopolistic, imperialist capitalism.

In many cases the factory owners closed down their plants for a time in order to install new machinery, to reorganize the management and to combine with other plants. The unemployment that was created by the crisis assumed a spasmodic character, and this gave rise to a feeling of insecurity among the workers. Male workers were dismissed wholesale and!" replaced by cheap female and child labour. The material conditions of the workers sharply deteriorated. The employers tried to force the workers back to the conditions of labour that had existed before the revolution of 1905. The working day was lengthened to ten and even to twelve hours. Piece rates for all categories of work were re- duced, and fines again became the rule. The cost of living steadily rose.

The large federations of employers that sprang up in 1906 and 1907 in St, Petersburg and Moscow formed a united front with tsarism against the workers. The employers’ organizations discharged the more class-conscious and militant workers. These workers were blacklisted and could not fi.nd employment anywhere. The factory owners often practised wholesale dismissals of workers.

Counter-Revolution Rampant

After tlireo years of revolution, Russia passed thro\ijfj;li years of blootlshod and rani])aiit cpimtcr-rcv- olution. Lon ill described this period as years ‘‘of tiio black Duma, rampant violence and opju'essiou, the onslauglit of the ea])italists upon the workers, tJie Joss of tJio gains wliich ilu* workers had won'"' {V. 1. Lenin, Collected Ifo-rfe, Vol. XiV, Moscow, HKl?, Russ, cd., p. 391). TJio tsarist government, the landlonls an<l tlie capitalists wreaked vcngiaiice upon the vvorJeers and ])(^asants for the revolution.

In Siberia, in the Caucasus and in the Raltic rrovinccs, punitive expeditions continued their atrocities, sotting lire to and destroying scores of villages, killing thousands of Avorkers and ])oasants without trial, and flogging women and children . For a long time the tsarist government feared to return to tlieir regular stations the troops which had been sent to suppress the revolution. Tlio troops in the central gubernias wore reinforced with ti’oops drawn from the frontier regions, as the tsarist axitocraoy believed that the ‘"^internal enemy” was more dangerous than the foj’oigii foe.

Tlie field courts-martial that o])oratod in 1 000 and 1 907 Avere replaced by military courts. The entire country Avas dotted with gallows, which the people dubbed “^Stolypin ne<}kties,” iiftor the head of the tsar’s govo 3 'nment, Stolypin. Lenin wrote regarding this period; “There has never before been in Russia such rampant ])orsoeution by tsarism, and during these Jive years tlu^ gallows boat tlu^ record of three centuries of Russian history.” Rundmls of thousands of people Avero flung into prison, and there the revolutionaries wore siibjecsted to torture and limtal ill-treatment, I^or having j)articipatod in strikes or revolution- ary demonstrations woi'kors Avero sonteiieod to long years of penal servitude.

After the coup (Velai of June 3, the Black Hundreds, who were organized by the League of the Russian People, intonsiliod their pogrom activities. Black Hundred outrages Avore iiarticularly rife in Odessa, Avhere organized gangs of hooligans marched through the town carrying rubber truncheons and revolvers and boating up ])assers-by. Not a year passed but what the Black Hundred hooligans organized a bloody pogi‘om against the Jews. Throughout the country x^i^^datory raids by the police and gendarmes upon the workers’ organizations became more frequent. In 1907, 169 trade unions wore sujjprcssed, in 1908, over 100 wore sux)X)resscd, in 1909, 96 Avere siq^xwcssed. Workers’ newspapers and magazines were banned. The workers’ cultural and educational organizations that managed to survive dragged out a miserable existence.

Tsarism acted as the bitterest enemy of the jiooplo. In a general description he gave of tho 3rd of Juno monarchy, Lenin wrote; . The tsarist monarchy is tho rallying centre of that gang of Black Hundred landlords (first among whom is Romanov) which has turned Russia into the terror not only of Europe, but now also of Asia, the gang which has developed tyranny, robbery and embezzlement of state funds by government officials, systematic violence against the ^common people/ torment and torture of political opponents, etc., to absolutely excep- tional dimensions” (V. I. Lenin, Collected Worhs, Vol. XV, Moscow, 1937, Euss. ed,, p. 247).

The Third State Duma

The cou'p d’etat of the 3rd of June marked the opening of the offensive which tsarism launched against the gains won by the revolutionary masses; but it could not return entirely to the conditions that prevailed before the revolution. Although the revolution of 1905 sustained defeat, the revolutionary struggle which the working people had waged made it impossible for tsarism to rule by means of the old methods. After dispersing two Dumas, Nicholas II was obliged to convene the Third Duma. Another reason which dictated the necessity of maintaining the semblance of a representative institution in Russia was the growth of capitalism, the growing strength of the Russian bourgeoisie, and the unstable inter- national position of tsarism, wffiich was compelled to manoeuvre and give Europe the impression that Russia was a constitutional country. Above all, however, tsarism aimed at making the Third Duma a new class bulwark for itself by forming a bloc with the counter-revolu- tionary Russian bourgeoisie.

In the endeavour to ''retain power and revenues” for the rul- ing class of feudal landlords, tsarism — following the 1905 revolu- tion — took the second step (the first was taken in 1861) towards establishing a bourgeois monarchy, by consolidating the bloc with the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie. The political expression and embodiment of the 3rd of June bloc between the landlords and the bourgeoisie was the Third State Duma, convened on the basis of the new electoral law of June 3, 1907,

In conformity with this law, the landlords were allowed to elect one elector from every 230 voters, the bourgeoisie one from every thou- sand, the peasants one from every 60,000, and the workers only one from every 125,000. This law increased the number of landlord elec- tors almost fivefold, that of bourgeois electors sevenfold, compared with that provided for by the law of December 11, 1905, while the number of the worker and peasant electors was more than halved. The franchise for the non-Russian nationalities in Russia was still further restricted. The peoples of Central Asia were totally deprived of representation in the Duma. Poland was entitled to send only 12 Deputies instead of 35, and of these, two — ^the represent- atives of Waisaw and the Kholm Region — ^had to be Russians. European Russia was granted 403 seats in the Duma, but the “border regions” were given only 39,

Thus, the new electoral law ensured that the Third State Duma would consist of landlords and the bourgeoisie. In other words, it was not so much an olocted body as a body carefully chosen to suit the interests of tsarism. Of the members of the Tuird Duma, 202, or 46 per cent of the total, wore landlords.

The state of the parties rejircsontod in the. Duma also clearly proved that it was a bourgeois and landlord body. Tho Right-wing parties had 40 per cent of the seats, tho Octobrists 25 ])cr cent, the Cousti- tutional-Domoorata (Cadets) 23 per cent and tho Left-wing parties a little over 7 per cent. Tho rest of tho Deputies declared themselves to be non-party. No single party had an absolute majority in the Duma.

This latter fact enabled tlie tsarist government to manoeuvre and to base itself on the Black Hundred and Octobrist majority at one moment and on the Octobrist and Cadet majority at another, without having to fear serious op])osition from either of them. The obedient Octobrists voted for all the govoniinent projiosals either in alliance with tho Right-wing Black Hundreds or in alliance with the Cadets,

Tlio head of tho govormnnnt during tho 3rd of June bloc was Stoly- pin, one of tho most jmunincut rojirosontativos of the landed nobility, who were organized in the countor-rovoliitiouary organization known as tho Council of the United Nobility. With tho support of tho Octo- brists and Constitutioual-Domoorats, Stolypin launched an offensive against the workers and peasants and tJio working people in tho non- Russian national regions. The keynote of Stolyj)iii’s domestic policy was: “First pacification and then reforms.” Stotyxiin achieved “paci- fication” by moans of tho criiolost terrorism. Fearing another outburst of revolution, however, ho was obliged to introduce an agrarian refonn.

Stolypin's Agrarian Reform

The State of Agriculture

The agrarian, or laud question, was, as Lenin expressed it, the j^ivot of tho Russian boui*gcois-domocratic revolution. Tho problem was to break up tho vast landlord latifundia which were tho basis of the mediaeval bondage in which the peasants still found themselves and the major obstacle to tho development of caj)italism. After the revolution of 1905, 30,000 big landlords still owned 70,000,000 desyatins of land, while an almost equal amount belonged to 10,600,000 poor peasant households. The distribution of the land in this fashion kept agriculture in a state of extreme back- wardness.

Tlio landlords found it more profitable to rent land to tbo ])casants than to farm their land themselves on modern linos. Tho ])e.asants cultivated their own allotments and tho land which they rented from fjhe landlords with thoir primitive implements. As a rosuit, the general level of agriculture in Russia in the beginning of the twentieth century was as low as ever it was before. As far as yield is concerned, Russia stood almost at the bottom of the list of all the countries of the world. In the x^criod from 1909 to 1913 the average yield of grain in Russia was 45 xioods X)er dosyatin compared with 90 in France, 152 in Germany ajid 192 in Denmark. In respect to the mechanization of agriculture, Russia was equally far behind the advanced countries. The greater part of the peasants’ lands were ploughed with wooden ploughs, and grain was sown and threshed by hand. In 1910, there were employed in agriculture throughout the empire 3,000,000 primitive wooden ploughs, 7,000,000 wooden-handled ploughs, 6,000,000 wooden harrows and only 27,000 steam threshers. Tractors and electric ploughs were not even thought of.

After the revolution of 1905, the utter destruction of the old mediae- val system of landownei ship in Russia became particularly urgent. Still more acute than in 1861 became the struggle for one or the other of the two possible paths of development of capitalism in agriculture — the Prussian or the American. In 1907, Lenin wrote that there were two possibilities: “Either the Prussian type of evolution: the feudal landlord will become a Juiil?:er. The power of the landlords in the state will be consolulated for decades. Monarchy. ^A military despotism clothed in })arliamentary forms’ instead of democracy. The utmost inequality among the rural and among the rest of the population. Or the American tyx^e of evolution. Abolition of the landlord system. The peasant becomes a free farmer. Sovereignty of the people. A bourgeois-democrat- ic system. The utmost equality among the rural population as the stai‘ting point and condition for free capitalism” (V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. XI, Moscow, 1937, Russ, ed., p. 188).

The peasant revolts in the period of the revolution showed that the peasantry refused to tolerate their present conditions any longer, wanted to sweep away the old system of landownership by revolu- tionary means, and were in fact taking the American path of develop- ment of capitalism in agriculture.

The tsarist government, the landlords and the counter-revolu- tionary bourgeoisie wanted to bring about this change in a way that would serve the interests of the landlords, they wanted the Prussian way. The govermnent therefore decided to split the peasantry, even at the cost of ruining the countryside, and to encourage the rise of a pros- perous class of small landowners — “new landlords” who would fight for the protection of private property in land and for the preservation of the tsarist autocracy.

The government, therefore, abandoned its former policy of preserv- ing the village C' minunities and the mediaeval forms of land tenure connected with it, such as tying the peasants to the village community, collective rosiionsibility of the community for the payment of taxes, etc. The aim of the autocracy in destroying the village communities was to strengthen the position of the kulaks and to transform the buUc of the peasants into a vast reserve army of labour, thereby ensuring cheap labour power for large-scale industry and for the landlords estates.

While the “reform” (“emancipation of the serfs”) of 1861 enabled the landlords to rob the peasants of their land, the new reform provided the kulaks with the opportunity to do so.

Destruction of the Village Community

Stolypin devised three groups of measures with which he hoped to avert an agrarian revolu- tion and strengthen the rule of tsarism. These groups were: 1) destruc- tion of the village community, 2) introduction of ‘‘kiiufcor” and ^‘otrub” farms in the countryside, and 3) resettlement of the peasants in other regions.

Stolypin ’s ukase of November 9, 1906, which initiated the destruc- tion of the village community, became, after it was amended by the Third State Duma, the law of June 14, 1910, which was to complete this destruction. The ukase of November 9, 1906, granted the peasants permission to leave the village community if they so desired; the law of June 14, 1910, made it obligatory for them to do jo. In those village communities where there had been no redivision of the land since the time when the peasants were allotted land, the plots became the private property of householders. Where the land had been redisr tributed,. householders were allowed to run their allotments as separate farms.

The Stolypin land law destroyed the community system of land tenure. It allowed the peasant to leave the village community and to sell his allotment, which he had no right to do before. This enabled the rich peasants, or kulaks, to buy up the allotments of the ruined poor peasants at low prices. A peasant who broke with the village community could remain in the village and become permanent owner of his plots, which could be exchanged for one continuous plot, the “otrub.” Or he could transfer his home and his property to a plot of land outside the village, and set up a farm there, a “khutor.” In either case the setting up of a farm entailed expend- iture. The government granted loans io kulaks to purchase land and organize “khutor” farms. It demanded that thebest of the vil- lage community’s land be allotted to the kulak “khutor” -farmers. The establishment of “khutor” and “"otrub” farms was frequently ef- fected by force, with the help of the rural prefects. The tsarist govern- ment sent a whole army of mounted police to the rural districts and gave Provincial Governors power to send troops to suppress the peasants who resisted land assignment from community land. However, among “khutor” -farmers the kulaks were in a minority^ There was a majority of another category of “khutor ’’-farmers, the ruined and impoverished peasants who, having no means to escape from want, said: “There’s nowhere to go, so let’s take up a "khutor’ farm.” But having no means with which to make such farms work, they would sell their allotments to the kulaks. In this way the kulak farms within and without the villages grew into real estates where wage labour was employed on a large scale. The process of dijfferentiation of the peasantry into classes was acceler- ated. A section of the peasants who had been deprived of their land went to seek a livelihood in the towns and became proletarians.

During the ten years the Stolypin law was in operation over 2,000,000 householders, with an area of land amounting to 18,000,000 hectares, left the village communities and took over the land ls their private property. Of this number, 54.7 per cent set up “khutor” and “otrub” farms, but three- jfifths of these subsequently sold their allotments.

The buying and selling of land was transacted through the Peasant Bank. Prom 1906 to 1910 the peasants acquired through this bank a total of 6,000,000 hectares of land. The bank concerned itself exclu- sively with the setting up of “khutor” and “otrub” farms, and during the ten years it was in operation, from 1906 to 1916, it helped to form 200,000 of these. The Peasant Bank operated in the interests of the nobility and the kulaks. It purchased allotment land at a ridiculously low price compared with that of landlord land. Where landlord land was assessed at 121 rubles j)er hectare, allotment land was assessed at 79 rubles, but the bank sold the latter at 140 to 150 rubles i^er hectare. When it sold land to be paid for in instalments it demanded high interest on the mortgage. Frequently pleasant s who had become “khu- tor” -farmers fell into arrears in the payment of interest and principal on loans received from the bank. In such cases their property was sold under the hammer and they were compelled to seek a livelihood in the towns.

Stolypin also extensively applied the policy of resettlement. His aim was to form a class of “sturdy” and “prosperous” peasant owners in the Central regions of Russia and to shift the discontented poor and middle peasants further out — to Siberia and other border regions* From 1906 to 1910, 2,500,000 peasants were resettled in Siberia, the Far East, Central Asia and other outlying regions.

In the pursuit of political aims the Stolypin government rodi* roughshod over the interests of the settlers and the rights of the native inhabitants.

The task of carrying out the resettlement policy was entrusted to resettlement commissions, Prefects and Provincial Governors. The commissions packed off whole contingents of poor and middle peasants in cattle trucks which bore the inscription: “Forty persons, eight horses.” The settlers with their wives and children, healthy and sick, travelled for months to their new places of settlement, living in thesis cattle trucks, in which they cooked their food and did their washing; and when they reached their destination they were bundled out and left ill the open field, in the rain or snow. To create some shelter for themselves they hastily dug dugouts, and then began a veritable martyrdom in their quest for land and loans with which to start their farms. Most of the land that was allotted them was situated in remote and inconvenient places, where there was no water, meadows and no pastures. The loans that were granted were inadequate. What the settlers suffered, left to their fate in these remote districts, can be seen from the following excerpt from the report of Prince Lvov, whom the Z3m3tvos sent on a mission of inspection to the Far East. ‘Tsolabion from the world, living as if on an uninhabited island among the marshes in the dense taiga, in the marshy valleys and muddy hills, absolutely wild conditions of life, labour and sustenance, naturally crush the weak-spirited and poor settler. He becomes apathetic after exhausting his small stock of energy at the very beginning of his struggle against stern nature in building his wretched habitation. Scurvy and typhus attack his exhausted frame and carry him to the graveyard. In many settlomfiiits, in 1907, the death rate was posi- tively incredible, amounting to 25 and 30 per cent. In the settlements there are as many gravestones as there are households, and many of the settlements will have to bo shifted to new sections otherwise they will be transformed into graveyards.”

Miny of the settlers abandoned their newly acquired allotments in despair and returned to their former places of habitation utterly ruiued. Settlers who but recently had been middle peasants wore reduced either to working as agricultural labourers or going into the towns to seek work.

This settlement policy spread ruin among the native inhabitants of the border regions. The land intended for colonization was forcibly taken from the natives. The Kirghiz, for example, were driven wholesale from their winter pastures. The Caucasian highland- ers were pushed from their fertile lands into the rocky gorges. In Central Asia, magnificent orchards, that were situated in an area intended for cultivation by settlers, were simply destroyed.

The ruined and impoverished native inhabitants of the border regions became revolutionary and augmented the ranks of the fight- ers against tsarism.

The Result of Stolypin’s Agrarian Reform

When he introduced his agrarian reform Sbolypin stated that his object was to wi*est tlie peasantry out of the hands of revolution and to convert the kulaks into a class of “small landlords” which was to serve as a firm bulwark for the autocracy in its struggle against the revolution.

“Give me twenty quiet years and I will reform Russia,” he said.

In an article entitled “The Last Safety Valve,” Lenin showed that Sbolypin’s agrarian policy brought neither “reform” nor quiet.” In 1910, an outbreak o£ cholera in the south of Russia carried away 100.000 persons. Plague broke out in the steppes of Astrakhan. Ruination, poverty and starvation roused the anger of the peasants and imbued them with the spirit of revolution.

Another crop failure in 1911, and the famine which affected

30.000. 000 peasants showed that the Stolypin reform had not abol- ished the fundamental causes of the backwardness of agriculture. Tj^hus and other epidemic diseases ravaged the famine-affected areas.

Stolypin ’s reform did not abolish mediaeval landownership. The royal family, the landlords and the monasteries still retained over

150.000. 000 hectares of the best and most fertile land in the country. The landlords continued to keep the peasants in bondage, compelling them to cultivate their, the landlords’, land with their wretched horses and primitive implements. “This is not capitalism,” wrote Lenin, describing the state of landlord and peasant farming that resulted from Stolypin ’s reform. “This is not the European method of farming. . . . This is the old Chinese way. This is the Turkish way. This is the feudal waif^ (V. I. Lenin, Selected Works^ Voi. IV, Moscow, 1934, p. 239).

The reform did not even abolish the open-field system and other survivals of serfdom which reduced the productivity of the peasants’ labour. The peasants, with bitter irony, described Stolypin ’s policy of land settlement as “land unsettlement.”

Stolypin ’s reform merely postponed the doom of serfdom; it did not eliminate the profound contradictions that constituted the basis of the Russian bourgeois-democratic revolution. It still further accel- erated the process of differentiation among the peasantry and intensified the class struggle in the rural districts. The agrarian ques- tion, the fundamental question of, the Russian revolution, could be set- tled only by abolishing the landlord latifundia and by transferring the

70.000. 000 hectares of landlord land to the peasants without compen- sation. But only another revolution could do this.

The Working-Class Movement in the Period of Reaction

In the winter of 1907, the Stolypin government issued an order for the arrest of Lenin. The tsarist sleuths hmited high and low for the leader of the revolution. On the proposal of the Party, Lenin, who was living in Finland at the time, went abroad. To board the ship unobserved by the police he, one night, crossed the ice in the Gulf of Finland on foot to a near-by island, accompanied by two Finnish peasants. The Decem- ber ice was frail and Lenin was almost drowned in an icehole, out of which he managed to extricate himself with diifioulty. He got safe on board at last and left Finland for Switzerland. His second period abroad as an exile lasted nearly ten years.

While abroad, in February 1908, Lenin resumed the publication of the Bolsheviiv newRpax)er Proletary, in the colmnns of which he began to prepare the Party and the working class for another revolution.

In 1907, Comrade Stalin left Titiis for Baku, where he led the rev- olutionary struggle of the Baku ‘proletariat.

Under the blows of reaction the strike movement in Russia con- tinued to subside. In 1908, 176,000 workers were involved in strikes, in 1909, the number was 64,000, and in 1910, it was only 46,000. The strilces were of a defensive character. Only in Baku did the working- class movement, led by Comrade Stalin, bear a clearly expressed polit- ical character. To divert the workers from the revolutionary struggle, the oil employers invited the workers in the oil plants and oil fields to elect delegates to a conference with employers to discuss the terms of a collective agreement. The Bolsheviks called upon the workers to boycott this conference.

At the end of 1907, when reaction was raging throughout tlie coun- try, a sort of worl^ers ’ parliament was in session fur nearly two weeks in Baku, at which the workers drew up their demands to be presented to the oil employers. When these demands were rejected the Bolsheviks called for a general strike. During the preparations for this strike the twenty-two-year-old Azerbaijan worker Hanlar, a splendid orator and leader of the masses, was foully assassinated. Hanlar ’s funeral developed into a powerful political demonstration. Speaking at the graveside of the fallen fighter, Comrade Stalin called upon the Azer- baijan workers to continue the struggle. Hanlar, he said, was the first sacrifice the Azerbaijan people had made for the Russian revolution.

Commenting on the militant character of the Baku strikes, Lenin wrote: “In 1908, at the head of the list of gubernias showing a large number of strikes stands Baku with 47,000 strilters. The last of the Mohicans of the mass political strike!” (V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. XV, Moscow, 1937, Russ, ed,, p. 33.)

In March 1908, Comrade Stalin was arrested by the gendannes, but even in prison he continued to lead the movement and sent out articles for publication in the newspaper Qudok, One day a group of Bolsheviks was sent off from the prison to penal servitude. From his prison window Comrade Stalin called out to them as they went: “Keep your manacles, we shall want them for the tsar’s government!”

In the autumn of 1908, Comrade Stalin was sentenced to two years ’ exile in Solvychegodsk, but in tho summer of 1909, he escaped from there.

Ideological Confusion among the Intellectuals

Describing the po- litical life of Russia dining the period of the Stolypin reaction, Com- rade Stalin called it “an abomination of desolation.” “Fettered public opinion,’’ he went on to say, ^"general weariness and apathy, want and despair among the workers, a downtrodden and intimidated peasantry and with the police- landlord-cax)italist hounds running riot — such are the characteristic features of Stolypin’s Opacification.’” ("On the Occasion of the Tenth Anniversary of Pravda,‘'^ Stalin’s article pub- lished in Pravda No. 98 of May 5, 1922.)

The defeat of the revolution caused disintegration and degeneration among the intellectuals. Some of the bourgeois fellow-travellers of the revolution deserted to the camp of its open enemies. Others found jobs for themselves in the legal working-class organizations, condemned all revolutionary activity, and called upon the workers to adjust them- selves to reaction and reconcile themselves to tsarism. This section of the intellectuals believed that Stolypin’s reforms had already con- verted Russia into a bourgeois state and had made revolution super- fluous. More hostile to the revolution than any other section of the intellectuals was the bourgeois (Cadet) intelligentsia who united around the symposium entitled VeJcM (Lmidmarhs) which was published in 1909. The contributors to this symposium were prominent repre- sentatives of the bourgeois intelligentsia, former legal Marxists and Constitutional-Democrats. They proclaimed war on Marxism, re- nounced the struggle for democracy and called for conciliation with tsarism. VekJii advocated the doctrines of the Orthodox Russian Church, mysticism and obedience to God and the powders that be, and chamx3ioned the Great-Power and imperialist foreign policy which the Cadet bourgeoisie began to advocate after 1905.

Ideological confusion and collapse were particularly rife among the petty-bourgeois parties (Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries and others) in which numerous factions, groups and coteries were formed.

The Mensheviks were of the opinion that the revolution was over and that Stolypin had put Russia onto the path of bourgeois develop- ment. They tried to adjust themselves to the Stolj^in regime and urged that the old militant Social-Democratic Party, which tsarism had driven underground, should be liquidated. For this reason the Menshevilcs were called Liquidators. Lenin called the Liquidators the "Stolypin Labour Party” because they had become the servants and coadjutors of the 3rd of June monarchy.

The Socialist-Revolutionary Party split in two. The Right Social- ist-Revolutionaries had as early as 1906 formed a semi-Cadet Work- ing People’s Socialist Party and were referred to briefly as Popular Socialists. The Popular Socialists advocated the payment of compen- sation for landlords’ land alienated for the benefit of the peasantry and entered into a bloc with the Cadets. The "Left” wing of the Socialist- Revolutionary Party formed a semi-anarchist group known as the Maxi- malist Socialist-Revolutionaries. They proposed economic and political terrorism as the j)rincipal wea]ion in the struggle and soon deteriorated into an unprincipled group of exproiiriatora.

During tlie period of reaction and police terrorism treachery and provocation became widespread. Agents provocateurs wormed their way into the Party organizations and some of them, on the instructions of the secret police, engaged in political murder wliich brought scores of innocent people to the gallows. A sensational event of that period was the exposure of the agent provocateur Azof who, since 1903, had been at the head of the ‘hnilitant organization” of the Socialist-Revolu- tionary Party. The Azef a. 'fair vividly demonstrated that the terroristic tactics of the Socialist-Revolutionaries were useful to the secret police and harmful to the masses.

The Bolsheviks during the Period of Reaction

The Bolsheviks Fight to Preserve the Party

The Bolsheviks alone were able to retreat in perfect order. They were aware that the vic- tory achieved by tsarism was a temporary and unstable one and contin- ued to rally the forces for another revolution. They were fiercely persecuted by the tsarist government and were liable to be sentenced to penal servitude if caught by the police; but they wont underground and tirelessly continued their revolutionary activities. They formed Bolshevik cells in factories and, combining legal with illegal forms of activity, they made use of every legal possibility, such as trade un- ions, workers’ clubs, adult Sunday schools and co-operativo societies, for the purpose of maintaining contact with the masses. The Bolshevik Deputies in the State Duma utilized the tribune of the Duma to further the interests of the revolution. The aim of the Bolsheviks was still, as in 1905, to overthrow tsarism and to complete the bourgeois- democratic revolution in order to pass on to the socialist revolution. They continued to advocate the old and tried slogans: A democratic republic, conJBsoation of the landlords' estates, and an 8-hour day.

Amidst the stern conditions of the Stolypin reaction the Bolshe- viks waged a struggle on two fronts — against the Menshevik Liquida- tors and against the Otzovists. The latter term was applied to a section of former Bolsheviks who demanded the recall (i-n Russian — otozvat) of the workers* Deputies from the State Duma and the cessation of all work in legal organizations, Lenin called the Otzovists ‘‘Liquidators inside-out,” because their tactics would have resulted in the Party becoming isolated from the masses and, consequently, in the liquidation of the revolutionary Party. Por this reason the Otzo- vists were expelled from the Bolshevik organization,

Trotsky and the Trotskyites took a Liquidatorist stand on all ques- tions . Lenin said that Trotsky was more despicable and harmful than the avowed Liquidators because he deceived the workers by asserting that he was "‘above factions/’ whereas actually he supported the Menshe- vik Liquidators. It was in that period that Lenin called Trotsky “Judas Trotsky,” In 1912 Trotsky organized the so-called “August bloc,” which consisted of all the anti-Party elements which were united in their struggle against Bolshevism.

Trotsky was supported in his opposition to Lenin by Kamenev, Zinoviev and Pv.ykov. Concealing their alliance with Trotsky, they succeeded in getting the Bolshevik newspaper Proletary closed down and in securing support for Trotsky’s newspaper. Kamenev joined the editorial board of Trotsky’s newspaper and tried to turn it into the organ of the Central Committee of the Party.

Despondency and lack of faith infected a section of the intellectuals who regarded themselves as Marxists but who had never taken a firm Marxian stand. They launched a “criticism” of the theoretical prin- ciples of Marxism. Some of the intellectuals who had deserted Marx- ism even began to urge the necessity of creating a new religion (the so-called “God-seekers” and “God-builders”).

In his famous book Materialism and Empirio^Criticism, which ap- peared in 1909, Lenin trounced these degenerates in the sphere of Marxist theory and fully substantiated the basic theoretical principles of the Marxist party.

The Bolsheviks Form an Independent Marxist Party

The fight against the Liquidators, Otzovists and Trotskyites confionted the Bol- sheviks with the task of uniting all the Bolsheviks and forming them into an index^endent Marxistparty.This was necessary in order to be able to prepare the working class for a new upward swing of the revolution.

Por the purpose of forming the independent Bolshevik Party the Sixth All-Bussian Party Conference was held in Prague, in January 1912. This conference was equal in importance to a Party congress. The Prague Conference elected a Bolshevik Central Committee of the Parly, headed by Lenin. J. V. Stalin and Y. M. Sverdlov, who were in exile in Siberia at the time, were elected to the Central Committee in their absence.

The Bolshevik Party did not adopt a new name after defeating the Mensheviks both ideologically and organizationally, and after expelling them and the Otzovists from the Party; it retained the old name of Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party but added the word “Bolshe- viks” in brackets. This name it retained up to 1918.

In its decisions the Prague Conference pointed to the inevitability of another revolutionary upsurge and urged the necessity of intensifying activities among the masses. For th.r puipoae of diiecting the Par- ty’s revolutionary activities in Russia, a centre for practical work was set up known as the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee. This Bureau was headed by Comrade Stalin. On Lenin’s instructions. Sorgo Orjonikiclzc travelled to the })]ace where Comrade Stalin was in exile in order to infonn him of the conference’s decisions and to arrange for his escape. In February 3912, Comrade Stalin escaped from exile for the fourth time. Ho visited a number of cities in Russia and headed tiie growing revolutionary movement in iSt. Petersburg.

The Bolshevik Iron Guard

Under the guidance of Lenin and Stalin many of the Bolsheviks who were active underground during the stern period of reaction dcvclo])od into outstanding professional revolution- aries and Party leaders.

One of these was the indomitable revolutionary Yakov Mikhail- ovich Sverdlov, whom Lenin described as “the most finished type of lorofessional revolutionary.” Sverdlov commenced his underground revolutionary activities at the early age of fifteen among the workers of Nizhni Novgorod and Sermovo. In 1902, after organizing a polit- ical demonstration in Sormovo, he was arrested and imprisoned for the first time; after that the whole of his life consisted of strenu- ous revolutionary activity, ever dogged by danger, and frequently interrupted by arrests, exile and escape from exile. In 1905 ho engaged in Bolshevik activities in Kazan and in the Urals wliere he became the beloved leader of the masses of the workers. For two years after the defeat of the revolution ho was incarcerated in a fortress. His sentence expired during the period of reaction and soon after his release he was arrested again and exiled to the district of Maximkin Yar, in the Narjnn Region. Five times lie tried to escape from this remote place where even the mails wore received only twice a j^-oar. In the autumn of 1912, he tried to cross the river Yenisei in a canoe and was nearly drowned. At the end of 1912, he reached St. Petersburg.

Another staunch Bolshevik fighter was Mildiail Vassilyevich Frun- ze. In 1905, he led the strike of the Ivanovo-Voznesensk workers. In March 1907, he was arrested and put in prison to await trial on a charge that made him liable to sentence of death. At the trial his counsel said to him: “Renounce your proletarians and you will be pardoned forthwith.” Frunze indignantly told the court that he refused to have a lawyer like that to defend linn. The tsarist court sentenced him to ten years’ penal servitude.

In this period extensive Party work was also conducted by Sergei Mironovich Kirov. Kirov joined the Bolshevik Party in Tomsk when still a youth of eighteen and took a most active part in the revolution of 1905. He was arrested three times. On the third occasion he was arrested on the charge of conducting revolutionary activities and of organizing a secret printing i^lant. He was tried and sentenced to confinement in a fortress. Immediately he was released from prison he flung himself with his customary energy into Party work in Vladikavkas, WiiCre he organized and trained new cadres of revolutionary Bolsheviks.

A no less ardent and outstanding young revolutionary of that time was the pupil of Lenin and Stalin — Grigori Konstantinovich Orjonikidze, whose Party pseudon;VTn was Sergo. The son of a Georgian peasant' he commenced revolutionary activity at the age of seventeen. In 1903 he joined the Bolslicvik Party. During the first Russian revolution he took part in preparing the armed insurrection but was arrested in December 1905 wliilo unloading a eousignment of arms which had been received . He succeeded in esca]nng abroad but subsequently re- turned to Baku. In 1900, ho made his way into Persia and took part in tlic Persian revolution. After lepeated a. rests Sergo Orjonikidze went to Lon'n in Paris, where he attended a Party schooi organized by Lenin, At the Prague Conference he was elected a member of the Cen- ri*al Committee of the Bolshevik Party and he returned to Russia to conduct underground Bolshevik activity. He was arrested shortlv after this, however, and sentenced to three years ^ confinement in the Schliisselhurg Portress. In this }}eriod too, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov became a ]>rofessional revolutionary. He joined the Bolslicvik Party in 1006 while still a high-school student, and at the age of sixteen already conducted Marxist ])ropaganda among the student youth. This activity he continued during tlie ])eriod of reaction. At the age of ninotoeii, not having yet gimluatol from high sebooh he Wtis depoi’ictl to Vologda (hibeniia, but lie continued his revolu- tionary activities evi-n while in t^xile and cojiiliated the views of the iMcnslieviks and So(*ialist-Revolubionaries. Like the other Bolsheviks, V. M. Molotov sjient liis tinu^ in (‘xile inqiroving his knowledge of rev- olutionary theory and in studying the classical vwks of Marxism. In Vologda he established contact with and conducted revolutionary •jiropaganda among the railway w'orkers. When his iieriod of exile ex- })ircd he returneil to St. Pctcu'sburg to conduct underground Bolshevilv activity and took an ae,tivc part in all the im^iortant measures under- taken by the St. IV‘tersburg Bol lievik organization. During tlu'- ])criod of i'ea,(l.ion the w’orkingmen Bolsheviks Mikhail Ivanovich Kalinin and Kliment Efromovich Voroshilov worked as professional underground rovolutionarms. M. 1. Kalinin, a metal turner by ti*aclo, had led tlie arduous life of a professional rcvoliitiouary since the 1890 ’s and had known the in- side of many jirisous in tsarist Russia. Ho had been a member of the »St. Petersburg Li'agiio of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Work- ing Class and one of the active agents of Iskm. In 1910, after com- ])loting a prison stmtonco, bo went to work at an ordnance works in St. Petersburg, and in 1911, lie became the leader of the Bolshevik organi- zation in the Vyborg District of that city. At the Prague Conference he was eloctod as an alternate member of the Bolshevik Central 0onvmittt‘(^ of tlu* Pai’ty.

Equally arduous was the life of K. E. Voroshilov, who was a fitter in Lugansk. He started work in the factory at the age of fifteen and by the end of the 1890 ’s he was already an active participant in illegal meetings and workers’ demonstrations. In 1903, he joined the Bolshevik Party. During the 1905 revolution he prepared the workers of Lugansk for insurrection, formed fighting squads, procured arms, and taught the workers to handle firearms. At a meeting he addressed in 1906, he urged the workers to learn the art of armed fighting and to train their own commanders. One of the workers at the meeting called out: “We appoint you our Red General.” “You are going too far,” answered Voroshilov laughing. “I don’t know anything about military matters.” None of the workers, nor Voroshilov himself, then suspected that the “Red General” whom the workers appointed in 1906 would become a Marshal of the most powerful army in the world and a foremost expert in military matters.

Voroshilov was arrested after the revolution of 1905, and in 1907 he was exiled for three years. Three months later he escaped to Baku and together with Comrade Stalin took part in the strug- gle that was waged by the Baku workers. He was again arrested and deported to the Archangel Gubernia, but he escaped again and with great difficulty succeeded in reaching his native Donetz Basin in 1912,

Self-sacrificing and heroic work under the severest conditions of tsarist reaction was also conducted by other leaders of the Bolshevik underground in preparing the working class for another revolutionary upsurge.

The Foreign Policy of the Stolypin Government

The Anglo-Russian Agreement

The defeat of tsarism in the Russo- Japanese War led to a further decline of its international prestige and importance. After it had concluded the Portsmouth Peace Treaty with Japan, the autocracy wanted to muster its forces for the purpose of crushing the revolution, but it could do that only on two conditions: that it received a huge foreign loan, and that it secured itself against foreign attack. At first, Nicholas 11 placed his hopes upon an alliance with Germany which Wilhelm II was urging him to conclude. This plan, however, was frustrated by a group of Cabinet Ministers headed by Witte. Witte was aware that if Russia concluded an alliance with Germany, financial assistance from Prance would cease, the Pranco-Russian alliance would be broken, and Russia would become completely dependent upon Germany in Europe and upon Japan in the Par East. As a consequence of his opposition, the secret treaty which Nicholas 11 and Wilhelm n had signed in Bjdrke was annulled.

In 1906, Great Britain and JVance granted the tsarist autocracy loans amounting to 2,500,000,000 francs and thereby saved it from financial bankruptcy. These countries also helped the autocracy finally to settle its relations with Japan, which, on the pret xt of impl menting certain clauses of the Portsmouth Treaty, continued to present Russia with unacceptable demands and threatened to resume the war. After the recent losses, however, and after the demobilization of the Russian army in the Far East, tsarist Russia was totally inca- pable of waging another war with Japan. The British and French gov- ernments took advantage of Japan’s need of a foreign loan to compel her to make concessionsto Russia and to conclude, in the summer of 1907, an agreement guaranteeing the security of Russia’s Far Eastern fron- tiers. The tsarist government, in its turn, pledged itself to support France in her struggle against Germany over Morocco, and agreed to a demarcation of spheres of influence between Great Britain and Russia in the Middle East (Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet). Thus, simultaneously with the signing of the Russo-Japanese agreement, a political agreement between Russia and Great Britain was signed. By the treaty of 1907, Northern Persia, the most densely populated part of the country, was recognized as Russia’s sphere of influence, and Southern Persia, the strategical cover of the approaches to India, with its naval ports and rich oil deposits, was proclaimed Great Britain’s sphere of influence. Central Persia was proclaimed a neutral zone.

The Anglo-Russian agreement suppl mented the Franco-Russian Treaty of 1893 and the Anglo-French agreement of 1904 and thus con- summated the formation of the Triple Entente between Great Britain, France and Russia. Herein lay its immense political importance. This Triple Entente was directed against the Triple Alliance that was headed by Germany.

The Bosnia Crisis

The definite formation of these two coalitions brought the prospect of a European war very much nearer.

From the very outset Russian tsarism occupied a subordinate posi- tion in the Entente. Russia’s national interests called for the strengthen- ing of her influence in the Balkans and in the Near East to counter- balance the growing Austro-German menace. But Russia was hindered by the international treaties which prohibited Russian warships from passing through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. Russia failed to receive the diplomatic support of her allies, who preferred to leave the question unsettled in order to keep Russia dependent upon . them.

In May and June 1908, a meeting between the King of England and the Tsar of Russia took place in Revel at which the two monarchs agreed to make joint preparations for war against Geimany. They also agreed on the joint introduction of reforms in Macedonia, which, in fact, nieatit prej)iiriii!^ to wrest that rcg’ou from Turkey. As regards the question of the Htraits, however, the meeting in Jlcvel failed to produce t]\o results the Eussiau government desired.

First and foremost in accoieratiiig the outbreak of the European war wore Gornuiny, who w'as bc^tter ariued tlian any other country,, and her satellite Austria-Hungary. Tiio latter, a iiiulti- national state, was su'fering from internal disintegration and iioped i.o strengthen h(‘r position by pushing into the Balkan Peninsula,

Jn tlie autumn of 1908, a meeting took placid between tlie Eussian and Austro-Hungarian Foreign Ministers at whicli it was agreed that the tsarist govorranonb would raise no objecitioii to tlu^ annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary, who had occupied those regions since the Berlin Congress of 1878. In return for this, Austria-Hungary promised to support the Eussian government's dt‘- mand for the free ]>assage of Eussian warshi] is through the Turki'‘jli Straits.

Tsarism's claims in the Balkans, however, were strongly 0[)posed by Great Britain. Omijileicly ignoring her promise to llussia, Austria- Hungary hastened to pnic.laim the annexation of Bosnia aiul Herze- govina, which wore iiihahitod by Herbs. ^Jhis caused an outburst erf jiatriotio indignation in Serbia. Tsarist lliissia, whieb regardetl lierself as Serliia's prote(‘tress, demanded that the annexation of Bosnia an<l Herzegovina anrl the question of the Htiuits bo discussed at a con- ference of the Kiin)])eau Powers, but in March 1909 Germany intervened ill the conflict and in terms that sounded like an ultimatum demand- ed that Ivussia and Serbia should o'jficially recognize the u-iuiexation »if Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Bosnian crisis of 1908-1909 almost led to an armed confl ct biitween the Powers; but tsarism was imt ])re[>ared for another war and therefore gave way itself and compel let I Heiliia to do the same. The Eights in the Third Buma deseriheil this defeat sustained by tsarist diplomacy as a “diplomatic Tsushima/*’

Tsarism’s Policy in the Orient

The tsartst government also lost its independence iii pursuing its policy in ivlation to the eountries of tlu' Orient. In Persia, Turkey and Cliina, Eussian tsarism played the i’ea.e- tionary role of suppressor of movements f^ir national liberation anil oi’ revolutions.

The Eussian revolution of 1906-1907, the. first bourgois-democrat- ic revolution in the epoch of imperial ism , had wide rcpercuss ions among the colonial and somi-colonial peoples which wore o])i)ressed by impe- rialism, primarily among the Oriental peoples who lived in ]U'opiu(iuity to Eussia. Ill 1900, the bourgeois revolution in Persia began. Yield- ing to the demand of the people, the Shah of Persia instituted a parlia- ment (the Mejlis); but Eussian tsarism, whom the western imperialists allowed “freedom of action” in Persia, decided to (*rush the Persian revolution. In the summer of 1908, Colonel Lyakhov, who was in command of a Cossack brigade in Persia, bombarded the Mejlis with artillery and established a reign of White terror in Teheran. The tsarist government compelled the Shah to dissolve the Mejlis; many members of the Mej- lis were executed and others were flung into prison. But the Persian revolution continued in spite of this, and in 1909, the Shah was obliged to flee to Russia, leaving a boy successor. Great Britain and Rus- sia instituted a financial blockade of revolutionary Persia. In December 1911, the Persian reactionaries, supported by Great Britain and Rus- sia, carried out a counter-revolutionary coup. The Persian revolution was crushed. By agreement with Great Britain, Russia retained her troops of occupation in Northern Persia.

In 1908, a military coup, led by the party known as the Young Turks, was brought about in Turkey with the object of saving the integrity of the Turkish empire. This coup resulted in the introduction of a constitutional form of government. The flrst blow at the Young Turk revolution was struck by Austria-Hungary, which annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina. The tsarist government too helped to strangle the Young Turk revolution by the Balkan policy it pursued. In 1909 it consented to Italy's annexation of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, Turkey’s provinces in Africa. It also supported the claims of Prance and Great Britain to Arab territory. Under the leadership of Russia, a league of Balkan countries was formed to attack Turkey. All this served to weaken the Young Turk revolution and to turn the Young Turks towards rapprochement with German imperialism.

The biggest revolution in the Orient was the Chinese revolution of 1911, which was directed against the feudal rulers of China and against the foreign imperialists.

Russian tsarism also acted as the supp’^essor of the Chinese rev- olution by entering the bloc of six Powers (Great Britain, France, Russia, Germany, Japan and the United States), which subjected rev- olutionary China to a financial boycott and helped the counter-revolu- tionary President Yuan Shih-kai to suppress the revolution.

Tsarism, the Reserve ot Western Imperialism

Although Russian tsarism pursued its own imperialist aims in the world war that was in preparation, the subordinate and dependent place it occupied in the Triple Entente converted it into the military reserve of Western imperialism.

The operations of the tsar ’s army in the impending war were deter- mined by the military interests of Great Britain and Prance. At a con- ference of Chiefs of General Sta.Ts held in 1911, the representative of Prance saidt “The object which the Russian forces must pursue is to compel Germany to maintain the largest possible forces on the Eastern Front.” The Russian Army was to launch an o.Tensive against Germany simnltaueonsly with the Anglb-Prench offensive. At a conference of Chiefs of General Staffs held in 1912, France demanded that; in conformity with the Franoo-Russian military con- vention of 1892, Russia should concentrate no less than 800,000 men on the Austro-German frontier, and that she should launch an attack on the sixteenth day of mobilization irrespective of what the situation on the Anglo-French front might be. To transport troops to the Ger- man frontier. tsarist Russia was to build new strategical railways, and it was stipulated that the next loan to bo granted the tsarist government was to be used exclusively for this purpose.

All this indicated that tsarism was gradually losing its independence even in purely military matters.

Emphasizing Russia’s dependence upon the West- European im- perialists, Comrade Stalin wrote: ‘‘Tsarist Russia was an immense reserve of Western imperialism, not only in that it gave free entry to foreign capital, which controlled such basic branches of Russia’s national economy as the fuel and metal industries, but also in that it could supply the Western imperialists with millions of soldiers” (J. Stalin, Problems of Lenmism>^ Moscow, 1945, p. 17)

The Growth of National and Colonial Oppression during the Period of the Stolypin Reaction

Tsarism’s National Policy in the Period of Reaction

The law of June 3, 1907, drastically reduced the franchise of a number of non- Russian nationalities and the Third State Duma passed a series of laws which still further restricted their elementary rights. The Stolypin government decided first of all to restrict the rights of those “border regions” where the movement for national liberation was strongest at that time — ^Finland, Poland and the Caucasus. ♦

In 1910, the Third Ktate Duma, on the proposal of Stolypm, passed a law which i rovided that all fundamental questions affect- ing Finland should be discussed in the Duma, and that the meas- ures passed in conn otionwith them should receive the sanction of the tsar’s government. Thus, the Finnish Sejm was converted into a mere advisory b dy on matt* rs of legislation.

The Polish bourgeois nationalist parties in the Third State Duma had fo msd a separate Pol'sh bl-^o, but this bloc oiffeied only passive resistance to a bill introduced in the Duma frr the institution in the western gubernias of Zemstvos, in which the Russian landlords were to be predominant.

Tsarism was able to rob Finland and Poland of the liberties they had won thanks to the her ic struggle waged by the Russian proletariat in 1906 because of the treache ry of the Finnish and Polish bourgeoisie, whose hatred of the revolution united them with tsarism. As Lenin wrote; *‘The experience of the 1905 revolution showed that even in these two nations the ruling classes, the landlords and the bourgeoisie, are re- nouncing the revolutionary struggle for freedom and are seeking rap- prochement with the ruling classes in Russia and with the tsarist mon- archy out of fear of the revolutionary proletariat of Finland and Po- land” (V. I. Lenin, Collected Works^ VoL XVI, Moscow, 1937, Russ, ed., p. 508).

The Third State Duma also discussed a bill providing for the ex- tension to the Caucasus of the regulation of 1881, by which all peasants working under temporary obligation were released from serf labour with payment of compensation to the landlords.

Thus, serfdom in the Caucasus was abolished only in 1912; sur- vivals of it continued right up to the revolution of 1917.

In the period of reaction the tsarist autocracy dropped its former policy of protecting the Moslem clergy who cultivated ignorance and fanaticism in their schools. The Rights in the Third State Duma demand- ed that all Moslem schools be closed in order to “Russify all the non- Russians, and to bring all the unorthodox into the Orthodox fold.” The tsarist ofiS.cials and the Orthodox Church intensified their perse- cution of Moslems, and Moslem schools and charitable institutions were banned.

The Black Hundreds in the Duma also succeeded in depriving the Ukrainians, Byelorussians and Jews of the right to have schools con- ducted in their own languages. In the Ukraine all the “Prosvity” were closed, and concerts and theatrical performances in the Ukrainian lan- guage were prohibited. High-school teachers and college professors suspected of having a ‘TJkrainian trend of thought” were dismissed. Minstrels were even prohibited from singing Ukrainian folk songs at fairs. Exceptionally fierce, however, was the Stolypin government’s persecution of the Jews. It deliberately fomented anti-Semitism among the backward sections of the population. Six million Jews were herded in the “Pale,” or ghettos, and yet the Black Hundreds in the Third Duma let loose a campaign about “the impermissibility of giving equal rights to the Jews” and demanded still further restric- tions for the Jewish population in Russia. The pogrom-mongers among the higher tsarist officials staged the anti- Jewish trial known as the Beilis case. This case was framed up in the following way. In 1911, a gang of thieves in Kiev killed a Russian boy. The tsarist officials pounced upon this murder as a pretext for increasing the persecution of the Jews. The Public Prosecutor, supported by official experts who had been bribed for the purpose, charged a Jew named Beilis witn the murder, alleging that he had committed the crime for “religious ends.” This trial, which took place in 1913, roused a storm of protest among the entire progressive population of Russia and in all other countries. The jury acquitted Beilis.

Explaining why tsarism resorted to pogroms against the Jews and to the savage persecution of Jews, Lenin wrote: “The monarchy had to defend itself against the revolution; and the semi-Asiatic, feu- dal Russian monarchy of the Romanovs could not defend itself by any other but the most infamous, most disgusting, vile and cruel means. The only honourable way of combating the pogroms, the only rational way from the standpoint of a socialist and a democrat, is not to express high moral condemnation, but to assist the revolution selflessly and iti every way, organize the revolution for ihQ overthromal of this monarchy” (V. I. Lenin, Selected Works, Two-Vol. ed., Vol. I, Moscow, 1946, p, 488).

Years of Revolutionary Advance (1912–1914)

The New Upswing of the Revolutionary Movement

Growth of Monopolistic Capitalism in Russia

In 1910 the pro- longed depression in Russia began to give way to an industrial boom. This was brought about by the considerable accumulation of home capi- tal in the country and the growth of the home market due, partly, to th(^ operation of Stolypin’s agrarian reform. The kulak upper stratum of the peasantry which had established itself after the reform was intro- duced created an increased demand for iron goods, building materials, leather, textiles, sugar, etc. In 1909, a series of relatively good harvests began. Peasants’ savings-banlc deposits increased and from 1900 to 1914 rose by over a billion rubles.

The growth of the war industries, and of shipbuilding in particular, ensured the heavy industry of big government contracts. Prom 1905 to 1913, the government placed army contracts to the amount of 2,600,000,000 rubles; in two years of the boom period over 3,600 kilo- metres of railway were laid and a corresponding amount of rolling stock was built. Such were the main reasons for the industrial boom in Russia. The boom was also facilitated by the general economic re- vival in the western capitalist countries, due largely to the race for armaments and increase in war contracts.

During the period of the boom the monopolist organizations — trusts and syndicates — continued to grow and gain strength. The predominant form of monopolist organization in Russia was the syn- dicate. During the decade from 1900 to 1910, these syndicates gained control of the major part of the mining and metallurgical industiy in Russia. The Prodamet, which combined from twelve to fifteen of the largest metallui'gieal plants in the country, controlled two-thirds of the sales, of the entire metallurgical industry. The Produgol, the abbreviated name of the Russian Company for Trading in the Mineral Fuel of the Donetz Bn-sin, which was formed in 1906, gained control of about 60 per cent of the coal output of the Donetz Basin. The Prodarud Syndicate, which was formed in 1908, controlled four- fifths of the ore output of the south of Russia. The growth of syn- dicates in light industry was slower and feebler. In 1908 the syn- dicate known as the Cotton Manufacturers’ Company (in Moscow) con- trolled 4;7 cotton mills. The organization of syndicates was accompa- nied by a rise in the prices of the goods manufactured by the indus- tries they controlled.

The banks increasingly became the owners of the manufacturing enterprises. The small and medium banks merged and formed powerful banking combines. In 1908, for example, the St. Petersburg- Azov, the Orel, and the South Russian Banks combined to form the United Bank. In 1910, the Northern Bank merged with the Russo-Chinese and Russo- Asiatic Banks. More than half the total bank capital in Russia was controlled by seven big banks.

The concentration of industry and the banks was accompanied by the rapid fusion of bank capital with industrial capital. The banks financed joint-stock companies and helped them to reorganize. This had been exceptionally marked during the crisis. The biggest industrial and financial magnates were simultaneously chairmen of bank di- rectorates and directors of syndicates. Thus, Putilov, the owner of numerous metallurgical plants, was chairman of the Board of the big Russo-Azov Bank and also director of the Prodamet, to which his plants were affiliated. In the textile industry enormous influence was exercised by the finance capital magnates Ryabushinsky, Prokhorov, Morozov and others.

In this period too finance capital rapidly merged with the state ap- paratus. The financial magnates felt quite at home in the Ministries of Finance, Industry and Trade, while prominent government officials, and even members of the royal family, held shares in banks and in in- dustrial undertakings. Many retired ministers left then ministerial armchairs to take up positions* as directors of the banks and joint-stock companies of which they were shareholders.

The influence of foreign capital in the Russian banks and industry increased after the revolution of 1905-1907. By 1914, out of a total cap- ital amounting to 435,500,000 rubles belonging to eighteen of the chief joint-stock banks, 185,500,000 rubles, or 42.6 per cent, was foreign capital, divided as follows: German capital 17 per cent, SVench capital 21.9 per cent, and British capital 3 per cent. Thus, British and French capital tog 3 ther constituted the largest share. Foreign capital gained control of Russian industry by forming joint-stock companies through Biissian and sometimes directly through foreign banks. Foreign capital gained control of nearly the whole of tha Russian fuel industry and of the whole of the metallurgical industry.

The Economic Backwardness of Russian Industry

Although large- scale capitalist industry made considerable progress in Russia during the period of the boom, it nevertheless lagged behind the industry of Western Europe. As regards output of pig iron, Russia occupied fifth place in the world; as regards the technique of production and, in partic- ular, consumption per head of the population, she was almost at the bottom of the list. Describing the backwardness of Russia, Lenin wrote: ‘“During the half century that has passed since the peasants were liber- ated, iron consumption in Russia has increased fivefold, but still Rus- sia remains an incredibly, unprecedentedly backward country, poverty- stricken and half savage, equipped with modern implements of produc- tion to the extent of only one-fourth of that of England, one- fifth of Germany and one-tenth of America” (V. I. Lenin, Oollected Wo7*IcSt Vol. X^, Moscow, 1937, Russ, ed., p. 543).

One of the indices of the technical and economic backwardness of tsarist Russia was the state of railway transport. The total length of railways in Russia in 1913 was about 65,000 kilometres. Of this, 43,500 kilometres belonged to the state and over 19,000 kilometres belonged to private companies. As regards density of railways, Russia was almost at the bottom, of the list.

In 1910, the total industrial output in Russia was one-ninth of that of the United States, and the average wage of the Russian worker was one-fourth of that of the American worker.

Stolypin and the Minister of Finance Kokovtsev made it a practice to borrow from the Paris bankers and hospitably opened the door wide for foreign capital, for they hoped, with the aid of French and British gold, to save landlordism and the tsarist system in the country in which capitalism was rapidly developing. To pay the interest on these loans the tsarist government annually squeezed hundreds of millions of ru- bles out of the population. Before the First World War Russia *s national debt amounted to 8,800,000,000 rubles. Tsarist Russia’s chief creditor before the war was France.

In tsarist Russia a number of leading branches of industry, such as electr cal engineering, turb’ne building, machine-tool building, heavy -engineering, and the automobile and chemical industries, did not exist.

The oil industry was controlled by foreign capital, who stopped at nothing in exploiting the rich deposits of Russian oil, wastefully utilizing only "gushers” and eschewing deep boring, extensive explo- ration of new fields, etc.

The Lena Shootings

The industrial boom was accompanied by the growth of the Russian proletariat and of the working-class movement. The general upswing of the revolutionary proletarian struggle was stimulated by the events that occurred in the remote gold fields in Siberia that belonged to the Lena Gold Fields Company. This company was formed in 1908. Three-fourths of the shares belonged to British capitalists and the rest belonged to big Russian capitalists and high tsarist officials. Among the shareholders were capitalists like Putilov, bank directors like Vyshnegradsky, and a number of high St. Peters- burg dignitaries. The British and Russian shareholders in the Lena Gold Fields Company drew profits amounting to over 7,000,000 rubles per annum. The gold-field workers were cruelly exploited and, in addi- tion, were totally bereft of rights.

The gold fields were situated in the remote taiga, 1,700 kilometres from the railway. It was possible to get away from the place only during the navigation season on the river Lena. Ihe conditions of labour were fixed by harsh contracts, and although the workers had no right to leave their jobs before the expiration of the contract they could be discharged at any time. Wages were paid only on the expiration of the contract; the provisions issued to the men at the company stor3s on account of wages were of the worst quality. The working day was fixed by contract at 10 to 11^/2 hours, but it was often extended at the arbitrary will of the management. The workers were completely in the power of the management who, to keep the workers in hand, had at their command a police force paid by the company. The Lena Gold Fields Company behaved like a feudal ruler. Byelozerov, the manager of the Lena Gold Fields, was called the uncrowned king of the taiga. In 1912, the gold fields were, as Lenin described them, one of ‘‘those corners where it seems as though serfdom existed -but yesterday.”

The atrocious conditions of labour, the holding up of wages, the sale of bad-quality provisions at exorbitant prices and the violence and tyranny of the management and the police often gave rise to unrest in the gold fields.

At the end of February 1912, a strike broke out on one of the sec- tions where the conditions of the workers were exceptionally hard. It would have paid the management to close the section, but that would have meant breaking the contract, which was due to expire only in September. The management therefore set out to provoke the workers to break the contract themselves. The immediate cause of the strike was the issue of bad horse meat. The workers downed tools in protest and sent dele- gates to the other fields to bring the men out there. On March 1, the strike spread to a number of other sections. A strike committee was set up with the object of making the strike general. Strike committees were also set up in all the fields, and stewards were appointed in the living quarters. The Central Strike Committee opened negotiations with the management. Tulehinsky, the Regional Engineer, received the deputa- tion with great courtesy and persuaded the Menshevik delegates to agree to call off the strike. Tlic BoLshevik-niimlccl members of the Strike Committee condneted propaganda among the masses against calling off the strike. .

It was decided to settle the question by a secret ballot of the work- ers. In the morning of March 25, two sugar barrels were ])laeed opposite each other in one of the fields, one bearing the inscription “Will go back to work” and the other the inscription “Will not go back to work.” The workers filed between the barrels holding a pebble in one hand. As they passed they dipped their hands into both barrels and dropped the pebble into one barrel or the other. Soon the barrel bearing the inscription “Will not go back to work” was full to the brim. In the other barrel only seventeen pebbles were found.

On March 27, the strike became general and over 6,000 workers were involved. Under the leadership of the Bolslievik-minded workers the strike proceeded in a unanimous and organized manner; but notwith- standing the peaceful cliarfeicter of the strike the management called for troops, and a largo force was sent to the gold fields. For the delib- erate purpose of creating disorders Captain of Gendannes Tresliehenkov ordered the i^rrest of the members of the Strike Committee and told the troops not to hesitate to “use force” against the workers if they attempt- ed to release their comrades. On April 4 (17), 3,000 workers sigiaed a statement to the effect that they had gone on strike on their own ac- cord and had not been instigated to do so by anybody, and they marched in procession to the Nadczhdinsk Section of the gold fields to hand this statement to the local prosec'.uting attorney.

On this frosty morning of April 4, long lines of workers streamed from various parts of the gold fields » to Nadezhdinsk, and on nearing that centre they linked up in one long, dark ribbon stretching for three or four kilometres. The road along which the procession wended its way was flanked on the one side by the steep bank of the river Bodaibo and on the other by stacks of timber. Near Nadezhdinsk the road was blocked by a cordon of treoj^s in full fighting kit. Engineer Tulchinsky stepped out to the workers and told them to disperse. The workers at the head of the procession halted, but the rest, stretched out along the narrow road, continued to press forward. Suddenly shots rang out, volley after volley; 260 workers were killed and 270 were wounded.

This new atrocity committed by the tsarist autocracy roused a unanimous outburst of anger among the workers. A wave of protest strikes swept the country. Revolutionary demonstrations took place in the cities. On the demand of the Social-Democratic Deputies the State Duma was compelled to (liscuss the Lena events, but Makarov, the Minister of the Interior, explained the matter to the Duma in his own way. He said: “So it was, and so it will bo.”

This insolent statement of the tsar’s minister, was answered by the rise of an immense mass political movement of the working class in protest against the I/ena shootings. As Lenin wrote: “The Lena shootings . . . were an exact re fleet ion of the regime of the Third- of- June monarchy.” He went on to say that it was not the demand for certain particular rights but the general lack of rights that prompted the workers to enter into decisive struggle against tsarism. “It is precisely this general tyranny in Russian life,” he wrote, “it is pi ecisely the hopelessness and impossibility of waging a struggle for particular rights, precisely this incorrigibility of the tsar’s monarchy and of its entire regime, that stood out so clearly against the background of the Lena events that they fired the masses with revolutionary ardour” (V. I. Lenin, Selected Works, Two-Vol. ed., Vol. I, Moscow, 1946, p. 550).

Emphasizing the historical significance of the Lena events, Comrade Stalin wrote in the Bolshevik newspaper Zvezda in 1912:

“The Lena shooting has broken the ice of silence and the river of the people’s movement has begun to flow.

“The ice is broken! , . .

“All that was evil and pernicious in the present regime, all the ills of much-suffering Russia, were focussed in the one fact, the events on the Lena.

“That is why it was the Lena shootings that served as a signal for strik<='S and demonstrations.”

The Mass Revolutionary Movement During the Revival

The wave of political strikes called in protest against the shooting down of the workers in the I^ena gold fields swept over the whole country with ex- traordinary rapidity. Hundreds of thousands of workers downed tools. In St. Petersburg the strikes were accompanied by street demonstra- tions. The struggle of the St. Petersburg workers was led by Comrade Stalin, but soon he was again arrested. Protest strilces against the Lena diootings merged with a powerful First of May movement. The Lena events revealed that the working class had accumulated enormous rev- olutionary energy. In April 1912, over 300,000 workers were involved in strikes, but the First of May strike affected about 400,000 workers. The movement spread and affected even the most backward strata of the workers. Strikes took place in every district in the countiy. At the head of the stiike movement marched the revolutionary proletariat of St. Petersburg; then came the workers of the Baltic Provinces, Moscow, the Ukraine and the Caucasus. According to official figures, the total number of workers involved in strikes in 1912 was 726,000 and in 1913, 861,000, Actually, the number was considerably higher. Economic strikes were interwoven with the political strikes. Lenin described these mass strikes as revolutionary strikes, for they were directed against the autocracy and were of nation-wide importance. The strikes enjoyed the sympathy of the majority of the working population. They stimulated the peasants to fight against the landlords and tsarism. The factory owners retaliated to the strikes by lockouts. The police and the secret police intensified their persecution of the strikers.

The strikes proceeded under the Bolshevik slogans of: ‘‘An 8-hour day, confiscation of the landlords’ estates, and a democratic republic.” These slogans were calculated to rouse for the struggle against tsarism not only the workers, but also the peasants and the men in the army.

The peasant movement, which had subsided after 1907, began to flare up again. The introduction of the Stolypin reform accelerated the process of class diTerentiation among the rural population. The conditions of the rural poor still further deteriorated, partic- ularly after the famine of 1911 which a,Teoted about 30,000,000 peasants. The peasant movement directed against the landlords and the kulaks assumed the militant forms of incendiarism, trespass, tree felling, refusal to pay taxes, etc. Collisions between poor peas- ants and kulak “khutor^-farmers became more and more fre- quent.

Revolutionary outbreaks occurred also in the army. In 1912, a revolt broke out among the troops who were stationed in Turkestan, and fierce reprisals were taken against the mutineers. In June 1913, 62 sailors of the Baltic Fleet were tried by naval court-martial in Kronstadt on the charge of conspiring to cause a revolt. Strikes in protest against this trial of the revolutionary sailors broke out, and this indicated that the class-conscious working-class movement in tsar- ist Russia constituted a powerful political force.

As Comrade Stalin said, the mass revolutionary strikes showed that “. . . in Russia a tremendous popular revolution was rising, headed by the most revolutionary proletariat in the world, which possessed such an important ally as the revolutionary peasantry of Russia” (J. Stalm, Problems of Leninism^ Moscow, 1945, pp. 17*18).

The Bolshevik Pravda

The struggle that was waged by the pro- letariat was led by the Bolsheviks and proceeded imder Bolshevik slogans. The revolutionary upswing created the urgent need for a mili- tant daily political newspaper that could be read by the broad masses of the workers. Under the direction of Comrade Stalin, who had escaped from exile in Vologda, preparations were made for the publication of a popular daily newspaper, the Pmvda.

In January 1912, the workers began to contribute funds for the purpose of starting such a workers^ newspaper. Contributions came in from all parts of Russia. As Lenin wrote . the creation of Pravda remains outstanding proof of the class consciousness, energy and solidarity of the Russian workers” (V. I, Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. XVI, Moscow, 1937, Russ, ed., p. 46).

Tlio tilvt ir^aiio uf Pravda, vyhiclj Cojiirade Staliu edited, appeared on April 22 (May 5 new ntyle). That is why wo now o'.dcbrate May 5 as Workers' Press Day. The work of tht^ Pravda was gnided from abroad by Lenin. Its first editor was Comrade Staliu and its first editorial secr^taiy was V. M. Molotov, who devoted much time and energy to the paper. Among the mem hers of the staff wore K. E. Voroshilov, M. 1. Kalinin and Y. M. Sverdlov. Maxim Gorky also eontribiiied to tlie paper.

Fmvda was the organizer of the revoiutionary masses and directed all the mass campaigns that were organized by the Bolsheviks. Of considerable ijnportance among these eampaigtis was the insurance campaign. In Juno 1912, an act was ])assed to insure the workers in (5ase of sickness and accidents. The insurance Lmd was to be managed by insurance boards on which the workers wore to be represented. Notwithstanding the grave defects of this law, Pravda called ni)on the workers to take j)art in the election of the insurance boards and the elections ])assod n.T successfully. This insurance campaign was of gi*eat importance l>ecauso it helped to organize very wide masses for the revolutimmry siruggle.

Pm?Y/a. trained a whoh^ generation of worker-Bolshcvike who liel)>ed Ijenin and Wtaliu to rei^reate the mass Bolsluwik .Party in the pcwiod of the revohition.ary ujmwing. As Oomnide Staliu wrote: ‘'The old Pravda was undoubttully the hai'bingor of tlie coming of glorious victories of the Russian ] proletariat"" (“On the Occasion of the Tenth Anniversary of Pravda Stalin’s article publislied in PrnrdaNo. 08 of May T), 1922).

Pravda w^as eonstantly subjected to the ]Pcrsecution of the poli(ie. In the lirst year of its oxistonco the police raided the ] printing })lant and destroyed the current issue of the pa[)er no less than forty times. To prevent this, the workers would come to the jprinting plant at niglit and take the fi’eshty printed iicwsjpapcrs away b(‘fore the police arrived. The newspaper often had to change its name. In July 1914, just before the First World Wai*, Pmrda's jpremises wore wrecked and its staff was arrostfnL.

The Fourth State Duma

The Elections to the Fourth State Duma

In 1912, the fcerm of the Third State Duma expired. The tsar’s government dissolved it and appointed elections to tlie Fourth Duma. These elections took place in an atmosphere of repression and persecution, which had become exceptionally intense after the assassination of Stolyiiin in 1911.

The Bolsheviks decided to utilize the elections for the purpose ■of conducting a new mass campaign against tsarism. To be nearer to Eussia, and to direct the election campaign, Lenin, in the summer of 1912, removed from Paris to Cracow. In Eussia the Bolshevik election campaign was led by Comrade Stalin who, in Sep- tember 1912, had again escaped from exile and had returned. to St. Petersburg. The editorial ojSces of Pravda were used as stafr head- quarters for organizing the working class for the campaign. The Bolsheviks issued a document, drafted by Comrade Stalin, entitled “The Mandate of the Workingmen of St. Petersburg to Their Worker Deputy.”

At election meetings the Bolsheviks denounced and exposed the compromising tactics of the Liquidators, and emerged victorious at the elections. Often the police came to the assistance of the Liquida- tors and baimed meetings of workers’ representatives. The workers voted in their separate curiae, apart from the rest of the popula- tion. Pive Bolsheviks were elected by the workers to the State Duma — ^in the St. Petersburg, Moscow, Vladimir, Kharkov, Ekate- rinoslav and Kostroma gubernias. A sixth Deputy elected on the Bolshevik panel turned out to be an agent provocateur. The Menshe- viks secured the election of seven of their candidates, but these were in gubtrnias where there were no workers’ curiae.

Tiie Fourth State Duma, which assembled at the end of 1912, was as much a Black Hundred and Octobrist Duma as the Third Duma had been. Of a total of 410 Deputies, 170 were Eights. The Octobrists, who constituted the government party and had nearly 100 Deputies, were adherents of the Eights. The Cadets had 50 Deputies. They differed from the Octobrists only in that they indulged in “Lfffc^ phrases and in the Duma they acted jointly with the Octobrists. The petty bourgeoisie was represented by ten Trudoviki and seven Men- shevik.

The Bolsheviks in the Fourth State Duma

At first the Bol- sheviks in the Fourth State Duma formed a single group with the Mensheviks, but the latter, taking advantage of their majority of one vote, systematically prevented the Bolsheviks from speaking in the Duma. In conformity with the decision of the Central Committee of the Party, the Bolshevik Deputies left the joint group and formed an independent Bolshevik group. The group maintained close contact with the masses of the workers and conducted extensive activities among them; it received numerous letters, declarations, reso- lutions, instructions and greetings from workers in all parts of Eussia. One of the most effective means it employed for using the floor of the Duma was to interpellate the government in cases of acts of lawless- ness and tyranny. The Bolshevik Deputies conducted their activities in the Duma under the direction of the Party Central Committee and of Lenin. The Deputies used to receive directives from Lenin and on several occasions went abroad to consult with bim, Comrade Stalin, who was in St. Petersburg, directly guided the activities of the Bolshevik gi'oup in the Duma.

The Works of Lenin and Stalin on the National Question

The growth of jingoism among the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois nationalist parties duo to the intensification of national oppression during the period of reaction made it particularly necessary for the Bjlshevik Party to explain to the masses the essence of the national question and its role in the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat.

In 1913, two classical works on the national question appeared: Lenin’s Critical Notes on the National Question, and Stalin’s Marxism and the National Question. These two books provided the proletariat with the theoretical basis of the Bolshevik program on the national and colcnial problem.

In the autumn of 1913, Lenin convened a conference of the Central Committee in the village of Poronino, in Galicia, whe-re ho then lived, to discuss the national question. This conference adopted a resolution, which Lenin had drafted, and endorsed the slogan which had been substantiated in the works of Lenin and Stalin, namely, the right of nations to self-determination, including secession. The conference also emphasized that the preservation of the militant and solid Party of the proletariat, undivided by national barriers, was an essential condition for victory in the struggle for the liberation of the oppressed nations.

The Preparation of the World War

In the epoch of imperialism great changes took place in the relations between the capitalist coun- tries. As a result of the process of uneven economic development, Ge.Tnany, at the beginning of the twentieth century, outpaced France and Great Britain in the sphere of industry. The magnates of German finance capital, in conjunction with the Prusso-German mili- tarists, made energetic preparations for a European war. They dinned it into the minds of the German people that Germany’s powerful war industry, the superior armament of her vast army and her navy would make victory certain, and held out the prospect of Germany becoming the ruler of the world. Tlie Pan-Gkrman League, the imperialist organization which they formed, was convinced that Ger- many could achieve victory over France and Bussia as long as Russia was fettered by the autocratic system. The chief obstacle to German domination, particularly on the sea, in the opinion of the German imperialists, was Great Britain, and against that country they pre- pared for a ruthless naval war. On the other hand, the chief obje ct of Groat Britain’s foreign policy was to crush Germany’s might with the aid jDf . France, with whom she had concluded an agreement on this soQre’in 1904;.

in the forefront stood the conflict of interests of British and Ge^an imperialism, of which the latter was particularly aggressive.

Second^ to that came the conflict of interests of imperialist Ger- many and tsarist Russia.

^rman imperialism was driving towards the Near East, into Turkey. The German banks gained control of the building of the rail-^ way that was to link Germany with Turkey, and German military instructors directed the organization of Turkish military forces in preparation for war against Russia and Great Britain.

The growth of Germany’s economic and political influence in the Turkish empire would have placed her in control of the Black Sea Straits.

Ruling circles in Russia became increasingly imbued with the thought that “the road to Constantinople lies through Berlin, ” that is to say, through the destruction of the German empire.

Lenin described Great Britain, Germany and tsarist Russia as “three big highway robbers” and the chief factors in the world Wt'-.ir, while the other countries were merely “non-independent allies.” He emphasized that while the war for the redivision of the world affected the interests of all the imperialist powers, the chief instigator was Germany.

In the struggle for the redivision of the world all the participants in the world slaughter drew up predatory plans.

The plans of the German imperialists included the creation of a great German empire that was to embrace so-called “Middle Europe,” to seize the Baltic Provinces and Poland, dismember Russia, deprive her of the Ukraine, subjugate the Balkan Peninsula and Turkej^, deprive Great Britain of Egypt and India, and push France away from the English Channel, etc.

The plans of Austria, Germany’s ally, were, with the aid of Ger- many, to dismember Serbia, annex Russian Poland and to subjugate the Ukraine and the Balkan Peninsula.

Great Britain’s plans were to crush her principal rival, Germany, to destroy her navy and mercantile fleet, to seize the German colonies, and also to deprive Turkey of Mesopotamia and Palestine and finally annex Egypt.

The plans of France were to regain Alsace-Lorraine and seize the left bank of the Rhine, to crush Germany’s military power, share the German colonies with Great Britain, and take part in the partition of the Turkish empire.

The plans of tsarist. Russia were to gain possession of the Bospho- rus and the Dardanelles, to seize Turkish Armenia, to dis- member Austria-Hungary, and establish her influence in the Balkan Peninsula. . \

Japan’s plans were to take advantage of the war in Europe, to seize China with the assistance of Russian tsarism, and in the.^s^ent. of Russia’s defeat to seize the Russian Par East.

Notwithstanding fierce repression by the police and the gendarmes, the Baku workers, supported by the workers of St. Petersburg and other industrial centres, staunchly continued the struggle for two months.

In response to the appeal of the Bolsheviks, 90,000 workers in St. Petersburg struck work in solidarity with the Baku workers. On July 11, 200,000 workers were out on strike in that city. Meetings Avere continuously held under the slogans; ""Comrades of Baku, we arc with you!’*, "'Victory for the workers of Baku is victory for us,” etc. One such revolutionary demonstration ended in the shooting down of workers at the Putilov Works.

In retaliation to this outrage, the whole of the working class of St. Petersburg rose in protest; the workers of all the big plants downed tools and poured into the streets for a revolutionary demonstration. Collisions occurred between workers and troops which developed into barricade fighting. The caj^ital was transformed into a military camj). Pravda was suppressed.

When these events were at their height Poincare, President of France, arrived in St. Petersburg to conduct negotiations with the tsar. During these negotiations the tsarist government agreed that France and Russia should jointly counteract Austria-Hungary’s attack on Serbia, -which was likely to lead to a world war.

The Second Bourgeois-Democratic Revolution

Tsarist Russia during the First World War (1914–March 1917)

Russia's Part in the War

The Beginning of the World War

In July 1914, the world imperialist war, of which Germany was the instigator, broke out. This war was fought between two . groups of imperialist countries; one, headed by Germany, constituted the Quadruple Alliance (Ger- many, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey); the other, headed by the British and French imperialists, constituted the Triple Entente (Great Britain, France and Russia, and also Serbia and Belgium). In 1914, Japan joined the Triple Entente; Italy did the same in 1915, and the United States joined it in 1917. In alL 33 countries were involved in the war, and 74,000,000 men were mobilized for the various armies. The war cost 30,000,000 human lives and about 300,000,000,000 rubles in money.

As regards the number of cormtries that were involved all over the globe it was a world war, but in its aims it was an imperial- ist war, a war for the forcible redivision of the world.

As Lenin wrote: 'Tn its real nature this war is not a national but an imperialist war.

, The war is being waged between two groups of oppressors, between two robbers, to decide how to divide the booty, who is to plunder Turkey and the colonies” (V. I. Lenin, Collectf^d WorJcs^ Vol. XIX, Moscow, 1937, Russ, ed., p. 200).

This predatory war for the redivision of the world was prepared for in the course of decades and affected the interests of all the impe- rialist countries. Its immediate cause was Austria-Hungary’s plan to crush Serbia, a plan that was supported by Germany, who counted on securing a redivision of the world in her own favour as the result of the development of the Austro-Serbian war into a world war. The spark that ignited the conflagration of the world war was the assassination of the Austrian Crown Prince Francis Ferdinand in Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia. Mae assassination was committed on Juno 28, 1914, by a nineteen-year-old student named Gavrila Princip on tho instructions of a Serbian army officers’ nationalist organization. Austria-Hungary, instigated by Germany, presented Serbia wiiJi an ultimatum that was couched in terms that made its rejection by the Serbian government inevitable. On the advice of tlie Russian government, however, the Serbian government agreed to nearly all of the terms of the ultimatum, but in spite of this the Austrian Minister, who aheady had his trunlis packed, left Belgrade, and Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia. After receiving the assur- ances of President Poincare that France was ready to sujiport Russia and Serbia, the tsarist goveriunent intervened in tho conflict

Proclaiming her solidarity with Serbia, Russia began to mobilize. Germany called upon the tsarist government to stop mobilizing. Tlie tsarist government refused to do so, whereupon, Germany, on August 1, declared war on Russia. France began to mobilize. On August 3, Ger- many declared war on France, and on that same day German trooiis crossed the Belgian frontier. Next morning the British government presented an ultimatimi to Germany demanding lier withdrawal from Belgian territory, but without waiting for a reply fche British govern- ment, in tho aftenioon of August 4, issued an order to mobilize the British army. At midnight it declared war on Germany. Thus com- menced tho first world imperialist war of 3914-1918.

The War on the Eastern Front

At the very beginning of August three fronts were formed in belligerent Europe: a Western Front, which stretched from the North Sea to Switzerland; an Eastern or Russian Front, which* stretched from the Baltic Sea to Rumania, and the Balkan Front, which ran along the Danube. The Russian Front was split up into two almost independent operative sectors — the Northwestern and Southwestern sectors. The Northwestern Front ran from the Baltic Sea to the lower reaches of the river Bug, and tho Southwestern Front ran along the Russo-Austrian frontier to Rumania. On the Balkan Front the Serbian army fought the Austro-Hungarian army.

After violating the neutrality of Belgium the German army made a drive towards Paris. The French government called upon Russia forthwith to launch an offensive on the Eastern Front with the object of diverting the largest possible number of German troops from the Western Front. Accordingly, two Russian armies, under tho com- mand of Generals Samsonov and Rennenkampf, were sent to invade East Prussia. Rennenltampf’s army launched a successful offensive and won a big victory in the battle of Gumbinnen, but this victory was not followed up. Rennenkampf ’s army failed to develop its offensive and this enabled the German Command to throw the whole weight of its forces against General Samsonov’s army. The oj)er- ations of the two Russian armies were not co-ordinated. From inter- cepted and decoded telegrams sent by General Samsonov and Rennen- kampf, and also through its own spies, the German Command learned of all the movements of the Russian troops. A large part of General Samsonov’s army was surroimded by the Germans in the marshy and wooded region of the Masurian Lakes and was wiped out. Tens of thousands of Russian soldiers perished. General Samsonov com- mitted suicide.

After defeating Samsonov’s army, the Germans hurled their troops against Rennenkampf’s army, which had remained inactive. Rennenkampf retreated to Russian territory, losing 110,000 men. But Paris was saved. By taking the blow upon herself, Russia saved her ally France from defeat.

In August 1914, simultaneously with the unsuccessful offensive in East Prussia, four Russian armies launched an offensive against Austria-Hungary on the Southwestern Front. The armies commanded by General Brusilov and Ruzsky defeated the Austro-Hungarian armies, occupied Lvov and Gorlice and surrounded the fortress of Przemysl. Nearly the whole of Galicia was occupied by the tsarist forces.

In the middle of September the German armies came to the assist- ance of Austria-Hungary by launching a wide offensive from the foothills of the Carpathians. In the middle of December 1914, the offensive was halted on both sides.

In the autumn of 1914, a new front was formed — ^the Caucasian Front. Two German warships, the Ooehen and the Breslau, stole their way from the Mediterranean into the Black Sea and bombarded Foo- dosia and Odessa. After this, Turkey, who was bound by a military alliance with Germany, went to war against Russia. In December 1914, the Turkish army was defeated in the battle of Sari Quamish, after which the Russian troops on the Turkish Front slowly pushed forward. On the Austro-German Front, however, the belligerent sides were extremely exhausted and consequently passed over to trench warfare, meanwhile mustering forces for new decisive blows. At the end of April and the beginning of May 1916, a German army, under the command of General Mackenzen, supported on both flanks by Austrians, pierced the Russian Front between Gorlice and Tarnov thus compelling the Russian armies to beat a hasty retreat. The Austro- Hungarian troops occupied Przemysl and Lvov. In July, another German army occupied the fortress of Ivangorod. At the end of July German troops occupied Warsaw and Brest-Litovsk. The Germans developed their offensive and occupied Grodno and Vilna. Thus, by the autumn of 1916, Poland, Lithuania, part of tlie Baltic Provinces a.nd VoUiynia had fallen into the hands of Germaiiy and Austria-Hungary. From May to October 1915, the Russian army lost over 150,000 men in killed and more than 1,000,000 in wounded and pris- oners. Towa^rds the end of September 1915, operations on the Eastern Front were reduced to trench warfare. This front now stretched in an ahnost straight Ime from the river Dniester to the Gulf of Riga. Thus, in the first period of the world war tsarism sustained grave military defeats.

Military operations on the Eastern Front in 1914-1915 ended in the defeat of the Russian armies. This made the loss of the war by Russia a foregone conclusion. Thus, tsarist Russia’s unprepar- edness for war made itself felt at tlie very outset. The Russian ^army was inadequately supplied with ammunition, heavy artillery, air- craft, materials for chemical warfare and equipment. There were cases when men went to the front without weapons and had to pick up ibose left by the men who were killed in battle. Sometimes a unit had' only one rifle for every three men. The army was supplied with boots with rotten-lcathor soles, with greatcoats which bebame useless after the first downpour of rain, with provisions thaWiad gone bad, and so forth. All sorts of sliarpers and swindlers speculated in war contracts and made fabulous i)rofits. Military headquarters, army supply departments and munition plants swarmed with spies, adventurers, scoundrels and j)rofiteers, incompetent generals and downright traitors.

A German and Austrian espionage organization, headed by Colonel of Gendarmes Myasoyedov, was already operating in Russia before the war. Even the War Minister Suldiomlinov was accused of espio- nage. The effect of sabotage and espionage was severely felt at the very outset of the war. The stocks of military su]pplies were exhausted during the first month, and no new supplies were forthcoming. The Ministry of War had not supplied the army with shells and small- arms ammunition. Output in the government small-arms factories had been reduced by three-fourths and of the ordnance works by one- half. Treachery and espionage caused the death of thousands of men at the front. Sometimes vital orders were communicated by radio uncoded and were intercepted by the Germans, who were thus able to follow the movements of the Russian armies. Headquarters staffs were incompetent and the orders they issued only caused anarchy and confusion. But even under these conditions the Russian army, as always, displayed magnificent fighting qualities. The courage, endurance, heroism and initiative of individual soldiers and units often saved the situation and helped to extricate a force from encircle- ment in which it was threatened by complete extermination.

The Treachery of the Second International

From the very first days of the war the imperialist bourgeoisie in all the belligerent countries tried to deceive the masses and make them believe that the war had been caused by the aggression of the enemy and was there- fore a defensive war. The parties that were affiliated to the Second International betrayed the principles of internationalism and Sociah ism and helped the bourgeoisie to perpetrate this deception upon the masses. Playing upon the natural love of the common people for their country, they did all in their power to rally the masses for the impe- rialist war by concealing its true character and lU’ging the necessity of defending the bourgeois fatherland.

On August 4, 1914 j the German Social-Democrats, in defiance of the resolutions passed at international congresses of the Second International, voted with the German bourgeoisie in the Reichstag in favour gi war credits. That same day, the French Socialists also voted for the war credits. “We are being attacked, we are defending ourselves,” they assured the workers and peasants. In a number of countries ^(France, Belgium, Great Britain) the leaders of the socialist parties entered the upper ialist governments. Thus, as Lenin wrote:

Overwhelmed by opportunism, the Second International has died’’ (V. I. Lenin, Collected Worlds, Vol. XVIII, New York, 1930, p. 89). It broke up into separate social-chauvinist parties, engaged in war with one another. By the time the war broke out the opportunists degenerated into social- chauvinists.

The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries as the Vehicles of Chauvinism in Russia

At the beginning of the war chauvinist fever ran as high among the petty bourgeoisie in Russia as it did in other countries. In Petrograd, as St. Petersburg was renamed after the outbreak of war, university students who were called up for mili- tary service marched in procession to the Winter Palace to pay homage to the tsar. The Cadet-minded bourgeoisie called for the cessation of “internal controversy” for the duration of the war. At the very first session of the State Duma that was held after the outbreak of the war, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Trudoviki associated themselves with the solemn declaration made by the Octobrist Rodz- yanko, the President of the Duma, who called for “unity between the tsar and his faithful people.” Behind the guise of socialist phrases, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks helped the bourgeoisie to deceive the people by calling upon them to “defend the fatherland,” hence the term “Defencist” that was applied to the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. In the autumn of 1914, the Belgian Socialist Cabinet Minister Vandervelde sent a telegram to the Russian Socialists calling upon them to help in the prosecution of the war. In answer to this the Mensheviks wrote; “By our activities in Russia we are not hindering the prosecution of the war.” Thus, the Russian Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, like all the social-chauvinists of the Second International, openly spread chauvinistic propaganda among the masses. The most dangerous to the* cause of the proletariat were the concealed social-chauvinists, the so- called Centrists, like Kautsky, Martov, Trotsky and others, who, like the avowed social-chauvinists, stood for the defence of the hour- geois “fatherland,” called for the cessation of the class struggle against the bourgeoisie for the duration of the war and, deceiving the masses^ as regards the actual war criminals, covered up their own treachery with “Loft” phrases about fighting for peace.

The Bolsheviks' Fight against the War and the Social-Chauvinists

The only party in the International which saved the honour of the international proletariat was the Bolshevik Party, headed by Lenin and Stalin. Prom the very outset of the war the Bolsheviks ex- posed its imperialist character and the treacherous conduct of the Second International.

Lenin was in Austria when the war broke out. The Austrian im- perialists hastened to arrest the leader of the world proletariat and then deported him from the country. Lenin went to Switzerland and there launched a campaign to expose the predatory, imperialist char- acter of the war, and also the treachery of international social-chau- vinism.

“The Bolsheviks hold that there are two kinds of wars:

“a) Just wars, wars tliat are not wars of conquest but wars of liber- ation, waged to defend the people from foreign attack and from at- tempts to enslave them, or to liberate the people from capitalist slav- ery, or, lastly, to liberate colonies and dependent countries from the yoke of imperialism; and

“b) unjust wars, wars of conquest, waged to conquer and enslave foreign countries and foreign nations” {History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union [Bolsheviks]^ Short Course, Moscow, 1945, pp. 167-168).

Lenin regarded the World War of 1914 as an unjust war of conquest and called for a determined struggle against it to the extent of over- throwing the imperialist governments by means of revolution. Ho ad- vanced the slogan of transforming the imperialist war into civil war and called upon the proletarians of each country to wage a revolutionary struggle for the defeat of “their own” government. The slogan “Por the defeat of the tsarist government” issued by the Bolsheviks meant not only the 'fulfilment of their international duty as Socialists. The Bolsheviks* fight for their slogans was one to save their country, to preserve its independence, which could be guaranteed only if the workers and peasants won victory over tsarism and imperialism. The Russian social-chauvinists and the Centrists headed by Trotsky ' opposed Lenin’s slogan calling for the defeat of tsarism. Rebutting their arguments, Lenin said that . to justify participation in the imperialist war, to advance in this war the slogan ‘against defeat^ means to act not only as an anti-socialist, but also as an anti-national politician” (V. I. Lenin, Collected Worlcs, VoL XVIII, New York, 1930, p. 190).

From the very outbreak of the war Lenin set out to form a new. Third International in place of the Second International, which had suffered a shameful collapse.

Lenin’s poiicj’- of a complete rupture with the imperialists and of waging a determined struggle against the social-chauvinists and Centrists was vigorously carried out in Russia by the Bolshevik mem- bers of the Duma. They constituted the only legal group of Bolsheviks that had the opportunity of appealing to the masses, for with the out- break of the war all the Bolshevik newspapers were suppressed, the - prominent Partyworkers were arrested and exiled, the workers’ orga- nizations were wrecked and the more class- conscious and advanced workers were called up for military seivice and bent to the fiont. The five Bolshevik members of the Duma toured the country, visiting factories, holding tail^is with the workers and explaining to them the aggressive and predatory nature of the war. In the Duma itself the il^lslievik nicinhers openly proclaimed their opposition to the war and refused to vote for the war credits.

In November 1914, all the Bolshevik members of the Duma were arrested by the jiolice just when they were holding a secret conference with Party workers, and in February 1915, they were put on trial. At the trial they conducted themselves like staunch fighters for the cause of the proletariat. Only Kamenev, who had been arrested with the Duma Deputies, behaved at the trial like a renegade. He declared that he differed fundamentally with the Bolsheviks on the question of the war and that he agreed with the Defencists. On receiving a report of this trial Lenin expressed his approval of the conduct of the workers’ Duma Deputies and denounced the disgraceful, craven and despicable conduct of Kamenev.

The tsarist court sentenced the five Bolshevik members of the Duma to lifelong exile in Siberia.

But even while in exile the Bolsheviks continued to oppose the war and to combat social-chauvinism. Comrade Stalin who, in 1913, had been exiled (for the sixth time) to the remote Turukhansk Region, although cut off from Lenin and the central Party bodies, took Lenin’s stand on the question of war, peace and revolution.

Tho hamlet of Kureika, whore Comrade Stalin lived, was two hundred kilometres from tho nearest village of Monastyrskoye and newspapers arrived there very rarely; the mail came once in two or three months and letters from comrades were delivered with great difficulty. Nevertheless, at the end of 3914, Comrade Stalin received Lenin’s theses in which he formulated the Bolshevik attitude towards the war. In the summer of 1915, Comrade Stalin called a conference in Monastyrskoye of the Bolsheviks in exile. This conference denounced Kamenev’s craven and treacherous conduct at the trial. In 1916 Com- rade Stalin received copies of the Bolshevilc magazine Insurance Questions^ whereupon he sent greetings to the editorial staff of that magazine in which he emiDhasized that in his opinion the chief task of the Bolshevik press was ideologically to insure the working class of Russia against the corrupting, anti-proletarian, chauvinistic propa- ganda of the Menshevik Defencists.

A similar attitude of imcompromising opposition to opportunism in every form was displayed by Y. M. Sverdlov, who was in exile with Comrade Stalin, by G. K. Orjonikidze, who was serving a sentence of penal servitude, and by the other Bolsheviks.

Brusilov's Breakthrough

The Military-Strategical Situation in the Beginning of 1916

Germany’s plans for a blitzkrieg collapsed; the war became a prolonged one. Germany had less chance of winning a prolonged war than the Entente, as the latter possessed large resources of manpower and ma- teriel. In 1915, the 6e man High Command concentrated its main forces on the Eastern Front and strove to defeat the Russian army and compel Russia to conclude a separate peace. Its aim was to rid it- self, in this way, of the second front in the East and to concentrate all its forces for the struggle in the West. The Germans did succeed in capturing a large area of Russian territory, but they failed to rout the Russian armies and the second front was not liquidated.

By the autumn of 1915, the German High Command came to the conclusion that it was useless to continue active operations against Russia and therefore began to make preparations for decisive opera- tions on the Western Front. Leading Entente circles also realized that the respite the. Entente had received in 1915 at Russia's expense had ended, and they too began to prepare for the anticipated German offensive on the Western Front. The military situation comj)elled the Allies to decide to smash their opponents in the Western and Eastern theatres of war by a series of successive decisive blows.

In the beginning of 1916, tsarist Russia intensified military oper- ations on the Caucasian Front. In spite of the incredibly dijficult fighting conditions in mountain terrain the Caucasian army stormed and captured Erzerum in February and Trebizond in April. Another Russian army launched a drive in the direction of Persia. But the offensive against Turkey was not pressed home as the Allies did not wish Turkey to be utterly defeated by Russia.

The strategical position of the Entente countries had now consid- erably improved. Their military technical forces had grown. The French and British armies were equipped with splendid artillery, and having succeeded in organizing the mass production of shells they now had a plentiful supply of these. Particularly well equipped was the for- tress of Verdun, which covered the road to Paris. Lacking adequate forces for an offensive on other parts of the front the Germans, in Feb- ruary 1916, launched a drive precisely against this fortress in the hope of breaking through and gaining a decisive success. Within a short space of time the Germans fired against the Verdun fortifica- tions over 2,000,000 shells. At the crucial moment they even resorted to asphyxiating gases, for it was the Germans who first used poison gas in the First World War.

To divert some of the German forces from Verdun the Allies de- manded that the Russian armies should launch an offensive on the Eastern Eront. This offensive had the added object of preventing the defeat of Italy, against whom the Anstro-German command was preparing to strike a blow at Trent ino.

The Russian Army's Offensive on the Southwestern Front

In conformity with the plans of the Russian High Command the offen- sive operations wore to comniL'nce on the Russian Western Front from the region of Molodeczno and drive towards Oszmiana-Vilna. A supple- mentary blow was to be struck on the Northern Front in the region of Dvinsk. The Southwestern Front was to kcc]) on the defensive. But General Brusilov, who shortly before had been appointed Commander- in-Chief of the Southwestern Front, was stiongly opposed to this plan. At the conference held at General Headquarters in Mogilev on April 14, 1916, ho argued that all the fronts should launch an offen- sive, and do so simultaneously. The war, he said, could not be won by defensive tactics, and the Russian army and its allies now possessed all the facilities for launching a general and decisive offensive.

Brusilov, an outstanding loader in the Russian army in the period of the First World War, held the view that military objectives could be achieved only by active methods. In this iCvspcct he was ono of the last representatives of the Suvorov school in the old Russian army. What distinguished him as a military leader was his constant striving to employ new methods on the basis of a study of the oxperien.co of war. He demanded thorough preparation for an operation and a clear understanding of the general strategical tasks. Hd was of the opin- ion that preparations for an offensive should be made along the whole front and that blows should be struck on several sectors simultane- ously so that the enemy should not know where the main blow was to be struck.

Brusilov drew up the following plan of operation. He decided to strike the main blow in the Luck direction, on the right flank of his front, which was capable of rendering most assistance to the Russian Western Front where offensive operations wore about to begin. Making clever use of camouflage, he did all possible to ensure that his preparations were concealed from the enemy. All troop movements were performed at night. No conversations about the preparations were conducted over the telephone. Not a single person unconnected with the forthcoming operations knew anything about them. All this ensured not only thorough preparation but also that the enemy would be taken completely by surprise.

Brusilov’s army launched its offensive at dawn on June 4, 1916. After artillery preparation lasting twenty-nine hours, the infantry charged the Austro- German positions. After ten days’ fighting the enemy’s defensive system was breached on a front of ninety kilomelTcs and Luck was captured. Within a few days the army captured the whole of Bukovina and part of South Galicia and reached the passes of the Carpathian mountains. Brusilov’s successful offensive compelled the enemy to transfer his reserves from the Italian and French Fronts to the Eastern Front. The German High Command effected such a transfer.

Brusilov’s blow saved the Italians from defeat and eased the position of the French at Verdun. The whole Austro-German Front from Pole- sie to the Bumanian frontier was disorganized, and this created the possibility of inflicting decisive defeat upon the German coalition. But neither the Allies nor the Russian High Command followed up Brusilov’s success in time. The Anglo-French troops failed to pass to the offensive at this crucial moment for the German army, thus enabling the German High Command to transfer considerable forces from the Western to the Eastern Front. Failing to receive the support of the other armies, Brusilov’s offensive was checked, after fierce fighting involving heavy casualties, in the marshy terrain near the river Stokhod. This lack of co-ordination of active Allied operations v/as one of the factors which helped to prolong the war and to ease Germany’s position in 1916.

Growth of the Revolutionary Crisis

Economic Chaos in the Country

Despite the successes the Russian armies achieved on the Turkish and Southwestern Fronts it was already evident that tsarist Russia had lost the war. The main reason for the defeat of tsarism was Russia’s economic and technical backward- ness. The technically backward war industry was incapable of sup- plying the army with the munitions of war. In the rear, economic chaos reigned. Although the number of workers employed in industry almost doubled, the productivity of labour steadily declined.

Shortage of fuel led to the cutting down of production in the fac- tories and mills. In 1916, thirty-six blast furnaces were blown out. The steel mills produced only half the metal that was needed for the war industry and metal deliveries to plants were rationed.

The railways could not cope with the traffic. The transport system was dislocated, as a result both of repeated militar^’^ withdrawals and of the flood of refugees who poured from the regions occupied by the Germans into the hinterland of Russia. During hasty retreats large quantities of rolling stock were left in the hands of the enemy. Wrecked cars and locomotives blocked the roads. To allow trains to pass, trains ahead of them were sometimes thrown over the railway embank- ment. Owing to the lack of transport facilities even urgent supplies of war materiel obtained from the United States, Great Britain and France were not delivered on time. The military port of Archangel was so congested with war materiel that the lower oases literally sank into the ground under the weight of those on top of them.

The utter dislocation of the transport system intensified the food crisis. Over a billion poods of grain from preceding harvests lay rotting at remote railway stations while the population of the towns were living; on meagre bread rations. The army received only half the regu- lation rations. The price of bread rose over 50 per cent. In the autumn of 1916, fixed grain prices were introduced, but the landlords and kulaks ignored them. Profiteering in grain increased, while long queues of starving people lined up outside the bakeries.

■ Agricultural output dropped considerably during the period of the war. About 14,000,000, or 47 per cent, of the adult male popula- tion had been conscripted for the army, and it was the most able-bodied section of the rural population that was taken. Agriculture also suf- fered from the continuous requisition of horses and cattle; during the period of the war the number of horses in the coimtry was reduced by 5,000,000.

Tn 1916 the sown area in the country was 85 per cent of that of 1909. Landlord farming, deprived of the cheap labour of day labour- ers and peasants, deteriorated. The landlord farms were largely cul- tivated by prisoners of war, but their labour was very unproductive.

Particularly disastrous were the effects of the war upon the cur- rency of the country. The colossal expenditure entailed by the war was covered by the issue of paper currency. The value of the ruble dropped and the cost of living steadily rose. To meet the war expend- iture the tsarist government floated internal loans and also appealed again and again for loans to the Allies. To pay for war contracts placed abroad it received from Great Britain, France and the United States sums amounting to 7,769,000,000 rubles.

The defeats at the front and economic chaos at home roused the alarm of the bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie had been making unprece- dented profits out of war contracts. Since tsarism proved to be inca- pable of organizing a victorious war, the Russian bourgeoisie tried to take charge of the organization of the war effort and achieved great influence in affairs of state.

In the summer of 1915, the bourgeois representatives in rural and urban local government bodies formed an organization, known as the ‘‘Zemgor, ” which demanded a voice in the distribution of sup- plies for the army. At about the same time so-called War Industry Committees were set up which undertook to fulfil part of the war contracts. Proclaiming the slogan of “everything for the war, all for the war,” the bourgeoisie launched a campaign to increase output in the factories.

The bourgeois opposition during the war years was led by a body set up in the State Duma in August 1915, and known as the Progressive bloc. It included nearly all the bourgeois parties, the Octobrists, Progressives, Cadets and part of the Nationalists.

Backed by the Mensheviks and the Trudovik ^^roup, tliis bloc demanded the" formation of a “Cabinet of confidence,” that is to say, the ap- pointment of Cabinet Ministers who would enjoy the confidence of the bourgeois majority in the Duma. The tsarist government, however, refused to make any concessions and in September 1915, it issued a decree to prorogue the Duma “for recess.”

During the war Russia’s economic dependence upon British and French capital greatly increased. In return for credits amounting to 3,000,000,000 rubles, Great Britain demanded that the tsarist gov- ernment should transfer to London a part of Russia’s gold reserve as security for payment on war contracts. At the same time the Allies continuously kept demanding fresh reinforcements fiom^Russia. In April 1916, the French “Socialists” Albert Thomas and Viviani were sent to Russia to demand the despatch of 400,000 Russian soldiers to France. Only a proletarian revolution could save Riissia from being utterly converted into a colony of foreign imperialism.

The Revolutionary Situation in the Country

At the end of 1915, a revolutionary situation began to develop in iche country. The war and the economic chaos caused extreme discontent among the masses of the working people who were obliged to bear the whole brunt of the war. The conditions of the working class had greatly dete- riorated during the period of the war. The insignificant “war bonus”' was insufficient to cover the rising cost of living. High prices, shortage* of food and the eternal queues, particularly wore out the women workers who were obliged to maintain their children without the assistance of their husbands who were away at the front. About 40 per cent of the industrial workers had been conscripted for the war and it was the more class-conscious and j)rogrcssive workers, and also 3 ^oung workers, who were sent off first. Their j)laces in the factories were taken by work- ers from the rural districts and by women and juveniles. To compel the workers to work harder and to rouse their supportfor the war, the War Industry Committees formed "workers’ groups.” In September 1915, at a meeting of representatives of the workers of the factories of Petrogr«^.d, the Bolshevilis secured the adoj^tion of a resolution against the election of such a gi’oup to the Central War Industries Commit- tee. The result was that only an insignificant number of workers took part in the election of the "workers’ group” which took place in No- vember. The Menslievilvs, who advocated “class peace” between the workers and the bourgeoisie, supported the “workers’ group,” and the Menshevik Kuzma Gvozdev, an arrant Defencist, became the head of it.

Ill the spring of 1916, the strike movement began to assume wide proportions and the strikes in the central industrial region were exceptionally tiTrbulent, At the Novo Kostroma Linen Mills the work- ers demanded an increase in wages and marched in procession to the offices of the mill to present this demand. They were met by troops who fii’ed at them, killing and wounding scores of them. The Commander of the Cor])S of Gendarmes sent a telegi’amto the Governor of Kostroma stating; “Apiirove your action. Find ringleaders. Court-martial them.”

The same brulal treatment was meted out by troops and police to the workers of Ivanovo-Voznesensk who marched to the Town Hall to XDresent their demands. The shooting down of the workers in Kostroma and Ivanovo-Voznesensk called forth a wave of protest strikes. The strike of the workers of the Putilov Works, which was engaged on war orders, assumed a militant character, and was joined by the new work- ers, among whom the Bolsheviks employed at the ]3lant had been very active. The Putilov strike was supported by the entire proletariat of Petrograd. In the autumn, mass strikes began to spread all over the country.

January 9, 1916, the anniversary of Bloody Sunday, was com- memorated by the workers by a political strike. The political strike wave reached its peak in October 1916, when these strikes were accom- panied by demonstrations in which the workers carried the revolution- ary slogans: "Down with the war!”, "Down with the autocracy!”

The movement among the workers stimulated the struggle of the peasants. The imperialist war had finally divorced the peasants from the bourgeoisie, for it revealed to them how utterly groundless were their hopes of receiving land and peace from the tsar and his bourgeois allies. The impoverishment and ruin created in the countryside by the war strengthened anti-war temper in the most backward and remote villages. The Department of Police noted the growth of propaganda conducted by peasants against the further recruitment of soldiers for the war. One such rural propagandii^t is reported to have said: “Our tsar is throwing the people into the war like an extrava- gant cook throwing logs in the stove.”

Information rhout the disastrous condition of peasant farming reached the army. Worn out by the protracted war and enraged by the ruination of their farms at home the soldiers refused to go into action against the enemy, voluntarily surrendered, inflicted wounds upon themselves and deserted in masses. In 1916 the number of de- serters was estimated to have exceeded 1,500,000.

The Activities of the Bolsheviks During the War

The Bolshe- viks developed extensive activities in the aimy and in the navy. They formed underground military organizations m the army units and printed and distributed revolutionarj’- leaflets in which they called for fraternization between the soldiers of the belligerent armies and stressed that their common enemy was the imperialist bourgeoisie, and that the only way they could end the war was by turning their weapons against the bourgeoisie and their governments.

In the autumn of 1915, fraternization commenced at the front. The Bussian soldiers left their trenches to mingle with the enemy soldiers. Tlio soldiers of both sides treated each other to cigarettes and understood each other perfectly even though they did not know each other’s language. This fraternization strengthened the international unity of the working people in both lines of trenches.

By the end of 1916, the letters vrhich the soldiers sent home from the front reflected their growing hatred of the vrar and of tsar- ism. One soldier wrote: “The soldiers today are not what they were during the Japanese War; under the mask of slavish obedience there bums frightful anger. It is enough to light a tiny match for this mass to flare up.” The conscripted workers, many of whom had taken part in the revolution of 1905, conducted propaganda in favour of another revolution.

A number of leading Bolsheviks were active in the army. M, V. Frunze, who escaped from prison in 1915, secured a situation in the Union of the Zemstvos under the assumed name of Mikhailov. He formed an underground Bolshevik organization in Minsk and established close contacts with the soldiers on the Eussian Western Front. A. A, Zhdanov, mobilized into the armyj» conducted energetic Bolshevik propaganda among the troops. V. V. Kuibyshev was active in the pipe works in Samara, and S.M. Kirov was active in- the Caucasus, rousing the most backward and downtrodden highlanders for the struggle against tsarism. In Kiev, and later in Ekaterinoslav, L. M. Kaganovich conducted propaganda among the workers and soldiers. In the spring of 1915, V. M. Molotov arrived in Moscow to organize a Bolshevik conference. He was arrested and ex- iled to Siberia, but he escaped shortly afterwards, went to Petrograd, and there directed the preparations for a new revolution.

Never had the lives of the Bolsheviks working underground been so full of danger as during the imperialist war, when those conduct- ing revolutionary propaganda were liable to be coiirt-martialled and shot. But the Bolsheviks were not daunted by dijOSiculties or dangers; they knew how to be with, and at the head of, the masses, no ‘ matter what conditions prevailed.

In the endeavour to rally all the revolutionary forces for the struggle against the imperialist war the Bolsheviks conducted intense activity among the youths and workingwomen who had taken the places in industry of the men who had gone to the front.

The theoretical basis for the activities of the Bolsheviks during the period of the war was provided by Lenin’s works on imperialism. In 1916, he wrote that work of genius, Im'periaUsm^ the Highest Stage of Capitalism in which he showed that imperialism is the last stage in the development of capitalism and is the eve of the proletarian revo- lution. In this book, and in the articles he wrote in 1916-1916, he showed that imperialist wars weaken the forces of imperialism and ren- der possible the breaking of the chain of imperialism at its weakest link. In his articles “The United States of Europe Slogan” and "The War Program of the Proletarian Eevolution” he showed that it was quite possible for the proletariat to break the chain of imperialism at some one point, that Socialism could not be victorious in all coun- tries simultaneously, that it would iii’st achieve victory in a few coun- tries, or even in only one country, while the other countries would for a time remain bourgeois countries. This was a new and complete theory of the socialist revolution, a theory the fundamentals of which were outlined by Lenin as early as 1906. This theory opened up a revolutionary perspective for the proletarians of the various countries, taught them to utilize the war situation for a revolutionary onslaught upon the bourgeoisie in the given country, and strengthened their confidence in the victory of the world proletarian revolution.

The Revolt of the Peoples in Central Asia in 1916

The National Question During the Period of the War

The bourgeoisie in all eountries proclaimed the imperialist war a war for the protection of weak nations, but actually, during the war the oppressed nationalities were forced into, greater dependence than ever upon the imperialist bourgeoisie. The colonial peoples served, as the source from which the belligerent armies received replenishments of “cannon fodder.” During the period of the war the movement for national liberation was rapidly heading towards a revolutionary uprising against imperialism. Lenin and Stalin pointed out that the revolutionary movement for national liberation of the oppressed nationalities was a reserve of the proletarian revolution. The Bolsheviks waged a determined struggle against national oppression in Russia and in other oountries, and upheld the right of nations to self-determination and the international unity of the working class in its struggle for Socialism.

The Bolsheviks denounced the policy of national oppression pur- sued by tsarism and the imperialist bourgeoisie. As far as Russia

is concerned,” wrote Lenin at this time, “the war is doubly reaction- ary and hostile to national liberation” (V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. XVIII, New York, 1930, p. 226).

The Revolt in Central Asia and Kazakhstan

The war imposed great suffering upon the oppressed peoples of tsarist Russia, la its quest for fresh sources of revenue for the purpose of financing the war, the tsarist government imposed additional taxes on the inhab- itants of the outlying regions. The peoples of Central Asia were sub- jected to exceptionally cruel exploitation. In the settled cotton-grow- ing regions, the exploiters enmeshed the entire population in a net of enslaving contracts. During the period of the war the area under cotton increased 50 per cent, but the peasant growers could not enjoy the produce of their labour. They delivered the greater part of their crop to the landlords in payment for rent, and sold the remainder at ridiculously low prices fixed by the government to the disadvantage of the poor peasants . Meanwhile, the price of manufactured goods rose to an enormous extent. The Uzbek peasant cotton growers were threat- ened by famine, as they grew scarcely any grain themselves and little grain was shipped into the region owing to the dislocation of the railways.

Conditions in the nomadic and semi-nomadic regions of Central Asia and Kazakhstan were even worse. The government continued to drive the Kirghiz and Kazakh herdsmen from their pastures in order to provide land for Russian settlers. In 1915, 1,800,000 hectares of the best land of the Kazakh and Kirghiz were granted to Russian land- lords, government offtcials and kulaks. The continuous requisition of horses, cattle and wool for war purposes utterly ruined the herdsmen. The tyranny of the local authorities and the levies they imposed still further worsened the hard lot of the people.

The immediate cause of the extensive revolt of the working people in Central Asia was the order issued by the tsarist government in June 1916, conscripting the inhabitants from the age of nineteen to forty-three for the purpose of digging trenches and performing other work at the front, in spite of the fact that according to the laws of tsarist Russia the noii-Riissiau population was not liable to military service.

The Uzbeks, Ivazaldis, Kirghiz and Turkmen refused to obey thi.s harsh order, the more so that it was issued just when t]ie harvest was being taken in. The fii^st to rise in revolt were the peoples of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Crowds of excited Uzbeks in the towns and villages of the Tashlient and Samarkand counties attacked the rural admin- istration ofliccs and demanded that the conscription lists should be destroyed. By the middle of July 1916, the revolt had spread over the whole of Ferghana. Near Jizak, in the Samarkand Region, regular battles with the tsarist troops took place, in which the latter employed artillery. The rebels cut eommunications between Verny (now Alma-Ata) and Tashkent, caj^tured a trainload of arms that w^as being sent to be used against them , armed the peasants and entered into battle with the Russian troops. The revolt was suppressed only in October, after a punitive army had been sent against the rebels of the Somirechensk Region.

The revolt of the Kazakhs in the Turgai (now Aktyubinsk) Re- gion which broke out in September 1916 was exceptionally iirolonged and stubborn. The revolt was headed by Aniangeldy linanov. When the Kazakhs of the Turgai Region refused to obey the tsar’s conscription order, the Governor of the region went to them in person to jjorsiiade them to obey. Amangeldy turned to him and said: '‘Permit me, worthy chief, to put one question to you. In our ignorance we do not understand; whom shall we defend in this war?” The Governor ordered the arrest of Amangeldy, but he went into hiding among the poorest sections of the Kazakhs. Sliortly afterwards Amangeldy Imanov organized a large force of rebels which entered into battle with one of the punitive units at Lake Kizil-KuL The battle lasted a whole day and the troops were forced to retreat.

At the end of October 1916, the rebels headed by Amangeldy Imanov besieged the town of Turgai, but failed to capture it. Aman- geldy retreated from Turgai and fortified himself in the village of Batbakara. Here workshops were set up where armourers worked day and night making swords and other side arms. The Ka- zakhs were trained in the use of firearms and in military exercises. The local inhabitants supplied the rebels with food, and with fodder for their horses. A large punitive army was sent against Amangeldy, and in the middle of February 1917 this army captured Batbakara. The rebels retreated into the steppe. Later their brave leader Aman- geldy took part in the revolution, joined the Bolshevik Party and died like a hero in the Civil War.

The revolt in Turkmenistan also lasted a considerable time. Tlie Turkmen herdsmen, moving from place to place, easily evad- ed the tsar’s troops sent against them. A special punitive expedition of Cossack troops sent against them succeeded in forcing the rebels to cross the frontier into Persia. The revolt was suppressed with ruthless cruelty. The punitive army burned down the herdsmen’s encampments, and seized their property and cattle. In a number of counties more than half the population was wiped out. The Governor General, Kuropatkin, put 347 of the rebels on trial, and of these 51 were executed. In the case of the others sentence of death was commuted to penal servitude. Several hundred rebels were exiled without trial . After the revolt was sup- pressed many thousands of Khghiz and Kazakli refugees, with their families and herds, wandered into China and Mongolia, while the Turkmens crossed over into Persia. On leaving their habitations the refugees sold the remnants of their jjroperty to the rich and to the bai (kulaks) for a mere song; but in the countries in which they had taken refuge they were also subjected to persecution. After Soviet rule was established in Kussia many of the refugees returned home.

Education and Culture in Russia before the Revolution (1907–1917)

Education and Science

The revolution of 1905-1907 had roused among the masses of the people a tremendous thirst for knowledge. During the period of the revolution a large number of educational societies were formed, and adult schools and study coxirses, libraries, people’s universities, etc., were oj^ened. During the period of reaction, however, the tsarist government suppressed most of these educational societies and institutions. The first to suffer were the educational so- cieties which had been formed by the workers and the iion-Eussian nationalities. Among these were the Ehiowledge Is Strength Society, The Educational Society, The Self-Educational Society, The Voluntary High School, which had been organized by P. E. Lesgaft, a number of educational study courses, nearly all the People’s xmiversities, and many of the elementary educational societies. But the tsarist govern- ment was unable to crush the people’s desire for knowledge.

The needs of developing capitalism, the growing economic and political intercourse with the more cultured European countries, and lastly, the steps which the tsarist government itself was taking towards a bourgeois monarchy, compelled the government to increase the extremely insignificant funds hitherto allocated for education in Russia.

The industrial boom of 1912-1914 confronted the bourgeoisie with the need for training technical personnel which were practically non-existent in tsarist Russia. The number of students in technical colleges in 1914 was twice that in 1903.

With funds provided by the Zemstvo and private capitalists teclinioal and commercial schools, and trade and agricultural schools were opened-

Duriiig tho six years from 1907 to 1913 the ‘estimates of the Min- istry of Education were trebled, from 46,000,000 rubles to 137,000,000 rubles; but the latter was an insignificant sum considering the real needs of a civilized country. The tsarist government spent on educa- tion 65 kopeks per head i)er annum, whereas Great Britain, Prance and Germany spent three to four rubles, and the United States nine rubles per head per annum. On the eve of the war the number of pupils attending educational establishments of all types was about 7,000,000, which was less than 60 per 1,000 ofthe population. Only about one-fourth of the children of school age attended school. Accord- ing to official figures, before the revolution of 1917, only 21 per cent of the population of Russia was literate. In the non-Russian national regions the percentage of literacy was even lower: in Transcaucasia 12 per cent, in Central Asia about 5 per cent. Of Uzbek, Turkmen and Tadjik children only 42 per 1,000 attended school. This explains why entire nationalities, such as the Bashkirs, Kirghiz, Turkmens, Yakuts and many others were totally illiterate. As Lenin wrote: “No such barbarous country in which tho masses of the people have been so completely robbed of education, light and knowledge has remained in Europe except Russia” (V. I. Lonin, Oollected Works, Vol. XVI, Moscow, 1937, Russ, ed,, p, 410).

Lonin pointed to the conditions of schoolteachers as an index ofthe backwardness and barbarism of tsarist Russia. Teachers* salaries were miserably low, they wore continuously subjected to the carping crit- iciam and persecution of the higher officials, and were constantly harassed by the police and secret service agents.

The tsarist school, “the school of drilling and learning by rote” as Lenin called it, dinned into the minds of the children knowledge of which nine-tenths was useless, while the other tenth was distorted. High-school students were prohibited from forming self-educational circles.

After defeating the revolution of 1906, the tsarist government came down heavily on the universities. In 1910 and 1911, in connection with the death of Leo Tolstoy, the students resumed their political meetings and protest demonstrations. In retaliation to this the tsarist government issued an order iabolishing university autonomy which had been won by the 1906 revolution, and suppressing student organizations which hitherto had been permitted to exist. Largo numbers of students were expelled from the universities and deported for taking part in tho students’ movement. In 1910 the newly appointed Minister of Edu- cation, the reactionary Kasso, dismissed all the liberal and radical professors and he also discharged the Principal of the Moscow University and his assistants for failing to take adequate measures against the “mutinous” students. In protest against this act of bureaucratic tyraimy 125 professors and lecturers of the Moscow University, among whom were K. A. Timiryazev, Professor of Physics P. N. Lebedev, and others, resigned.

To combat the revolutionary student movement the government encouraged the formation in the higher educational establishments of Black Hundred student organizations, such as the Academic Union, and others, which were connected with the Union of Russian People.

The state of the universities to some extent detennined the state of science in Russia. The university chairs trained an inadequate num- ber of scientific research workers and there were few scientific research institutes in tsarist Russia. The Imperial Academy of Sciences pro- duced no works of any great scientific value, and the President of the Academy was the tsar’s uncle Konstantin Romanov, who knew nothing about science.

The genuine scientists who sprang from the ranks of the people received neither recognition nor assistance. The great genetics se- lectionist, I. V. Michurin, was not recognized as a scientific researcher, in spite of the fact that scientists from other countries came to him to study his methods. The same applied to another great scientist, K. E. Tsiolkovsky, who constructed a dirigible airship ten years before the Zeppelin appeared, and who formulated the principles of the jet- propelled engine; he was obliged to remain a teacher of mathematics in Kaluga and conduct his scientific researches with his own very modest resources. The outstanding mechanic, the father of Russian aviation, N. E. Zhukovsky, devoted himself to the study of aerial dynamics and the theory of the flight of aircraft, but the results of his work found application only under the Soviet regime. The first Russian airmen, Rossinsky, Utochkin and others, performed their flights at the risk of their lives in badly constructed aeroplanes provided by professional showmen for the purpose of public entertainment.

The plan proposed by the Arctic explorer, G. Y. Sedov in 1912, for an expedition to the Korth Pole was met with hostility and ridicule. It was only with great dijfiSlculty that Sedov, with the aid of private contributions, fitted out the St. Phoca and started out on his expedition, which was inadequately organized. Eventually, the ship was caught in the ice and Sedov, accompanied by two sailors, abandoned the ship and attempted to reach the Pole on foot, but they only succeeded in reacliing Rudolf Island, where, in the winter of 1914, the brave explorer died of hunger and cold. The remains of Sedov’s grave on Rudolf Island were only recently discovered.

Thus, scientific discoveries, research and expeditions were treated by the tsiirist govoriiiiient and the bourgeoisie with cold indifference, and sometimes oven with ignorant contempt.

Literature and Art

The ideological disintegration that set in among the bourgeois intelligentsia found most vivid rejection in the decadence that cliaraoterized the literary world in the last decade be- fore the revolution. Tlie Cadet proff^ssors and philosopliers, such as Bulgakov, Berdj^aev and others, intensified, in their philoso];>hical works, their attacks on Marxism and revolution and preached idealism and mysticism. Reactionary idealistic philoso])hy exercised considerable inlluenc(.’^ upon the Russian petty-bourgeois intelligentsia who frequently sought escape from reality in the world of abstract ideas and emotions. The individualist intellectual, disillusioned with life, became the lu’incipal hero in fiction. Social reaction opened the way for numerous literary trends such as the symbolists, futurists, acme-ists, etc., and while these various groups, schools and coteries were at loggerheads with each other, they all agreed in reimdiating realism in art. The predominating jirinciplc in literature was formalistic searching. The literature and poetry of that time was distinguished for its intellectual shallowness and }}essi- inistio moods. Thus, tho works of Leonid Aiidrcyov breathed profound }>essimism and fatalism. Life for him was “madness and horror” and man was “a plaything in tho hands of fate.” Artsybashev argued that a man “could do anything ho pleased since Death stood at everyone’s back.” Merezhkovsky and Zinaida Hippius advocated “seeking for a God” and denounced the Russian revolution. Undoubtedly talent- ed poets like Balmont, Theodore Sologub and others, withdrew from; public life and sanli into extreme individualism, or into the world of abstract fantasy, “from constricting borders into a wonderful world, to unlmown beauty” as Balmont wrote. Pessimism even affect- ed tho work of progressive poets like Alexander Blok and Valeri Bryusov. Tho Bolsheviks combated this state of decay in the literary world. Amidst the gloom of that period the wonderful stories that were written by the great proletarian author Maxim Gorky breathed cheer- ful confidence and strength. “Man — ^there is a proud ring about that word,” said Gorky. He had confidence in the new man and in his lofty mission as fighter for and builder of the new way of life. At that time Gorky came out as the bard of socialist democracy. In his novel Mother ^ he put into the month of his hero the following words about the new generation of Russian workers: ^VPhen you look at them you can see that Russia will be tho brightest democracy on earth.” Maxim Gorky became tho favourite author of tho proletariat, and from his works the proletarians imbibed new strength for the struggle. Lenin wrote that “Gorky is undoubtedly the greatest representative of proleia^'ian art, who has done a great deal for this art and is capable of doing still more in the future” (V. I. Lenin, Selected Worhs, Vol. IV, Moscow, 1934, p. 36). Another challenge to the old decaying world was the poetry of the young poet Vladimir Mayakovsky. His poem “Cloud in Pants,” written in 1914, was a hymn to life, love and the struggle, Mayakovsky proclaimed himself the “drummer boy of the revolution” and welcomed its coming. The call for the struggle for the new way of life was also sounded ill the works of the Ukrainian autlioress Lesj^a Ukrainlva, whose art reached its peak in the darkest years of reaction. The writer's fate was a tragic one: she was bedridden with tuberculosis in a severe form, but her work, which was strongly influenced by Puslikin's poetry, breathed ardent sjunpathy for the people who were rising against the autocracy, and sounded a call for the struggle against the oppres- sors. In 1913, untimely death carried away another great artist in the field of literature in the person of M. M. Kotsyubinsky. Kotsyubinsky commenced his literary career in the 1880 's and 1890 ’s by ruthlessly denouncing the liberal Narodnik intelligentsia and the monstros- ities of peasant life. In the period of the 1905 revolution he definitely became the mouthpiece of revolutionary peasant democracy. In his most important work, Fata Morgana, he describes with pro- found sympathy the revolt of the peasants and reveals his hatred for the landlords and the kulaks. In 1916, the most popular of Jewish authors, Sholem Alechem, the nom de plmne of Sholem Rabinovich, died. Maxim Gorky described him as an “artist in melanchol 3 ’’ and grave humour.” In his series of humorous tales: Tobias the MUhtnan, The Memoirs of a Commer- cial Traveller, and others, he described with great artistic realism and sincere sympathy the joyless life of the Jewish poor. Art in this period reflected the same ideas and moods as were reflected in literature. In painting, decorative themes came to the forefront (the “World of Art” group represented by Roerich, Benois and others). The same tendency to escape from realism into the world of inner emotions and external formalistic searchings was reflected in sculpture (P. P. Trubetskoy, Konenkov, and others). The work of the outstanding composer A. N. Scriabin (1871-1915)^ an innovator of musical form, contained elements of mysticism and' symbolism (“A Divine Poem,” and others).

The February Bourgeois-Democratic Revolution

Overthrow of Tsarism

Two Conspiracies

Hie last years of tsarism in Russia were the years of its utter decay and decomposition. During the period of the war, the rascal Gregory Rasputin, formerly a peasant from Siberia, gained exceptional influence at the tsar’s court. In his youth Rasputin had been a horse thief and later he roamed from monastery to monastery with pilgrims and alms-beggars. Skilfully posing as a “seer,^" he became extremely poxmlar among ignorant religious people and partic- ularly among women. Rumours about him and the ^’"miracles” he performed reached the tsar’s comt. The tsar and the tsarina who were extremely superstitious believed these rumours. The tsarina, who was fanatically religious, invited Rasputin to the court in the hope that he would bo able to cure the Crown Prince Alexei of the illness which the physicians had iDronounoed incurable. Rasputin was shrewd and brazen and gained enormous influence over the tsarina, and through her, over the tsar. The tsarina constantly induced Nicho- las II to follow the advice of Rasputin, to whom, she believed, “God reveals everything.” In obedience to Rasputin’s illiterate messages the tsar appointed and dismissed ministers. With his assistance shady businessmen, profiteers, swindlers and foreign spies obtained important posts, profitable concessions, enormous subsidies and lucrative war contracts. The ascendancy of Rasputin most vividly reflected the obscurantism, the superstition, the intellectual poverty and mor- al decay of the tsarist regime.

The defeats sustained at the front and the revolutionary situation in the country created panic in governmental circles. To have their hands free to crush the growing revolution, the tsar and the court clique wanted to conclude a separate peace with Germany, and arrange- ments for negotiations for such a peace were made by the tsarina through her Geiman relatives. The scheme to conclude a separate peace with Germany was also supported by Rasputin,

Rumours that the court was secretly preparing to conclude a sepa- rate peace with Germany leaked out and this, together with the fact that tsarism was obviously incapable of coping with the revolutionary movement in the country, stimulated the opposition of the bourgeoisie. At the Olid of 1915, the government began to meet with increasingly vigorous and sharp criticism in the State Duma. True, as Shulgin, one of the Deputies of the Right explained, this criticism was merely an attempt to transform ‘'the seething revolutionary energy into words" and to “substitute resolutions for revolution.” Nevertheless, bourgeois circles had lost their former “confidence” in the government. The government became panic-stricken and began to indulge in what was called “Ministerial leapfrog,” i, e., constantly dismissing ministers and replacing them by others. During the period of the war there were no less than four Presidents of the Council of Ministers, six Minis- ters of the Interior, four Ministers of War, three Ministers of Foreign Affairs, four Ministers of Agriculture and four Ministers of Justice. As was said in the Duma, the changes were so fast that it was impossible to “get a good look at the faces of the Ministers who fell.”

In November 1916, the Fourth State Duma reassembled after the summer recess in an atmosphere of extreme political tension. The revolutionary crisis in the country was growing with catastrophic speed. The time had come when the ruling classes could no longer govern in the old way and the working people would no longer live in the old way. In its report on the political situation in the country, the Department of Police was obliged to admit that “opiDosition tem- per has now reached such exceptional dimensions that it far exceeds that which prevailed among the broad masses in the turbulent period of 1905-1906.”

Even the Grand Dukes and the higher aristocracy sensed the im- pending collapse of tsarism and demanded the removal of Rasputin, whom they regarded as the chief cause of all the trouble in the country. On the night of December 17, 1916, Rasputin was killed by conspirators, among whom were relatives of the tsar, and his body was thrown into an ice hole on the river Neva. The assassination of Rasputin, however, could not, of course, alter the situation in the country. The tsarist government resolved to take drastic measures to crush the revolu- tionary masses. Its plan was to conclude a separate peace with Ger- many, dissolve the Duma, and then concentrate its main blow against the working class. It intended to draw troops, including artillery, to the capital and to do so in good time. The war factories were to be militarized in order to place the workers under military law. The Petrograd Military Area, which came within the area of the Northern Front, was formed into a separate military area under the command of General Khabalov, a most reactionary general. The police force in the capital was put on a war footing and supplied with machine guns. Maklakov, formerly Minister of the Interior, wrote to the tsar demanding that the sternest measures be taken to combat the revolutionary movement in order “to restore order in the state at all costs and ensure victory over the internal enemy who has long been becoming more dangerous, more fierce and more insolent than the external enemy.” Concurrently witli this plot, another plot was being hatched by the imperialist bourgeoisie and the militarists. Giving up all hope of reaching an agreement with tsarism, the bourgeois plotters decided that the best means of averting a revolution would be a palace revolution. They plofcted to capture the tsar’s train while it was on the way from Army Gonoral Headquarters in Mogilev to Tsarskoye Solo, compel the tsar to abdicate in favour of his son Alexei and appoint the tsar’s brother, J\Tiehacl Romanov, who sjuapathized with “English ways,” regent until Alexei came of age. A part in tliis plot to bring about a palace revolution was idaj^'ed by the British and French im- perialists who were afraid that the autocracy would conclude a separate ]3oace with Germany.

But neither the plot of the tsarist autocracy nor that of the bourgeoisie fructified. They could not avert revolution. The working class and the peasants in soldiers’ uniforms thwarted these plans by their mass revolutionary actions.

The Insurrection in Petrograd

At the beginning of 1917, the general crisis in the country became extremely acute. The railways almost ceased to function. The factories and mills failed to receive raw materials and fuel and came to a standstill. The food problem grew into an acute political problem. Ou January 9, 1917, the anniver- sary of Bloody Sunday, a huge anti-war demonstration took place in Petrograd. Similar demonstrations took place in Moscow, Baku, Nizhni Novgorod and other towns. In Moscow two thousand workers came into the streets carrying red flags and banners bearing the slogan “Down witli the war! ” Mounted police dispersed the demonstrators. In a number of towns strikes broke out, and in some, the people spontaneously began, to raid the baker shops. The government lost its head and began to intensify its measures of repression. The Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries tried to prevent the revolution from developing by calling upon the workers to organize a demonstra- tion in defence of the State Duma; but on February 14, the day on which the Duma was to open, a large section of the workers, in response to the call of the Bolsheviks, came into the streets, carrying the slogans “Down with the autocracy! ”, “Down with the war!”

In the latter half of February the revolutionary movement in Petrograd grew with exceptional rapidity. On February 18, 30,000 workers employed at the Putilov Works came out on strike.

In the morning of February 23 the Putilov workers came out in a demonstration and were joined by the workers of other plants and by women waiting in the queues outside the baker shops. The Petrograd Committoo of the Bolshevik Party had issued an appeal for February 23 (March 8 new style) — International Workingwomen’s Day — ^to be marked by a political strike. In all, 90,000 men and women workers struck work that day. The political strike began to develop into a general political demonstration against tsarism.

Next day, February 24, 200,000 workers were on strike. Revo- lutionary meetings were held in all parts of the city. The police occupied the bridges across the Neva, but the workers streamed towards the centre of the city over the ice. On February 25, the political strikes in the different districts of Petrograd developed into a general political strike of the workers of the whole city. From General Headquarters the tsar sent the officer commanding the Petro- grad Military Area the following order: ‘T command you to put a stop to the disorders in the capital not later than tomorrow.” The police began to fire upon the demonstrators with machine guns that were posted on the roofs of houses. The streets and squares in the centre of the city were occupied by troops. Large numbers of workers and Bol- sheviks were arrested and flung into prison, among them members of the Petrograd Committee of the Bolshevik Party. The revolt at that time was directed by the Bureau of the Central Committee headed by Comrade Molotov.

V. M. Molotov had returned to Petrograd in 1916, after escaping from the Irkutsk Gubernia, where he had been exiled in 1915. On Lenin’s instructions he was appointed to the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party, which was directing the preparations for the February revolution. It was he who edited the leaflet issued by the Petrograd Committee of the Bolshevik Party on February 25, the last before the revolution — openly calling for insurrec- tion. This leaflet ended with the words: '‘Ahead of us lies struggle, but victory awaits us. Let everybody rally under the Red flags of the revolution! Down with the tsarist monarchy!”

On February'’ 26, the Vyborg Side of Petrograd was entirely in the hands of the insurgent workers. The Vyborg District Committee of the Bolshevik Party called upon the workers to arm themselves by seizing the arsenals and disarming the police. Meanwhile the workers intensified their propaganda activities among the troops; they forced their way into the barracks and called upon the soldiers to join them. In the morning of February 26, some military units were still firing at the people, but by noon the soldieis w’ere firing not at the people, but at the mounted police who were attacking the workers. An important part in winning the soldiers over to the side of the people was played by the workingw'omen who ardently pleaded with the soldiers to help the workers to overthrow the hated autocracy.

On February 27, the troops in Petrograd began to go over to the side of the insurgents. Thg men of the Volhynsky and Lithuanian Regi- ments joined the workers in the Vyborg District. The workers captured an arsenal containiug 40,000 rifles and armed themselves. Political prisoners were liberated from the prisons.

General Khabalov proclaimed martial law in Petrograd, but the tsarist authorities were no longer capable of checking the revolution. The insurgent workers marched to the Taurida Palace, where the State Duma met. During these daysRodzyanko, the President of the State Duma, had been sending the tsar at General Headquarters in Mogilev telegram after telegram begging him to make concessions to the people and thus "save the country and the dynasty”; but the tsar regarded the Duma as the principal hotbed of the resolution and therefore, on February 26, had issued a decree dissolving the Duma. The members of the Duma submitted to the tsar’s decree, but they remained in the Taurida Palace.

The tsar at General Headquarters continued to receive reassuring telegrams from the tsaripa who was in the capital, "It is a hooligan movement,” the tsarina wrote, “young boys and girls are running about and screaming that they have no bread — only to excite. ...” The tsar ordered troops to be withdrawn from the front and sent to Petrograd, but a troop train under the command of General Ivanov scarcely managed to reach Tsarskoye Selo, near Petrograd, where the soldiers fraternized with the revolutionary soldiers and want- ed to arrest the General. The tsar left General Headquarters for Petrograd, but the royal train barely reached Dno, where it was obliged to turn and make ior Pskov, the Headquarters of the Northern Front.

Everywhere the troops went over to the side of the revolution.

The Dual Power

The Formation of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies

On February 27 (March 12 new style), the revolu- tion triumphed.

Armed workers and soldiers liberated political prisoners from the prisons. The victorious workers and soldiers marched to the Taurida Palace where the members of the dissolved Duma were gathered. Hardly had the fighting ended than Comrade Molotov, member of the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party, andved a-t the palace.

The idea of Soviets lived on in the minds of the people ever since the days of the 1905 revolution, and they put this idea into effect immediately on the overthrow of tsarism. Even while fighting was still in progress in the streets the workers in the factories and mills were already electing their first Deputies to the Soviets. Comrade Molotov sent Bolshevik soldiers to the various regiments of the Petrograd garrison with instructions to organize the election of Depu- ties to the Soviet from each military unit.

Thus, unlike what occurred in 1905, when only Soviets of Workers’ Deputies were formed, in February 1917, a joint Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies was formed. The &st meeting of the Petrograd Soviet took place in the evening of February 27.

The Petrograd Soviet and its Executive Committee proved to be under the control of representatives of the compromising parties — ^the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries — ^who managed to secure election while the Bolsheviks were in the streets leading the workers’ insurrection. Another factor that infiuencedthe elections was that most of the leaders of the Bolshevik Party were still in prison or in exile. Tsarism had tom the leaders of the Bolshevik Party out of the ranks of the working class: Lenin was a political emigrant abroad, Stalin was in exile in distant Siberia. The Mensheviks, however, had remained at large, and posing as the champions of freedom they deceived the workers and soldiers and got themselves elected to the Soviets as their representatives. The rate of representation also helped the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries to obtain a majority in the Soviets; the rate of representation for large plants was one Deputy per 1,000 workers, but plants employing less than 1,000 workers could also elect one Deputy. The result was that the big plants, where Bol- shevik influence was strongest, received only as many seats in the Soviet as the small plants in which Menshevik influence predominated. The army units, wliicli consisted largely of peasants, elected mainly Socialist-Revolutionaries or their sympathizers to the Soviet.

The Provisional Committee of the State Duma

On February 27, after backstairs negotiations between the bourgeois members of the Duma and the leaders of the Menshevik and Sooialist-Eevolutionary parties, a Provisional Committee of the State Duma was set up, headed by the President of the Fourth Duma, Eodzyanko. The latter en- tered into communication with General Headquarters with the view to obtaining the consent of Nicholas II to the formation of a Cabinet that would be responsible to the Duma. The bourgeoisie were still trying to save the monarchy. As Comrade Stalin wrote in appraising the stand that was taken by the bourgeoisie at the time of the Feb- ruary revolution, they “wanted a little revolution for a big war,” The first thing the Provisional Committee of the State Duma did was to issue an order to the troops to retmn to barracks immediately and obey their officers. At a meeting of the Soviet of Workers’ Deputies the soldiers’ representatives raised a protest against this order. Yield- ing to the pressure from the masses of soldiers the Soviet issued Or- der No. 1, which defined the rights of the revolutionary soldiers. It provided for the elect’on of Soldiers’ Committees in all units of the Petrograd garrison, abolished the rule of addressing officers and gener- als as “Your Honour,” “Your Excellency,” etc., prohibited officers from using the degrading form, “thou,” in addressing soldiers, and granted the latter the same political and civil rights as those enjoyed by officers.

Order No. 1 was an important factor in organizing the revolu- tionary forces of the army and in finally swinging the soldiers at the front to the side of the revolution.

The Revolution Victorious Throughout the Country

Follow- ing on the successful revolution in Petrograd, the revolution swept in triumph over the whole country. On February 27, the Moscow or- ganization of t e Bolshevik Party called upon the workers and soldiers in that city to support the revolution in Petrograd. In the morning of February 28, the workers of the biggest plants came out on strike and were joined by the soldiers of the Moscow garrison. In the evening of March 1, the workers liberated imprisoned Bolsheviks. Among these was F. E. Dzerzhinsky.

The victory of the revolution m Petrograd was the signal for a revolt against tsarism also in the city of Nizhni Novgorod. The workers of the Soxmovo and other plants started a general strike, liberated political prisoners, disarmed the police and marched to the barracks and fraternized with the soldiers.

On March 2, the workers employed at the small-arms and ammuni- tion factories in Tula rose in revolt, set up Soviets and arrested the local tsarist authorities. Similar scenes occurred in February and Marcli all over Eussia. As Lenin figuratively expressed it, the blood-and mud-stainerl cart of the Eomanov monarchy was overturned at one stroke.

The Provisional Government

The revolution was brought about by the workers and the peasants in soldier’s uniform, but they were robbed of the fruits of their victory. The Socialist-Eevolution- aries and the Mensheviks were of the opinion that the revolution was already over and that the main thing now was to set up a ‘"normal” bourgeois government. On the night of March 1, behind the backs of the Bolsheviks, they reached an agreement with the members of the Duma to form such a government. In the morning of March 2, the appointment of a Provisional Government headed by Prince Lvov, a big landlord, was announced. Among the members of this government was Milyukov, leader of the Cadet Party, prof3ssor of history, who was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs; Guchkov, leader of the Octobrist Party, a manufacturer and banker, head of the War Indus- try Committees, who was appointed Minister of War and Marine; Konovalov, member of the Progressive Party and textile mill ower, was appointed Minister of Commerce and Industry; and the millionaire sugar manufacturer Tereshchenko was appointed Minister of Finance, Of the eleven Ministers only one was a “Socialist,” the Peo- ple’s Socialist (later Socialist-Revolutionary) Kerensky, a lawyer, who received the minor post of Minister of Justice.

In his first “Letter from Afar,” Lenin described this government in the following words: “This government is not a fortuitous assem- blage of persons. They are representatives of the new class that has risen to political power in Russia, the class of capitalist landlords and bourgeoisie, the class that for a long time has been ruling our country economically. ...” (V. I. Lenin, Selected Works, Two-Vol. ed., Vol. I, Moscow, 1947, p. 739.)

The first steps the new bourgeois government took were directed towards saving the monarchy. Behind the back of the Petrograd So- viet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies, Guchkov and Shulgin went to the deposed tsar in Pskov, and in the name of the Provisional Govern- ment urged him to abdicate in favour of his son Alexei. The tsar con- sented to abdicate in favour of his brother Michael. The bourgeoisie were willing to accept even this new tsar. On his return to Petrograd Guchkov addressed a meeting of the workers in the railway workshops and after reading the manifesto announcing the abdication of Tsar Nicholas 11 he concluded with the cry: “Long live Emperor Mi- chael!” The indignant workers demanded Guchkov’s immediate arrest. “Horse-radish is no sweeter than radish,” they said.

Realizing that it was impossible to save the monarchy, the Provi- sional Government sent a deputation to Michael Romanov to request him to abdicate and transfer power to itself. On March 3, Michael Romanov signed iiis abdication, and in a manifesto to the people he called upon them to obey the Provisional Government.

The Class Nature of the Dual Power

At the very outset of the revolution a dual power arose in the country; the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, rej)resented by the Provisional Govemment; and the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, represented by the Soviets of Deputies. Both these powers existed side by side.

After victory was achieved over tsarism Soviets of Workers’ Depu- ties were set up in all the towns of Russia, even in the most remote parts of the country. Somewhat later, in the latter half of March, Soviets of Peasants’ Deputies began to spring up. At first, the Petro- grad Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies served as the all- Russian centre of the Soviets. The Soviets were virtually a second government. They controlled the armed forces of the revolution. Armed workers formed units of Red Guards. The Soviets enjoyed the undivided confidence and support of the army and of the masses of the working people. Nevertheless, the Soviets voluntarily surren- dered all state power to the bourgeoisie and its Provisional Government .

Lenin wrote the following: “The class origin and the class signifi- cance of this dual power consist in- the fact thab the Russian revolu- tion of March 1917 not only swept away the whole tsarist monarchy, not. only transferred the entire power to the bourgeoisie, but also approached very closely to the point of a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship , of the proletariat ' and peasantry. The Petrograd and the otW, the local, Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies represent precisely such a dictatorship (that is, a government power resting not on law but on the direct force of armed masses of the population), a dictatorship precisely of the above-mentioned classes” {V. I. Lenin, Selected Worlcs, Two-Vol. ed., Vol. II, Moscow, 1947, pp. 27-28).

The existence of a dual power in 1917 was due to the fact that Russia was a petty-bourgeois country. During the revolution, millions of people who had had no previous experience in politics were awak- ened to political life, and this petty-bourgeois tide swept to the political forefront the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary parties which entered into a compromise with the bourgeoisie.

As a class, the bourgeoisie was better organized than the workers and peasants, who had not had the same legal opportunities to organize as the bourgeoisie had enjoyed. After 1906, and particularly during the war, the capitalist class was able to build up for itself the machinery of its future power, and it easily set this machinery in motion at the time of the revolution.

During the war the petty-bourgeois stratum of the proletariat also gained in strength as a consequence of the fact that numerous small property owners, handicraftsmen, shopkeepers and kulaks had poured into the factorit-s in order to escape military service. It was this petty-bourgeois stratum of the workers, together with the small “labour aristocracy,” that served as the main prop of the Mensheviks and the Sooialist-E.evolutionaries.

The politically mature and most class-conscious section of the proletariat belonged to the Bolshevik Party; but during the war most of these were either in prison, in exile, or at the front.

The vast masses of the workers, soldiers and peasants, formerly downtrodden by tsarism, betrayed naive confidence in the Provisional Government, which, they believed, had been created by the revolu- tion, and in the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks, who were the worst enemies of peace and Socialism.

The Great October Socialist Revolution

Preparations for the Great October Socialist Revolution

The Beginning of the Crisis of the Provisional Government

The Imperialist Policy of the Provisional Government

The masses of the working people expected that the government which came into power as a result of the revolution would put a stop to the war, transfer the land to the peasants, introduce an 8-hour day for the workers and take measures to combat hunger and economic chaos. But, as Lenin wrote, the Provisional Government could “give to the peoples of Russia (or to those nations to which we are bound by the war) neither peace, nor bread, nor complete freedom. . .

(V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. XX, Bk. I, New York, 1929, p. 24.)

The Provisional Government, which consisted of representatives of the landlords and capitalists whose interests were bound up with the war, had no intention of terminating the war. On the contrary, it tried to utilize the revolution for the purpose of stimulat- ing military operations and of giving effect to the plans of the imperialists.

Russia’s British and French allies also demanded that the Provi- sional Government prosecute the war “to a victorious j&nish.” The Brit- ish government recognized the Provisional Government on the condition that it “remained faithful to the obligations undertaken by its prede- cessors.” The French government sent the Provisional Government a note wishing it success in its determination to prosecute the war “honestly and tirelessly to a victorious finish,” but made no mention of official recognition.

With the assistance of the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolu- tionaries, the Provisional Government deceived the masses by assur- ing them that after the overthrow of tsarism the war had ceased to be an imperialist war and was now a war for a free and democratic Eussia. The bourgeois, landlord, Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary newspapers proclaimed in different keys that “without victory at the front there can be no freedom.”

The workers, soldiers and peasants, however, persistently demand- ed the termination of the hated war, and as a result of their pressure the Petrograd Soviet on l\Iarch 14 issued an appeal to the peoples of Europe calling for a “just democratic peace without annexations or indemnities.” This appeal did not, however, indicate any concrete measures for the struggle for peace; it merely fostered the illusion that an imperialist war can terminate with a “just peace” without the overthrow of the imperialist governments. But even this compromise appeal of the Soviet roused the protests of the Entente governments.

The Provisional Government hastened to assure the Allies of its readiness to prosecute the war to a victorious finish. Eor the purpose of continuing the war it floated a “Liberty Loan” to the amount of 6,000,000,000 rubles, and the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolution- aries supported this measure.

The bourgeois Provisional Government tried to preserve the old order after the revolution; the land remained in the possession of the landlords, and the factories in the possession of the capitalists. Protect- ing the interests of the employers, it refused to pass a law introducing an 8-hour day; the workers instituted the 8-hour day on their own accord. Protecting the interests of the landlords, the government, in March, sent troops to the Kursk, Mogilev and Perm Gubernias to suppress the incipient peasant movement there. In April it circulat- ed an order to Gubernia Commissar calling upon them to crush revolu- tionary actions of the peasants “by all means, including the calling out of military forces.” At the same time it passed a law on the protection of grain fields, which provided for the payment of compensa- tion to landlords for damage caused by “popular unrest.” The Ministry of Agriculture, of which the Cadet Shingaryov was the head, set up Conciliation Boards consisting of peasants and landlords for the purpose of settling disputes between them “by voluntary agree- ment.” The Provisional Government introduced no reforms what- ever; it postponed all reforms until the “convocation of the Con- stituent Assembly,” which, however, it was in no hurry to con- vene.

The Provisional Government left intact the entire administrative machinery of the old regime. The Provincial Governors were replaced by Provincial Commissars, these posts being filled by chairmen of gubernia and county Zemstvo Administrations, most of whom were landlords and arrant monarchists. The Minister of Justice, the Social- ist-Revolutionary Kerensky, left all the tsarist procurators in their posts. The former tsarist ministers and high government offieials contin- ued to receive huge pensions. Neither titles (prince, count, baron, etc.) nor tsarist decorations were abolished. The nobility continued to enjoy all their caste and property rights and privileges. The Provi- sional Government even tried to save the royal family by sending it to England, and it was only the determined intervention of the workers and soldiers that compelled the government to abandon this plan and arrest the tsar.

The imperialist Provisional Government neither could nor would give the people peace, land, bread and freedom; but a section of the workers and a considerable section of the soldiers and peasants still had confidence in the compromising parties — the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Eevolutionaries — ^whioh called upon them to support the Provisional Government. Lenin called these misguided people “honest Defencists” as distinct from the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary’’ leaders who deliberately advocated the continuation of the imperialist war.

Lenin's April Theses

As a result of the victorious revolution Russia, which only recently had been the most oppressed country in the world, became a free country compared with other countries. The masses of the people made full use of the democratic rights and the freedom of speech, press, combination, demonstration and assembly which they had won.

All over the country the workers set up factory committees and formed trade unions; the peasants began to organize land committees; in conformity with Order No. 1 the soldiers democratized the army. To develop the revolution further, it was necessary to guide the activi- ties of these broad masses who had just been awakened to political life and to help them to understand the situation that had arisen in the country. This was the task that the Bolshevik Party set itself after the victory of the Eebruary revolution.

On March 5, 1917, the first issue of the revived Bolshevik newspaper Pravda appeared. On March 12, Comrade Stalin returned to Petrograd from exile in Turukhansk, and on March 14, his first article on the Soviets appeared in Pravda, In this article Comrade Stalin urged that the Soviets should be strengthened in every way as the organs of the revolutionary power of the people. The change from •underground to legal conditions caused semi-Menshevik wavering among some of the members of the Bolshevik Party. Thus, Kamenev, on his return to Petro- grad, took the Menshevik stand of supporting the Provisional Govern- ment and the policy it pursued. But the Petrograd Bolsheviks, headed by Comrade Stalin, strongly combated the attempts of Kamenev and his group to divert the Party to the path of opportunism.

The entire Party eagerly awaited the return to Russia of the leader of the revolution, V. I. Lenin.

Lenin was an exile in Switzerland when he received the newsoftho second revolution in Russia. He wanted to return home at once, but the imperialist governments of Prance and Great Britain put every obstacle in his way. From this “accursed afar” as he called it, he closely watched the development of events in Russia, and in letters to com- rades and articles in Pravda (his “Letters from Afar”) indicated to the Party the fundamental tasks of the proletariat in the revolu- tion.

It was not until April 3 (16), 1917, that Lenin succeeded, after overcoming great difficulties, in returning to Pi,ussia. At Byelo-Ostrov, near Petrograd, he was met by Comrade Stalin . Thousands and thousands of workers, soldiers and sailors assembled at the Finland Railway Sta- tion in Petrograd to welcome the beloved leader of the revolution. The station square and the adjoining streets were crammed with people and scores of Red flags bearing the inscription “Welcome to Lenin” fluttered in the light of flaming torches. On his appearance outside the station Lenin was greeted with thunderous cheers. Mounting an ar- moured car he delivered a brief speech of greeting which he concluded with the cry: “Lo7ig live the Socialist EevolutionV^

In the morning of April 4, Lenin attended a meeting of Bolsheviks at which he expounded his theses entitled “The Tasks of the Proletariat in the Present Revolution.” These were Lenin’s celebrated April Theses.

In these theses Lenin emphasized that “the specific feature of the present situation in Russia is that it represents a transition from the first stage of the revolution — ^which . . . placed the power in the hands of the bourgeoisie — to the second stage, which must place the power in the hands of the proletariat and the poorest strata of the peasantry” (V. I. Lenin, Selected WorJcs, Two-Vol. ed., Vol. 11, Moscow, 1947,

p. 18).

The Bolshevik Party came to the new stage with the plan for developing the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist revolution which Lenin had worked out as far back as 1906. It launched its struggle for the new stage of the revolution on the basis of Lenin’s theory that Socialism could be victorious in a single country. Formerly, Social-Democrats had regarded the parliamen- tary democratic republic as the best political form for the transition to Socialism; now, however, Lenin proposed that the demand for a democratic republic should be superseded by the demand for a Soviet republic. In his theses he proclaimed the slogan: “A republic of Soviets of Workers’, Agricultural Labourers’ and Peasants’ Deputies through- out the coimtry, from top to bottom.” As regards the Provisional Government he proclaimed the slogan: “No support for the Provisional Government.”

In his theses Lenin also put forward the demand for the confisca- tion of the landlords’ estates and the nationalization of all the land, the immediate merging of all the •banks in one national bank to be controlled by the Soviets of Workers’ Deputies, and the immediate institution of Soviet control over the social production and distri- bution of products.

Another of Lenin ’s pro- posals was that the Bolshe- vik Party should drop the name of Social-Democratic Party, which had been dis- credited and disgraced by tfe opportunists, traitors to Socialism, and adopt the name of Communist Party, as Marx and Engels had called the proletarian party.

By adopting this name the Party emphasized that its ultimate goal was Communism.

Lenin also set the task of forming a neWj Third, Communist International.

Kamenev, Rykov and the other opportunists who were opposed to the transition to the socialist revolution joined the Mensheviks in opposing Lenin’s theses. The entire Party, however, unanimously adopt- ed Lenin’s theses which outlined a masterly plan of the party s’ struggle for the transition from the bourgeois-democratic revolution to the socialist revolution.

Lenin’s April Theses served as the basis for all the decisions that were adopted by the Seventh All-Russian Conference of the Bolshevik Party that was held in April 1917 (hence known as the April Con- ference). At this conference Kamenev, Rykov and Zinoviev opposed Lenin’s plan for the development of the bourgeois-democratic into a socialist revolution. They repeated the Menshevik argument that Russia had not yet matured for a socialist revolution, and that only bourgeois rule could be established. The conference, however, supported Lenin’s theses and denounced the enemies of Socialism.

The conference adopted a resolution demanding that the landlords’ estates be confiscated and placed at the disposal of the Peasant Com- mittees,

Comrade Staliir delivered a report on the national question in which he substantiated the Bolshevik program demands for the right of nations to self-determination, including the right to secede and form independent states. Pyatakov, who, with Bukharin, had taken a national-chauvinist stand during the imperialist war, opposed grant- ing nations the right to self-determination. Pollowing the lead of Lenin and Stalin, the conference rebuffed this attempt at the oppor- tunist revision of the Party’s program on the national question. In the speech he delivered at the conference, Lenin advanced the slogan of “All power to the Soviets.” The fact that the Party put forward this slogan meant that it was setting out to abolish the dual power and to secure the transfer of all power to the Soviets. The fulfilment of this slogan would mean expelling the representatives of the landlords and capitalists from the organs of power.

The Apxil Confeience was of tremendous significance in the his- tory of the Bolshevik Party. It headed the Party for the fight to- develop the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist revolu- tion, for the fight for the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The April Crisis

The Bolsheviks did not at this time call upon the masses immediately to overtlirow the Px'ovisional Government, in so far as it was still supported by the Soviets. They set out to win a majority in the Soviets, which were controlled by the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries and through the Soviets to bring about chan- ges in the composition and the policy of the Provisional Government. The propaganda of the Bolshevik Party and experience itself soon helped the workers and soldiers to realize tliat the bourgeois Provision- al Government was deceiving them on the most vital question, namely, the question of the war.

On April 18 (May I new style), when huge May Day demonstra- tions were taking place all over the country in support of universal peace, Milyukov, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, sent a note to the Allies in which he pledged the Provisional Government “to continue the war until a decisive victory is achieved” and promised that the Provisional Government would honour to the full the obligations undertaken towards the Allies.

When, on April 19, Milyukov's note became known to the workers and soldiers it caused profound indignation among them.

On April 20, the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party called upon the working people to protest against the Provisional Govern- ment’s imperialist policy. In the morning of that day the “Finland” Regiment marched to the Mariinsky Palace, where the Provisional Government was sitting, carrying the slogan: “Down with the policy of conquest!” Late in the afternoon columns of workers marched to the palace carrying banners on which were inscribed; “All power to the Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies!”, “Down with the war!”

On April 20 and 21 (May 3 and 4) over 100,000 people took part in the protest demonstration against the 'Provisional Government's imperialist policy. The bourgeoisie in their turn organized a demonstration of armed officers, cadets^ university students and shopkeepers who carried the slogan: ‘''Confidence in the Provisional Government!” General Kornilov, Commander of the Petrograd Military Area, issued an order to the troops to fire on the demonstrating working people, but the soldiers refused to obey the order of this counter-revolutionary general.

The April demonstration showed that the masses were beginning to waver in their confidence towards the Provisional Government and the compromising parties, but that it was still premature to set the task of immediately overthrowing the Provisional Government.

The April demonstration of the masses signified a crisis of the Prov’-sional Government. When the bourgeoisie saw that they would be unable to secure complete power through the medium of the Cadet and Octobrist Ministers, they resorted to a manoeuvre: they removed from the government the ministers that were most hateful to the people and agreed to the appointment of several representatives of the compromising parties to posts in the government.

On May 2, Milyukov and Guchkov were removed from the Provi- sional Government. The reorganized government consisted of represent- atives of the bourgeoisie and a number of Mensheviks and Social ist- Pevolutionaries . Thus, V. M. Chernov, the head of the Socirlist- Revolutionary Party, became Minister of Agriculture, the Menshevik Tsereteli became Minister of Post and Telegraph, the Menshevik Skobelev became Minister of Labour. That was Low the first coalition Provisional Government was made up. The entry of Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries into the coalition government signified the open desertion of the compromising parties to the camp of the coxmter-revolutionary bourgeoisie.

As Lenin wrote: “The bourgeoisie has begun to use them [the compromisers] as its oat's paw; it has started doing such things through them as it could never have done without them” (V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. XX, Bk. 2, New York, 1929, p. 230).

The policy of the coalition government differed in no way from that of the Milyukov and Guchkov government. The '^Socialist” Minis- ters acted in conformity with the instructions of the imperialist bour- geoisie. The Socialist-Revolutionary Kerensky, who took Guchkov's place as Minister of War, on the demand of the Entente began to prepare for an offensive. The Socialist-Revolutionarj’’ Chernov, the Minister of Agriculture, ordered stronger measures to be taken to combat the seizure of the landlords' land by the peasants. The Men- shevik Minister of Labour, Skobelev, while helping the capital- ists, called upon the workers to display “self-denial” and complained that their “wages were too high.” The People’s Socialist Peshekhonov, Minister of Food, in every way protected the landlords and kulaks, who were proiiteering in grain, and dared not put into effect the law introducing a state grain monopoly which had been passed in March. Casting off all restraint, the landlords and the kulaks even sabotaged the census of grain stocks in the country which had been ordered. Profiteering in grain assumed vast proportions.

The June Crisis

The June Demonstration

Tlie policy directed against the in- terests of the people that was pursued by the coalition government showed that the petty-bourgeois Menshevik and Socialist-Revolu- tionary parties had become the most important social prop of impe- rialism in Russia. Hence, the exposure and isolation of these compro- misers became the fundamental aim in the activities of the Bolsheviks.

As Comrade Stalin wrote: “Naturally, the Bolsheviks at that time directed their main blows at these parties, for unless these parties were isolated, there could be no hope of a rupture between the labouring masses and imperialism, and unless this rupture was ensured, there could he no hope of the Soviet revolution achieving victory” (J. Stalin, Problems of Leninism^ Moscow, 1945, pp. 112-113).

In pursuance of the decisions of the April Conference, the Bolshevik Party launched an extensive campaign to explain the Bolshevik slogans and to expose the policy of the Mensheviks and Socialist- Revolutionaries. The effect of this was that the workers began to carry through new elections of the Soviets, out of which they swept the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary Deputies, replacing them by Bolsheviks.

The Bolsheviks also ousted the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Rev- olutionaries from posts in the trade union organizations, particularly in the factory committees. On May 30 (June 12), the first conference of factory committees was held in Petrograd at which three-fourths of the delegates voted for the Bolsheviks.

Indicative of the growth of Bolshevik influence among the masses were the letters to Lenin and to Pravdu that were sent from villages, factories and the trenches. “Comrade, friend Lenin,” wrote the sol- diers to Lenin, “remember that we soldiers are prepared to a man to follow you anywhere, and that your ideas truly express the will of the peasants and workers.” The growth of political consciousness among the workers and soldiers was exceptionally rapid in Petrograd.

In the provinces the liberation of the masses from the influence of the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries was slower. This is shown by the fact that of the 1,000 delegates who assembled at the First All-Russian Congress of Soviets that was held in June 1917, only 105 were Bolsheviks. But even though in the minority, the Bolsheviks were successful in exposing the compromising policy of the Mensheviks and the Socialist Revolutionaries .

The main item on the agen- da of this congress was the ques- tion of the attitude to be taken towards the coalition Provision- al Government. The Menshevik Tsereteli tried to scare the con- gress by stating that the rev- olution would be doomed if the coalition with the bourgeoi- sie were abandoned. “There is no political party in Russia at the present time,” he said,

"that would express its readi- ness to take entire power upon itself.” Lenin at once shouted from his seat: “There is such a party!” And then, mounting the platform, he said: “I say there is! . . . Our party does not refuse it; it is prepared at any moment to take over entire power” (V. I. Lenin, Selected Works, Two-Vol. ed., Vol. II, Moscow, 1947, pp. 59-60).

Lenin strongly denounced the compromising policy that w^aa pursued by the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries, who were helping to prolong the war and assisting the bourgeoisie in every way, and he concluded his speech with the demand that all power be transferred to the Soviets.

While the congress was in session the Bolsheviks were making preparations for a demonstration of Petrograd workers and soldiers under the slogans of “All power to the Soviets!”, “Down with the ten capitalist Ministers!”, “Bread, peace and freedom!” Dreading the growing influence of the Bolsheviks, the Menshevik and Socialist- Revolutionary leaders of the congress secured the passage of a resolu- tion prohibiting all demonstrations for three days. At the same time the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet called for a general demonstration on June 18, with the intention of making its watchword “Confidence in the Provisional Government!” The compromisers anticipated that th*s would l^e a patriotic demonstration to mark the launching of the offensive at the front. The Bolsheviks called upon the workers and soldiers to join in this demonstration, but to inscribe Bolshevik slogans on their banners. Over four hundred thousand workers took part in the demonstration.

Comrade Stalin described this demonstration in Pravda in the following words: “A bright sumiy day. An endless string of demon- strators. From morning to night the procession moves towards the Field of Mars. An endless forest of banners . ... A feature that struck the eye: not a single mill, not a single factory, not a single regiment displayed the slogan ‘Confidence in the Provisional Government!’ Even the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Eevolutionaries forgot (or rather did not dare) to display this slogan. . . . Only three groups had the courage to display the slogan of confidence, but even they found causo to regret it. These were a group of Cossacks, the * Bund’ group, and Plekha- nov’s Yediifistm group. *The Holy Trinity! ’ the workers on the Field of Mars ironically called them. Two of them (the Bund and the Yedinstvo)- were compelled by the workers and soldiers to furl their banners amidst cries of ‘Down with them! ’ The Cossacks refused to furl their banner, so it was torn to shreds. And one anonymous banner of ‘confidence’ stretched ‘in mid-air’ across the entrance to the Field of Mars was tom down by a group of soldiers and workers amid the approving comments of the public: ‘Confidence in the Provisional Government is hanging in mid-aiP^ (Lenin and Stalin^ 1917, Selected Writings and Speeches, Russ, ed., pp. 156-157).

Thus, the demonstration of June 18, turned into a demon- stration of no confidence in the Provisional Government. It served as an index of the growing revolutionary spirit of the workers and soldiers of Petrograd, of their readiness to fight for the Bolshevik slogans. It was a de- feat for the Menshevik and So- cialist-Revolutionary parties which supported the Pj ovisional Government.

The June Offensive

On the demand of the Brit- ish and French imperialists, the Provisional Government prepared to launch an offensive at

the front. In April 1917, the United States entered the World War, but considerable time was required to transport the Amer- ican troops to the theatre of war. The governments of the Entente countries wanted at all costs to keep the Russian Front active in order to prevent the Germans from transferring troops to the Western Front, and they threatened to deprive the Provisional Government of loans and subsidies if it did not immediately launch an offensive and so draw German troops away from the Western Front. In addition, the Russian bourgeoisie saw in an offensive the only way of putting a stop to the revolution. They calculated that if it failed they could throw the blame on the Soviets and the Bolsheviks and crush them,

Kerensky, the Minister of War, speeded up the preparations for the offensive. Troop trains carrying reinforcements and trains loaded with ammunition and supplies were sent to the front lines, and Keren- sky himself toured the different fronts haranguing the soldiers and urging them to fight. That was why the soldiers dubbed him “Persuader- in-Ohief. ”

The offensive was launched on June 18, and at first proceeded successfully, particularly in the case of the Eighth Army, which pierced the Austrian Front and moved its divisions into the breach, A few days later, however, the offensive petered out. Reinforcements arrived slowly, and the army command w'as unable to develop the first suc- cesses. The offensive came to a halt.

Shortly afterwards the Austro-German troops launched a counter- offensive, inflicted defeat on the Russian army at Tarnopol and forced it to beat a rapid retreat. During the ten days of the ' offensive the Russian Southwestern Front lost about 60,000 men. War weariness and discontent among the troops, their desire for peace, and their distrust of and downright enmity towards the counter-revo- lutionary officers were factors which contributed to the failure of the offensive.

The National-Liberation Movement of the Oppressed Nationalities in Russia after the Overthrow of Tsarism

The Provisional Government's National Policy

After it came into power the imperialist bourgeoisie pursued the same great-power policy of national oppression in the non-Eussian regions as that pursued by tsarism, for it regarded the maintenance of its rule over the non-Bussian regions as one of the bases of its economic and political power. Backed by the petty-bourgeois parties, the Provisional Gov- ernment advanced the old tsarist slogan of “Russia, united and in- divisible,^’ but covered it with the flag of “revolutionary democracy.”

The Provisional Government met with hostility every attempt at self-determination on the part of the nations, and called upon all the oppressed peoples in Russia to wait until the Constituent Assembly decided their fate. It made an exception only in the case of Poland by adopting an official decision recognizing her independ- ence; but Poland had been occupied by German troops since 1915,

The movement for national liberation in the former tsarist colo- nies grew with increasing intensity in 1917,

Comrade Stalin wrote: “‘Abolish national oppression’ was the slogan of the movement. In a trice, ‘all-national’ institutions sprang up all over the border regions of Russia, The movement was headed by the national, bourgeois-democratic intelligentsia, ‘National Coun- cils’ in Latvia, the Estonian Region, Lithuania, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, the Caucasus, Kirghizstan and the Middle Volga Region; the ‘Rada’ in the Ukraine and in Byelorussia; the ‘Sfatul Tsarii’ in Bessarabia; the ‘Kurultai’ in the Crimea and in Bashkiria; the ‘Auton- omous Government’ in Turkestan — such were the ‘all-national’ in- stitutions around which the national bourgeoisie rallied its forces” (J . Stalin, Marxism and the National and Colonial Question^ Moscow, 1940, p. 60).

The bourgeois nationalist intelligentsia tried to capture the leader- ship of the growing national movement and to take advantage of the February revolution to form “their own” national states.

The national bourgeoisie in the border regions, however, demanded not secession from Russia, but national autonomy within the Russian state, with the bourgeois government of which they hoped they could reach agreement.

The Provisional Government’s Conflict with Finland

In the beginning of March 1917, the Provisional Govermnent issued a decree restoring the tsarist Constitution in Finland. Shortly after that a coalition Senate was set up in that country, consisting of six Social-Democrats and six representatives of the bourgeoisie. This Senate was to act as the government. The Finnish Sejm, which had been elected in 1916, was convened. But actually, neither the Sejm nor the Senate were given any power. The Provisional Government sent a Commissioner to Finland and refused to recognize her independ- ence.

Finnish army officers opened negotiations with Wilhelm II with the object of obtaining his assistance in severing Finland from Russia. The Finnish bourgeoisie hoped with the assistance of the German imperialists not only to separate Finland from Russia, but also to launch a civil war against the Finnish workers. In the guise of athletic clubs they began to form reactionary "maintenance of order squads.”

The Finnish proletariat were emphatically opposed to an alliance with German imperialism against Russia, where tsarism had .been overthrown, and ardently supported the Russian revolution.

In the endeavour to achieve Finland’s independence, the Finnish Sejm, in July, passed a law defining the supreme powers of the Sejm. In retaliation to this, the Provisional Government, following the example of the tsarist government, dissolved the Sejm.

The Bolsheviks headed by Lenin and Stalin denounced the im- perialist policy of the Provisional Government and demanded recognition of Finland’s right to self-determination, including secession.

Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia after the February Revolution

By the beginning of 1917, the greater part of Lithuania was oc- cupied by German troops. At a conference of representatives of Lith- uanian kulaks, landlords and the bourgeoisie that was held in Vilna, a Taryba, or National Council, was formed. The German authorities tried to convert the Taryba into an obedient tool of their own, and wishing to entrench themselves in Lithuania they played up to the Lithuanian bourgeoisie and promised to recognize the independence of Lithuania if she officially seceded from Russia.

A considerable part of Latvia was also occupied by German troops during the world wa^r. Latvia was the most capitalistically-developed of the Baltic countries. The war had caused it great devastation. The Northern Front ran through Latvia; more than half the country was furrowed with trenches and affected by military operations. The crops were destroyed, and cattle breeding had declined. The commercial and economic life of the country was almost at a standstill and industry was severely damaged. On the outbreak of the war a number of the plants, and the workers employed in them, were evacuated to the interior of Russia, and after Latvia was occupied by the Germans the rest of the industrial plants were either wrecked or transported to Germany. The conditions of the masses of the working people were extremely hard during the occupation. Relying on the support of the Latvian barons, the German imperialists aimed at converting Latvia into a German duchy. But even in the imocciipied part of Latvia the workers and peasants suffered a great deal from the effects of the war and from exploitation by the tsarist authorities and the local landlords and capitalists.

Consequently, the February bourgeois-democratic revolution in Eussia was welcomed with great rejoicing in Latvia. A movement for national liberation sprang uij in the country, but the Latvian bour- geoisie, who were dependent upon the Eussian market, counted on the Provisional Government granting Latvia autonomy, and there- fore did not strive for the independance of that country. At the begin- ning of the revolution a kulak party which called itself the Peasant Union was fonned, and in the middle of March 1917, this Peasant Union convened a National Assembly, which passed a resolution de- manding Latvian autonomy within the Eussian state. The Provision- al Govermnent, however, gave a hostile reception even to this mod- est demand.

The policy which the Provisional Government pursued agamst the interests of the people roused discontent among the masses of the Latvian working people. A conference of representatives of the Lettish Eifle Regiment passed a Bolshevik resolution condemning the Provi- sional Government’s policy and the imperialist war. A congress of landless peasants that was held at about the same time passed a reso- lution demanding the confiscation of landlord and church land. The masses demanded the transfer of all power to the Soviets.

Estonia, situated near Petrograd, was the first of the Baltic coun- tries to secure autonomy; the Provisional Government passed a law granting that country self-government in April 1917. Not- withstanding this, however, the government continued to pursue the old policy of Russification, In the summer of 1917, a National As- sembly consisting of representatives of the Estonian bourgeoisie, landlords and kulaks, was convened in Eevel. After securing a few political rights for the Estonian bourgeoisie this National Assembly entered into a compromise with the Provisional Government. The masses of the working people of Estonia were discontented with the compromising policy pursued by the propertied classes and began to go over to the Bolsheviks and demand the transfer of all power to the Soviets.

The Ukrainian Central Rada and the Provisional Government

The Provisional Government also very strongly opposed the movement for national liberation in the Ukraine. In the beginning of April 1917, the Ukrainian bourgeois and petty-bourgeois nationalist parties set up in' Kiev a Ukrainian Central Rada, or Council. The largest and most influential party in the Rada was the Ukrainian Socialist-Rev- olutionary Party. The Rada had the support of the village kulaks. The leading members of the Rada were Grushevsky, Vinnichenko andPetliura. In the beginning of June, the Central E,ada issued an address to the Ukrainian people, proclaiming the autonomy of the Ukraine. The petty-bourgeois Central Eada did not dare to go to the length of a rupture with the Provisional Government, as it feared to remain alon3, face to face with the revolutionary masses of workers and peasants; it therefore sought a compromise with the Eussian bour- geoisie. On the other hand, the Provisional Government needed the support of the Ukrainian bourgeoisie during the offensive, and it therefore sent four Ministers, headed by Kerensky, to negotiate with the Eada.

The upshot of these negotiations was that in the summer of 1917, a new administrative body consisting of representatives of the Central Eada was set up in Kiev. This body was known as the General Secre- tariat, and its ftinction was to co-operate with the Provisional Govern- ment’s Commissioner in the Ukraine as the representative of the supreme authority. The final settlement of the political structure of the Ukraine was put off until the Constituent Assembly.

Lenin was of the opinion that the demand for Ukrainian autonomy was ‘Very modest and very legitimate.” The Bolsheviks denounced both the great-power policy pursued by the imperialist Provisional Government and the compromising policy of the Central Eada, and called upon the Ukrainian workers and peasants to fight jointly with the Eussian workers and peasants against the imperialist bourgeoisie for the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The Byelorussian Central Rada

In the middle of March 1917, the First Congress of Byelorussian nationalist parties and organiza- tions was held in Minsk. These bodies were united in the Byelo- russian National Committee headed by the landlord Skirmunt. In June 1917, this committee convened a congress of representatives of Byelorussian bourgeois and petty-bourgeois parties at which the Byelo- russian Central Eada was formed. Under cover of national slogans, the nationalists tried to keep the Byelorussian workers and peasants out of the revolutionary struggle, but at the same time they expressed readiness to organize the administration of Byelorussia "in co-opera- tion with the Provisional Government.” Like the bourgeois national- ists everywhere, those in Byelorussia concluded an alliance with the bourgeoisie of the dominant, Eussian nation for the purpose of combat- ing the revolutionary movement.

The Byelorussian Bolsheviks strongly combated the Byelorussian Central Eada. An exceptionally important part in this struggle against the bourgeois nationalists was played by M. V. Frunze, who was then at the head of the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Peasants’ Deputies; at the First Congress of Peasants’ Deputies of the Minsk and Vilna Gubernias he exposed the counter-revolutionary nature of the Byelorussian nationalists. The Bolsheviks established closer contacts with the front and the rural districts of Byelorussia, gained influence there and roused the B 3 "elorussian workers, peasants and soldiers to the fight, with the slogans of the self-determination of nations and the conversion of the land into the property of the people.

The Transcaucasian Committee and the "National Councils"

After the February revolution the leading position in Transcaucasia was held hy the Georgian Mensheviks. Like the bourgeoisie and the landlords, it was their aim to preserve the bourgeois system. When they received the telegram announcing the overthrow of tsarism they kept it from the masses, but hastened to express their loyalty to the Vice- roy of the Caucasus, the Grand Duke Nicholas. The old tsarist ad- ministration was allowed to remain intact. To govern Transcaucasia the Provisional Government set up a Special Transcaucasian Commit- tee (pzahom) consisting of local bourgeois nationalists and Mensheviks. The leading position in this committee was held by the Georgian Mensheviks.

The Georgian Mensheviks, the Armenian Dashnaoks and the Azer- baijanian Mussavatists called upon the peasants to refrain from “unauthorized action” and wait until the land question was settled by the All-Russian Constituent Assembly. To organize their forces and to conduct a struggle for power, the Transcaucasian bourgeoisie set up National Councils, which fought against the movement for national liberation of the Caucasian people being transformed into a mass revolutionary struggle against imperialism.

The Bolsheviks were the only party to fight for the complete abo- lition of national oppression in Transcaucasia and to demand a com- plete rupture with the imperialist policy that was being pursued by the Provisional Government.

The Provisional Government's Policy in Central Asia

On March 2, 1917, the railwaymen in Tashkent received the news of the overthrow of the tsar and thereupon elected a Soviet of Workers' Deputies; but the tsarist Governor General Kuropatkin, who had crashed the popular movement in 1916, remained in power. At the end of March, Kuropatkin was removed on the demand of the workers and soldiers. But it was not until the middle of April that the tsarist authorities were replaced by the Turkestan Committee, a body representing the bourgeois Provisional Government.

The national movement in Central Asia was led by the reactionary Moslem clergy. The dekhans (peasants) were downtrodden and igno- rant and still believed the hai and mullahs. In the towns, however » the Moslem workers and other poor strata set up their Soviets of Moslem Working People. In most cases these Soviets were organized by Russian workers and soldiers, and also by active participants in the insurrection of 1916 who returned home from exile.

In Khiva and Bukhara the old feudal rulers, the Khan and the Emir, remained in power after the February revolution. The Provi- sional Government sent a Commissar to Khiva who acted hand in hand with the lOian. In Bukhara, the working people demanded the limi- tation of the power of the Emir. Fearing a popular insurrection, the representative of the Provisional Government in Bukhara advised the Emir to issue a manifesto promising reforms, but shortly afterwards the Emir, with the knowledge of the Provisional Government, arrested and executed the advocates of reform.

Thus, the peoples of Central Asia failed to achieve either social or national liberation as a result of the February revolution.

Not only that. In Turkmenia the Provisional Government con- tinued, until it was overthrown, the punitive policy which the tsarist government had pursued against the Yomuds, who rose in revolt in 1916.

The July Crisis

The Demonstration of July 3–5

The war was costing the country 40,000,000 rubles per day. To cover this expenditure the gov- ernment issued a huge quantity of paper currency, the value of which steadily dropped while the cost of living rose. There was a shortage of raw materials and fuel for industry and of bread for the workers. The transport system was completely dislocated. Factories and mills closed down. In May, 108 plants employing 8,700 workers, in June, 125 plants employing 38,465 workers and in July, 206 plants employing 47,754 workers were closed. Iron and steel output dropped 40 per cent and textiles 20 per cent. Unemployment grew. The strike movement spread. The workers demanded an 8-hour day and higher wages. An agrarian revolution began to sweep the country. By July, 43 out of the 69 gubernias in the country were affected by peasant un- rest; the peasants seized the landlords* land and set fire to their man- sions. The movement of the workers and peasants was warmly welcomed in the army. The soldiers, war weary and enraged by the continuation of the war, threatened to leave the trenches and go home. The masses of the people became more and more convinced that the Provisional Government was deceiving them. The news of the launching of the offensive and of its subsequent failure roused a storm of indignation among the workers and soldiers in Petrograd.

At the end of June the situation in Petrograd became exceptionally strained. In this situation the bourgeois parties called upon the Pro- visional Government to take determined measures to crush the revo- lutionary workers and soldiers of Petrograd, The government decided to get rid of the revolutionary garrison of Petrograd and with this object sent larger contingents of the garrison to the front on the pre- text that the units there needed reiuforceinents. In order to exert pressure on the compromising parties and to force them to agree at last to the formation of a “strong government” the Cadets, on July 2, re- signed from the government and thereby created a governmental crisis.

The failure of the offensive, the govermnental crisis, and the pro- vocative tactics of the bourgeois parties and organizations, filled the eup of bitterness of the workers and soldiers of Petrograd to overflow.

^ ing, and on July 3 (16), individual regiments and the workers of dif- ferent factories demonstrated in the streets. Soon these demonstra- tions grew into a general armed demonstration under the slogan of “All power to the Soviets!”

The Bolshevik Party was of the opinion that to seize power at that moment would be premature. Lenin and Stalin pointed out that the Bolsheviks could easily capture power in Petrograd but would be unable to hold it as they did not yet have a majority in the Soviets throughout the country. In spite of these warnings, however, on July 3, the Pirst Machine-Gun Begiment came out in full fighting kit and marched to the Bolshevik headquarters. On the way other regi- ments, and also units of the workers’ Red Guard, joined the Machine- Gun Regim nt. At 11 o’clock at night the workers of the Putilov Plan came into the street. The demonstration assumed a mass charac- ter. When it became evident that this spontaneous demonstration could not be stopped the Bolsheviks decided to take the lead of it in order to keep it within peaceful and organized bounds, so as to give the bourgeoisie no opportunity for provoking the workers and soldiers to premature action with the object of crushing them.

In the morning of Jul}?^ 4, no less than 500,000 workers partici- pated in the demonstration. Strikes closed the . factories and mills. Ninety delegates, representing all the factories and regiments in the city, went to the Taurida Palace where the Central Executive Com- mittee that was elected by the First Congress of Soviets was in session, and demanded that the All-Russian Central Executive Committee should proclaim the transfer of 'power to the Soviets,

Meanwhile, the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries fe- verishly mustered troops for the purpose of suppressing the demon- stration. Cossack units were called in from the front. In the evening of July 4, detachments of army cadets and Cossacks opened fire on the demonstrators. On July 5 demonstrators were still being fired on. After suppressing the demonstration of the workers and soldiers, the counter-revolutionaries attacked the Bolshevik Party. The editorial offices of Pmvda were raided and wrecked and all the Bolshevik newspapers were suppressed. A detachment of cadets ar- rived at Lenin’s lodgings with the object of arresting him and searched the premises. Foreseeing this, Comrade Stalin had opportunely ar- ranged for Lenin’s departure from Petrograd. After shaving off his beard and moustaches and disguising himself as a Finnish peasant.

Lenin safely reached Raz- liv Station on the Ses- troretsk E,ailway, where for several weeks he lived in a shack on the shore of a lake, hiding from the spies of the Provi- sional Government.

The bourgeoisie were determined to crush the rising proletarian revolu- tion, and with this object the authorities arrested a number of prominent Bolsheviks and wrecked the printing plant where the Party publications were printed. The Bol- shevik Party became semi- illegal. The government instituted proceedings against Lenin on the charge of "high treason” and of organizing an armed insurrection.

Rykov, Kamenev and Trotsky, the masked ene- mies of the revolution, demanded that Lenin should attend the court, but Stalin emphatically opposed this treacherous proposal and warned that "the cadets will not bring Lenin to the prison, they will kill him on the way.” It was proved subsequently that Stalin was right: the cadets had actu- ally received instructions to kill Lenin, ostensibly “while attempting to escape.” Thus, Comrade Stalin saved the life of the great leader of the working people for the benefit of mankind.

The events of July 3-5 marked the third political crisis in the country. As in the first two crises — in April and in June — the cause of the third crisis was, as Lenin put it "... the overflowing dissatisfaction of the masses, their indignation against the bourgeoisie and ifs government” {Lenin and Stalin, 1917, Selected Writings and Speeches, Moscow, 1938, p. 203), The July events marked the turning point in the process of the development of the bourgeois revolution into a socialist revolution. During the July events the Menshevik and the Socialist-Revolutionary leaders, in conjunction with the monarchist generals, organized the shooting down of the workers’ and soldiers’ demonstration; and the All-Riissian Central Executive Committee, which was controlled by the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, even issued a special order authorizing the Socialist-Revolutionaries Gotz and Avksentyev to assist General Polovtsev to “restore order.”

After the July events the political situation in the country changed. The Soviets lost the confidence of the masses and became impotent. The dual power was superseded by the sole power of the bourgeoisie. Appraising the situation in the country at the time, Lenin vTote: “A peaceful development of the Russian revolution has now become im- possible, History puts the question thus: either complete victory for the counter-revolution, or a new revolution” (V. I. Lenin, Collected Works y Vol. XXI, Bk. 1, New York, 1932, p. 58).

In view of these circumstances, it became necessary to withdraw the slogan of “All power to the Soviets! ” for a time, because the Soviets, which were controlled by the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolution- aries, were then acting as the accomplices of counter-revolution. The party was faced with the new task of winning a majority in the So- viets and of converting the latter into organs of insurrection.

The offensive that was launched by the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie with the assistance of the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revo- lutionaries shook the confidence of the workers and peasants in those parties. Discontent grew among the masses of the soldiers at the fipont. Reports to headquarters read: “The masses are sullen. Hostility to- wards the officers continues. The bulk of the soldiers do not want to fight. There are frequent cases of refusal to obey orders.”

In the rural districts the peasants rose against the landlords. The “Red Chanticleer” (incendiarism) was on the rampage among the land- lords’ estates. Whereas in March, 34 counties had been affected by the peasant movement, in July, 325 were affected. The workers in the mills and factories went on strike and in many cases the}’’ drove out the hated directors and managers and introduced workers’ control of production.

The Sixth Congress of the Bolshevik Party

On July 26, the Sixth Congress of the Bolshevik Party was opened in Petrograd. The congress was held in secret.

Lenin, who was in h’dlng, was unable to attend the congress, but Comrade Stalin kept him informed of its proceedings and received instructions from him. The congress proceedings were directed by Comrade Stalin.

Comrade Stalin delivered a report on the political situation in which he emphasized that the revolution “had begun to assume the character of a socialist vorkers’ revolution,” and that the only way to achieve the victory of the socialist revolution was to prepare for and carry out an armed insurrection.

The Bukharinites and Trotskyites at the congress opposed the line for a socialist revolution. In denouncing their treacherous policy, Comrade Stalin said: “The possibility is not excluded that Russia will be the country that will lay the road to Socialism, . . . We must discard the antiquated idea that only Europe can show us the way” {History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union [Bolsheviks']^ Short Course, Moscow, 1945, p. 197). *

The congress adopted a resolution that was submitted by Comrade Stalin and endorsed the Bolshevik economic program — confiscation of the landlords’ estates and nationalization of all the land, nationali- zation of the banks and large-scale industry, and workers’ control of production and distribution. The congress also adopted a resolution on the Youth Leagues in which the latter were regarded as the re- serves of the Party.

The Socialist Young Workers’ League was formed in July 1917, and all its branches were directed by the Bolshevik Party. The Petro- grad Committee of the Bolshevik Party set up a special committee headed by N. it. Krupskaya to organize the young workers and to concern itself with their interests.

The Sixth Congress of the Bolshevik Party was the congress of preparation for the armed insurrection against the bourgeoisie. It headed the Party for the socialist revolution.

The Suppression of General Kornilov's Counter-Revolutionary Revolt

The Bourgeois Counter-Revolutionary Plot

After the July demonstration the bourgeoisie began to mobilize its forces for the purpose of crushing the revolution. The petty-bourgeois parties which controlled the Soviets obediently carried out the program of the coun- ter-revoluti onary bourgeoisie .

On July 8, 1917, the “Little Bonaparte,” “the little braggart Ker- ensky,” as Lenin called him, became the head of the government. Kerensky introduced the death penalty at the front, and informed the Allies that he had taken all measures to restore the fighting efSiciency of the army. On the demand of the Allies, General Kornilov, who was notorious for his uncompromising hostility to the revolution, was appointed Supreme Commander-in-Chief. He issued an order prohibiting all meetings in the army. Field courts-martial intro- duced a reign cf terror at the front. Kornilov demanded the introduc- tion of the death penalty in the rear as well.

After Kornilov was appointed Supreme Commander-in-Chief the second coalition Provisional Government was formed. This government was headed by Kerensky and included members of the Cadet Party.

The counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie set out to establish a mili- tary dictatorship and with this object organized a military monarch- ist plot. The instigator of this plot was the Cadet Party. As Lenin wrote at the time; “The Cadet Party is the chief political force of the bourgeois counter-revolution in Russia” (LeTiin arid Stalin^ 1917, Selected Writings and Speeches, Moscow, 1938, p. 359). The plot was hatched at the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Kornilov, who was mustering troops for the purpose of marching them against Petrqgrad.

On August 12, 1917, Kerensky convened in Moscow a Council of State, which served as a sort of general review of the counter-revolu- tionary forces. Comrade Stalin characterized this council in the follow- ing words: “The ‘way out’ for the counter-revolution lies in conven- ing a conference of merchants and manufacturers, of landlords and bankers, of members of the tsarist Duma and already tamed Men^e- viks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, in order, by declaring this con- ference to be a ‘National Assembly,’ to obtain from it approval for the policy of imperialism and counter-revolution, and for transferring the burdens of the war to the shoulders of the workers and peasants”

• {Lenin and Stalin, 1917, Selected Writings and Speeches, Moscow, 1938, pp. 314-16).

The leaders of the counter-revolution intended to proclaim a mili- tary dictatorship at this council, but events developed differently from the way they anticipated.

On the day the council was opened in Moscow the Central Committee of the Bol- shevik Party called a general protest strike and 400,000 workers downed tools. The Coun- cil of State sat without electric light; the tramways did not run.

Next day, August 13, Kornilov arrived in Moscow and the bourgeoisie organized an official reception for him; but the heads of the Council of State did not dare openly to proclaim a counter-revolutionary dictator- ship; the situation in Moscow was too unfavourable for this. Kornilov left for General Headquarters in Mogilev and there continued his preparations for a counter-rev- olutionary cowp. His plan was to capture Petrograd with counter-revolutionary troops that were to be drawn to that city and to establish a military dictatorship in the country.

A part in this plot against the revolution was also played by the British and French imperialists. After the fail- ure of the June offensive, the “"allied” governments, who up to now had intervened in the internal affairs of Russia through the Provisional Government, now practically ignored that government and est ablished closer direct connections with the counter-revolutionary leaders of the Russian army. The representatives of the Entente promised Kor- nilov a loan of 5,000,000,000 rubles as soon as a ‘‘strong government” was established in Russia.

On August 19, Kornilov treacherously surrendered Riga, thereby opening to the German troops the road to Petrograd. The surrender of Riga served as a new pretext for launching an offensive against the revolutionary masses.

Kornilov prepared for his counter-revolutionary cm/p with the knowledge and assistance of Kerensky, who ordered the revolutionary Petrograd garrison to be sent to the front in order to make it easier for the counter-revolutionaries to capture the capital. The Menshevik and the Socialist-Revolutionary leaders actively helped Kerensky and Korni- lov to prepare for their cowp. When, however, Kornilov demanded that all military and civil power be entirely concentrated in his hands Ke- rensky, fearing the anger of the masses, proclaimed Kornilov a traitor to the state and issued an order for his dismissal from the post of Su- preme Commander-ia-Chief. Kornilov refused to obey this order and on August 25, 1917, sent the Third Cavalry Corps, under the command of General Krymov, against Petrograd.

The leaders of the compromising parties were terrified by this turn of affairs and turned to the Bolsheviks for assistance, for they were aware that the only force in the country that was capable of organizing the defeat of Kornilov was the Bolshevik Party.

Mobilization of the Forces of the Revolution

The Bolsheviks took the lead in the struggle against Kornilov. While calling for the suppression of the mutinous general, the Bolshevik Party denounced the Provisional Government, which consisted of masked Korni- lovites, and the entire policy of which had served to strengthen the counter-revolution .

The proletariat rose to a man to defend revolutionary Petrograd. In the course of three days 25,000 workers enrolled in the Red Guard. The military organization of the Bolshevik Party enlisted the serv- ices of 700 army instructors to train the Red Guards. In the munition factories the production of shells was speeded up and armoured cars were fitted out. Within two days the workers at the Putilov Plant, working 16 hours a day, turned out about 200 new pieces of ar- tillery. The railwaymen diverted Kornilov’s troop trains to sidings, blocked the stations with empty trains, tore up the rails on railway bridges and removed vital parts fi'om locomotives. Thousands of working people dug fortifications at the approaches to Petrograd.

Meanwhile, hundreds of Bolshevik agitators worked among Kor- nilov’s troops explaining to them the object of Kornilov’s mutiny. Enormous influence upon Kornilov’s so-called “Savage Division” which consisted of Caucasian highlanders, was exercised by a del- egation of highlanders who, on S. M. Kirov’s advice, were sent to the division to explain the true objects of the counter-revolution. The soldiers and Cossacks in Kornilov’s force began to go over to the side of the workers.

The Kornilov adventure collapsed. General Krymov committed suicide. Kornilov, Denikin and other generals were arrested, but the manner in which these monarchist generals were “held in custody” was very strange. Kornilov and his accomplices were “imprisoned” m the premises of a school known as Bykhov’s High School, and the Tekinsky Regiment which Kornilov himself had formed, and which was loyal to him, was appointed to guard them. Actually, Kerensky protected the mutinous generals from popular anger and judgment.

The civil war begun by the generals and the bourgeoisie rad- ically changed the relation of forces in the country. As Comrade Stalin wrote at the time: “The Kornilov revolt merely opened the valve for the accumulated revolutionary anger, it merely unbound the hith- erto fettered revolution, whipped it up and pushed it forward” (J. Stalin, On the Eoad to October, Moscow, 1925, Russ, ed., p. 206).

The suppression of the Kornilov plot revealed that the position of the bourgeoisie and of their stooges, the Mensheviks. and the Social- ist-Revolutionaries, was a hopeless one. Their influence among the masses was completely undermined. The Bolsheviks unmasked the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries whose entire policy had facilitated Kornilov’s counter-revolutionary plot.

The suppression of the Kornilov plot also revealed that the Bolshevik Party had become the decisive force of the revolution. The masses saw that the Bolsheviks were the only effective force that was capable of crushing the counter-revolution, and, as a result, the Bolsheviks gained undivided influence in the factories and mills. In the rural districts and at the front the influence of the Bolsheviks, grew as it had never done before. The soldiers demanded that stern retribution be meted out to the counter-revolutionaries. In connection with the contemplated trial of Kornilov, soldiers wrote from the front: “Dear comrades, don’t make it a long trial; they betrayed us, they spilled our blood. Make it short — in twenty-four hours, just as they did to us.”

Lastly, the suppression of the Kornilov revolt showed that after abandoning the policy of compromise the Soviets were beginning to revive and were becoming a great revolutionary force. A period of the Bolshevization of the Soviets began. On August 31, the Petrograd So- viet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies, by a majority vote, passed a resolution proposed by the Bolsheviks; on September 5, the Moscow Soviet did the same. The Bolsheviks gained control of the Soviets in the two capitals and also in the decisive industrial centres.

In view of the Bolshevization of the Soviets the Party, in Sep- tember, brought forward again the slogan which had been withdrawn after the events of July 3-5, namely, “All power to the Soviets.”

As Comrade Stalin has written: “The slogan ‘All power to the Soviets!’ was again put forward. But now this slogan had a different meaning from that in the first stage. Its content had rad- ically changed. Now this slogan signified a complete rupture with im- perialism and the passing of power to the Bolsheviks, for the majority of the Soviets were already Bolshevik. Now this slogan signified that the revolution must march directly towards the dictatorship of the proletariat by means of insurrection. More than that, this slogan now signified the organization and shaping of the dictatorship of the pro- letariat as a state” (J. Stalin, Problems of Leninism^ Moscow, 1945, p. 115).

The slogan “All power to the Soviets!” was a call for insurrection against the Provisional Government for the purpose of transferring all power to the Soviets controlled by the Bolshevilis.

Terrified by the revolution, the Mensheviks and the Sooialist- Bevolutionaries countered the slogan of “All power to the Soviets!” by convening a Democratic Conference with the object of diverting the revolutionary movement into a less dangerous channel. The Demo- cratic Conference which was made up of representatives of the com- promising parties, Soviets, trade unions, Zemstvos, army organiza- tions and co-operative societies, met on September 12, and rejected the coalition with the Cadets. The Sooialist-Bevolutionaries and the Mensheviks thereupon proposed that the Democratic Conference should set up a Provisional Council of the Republic, known as the Pre-par- liament, for the purpose, as they said, of controlling the actions of the government. Actually, however, their aim was to create another screen for their coalition with the bourgeoisie. While the Democratic Confer- ence was in session, Kerensky obtained the consent of the Cadets Kishkin, Buryshkin, Konovalov and others to enter the government. The Pre-parliament remained a futile exercise in parliamenta- rism. The workers derisively called it the “Pre-bathhouse.”

The Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party decided to boy- cott the Pre-parliament, but Kamenev and his supporters, wishing to divert the Party from its preparations for an insurrection, insisted that the Party should be represented in it. At a meeting of the Bol- shevik group in the Democratic Conference, Comrade Stalin strongly opposed Kamenev’s proposal and exposed the manoeuvre of the compromisers.

Organization of the Assault

The Maturing Revolutionary Crisis

Comrade Stalin has de- scribed the months of September and October 1917 as the period of preparation for the assault upon the rule of the bourgeoisie. “We must regard as the characteristic feature of this period,” he wrote, “the rapid maturing of the crisis, the utter consternation reigning in ruling cir- cles, the isolation of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks, and the wholesale crossing over of vacillating elements to the side of the Bolsheviks.”

The revolutionary crisis matured while the imperialist war was still in progress. The war aggravated the economic chaos which in the autumn of 1917 assumed catastrophic dimensions.

The capitalists and landlords deliberately sapped the foundations of the economy of the country. In August and September the factory owners in Petrograd alone closed as many as 230 plants employing 61,000 workers. In the Donetz Basin, in the Urals, in Mos- cow, all over the country, in fact, the capitalists declared lockouts and threw hundreds of thousands of workers onto the street. The food situation became exceptionally acute. The landlords and kulaks sabo- taged the state grain monopoly in spite of the fact that to please them the government had twice raised the “fixed prices” of grain. The grain profiteers, so-called “bagmen,” overloaded the aheady dislocated transport system. The workers’ bread ration amounted to less than 200 grams per day and hunger was making itself felt more and more. The capitalist Ryabushinsky, one of the organizers of the hunger and ruin, openly stated that the revolution would be crushed only if “the gaunt hand of famine, the impoverishment of the masses, clutches by the throat the false friends of the people — the democratic Soviets and committees.”

In his work “The Impending Catastrophe and How to Combat It,” written in September 1917, Lenin showed that the hunger and ruin were due to the policy that was pursued by the Provisional Government in obedience to the will of the capitalists. Lenin foimu- lated in this work the Bolshevik economic program, indicating the first steps toward Socialism.

“The result of the revolution has been,” he wrote, “that the political system of E»ussia has in a few months caught up with that of the advanced countries. But that is not enough. The war is inexorable; it puts the alternative with ruthless severity: either perish, or overtake and outstrip the advanced countries economically as tvelV (V.I. Lenin, Selected Worhs^ Two-Vol. ed., Vol. II, Moscow, 1947, p. 117).

In August-September 1917, Lenin finished his book The State and Revolution in which he developed the fundamental propositions of Marx and Engels on the proletarian revolution and the dictator- ship of the proletariat and expounded the doctrine of the Soviets as the state form of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

At the end of September 1917, the Mensheviks and the Socialist- Revolutionaries made another attempt to check the revolution by forming a new coalition government. It included “six capitalist ministers as the nucleus of the ‘Cabinet’ and ten ‘Socialist’ ministers to be at their service as the vehicles of their will’^ (J. Stalin, On the Road to October^ Moscow, 1925, Russ, ed., p. 223). Kerensky re- mained Prime Minister.

The counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie began secretly to plot another blow against the revolution.

Large counter-revolutionary forces were concentrated around the capital and shock battalions were formed of specially picked men who wore allowed to join only on the recommendation of officers. These battalions consisted of the sons of kulaks and the bourgeoisie. More than ten such battalions were posted on the Northern and Western Fronts, in proximity to Petrograd and Moscow. Cossack and cavalry regiments which were regarded as exceptionally “reliable” were withdrawn from the front to the rear. Polish soldiers serving in the Russian army in Byelorussia were formed in a separate Polish Corps under the command of General Dowbor-Musnicki for the purpose of cutting the Western Front off from Petrograd and of capturing all the railway jtmetions on the line to Petrograd. A simil- ar corps was formed in the Ukraine of Czech and Slovak prisoners of war for the purpose of cutting off the Southwestern and Rumanian Fronts from the revolutionary capital if this was found necessary.

The Bolshevization of the Masses

In September and October 1917, the political influence of the Party of Lenin and Stalin grew day after day and its membership steadily in- creased. Thus, in April 1917, the membership of the Bolshevik Party was 80,000, in the middle of August it had risen to 250,000, and in the beginning of October to 400,000. Under the leadership of the Bolshe- viks a strike movement commenced among the proletariat. One hun- dred thousand leather workers in Moscow went on strike and remained out for two and a half months. Over 300,000 workers were involved in the textile strikes in Ivanovo-Voznesensk and Kineshma. Strikes of printers spread over nearly the whole country. The Baku workers waged a long and stubborn struggle for a collective agreement. The very forms of the strike struggle changed. The workers not only downed tools butdrove the capitalists and their managers out of the factories and took over the management of production themselves. The movement for workers’ control of industry spread over the whole country and faced the workers with the struggle for power.

All over the country the overwhelming majcrlty of the proletariat followed the lead of the Bolsheviks.

At the same time Bolshevik influence increased in the rural dis- tricts and in the army. Delegations of soldiers arrived in Petrograd and called upon the Petrograd Soviet immediately to launch a struggle for peace. The only organization which the war-weary masses of soldiers trusted and now followed was the Bolshevik Party. Soldiers at the front wrote the following letter to a Bolshevik army newspaper: ‘‘Comrades, workers and soldiers! Keep your weapons. Let’s go to Petrograd and flght the bourgeoisie and the coalition government. The soldiers have lost all patience with this miserable life in the trenches.”

In regiments and divisions the men drove out the officers, elected new army committees and in a number of localities even killed the more detested of their officers. In their letters home the soldiers advised their fellow villagers to drive out the landlords and to get Peasant Committees to take over the land.

In the rural districts the relatively peaceful forms of fighting the landlords, such as refusal to pay rent and seizing meadows and pastures, we-'e superseded by the seizure of the landlords’ land. Casting ofl the influence of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the local Soviets of Peasants’ Deputies adopted decisions to transfer all the land and all the landlords’ farm property to the peasants. The poorest stratum of the peasants seized monastery and church lands. The peasant move- ment grew into a peasant insurrection.

The Provisional Government sent punitive expeditions to the coun- tryside to suppress the peasant revolts. From March to June there were 17 cases of the armed suppression of peasant revolts; in July and August there were 39, "and in September and October the number grew to 105.

All over Russia members of Land Committees were arrested en masse and put on trial for seizing landlords’ land. This only served to excite the masses of the peasantry still more.

Referring to these incidents Lenin wrote: “It is obvious that if in a peasant country, after seven months of a democratic republic, matters have come to the pass of a peasant revolt, it is irrefutable proof that the revolution is suffering nation-wide collapse, that it is passing through a crisis of unprecedented severity, and that the forces of counter-revolu- tion have gone the full (V. I, Lenin, Selected Works, Vol. VI,

Moscow, 1935, p. 227).

The peasantry began to cast off the influence of the Socialist-Revolutionary party which, had become, to use Lenin’s words party hostile to the 'people, hostile to the peasants, and counter-revolutionary

In alliance with the poorest stratum of the peasantry, and with the bulk of the peasantry supporting the Bolshevik slogans, the proletariat inarched towards the proletarian revolution.

The maturing of the proletarian revolution caused wavering and confusion in the ranks of the petty-bourgeois parties. After the July events a “Left” wing calling itself ‘^Left” Socialist-Revolutionaries, sprang up in the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. A group of “Lefts” who called themselves Internationalists also sprang up among the Men- sheviks. In the endeavour to retain the masses who were rapidly desert- ing them, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks came for- ward with the proposal to establish a republic in Russia. Hitherto, the question of the form of government, like all other questions arising out of the revolution, had been put ofiE imtil the convocation of a Con- stituent Assembly.

The confusion that reigned in the ranks of the Menshevik and the So- eialist-Revolutionary parties indicated that these compromising parties — the main prop of the bourgeoisie — were becoming isolated from the masses, and this brought nearer the victory of the socialist revolution.

The oppressed nationalities in Russia also rose up to fight the impe- rialist bourgeoisie; under the leadership of the Bolsheviks the movement for national liberation developed into a struggle for power. This was exceptionally evident in Central Asia. In September, a spontaneous mass revolt of the workers broke out in Tashkent, and for two weeks pow- er was in the hands of the Soviet. The Provisional Government sent a punitive expedition to Tashkent under the command of General Korov- nichenko, who dealt ruthlessly with the working population of the city.

In the Ukraine the Bolsheviks won over the masses and made vigor- ous preparations for an armed insurrection. In Kharkov, Kiev and Ekaterinoslav, Red Guard units were formed.

In Latvia, the Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies were Bolshevik. In Estonia the Bolsheviks had a majority at the Congress of Soviets that was convened in October. In Finland a Regional Congress of Soviets which was held in the beginning of September adopted resolutions submitted by Bolsheviks.

Not only Russia, but all the countries ofWestem Europe that were suffering from the protracted war were passing through a revolutionary orisis.

In France workers went on strike in protest against the im- perialist war. The anti-war movement spread to the army and in some regiments Councils of Soldiers* Deputies were formed. Soldiers even talked about marching on Paris to settle accoimts with the capitalists and the government.

In Germany hunger riots were occurring all over the country. In the autumn, the crews of four battleships that were stationed at the naval fortress of Wilhelmshaven rose in armed revolt. The revolutionary pro- letarian organization known as the Spartacus Union conducted exten- sive activity among the masses.

Analyzing the events in Russia and abroad in an article he wrote at the end of September 1917, entitled “The Crisis Has Matured,” Lenin said: “The end of September undoubtedly marked a definite turning point in the history of the Russian revolution and, to all appear- ances, of the world revolution also” (V. I. Lenin, Selected Works, Vol. VI, Moscow, 1935, p. 224).

The Victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution

The October Armed Insurrection

Preparations for the Insurrection

In September Lenin lived in Helsingfors, Finland, hiding from the sleuths of the Provisional Gov- ernment. From here he closely watched the development of the revo- lution and sent directives to the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party.

Between September 12 and 14, Lenin sent two remarkable letters to the Central Committee, one entitled “The Bolsheviks Must Assume Power” and the other entitled “Marxism and Insurrection.” In the first-mentioned letter he wrote that, having won the majority in the Soviets of the two capitals, the Bolsheviks can and must take state pow- er into their hands. “The point is,” he wrote, “to make the task clear to the Party. Armed insurrection in Petrograd and Moscow (with their regions), the conquest of power and the overthrow of the government must be placed on the order of the day” (V. I. Lenin, Selected Works Vol. VI, Moscow, 1935, p. 216),

In the second letter Lenin urged that insurrection must be treated as an art and that the conditions necessary for a successful outcome of the iusurrection must be seriously studied. He outlined a general plan for the organization of the insurrection in which he insisted that the decisive forces must be concentrated at the decisive points, and that the revolutionary forces should without fail take the offensive, for, he said, defence means the death of armed insurrection.

On September 15, Lenin’s letters were discussed at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party. The only one to oppose Lenin’s directives to prepare for insurrection was the traitor Kamenev. On Comi\ de Stalin’s proposal, the Central Committee decided to send copies of the letters to the largest Party organi- zations. During the latter part of September the Bolshevik Party developed extensive activities in preparation for the armed insurrec- tion, and on October 7, Lenin secretly arrived in Petrograd for the purpose of directing it. Stalin informed him of the progress that was being made in the preparations.

On October 10 (23), Lenin attended a meeting of the Central Com- mittee, for the first time since the July events, and delivered a report on the preparations for the insurrection in which he proposed that anj' suitable occasion be utilized for the purpose of launching it. He empha- sized that the entire external and internal situation of the country, including the war situation, had prepared the ground for a political insurrection: the Provisional Government had decided to send the revolutionary garrison out of Petrograd and to surrender the capital to the Germans, and the Pussian bourgeoisie he^d opened negotiations for the conclusion of a separate peace with German imperialism in order to crush the Pussian revolution. He said it was time to fix the date for the insurrection and to make the military-technical prepa- rations for it.

Stalin, Sverdlov, Dzerzhinsky and the other members of the Cen- tral Committee supported Lenin’s proposals. Those blacklegs of the revolution, Zinoviev and Kamenev, were the only ones to oppose him.

The Central Committee condemned these defenders of capitalism and passed a resolution, moved by Lenin, calling for the immediate organization of armed insurrection and the subordination of all the Party’s activities to this task. The resolution read: “Considering therefore that an armed uprising is inevitable, and that the time for it is fully ripe, the Central Committee instructs all Party organiza- tions to be guided accordingly, and to discuss and decide all practical questions (the Congress of Soviets of the Northern Pegion, the with- drawal of troops from Petrograd, the action of our people in Moscow and Minsk, etc.) from this point of view” (V. I. Lenin, Selected Works, Two-Vol. ed., Vol. II, Moscow, 1947, p. 135).

After strongly rebuffing the capitulators, the Central Committee continued with its preparations for the armed insurrection. A Pevo~ lutionary Military Committee of the Petrograd Soviet was set up which served as a legal headquarters for the insurrection. The main force of the insurrection was to be the Petrograd Red Guard, which in October numbered 12,000 armed men. It was decided to call the sailors of the Baltic Fleet from Helsingfors to assist the revolution- ary capital. Committees of Three were set up in every district of Petrograd to guide the insurrection in the given district. Meanwhile, congresses of Soviets were held in most of the regions throughout the country, and these passed resolutions calling for the transfer of all power to the Soviets, On October 16 (29), on Lenin’s recommendation, a second meeting of the Central Committee of the Party was held to which representatives of the Petrograd Bolsheviks were invited in order that a larger circle of Party members could be informed of the plan for the insurrection. This meeting reaffirmed the decision to launch the armed insurrection. Kamenev and Zinoviev again demanded that the insurrection be postponed. Comrade Stalin spoke and denounced these traitors. He said: “Objectively, what Kamenev and Zinoviev propose amounts to giving the counter-revolution the opportunity to organize.”

That same day a Party Centre was set up, headed by Comrade Stalin, for the purpose of exercising practical leadership of the insurrection.

After sustaining defeat at the meeting of the Central Committee, Zinoviev and Kamenev resorted to an act of unprecedented treachery. They sent a statement to the Menshevik newspaper Novaya Zhizn, which published it in its issue of October 18, declaring that they disagreed with the decision of the Central Committee of the Bol- shevik Party to launch an insurrection. This was a downright betrayal. Concerning this action Lenin wrote: “Kamenev and Zinoviev have betrayed to Rodzyanko and Kerensky^ the decision of the Central Committee of their Party on armed insurrection and the fact that preparations for armed insurrection and the choice of the date for the aimed insurrection were being concealed from the enemy” (Lenin and Selected Writings and Speeches, Moscow, 1938, p. 605). Following in the footsteps of Kamenev and Zinoviev, Trotsky too di- vulged the date of the insurrection by stating at a meeting of the Petrograd Soviet that the Second Congress of Soviets that was to be held on October 25 must take over power, Kerensky took advantage of this betrayal to take a series of military measures for the purpose of forestalling the insurrection.

The Bolsheviks intensified their activities in preparing for the armed insurrection. In conformity with the plan drawn up by Comrade Stalin, the workers of the Urals were to come to the aid of Petrograd, those of Ivanovo-Voznesensk were to go to the aid of Moscow, and in Byelorussia the soldiers at the front, in the event of being sent against Petrograd, were to be disarmed. In preparing for the insurrection Com- rade Stalin was assisted by Y. M. Sverdlov, F. E. Dzerzhinsky, V. M, Molotov, G. K. Orjonikidze, M. I. Kalinin, A. A. Andreyev and other comrades.

In the provinces preparations for the armed insurrection were made under the direction of those tried and trusted pupils of Lenin,

K. E. Voroshilov in the Donetz Basin, Artyom (Sergeyev) in Kharkov, V. V. Kuibyshev in the Volga Region, A. A. Zhdanov in the Urals,

L. M. Kaganovich in the Polesie Region, M. V. Frunze in Ivanovo-Voznesensk and S. M. Kirov in the North Caucasus. The Bolsheviks intensified their activities in the Baltic Fleet and on the Northern Front, the nearest front to the capital.

In the factories feverish activities were conducted in arming and drilling the workers. Units of the Bed Guard were quickly formed. The workers of the Sestroretsk Small -Arms Factory delivered the weapons they made to the headquarters of the Bed Guard. The workers of the Schlusselburg Gun Powder Works sent by way of the Neva a bargeload of grenades to the headquarters of the Bed Guard in Petro- grad. At the Putilov Works there was a Bed Guard miit of 1,500 men, ready for action.

Lenin called a conference of the leaders of the military organization and discussed with them what ships and troops should be called in from Kronstadt and Helsingfors. The Bevolutionary Military Committee sent its Commissars to all the army units for the purpose of preparing the soldiers for the insurrection.

The Insurrection in Petrograd

Forewarned by the traitors Kamenev, Zinoviev and Trotsky, the Provisional Government believed that the proletarian insurrection would commence on October 25, 1917, the day the Second Congress of Soviets was to open, and took measures to suppress it on that date.

The headquarters of the counter-revolution hastily drew up a plan to capture the Smohiy Institute, where the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party had its headquarters. Military forces were drawn to the capital and the cadet schools were prepared for action. The Provisional Government ordered the revolutionary cruiser Aurora, which was under- going repairs on the Neva, to put out to sea immediately, as it was afraid to allow the ship to remain in Petrograd. The bridges that connected the working-class districts with the centre of Petrograd were ordered to be raised.

Early in the morning of October 24 (November 6), a detachment of cadets arrived in motor trucks at the premises of Eabochi Put (the temporary title of Pravda) with the object of confiscating the latest issue of that newspaper. The workers in the printing plant managed to inform Comrade Stal^ of this raid; soon a detachment of revolutionary sol- diers arrived on an armoured car and the cadets beat a hasty retreat. The BabocJhi Put came out with an appeal for the overthrow of the Pro- visional Government. In a leading article in that issue entitled “What Do We Need?” Comrade Stalin wrote: “The time has come when further delay will be fatal for the whole cause of the revolution. The present government of landlords and capitalists must be replaced by a new gov- ernment of workers and peasants. . . (Lenin and Stalin, 1917, Selected Writings and Speeches, Moscow, 1938, p. 611.)

Towards the evening of October 24 (November 6), Lenin, on learning of the attack launched by the counter-revolution, sent the Central Committes of the Bolshevik Party his last letter demanding that the insurrection should be started forthwith, “We must at all costs, this very eve- ning, this very night, arrest the government, first disarming the cadets (de- feating them if they resist), and so forth,” he wrote. “Under no circum- stances must power be left in the hands of Kerensky and Co, until the 25th — ^not under any circumstances; the matter must be decided with- out fail this very evening, or this very night” (V. I, Lenia, Selected ITor&s, Two-Vol. ed., Vol. II, Moscow, 1947, p. 159).

To prevent Kerensky from taking action on the 25th, the day the Congress of Soviets was to open, the Central Committee of the Bolshe- vik Party instructed the Revolutionary Military Committee to start the insurrection at once.

In the morning of October 24 (November 6), the Revolutionary Military Committee ordered the military units to prepare for action; it also ordered that a close watch be kept on the army units that were approaching the capital, and that the guard at bridges and railway sta- tions be reinforced. It decided to call in the assistance of the warships and sailors of the Baltic Fleet and with this object sent the Central Committee of the Soviets of the Baltic Fleet in Helsingfors a prear- ranged telegram containing the words: “Send regulations”; this meant “the insurrection has commenced, dispatch ships and men.”

That evening Lenin, disguised as a workingman, with his face tied up and wearing a wig, and accompanied by a comrade sent from the Central Committee, arrived in the Smolny. Men from the Lithuanian Regiment and detachments of Red Guards were called to the Smolny, where they took up their posts, supported by machine guns, at all the entrances and exits. Detachment after detach- ment of Red Guards kept arriving. Earlier in the day the Red Guards were armed with weapons obtained from the arsenal in the Fortress of Peter and Paul which had gone over to the Bolsheviks.

In conformity with the prearranged plan, detachments of workers proceeded to occupy state buildings; after midnight t-he Central Telephone Exchange, the State Bank, the General Post Office, the railway stations and the principal government offices were occupied.

The Revolutionary Military Committee ordered the cruiser Aurora to move up from the Franoo-Russian Shipyards on the Neva to the Winter Palace. The commander of the Aurora refused to obey the order on the plea that the Neva was too shallow, whereupon the sailors took soundings, found that the fairway was suffi- ciently deep, arrested the commander and steered the ship in the ap- pointed direction. The Aurora's guns were turned on the last refuge of the bourgeois government — ^the Winter Palace.

The insurrection proceeded in an organized manner a-ocording to plan. By 9 a. m. on October 25 (November 7), seven companies of the Kexholm Regiment had occupied the approaches to the Winter Palace, where the Provisional Government was assembled. By this time it was evident that the government was completely isolated; not a single military unit supported it. On the morning of the 25th Kerensky fled from the insurgent capital in a motor car flying the United States flag.

At 10 am. on October 25 (November 7), the Revolutionary Mili- tary Committee issued a manifesto proclaiming the overthrow of the Provisional Government, The manifesto, which had been drawn up by Lenin, stated;

“The Provisional Government has been overthrown. The power of state has passed into the hands of the organ of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers* and Soldiers* Deputies, the Revolutionary Military Commit- tee, which stands at the head of the Petrograd proletariat and garrison.

“The cause for which the people have fought — the immediate propos- al of a democratic peace, the abolition of landed proprietorship, workers* control over production and the creation of a Soviet govern- . ment — is assured.

“Long live the revolution of the workers, soldiers and peasants!” {Lenin and Stalin, 1917, Selected Writings and Speeches, Moscow, 1938, p. 613.)

On October 25, a special meeting of the Petrograd Soviet was held. The appearance of Lenin, the leader of the revolu- tion, was greeted with round after round of applause and cheers. Addressing the meeting, Lenin said: “Comrades, the workers* and peasants’ revolution, about the necessity of which the Bolsheviks have always spoken, has taken place. . . . From now on, a new phase in the history of Russia begins, and this revolution, the third Russian revolution, should in the end lead to the victory of Socialism” {Lenin and Stalin, 1917, Selected Writings and Speeches, Moscow, 1938, p. 614).

The Petrograd Soviet adopted a resolution welcoming the pro- letarian revolution and expressing the conviction that the Soviet government which the revolution created would march firmly along the road to Socialism.

By this time the insurgents controlled the whole city except the Winter Palace. Lenin ordered the Winter Palace to be captured before the opening of the Congress of Soviets. The Provisional Government was called upon to smrender forthwith, but it refused, whereupon, at 9 p. m., the assault on the Winter Palace was launched. After the prearranged signal, the firing of a gun from the Fortress of Peter and Paul and shots from the six-inch guns of the Aurora, the Red Guards, sailors and soldiers, led by the Bolsheviks, stormed the Winter Palace.

Almost the entire Petrograd Young Socialist Workers’ League (the future Young Communist League) had joined the ranks of the Red Guard, and the young proletarians constituted more than one- third of its strength.

The broad masses of the workers and soldiers were imbued with tremendous enthusiasm and confidence in victory. The Provisional Government that was besieged in the Winter Palace waited in vain for the assistance that had been promised from the front.

The Second Congress of Soviets

The Second Congress of Soviets was opened in the Smolny at 10:45 p. m. on October 25 (November 7). The assault on the Winter Palace was still in progress. Many of the congress delegates had taken part in the insurrection. The Smol- ny Institute looked like a military camp. Armoured cars, automobiles, motor trucks filled with armed workers, columns of Red Guards and sailors with machine-gun cartridge belts across their chests and hand grenades strung around their belts, Red Cross nurses in ambulance carts and Red Cross cars moved in an endless stream to and from the Smolny. At tiie congress there were 650 delegates, of whom 390 were Bolsheviks.

When the congress was opened the Mensheviks, the Bundists and the Bight Socialist-Revolutionaries called upon the soldier and non- Party delegates to leave, but only a handful of Menshevik and Social- ist-Revolutionary leaders left the hall.

As they left the indignant delegates shouted at them: “Kornilov- ites!”, “Deserters!”

A delegate from the Twelfth Army got up and said amidst general approval: “We must take power into our hands. Let them go. The army is not with them! ”

At 2:10 a. m. the Winter Palace was captured. The wretched group of friglitened Ministers of the Provisional Government was arrested and taken to the Portress of Peter and Paul.

At 5 a. m. on October 26 (November 8), the Congress of Soviets passed the historic decision declaring that all power had passed to the Soviets and approved the appeal to the working people, written by Lenin, announcing this great historic event. The appeal read: “Backed by the will of the vast majority of workers , soldiers and peasants, backed by the victorious uprising of the workers and the garrison which has taken place in Petrograd, the congress takes the power into its own hands” (V. I. Lenin, Selected WorJcs, Two-Vol. ed,, Vol II, Moscow, 1947, p. 226).

The second session of the congress opened at 8:40 p. m. on the same day (October 26 [Novembers]). At this session Lenin, who was greeted with indescribable rejoicing, read the Decree on Peace, which called upon all the belligerent peoples and their governments to conclude a just, democratic peace without annexations and without indemnities, on the basis of the self-determination of oppressed nations. The congress unanimously passed this decree.

Lenin next read the Decree on Land, which proclaimed that all landord, appanage, monasterial and church lands, with their livestock, farm buildings' and implements, were to pass without compensation under the control of Volost Land Committees and Uyezd Soviets of Peasants’ Deputies. In all Soviet rule brought to the peasants over 150,000,000 hectares of land and relieved the peasants of the payment of rent to the landlords amounting to about 500,000,000 gold rubles per annum.

The Decree on Land proved to the peasants that “there are no more landlords in the countryside/’ as Lenin expressed it.

This decree was based on the General Peasant Instructions which had been drawn up on the basis of 242 local Peasant Mandates, the main one of which had been the abolition of the private ownership of land and the transfer of the land to the peasants without compen- sation through the Land Committees and Soviets.

At 2:30 a. m. the congress passed a decree announcing the forma- tion of the first Soviet government — ^the Council of People’s Commis- sars. The congress endorsed Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov (Lenin) as Chair- man of the Coimoil of People’s Commissars, and Lenin’s unfailing colleague, Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin, as People’s Commissar of Nationalities, the function of which was to help to unite the oppressed nations in a single fraternal socialist federation of nations. The activ- ities of the Coimcil of People's Commissars were to be controlled by a Central Executive Committee elected by the All-Russian Congi’ess of Soviets.

The first Soviet government consisted exclusively of Bolsheviks, although the latter had invited the “Left” .Socialist-Revolutionaries to join it. Before the Second Congress of Soviets was opened the “Left” Socialist-Revolutionaries were still organizationally connected with the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries. It was only after the latter had left the congress together with the Mensheviks that the “Left” Socialist-Rev- olutionaries formed their own se]parate party. Conscious of the pressure of the entire mass of the peasantry who were thirsting for land, the “Left” Socialist-Revolutionaries had been constantly wavering be- tween the Bolsheviks and the Right Socialist-Revolutionarj^-Menshevik bloc and urging the Bolsheviks to reach an agreement with the latter. Lenin called them “fellow travellers of the proletarian revolution” and foresaw that they would betray the revolution at the critical moment. Influenced by the revolutionary temper of the peasants and soldiers, the “Left” Socialist-Revolutionaries announced that they supported the October Revolution. It was then that the Bolsheviks invited them to enter the government.

But the “Left” Socialist-Revolutionaries opposed the formation of a Sovietgovemment; they wanted “a homogeneous socialist govern- ment,” by which they meant a Cabinet consisting of representatives of different parties, ranging from the People’s Socialists to the Bolshe- viks. The Second Congress of Soviets, however, rejected this proposal and set up the first Soviet government entirely of Bolsheviks.

The congress closed at 5 a.m. on October 27, amidst the enthusias- tic cries of the delegates andPetrograd workers: “Long live the revolu- tion!”, “Long live Socialism!”

Suppression of the Kerensky and Krasnov Anti-Soviet Revolt

The victory of the socialist revolution in Peti'ograd evoked the desper- ate resistance of the deposed classes. The Committee for the Salvation of the Fatherland and the Revolution, which was headed by Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries and backed by the Entente imperialists, became the centre of the counter-revolution. The workers and soldiers called this committee “The Committee for the Salvation of the Counter- Revolution.”

The first armed revolt of the counter-revolution was organized by Kerensky and the Cossack General Krasnov. After fleeing from Petro- grad, Kerensky withdrew several Cossack units from the front and sent them against Petrograd under the command of General Krasnov to crush the proletarian revolution. On October 28 (November 10), Kras- nov occupied Tsarskoye Selo (now the town of Pushkin) near Petrograd.

The workers of the capital rose to defend the revolution. They marched to the firing line, dug trenches, erected fortifications and manu- factured arms. Work in the factories went on day and night. The Putilov Plant received orders to fix armour plats on two railway fiat cars, and Lenin, who was personally directing the organization of the defence of Petrograd, went to the plant to see how this order was being carried out. He found the workers busily engaged on the job. He spoke to the work- ers, encouraging them to further efforts, and told them what the situation was at the front. Within twenty-four hours the order was executed. Lenin ordered destroyers to move up the Neva to cover the flanks of the Red forces, and as many as ten thousand men ready for action were concentrated on the Pulkovo Hills.

Taking advantage of the fact that the Red forces had gone ofi to the front, the counter-revolutionaries in Petrograd organized a mutiny of cadets in the city. On tlie night of October 28 (November 10), a Red Guard patrol detained two suspicious men. One of them tried stealthily to get rid of some document or other, but one of the Red Guards saw it and picked it up. It turned out to be the plan for the mutiny. Thanks to the united and vigorous efforts of the workers and soldiers the mutiny was crushed by 4 p. m. next day. On October 31 (November 13), the revolutionary workers and soldiers routed a force of Cossacks near Pulkovo. This defeat caused rapid disintegration among the Cossack units, and in spite of all the orders issued by Krasnov, the Cossacks re- fused to take to arms, A delegation of Soviet sailors went to the Cos- sacks in Gatchina and promised that they would be allowed to return to their homes if they stopped fighting the Soviets and delivered up Kerensky. The Cossacks agreed to this, but Kerensky managed to escape from Gatchina disguised as a Bed Cross nurse. Ki-asnov was arrested but released later on giving his word of honour not to fight against the Soviets.

He failed to keep his word, however. He fled to the Don, which subsequently became a hotbed of counter-revolution.

The Insurrection in Moscow

On receiving news of the insurrec- tion in Petrograd the Moscow Committee of the Bolshevik Party, on October 25 (November 7), took measures for an insurrection in Moscow.

On the night of October 25, the Bolshevik Military Centre called upon the Revolutionary Military Committee of the Moscow Soviet to garrison the Kremlin with troops who were loyal to the revolution; but instead of doing this the Revolutionary Military Committee leaders entered into negotiations with the counter-revolutionary headquar- ters. In the evening of October 26, the Moscow Committee of the Bolshevik Party held a special meeting'^"and demanded the cessation of these negotiations. Meanwhile, the counter-revolution- aries launched an offensive. On October cadets occupied all the bridges across the Moscow River. At 7 p. m. that day Colonel Ryab- tsev, the commander of the counter-revolutionary forces, presented an ultimatum to the Revolutionary Military Committee, demanding that it should dissolve.

The cadets captured the Kremlin by a ruse, surrounded the revolu- tionary soldiers there and shot them down with machine guns. This out- rage roused the indignation of the workers and soldiers of Moscow. The Moscow Committee of the Bolshevik Party called upon the workers to take to arms in order to crush the counter-revolution and to seize power forthwith. The Moscow proletariat and soldiers unanimously responded to this appeal. The workers sent Red Guard units to the assist- ance of the Moscow Soviet. The offensive converged from the various districts of the city to the centre, where the Moscow Soviet headquarters were situated. The initiative in the fighting passed to the districts.

An exceptionally active role in the October fighting in Moscow was played by the workers of the Simonov District (now the Lenin District) where the AMO (now Stalin) Automobile Plant, the Dynamo Plant and other big plants were situated. The workers captured the arsenal and armed themselves, and detachments of Red Guards fought their way from the district towards the Moscow Soviet and took a most active part in the assault upon the cadets. The workers and soldiers fought solidly in the other districts as well. In the Lefortovo and Bas- manny Districts they captured pieces of artillery and for two days bombarded the Alexeyevsky Military School and finally compelled the cadets to surrender. In the centre of the city the Red Guards and soldiers attacked the General Post Office, the Central Telegraph Office and the Central Telephone Exchange. In the Khamovniki District the Red Guards dislodged the cadets from the army food warehouse and captured the Krymsky Bridge and the Bryansk (now Kiev) Railway Station. The workers of the Krasnaya Presnya District cleared the cadets out of the whole district up to the Kovinsky Boulevard.

Red Guard units came bo the assistance of the Moscow workers from the adjacent towns. Detachments of poor peasants armed with shot- guns and axes arrived from the villages in the Moscow Region and were organized and armed by the workers of the railway repair shops. Red Guards from Petrograd, sailors from Kronstadt, weavers from Ivanovo and workers from Tula on motor trucks and armed with machine guns, hastened to the assistance of Moscow.

On October 31 (November 13), the Red Guards captured the Gen- eral Post Office, the Central Telegraph Office and the railway stations, and two days later began to bombard the Kremlin.

At 9 p. m. on November 2 (15), after six days’ fighting, the counter-revolutionaries were defeated and forced to surrender. All power passed to the Revolutionary Military Committee of the Moscow Soviet.

The October Revolution at the Front

The Second Congress of So- viets issued an appeal to the soldiers at the front to support the insurrec- tion of the Petrograd workers, and stated that the Soviet government would exert all efforts to terminate the war. The decrees on peace and on the land were immediately circulated to all the soldiers’ organizations, but the Army Committees, led by Men- sheviks andSocialist-Revolutionaries , tried to conceal from the soldiers the decisions which had been adopted by the Second Congress of Soviets. The soldiers, however, sent deputa- tions to the Petrograd Soviet to learn the truth about the events that had taken place in the capital. When these delegates returned and in- formed their comrades that Soviet rule had been established in Petrograd, the masses of soldiers heartily welcomed it. The proletarian revo- lution triumphed first on the Northern and Western Fronts, which were closest to Petrograd. Here the Bolsheviks had conducted extensive activity; nearly all the Regimental Committees were headed by Bolsheviks and, as a consequence, the soldiers •declared unanimously for Soviet power. The other fronts* — ^the Southwestern, Rumanian and Caucasian — being very remote

from the centre of the revolution, did not at once learn of the

victory of the proletarian revolution in Petrograd; but as the truth about the events came through and the soldiers learned of the Soviet decrees they too joined the revolution.

Although defeated in Petrograd and in Moscow, the counter- revolution still made efforts to organize and pass to the offensive. The representatives of the anti-Soviet parties which had been defeated by the revolution, and the military missions of the Entente countries which refused to recognize the Soviet government, flocked to the 'General Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief in Mogilev, which now became the centre of a new counter-revolutionary plot. General Headquarters kept from the soldiers the decree on peace and began to form units for a drive against Petrograd. The Soviet government ordered General Dukhonin, Chief of the General Staff, who after the flight of Kerensky, had proclaimed himself Supreme Commander- in-Chief, immediately to open negotiations for an armistice with the German Command, but Dukhonin refused to obey this order, whereupon Lenin dismissed Dukhonin and sent revolutionary detachments to Mogilev which captured General Headquarters and liquidated this hotbed of coimter-revolution .

The Organization of the Soviet State

Failure of Attempts to Liquidate the Proletarian Dictatorship

After the armed insurrection the proletariat became the ruling class in Russia.

The class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie continued in new and more intense forms. As Lenin wrote: “The dictatorship of the proletariat is a most determined and most ruthless war waged by the new class against a more, 'powerful enemy, the bomgeoisie, whose resistance is increased tenfold by its over- throw ” (V. I. Lenin, Selected Worl^s^ Two-Vol. ed., VoL II, Moscow,

1947, p. 573.) The proletarian dictatorship set out to crush the resistance of the vanquished exploiters and to build communist society.

Emphasizing the significance of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the struggle against the vanquished bourgeoisie, Comrade Stalin said: “The dictatorship of the proletariat is not a mere change of government, but a new state, with new organs of power, both central and local. ...” (J. Stalin, Problems of Leninism ^ Moscow, 1946, p. 42.)

The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries launched a struggle against the dictatorship of the proletariat and demanded the establish- ment of a “homogeneous socialist government” in place of Soviet rule.

The All-Russian Executive Committee of the Railwaymen^s Union, (known as Vikzhel) which was controlled by Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, threatened a general railwaymen’s strike if negotiations were not opened on the issue of power. Meanwhile Krasnov and Kerensky were at the gates of the capital. Kamenev, who was. then the Chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, opened negotiations with the Railwaymen’s Executive as to the establishment of a coalition government. He commit- ted an act of unparalleled tr achery by conceding the demand of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks that Lenin, the leader of the proletariat, should he removed from the post of Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars and that either Avksentyev or Chernov, both Socialist-Revolutionaries and creatures of the counter-revolution, be appointed in his place.

After the Kerensky and Elrasnov revolt was crushed, Lenin de- manded that negotiations with the Railwaymen’s Executive should cease forthwith. In answer to this Kamenev, Zinoviev, Rykov and the few supporters the^r had, resigned from the Central Committee of the Party. Lenin demanded that these deserters and blacklegs of the revolution should be removed from all Soviet and Party work. In an angry letter he addressed to Zinoviev and Kamenev he wrote: “. . . You are causing indecision in the ranks of the fighters in an in- surrection which is still in progress. . , (V. I. Lenin, Collected Works,

VoL XXII, Moscow, 1937, Russ, ed., p. 57.)

The Central Committee of the Party addressed a letter ‘To All Party Members and to All the Toiling Classes of Russia” in which it emphasized that only a Bolshevik government could now be regarded as the Soviet government.

At that time Yakov Mikhailovich Sverdlov was elected as Chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee,

A steadfast Leninist and a man of extraordinary strong will and outstanding organizing talent, Yakov Mikhailovich Sverdlov played a tremendous part in building up the Party and Soviet power after the victory of the October Revolution. His iron will, seething energy, enormous capacity for work, phenomenal memory, astonishing knowledge of men and his ability to find and place the neces- sary workers made him a priceless leader and organizer of Soviet power.

The Breakup of the Old State Machine

The fundamental antithesis between bourgeois revolutions (including the French bour- geois revolution of 1789) and the Great October Socialist Revolution lay in that “the French (and every other) bourgeois revolution, while liberating the people from the chains of feudalism and absolutism, put new chains upon them, the chains of capitalism and bourgeois de- mocracy, whereas the socialist revolution in Russia smashed all chains whatsoever and liberated the people from oil forms of exploitation. ...” (J. Stalin, S. Kirov and A, Zhdanov, Comment on a Synopsis for a Textbook on Modern History.)

After overthrowing the rule of the capitalists and landlords and becoming itself the ruling class, the proleto^riat had to organize in a new way the state power it needed to be able to crush the resistance of the exploiters and lead the peasants in building the new socialist society.

This process of creating the new proletarian authority was a compli- cated and difficult one, for it entaihd the breaking up of the old bourgeois machinery of state and the creation of a new tj^e of state authority. As Lenin wrote: “. . . All the revolutions which have occurred up to now have helped to perfect the state machine, whereas it must be smashed, broken.

“This conclusion is the chief and fundamental thesis in the Marxian doctrine of the state” (V. I. Lenin, Selected WorTcs, Two-VoL ed., Vol. II, Moscow, 1947, p. 169).

The Paris Commune of 1871 was the first attempt in history at the breakup of the bourgeois state machine by a proletar- ian revolution. The revolutions of 1905 and of February 1917, which set up Soviets, not only continued the cause of the Paris Commune but took further gi- gantic strides in that direction. As Comrade Stalin wrote: “The dictatorship of the proletariat cannot arise as the result of the peaceful development of bour- geois society and of bourgeois democracy; it can arise only as the result of the smashing of the bourgeois state machine, the bourgeois army, the bourgeois bureaucratic machine, the bourgeois police” (J. Stalin, Problems of Leninism, Moscow, 1945, p. 44).

By the decree of December 16 (29), 1917, plenary power in the army was transferred to the Soldiers’ Soviets and Committees. The Com- missars of the Provisional Government were removed and the election of officers, right up to front commanders, was introduced. All the old ranks, titles and decorations were abolished. This decree thus completed the democratization of the army and signified the complete breakup of the old army. The organization of the new army was sanc- tioned by the decree of January 15 (28), 1918, about the formation of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red .^my.

The Soviet government liquidated the old machinery of vio- lence and oppression by the decree of November 22 (December 5), 1917, which abolished the old judiciary and established the new, people’s courts.

The police force had been shattered by the workers in the very first days of the February revolution. In its place the Provisional Government had formed a militia, but not on the principle of recruiting it from among the ranks of the working people. After the victory of the proletarian revolution a- Workers’ Militia was organized to maintain revolutionary order, and was placed under the control of the local Soviets.

A series of decrees was issued abolishing the old division of the population into estates. Thus, on November 10 (23), 1917, a decree was passed abolishing the different estates and civil ranks. The designations current till then (noble, merchant, burgher, peasant, etc.,) were abolished and the designation of Citizen of the Russian Republic was introduced to cover all the inhabitants of Soviet Russia.

Decrees were also issued abolishing the privileges of the church. Thus, the decree of January 21 (February 3), 1918, separated the church from the state and the school from the church. The state ceased to maintain the clergy and missionaries, relieved schoolchildren from the obligation of learning the scriptures, and proclaimed religion and the church to be the private affair of citizens.

The Soviet state emancipated women and purged family relation- ships of feudal survivals. The decrees issued on December 19 and 20, 1917, old style, introduced civil marriages, placed children under the protection of the proletarian state and granted women equal rights with men in all respects.

On December 21 (January 3), spelling reform was introduced, thus making it easier for the vast population which had been kept in ignorance for generations to learn to read and write. On January 25 (February 7), 1918, a decree was issued abolishing the old style calendar and introducing the calendar in use in all Europian countries.

First Steps Towards Socialism

The October victory ushered in the first stage of socialist construction. The Great October Socialist Revolution, as Lenin said, completed, in passing, the task of the bour- geois-democratic revolution and at the same time took ths first steps towards Socialism,

The first decrees of the Soviet State introducing socialist meas- ures were also aimed at doing away completely with the survivals of feudalism, serfdom and the caste system. In this respect the Soviet State did more in a few weeks than the Cadets, the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries had done during the eight months they were in power.

On October SO (November 12), 1917, a decree was issued intro- ducing the 8-hour working day.

To combat the sabotage of the capitalists, workers’ control of industry was introduced, the Regulations on Workers’ Control being passed by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on November 14 (27), 1917, Workers’ control meant that the workers prevented the deliberate closing of factories, the removal of finished goods and stocks of raw materials and fael from the premises, and the stopping of produetion, and kept watch over the machinery. The decree introducing workers’ control was one of the first steps towards Socialism, for it gave the workers an opportunity to learn to manage industry and to administer the state. Tens of thousands of workers passed through this school.

From workers’ control the Soviet State gradually passed on to workers’ management of industry". The case of the first Soviet factory, formerly Lickin’s Textile Mill, may serve as an example of how this transition was made. The workers at this mill, discover- ing that the owner was deliberately sabotaging production, raised the demand that they be allowed to take over the management. On November 17, 1917, Lenin signed a decree nationalizing the mill. The higher officials and technical staflF of the mill boycotted the work- ers ’ management and refused to work without the capitalists, but the factory committee came to the aid of the workers’ management and production at this first nationalized Soviet plant was organized.

On December 5 (18), 1917, a decree was issued setting up the Supreme Council of National Economy, This was a militant organ of the Dictatorshij) of the Proletariat established for the purpose of directing industry. Lenin wrote that “the Supreme Council of Nation- al Economy must not be converted into a parliament, but must be just as militant an organ for combating the capitalists and landlords in the sphere of economics, as is the Council of People’s Commissars in the field of politics” (V. I, Lenin, Collected Worlca, VoL XXII, Moscow, 1937, Euss. ed., p. 108).

The railways and the merchant fleet were taken over by the proletarian state.

Foreign trade was declared a monopoly of the Soviet State* The loans contracted by the tsarist regime and the Provisional Government were annulled, thus liquidating forever Russia’s economic dependence upon West-European capital which was gradually transforming our country into a colony of British and French imperialism.

On December 14 (27), the All-Russian Central Executive Committee issued a decree nationalizing all private banks and merging them with the State Bank. This measure shattered one of the most im- portant props of the economic sway of the bourgeoisie and strengthened the material basis of the young proletarian state.

The decree on land passed by the Second Congress of Soviets abolished the economic basis of the domination of the landlords and cleared the way for the struggle to reorganize petty-bourgeois peasant farming on collective lines.

Such are the most important decrees that were issued in the first months of the Soviet regime. These decrees laid the foundation of the new Soviet socialist system of stato and marked the beginning of the reorganization of the country's economy on socialist lines.

Building the Soviet Machinery of State

The establishment of Soviet power met with the strong opposition of the bourgeois intel- ligentsia who had formerly been in the service of the overthrown landlord and capitalist classes. In order to undermine the young pro- letarian state, government officials and the higher categories of ad- ministrative employees engaged in sabotage. Politically this sabotage was directed by the Cadets, Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolu- tionaries who on the very day that power passedinto the hands of the Soviets, called upon government officials to refuse to obey the new authorities. The officials of all fourteen Ministries declared a general strike, being financed by the bourgeoisie to’ the extent of over 2,000,000 rubles. The banks refused to finance those enterprises which had been placed under workers* control, and bank clerks carried away the keys of the vaults. The Pood Administration announced that it would no longer be responsible for supplying the capital with food. The bread ration was reduced to 150 grams per day. The Ministry of State Relief stopped paying pensions to orphans, disabled persons and the aged. The Technical Engineers* Union expelled those of its members who obeyed the Soviet decree on workers* control and co-operated with the Bolsheviks. The Post and Telegraph Emxjloyees* Union ordered all local post and telegraph offices to hold up all orders issued by the Soviet government.

Notwithstanding this sabotage, the Soviet government and the Bolshevik Party built up a network of Soviet institutions. Commu- nication was established between the central organs of the Soviet State and the local Soviets, but during the first period work was carried on under very difficult conditions.

Here is how N. K. Krupskaya has described the conditions of this period: ‘Work in the Smolny went on not only during the day, but all through the night. In the beginning all the work was done in the Smolny — ^Paity meetings, sessions of the Council of People’s Commissars and the work of the People’s Commissariats. Telegrams and orders were sent out from there. People streamed to the Smolny from everywhere. And what kind of staff did the Council of People’s Commisars have? In the beginning, four utterly inexperienced people, working without respite, doing everything that was re- quired. . . . Lenin often had to do the most routine work, making phone calls, etc.”

On November 15 (28) the Council of People’s Commissars ordered that the work of all the People’s Commissariats be conducted in the premises of the corresponding Ministries and that the Com- missars should gather in the Smolny only in the evenings. The reason for this decision was that m the process of combating sabotage a new Soviet machinery of state was beginning to be built up. A tremendous part in organizing the Soviet machinery of state was played by the trade unions, which sent members to work in the People’s Commissariats, financed the Commis- sariats which were not receiving money from the banks, and so forth.

The very lowest ranks, the most oppressed sections, of the people yield 3d the new forces that proceeded to build up the Soviet State.

The Merging of the Soviets of Workers’ Deputies with the Soviets of Peasants’ Deputies

The operation of the Decree on Land gave rise to a fierce class struggle in the rural districts. The newly organized People’s Commissariat of Agriculture issued regulations governing the work of the Kural Area Land Committees which had begun to put the land decree into force. The Socialist-Revo- lutionaries tried to hinder the holding of new elections for these Land Committees and also the establishment of Soviets of Peasants’ Deputies. They concealed from the peasants the decrees on land and peace adopted by the Congress of Soviets, and also decrees of the Soviet governm?nt. The peasants learned of these only from letters sent home by soldiers and from workers and soldiers who arrived in the villages. Many villages sent deputations to Lenin. Lenin, in plain and simple terms, explained to ^e peasants the tasks of the new workers’ and peasants’ government and urged them to take advantage of the new Soviet laws and to strengthen the alliance with the working class in order to become masters of their own lives.

Lenin said: "What we need is an alliance between the poorest peas- ants and the workers — ^when we get that Socialism will triumph all over the world” (V. I. Lenin, Collected Worhs, Vol. XXII, Moscow, 1937, Russ, ed., p. 51).

In November 1917, the All-Russian Congress of Peasants’ Soviets was held in Petrograd. At this congress Lenin demanded of the "Lefb” Socialist-Revolutionaries that they drop their policy of compromise with the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries. Reckoning with the wishes of the masses of the peasantry, the Bolsheviks invited the “Left” Socialist-Revolutionaires to join the government. These latter, yielding to the pressure of the peasant masses, accepted the Bolshevik terms and appointed their representatives to the Council of People’s Commissars.

To tighten the alliance between the workers and the peasants it was decided to unite the Executive Committees of the Soviets of Workers’ Deputies and of the Soviets of Peasants’ Deputies in one All-Russian Central Executive Committee of Soviets of Workers’, Peasants’ and Soldiers’ Deputies.

At a joint session of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, the Petrograd Soviet and the Congress of Soviets of Peasants ’ Deputies, a resolution was unan- imously adopted to unite the Soviets of Workers’ Deputies with the Soviets of Peasants’ Deputies.

“The Declaration of Rights of the Nations of Russia.” The main principles of the Soviet na- tional policy were proclaimed in the Declaration of Rights of the Nations of Russia that was signed by Lenin and Stalin and pub- lished on November 2 (15), 1917.

The plain, clear and powerful words in which the Declaration was couched found an echo not only among the nations inhabiting Russia but also among the colonial and dependent peo- ples abroad. The Declaration pro- claimed the emancipation by the Great October Socialist Revolution of all the nations inhabiting Russia and laid down the following principles of the national policy of the Soviet State: 1) Equality and sovereignty of the nations of Russia; 2) the right of the nations of Russia to free self-determination, including the right to secede and form independent states; 3) abolition of all and sundry national and national-religious privileges and restrictions; 4) the free development of the national minorities and ethnographical groups inhabiting the territory of Rus- sia. This policy of the Soviet State satisfied the age-long strivings of the oppressed nationalities and thereby strengthened their alliance with the Russian proletariat who had established themselves in power.

The Establishment of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission

On December 7 (20), 1917, the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission to Combat Counter-Revolution and Sabotage was set up to protect the proletarian dictatorship and safeguard all the gains of the revolution. This Commission soon became, as Comrade Stalin called it, “the ever-wakeful guardian of the revolution, the drawn sword of the proletariat.”

At the head of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission the Party placed that most faithful comrade-in-arms of Lenin and Stalin, firm Bolshevik and staimch fighter in the revolution, Felix Edmundovich Dzerzhinsky. F. E. Dzerzhinsky was bom in 1877, and was one of the veterans of the Polish and Russian working-class movements. His whole life was a record of revolutionary daring; it was a lif^ of the tireless activity of a professional revolutionary interspersed with impris- onment, exile and escapes. “Only the grave can put a stop to the struggle I am waging, ”he wrote. “Here in prison things are bad, sometimes fright- ful and yet, if I had to start all over again, I would do what I have been doing up to now.” The February revolution liberated Dzerzhinsky from the penal servitude prison where he had spent nine years. The October Revolution entrusted him with the task of safeguarding the power of the Soviets. His sterling honesty, courage and Bolshevil?: power of penetration won for him the love of and tremendous author- ity among the broad masses who called him “Iron Felix.” Comrade Stalin said of h’m: “A terror to the bourgeoisie — ^that is what Felix Dzerzhinsky was.”

The Soviet intelligence 'department which was directed by F. E. Dzerzhinsky, was built up with the aid of staunch, devot- ed and vigilant advanced workers and with the constant backing of the working people, who helped the Extraordinary Commission to discover plots and wi^^e out the enemies of the revolution.

The Triumphal March of Soviet Power

The Expansion and Consolidation of Soviet Power

The power of the Soviets quickly spread throughout the country. In most of the industrial districts where the Bolsheviks had won over the Soviets before the October insurrection, power passed to the Soviets peace- fully. There Revolutionary Military Committees were set up and Red Guards occupied the post and telegraph offices and other public buildings. Backed by the trade unions, the Revolutionary Military Committees organized administrative machinery and made prepara- tions for the summoning of Congresses of Soviets to set up plenipo- tentiary organs of Soviet power. This was the case in numerous dis- tricts in the Urals, the Donetz Basin, in Ivanovo-Voznesensk, in Shuya and other towns.

In a number of towns, however, the establishment of Soviet power was delayed because coalition Revolutionary Military Commit- tees had been set up, and the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolution- aries did all they could to prevent the transfer of power to the Soviets.

Lenin described the period from October 25 to February 18 <up to the ofEensive launched by the German imperialists) as the period of the triumphal march of Soviet power. The Soviets triumphed quickly because the masses, while the Provisional Government was still in power, had lost faith in the Kerensky regime owing to its policy of compromise with the bourgeoisie. The decisions of the Second Congress of Soviets, the decrees of the Soviet government, the manifestoes and appeals issued b\' the Bolshevik Party and Lenin’s speeches and newspaper articles were therefore welcomed by the masses with tremendous enthusiasm.

Speaking at a meeting of the Moscow Soviet on March 12, 1918, Lenin said:

“Soviet power has not only been established in the big towns and factory districts, it has penetrated to all the remote comers of the country” (V. I. Lenin, Collected WorJcs, Vol. XXII, Moscow, 1937, Euss. ed., p. 381).

In the villages around industrial districts, Soviet power was organized by factory workers; in the non- industrial districts it was organized by the poorer peasants and Bolshevik-minded soldiers returned from the front. The latter brought Bolshevik newspapers with them, held village meetings at which they explaiaed the tasks facing the Soviets in power, and under their direction new elections to the Soviets were held.

At the end of December 1917, the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs issued an order abolishing all the former local govern- ment bodies and replacing them by Soviets.

The Defeat of Kaledin and Dutov

At the very beg inn ing of the October Eevolution a geographical demarcation of a kind between the revolution and the counter-revolution was to be ob- served. As Comrade Stalin wrote: “Inner Eussia with her industrial, cultural and political centres — Moscow and Petrograd, with a nation- ally homogeneous, mainly Eussian, population, has become the base of the revolution. The outlying regions of Eussia, on the other hand, mainly the Southern and Eastern regions, with no important industrial and cultural and political centres, with a population extremely diverse nationally and consisting of privileged Cossack colonizers on the one hand, and disfranchised Tatars, Bashkirs, Kirghiz (in the East), Ukrainians, Chechens, Ingushes and other Moslem peoples on the other — has become the base of the counter-revo- lution” (Lenin and Stalin, Selected Works ^ Vol. II, Euss. ed., p. 276),

This demarcation was distinctly visible in the counter-revolu- tionary operations of General Dutov in Orenburg and of Kaledin on the Don.

The Cossacks had long played the part of colonizers in the Oren- burg territory. The conditions of the Eussian settlers, “strangers” as they were called, and particularly of the native inhabitants — Kirghiz, Bashkirs, Tatars and Kazakhs — were extremely hard. The Provisional Government permitted the Cossacks in Orenburg to set up a Cossack Eegional Eepresentative Assembly, which still further helped to transform the Cossacks into an exclusive, privileged mili- tary caste. After capturing Orenburg, Chelj^abinsk and Troitsk, General Dutov planned to establish contact with the counter-revolutionary forces in Siberia and the Urals ^ and with those in the Don and the Kuban via the Volga Kegion. This was a plan for the military encir- clement and economic isolation of Soviet Russia so as to cut her off from the rich grain and other produce regions.

The workers of Orenburg sent a deputation to Lenin and Stalin to ask for assistance in the fight against Dutov. Accordingly^ detachments of sailors were sent from Petrograd, and workers’ Red Guard units were sent from the Volga Region and the South Urals. An active part in defeating Dutov was played by the native in-- habitants, particularly the Kazakhs and the Kirghiz. The rich feudal elements among these nationalities, who were organized in the nation- alist party known as Allash, actively supported Dutov.

In the beginning of December 1917, a congress was held in Orenburg of representatives of the bourgeois and feudal elements oi Kazakhstan. At this congress the Allash party set up a counter- revolutionary Kazakh government known as the Allash Orda, which co-operated with General Dutov in his struggle against the Soviets. At the end of December 1917, Dutov ’s forces were routed by the Red Guard, and in January 1918, Orenburg became a Soviet city.

Similar defeats awaited the Cossack counter-revolution in the Don and Kuban Regions . The Don Region had become a refuge for the counter-revolution since the Kornilov mutiny and particu- larly so after the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution. It was here that Kornilov, Denikin and the other generals had fled.

On learning that Soviet power had been established in Petro- grad, the Ataman of the Don Cossacks, Kaledin, proclaimed the independence of the Don Region and prepared for war against the Soviets. Counter-revolutionary officer units were formed, which went to make up the Whiteguard Volunteer Army that was commanded by Generals Kornilov and Denikin. In December 1917, Kaledin cap- tured Rostov and prepared for a march into the Donetz coal basin.

Kaledin received considerable assistance from the Ukrainian Central Rada, which sent him arms, ammunition and money, and while allowing detachments of army cadets and Cossacks to pass through its territory, refused to allow Red Guard units fi'om the North to go through to flght Kaledin.

To help the workers of the Donetz Basin in their struggle against Kaledin, Red Guard detachments were sent from Soviet Russia. Cossacks home from the front and the poorer Cossack farmers who demanded land and peace also rose against Kaledin. At the end of December, a congress of Cossacks who had served at the front, representing forty-six regiments, was held at Kamenskaya, at which a Don Eevolutionary Military Committee was set up, headed by tho Cossack Podtyolkov. This Revolutionary Military Committee recognized the Soviet government and called upon working Cos- sacks to fight Kaledin, Backed by the revolutionary Cossacks, the Red Guards launched an offensive against Novocherkassk and Rostov, The officer and cadet units sent against them by Kaledin were defeated.

Realizing that his position was hopeless, Elaledin committed suicide. At the end of February 1918, the Red forces occupied Rostov and Novocherkassk. Soviet power was established in the Don Region.

The remnants of the White forces commanded by General Kor- nilov fled to the Kuban, where they hoped to obtain the assistance of the counter-revolutionary Cossack Kuban Rada; but by this time Soviet power was being established in the Kuban Region.

On March 14, 1918, Kuban Red Guard forces dislodged the forces of the Kuban Rada from Ekaterinodar, The remnants of the Kuban counter-revolutionary forces fled beyond the river Kuban, and power in Ekaterinodar passed over to the Revolutionary Military Com- mittee,

When Kornilov learned of the flight of the Rada from Ekate- rinodar he went to the assistance of the Kuban counter-revolutionaries. On the way his bandit troops robbed and murdered the peasant ‘"strangers” andthe Cossack poor; his line of march was strewn with corpses. Kornilov united all the counter-revolutionary detachments under his own command and on April 11 launched an offensive against Ekaterinodar. The town was defended by Red Guards and the entire working population. The assault, which lasted three days, was repulsed. The Whiteguards were defeated. Kornilov was killed. The remnants of the Whiteguards, under the command of Denikin, fled. Soviet power became firmly established in the Kuban Region.

The Fight to Establish Soviet Power in North Caucasus

After the victory of the October Revolution in Petrograd, the upper strata of the Don and Terek Cossacks concluded an alliance with the Chechens, the rich highlanders of Daghestan, to prevent the establishment of Soviet power in the Cossack and mountain regions of North Caucasus. This alliance between the Cossack upper strata and the feudal highland rulers, however, found no support among the masses. There w^as a long-standing enmity between the North Caucasian highlanders and the Cossack colonizers over the land- The “strangers,” i, e., the landless Russian peasants who had set- tled in North Caucasus and did not belong to the Cossack caste, also waged a struggle against the uj)per strata of the Cossacks.

The situation was exceptionally tense in the Terek Region with its extremely diverse population. Of a total of 1.200,000 inhabitants in the Terek Eegion, the Cossacks niunhered only 150,000, the peas- ant ‘"strangers” 300,000, while the rest constituted the small highland peoples. The Cossacks owned on the average eleven hectares of the best land per head, whereas whole villages of highlanders lived on land rented from the Cossacks. Many of the Cossack stanitsas had only recently belonged to the highlanders, whom the tsarist author- ities had evicted and had forced into the rocky mountain gorges. Before the revolution, the highlanders were almost regarded as out- laws. It was no crime to kill a highlander on Cossack land. The tsarist authorities constantly incited the highland peoples against each other, particularly Christians against Moslems.

The February revolution did scarcely anything to relieve the ten- sion in North Caucasus. After the victory of the Great October Social- ist Eevolution the local aristocratic army officers incited the highland peoples to fight the Soviets.

An extremely important part in the struggle for Soviet power in this complicated situation was played by S. M. Kirov, who returned to Vladikavkaz after the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets. He travelled from village to village explaining to the people the laws which had been passed by the Soviet Congress on coming to power, and organizing the highland poor for the struggle against the eounter-revolution. The working folk among the Cossacks and highlanders were not yet ready for the immediate establishment of Soviet power. There were no Soviets yet among the highland peoples, only so-called National Councils existing.

In February 1918, a People's Soviet for the Terek Region was •set up on the recommendation of S. M, Kirov, and this Soviet con- vened in Pyatigorsk a congress of all the nationalities of the region. In spite of the provocative work of the counter-revolutionaries, peace was solemnly proclaimed at this congress, which was guided by S. M. Kirov, between ail the peoples of Terek.

The congress passed a resolution moved by Bolsheviks recog- nizing the authority of the Council of People 's Commissars and sent a telegram of greetings to Lenin.

Four days later the Regional People’s Congress moved from Pyatigorsk to Vladikavkaz, the centre of the Terek Region and there elected the Terek Council of People’s Commissars, headed by the Bolshevik Noy Buachidze.

By the spring of 1918, Soviet power was established in all parts of the Russian “Cossack Vendee” — in the Don, Kuban and Terek Regions.

The Struggle for Soviet Power in Siberia

In the large ■centres of Siberia — Omsk, Tomsk, Novonikolayevsk (now Novo- sibirsk) and others — ^power passed into the hands of the Soviets in the early days of November 1917 (old style). The Soviets had to conduct a struggle against the counter-revolutionar 3 " organizations of the “^regionalists, ” who demanded the formation of an independent Siberian region, and also of the Socialist-Revolution- aries and kulaks. In December 1917, the “regionalists'’ gathered at an extraordinary All-Siberian Congress at which it was decided to convene a Siberian Constituent Assembly in March 1918, and before that to convene a Siberian Regional Duma.

In the early part of February the Duma delegates began to gather in Tomsk, but here part of them were arrested by the local Soviet by order of the Central Executive Committee of Soviets of Siberia (Tsentrosibir). The delegates who remained at large formed an underground counter-revolutionary Provisional Siberian Govern- ment.

In January and February Soviet power was also established in the remoter regions of Siberia — in the majority of districts in the Transbaikal Region, and in the northern districts of the Tobolsk Gubernia.

At the end of February 1918, the Second All-Siberian Congress of Soviets was held at which a new Central Executive Committee of Soviets (Tsentrosibir) was elected, headed by Bolsheviks. Soviet power prevailed over the whole of Siberia.

Dispersion of the Constituent Assembly

The Constituent Assembly became the watchword of the bourgeois counter-revolu- tion, which rose up to fight the Great October Socialist Revo- lution. In opposition to the slogan of “All power to the Soviets” the bourgeoisie and its agents, the Mensheviks and the Socialist- Revolutionaries, issued the slogan of “All power to the Constit- uent Assembly!” On November 29 (December 12), 1917, the Soviet government issued a decree ordering the arrest of the members of the Central Committee of the Cadet (Constitutional-Democratic) Party as enemies of the people.

The Soviet authorities did not hinder the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, since the j)6asants had to be given an opportunity of outliving illusions they had about it. The elections to the Constituent Assembly resulted in a majority for the Socialist-Revolutionaries: of the 715 seats they secured 412, while the Bolsheviks won only 183, all the other parties receiving an insignificant number of seats. Actually, however, not only did the Right-wing Socialist-Revolutionary majority in the Constitu- ent Assembly not reflect the real relation of forces in the coimtry. It did not even represent the actual relation of forces within the Socialist-Revolutionary Party itself. The elections to the Constituent Assembly took place in November, after Soviet power had been established, whereas the lists of candidates for election to the Assembly had been drawn up before the victory of the revolution. During the period between the nominations and the elections the Socialist-Revolutionary party had split, but the peasants and soldiers who supported the “Left” Socialist-Revolutionaries had to vote for the general Socialist-Revolutionary ticket.

On December 13 (26), 1917, Lenin published his “Theses on the Constituent Assembly” in which he pointed out that the masses of the people were demanding that the Constituent Assembly should recog- nize the power of the Soviets and the major decrees on peace, land and workers’ control.

The Constituent Assembly w^as opened on January 5 (18), 1918, by Yakov Mikhailovich Sverdlov on behalf of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. Sverdlov read the Declaration of Rights of the Toiling and Exploited People, drawn up by Lenin and Stalin. The Declaration called upon the Constituent Assembly to proclaim Russia a Soviet Republic, to abolish the private ownership of land and to endorse ail the Soviet laws. The Constituent Assembly, however, rejected the declaration, whereupon the Bolsheviks declared that the Constit- uent Assembly “expresses the yesterday of the revolution,” that they had no desire to cover up the crimes of the enemies of the people and were leaving the Assembty. After the Bolsheviks left, followed by the “Left” Socialist-Revolutionaries, the x^roceedings soon ter- minated. At 4 a. m. a sailor named Zheleznyakov walked up to Cher- nov, the Chairman of the Assembly, and said: “The guards are tired. It*s time to close.” The Deputies filed out of the hall. On January 6, 1918, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee issued a decree proclaiming the Constituent Assembly dissolved.

The workers and peasants unanimously approved of the disper- sion of what they called the “Constitute,” for they saw that the Constituent Assembly wanted to hand power back to the capital- ists and landlords.

Delegates to a Peasant Congress then in session, when asked to indicate their attitude to the Constituent Assembly gave the following written answers: “I place no hopes in the Constituent Assembly,” “The soldiers have no confidence in the Constituent Assembly and expect nothing good from it,” “Confidence in the Constituent Assembly has been shaken,” and so on.

The Third Congress of Soviets

The Great October Revolu- tion in Russia took place at the time when the war on the Western Front had entered an acute stage. This explains why the Soviet state at first gained what Lenin called a sort of temporary independ- ence of international relations. Without the backing of the foreign imperialists the forces of the enemies of the proletarian dictatorship XDroved to be impotent. At that time, as Lenin said “. . . the Civil War was one unbroken triumph for Soviet power because its enemies, the exploiters, the landlords and the bourgeoisie, had no political or economic support whatever. ...” (V. 1. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. XXII, Moscow, 1937, Russ, ed., p. 390.)

The broad results of the triumphal march of Soviet power in the country were summed up by the Third All-Russian Congress of Soviets that was held in January’- 1918. The congress adopted the Decla- ration of Rights of the Toiling and Exploited People, drawn up by Lenin in conjunction with Stalin, which stated: “Russia is hereby proclaimed a Republic of Soviets of Workers", Soldiers’ and Peasants’ Deputies. All power, centrally and locally, belongs to these Soviets.”

The Third Congress confirmed all the decrees issued by the Soviet authorities laying the foundation of the new Soviet Socialist State and confirmed the point that the main task of the Soviet State was to abolish all exploitation of man by man, to build socialist society in Russia and to fight for the victory of Socialism in all countries.

After a report delivered by Comrade Stalin, the congress proclaimed that “the Soviet Russian Republic is established on the basis of the free union of free nations as a federation of Soviet national republics.” The formation of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (R.S.F.S.R.) ensured the free and voluntary, and therefore close and durable, alliance of the working people of all the formerly oppressed nations in Russia.

The Third All-Russian Congress of Soviets is of enormous im- portance in the history of the Soviet State, for it consolidated its socialist foundations.

Soviet Power Brings Liberation to the Oppressed Nations

Recognition of the Independence of Finland

The bourgeois “National Councils” and regional bourgeois “governments” that were set up before the Great October Socialist Revolution wanted to preserve the bourgeois order and therefore declared war on the Soviet government.

The workers and peasants in the non-Russian regions, having under the leadership and with the assistance of the Russian workers set up Soviets of Workers’ and Peasants* Deputies, launched a struggle to establish Soviet power in the non-Russian regions as well.

Among the first to start this struggle for power was the working class of Finland. But the treacherous Right-wing of the Finnish Social- Democratic Party surrendered power to the bourgeoisie. The Finnish Sejm sanctioned the formation of the reactionary government headed by Svinhuvud. An extraordinary congress of the Social-Democratic Party was called to settle the issue of power.

On November 14 (27), 1917, J. V. Stalin, then People’s Commissar of Nationalities, addressed this congress and after greeting the workers of Finland explained the program of the Soviet State on the national question. The Soviet government guaran- teed the independence of Finland. "'Complete freedom^” proclaimed Comrade Stalin, ""for the Finns, as well as for all the other nation- alities of Eussia, to arrange their lives in their own way. A volun- tary and honest alliance of the Finnish people with the Eussian people I No tutelage, no supervision from above, over the Finnish people!” (Lenin and Stalin^ 1917, Selected Writings and Speeches, Moscow, 1938, p. 659.) He called upon the workers of Finland to follow the uxample of the Eussian workers, and promised them the fraternal assistance of the Soviet Eepublic.

• The congress, however, being controlled by the opportunists, did not decide in favour of the seizure of power by the working class of Finland, With the aid of the Finnish Social-Democrats, the bourgeoisie consolidated its rule. The bourgeois majority in the Finnish Sejm voted in favour of secession from Eussia.

In December 1917, the Council of People’s Commissars issued a decree recognizing the independence of the Finnish Eepublic, thus demonstrating that the Soviet government really stood for the right of nations to self-determination, including secession as state entities.

The Struggle to Establish Soviet Power in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia

The working people in the Baltic coimtries greeted the October Eevolution with tremendous enthusiasm; the landlords and the bourgeoisie of those countries met it with hatred and fear.

The Lithuanian bourgeoisie wanted to separate Lithuania from Soviet Eussia and prevent the establishment of Soviet power there. In December 1917, the Lithuanian National Council (Tary- ba), of which the reactionary landlord Smetona was President, pro- claimed the independence of the Lithuanian state. Taking advantage of the fact that Lithuania had been occupied by German troops dur- ing the war, the National Council appealed to the Kaiser for assistance in combating the Bolshevik revolution, and expressed readiness to enter into a military , economic and customs union with Germany. Thus, the bourgeois Lithuanian Eepublic was formed with Vilna as its capital; but the real masters in Lithuania were the German military author- ities who were backed by the Lithuanian landlords and the bourgeoisie .

In the unoccupied part of Latvia, Soviet power was established in October (November) 1917. An important role during the Octo- ber days was played by the Lettish Eifleswho took an active part in the proletarian revolution. They occupied the railway junctions in Latvia and prevented troops being sent from the front to help Keren- sky. But Soviet rule in Latvia was short-lived. Terrified by the prole- tarian revolution, the Latvian bourgeoisie and landlords appealed to the German authorities to send troops into the part of Latvia where Soviet power had been established. The request was fulfilled b^r the German imperialists.

In Estonia the proletarian revolution took place immediately after the victory of the armed insurrection in Petrograd. All power passed into the hands of the All-Estonian Soviet of Workers’, Peas- ants’, Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Deputies. With the establishment of Soviet power in Estonia the land and factories were nationalized. This victory of the Soviets in Estonia greatly" facilitated the success of the October fighting in Petrograd, for the Soviet authorities in Estonia i3revented the dispatch of troops from the front to assist Kerensky. In the middle of November 1917, the Estonian National Sejm, which had become a centre of the counter-revolution, was dissolved, whereupon, the Estonian bourgeoisie and the Baltic barons prepared for a coup d^Etat. They appealed to the German military authorities, who as early as September 1917 had occupied a number of Estonian islands, to occupy Estonia itself. Thus com-- menced the German occupation of the whole of Estonia.

The Struggle to Establish Soviet Power in the Ukraine

As Comrade Stalin has stated, in the border regions the Great October Socialist Revolution encountered a barrier in the shape of the ‘'Na- tional Councils” and regional “governments” that had been set up before the October Revolution. “The revolution, which started in the centre,” he wrote, “could not long be confined to this narrow territory. Once having triumphed in the centre, it was bound to spread to the border regions. And, indeed, from the very first days of the seizure of power, the revolutionary wave spread from the North all over Russia, sweeping over one border region after another. But here it struck a dam in the form of the ‘National Coimcils’ and regional ‘governments’ (Don, Kuban, Siberia) which had come into being before the October Revo- lution. The fact is that these ‘national governments’ would not hear of a socialist revolution. Bourgeois by nature, they had not the slightest intention of destroying the old bourgeois world; on the contrary, they considered it their duty to preserve and consolidate it by every means in their power. Essentially imperialist, they had not the slightest intention of breaking with imperialism; on the contrary, they were never averse to seizing and subjugating bits and morsels of ‘foreign’ nationalities whenever opportunity offered. No wonder that the ^na- tional governments’ in the border regions declared war on the socialist government in the centre. And, once they had declared war, they naturally became centres of reaction attracting all that was counter- revolutionary in Russia” (J. Stalin, Marxism arid the National arid Colonial Question^ Moscow, 1940, p, 63).

After the October Revolution the Ukrainian Central Rada be- came a bulwark of the bourgeois counter-revolution. On learning that power in Russia had passed into the hands of the Soviets it passed a resolution refusing to recognize the Soviet State and declaring that all attempts to establish Soviet power in the Ukraine would he combated. It concluded an agreement with various Russian counter- revolutionary organizations and parties and proclaimed its loyalty to the "'Allies,” i, e., the Entente.

The masses of the workers and peasants in the Ukraine, however, were roused to enthusiasm by the news of the victory of the insur- rection in Petrograd and rose up to fight for the establishment of Soviet power. In Kiev, the workers, led by the Bolshevik Andrei Iva- nov, set up a Revolutionary Committee, which organized an insurrec- tion against the Provisional Government,

Just when the Kiev workers were on the point of victory, the Central Rada, which claimed to be neutral but was actually helping the troops of the Provisional Government, treacherously attacked the Kiev Soviet and seized power. The Rada concluded an alliance with Kaledin and allowed Cossack units to pass through its territory from the front to the Don. At the same time the Rada refused the right of passage to Soviet troops who were marching against Kaledin.

After exhausting all means of reaching a iDeaceful settlement of the conflict, the Soviet government, on December 4 (17), sent the Rada a categorical demand to stop assisting Kaledin. The Ukrainian workers and the poorer strata of the peasantry began to rise in revolt against the Rada.

On December 11 (24), 1917, an All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets was held which set up a Central Executive Committee; the latter set up the first Soviet government in the Ukraine. Troops from Soviet Russia were sent to the assistance of this government.

On January 16 (29), 1918, in answer to the call of the Bol- sheviks the workers in Kiev rose in amied insurrection against the Rada. During the fighting, which lasted several days, exceptional heroism was displayed by the workers employed in the Kiev .^senal, who, though surrounded and even after their ammunition, drink- ing water and provisions had run out, refused to surrender, and kept on fighting. The Rada inflicted cruel reprisals upon the ArsenaPs brave defenders. But Soviet troops were already approaching Kiev and, on January 27 (February 9), assisted by the Kiev workers who rose in revolt again, they captured the city. The Rada fled to .JZhitomir. Soviet power was established all over the Ukraine.

The Struggle to Establish Soviet power in Byelorussia

The fight to establish Soviet power in Byelorussia was waged by the revolutionary-minded masses of workers, peasants and soldiers at the front, led by the Bolsheviks. As soon as the first news of the October insurrection in Petrograd was received in Minsk, the Minsk Soviet seized power, liberated from pris- on all the soldiers whom the Kerensky government had arrested for ‘'political of- fences” and formedj^them into a revolutionary regiment.

The counter-revolution made an attempt to use Cos- sacks in order to crush the Minsk Soviet, but an armoured train and a regiment of soldiers arrived from the front and the Cos- sacks were beaten off. The Bolsheviks in Polesie, led by L. M. Kaganovich, established control over the movements of troop trains and held up and disarmed the Cossack contin- gents.

The Eleventh Congress of the Western Eront, which was held in Minsk in the latter half of November 1917, proclaimed the establish- ment of Soviet power in Byelorussia.

The Struggle to Establish Soviet Power in Transcaucasia

The population of Transcaucasia, numbering seven million, was made up of dozens of different nationalities. In the endeavour to keep the masses from taking part in the proletarian socialist rev- olution, the enemies of the revolution fomented strife among these nationalities. The Transcaucasian bourgeois nationalists — the Armenian Dashnacks, Azerbaijanian Mussavatists and the Georgian Mensheviks — ^who had got on very well with the Provisional Govern- ment, decided to secede from Russia as soon as Soviet power was established.

With this object in view they set up, on November 11 (24), 1917, a Transcaucasian Commissariat, which was a bloc of all the bour- geois parties to fight the Soviet State. Claiming to assert the inde- pendence of the Transcaucasian peoples, this Commissariat broke with Soviet Russia and concluded an alliance with the coun- ter-revolutionaries in the Don and Kuban Regions. The Transcau- casian Commissariat formally united Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, but actually each of these countries was ruled by its own National Council. Acute inter-national strife broke out among them. The Transcaucasian counter-revolution was led by the Georgian Mensheviks. The latter captured the Tiflis Arsenal and the premises and funds of the Regional Soviet of the Caucasian Army and began to form national units. They intended to arm these units with the weapons of the demobilized Caucasian Army. In January 1918, an armoured train, supported by armed gangs of Mussavatists, was sent to Shamkhor, where it fired on troop trains carrying soldiers home from the Caucasian Front. As a result of this treacherous onslaught 2,000 Russian soldiers were killed. The Shamkhor mas- sacre roused the most profound indignation and protest among the working people in Transcaucasia, but the Transcaucasian Commissariat retaliated to this by sterner measures of repression; it suppressed workers’ newspapers, arrested a number of Georgian Bolsheviks and broke up demonstrations.

On February 10, the workers and soldiers in Tifiis organized a huge meeting in the Alexander Park to protest against the counter-revo- lutionary activities of the Transcaucasian Commissariat. Armed detachments sent by the Mensheviks surrounded the meeting and shot down the miarmed workers with machine guns. That day the Transcaucasian Sejm which consisted of Menshevik, Dashnack, Mussa- vatist, Socialist-Revolutionary and Cadet members of the dispersed Constituent Assembly, was opened in Tifiis. White terror was intensified in Transcaucasia. Punitive expeditions were sent to suppress the peasant movement and thousands of peasants were shot down.

Unable to cope with the growing revolutionary movement the Transcaucasian ^‘national governments” appealed to the Western imperialists for assistance in crushing the workers and peasants.

Transcaucasia and the rich oil fields of Baku in particular had long attracted the West-European imperialists. The separation of Transcaucasia fk>m Russia and the rule of the bourgeois nationalists in that region now facilitated the seizure of Transcaucasia by the imperialists.

The Transcaucasian Sejm first opened negotiations with the Entente, but at that time the latter lacked the necessary forces to undertake such an operation. The Sejm then decided to strike a bargain with the German coalition and opened negotiations with Turkey. The Turks, however, backed by the Mussavatists, broke ofi these negotiations, seized Kars and Batum, and commenced a drive into the interior of Transcaucasia. Through the mediation of the Mussavatists, the Dashnacks and Mensheviks came to an arrangement with the German and Turkish imperialists, and on their demand, in April 1918, pro- C'laimed the “independence” of Transcaucasia.

But the British imperialists also had designs upon Transcaucasia, In the beginning of 1918, they sent a military expedition there through Persia. The head of this expedition enlisted the services of Russian army officers who had fled to Persia from Soviet Russia and began to make preparations to seize Baku.

The Baku Soviet of Workers’ Deputies, in which the Bolsheviks were in the majority, was the only Soviet in Transcaucasia that wel- comed the insurrection in Petrograd and refused to recognize the authority of the Transcaucasian Sejm. In a resolution passed in the beginning of March 1918, the Baku Soviet declared: ‘'The City of Baku must be transformed into a base for the struggle to establish Soviet rule in Transcaucasia.” This struggle was started &st of all against the bourgeois nationalist parties, the Mussavatists and Dashnacks, who were conducting provocative activities among the Azerbaijanians and among the Armenians in Baku. On March 18, the Mussavatists rose in revolt against Soviet rule, but the Baku workers, led by the veteran Bolshevik Stepan Shaumyan, crushed this counter-revolutionary uprising. Soviet rule was consolidated in Baku and the heroic Baku Commune was formed.

The Struggle to Establish Soviet Power in Central Asia

While the fighting in Petrograd was at its height the Bolsheviks in Tashkent began to prepare to seize power, but on October 28 (November 10), 1917, Cossacks and army cadets surrounded the Tashkent Soviet and arrested the members of the Revolutionary Committee. Sirens sounded the alarm and in response as many as 3,000 armed workers, Russians and Uzbeks, rallied to liberate the prisoners. An insurrection commenced. Cossacks and army cadets occupied the Tashkent fort and dispatched armoured cars against the city. The work- ers built barricades ‘ and barred their way. The fighting lasted for nearly four days. Uzbek and Kirghizian peasants came from the surrounding villages to help the workers.

On October 31 (November 13), 1917, after stubborn fighting, power passed into the hands of the Soviets- The members of the Revo- lutionary Committee were liberated from prison and the Soviet govern- ment of Turkestan was set up in Tashkent.

To combat Soviet rule in Central Asia, the bourgeois nation- alists and Russian Whiteguard colonizers, assisted by the British, set up in Kokand, in November 1917, a government of their own called the “Kokand Autonomy,” which started civil war in Central Asia. In February 1918, the Kokand “government” was liquidated by the Turkestan Red Guard, which consisted not only of urban workers — railwaymen and cotton warehousemen — ^but also of Uzbek, Kirghiz, Kazakh and Turkmen handicraftsmen and peasants.

The People’s Commissariat of Nationalities

In the very first days after the victory of the October Revolution a People’s Commissariat of Nationalities (Narkomnats) was formed to direct the struggle of the oppressed nationalities for their liberation and to give practical effect to the national policy of the Soviet State. The Narkomnats was headed by Comrade Stalin. It was faced with the enormous task of directing the political, economic and cultural growth of the non-Eussian nationalities, which, with a total pojDulation numbering 65,000,000, differed very widely in language, habits of life and in their level of cultural and political development.

In the beginning of 1918, Comrade Stalin, in the name of the Narkomnats, addressed a message to the Soviets of Kazan, Ufa, Orenburg and Ekaterinburg and to the Council of People’s Com- missars of the Turkestan Eegion, in which he explained the funda- mental aims of the Soviet State on the national question and outlined a complete program of action for rallying the masses around the Soviets. He proposed that the border regions should be given autonomy and that steps be taken forthwith to set up local schools and courts, local organs of power and local political and educational bodies, all to function in the native languages. The Soviets were to strengthen the alliance between the workers and peasants of the different nationalities and lead them to Socialism.

The People’s Commissariat of Nationalities did considerable u'ork in developing the national culture of the formerly oppressed nationalities, trained personnel to conduct work among them, published books and newspapers in their respective languages and set up schools and other educational institutions.

The Narkomnats was particularly energetic in protecting the interests of the national minorities who had been utterly down- trodden imder the old regime, such as the Yakuts, Nentsi, the peoples of the Volga Eegion, etc. On the suggestion of the Narkomnats the Council of People’s Commissars, in the summer of 1918, issued a decree calling for the ‘'uprooting of the anti-Semite movement.” Lenin wrote the following on the draft of the decree: "Pogrom- mongers and those conducting pogrom propaganda are to be outlawed.”

The Great October Socialist Eevolution razed to the ground that prison of the peoples — tsarist Eussia, laid a firm foundation for the alliance of the Eussian workers and peasants with the working, people of all the non-Eussian nationalities, awakened the most backward peoples of Eussia to political life and opened up to them the road to Socialism.

The policy of the Soviet State on the national question was of enormous international importance and exercised excep- tional infiuence upon the peoples of the Orient.

The Soviet government annulled all the imequal treaties which the tsar had concluded with Turkey and Persia and began to with- draw the troops from the regions which Eussian tsarism had occupied, such as Turkish Armenia, and others.

The struggle which the Soviet government waged for the inde- pendence of small nations gained for it the confidence of the formerly most backward and downtrodden nations.

The World-Historic Importance of the Great October Socialist Revolution

Reasons for the Victory of the October Revolution

The Great October Socialist Revolution was brought about by thfe working class and the poorest strata of the peasantry. The revolution was socialist in character. After overthrowing the exploiting classes, the proletariat set up the proletarian dictatorship in the shape of the Soviet State. The Soviet State set out to build complete socialist society in our country.

The great proletarian revolution smashed the chains of imperialism and overthrew the rule of the bourgeoisie with relative ease.

“There were several reasons for this comparatively easy victor^' of the socialist revolution in Russia. The following chief reasons should be noted:

“1) The October Revolution was confronted by an enemy so comparatively weak, so badly organized and so politically inexpe- rienced as the Russian bourgeoisie. Economically still weak, and completely dependent on government contracts, the Russian bourgeoi- sie lacked sufficient political self-reliance and initiative to find a way out of the situation. It had neither the experience of the Erenoh bour- geoisie, for example, in political combination and political chicanery on a broad scale, nor the schooling of the Britisli bourgeoisie in broadly conceived crafby compromise. It had but recently sought to reach an understanding with the tsar; yet now that the tsar had been over- thrown by the February revolution, and the bourgeoisie itself had come to power, it was unable to think of anything better than to continue the policy of the detested tsar in all its essentials. Like the tsar, it stood for Var to a victorious finish,’ although the war was beyond the country’s strength and had reduced the people and the army to a state of utter exhaustion. Like the tsar, it stood for the preservation in the main of big landed property, although the peasantry was perishing from lack of land and the weight of the landlords’ yoke. As to its labour policy, the Russian bourgeoisie outstripped even the tsar in its hatred of the working class, for it not only strove to preserve and strengthen the yoke of the factory owners, but to render it intolerable by wholesale lockouts.

“It is not surprising that the people saw no essential difference between the policy of the tsar and the policy of the bourgeoisie, and that they transferred their hatred of the tsar to the Provisional Govern- ment of the bourgeoisie.

“As long as the compromising Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshe- vik parties possessed a certain amount of influence among the people, the bourgeoisie could use them as a screen and preserve its power. But after the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries had exposed themselves as agents of the imperialist bourgeoisie, thus forfeiting their influence among the people, the bourgeoisie and its Provisional Government were left without a support.

“2) The October Revolution was headed by so revolutionarj" a class as the working class of Russia, a class which had been steeled in battle, which had in a short space passed through two revolutions, and which by the eve of the third revolution had won recognition as the leader of the people in the struggle for peace, land, liberty and Socialism. K the revolution had not had a leader like the working class of Russia, a leader that had earned the confidence of the people, there would have been no alliance between the workers and peasants, and without such an alliance the victory of the October Revolution would have been impossible.

“3) The working class of Russia had so effective anally in the revolution as the poor peasantry, which comprised the overwhelming majority of the peasant population. The experience of eight months of revolution — ^whioh may unliesitatingly be compared to the expe- rience of several decades of ‘normaP development — had not been in vain as far as the mass of the labouring peasants were concerned . During this period they had had the opportunity to test all the parties of Russia in practice and convince themselves that neither the Con- stitutional-Democrats nor the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Menshe- viks would seriously quarrel with the landlords or sacrifice themselves for the interests of the peasants; that there was only one party in Rus- sia — ^the Bolshevik Party — ^which was in no way connected with the landlords and which was prepared to crush the latter in order to satisfy the needs of the peasants. This served as a solid basis for the alliance of the proletariat and the poor peasantry. The existence of this alliance between the working class and the poor peasantry determined the conduct of the middle peasants, who had long been vacillating and only on the eve of the October uprising wholeheartedly swung over towards the revolution and joined forces with the poor peasants.

“It goes without saying that without this alliance the October Revolution could not have been victorious.

“4) The working class was headed by a party so tried and tested in political battles as the Bolshevik Party. Only a party like the Bol- shevik Party, courageous enough to lead the people in decisive attack, and cautious enough to steer clear of all the submerged rocks in its path to the goal, could so skilfully merge into one common revolu- tionary torrent such diverse revolutionary movements as the general democratic movement for peace, the peasant democratic movement for the seizure of the landed estates^ the movement of the oppressed nationalities for national liberation and national equality, and the socialist movement of the proletariat for the overthrow of the bourgeoi- sie and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

“Undoubtedly, the merging of these diverse revolutionary streams into one common powerful revolutionary torrent decided the fate of capitalism in Russia.

“5) The October Revolution began at a time when the imperialist war was still at its height, when the principal bourgeois states were split into two hostile camps, and when, absorbed in mutual war and undermining each other’s strength, they were unable to intervene effectively in ‘Russian affairs’ and actively to oppose the October Revolution.

“This undoubtedly did much to facilitate the victory of the October Socialist Revolution” (History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union [Bolsheviks], Short Course, Moscow, 1945, pp. 212-214).

The Significance of the October Revolution

The Great October Socialist Revolution is of enormous significance in the history of man- kind. It marked a radical turn from the old capitalist world to the new socialist world. It split the world into two opposite systems — the system of dying capitalism and the system of victorious and flourishing Socialism.

For first time in history, the Great October Socialist Revolu-* tion razed to the ground the old state machinery of the exploiting classes and built in its place a new type of state~the Soviets, as the state form of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

By depriving the bourgeoisie and the landlords of the means of production and converting the factories, the land, the railways and the banks into public property, the October Revolution put an end to the exploitation of the masses of the people, rid millions of workers of the horrors of unemployment, and millions of peasants from bond- age to the landlords and gradual extinction.

. The victory achieved in the establishment of Soviet power gave the people, for the first time in history, not only freedom, but also the possibility of assuring their material well-being, the opportu- nity to lead a happy, prosperous and cultured life.

The Great October Socialist Revolution brought freedom, for the first time in world history, to the oppressed nations and converted them into free and equal builders of Socialism. Thus it indicated to the enslaved colonial peoples the way to fight for their emancipation.

Before th3 October Revolution our country was in danger of becoming the prey of the predatory imperialists and of being reduced to the position of a dependent colonial country. The victory of the so- cialist revolution saved Russia from the danger of losing her inde- pendence as a state.

The emancipated workers and peasants and liberated nationalities inhabiting Russia became the arbiters of their own destiny. The So- viets rendered it possible for the widest masses of the people to take an active part in affairs of state. Proletarian democracy, which safeguards the vital interests of the majority of the people, w'as firmly established.

The Great October Socialist Revolution is a colossal triumph for the theory of Marxism-Leninism, and proved that when revolution- ary theory takes hold of the masses it becomes a mighty factor in the development of society.

Comrade Stalin wrote: . The victory oi the October Revolution

signifies a radical change in the history of mankind, a radical change in the historical destiny of world capitalism, a radical change in the liberation movement of the world proletariat, a radical change in the methods of struggle and the forms of organization, in the life and traditions, in the culture and ideology of the exploited masses through- out the world” (J. Stalin, Problems of Leninism^ Moscow, 1947, p. 19S).

The Brest-Litovsk Peace. The Struggle for a Respite

The Brest-Litovsk Peace

The Struggle to Extricate Russia from the Imperialist War

One of the most important tasks that confronted the young Soviet State was to extricate the country from the imperialist war and to Gontlude peace.

The Decree on Peace of October 26 (November 8), 1917, called on all the governments and peoples to terminate the war and conclude a just and democratic peace.

The governments of the Entente countries rejected the Soviet government’s proposal. They wanted at all costs to keep the Russian troops on the Eastern Front until the United States, which had entered the war against Germany, had transported her troops to Europe.

Kaiser Germany agreed to enter into peace negotiations in the hope of easing her military and food situation. On November 20 (December 3), 1917, peace negotiations were opened in Brest-Litovsk. At the conference, the Soviet delegation read out the Decree on Peace and proposed the conclusion of peace without annexations and indemnities. The German delegation accepted this proposal, stipulating, however, that peace without annexations and indemnities would only be possible if the Entente countries agreed to it. The Entente countries rejected the Soviet proposals. But when the Soviet delegation asked the Germans how far they would retire. General Hoffmann answered cynically: “Not a single millimetre.” The Soviet delegation suspended negotiations for a week and returned to Petro- grad. Lenin proposed that the negotiations be resumed in a neutral country, but the German imperialists rejected this proposal and presented predatory peace terms which included the surrender to Germany of the Moon Soimd Islands, the Gulf of Eiga and the city of Eiga, and also Poland, Lithuania and the parts of Latvia and Byelorussia which the Germans had captured during the war. The Soviet delegation protested against these terms, broke off negotiations and returned to Petrograd again.

The Soviet government was faced with* the alternative of conclud- ing peace with Kaiser Germany on the latter’s predatory terms or of resuming the war. But the newly established Soviet Republic was not in a condition to fight. A process of spontaneous demobilization was taking place at the front. The soldiers were making for home. The old army was breaking up, but no new army had yet been formed. Utterly worn out by the war, the masses of the working people were longing for peace and were unable to wage another war. On January S (21), 1918, at a joint meeting of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party and the Bolshevik delegates at the Third Congress of Soviets, Lenin read out his theses concerning the immediate conclusion of a separate peace with Germany. In his theses he showed that the Soviet Republic was not in a condition to continue the war. It would be sheer recklessness, he said, to make the fate of socialist Russia dependent on the possibility of an early revolution taking place in Germany at a date wiien nobody could foretell. The conclusion of peace, said Lenin, would not weaken but strength- en the Soviet Republic, for it would give the Soviet government a respite which it could utilize to strengthen the defences of the country and consolidate the power of the Soviets.

The Struggle Against the Trotsky-Bukharin Instigators of War

In its, struggle for peace the Bolshevik Party had to overcome the fu- rious resistance of the numerous enemies of Soviet power.

The Russian and foreign bourgeoisie and their servitors, the Men- sheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries, wanted to drag the unarmed Soviet Republic into . a war' with Germany in order to overthrow the rule of the Soviets. This aim was also , pursued by the enemies of So- cialism and traitors to their country, the Trotskyites and Bukharin- ites, who were, supported by the double-dealers Kamenev and Zinoviev. Concealing *his' -treach^ous designs, Trotsky, who was the head of the Soviet delegation^ in- Brest-Litovsk, conducted the negotiations in such, a way as to lead to a rupture. A delegation &om the Ukrainian Rada also arrived in Brest-Litovsk claiming to represent an independ- ent government, although, by that time the Rada had been driven out by the insurgent masses of the Ukraine. Trotsky recognized the competence of the "independent” Rada, and the German imperial- ists concluded a treaty with it, behind the backs of the Soviet delega- tion, on terms that meant the enslavement of the Ukraine. Having secured the support of the betrayers of the Ukrainian people the German Kaiser's government sharply changed its tone towards the Soviet delegation and presented an ultimatum demanding the accept- ance of its predatory terms.

In defiance of Lenin’s instructions to conclude peace without delay, Trotsky refused to sign the peace terms proposed by Germany, but at the same time declared that the Soviet Republic would not wage war and would demobilize her army. The German impe- rialists could not wish for anything better. The Land of Soviets was in mortal danger, but Bukharin and Trotsky continued with their provocative assertion that "the Germans will not dare to attack. ”

Lenin categorically insisted that the acceptance of the peace terms be telegraphed to Germany and in this he was supported by Stalin and Sverdlov. On February 18, while the Central Committee of the Bol- shevik Party was in session, a communication was received to the eflFect that at noon that day the Germans had launched an offensive along the whole front. The Central Committee adopted Lenin’s proposal to conclude peace with Germany forthwith, but the German imperial- ists were in no hurry to conclude peace as they wanted to seize as much Russian territory and war supplies as possible. They hurled against the Land of Soviets thirty divisions of infantry, cavalry and armoured cars. Some of the German divisions marched through Latvia and Estonia to Narva and threatened Petrograd, while others occupied Dvinsk and marched on Pskov in order to reach Petrograd from the southwest. By arrangement with the Ukrainian Rada, Austrian and German troops began at the same time to occupy the Ukraine.

On February 21, 1918, Lenin proclaimed the socialist fatherland in danger. The Council of People’s Commissars of the R.S.F.S.R. issued an appeal to the entire working population to rally to the defence of the socialist fatherland against the invasion of the German aggressors, whose aim was to enslave the workers and peasants and restore the capitalist system. Red Army detachments were formed in all parts of the Soviet land.

At Pskov and Narva the German army encountered the heroic resistance of the first units of the young Red Army.

While oi^anizing the defence of the country amidst extremely difficult conditions, Lenin and Stalin called upon the working class of Petrograd to be vigilant and to wage a ruthless struggle against enemies who were trying to organize a revolt in Petrograd and to capture the capital. The German army’s offensive was halted. February 23, the day on which the Red Army repulsed the troops of German imperialism has since then been celebrated in the U.S.S.R. as Red Army Day.

On March 3, 1918, the Soviet delegation signed the peace treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the terms of which were even more harsh than those which Germany had proposed at the beginning of the negotiations. By this treaty Soviet Russia withdrew from Finland, Lithuania, Latvia and part of Byelorussia. It had to conclude peace with the Ukrainian Central Rada, demobilize the army and navy and pay Ger- many an enormous indemnity. At this time Turkey seized Kars and Batum.

The act of provocation committed by Trotsky and Bukharin jeopardized the very existence of the Soviet Republic. As Lenin wrote, the Trotsky ites and Bukharinites ‘‘actually lielfed the Ger- man imperialists and hindered the growth and development of the revolution in Germany” (V. I. Lenin, Selected, Worhs^ Two-Vol. ed., Vol, II, Moscow, 1947, p. 287). The German imperialists gained control of a vast territory covering almost a million square kilome- tres, equal in area to that of Germany and France put together. Over forty million Ukrainians, Letts, Estonians, Byelorussians and Lithuanians found themselves under the heel of German im- perialism.

Ratification of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty

Another fierce struggle flared up over the question of ratifying the peace treaty. The Trotsky and Bukharin gang of warmongers entered into a conspiracy with the Right and “Left” Socialist-Revolutionaries and organized a coun- ter-revolutionary plot with the object of preventing the ratification of the Brest-Litovsk Peace, of overthrowing the Soviet government and of arresting and killing Lenin, Stalin and Sverdlov. This mon- strous plot was uncovered only twenty years later.

The Seventh Congress of the Party (March 6-8, 1918) denoimced the subversive and disruptive activities of the Communists”

and ratified the peace treaty that had been signed in Brest-Litovsk.

On March 14, the Extraordinary Fourth Congress of Soviets was convened to ratify the peace treaty. At this congress the Men^eviks and the Right and “Left” Socialist-Revolutionaries formed a united front against Lenin. They were supported by the Trotsky ites and Bukharinites. How ver, the enemies of Soviet rule sustained another defeat. The Congress of Soviets approved the policy of gaining a req)ite, ratified the peace treaty and called upon the working people to mobilize all forces to defend their socialist fatherland and strengthen its defences.

In view of tiie military tlu'eat resulting from the invasion of the Baltic countries and Finland begun by the Geimaii imiDerial- ists, the congress resolved to transfer the seat of government from Petrograd to IMoscow, which thus became the capital.

The Struggle of the Soviet People against the German Occupation Forces in 1918

The Fight Against the German Invaders in the Ukraine

According to the terms of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty Germany was to cease hostilities against Soviet Russia; but the German imperialists, having concluded a separate peace treaty with the Central Rada, sent as many as 300,000 Austrian and German soldiers to the Ukraine and the Don Region. The German invaders needed the Ukraine for its rich re- sources of raw materials and food. They counted , on crossing the Ukraine so as to reach the Donetz coal fields, and on crossing the Don and Kuban to reach Transcaucasia and the oil fields of Baku. German imperialism particularly needed to seize the Ukraine as a base from which to war against the Soviet regimej to dismember the Land of Soviets.

In an article he wrote on March 14, 1918, entitled “The Ukrainian Knot,” Comrade Stalin wrote of the mortal danger that threatened Soviet Ukraine and called on the Ukrainian people to wage a pa- triotic war for liberation against the German invaders. “The imperial- ists of Austria and Germany he wrote, “are carrying on their bayo- nets a new shameful yoke which is not one whit better than the old Tatar yoke — such is the significance of the invasion from the West. Evidently this is felt by the Ukrainian are feverishly

preparing to offer resistance. The formation of a peasant army, the mobilization of the Workers’ Red Guard, a number of successful clashe.^ with the “civilized” violators after the first flashes of panic, the recapture of Bakhmaeh, Konotop and Nejin, and the approach to Kiev, the evergrowing enthusiasm of the masses who are rushing in thousands into the battle against the enslavers — such is the response of the people of the Ukraine to the invasion of the violators.

“Against the foreign yoke that is coming from the West, Soviet Ukraine is rising to wage a patriotic war of liberation — such is the significance of the events that are developing in the Uloraine” (J. Stalin, Articles and S'peeches on tlie Ukraine^ Kiev, 1936, Russ, ed., pp. 40-41).

On February 22, 1918, the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of the Xlkrame issued an appeal to the people to fight the Ger- man invaders. The aiDpealread: “Organize partisan units, blow up bridges, railways and roads; if yon are forced to retreat, carry off or de- stroy grain stocks and everjrthing that may be useful to the hungry rob- ber hordes. . . Let the violators know that they will meet with determined resistance everywhere along their path. Let them know that only over our dead bodies will they enter the capital of the Ukraine.”

In Kiev and other cities Defence Committees and Emergency Defence Staffs were formed. The weak Ked Guard units doggedly resist- ed the powerful armoured forces of the German army and held them at bay near Kiev for three whole days, but it was an imequal battle, and on March 1 Kiev fell to the Germans. The German army marched on to Kharkov and the Donetz Basin in one direction, and to the industrial centres of South Ukraine in another.

Along their entire line of advance — ^fipom the frontiers furthest west to the northern frontiers' of the Ukraine, on the borders of tlie Voronezh and Kursk Gubernias, and in the East, on the borders of the Don Begion — ^the Austrian and (Jerman troops encountered the determined armed resistance of the Ukrainian workers and peasants who were backed by the fraternal Bussian people.

The foreign invaders were fought by detachments of the Bed Guards consisting of workers from all the industrial centres of the Ukraine. Gradually, the numerous Bed Guard detachments were formed into five Ukrainian armies. The Central Executive Committees of the Ukraine, the Donetz-Krivoi Bog Soviet Eepublic, which had been formed in the Donetz Basin, the Don and Crimea Soviet Republics resolved to combine their forces to wage a joint struggle against the German imperialists. Red Guard detachments from Moscow, Petrograd and other big Russian towns were sent to assist the Ukraine.

The resistance to the German invaders in the Ukraine was organ- ized by K. E. Voroshilov, who at that time was one of the leaders of the Ukrainian Bolsheviks. With the assistance of the veteran Bolshe- vik Artyom (Sergeyev), Voroshilov united a number of partisan detach- ments and formed the Fifth Ukrainian Army. When the Germans had seized the Ukraine he determined to fight his way through to Tsa- ritsyn to unite with the Red Army. For six weeks the Fifth Ukrain- ian Army fought its way forward through the Cossack Don Region. When the column reached the Cossack stanitsa of Chirskaya it was found that the Whiteguards had blown up the bridge across the Don. Voroshilov ordered the bridge to be repaired. To do this it was neces- sary to fill the river bed at one point with sand, stones and earth, and build huge trestle supports of railway sleepers. When the comrade who proposed the plan was asked how much earth would be required to fill the river bed he said, pointing to a tall hill situated about two kilometres from the bank: “See that hill over there? It’ll have to be dragged to the Don.” They set to, and, undsr fire from the Cossacks, without carts or special implements to help them, carried the earth to the river in baskets. Somewhat later assistance arrived in the shape of the carts of peasants who were retreating with the partisans. The bridge was built and the army proceeded on its way to Tsaritsyn.

In the Ukraine the Central Rada, headed by Petliura, was rein'- stated in power, but shortly after, in April 1918, the Rada government was overthrown on the demand of the German authorities, and Pavel Skoropadsky, a big landlord and tsarist General, was proclaimed Hetman, or ruler, of the Ukraine.

The Germans established a colonial regime of plunder in the ter- ritory they occupied. The German military authorities possessed unlim- ited power in the Ukraine. Field courts-martial were set up ev- erywhere which ordered the shooting of non-combatants on the slightest suspicion of sympathy with the Soviets* The Ger- mans carried through the wholesale extermination of the popula- tion. Thousands upon thousands of workers and iDeasants were shot, hanged or sent to concentration camps. All the prisons were crammed. The inspector of the Petrakov Elementary School reported to the Ekaterinoslav Zemstvo administration the following: “Instruction in the school of which I am in charge has ceased because a punitive expedition hanged and shot several persons right outside the doors and windows of the school, leaving iie bodies lying here for three days.”

In many towns and villages the Gterman military authorities put up the following warning: “For every German soldier who is killed or wounded the first ten Russian soldiers or inhabitants that are caught will be shot forthwith.”

Trainloads of plundered property were sent from the Ukraine and the Don Region to Germany. The German invaders established a sanguinary regime of requisition and plunder. The peasants were robbed of their land, grain stocks, cattle, food stocks, farm implements and domestic furniture and utensils.

The German invaders wrecked the entire industry of the Ukraine. They closed down factories and mills and transported the machinery to Germany. Unemployment was rampant in all the towns in the occupied territory. Famine and epidemics raged over this once bounteous land. Those who were employed were forced to work twelve to fourteen hours a day. The workers were driven from the apartments they had received under Soviet rule and compelled to live in cold and filthy barracks. Tens of thousands were forcibly driven to Germany to work in the coal mines or on the farms of the big landlords.

With the German troops came the Ukrainian, Polish and Russian landlords. The Hetman reintroduced forced labour for the peasants, compelling them to harvest the crops on the landlords* land. Puni- tive expeditions consisting of the sons of kulaks flogged and shot peas- ants on the reports of reactionary clergymen and kulaks. Heavy contri- butions were imposed on villages and towns. During the rule of the. Hetman nearly 250,000 tons of grain and over 50,000 tons of sugar were transported to Germany, and during the whole period of German occupation 37,000 carloads o£ provisions and goods of various kinds were taken out of the Ukraine. Tkere were hundreds of thousands of unemployed in the Ukraine. Owing to starvation and epidemics the death rate increased enormously.

Tne Party led by Lenin and Stalin organized a people’s war against the German invaders. Underground Bolshev.k organizations were formed all over the Ukraine and insurgent Military Staff Head- quarters and Revolutionary Committees were organized. Tne whole of the Ukrainian people — ^the miners of the Donetz Basin, the workers of Kharkov, Nikolayev and Odessa, and the peasants of the Kiev, Poltava and Chernigov Gubernias — rallied to defend their native Soviet land. Within a short space of time, in nearly all parts of the Ukraine, innumerable partisan detachments were formed, made up of factory workers, miners and village folk. The partisans made sudden raids upon enemy garrisons and captured arms. The Germans sent punitive detachments armed with artillery and machine guns against the partisans but the latter were not to be caught. Dislodged from one locality they appeared in another, and everywhere they received the assistance of the working people.

One of the famous heroes in this patriotic war against the German yoke in the Ukraine was Nikolai Shchors, the son of a Ukrainian rail- way worker. Tne partisans ied by Shchors exterminated small German units engaged in plundering the peasants, and hindered in every way the movements of German troops. Tne Germans sent a large force against Shchors, but he retreated to the borders of Soviet Russia where he formed a regiment named after the Cossack Bogun, a comrade-in-arnosof Bogdan Chmielnicki who fought for the liberation of the Ukraine in the seventeenth century. The Bogun Regiment commanded by Shchors covered itself with undying glory.

Insurrections broke out in different parts of the Ukraine. A pop- ular movement flared up. In the towns strikes broke out. In July, a general railwaymen’s strike was declared and the railways were brought to a standstill. The invaders crushed the strike with the utmost cruelty and sent many of its leaders to concentration camps in Germany. In spite of this, however, the workers’ and peasants’ movement against the German invaders continued to grow.

The Fight Against the Germans in the Crimea

In April 1918, the Ge^’inan imperialists invaded the Crimea with the object of en- trenching themselves on the Black Sea coast. The well-armed German troops seized the Crimea, after meeting the feeble resistance offered by the newly formed Red Guard. The most stubborn and courageous resistance to the invaders was put up by the sailors of the Black Sea Fleet. To avoid falling into the hands of the German imperialists, who had occupied Sevastopol, the Soviet Black Sea Fleet retired to Novorossiisk — ^the centre of the Kuban-Black Sea Soviet Republic. Claiming that it was so stipulated in the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the German imperialists called for the surrender of the Black Sea Fleet. Lenin realized that the Kuban-Black Sea government would be unable to save the fleet, so he sent the Black Sea sailors the following secret order: "Sink the fleet. Don’t surrender it to the enemies of the revolution.” The revolutionary sailors obeyed Lenin’s order. The torpedo boats sank, with the last signal flying at their mast- heads: “I perish but do not surrender.” The battleship Svobodnaya Rossiya was sunk by three torpedoes fired at her by the revolutionary torpedo boat Kerch, In the morning of June 9, the Kerch herself sank after sending out her last radio message: “To all! To all! To all! I perish after sinking part of the Black Sea Fleet, which preferred death to shameful surrender.” After sinking part of the fleet the Black Sea sailors went to the front, joining the ranks of the Red Army.

The Fight Against the German Occupation Forces in Byelorussia

The Austrian and German occupation forces reinstituted the rule of the landlords and the bourgeoisie in Byelorussia as well. On February 21, 1918, the Germans occupied Minsk. The Byelorussian Rada pro- claimed the “independence” of Byelorussia, but at the same time it called upon the Byelorussian people to obey the German authorities in all things. The Rada also sent the German Kaiser Wilhelm II a telegram expressing their gratitude to him for liberating the country from the Bolsheviks. Shortly afterwards, however, the Germans ap^ IDointed a “government” that suited their purposes better, name- 13 ", that of the counter-revolutionary landlord Skirmunt. The monar- chist system was restored in all the towns and villages of the countr 3 ^ and Byelorussia was proclaimed a German province. All power passed into the hands of the German militarists. All the towns were ruled by- German commandants. The workers, peasants and working intelli- gentsia of Byelorussia were subjected to cruel oppression.

To fight the German invaders the Bolsheviks in Byelorussia or- ganized a partisan movement.

In April 1918, a Congress of Soviets of the Western Region was convened in the Soviet part of Byelorussia. This congress elected an Executive Committee which took the lead of the mass revolutionary" movement for the liberation of the workers and peasants of Byelo- russia.

The whole of Byelorussia was covered hy a dense network of par- tisan detachments. On March 15, 1918, one of these detachments suddenly attacked a Bavarian cavalry regiment that was stationed at Tsibuly-ovo and completely wiped it out. In the beginning of Sep- tember another large partisan detachment occupied the township of Gorval, in the Rechitsa Uyezd, Minsk Gubernia, and wiped out the German garrison. In the Rudobelsk Volost alone there were as many as 400 armed avengers of the people. In the villages of Polesie there were nearly 500 partisans who were armed with machine guns and artillery.

Lenin and Stalin closely watched and directed the struggle of the people against the German invaders. In the spring of 1918, Nikolai Shchors, the organizer of the Ukrainian partisans, arrived in Moscow. He had been invited by Lenin to talk over matters. The partisans received Lenin’s advice on liow to fight the German invaders in the Ukraine. In Jime 1918, Lenin issued directives to extend the partisan movement and indicated the methods which should he -employed in fighting the invaders. ‘Hamper the advance of the enemy in every way you can,” he wrote. ‘‘Lay ambushes. Act with fire- arms and cold steel. Protect your rear. And for that purpose com- pletely exterminate all spies, provocateurs, and counter-revolutionar\’ traitors who render direct or indirect assistance to the enemy.”

The Germans imagined that their march into the Land of Soviets, into the Ukraine and Byelorussia would be a mere walkover. Actually, however, the peoples of the Land of Soviets rose up to wage a general patriotic war which ended in the utter defeat of the German imperialists. Living in an atmosphere of universal con- tempt and constantly subjected to the blows of the partisans and the Red Army, the occupational forces deteriorated and lost their fight- ing efiSciency.

The Fight Against the Occupation Forces in the Baltic Provinces

During the negotiations in Brest-Litovsk the Germans rejected the demand of the Soviet delegation that the Baltic peoples should be granted the right of self-determination, and on their part demanded that Russia should renounce the territory of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, After the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed the Baltic Provinces were occupied by German troops.

The Lithuanian Taryba, or National Council, sent an address to the German Kaiser expressing their loyalty and begging him to con- clude a "perpetual alliance” with the Lithuanian state. In March 1918, Wilhelm IE officially recognized the "independence” of Lithu- ania. Actually, however, Lithuania became completely subjected to the German authorities. Continuing to betray the national interests *of the Lithuanian people, the Taryba, in July 1918, proclaimed Lithu- ania a monarchy, and it was only due to the universal discontent of the Lithuanian people that this proclamation was not put into force. A Lithuanian government headed by Voldemaras, leader of the reac- tionary “Tautin” party (the Lithuanian bourgeois- landlord nationalist party), was set up.

Forced labour for the benefit of the Germans was introduced. The Lithuanian peasants were obliged to work three days a week repairing roads and felling trees. In addition they were compelled to pay a land tax and numerous other taxes, including a heavy poll tax. There were innumerable taxes, which the occupationists collected by force.

• The German authorities also tried to establish monarchist rule in Latvia. Hindenburg, the German Commander-in-Chief, issued an order that large tracts of land in the country should be set aside for German colonists and as a result the Latvian peasants were robbed of 50 per cent of their land for the benefit of German landlords and kulaks.

Soviet power w'as established in Estonia in October 1917, but it lasted only three and a half months.

In February 1918, the bourgeois republic was re-established in Estonia. The Germans tried to incorporate Estonia in the German state and proclaimed Grerman the official language. All state posts were occupied by German nominees.

The Part Played by the Germans in Suppressing the Revolution in Finland

In January 1918, a workers’ revolution commenced in Fin- land. A revolutionary government — ^the Council of People’s Represent- atives — concluded a treaty of friendship with Soviet Russia. But there was no Communist Party in Finland at that time. The Council of People’s Representatives, which was controlled by the Finnish Social- Democrats, allowed the bourgeoisie to retain their electoral rights and their capital.

Svinhuvud, the head of the overthrown bourgeois government, fled to Vasa, in the north of Finland, where he received from Sweden and Germany arms and money for a counter-revolutionary campaign against the revolutionary part of Finland. A counter-revolutionary “Black” brigade came from Sweden and a punitive corps came from Germany to assist the Whiteguatd Finns.

The Finnish Red Guard numbered 70,000 men, but they were poorly armed, and notwithstanding their courage and heroism, suf- fered defeat from the Whiteguard Finns and the Germans.

The revolutionary proletarian government moved to Vyborg. On April 27, 1918, the Germans and Whiteguard Finns occupied Helsing- fors, the capital of Finland. The interventionists had counted on capturing the Soviet Baltic Fleet which was anchored off Helsingfors, as the sea was then frozen and it seemed impossible for the fleet to get * away. But, on orders from the Soviet government, the Dreadnoughts Garigut, Poltava, Petro'pavlovsh and Sevastopol and several cruisers, assisted by the icebreakers Termak and Volynets, undertook the passage to Kronstadt, a heroic journey of several hundred kilometres through solid stretches of ice. Later, the remaining 160 vessels were brought away. The Soviet Baltic Fleet was saved by the heroism and class consciousness of the Soviet sailors.

The position of the Finnish revolution became hopeless. On May 12, 1918, the Whiteguard Finns occupied Vyborg, and then commenced a reign of terror against the workers and Red Gruards. About 17,000 revolutionary workers were shot and over 70,000 men and women were herded in concentration camps.

Seizure of Bessarabia by Rumania

Taking advantage of the difficul- ties the Soviet Republic was encountering, boyar-ruled Rumania, with the approval and assistance of the Entente imperialists,* seized Bessarabia, which is inhabited by Moldavians, Ukrainians and Jews. As early as November 1917, a Sfatul Tsarii, or Regional Council, w^as set up in Bessarabia which shortly afterwards proclaimed the forma- tion of the Moldavian People’s Republic and the decision to join the R.S.F.S,R. But on January 26, 1918, Rumanian troops captured Kishinev. Red Guard detachments fought the Rumanian invaders, but owing to the occupation of the Ukraine by German troops the Soviet units were obliged to retreat from Bessarabia. The leadership of the Sfatul Tsarii fell into the hands of the agents of Rumania who secured the adoption of a decision incorporating Bessarabia in Rumania. In December 1918, in opposition to the will of the masses of the working people of Bessarabia, the Rumanian parliament ratified the incorpora- tion of Bessarabia in the Kingdom of Rumania.

The Beginning of Socialist Construction

Lenin’s Plan for the Initial Steps in Socialist Construction

While the working people of the Ukraine, the Crimea, Byelorussia, Lithua- nia, Latvia and Estonia were fighting for their independence against the German troops in occupation of their territory, the Soviet govern- ment in Russia was mustering forces for the inevitable struggle against the German imperialists and for the liberation of the Soviet territo- ries they had seized. At the same time the government of the R.S.F.S.R. strove to utilize the respite won by the conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk Peace for the transition to socialist constinction. The Bolshevik Party utilized the respite to organize and strengthen the Soviet State and to build up a workers’ and peasants’ Red Army.

At a meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee* held on April 29, 1918, Lenin delivered a report on the immedi- ate tasks of the Soviet government in which he urged that it was neoes - sary to take advantage of the respite to start building the foundation of socialist economy, and submitted a plan of how this beginning should be made. The All-Russia\i Central Executive Committee ratified this plan.

By the spring of 1918, the proletariat was already in command of the key positions in the national economy, namely, the land, the big industrial plants, the railways and ban^, the mercantile fl.eet and foreign trade. No .less than 500 enterprises had been nationalized. In Lenin’s opinion the main task of the proletarian dictatorship at that time was to keep account of what was being produced and to ensure state control 6ver the distribution of the finished x>roduct.

At that time agriculture in the Soviet Republic was conducted in 20,000,000 small, scattered, individual peasant farms. The petty proprietors in town and country recognized neither labour nor state- discipline, refused to ^submit to either accounting or control and grew rich by profiteering and huckstering. As Lenin said: “The profiteer, the trade marauder, the disrupter of monopoly — ^these are our principal ^intemar enemies, the enemies of the economic enactments of the Soviet government” (V. I. Lenin, Selected Worlcs^ Vol. VII, Moscow, 1936, p. 362).

Lenin set the proletariat the task of creating a new Soviet labour discipline, of increasing the productivity of labour and of organiz- ing socialist emulation. Lenin proposed that the services be enlisted of bourgeois specialists who should be made to serve the interests of the socialist state. At the meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee that was held on April 29, the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries opposed this program of Lenin’s and were supported by the Bukharinites, who, under cover of “Left” phrases, defended the kulaks, shirkers and profiteers.

After breaking down the resistance of the enemies of the proletarian dictatorship, the working class, in the summer of 1918, completed the expropriation of the big bourgeoisie. On June 28 of that year the Coun- cil of People’s Commissars issued a decree for the nationalization of the whole of large-scale industry. The whole of the nationalized industry was placed under the control of the Supreme Council of Na- tional Economy.

The Development of the Socialist Revolution in the Rural Districts

In the spring of 1918, the counter-revolutionary kulaks rebelled against the socialist measures of the Soviet government. They refused to deliver grain at the prices fixed by the government and were the main cause of the starvation ]Drevalent in the countr}’^. The workers of Moscow and Petrograd were getting only fifty grams of adulterated bread every other day. The demobilization of the army overloaded the railways, and this still further hindered the delivery of food to the towns. The food administration, which was controlled by of6.cials and profiteers who were hostile to the Soviet regime, sabotaged the procurement of ^ain. The Socialist-Revolution- aries and Mensheviks took advantage of these food difficulties to con- duct propaganda among the workers and peasants in favour of abolish- ing the state grain monopoly and of introducing free trade in grain.

On May 24, 1918, Lenin published an open letter to the Petrograd workers, entitled “The Famine,” in which he called upon them, as the vanguard of the Russian proletariat, to organize a mass “crusade” against the grain profiteers, kulaks, parasites, disorganizers and bribetakers. "The famine is not due to the fact that there is no bread in Russia, ” he wrote, ‘'‘but to the fact that the bourgeoisie and the rich gener- ^ ally are putting up a last decisive fight against the rule of the toilers, against the state of the workers, Against the Soviet government, on this most important and acute of questions, the question of bread’’ (V. I. Lenin, Selected Wwlce, Two-Vol. ed., Vol. 11, Moscow, 1947, p, 345).

Lenin explained to the workers that the fight for bread was a fight for Socialism and that it was necessary for them to go into the rural districts, organize the rural poor and take the grain from the kulaks in order that the workers and the army could be fed.

The Soviet government issued a series of decrees dealing with the struggle against the rural bourgeoisie who were hoarding or profit- eering in grain. The decree issued in May 1918, for the formation of special workers’ food detachments facilitated the task of the People’s Commissariat of Pood in procuring grain for the state. The Petro- grad proletariat chose from its ranks about fifteen thousand of its most advanced members to be sent into the rural districts. Other industrial towns also sent food detachments, made up of their best workers. The food detachments relied on the rural poor in their operations in the rural districts.

On June 11, 1918, a decree was issued, on Lenin’s recommendation, regarding the organization of committees of the village poor. The committees were given the responsibility of assisting the People’s Commissariat of Pood in requisitioning superfluous grain stocks and of redistributing the confiscated land, farm implements and cattle. As a result of these measures of the Soviet State, the village poor and the middle peasants secured additionally over 50,000,000 hec- tares of land held by the kulaks. The formation of these committees of the village poor marked a further stage in the development of the socialist revolution in the rural districts.

The Committees of the Poor Peasants organized the poorest strata of the peasantry and converted them into active builders of the Soviet system in the rural districts. They were also the medium for form- ing the Red Army. They explained to the working pea antry the measures adopted by the Soviet State and won the middle peasants over to its side. At first the middle peasants were suspicious of the Committees of the Poor Peasants, but whc-n they became convinced that the Soviet State was helping the middle peasants, that the kulaks had been vanquished, they came over to the side of the Soviet State. This swing-over of the middle peasants enabled the Bolshevik Party, as early as the autumn of 1918, to raise the question of abol- ishing these Committees of the Poor Peasants and of establishing a firm alliance between the working class and the bulk of the middle peasants. All this ensured the further consolidation of the proletarian state.

Military Intervention. The Civil War

The Beginning of Military Intervention

The Respite Ends

The Part Played by International Imperialism in Organizing the Civil War

In the summer of 1918, the work begun on the build- ing of Socialism was halted by civil war. The civil war was fomented and directed by international imperialism, in alliance with the Kussian landlords and the bourgeoisie, and with the active support of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks and the Bukharinite and Trotsky ite traitors.

The chief reason that prompted the foreign imperialists to inter- vene in Russia was their fear that the revolution would spread to Europe and their desire to prevent the building of a socialist state in Russia. They could not reconcile themselves to the loss of their big investments in Russia’s large undertakings, and so insisted on inter- vention.

In December 1917, the Erench and British imperialists reached an agreement to divide Russia into "spheres of influence”; the Ukraine, the Crimea and the Donetz Basin were to constitute France *s "sphere,” and North Russia, the Caucasus, Transcaucasia and Central Asia were to be Great Britain’s "sphere.” Since the Entente imperialists were w’ithout frontiers contiguous with those of Soviet Russia and did not possess adequate military reserves, they were unable to com- mence intervention openly. To deceive the masses of the working people, they had to make it appear that the Russian people them- selves were asking for the despatch of Entente troops to fight the Germans and the Bolsheviks. The Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolution- aries, Trotsky ites and Bukharinites acted as the accomplices and agents of the foreign imperialists and Russian landlords and capi- talists in organizing the intervention.

Having joined in a conspiracy with the British imperialists, Trots- ky and Buj^arin exerted all efforts to hasten the resumption of hostilities with Germany and thereby put an end to the hard- won respite. Trotsky sent his followers who were at the head of the Murmansk So- viet the treacherous instruction to permit a landing of British troops in Murmansk on the pretext that they were coming to fight the Ger- man imperialists. Lenin and Stalin categorically ordered the Chairman of the Murmansk Soviet to stop this shameful collaboration with the interventionists, and when the Murmansk traitors failed to obey this order they were proclaimed enemies of the people. Trotsky also facili- tated the intervention of the Japanese imperialists in the Far East. At the end of March 1918, Trotsky, in conversation with the British rep- resentative in Moscow, told him that he had no objection to the landing of Japanese troops in Kussia for the purpose, allegedly, of protecting the Siberian Railway. Several days later, on April 5, 1918, Japanese troops landed in Vladivostok. The Entente imperi- alists, however, were engaged in the world war, fighting decisive battles on the Western Front and therefore could not organize their intervention on a wide scale. Nor could Germany participate in this intervention of the Anglo-French-Japanese-American bloc because she was at war with this bloc. Nevertheless, Kaiser Wilhelm’s govern- ment remained the bitterest enemy of Soviet Russia, and notwith- standing the peace treaty it had signed with Russia, supported her enemies and did all in its power to isolate, weaken and ruin the Land of Soviets. Under cover of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty it began openly to seize the Ukraine, Byelorussia and the Baltic countries.

Conspiracies and Revolts Against the Soviet Regime

When the counter-revolutionary Army General Headquarters were liquidated, the representatives of the foreign powers aimounced that they were leaving the Soviet Republic. They were, however, in no hurry to quit Russia, hut established themselves in Vologda.

The Entente imperialists supported the bourgeois and landlord counter-revolution and supplied money and arms to all the under- ground organizations in Russia which were conspiring to overthrow the Soviet regime.

The counter-revolutionaries plotted to use as their armed force the Czechoslovak Corps which had been formed during the war of Czech and Slovak prisoners of war. The Soviet government had given this Corps permission to leave for France via Vladivostok provided it surrendered its arms and journeyed in small contingents.

On the way to Vladivostok large numbers of Russian officers and cadets joined the Corps, which numbered 60,000 men. The Czecho- slovak contingents were strung out along the whole length of the railway from Penza to Vladivostok.

On May 25, 1918, the Czechoslovaks, supported by imderground counter-revolutionary organizations, rose in revolt with the object of seizing Siberia, the Urals and the Volga Region. On June 8, 1918 they, with the assistance of Socialist-Revolutionaries, captured Samara and there set up a Whiteguard-Socialist-Revolutionary author- ity known as the Committee of the Constituent Assembly (Comutch). A Whiteguard “government” headed by Socialist-Revolutionaries was also set up in Western Siberia.

The rule of the Socialist-Revolutionaries was exactly like that of the tsar. They annulled all the decrees of the Soviet State and returned the land and the crops taken from it to the landlords and the kulaks. Pre-revolution conditions were restored in the factories and strikes were prohibited. All supporters of Soviet rule were per- secuted. The Committee of the Constituent Assembly sent from Samara to the East a “deatJi train” containing 2,700 arrested Communists, work- ers and peasants, of whom 2,000 were shot or tortured to death. On the Volga and the Kama there were similar “death barges” on which hundreds of completely naked prisoners were starved, beaten and shot. Punitive expeditions roamed the country-side and pressed the peasants into the White army. The peasants were robbed of their land and cattle.

Meanwhile, Entente agents, jointly with Russian Whiteguards, were organizing revolts in twenty-three cities around Moscow, but they succeeded in carrying out a big revolt only in Yaroslavl. On July 6-8, 1918, the Whiteguards captured this town and subjected the workers to incredible torture; but on July 21, the Red Army liberated the town.

The Czechoslovak revolt was accompanied by a wave of kulak revolts, which everywhere were headed by Right-wing Socialist- Revolutionaries .

It was in this atmosphere of tense struggle that the Fifth All-Rus- sian Congress of Soviets opened on July 4, 1918. The “Left” Socialist- Revolutionaries who were present at the congress demanded the annul- ment of the decrees on the Committees of the Poor Peasants and on the food detachments. The congress rejected these counter-revolutionary de- mands, whereupon the “Left” Socialist-Revolutionaries wi^drew from the congress and began to organize a revolt against the Soviet regime. In secret complicity with the Bukharinites and Trotskyites they set themselves the object of provoking war with Germany, and to this end, on July 6, assassinated the German ambassador, Mirbach.. The German government answered this act with the demand that the Soviet government should permit German troops to enter Moscow ostensibly for the purpose of protecting the German embassy. The Soviet government emphatically rejected this demand. Lenin declared that the entire Soviet people, young and old, would rise up to defend the Soviet capital if the German imperialists dared to send their troops against her.

During those days, so full of peril for the Republic, the “Left” So- cialist-Revolutionaries, with the knowledge and approval of Trotsky and Bukharin, raised a counter-revolutionary revolt in Moscow. The Con- gress of Soviets suspended its proceedings and declared that all the dele- gates were mobilized for the fight against the counter-revolution. Under Lenin’s personal direction, the Soviet State vigorously crushed this reckless “Left” Socialist-Revolutionary adventure. The "Left” Socialist-Revolutionary party had conclusively become a counter- revolutionary bourgeois kulak party.

While these events were taking place, the "Left” Socialist-Revo- lutionary adventurer, ex-Colonel Muravyov, who was in command of the troops that were fighting the Czechoslovaks, tried to raise a revolt in Simbirsk, but thanks to the revolutionary vigilance of Com- rade Kuibyshev, the adventurer’s plot was speedily crushed.

The Czechoslovak revolt and the counter-revolutionary revolts of the kulaks and Socialist-Revolutionaries stimulated the activities of the monarchist counter-revolutionaries who placed their hopes on the last tsar, who, with his family, was at that time under arrest int Ekaterinburg. In view of this, the Ural Regional Soviet resolved, in the interests of the revolution, to do away with the ex-tsar and his family, and in July 1918, they were shot.

The First Soviet Constitution

On July 10, 1918, after the "Left” Socialist-Revolutionary plot in Moscow had been foiled, the Con- gress of Soviets adopted a Soviet Constitution (the Eundamental Law of the R .S .F .S .R .) . This Constitution had been drafted by a commission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee headed by Y. M. Sverdlov, with the assistance of Lenin and Stalin. The Constitution was based on the Declaration of Rights of the Toiling and Exploited People and on the “General Principles of the Constitution of the R.S.F.S.R.” which had been drawn up by Comrade Stalin.

In the Constitution were recorded the &st gains of the Great Octo- ber Socialist Revolution, The Constitution set the aim of “guarantee- ing the dictatorship of the proletariat with the object of suppressing the bourgeoisie, abolishing the exploitation of man by man, and of building Socialism.” It declared that it was the duty of all citizens of the Soviet Republic to engage in useful labour and proclaimed the slogan: “He who does not work, neither shall he eat.” It further declared that it was the duty of all citizens of the republic to defend the socialist fatherland, but it granted the right to defend the revolu- tion with arms only to working people — ^the non-working elements of the population were only permitted to undertake service in the rear.

The Constitution deprived the exploiters and their defenders of political rights in the Soviet State. All those who exploited hired la- bour and lived on unearned incomes, and also monks and the clergy, as well as former gendarmes and policemen, were deprived of elec- toral rights. The Constitution, proclaimed the All-Russian Congress of Soviets as the supreme organ of state power in the R,S,P.S.R. The congress was to consist of representatives of City Soviets at the rate of one Deputy for every 25,000 voters, and of representatives of Gubernia Congresses of Soviets at the rate of one Deputy for every 125,000 inhabitants. The inequality in the representation of workers and peasants was a temporary measure necessitated by the fact that the individual peasant still lacked sufficient political consciousness, was poorly organized and needed the leadership of the proletariat. In the intervals between congresses the supreme authority was the All- Russian Central Executive Conunittee^ elected by the All-Russian Congress of Soviets.

To administer and direct the country’s economic and political life, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee set up a Soviet government known as the Comic jl of People’s Commissars.

The Constitution of the R.S.P.S.R. that was adopted at the Fifth Congress of Soviets was the first genuinely democratic Constitution in the world, one that enabled the masses of the working people to take part in the administration of the state.

The Defence of Tsaritsyn

In A Ring of Fire

At the end of 1918, the Soviet Republic was enclosed in a ring of fire.

The whole of the Middle Volga P».egion, the Urals and Siberia right up to the Far East, were occupied by the Czechoslovaks.

In the Far East the Japanese imperialists were in control, and assist- ed by the mercenary gangs of Semyonov and Kalmykov were prepar- ing to seize the Maritime and Amur Regions.

In the North, which was occupied by British troops, a petty-bour- geois government consisting of ex-members of the Constituent Assem- bly was formed, but later this government was replaced by the open military-bourgeois dictatorship of General Miller.

In North Caucasus, the Whiteguard Volmiteer Army commanded by General Denilcin launched an offensive. In the Don Region, the Cossack Ataman Krasnov, who had fled to the Don after the Kerensky venture was crushed, established his rule with the aid of the German imperialists, who perfidiously violated the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty they had concluded with Russia.

The Uliraine, Byelorussia and the Baltic countries were under the heel of the German imperialists, Transcaucasia was in the hands of the Turkish and German imperialists, and the Transcaspian Region was in the hands of the British imperialists.

Soviet Russia^ being surrounded by battle fronts, was cut off from her main food, raw material and foe! regions. Lenin emphasized that now that the power of the landlords and capitalists had been overthrown, the workers and peasants would have to defend their native Soviet land against the imperialists and the counter-revolution. “Since November 7 (October 25), 1917,” he said, “we have become defencists. . . . From that day on we stand for the defence of our Fatherland” (V. I. Lenin, Selected Worlcs^ 7ol. XXII 5 Russ, ed., p, 291).

To defend Soviet Russia the formation of the workers ’ and peasants ’ Red Army was vigorously iiroceeded with.

At first the new army was an army of volunteers; only the most class-conscious and organized elements of the working classes were allowed to enlist.

During the first two months after the victory of the October Revo- lution 100,000 men voluntarily enlisted in the Red Army. In addition, the best organized revolutionary units of the old army and the local partisan detachments were incorporated in the Red Army. The staunchest and most class-conscious section of the Red Army was that made up of the proletarian Red Guards. An extremely important part in building the Red Army w'as plaj-ed by the Military Commissars, who trained the new recruits politically and welded them together.

In May 1918, a decree was passed introducing compulsory mili- tary service for workers and peasants. In the autumn, Lenin called for the formation of an army 3,000,000 strong. On November 30, 1918, the Council of Workers’ and Peasants’ Defence was set up. This Council, which was headed by Lenin, was in charge of providing replenishments for the Red Army and of supptying the front with arms and pro- visions.

The First Siege of Tsaritsyn

Cut oft from the grain regions, the Ukraine, the Volga Region and Siberia, the Soviet Republic experienced severe starvation. The key to the grain regions of the Lower Volga and North Caucasus, which kept Soviet Russia supplied with bread, was Tsaritsyn. That city became the pivot of the struggle that was to decide the fate of the revolution. The counter-revolutionaries aimed to capture Tsaritsjui in order to link up the Czechoslovaks on the Eastern Front with Krasnov’s forces on the Southern Front, and thus close the counter-revolutionary ring around Moscow. This would have out off the Soviet Republic from vital sources of grain and oil, and would have isolated Baku and the Lower Volga from the central area of the country.

On Lenin’s recommendation Comrade Stalin was sent to Tsaritsyn to organize food supplies. He arrived in Tsaritsyn on June 6 and found that the situation there was very bad. The Tsaritsyn Soviet was not operating the state grain monopoly, and the city and the adjacent villages teemed with profiteers, bagmen and bourgeois who had fled from Moscow and Petrograd. Saboteurs and spies were ensconsed iu Soviet and military establishments. There was no strong revolution- ary authority in the town. In a conversation Lenin had with Com- rade Stalin over the direct wire at that time, he said: '‘As regards food I must say that nothing at all is being issued either in Petrograd or Moscow today. The situation is very bad. Inform me whether you can take urgent measures, because we have no other source of supplies .except you.” Comrade Stalin took determined measures against the speculators. Grain was secured, but with gz'eat difficulty, after overcoming the resistance of the kulaks, who had hidden away their grain stocks.

Comrade Stalin realized that not only the question of food supplies, but also that of the defence of the Soviet Eepublic was being settled at Tsaritsyn. He therefore took charge of the defence of the town.

On August 18, 1918, Tsaritsyn was surrounded on three sides by the forces of Krasnov. To aid the White Cossacks who were approach- ing, the counter-revolutionaries were preparing a revolt in the rear — in Astrakhan and in Tsaritsyn itself. In Tsaritsyn the revolt was organized by Socialist-Revolutionaries and by tsarist army officers who were hiding underground. At the head of the conspiracy was General Nosovich, sent there by Trotsky on military duties. The conspirators were supported by the foreign Consuls in Tsaritsyn. Comrade Stalin discovered this criminal plot in time and the Whiteguards and spies were arrested. In Astrakhan army officers who had been enlisted in the Red Army raised a mutiny and succeeded in capturing the fortress, arresting Communists, dispersing the Soviet and capturing the bank and the railway station. This Whiteguard mutiny was, however, suppressed the very next day.

At that time the Whiteguards laxmched an attack on Tsaritsyn. Although their forces considerably outnmnbered the defenders of the city, they encountered very strong resistance. The defence of Tsaritsyn was directed by Comrade Stalin in person with the assistance of his close colleague, Comrade Voroshilov. They united the separate par- tisan detachments which arrived in Tsaritsyn from the IJlcraine and the Don Region into regular units, and on Comrade Stalin’s instruc- tions all the available weapons, artillery in particular, were utilized for the defence. Armoured trains, united in a single combat group, often broke into the rear of the Whites. As Comrade Voroshilov has written: “Comrade Stalin directed the whole defence. His dynamic spirit, his energy and will, accomplished what had seemed impossible before his arrival. In a very short time divisions, brigades, regi- ments, staffs and supply departments sprang into being. The entire rear was thoroughly purged of counter-revolutionary and hostile ele- ments. . . , Those were days of the utmost tension. Then was the time to see Comrade Stalin. As ever, calm, engrossed in his thoughts he went without sleep literally for days on end, his intense activi- ties divided between the the- atres of operations and army headquarters” (K. E. Voroshi- lov, Stalin and the Bed Army, i938j Russ, ed., p. 18).

Meanwhile, work went on night and day in the facto- ries and plants, where guns and machine guns were manu- factured and armoured trains repaired. The entire popu- lation of the town was mobi- lized to dig trenches.

As a result of this heroic defence, by the end of August the White Cossacks were flung back from Tsaritsyn.

The Attempt to Assassinate Lenin

While the attacks of the Whiteguards were be- ing repulsed at Tsaritsyn, the Soci alist-Revolutionaries , in criminal conspiracy with the Trotsky ites and Bukharinites, prepared to strike a mortal blow at the revolution by robbing it of its leader and organizer, V. I. Lenin.

In the evening of August 30, 1918, Lenin addressed a meetmg at the Michelson Plant (now the Vladimir Ilyich Plant) at which he called upon the workers to rally for the fight against the Czecho- slovaks. After the meeting, with workers crowding aroimd him, he walked out mto the factory yard to his car. Hiding behind the car, Fanny Kaplan, a Socialist-Revolutionary terrorist, lay in wait for him with a revolver. She fired three shots at Lenin and then tried to escape amidst the confusion, but the workers detained the would-be assassin.

The news of this attempt on the life of the beloved leader of the working people flashed throughout the countr 3 ^ like lightning. Their hearts burning with indignation against the enemies of the people, the vast masses of the workers and peasants anxiously watched the bulletins that were issued about Lenin’s condition. Thanks to his strong constitution Lenin recovered from his serious wounds, but his health was greatly undermined.

The unparalleled outrage committed by the Socialist-Revolution- aries roused among the masses of the people a feeling of the bitterest hatred towards the enemies of the revolution. On September 2, the Land of Soviets was proclaimed a military camp. Following a report by Y. M. Sverdlov on the attempted assassination of Lenin^ the Soviet government took the decision to proclaim a mass Red terror in retaliation to the White terror of the bourgeoisie and its servitors, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. Members ofWhiteguard organizations and participants in revolts became liable to the penalty of death by shooting.

At this time the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission dis- covered a series of plots against the Soviet regime. In the beginning of September 1918, one of the biggest of these Whiteguard plots, direct- ed by Lockhart, the head of the British Diplomatic Mission, in conjunc- tion with the French Consul Grenard, was liquidated. They tried to bribe the Red Army men who were guarding the Kremlin, so as to get into the premises of the Council of People’s Commissars and arrest the Soviet government. The plotters blew up bridges, disorganized the food supply in the capital and disrupted the Soviet administrative machinery . They wonned their way into the Red Army, stole military plans and conveyed them to the enemies of the Soviet regime. But all the enemies’ plans went a-wTy. The Red Army men whom they tried to bribe reported the matter to the Extraordinary Commission and helped the latter to capture the ringleaders of the conspiracy while they were at a secret meeting. The spies and plotters headed by Lockhart were arrested.

The Rout of the Czechoslovaks

The attempts of the enemies of the revolution to check the ofiensive which the Red Army had launched on the Eastern (Czechoslovak) Front failed. On August 1, before he was wounded, Lenin had sent a message to the com- manding personnel of the Eastern Front in which he wrote; "*Now the entire fate of the revolution is staked on one card: speedj^ victory over the Czechoslovaks on the Kazan-Ural-Samara Front. Ever 3 rbhmg depends upon that.” The main forces of the Czechs and Whites were concentrated at Kazan, from where they launched an offensive against Sviyazhsk, the capture of which would have opened the road to Moscow. Lenin ordered the most reliable units to be sent to Sviyazhsk. Soon an army of 10,000 men was formed there. Lenin also ordered several torpedo boats from the Baltic Fleet to be sent to Sviyazhsk via the Volga, and in August the Prythi, JRetivy and Prochny arrived, after travelling through the Mariinsky waterway. The torpedo boats broke into the Whiteguard lines and set fire to their steamers and barges. The arrival of the Baltic torpedo boats strengthened the Red Volga Flotilla which was commanded by the sailor Markin.

In the beginning of September the Red Army, supported by the Volga Flotilla, launched an attack upon Kazan. Several warships imder the command of Markin sailed right up to Kazan and landed a force of Red troops. On September 10, the city was captured and cleared of Whiteguards.

Lenin, who was now convalescent, sent the men of the Red Army a telegram congratulating them on their brilliant victory.

Two days later the Iron Division, which had been formed by V. V. Kuibyshev, captured Lenin’s native city Simbirsk. The Red Army men sent Lenin the following telegram: “Dear Ilyich: The capture of your native Simbirsk is a reply to one of your wounds; the reply to the second will be the capture of Samara.”

Lenin sent an answering message, addressed to Kuibyshev, in which he congratulated the men on their victory and thanked them on be- half of all the working people.

On learning of the villainous attempt to assassinate Lenin, the defenders of Tsaritsyn struck blows at the enemy with renewed energy. On September 7, Comrade Stalin sent Lenin a telegram informing him that the enemy had been routed and hurled across the Don, that the position of Tsaritsyn was now secure, and that the offensive was continuing.

In the middle of September, Comrade Stalin was called to Moscow where he related to Lenin, who was now on the way to recovery, the story of the heroic defence of Tsaritsyn. Lenin and Stalin sent Comrade VorosliiloY the following message of greetings for the heroes of Tsaritsyn: “Hold aloft the Red banners, cany them forward fearlessly, ruthlessly root out the counter-revolutionary landlords, generals and kulaks and show the whole world that Socialist Russia is in- vincible.”

The victorious Red Army continued the offensive through the whole of the Volga Region, The First Army marched on Syzran, while the Fourth Army, of which V. V. Kuibyshev was Political Commissar, marched on Samara. On October 7, 1918, Samara was liberated by the Red Army and the Volga Region was cleared of Czechs and Whiteguards.

Second Defeat of the Enemy at Tsaritsyn

After the Czecho- slovaks were defeated, the Southern Front began to acquire deci- sive importance.

In September 1918, on Lenin’s recommendation, a Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front was set up, J. V. Stalin was appointed chairman of the Council, and K. B. Voroshilov Commander of the Front. On September 22, 1918, Comrade Stalin returned to Tsaritsjm from Moscow, He foresaw that another inter- national conspiracy against Soviet Russia was being hatched in the South and expected the Entente to order the Whiteguards to make another attempt to capture Tsaritsyn, this time from the southwest. Krasnov realized that German intervention was coming to an end and therefore appealed for assistance to his new masters, the British and French imperialists.

By October 1918, he had mustered against Tsaritsyn twelve cavalry and eight infantry divisions, well supplied and armed b}^ the foreign imperialists. Tsaritsyn was completely surrounded and its position was extremely grave. Notwithstanding all the requests that were sent to him, Trotsky failed to send either reinforcements or ammunition. On Comrade Stalin’s orders the production of shells was organized at the Ordnance Works in Tsaritsyn. As was the case during the first siege of the city, the entire population was mobilized for the front. Among those mobilized were the engineers of the survey party that was working on the Volga-Don Canal project. In reply to a request of the Tsaritsyn Soviet for the release of these engi- neers so that the survey should not be interrupted^ Comrades Stalin and Voroshilov wrote: “We shall dig the canal after we have drowned the Cadets in the Volga and the Don.”

The poorly-armed, ill-shod and badly-clothed Red Army defended Tsaritsyn with exceptional heroism. Stalin and Voroshilov remained in the frontline positions directing the attacks in person.

On October 16, the Whiteguards launched determined attacks in the endeavour to break through to Tsaritsyn, but encountered the indomitable resistance of its defenders. That day many of the defenders met the death of heroes, including the twenty-three-year old hero commander Nikolai Rudnyev. During the battle of Tsaritsyn splendid Red Army commanders came to the forefront, such as Par- khomenko, Budyonny, Timoshenko and others.

In October 1918, on the recommendation of Comrades Stalin and Voroshilov, the first Bed mounted unit was formed under the command of Semyon Mikhailovich Budyonny. The son of a poor peasant in the Don Region, Budyonny as a youth experienced all the hardships of an agricultural labourer and later of a trooper in the tsar’s cavalry. At the beginning of the Civil War he organized a mounted partisan unit in the Don Region and, like many partisan commanders, fought his way to Tsarits 3 m to join the Red Army there. Here the separate mounted detachments were tmited in a cavalry regiment and later in the First Cavalry Division. Under the command of S. M. Budyonny, this Red Cavalry Division struck crushing blows at Krasnovas forces.

In October 1918, the second plan to capture Tsaritsyn was frustrat- ed just as the first had been. On October 24, Comrade Stalin, who had been called back to Moscow after the White Cossacks were defeat- ed, sent greetings to the defenders of Tsaritsyn in the name of the Soviet government.

Denikin Captures North Caucasus

While Krasnov, backed by the German imperialists, was surrounding Tsaritsyn, Denikin’s Volun- teer Army marched to his assistance from the South.

Denikin’s aim w'as to cover Krasnov’s Southern Front and defeat the Red Army in North Caucasus. The main Soviet forces, which had been mustered by Sergo Orjonikidze, were concentrated near Bataisk, under the command of a former officer of the old army named Sorokin, who turned out to be a traitor. Part of the troops were posted on the Taman Peninsula and part near Tikhoretskaya.

On the proposal of Sergo Orjonikidze, the Soviet Republics of North Caucasus — ^the Kuban, Black Sea, Stavropol and Terek Re- publics — decided to combine their forces for the struggle against the counter-revolution .

In the summer of 1918, the First Congress of Soviets of North Caucasus proclaimed the formation of a united North Caucasian Soviet Republic. Before, however, this republic had time to consolidate itself, Denikin launched an offensive with the object of cutting off Soviet North Caucasus from the Volga and of preventing the Cauca- sian Red Army from striking at Krasnov’s forces from the South.

In June 1918, Denikin succeeded in cutting off North Caucasus from Tsaritsyn and marched against Tikhoretskaya, where a Red Army 30,000 strong was concentrated. Denikin had a force of 20,000 men, nearly all army officers, Cadets and upper-class Cossacks. This so-called Volunteer Army was well armed with artillery and ar- moured cars, which it had received through Krasnov from the Germans. In the middle of July Denikiirs forces captured Tikhoretskaya.

Denikin’s successes encouraged the entire counter-revolution in North Caucasus.

Whiteguard revolts broke out in the Cossack stanitsas and in the towns. In August, as the result of Sorokin’s treachery, Deni- kin’s forces caj)tured Ekaterinodar and pushed the Soviet main forces across the river Kuban. By capturing Ekaterinodar, the White- guards out off the Bed Army that was stationed on the Taman Pen- insula. The Taman Bed Army decided to fight its way along the coast to Novorossiisk and then through Tuapse to Armavir to join the main forces of the Caucasian Bed Army. The column marched along the shore of the Black Sea and over the rocky heights of the Caucasian Mountains with no food and no water, under a blazing sun. With it retreated tens of thousands of refugees carrying their belongings. Women and chil- dren travelled on munition carts, sitting on cases filled with shells. There was continuous fighting all along the way. Clothing and foot- wear were worn to shreds. The only sustenance available was some corn and nuts. Near Tuapse the way — the only one available for the Soviet Taman forces — was barred by enemy forces. Bold spirits were chosen and these, sticking their bayonets and rifles in the fissures of the rock to serve as steps, climbed the steej) rooky mountainside and attacked the enemy from the rear. The Whites retreated. The column went in pursuit and forced its way into Tuapse.

At the end of September 1918, after a march of 600 kilometres with fighting all the way, the column captured Armavir and eflFected a junction with the Bed Army. This heroic march of the Taman forces is described in Serafimovich’s novel The. Iron Flood,

The units of the Caucasian Bed Army were reorganized to form the Eleventh and Twelfth Armies of the Southern Eront. Their posi- tion was one of great difficulty. They were cutofi from Tsarits3m, and Denikin’s forces were advancing against them on three sides. In their rear were the steppes and the Astrakhan sandy wastes. There was no food, and typhus was rampant among them. The womided received no medical assistance. The situation was made worse by the treacherj’^ of Sorokin, who in October rose in revolt and shot the leaders of the Bolshevik organization and of the Soviet government of North Caucasus. This greatly facilitated Denikin’s task in capturing the whole of the Kuban.

At the same time Denikiix’s agents raised a revolt in the Terek Region. This revolt was organized by the Menshevik Bichorakhov, whose gangs surrounded Vladikavkaz, the centre of the Terek People’s Republic. Sergo Orjonikidze hastened to the assistance of Vladikavkaz from Tsaritsyn. He broke through the enemy’s lines, entered the city, organized its defence and with the aid of Caucasian highlanders liberated the city. After this Bicherakbov’s forces besieged Grozny.

The workers of the Grozny oil fields, assisted by the highland poor led by that brave leader of the highlanders, Aslanbek Sheripov, staunchly defended the city and held out for three months until it was liberated by troops sent by Sergo Orjonikidze. To dis- lodge the Bicheraldiov gangs who had fortified themselves in the Cossack stanitsa of Grosnenskaya, right close to the city, it was de- cided to burn down the stanitsa. The Red Army men bombarded the stanitsa with incendiary shells and bottles of kerosene and drove off the Whiteguards. The Terek remained a Soviet area; the rest of North Caucasus was occupied by Denikin’s forces

The Entente Armies Attack Soviet Russia

The Defeat of Germany and the Annulment of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty

The latter half of July 1918 marked a turning point in the World War in favour of the Entente. The strength of German imperialism was giving out. In October 1918, Austria sued for j)eace. In the same month Turkey capitulated. Germany’s defeat at the front stimulated revolutionary unrest at home, and on November 9 . 1918, this unrest culminated in a revolution. Kaiser Wilhelm II fled abroad and a bourgeois republic was established in Germany. Two days later, on November 11, 1918, an armistice was concluded o the Western Front. The World War ended in the defeat of Germany.

The defeat of Germany by the united forces of the Allies facili- tated the struggle which the Soviet people were waging against the German imperialists. The German invaders began to be driven out at all points from Russia, the Ukraine, Byelorussia and the Baltic countries. On November 13, 1918, the Soviet government solemnly announced the annulment of the predatory Brest-Litovsk Treaty. This act marked a victory for Lenin’s farseeing tactics on the question of peace. Harsh and degrading as the terms of the Brest- Litovsk Treaty had been, they had nevertheless given the Soviet people a respite, during which the Soviet State consolidated its position, armed its forces and beat off all the attacks of the internal counter-revolution. The change in the international situation enabled the Soviet government to denounce the predatory peace treaty which had been forced upon it.

The Intervention of the Entente Countries

The defeat of Germany complicated the international situation. Describing this situation in the report he delivered at the Sixth All-Russian Congress of Soviets on November 8, 1918, Lenin said: . . While we have never been so near to an international revolution, never, on the other hand, has our position been so dangerous as it is now. The imperialists were engrossed with each other. But now the Anglo-Franco- American group has swept away the other. They are making it their cardinal aim to stifle world Bolshevism, to destroy its chief seat, the Russian Soviet Republic” (VJ, Lenin, Collected Works^ Vol. XXIII, New York, 1945, P..284).

Indeed, the Entente imperialists were alarmed at the spread of the revolutionary movement in Western Europe and therefore decided to take advantage of Germany’s defeat to wage a struggle against Soviet Russia, which they regarded as the hotbed of revolution. The Entente plan was to hurl their forces against Soviet Russia in conjunction with the counter-revolutionary forces which had begun to fight the Soviet regime immediately after the victory of the October Revolution. This general offensive was to start simul- taneously in three directions. The British troops, supported by Deni- kin’s forces were to occupy the Eastern regions of Russia, primarily the Transcaspian Region and Baku. The French troops were to land in South Russia and to occupy the Ukraine with the assistance of the Ukrainian nationalists. The united forces of Great Britain and America were to launch an offensive in the North and move along the Northern Dvina to establish a junction with the Czechoslovak and Kolchak forces.

British Intervention in the Transcaspian Region and Baku

This plan began to be put in operation as early as the summer of 1918, when the Soviet Republic was enclosed in a hostile ring and was holding at bay the Czechoslovaks, the German imperialists and the Russian Whiteguards.

The commander, of the British forces in Persia struck a bargain with the bourgeois nationalists in Turkmenia and with the Russian Whiteguards, Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks in Central Asia, and with their aid, in July 1918, the Soviet regime was over- thrown in Ashkhabad, Merv, Krasnovodsk and other Transcaspian cities. Nine Ashkhabad Commissars were taken prisoner and ^ot. A Whiteguard government headed by Socialist-Revolutionaries was set up in Ashkhabad, The Transcaspian Region was occupied by British troops. The Turkmen bourgeois nationalists and the Russian Whiteguards treacherously signed an agreement with the British interventionists which converted Turkmenia into a British colony.

After entrenching themselves in the Transcaspian Region, the British imperialists made preparations to seize Baku . At that time the situat ion of the Baku Commune was one of great difficulty. It was being attacked by Turkish troops and by'armed bands organized by the local national- ists, the Mussavatists. On the pretext of combating Turkish atroci- ties, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks of Baku entered into secret negotiations with British agents and then demanded that the Baku Soviet should call in the assistance of British troops. Comrade Stalin sent the Baku Bolsheviks categorical instructions not to permit foreign troops to enter Baku under any circumstances. The Baku Council of People’s Com- missars, headed by Stepan Sha- umyan, took energetic measures for the defence of the Baku Com- mune.

There had been close co-oper- ation between Soviet Russia and the Baku Commune; oil from Baku was sent to Soviet Russia Astrakhan, and So- viet Russia sent Baku grain from its stocks in North Caucasus.

But with the seizure of North Caucasus by Denikin’s forces, the food situation in Baku became considerably worse.

The enemy had cut off the Baku Commune not only from its grain supplies but even from its sources of drinl^iing water. The Men- sheviks and Socialist-Revolution- aries took advantage of this grave situation to intensify their de- featist propaganda and on July 25, 1918, after a stormy session, they succeeded in getting the Baku Soviet to pass a resolution to invite British troops into the city. Several days later a counter-revo- lutionary government seized power in the city and called in the British troops. The twenty-six members ofthe Baku Council of People’s Com- missars tried to escape to Soviet Astrakhan, but the ships on which they travelled were fired at by the British and compelled to return to Baku. The People’s Commissars were arrested and flimg into prison.

The British remained in Baku only for a month. In September Turkish troops and detachments of Mussavatists surrounded the city. Just before the British left, the arrested Baku Commissars succeeded in escaping from prison and made another attempt to reach Astra- khan, but on the orders of the ship’s captain the ship carrying the Baku Bolsheviks suddenly changed course and beaded for Krasnovodsk, where the Commissars were arrested by the Trans- caspian government. On September 20, 1918, they were taken to a point 207 kilometres from Efrasnovodsk and brutally put to death.

The fall of the Baku Commune and the death of the twenty-six Baku Commissars had disastrous consequences for all the Transcaucasian Republics, for after this they long remained dependencies of the foreign imperialists.

The Liberation of the Ukraine from the Foreign Interventionists

Shortly after the annulment of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty the Cen- tral Committee of the Bolshevik Party commissioned Comrade Stalin, who had just retmmed from Tsaritsyn, to organize the struggle to liberate the Ukraine from the German invaders. In November 1918, Soviet rule was restored in the liberated part of the country and the Ukrainian Soviet government calied upon the Ukrain- ian workers and peasants to over- throw Hetman Skoropadsky , the pup- pet of the Germans, The ke^mote of Jeanne Labonrbe the struggle against the German in-

vaders was “All power to the Soviets. ” The Ukrainian Bolsheviks intensified their work of disintegrating the German army. The German sol- diers began to demand that they be sent home at once, and to sur- render their artillery and ammunition to the Bed Army. Deprived of the support of the German troops, Hetman Skoropadsky lost all power. He fled from Kiev disguised as a German officer. Power in Kiev was seized by new enemies of the Ukrainian people — ^the bour- geois nationalists headed by Petliura. The Petliura government, known as the Directory, sought the support of the new interventionists. At this time the Entente commenced intervention. At the end of November 1918, two French and two Greek divisions were landed in the Ukraine. In all 50,000 Entente troops were landed in the South of Russia, together with large quantities of machine guns, artillery and shells intended for the White “governments which were fighting against Soviet Russia.

The Petliura government signed a treaty with France by which it pledged itself to form an army of 30,000 men to fight the Bol- sheviks and to place the entire economy of the Ukraine under France’s control.

The indignant workers and toiling peasants rose in revolt against the betrayers of the Ukrainian people. The fraternal Red Army came from Soviet Russia to assist the revolutionary insurgents. On February 5, 1919, the Tarashchansky Regiment, comma.nded by Bo- zhenko, a carpenter employed in the Kiev Arsenal, and the Bogun Regiment commanded b}’’ Nikolai Shchors liberated Kiev. Soviet rule was restored over the greater part of the Ukraine. Only in the South, in Odessa, Nikolayev and Kherson, and in the Crimea, did Entente troops, supported by Denikin’s forces remain. Entente warships were still anchored in the ports.

The Bolshevik underground organ- izations in Odessa, Nikolayev, Kher- son and Sevastopol conducted vigor- ous propaganda activities among the French soldiers and sailors, and in Odessa the underground Bolshevik organization formed a “foreign com- mittee” in which an active part was taken by Jeanne Labourbe, a French woman Communist, who was ardently devoted to the revolution. Subse- quently, Jeanne Labourbe was betrayed by an agent provocateur and was bru- tally put to death by the French im- perialists.

Energetic work among the French forces was also conducted by the French revolutionary sailor Andre Marty, who organized a mutiny in the French fleet. The mutiny was sup- pressed and Marty was arrested. He was in danger of being executed^ but the protests and revolutionary demonstrations of the French workers secured his release.

Lacking sufficient forces, the interventionists withdrew from Kherson and Nikolayev in March 1919, and concentrated in Odessa; but on April 6, 1919, the Red Army entered Odessa. On April 7, the Red Army, wading across the icy shallows of Sivash, occupied the Crimea.

The main reason for the speedy defeat of the British and French occupational forces in the South was the disintegration that rapidly spread through their ranks. Realizing that they had been deceived, the French soldiers refused to fight against Soviet Russia and said to their officers: “We haven’t come here to fight.”

In April 1919, the French government was obliged to withdraw its forces from all the Black Sea ports. On the eve of the departure of the French from Odessa the workers in that city rose in armed revolt and power passed to the Soviet of Workers’ Deputies. Soviet rule was restored in the whole of the Ukraine and the Crimea.

The Failure of the Entente Offensive in the North

In Mur- mansk and Archangel, about 50,000 Entente troops were landed. The region was controlled by the British who appointed their puppet. General Miller, as Military Dictator. The interventionists shamelessly plundered the region, cut down forests and carried off furs. Everybody who was suspected of sympathizing with the Soviet regime was sent to penal servitude on remote uninhabited islands. Preparations were made to strike from the North at Moscow.

The British interventionist troops moved along the Northern Dvina to Kotlas, from where a railway ran to Vyatka. The Entente intended in the region of Kotlas-Perm to effect a junction between the forces of the northern counter-revolution and the Czech and Kolchak forces. The Whiteguard units, which were formed with the aid of British instructors and were well supplied with British armoured trains, aircraft, artillery and machine guns, outnumbered the Red Army which was operating on the Northern and Eastern Fronts by three to one. Five divisions under the command of the Czech General Gaida surrounded the Third Red Army in the region of Perm (now the city of Molotov) and inflicted grave defeat upon it. In December Gaidars forces occupied Perm and marched onto Vyatka (now the city of Kirov). From Vyatka there was a straight road to Moscow.

Comrades Stalin and Dzerzhinsky were sent to the Eastern Front to save the situation. Their instructions were to ascertain the causes of the disaster and to propose measures for its elimination. Comrade Stalin found the Eastern Front in a state of utter disorganization. The tsarist generals whom Trotsky had appointed violated the Soviet government ’s instructions to recruit the Red Army only from among the working classes of the population. The army teemed with sons of kulaks and the bourgeoisie and downright spies who were demoralizing the Red forces. There was no cbmmunication between the front and the rear, and numerous spies and saboteurs were at work at staff headquarters and in the administrative services. General Headquarters had no definite plan of campaign and issued contradictory orders, which only served to demoralize the army. Comrade Stalin drove enemies out of headquarters, established order in the army administrations, organized the formation of regiments in conformity with the Soviet government’s instructions and took measures to clean up the rear. Above all, Comrade Stalin issued an order to hold Vyatka at all costs so as to prevent the Entente forces in the North from linking up with Kolchak’s forces and the Czechoslovaks who were advancing from the East, As a result of all these measures Vyatka was held and the Entente troops failed to join forces with the Czechoslovaks.

Enormous assistance was rendered the Red Army in tlie North by, ski-runners of the Komi people, who proved to be splendid scouts and dispatch carriers. Dressed in white coveralls and moving very swiftly, they out-witted the enemy.

An active part in the struggle against the invaders in both the North and South was played by women and juveniles, who obtained information about the enemy’s operations and intentions, supplied the partisans with food and arms and distributed Bolshevik leaflets.

Disintegration set in among the Entente forces in the North just as it did in the South. This was facilitated considerably by the Bolshe- vik propaganda that was carried on among them by means of leaflets which were posted up on trees and scattered wherever the foreign troops were stationed. The result of this propaganda was that the Entente soldiers refused to fight against the Bolsheviks and demanded that they be sent home. The Entente’s attempt to destroy the Soviet regune with the aid of their own forces failed. As Lenin wrote: “The victory we gained , . . was the greatest victory we have gained over the Entente. We have deprived it of its soldiers” (V. I. Lenin, Selected Worhs, Vol. VIII, Moscow, 1936, p. 54).

The Liberation of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia from the German Invaders

The defeat of Germany gave an impetus to the strug- gle of all the Baltic peoples against the German invaders. The expulsion of the Germans was accompanied by mass revolts against the local bourgeoisie who had betrayed the people and had entered into a deal with the invaders.

In Lithuania, after the expulsion of the Germans, the workers set up Soviets which organized revolts against the bourgeois government of Voldemaras. The preparations for these revolts were directed by the Communist Party of Lithuania and Byelorussia that was formed at that time. The Voldemaras government fled from Vilna, and in December 1918 the Vilna Soviet proclaimed the formation of the Lithuanian Soviet Republic. On December 23, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee recognized the independence of the Lithuanian Soviet Republic and issued a decree to incorporate the Kovno and Vilna Gubernias in Soviet Lithuania,

In November 1918, the advancing Red Army compelled the German troops to retire from Latvia too. The various bourgeois parties in Latvia feared that the proletarian revolution would be victorious in that country and in the endeavour to prevent this they set up in Riga a National Council, which, on November 18, 1918, proclaimed the for- mation of a Latvian bourgeois republic. A provisional bourgeois govern- ment was set up headed by Uhnanis, the leader of the Farmers’ Union. This government concluded an agreement with the German Social-Democratic government, by which the latter undertook to send “volunteers” to Latvia. Roused to indignation by this act, the masses of the people of Latvia rose in revolt and captured Riga. The bourgeois government fled to Libau. In January 1919, a Congress of Latvian Soviets was held which proclaimed the formation of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic. The Latvian Soviet state authorities formed a Red Army, abolished the private ownership of land, confiscated state, landlord and church lands and expelled the landlords from the country.

In the spring of 1919, the Latvian bourgeois government which had establi^ed itself in Libau sent an army of 80,000 men against Riga and captured the citj^. At that time Soviet Russia was surrounded by enemies and was unable to render the Latvian Soviet Republic military assistance, and so a bourgeois republic was established in Latvia.

In Estonia, after the German troops left, the bourgeoisie appealed for assistance to Great Britain, and the latter sent a squadron of war- ships to assist the Estonian counter-revolution. The working people of Estonia rose in revolt and with the assistance of the advancing Red Army expelled the invaders. On November 30, 1918, Soviet rule was restored in the shape of the Estonian Working People’s Commune. The Estonian bourgeoisie again appealed to Great Britain and also to their nei hbour^ White Finland, for assistance. The well-armed forces of the White Estonians, White Finns and the British forces compelled the Red Army to withdraw from Estonia and the Soviet regime was again abolished.

The Liberation of Byelorussia and the Formation of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic

By December 1918, the Byelo- russian workers and peasants, assisted by the Red Army, had cleared their country of German troops. The part of Byelorussia which the Germans had occupied during the imperialist war was also liber- ated. The working people of Byelorussia appealed to Lenin and Stalin to help them form a Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic. In December 1918, the First Congress of the Commtmist Party of Byelo- russia was held and resolved to proclaim an independent Socialist Byelorussian Republic consisting of the Minsk, Grodno, Mogilev, Vitebsk and Smolensk Gubernias. The congress declared: “The work- ing people of Byelorussia wish to know no other power except the power of the Soviets, which is the power of the workers, agricultural labourers and peasants. The power of the landlord Byelorussian Rada is hateful to them.”

On February 2, 1919, the First All-Byelorussian Congress of Soviets was held in Minsk, which made the arrangements for the formation of the Byelorussian Soviet Republic. All the land of the landlords, monasteries and churches was proclaimed public property, the rail- ways and factories were nationalized, and the Soviet laws were pro- claimed in force. Y. M. Sverdlov, Chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, who was present at the congress, announced the decision of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee to recog- nize the independence of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic and promised that it would be rendered fraternal assistance. In his speech he said: “The Russian proletariat will never forget that you were the first to meet the blows and the onslaught of Ger- man imperialism and check its advance into the interior of our country.”

The congress proclaimed the formation of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, ordered the opening of negotiations with the R.S.F.S.R. with the object of establishing federal ties, and appealed to all the independent Soviet Republics to follow the example of the B.S.S.R.

The Fight Against the Polish Invaders in Lithuania and Byelorussia

From the very first days of their existence the j^oung Soviet Republics of Lithuania and Byelorussia were attacked by gentry- ridden Poland, which had become the faithful agent of the Entente. Poland was indebted for her independence to the October Socialist Rev- olution, but the Polish capitalists and landlords were filled with mortal hatred of Soviet Russia, for the revolution had deprived them of vast estates and capital invested in the Ukraine, Byelorussia and Lithuania. Hence, notwithstanding the repeated peace offers of the Soviet government, gentry-ridden Poland broke off diplomatic relations with Russia and with the assistance of the Entente moved her troops to the frontiers of Soviet Lithuania and Soviet Byelorussia.

The Congresses of Soviets of Lithuania and Byelorussia decided to miite their forces against the White Poles and at a joint meeting of the Central Executive Committees of the Lithuanian and Byelorussian Republics a government for the united Lithuanian-Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic was formed.

The government of the R.S.F.S.R. rendered the young Soviet Republics all the assistance it could. Y. M. Sverdlov sent them men with experience in Soviet and Party work, and Lenin and Stalin helped them to form a Red Army for the purpose of combating the White Poles.

In the spring of 1919, the White Poles laimched an offensive and in April they captured Vilna, the capital of Lithuania.

The government of the R.S.F.S.R. sent units of the Red Army to Byelorussia to assist the fraternal Soviet Republics of Lithuania and Byelorussia. In June 1919, Sergo Orjonikidze, then a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Sixteenth Army, was sent to the Western Front, where he organized the resistance to the White Poles. The Red Army entrenched itself on the river Berezina.

In the parts of Lithuania and Byelorussia they captured, the Polish invaders restored private property and returned the factories to the capitalists and the land to the landlords. Scores of villages were burned to the ground and the peasants were robbed of their grain and cattle.

Under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party the workers and peasants of Byelorussia organized partisan detachments which operated in the rear of the "White Poles and also in the frontline areas. In con- junction with the Red Army, these detachments waged a determined struggle against the Polish aggressors for the freedom and independence of their country.

Defeat of the Three Entente Campaigns

The Defeat of Kolchak

The Entente’s Plans in the Spring of 1919

After defeating Germany and her allies, the Entente concentrated all its attention on the struggle against the Soviet Republic. By the spring of 1919, the prep- arations for an oifensive by Kolchak’s forces on the Eastern Rront were completed. An army of nearly 300,000 men marched across the Urals with the object of reaching Moscow, its rear “covered” by British, French, American, Japanese and Czechoslovak detachments. Inter- ventionist forces totalling over 100,000 men helped Kolchak in his campaign against the Soviets. The Whiteguard detachments under the command of Yudenich, jointly with White Estonian and White Finnish forces, and with the active assistance of a British naval force, were to march against Petrograd. Denikin, together with the Don and Kuban Cossack armies under his command, was to move up from the South. General Miller was making preparations for an oifensive from the North, In the Ukraine, Whiteguard and Entente agents were preparing counter-revolutionary revolts of the bandit Hetman Gri- goryev. In Central Asia an attack was to be launched by the British invaders, supported by the Basmaohi. Such were the far-reaching plans for the Entente’s first campaign. As Stalin said: “This was a combined campaign, for it provided for a simultaneous attack by Kolchak, Denikin, Poland, Yudenich and the joint Anglo-Russian detachments in Turkestan and in Archangel, the pivot of the campaign being in Kolchak’s region” (J. Stalin, Speeches and Articles on the XJhraine, Kiev, 1936, Russ, ed., p. 90).

The Organization of Resistance to the Entente. On March 18, 1919, the Eighth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshe- viks) was opened. This congress showed that the Central Committee led by Lenin was indeed a “militant organ of a militant party in the period of the Civil War,”

The main item on the agenda of this congress was the question of the attitude to be adopted towards the middle peasants. As a result of the victory of the October Revolution there were more middle peas- ants in the rural districts than before the revolution. They consti- tuted the majority of the peasant population, but in the early part of 1918 still wavered between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Taking advantage of these waverings the Whiteguards succeeded in temporarily overthrowing Soviet rule in the Volga and other regions. Bitter experience, however, soon taught the middle peasants that the victory of the Whites meant the restoration of the rule of the landlords. In and following the autumn of 1918, the middle peasants swung over to the Soviet regime. This explains why Lenin at that time advanced the watchword: ‘TSlnow how to reach agreement with the middle peasant, while not for a moment renouncing the struggle against the kulak, and relying solidly and solely on the poor peasant. . . (V. I. Lenin, Collected Worhs^ Vol. XXIII, Moscow,

1934, Russ, ed., p. 294.)

After hearing Lenin’s report the congress passed a resolution de- manding that a strict distinctionbe drawn between the middle peasants and the kulaks and that close attention should be paid to the needs of the middle peasants. The congress adopted the policy of establish- ing a firm alliance with the middle peasants, and of relying upon the poor peasants, while preserving the leading role of the proletariat in this alliance.

Some of the army delegates at this congress formed what was called the ^‘military opposition,” which was headed by the defeated group of former ^‘^Left Communists.” This opposition tried to drag the Party back to partisan methods of warfare, opposed the employment of military experts in the Red Army, etc. The congress devoted a great deal of attention to the task of building up*the Red Army. Lenin and Stalin strongly attacked this “military opposition.” Comrade Stalin said: “Either we create a real worker and peasant — ^primarily a peasant — strictly-disciplined army, and defend the Republic, or we perish.”

The congress also strongly censured Trotsky for staffing the central establishments of the Eed Army with elements clearly hostile to So* viet rule and for cramping in every way the activities of the Commu- nists, and particularly of the Political Commissars, in the army. The congress passed a resolution calling for the strengthening of the Eed Arihy, and issued a special appeal to the workers and peasants, warn- ing them of the impending war danger and of the campaign being prepared by the Entente.

On March 18, 1919, on the day the Eighth Congress of the Party was opened, proletarian Moscow saw to his last resting place Y. M. Sverd- lov, the Chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, “the first man in the fiirst Soviet Socialist Republic,” “the first of the organizers of the broad masses of the proletariat,” as Lenin said of him. In his intense efforts to build up the Soviet State, Y. M. Sverdlov knew no rest. During one of his tours of the country he caught cold, fell seriously ill and died. The death of Sverdlov was a severe loss to the Party and to the Soviet State.

On March 30, 1919, on Leninas recommendation, M. I. Kalinin was elected Chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. Originally a Tver peasant, and later a highly skilled metal worker employed in St: Petersburg, Mildiail Ivanovich Kalinin was an outstanding example of one who combined in his revolutionary activities the revolutionary struggle of the Russian worker and of the Russian peasant, Lenin said the following:

“It is very difficult to find a real substitute for Comrade Yakov Mikhailovich Sverdlov. If we can find a comrade who combines expe- rience of life and knowledge of the life of the middle peasant we shall solve this problem, and I think that the nomination you have read in the newspapers today satisfi.es all these conditions. The nomination is that of Comrade Kalinin” (V. I. Lenin, Collected Worlcs^ Vol. XXIV, Moscow, 1937, Russ, ed., pp. 188-189).

Kolchak’s Regime in Siberia

In the spring of 1919, the bulk of the armed forces of the foreign interventionists were compelled to leave the Land of Soviets, but they left the Russian "Whiteguards their artillery, tanks and aircraft. The imperialists of the Entente had not abandoned intervention, they had merely entrusted tjhis task to their puppets, the Russian ^^iteguards. First among these was Admiral Kolchak, whom the British, French and American impe- rialists lavishly supplied with arms, army clothing, provisions and money. The people at that time noted Kolchak’s complete dependence upon his foreign masters even in ditties such as the following: Kolchak established a military monarchist dictatorship and restored the tsarist regime in Siberia. The Siberian peasants, who had never known landlordism, were reduced almost to the condition of serfs. Their grain and cattle were requisitioned, levies were imposed upon them, and they were compelled to pay not only arrears in taxes, but also taxes several years ahead. For the slightest display of resistance they were subjected to public flogging. Kolchak was exceptionally cruel in his treatment of the workers and Bolsheviks and had them shot without mercy.

Proclaiming the slogan “Eussia, united and indivisible,” Kolchak cruelly suppressed movements for national lib3ration. He refused to recognize the national autonomy of a single people inhabiting the territory he occupied. He even refused to recognize the Bashkir counter-revolutionary government headed by Validov, in spite of the fact that the latter served him faithfully. The discontented masses of the Bashkir people compelled Validov to appeal for assistance to the Soviet government.

To stimulate the formation of a united front of the working people against Kolchak and to expose the counter-revolutionary manoeuvres of the Bashkir nationalists, Lenin and Stalin sent a telegram to the Eevolutionary Committee in Ufa confirming the autonomy of Bash- kiria and granting an amnesty to the Bashkir government head.d by Validov. In March 1919, a decree of the Soviet government was issued, signed by Lenin and Stalin, concerning the formation of the Autonomous Soviet Bashkir Republic. The working people of Bashkiria enrolled in the Red Army to fight Kolchak , but the bourgeois nationalists continued to play their double game, merely waiting for the opportunity to overthrow the Soviet regime in Baslikiria.

Kolchak's Offensive and Defeat

In the beginning of 1919, Kolchak launched an offensive along -Sie whole of the Eastern Front. In the northern direction (Perm-Vyatka) , Kolchak’s Siberian Army continued operations against the Third Red Army, but thanks to the resolute operations of Comrades Stalin and Dzerzhinsky the Siberian Army’s advance was checked at Glazov. In March and the early part of April, 1919, Kolchak’s Western Army captured Ufa, Bugulma and Buguruslan and threatened Simbirsk and Samara. Kolchak’s middle group of troops which coimeotsd the Siberian and Western Armies, threatened Kazan. Finally , south of Ufa, and further towards Turkestan , the White Cossack armies of Duto v and Tolstoy threatened Orenburg and Uralsk. Kolchak’s offensive assumed threatening proportions and creat- ed the danger that the Eastern and Southern counter-revolutionary forces would lijik up. Kolchak planned to effect a junction with Denikin in the region of Saratov in order to form a single front for an ad- vance against Moscow. At that time Denikin had captured a part of the Donetz Basin. Yudenich launched an offensive against Petrograd.

The country was in grave peril; swift and determined measures had to be taken to defeat Kolchak.

On April 12, the “Theses of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in connection with the situation on the Eastern Front,” drafted by Lenin, were published in Pravda. In this document Lenin emphasized: “All our energies must be bent to the extreme to smash Kolchak” (V. I. Lenin, Selected Works, Two-VoL ed., VoL II, Moscow, 1947, p. 467). The Party issued the slogan: “Everything for the Eastern Front!”

In response to the appeal of the Party and of Lenin, Moscow and Petrograd sent one-fifth of their Communists and one-tenth of their trade union members to the front. The Young Communist League sent several thousand of the best of the youth to the Eastern Front. Volunteers were enlisted in every town. In the rear women took the places of the men who went off to the front.

The task of organizing the defeat of Kolchak was entrusted to M. V. Frunze, who was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Southern Group of the Eastern Front, and to V. V. Kuibyshev, who was appointed a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Eastern Front. During the Civil War, the veteran Bolshevik Mildiail Vassilyevich Frunze developed into a splendid proletarian military leader. As early as the autumn of 1918, he was sent as Commander of the Fourth Army to strengthen the Eastern Front. Backed by the textile workers who came to his assistance, Frunze quickly restored revolu- tionary order in the army and launched a successful offensive, first against the White Cossacks and then against Kolchak. In the fighting against Dutov, the White Cossacks and Kolchak, V. V. Kui- byshev was always with Frunze in the frontline positions wher- ever the fighting was hottest. Frunze and Kuibyshev trained a num- ber of splendid proletarian army commanders and political workers. One of such commanders and heroes was V. I. Chapayev, around whose name legends have been woven,

Vassili Ivanovich Chapayev was born in Chuvashia. As a boy he helped his father and grandfather who travelled from village to village on the Volga doing carpentry jobs. As a youth he suffered the severe barrack- discipline of the tsarist army and spent the best years of his life at the front during the imperialist war. The hardships he endured roused in his heart a burning hatred for the oppressors and exploiters. After the February revolution he returned to the Volga, joined the Bolshevik Party, and from the very first days of the October Revolution plunged into the struggle to establish and consoli- date the power of the Soviets.

At the end of April 1919, the Southern Group of the Red Army, which Frunze had formed with the assistance of his close colleagues Kuibyshev and Chapayev, launched a general offensive. In the beginning of May, the 25th Division, commanded by Cha- payev, fought successful battles at Buzuluk and Buguruslan. On May 13, the Red Army cap- tured Bugulma and the White armies retreated towards Ufa. At this crucial moment Trotsky treacherously proposed that the Red Army’s offensive against Ufa should be halted and that part of the troops should be transferred from the Eastern Eront to the Southern Front, Had this proposal been carried out, the Urals, with its indus- trial plants, would have re- mained under Kolchak’s con- trol, and this would have ena- bled him to recover from his defeat. Frunze strongly opposed Trotsky’s order and was sup- ported by Lenin, who demand- ed that the Urals should be liberated before the winter set in.

Under Frunze’s leadership the Red Army forced the river Belaya and battled for Ufa.

Chapayev’s division repulsed the counter-attacks of Kolchak’s picked corps commanded by Kappel, and after fierce fighting the Red troops captured Ufa. Kolchak’s army rapidly retreated eastwd. The Red Army pursued the retreating Kolchak forces and reached the foothills of the Urals. On July 13, it captured Zlatoust, thus opening the road into Siberia, and on July 14, Ekaterinburg (now Sverdlovsk). ,

Meanwhile, fierce guerilla warfare was waged m Kolchak s rear by partisan detachments composed of workers and peasants from the Urals and Siberia. At the same time, the Red Army com- menced offensive operations against Kolchak’s allies, the White

Chapayev’s 25th Division was transferred to the Ural hront, and there fought its way forwards to the relief of Uralsk, which h.ad been heroically holding its besiegers at bay for the past two months. Chapayev liberated Uralsk and drove the White Cossacks towards the Caspian Sea. On September 5, 1919, his headquarters in the stanitsa of Lbishohenskaya was surrounded by White Cossacks who had broken through from the rear. Finding himself surrounded by the enemy, Chapayev fought his way to the river Ural into which he plunged, but he was wounded while in the water, and was drowned. The image of Chapayev is engraved in the hearts of the So- viet people forever.

The Eed Army had dealt Kolchak a shattering blow, but he still retained some of his forces and tried to put up resistance. In August, Lenin published “A Letter to the Workers and Peasants in Connection with the Victory over Kolchak,” in which he warned that ‘‘the enemy is still far from being destroyed. He has not even been definitely broken. Every effort must be made to drive Kolchak and the Japanese and the other alien marauders out of Siberia. . . (V. I. Lenin,

Selected Works, Two-Vol. ed., Vol. II, Moscow, 1947, p. 518.)

At this jimcture Denikin in the South, and Yudenich in the West, went into action in support of Kolchak.

The Fight for Astrakhan

After capturing North Caucasus, Denikin made a drive for the Volga in order to join forces with Kolchak. At that time a stronghold of the revolution which pro- tected the mouth of the Volga against the Whiteguards and prevent- ed Kolchak and Denikin from effoctiiig a junction was Astrakhan* The defence of the city was organized by S. M. Kirov, who had arrived there in January 1919. The situation in Astrakhan was one of great difficulty. The armed forces available were few. After a heroic march through the waterless Astrakhan steppe, the remnants of the Eleventh Army arrived, but nearly the whole force was sick with typhus. Typhus and scurvy were rampant in the city itself. The inhabitants were starving. The counter-revolutionaries openly conducted anti-Soviet propaganda. There were few industrial workers in the city. The city was beset on all sides by the enemy, Kolchak’s troops and White Cossacks moving from the East and Denikin’s forces from the West. Warships of the British interventionists were almost at the mouth of the Volga.

Kirov set up a Revolutionary Military Committee and established revolutionary order. The Revolutionary Military Committee issued the warning: “Bandits and marauders will be shot on the spot.’^ The saboteurs were told: “He who does not wish to work shall not eat. Available provisions will be issued only to those who work for Soviet Russia.” '

Help came to Astrakhan in the shape of the Volga Flotilla which the Bolsheviks of Nizhni Novgorod, under the direction of L- M. Kaganovich, had in the spring of 1918, formed out of river steamers and cutters covered with armour plate and mounted with guns. To reinforce the Volga Flotilla Lenin sent several light torpedo boats from Kronstadt via the canals of the Mariinsky system. Under Kirov's personal direction, the combined flotilla, numbering about forty vessels, crossed the dangerous shallows to the Caspian Sea where the British were in control. By a sudden raid Kirov captured the radio station by which Denikin maintained communication with Kolchak, and from Denikin’s reports he learned that one of Denikin’s generals had been sent to Kolchak with the plans of future operations. This general was captured together with the plans.

Bierce fighting raged around Astrakhan. Kirov mobilized all forces to resist the enemy. At a conference of Party members that was held on August 3, 1919, he said: ''As long as there is a single Communist left in the Astrakhan Region the mouth of the Volga will always remain Soviet’^ At this juncture Trotsky sent an order from General Head- quarters to evacuate Astrakhan for the purpose of ‘'straightening out the front.” Kirov appealed directly to Lenin and urged that Ast- rakhan must be held at all costs. Lenin sent the following reply: “Defend Astrakhan to the last.” Kirov carried out Lenin’s order.

The Defeat of Yudenich near Petrograd

To assist Kolchak the imperialists, in the spring of 1919, organized an offensive against Petrograd under the command of General Yudenich, who was sup- ported by White Finns, White Estonians and a British naval squadron. The Red Army’s forces near Petrograd had been weakened by the transfer of its best units to other fronts. A British spy was organizing a large-scale military plot in Petrograd. In his service were former army officers serving as military experts in the Red Army, and they seized the Kronstadt forts of Krasnaya Gorka and Seraya Loshad. Spies and conspirators were busy at Red Army Headquar- ters in Petrograd. The foreign diplomatic missions had stocks of machine guns, grenades and bombs to be used in the counter-revolu- tionary revolt that was to take place in Petrograd. Zinoviev and his supporters were spreading panic and consternation. Yudenich ’s forces were approaching Petrograd.

The Party sent to the Petrograd Front that tried organizer of victory, Comrade Stalin. He conducted a drive against 8|i:s, and ordered the Red Baltic Fleet to capture the mutinous forts from the sea. In spite of the assurances given to Comrade Stalin by military experts that this operation was doomed to failure, the gallant sailors of the cruiser Oleg and the battleships Petro'pavlovsh and Andrei Pervo- zvanny braved the guns on the forts, drove close in and subjected them to a heavy bombardment. On June 16, Stalin’s order was carried out, Krasnaya Gorka was cleared of mutineers. This fort was renamed Krasnoflotski (Red Fleet) in honour of the gallant Red Navy men who captured it. Seraya Loshad also surrendered and was subsequently renamed Peredovoi (Advanced).

Tbe British, squadron came to Yudenich’s assistance. It attempted to attack Kronstadt, but it met with heroic resistance.

The Red forces began to push back the Whites all along the line. Stalin reported to Lenin that the offensive was proceeding successfully and that the Whites were in flight. In August 1919, Yudenich’s army was defeated and its remnants retreated to Estonia.

The Defeat of Denikin

Denikin Launches an Offensive

The defeat of Kolchak did not discourage the leaders of the Entente. They prepared a “cam- paign of fourteen countries” against Soviet Russia, to be;^in in the autumn of 1919. Apart from the Entente countries, Poland, Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, the Transcaucasian bourgeois govern- ments and the Whiteguard forces in Russia and in the Ukraine were to be included in the campaign. But the governments of the border' (limitrophe) bourgeois states did not trust the tsarist generals who dreamed of restoring “Russia, united and indivisible.” Tne contra- dictions within the camp of the bourgeoisie, and above all the resistance offered by the Red Army, resulted in the campaign falling through. The Entente concentrated all its attention on assisting General Denikin, their last hope in the struggle against Soviet Russia. Thus was prepared the Entente’s second campaign.

As Comrade Stalin wrote: “The Entente’s second campaign was launched in the autumn of 1919. This was also a combined campaign, for it involved a simultaneous attack by Denikin, Poland and Yudenioh (Kolchak had been struck out of account). This time the pivot of the campaign is the South, in Denikin’s region” (J. Stalin, Articles and Speeches on the Ukraine ^ Kiev, 1936, Russ, ed., p. 91).

On July 3, Denikin ordered an offensive on Moscow. His forces advanced in three columns: one, under the command of Wrangel moved along the line of the Volga; the centre was formed by the army of the Don, and the lefb flank was formed of Denikin’s picked troops, the so-called Volunteer Army. To hasten the capture of Moscow, Denikin sent into action a cavalry force under the command of Mamon- tov. It operated in the rear of the Red armies of the Southern Front, and raided the towns of Tambov, Kozlov and Eiets. On October 6, the Whites captured Voronezh. On October 13, Denikin captured Orel and marched on Tula. At this juncture Yudenioh launched another offensive against Petrograd.

The landlords and capitalists felt certain that the fall of Moscow was only a matter of days. The capitalists of the Donetz Region offered a prize of a million rubles to the first Denikin regiment to enter Moscow. One of Denikin’s armoured trains bore a destination plate with the inscription: '‘To Moscow.”

In the regions occupied by Denikin’s forces the workers and peasants were subjected to a reign of bloody terror. The Donetz coal fields ran with proletarian blood. The people called the Volunteer Army the “Robber Army.” As Kolchak had done in Siberia, Denikin in the areas he occupied returned the land to the landlords, restored the rule of the landlords and capitalists and re-established the monarchical regime. In the Ukraine the Ukrainian language was banned. The highland villages in North Caucasus were wiped off the face of the ea»rth'. Daghestan was proclaimed a part of “Russia, united and indi- visible.” In all the occupied regions the Volunteer Army was able to maintain itself only by means of ruthless terrorism.

Victory Over Denikin

On July 9, 1919, Lenin issued an ap- peal to the workers and peasants entitled “Everything for the Eight Against Denikin” in which he wrote: “The Soviet Republic . . . must become a single military camp, not in word but in deed. All the work of all institutions must be adapted to the war and placed on a military footing!”

Under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party and the Soviet govern- ment, the Land of Soviets exerted all efforts to defeat Denikin.

During the summer and autmnn of that year the Party conducted “Party weeks” during which 200,000 new members joined its ranks, and these were forthwith sent to the front and to the sectors where the constructive work of the Soviets had to face the greatest ob- stacles. The Young Communist League displayed supreme devo- tion to the revolution. Often there were notices on the doors of the Y, C. L, premises stating: “The Committee is closed down. Everybody has gone to the front.”

The Central Committee of the Party entrusted the task of organ! z- ing the defeat of Denikin to Comrade Stalin. After studying the situa- tion on the Southern Front, Comrade Stalin rejected Trotsky’s treach- erous plan to conduct the offensive against Denikin by way of Tsar- itsyn-Novorossiisk. In a letter to Lenin, Comrade Stalin wrote;

“It is therefore necessary right away, without loss of time, to alter the old plan, which experience has already discredited, and replace it by a plan according to which the main attack will be launched on Rostov — ^by way of Kharkov and the Donetz Basin:

“Firstly, here we shall be in surroundings which are not hostile, but on the contrary sympathetic to us, a circumstance which will facilitate our advance.

“Secondly, we shall secure an extremely important railway system {that of the Donat z Basin and the main artery feeding Denikin’s army — the Voronezh-Rostov line. . . .) ‘‘Thirdly, by this advance we will cut Denikin’s army in two. One part, the Volunteer Army, we shall leave for Makhno to de- vour, while the other, the Cossack army, we shall threaten with an attack in the rear.

“Fourthly, we shall be in a position to set the Cossacks quarrelling with Denikin, who, if our advance is successful, will try to move the Cossack units to the West, to which the majority of the Cossacks will not agree. , . .

“Fifthly, we shall secure coal, while Denikin will be left with- out coal” (K. E. Voroshilov, Stalin and the Bed Army, Moscow, 1942, p. 23).

Lenin approved of Stalin’s plan and conceded his demand that Trotsky should not be allowed to have any say in the affairs of the Southern Front.

To carry out Stalin’s plan a special group of ’ shock troops was formed and placed under the command of Stalin’s colleague, Sergo Orjonikidze. An extremely important place in the plan was assigned to the operations of Budyonny’s cavalry.

Operating in conformity with Stalin’s plan, the Red troops, on October 20, 1919, liberated Orel from the Whites. On October 24, Budyonny’s Cavalry Corps, which had only just defeated Denikin’s cavalry under the command of Mamontov, liberated Voronezh by a lieroio surprise attack whose audacity and precipitation stunned the Whites, In this operation the Red cavalry were supported by a detachment of Voronezh workers and railwaymen under the command of L. M. Kaganovich. Budyonny inflicted another defeat on the White cavalry at Kastomaya. During these battles the Soviet cavalry grew and became firmly welded. In November, on Comrade Stalin’s recommendation, the First Cavalry Army was formed. S. M. Budyon- ny was appointed commander ol this army, and K. E. Voroshilov a member of its Revolutionary Military Council.

The Cavalry Army never sustained defeat. Nearly all its command- ers came from the ranks of the workers and peasants and had led the partisan struggle against the Whiteguards. The First Cavalry Army produced many valiant heroes, such as Morozov, Parkhomenko, Dun- dich, and others.

Meanwhile, partisan units were active in Denikin’s rear in the Ukraine. This partisan movement was led by the Bolshevik under- ground organizations and was assisted by the peasants, who gave the partisans concealment when necessary.

The atrocities that Denikin’s hordes committed roused the hatred of the peasants and swept them into the ranks of the fighters for the power of the Soviets. In the village of Golubovka, in the Ekaterino- slav Gubernia, for example, the Whites captured a partisan, cut a five-pointed star on his breast and then cut out his heart. The effect of this atrocity was to bring 300 additional peasants from the villages in the neighbourhood of Golubovka into the partisan struggle against the Whites. Numerous cases of a similar kind occurred.

The Young Communist League also played a heroic part in the underground struggle against Denikin. The young Soviet heroes displayed no less courage and fortitude under torture in the dungeons of Denikin’s counter-intelligence department than was displayed by the adult workers and peasants. There was the case, for example, of the nine members of the Young Communist League of Odessa, one of whom, Dora Luharskaya, wrote as follows in the letter she sent to her comrades just before her death: ‘Dear Comrades, I shall die as honestly as I have lived during my short life. Only now do I really feel like a conscious revolutionary and Party worker. How I behaved under arrest, and when I was sentenced, my comrades will tell you. They say I be- haved like a briok. All of us, the condemned, are behaving well, we are cheerful. . . . Soon, very soon, the whole of the Ukraine will breathe freely and real constructive work will commence, I am only sorry that I shall not be able to take part in it.”

The revolt of the workers and peasants against the Whites spread far and wide in all the districts occupied by Denikin’s forces.

’ After sustaining defeat at Orel, Kastomaya and Voronezh, Deni- kinas army rapidly retreated southwards to the Black Sea ports. In the beginning of January 1920, the First Cavalry Army, tireless in pursuit of the Whites, occupied Eostov-on-Don, and on March 27, 1920, Novorossiisk, the WThites’ last stronghold on the Black Sea coast, fell. The second campaign of the Entente, who had organized Denikin’s offensive, was defeated as thoroughly as the first had been. In his “Letter to the Workers and Peasants of the Ukraine in Conneo* tion with the Victories over Denikin,” Lenin wrote: “Denikin must be vanquished and destroyed, and such incursions as his not allowed to recur. That is to the fundamental interest of both the Great-Bus- sian and the Ukrainian workers and peasants. The fight will be a long and hard one, for the capitalists of the whole world are helping Deni- kin and will help Denikins of every kind” (V. I. Lenin, Selected Works ^ Two-Vol. ed., Vol 11, Moscow, 1947, p. 551).

The organizer of the Red Army’s victory over Denikin was J. V. Stalin.

In November 1919 the All-Eussian Central Executive Committee, in recognition of Comrade Stalin’s tremendous services on the different jhonts during the Civil War, conferred upon him the country’s highest award — the Order of the Red Banner.

The Rout of Yudenich

At the time when Denikin was at the height of success Yudenich launched another attack upon Petro- grad. The Whiteguards were supplied with tanks by the British, and the entire West-European press confidently prophesied the early capture of Petrograd. Lenin sent the workers of Petiograd an order not to surrender the capital. The Communists and Young Communist Leaguers of Petrograd were mobilized to defend the city. Women and old men went to the front. Whole workers’ families went out to dig trenches. The factories worked day and night producing materials for the city’s defence. The workers themselves unearthed traitors and spies, searched the whole city and confiscated arms from the bourgeoisie. Proletarian Petiogriid was converted into a fortiess. Machine guns wcie posted at the windows of the houses. The daily ration for ^rorkers amounted to half a pound of bread and one salt herring, but the spirit of Red Petrograd was indomitable.

On October 21, the Seventh Red Army launched a counter-offensive with tremendous enthusiasm, and on October 26 captured Krasnoye Selo. On November 14, the Red forces captured Yamburg and took the greater part of Yudenioh’s army prisoner. Yudenich’s soldiers killed their officers and went over to the Red Army. The peasants harassed the rear of the retreating Whiteguards.

That was how Yudenich’s army faded away.

The defeat of Denikin and Yudenich accelerated the utter defeat of Kolchak. In the autumn of 1919, the Red Army quickly checked Kolchak’s attempt to advance in the region of Tobolsk. Amidst the severe frosts of Siberia the Red Army drove the exhausted Kolchak army across the Siberian steppes, through the taiga to the East. The Red Army liad powerful allies in the Rod partisans of the Urals and Siberia. The Bolsheviks took the lead in the struggle to establish Soviet power in Siberia. On November 14, 1919, the Red Army captured Omsk, Kolchak’s capital, and on January 15, 1920, entered Irkutsk. Kolchak was arrested and shot. Soviet rule was established in Siberia.

Socialist Construction during the Civil War

The Policy of War Communism

During the Civil .War the Soviet Republic was a besieged military camp. The interventionists surrounded her and * operated an economic blockade. The forces of counter-revolution out off the proletarian centres from the regions which supplied food and raw materials. The lack of raw materials, fuel and food caused a drop in production. In 1919 industrial output was only one-fourth of pre-war. Workers who had not gone to the front dispersed to the rural districts. The existence of numerous fronts put a tremendous strain upon the Soviet State. It was neces- sary to supply the army with bread, arms, footwear and clothing. To hold out and supply food to the essential categories of workers and the Red Army the Soviet State made a register of all stocks of food, fuel and manufactured goods. In addition to the big enter- prises, medium and even small enterprises were nationalized.

On January 24, 1919, the Couneil of People’s Commissars issued a decree introducing surplus appropriations, in conformity with which the peasants were obliged to deliver to the state at fixed prices all stocks of food over and above their own requirements. Lenin explained the need for the mf^asure as follows: ‘‘If you, the peasant, offer a loan to the state and give your grain, the worker will be able to restore industry. . . . There is no other way out!” (V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. XXIV, Moscow, 1937, Russ, ed,, pp. 409-410.)

Pood was rationed on a strictly class basis. The bourgeoisie re- ceived one-fourth of the workers’ ration, but children received rations at a higher rate.

The Soviet Stp.,te introduced compulsorj’ labour service for all classes. In drawing the bourgeoisie into work the Soviet State applied the principle: “He who does not work, neither shall he eat.” Military methods, iron discipline had to be established in all Soviet, economic and trade union organizations; commissars were appointed or political departments set up in place of elected leaders. In tlie war area and aieas libeiaied from the Whites, Revolutionary Com- mittees were set up in place of elected Soviets, The whole of this system of measures, measures evoked by the conditions re.«;ultiRg from the country’s defence, was designated by the term “War Com- munism.”

The Civil War made it necessary to put the whole life of the country on a war footing. Only such a policy could guarantee the proletariat a firm rear and an invincible front. Only the strictest discipline, organ- ization and centralization enabled the working class and the peasantry to organize victory over an immeasurably more powerful enemy.

Economic and Cultural Development in the Period of the Civil War

During the Civil War and foreign intervention the entire life of the country was subordinated to the interests of the war fronts; but even when conditions were most severe, when hunger, cold, epidemics, counter-revolutionary conspiracies and revolts and the hardships and dangers of war prevailed , the working class of the Land of Soviets continued the work of reorganizing all aspects of social life.

In the very first months after the establishment of Soviet power Lenin devoted considerable attention to the problem of elec- trifying the coimtry. On his recommendation preparations were commenced in 1918 for the erection of a powerful hydroelectric plant on the river Volkhov, known as the Volkhovstroy project. In 1919, the erection of an electric power plant at Kashira, near Moscow, was start- ed. At the same time work was commenced on the erection of the Shatura power plant, which was to use as fuel the peat available in the district. Thanlcs to the invention of a Russian engineer, the problem of utilizing peat fuel was solved, and in 1920 the temporary Shatura power plant began to produce power. From 1918 to 1920, a fairly large number of small power plants was built. In 1920, the output ca- pacity of the electric power plants in Russia was even higher than pre-war, but tlie actual output was lower owing to the fact that most of the plants were idle due to the shortage of fuel.

The seizure of the Donetz coal region by the Whites and the dam- age they did to the collieries caused the fuel crisis to become excep- tionally acute. Wood became almost the only available form of fuel, but the cutting and transporting of logs was accompanied by enormous difdculties. The Council of Defence and the Council of Peo- ple’s Commissars drew up a number of measures to solve the fuel crisis. The railways were militarized and the transportation of wood fuel was put on a par with the transportation of war supplies. In KTovember 1919, compulsory labour service was introduced for the preparation, loading and unloading of fuel of all kinds, and the peasants were obliged to supply transport facilities to cart wood logs to the railways and river ports. Thus, assisted by the self-sacrificing labours of the workers and peasants, and thanks to the firm discipline that was introduced, the Soviet Republic gradually emerged from the fuel crisis.

The food situation too was extremely acute for the working people - True, the People’s Commissariat of Pood collected three times more grain in the 1918-1919 season than in the preceding year, and in the following year it collected nearly 3,000,000 tons of grain; but this was an infinitesimal amount compared with the needs of the civilian population and the army. The state was able to supply the workers with only half the food products they required, the rest had to be purchased on the open market from speculators who charged exorbitant prices.

To combat profiteering, the co-operative societies were given the responsibility of purchasing jfrom the peasants produce not liable to delivery under the surplus appropriations system. The workers were also encouraged by the Soviet government to cultivate vege- table plots.

On February 14, 1919, a decree was issued introducing socialist agrarian legislation and measures for the transition to socialist agriculture. The decree contained a number of measures for assisting the socialist sector of agriculture, namely, the state farms and col- lective farms. During the two years the proletarian dictatorship had been in existence 900 large state farms and 6,960 agricultural communes and co-operative farms were organized. The collective farms covered an area of over 3,000,000 hectares. The overwhelming majority of the peasants, however, remained small individual farmers.

Epidemics, particularly typhus, were a formidable menace at that time to the Land of Soviets. In a speech at the Seventh Congress of Soviets Lenin said: “We cannot imagine the horrors that have over- taken the localities infested by typhus. The population is helpless, en- feebled and bereft of material resources. All life, all public activity, is commg to a standstill. We say: 'Comrades, all our attention must be devoted to this problem. Either the lice triumph over Socialism, or Socialism will triumph over the lice!’” (V. I. Lenin, Selected Works, VoL VIII, Moscow, 1936, p. 72.)

To combat epidemics, the Soviet government mobilized about a thousand doctors, who worked with self-sacrificing devotion to save the working people. Free medical assistance was introduced for the working people and many rich mansions were converted into hospi- tals, dispensaries, creches and consultation centres.

During the Civi. War years masses of workers were given apart- ments in bourgeois houses, in most cases rent free. Electric light and other municipal services were also free.

Even during the most difi6.cult periods of the Civil War the Soviet State continued its cultural activity among the workers and peasants. At this time about 10,000,000 children attended school in Soviet Russia, whereas in tsarist Russia, which covered a far larger area, only about 8,000,000 children attended school. The Soviet school- teachers remained faithful to the people and vigorously set to work to reorganize the schools and adapt them to the needs and interests of the working people. Not infrequently they worked on empty stomac-is and in freezing schoolrooms, and taught both children and adults in spite of the shortage of paper, books and writing materials.

An enormously important part in the cultural awakening of the people was played by the Party and Soviet newspapers, which reached the most remote corners of the country. In the towns, theatres and work- ers ’ clubs were opened, which provided free entertainment for masses of people who had never gone to theatres before.

Public dining rooms were opened to relieve workingwomen of the drudgery of the kitchen.

Particular attention was paid by the Soviet government to the struggle against child vagrancy, which became a mass phenomenon. On Lenin’s recommendation, the All-Russian Extraordinary Commis- sion, under the direction of Felix Dzerzhinsky, organized children’s colonies where homeless waifs were trained in industrious habits.

During the period of the Civil War the working class set splendid examples of new forms of Communist labour. Communist subbotniks — the voluntary turn-out of masses of workers to perform work of public importance — ^became a regular sight. The first Commu- nist subbotnik was organized on May 10, 1919, by the workers on the Moscow-Kazanskaya Railway. Lenin called it ‘'a great initiative,” seeing in these subbotniks the beginning of the new, Communist form of work, and the embryo of the new labour discipline of sooiaL ist society.

The Respite in the Spring of 1920

After Kolchak and Denikin were defeated the Soviet Republic received a brief respite. The Red Army's victory, and the struggle whioli the workers in the capitalist countries had waged against intervention and the blockade, had strength* ened Soviet Russia’s international position. In February 1920, peace with Soviet Russia was concluded by Estonia, the first country to do so. “Peace with Estonia,” said Lenin, “is an unprecedented victory over world imperialism. ...” (V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. XXV, Moscow, 1937, Russ, ed., p. 23.)

During the Civil War the Soviet government repeatedly invited the Entente powers to conclude peace, but all its offers were rejected.

In the beginning of December 1919, the Seventh All-Russian Con- gress of Soviets adopted, on Lenin ’s motion, a special resolution reajBdrm- ing “its undeviating desire for peace,” and inviting the Entente powers to enter into peace negotiations, either collectively or sever- ally. This was the eleventh time Soviet Russia had offered to nego- tiate peace, but this time too the offer was rejected. It was not until January 1920, after the main forces of the counter-revolution had been defeated, that the Supreme Council of the Entente decided to call off the economic blockade of Soviet Russia. This decision did not mean that the Entente had dropped the idea of further attempts at intervention. The imperialists were simply waiting for an opportunity to incite gentry -ridden Poland against Soviet Russia. Lenin warned the country of this in March 1920 when lu‘ wrote: “We know that France is instigating Poland and is spending millions there. . . (V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. XXV, Moscow, 1937,

Russ, ed., p. 58.)

The Soviet State took all measures to save the workers and peasants from another war. In January 1920, the Council of People’s Commissars invited Poland to enter into peace negotiations, but the Polish gentry did not respond. On February 2, the Soviet govern- ment issued an appeal to the Polish people calling upon them to put a stop to the war and to commence a joint struggle against famine and economic chaos, but the Polish gentry kept this appeal from the Polish people. In the beginning of March 1920, the Soviet government made Poland a third offer of peace, but again Poland failed to answer and, with the assistance of the Entente, continued to arm. Thus, the danger of war still existed and it was impossible to demobilize the Red Army. While remaining under arms, many of the units of the Red Army were employed cutting timber for fuel, harvesting the crops and repairing the railways. A number of Red Army units stationed in the Urals, in Siberia and in the Ukraine were transformed into Labour Armies. In February 1920, a Committee for Universal Labour Service was set up. The Council of Workers’ and Peasants’ Defence was transformed into a Council of Labour and Defence, and .a State Planning Commission (Gosplan) was set up to assist it.

Displaying enormous heroism and perseverance, the Soviet people utilized the brief respite to combat hunger, cold and epidemics. The economic situation in the Soviet Republic was extremely grave. Stocks of raw materials and fuel had run out. Coal output was only a fourth of the pre-war figure; the production of pig iron was only 3 per cent of pre-war, and the output of cotton textiles was only 5 per cent of pre-war. The area under cultivation and the crop yields had shrunk considerably. After the liberation of the grain-growing regions the food situation somewhat improved, but the dislocation of the rail- ways rendered the transportation of grain extremely difficult. As many as 60 per cent of the locomotives in the country were out of commis- sion.

The Soviet government took measures to strengthen the food admin- istration and the work of the latter improved. Several thousand Communists were sent to work on the railways, and skilled workers were recalled from the front and sent into industry.

The Ninth Congress of the Bolshevik Party which was opened on March 29, 1920, discussed questions connected with the utilization of the respite for economic development and decided to begin by restor- ing the railways, improving the fuel supply, and restoring the iron and steel industry.

Lenin and Stalin upheld the necessity of strengthening one-man management in industry. In the early period of the Soviet regime col- legial management had been the rule, and this had served as a good school for the training of Soviet administrative personnel. But during the Civil War, when there was a particular need for swift decisions on problems as they arose and for individuals to be personally responsible for the fulfilment of these decisions^ collegial manage- ment proved to be a hindrance. Hence, the Ninth Congress of the Party resolved to “establish complete and absolute one-man management in workshops and shops, to work towards one-man management of whole factories, and to reduce collegial management at the middle and higher levels of the administrative and industrial apparatus.”

At the congress this decision was opposed by a group which included many former “Left Communists,” and which called for “democratic centralism.” Distorting the Bolshevik principle of democratic central- ism, they demanded the election of managements under all circum- stances, the loosening of discipline, demanded unrestricted “collegial management,” and opposed one-man management in industry and Soviet administration. At a time when the country was mustering every ounce of strength for the struggle, the “democratic centralists” caused disruption in the ranlcs of the Party and weakened the dictatorship of the proletariat, thereby assisting the worst enemies of the Soviet State who were preparing to attack it again. At this time also Trotsky came out with a pernicious proposal to convert the temporary measures to militarize labour which had been called forth by the exigencies of the Civil War and economic chaos, into a permaneDt system of leading the working class and the peasantry. In particular, he proposed that the Labour Armies should be made permanent institutions, for he regarded coercion as the natural method by which the working class should lead the peasantry.

The Party, which during the Civil War had done its utmost to strengthen the military and political alliance between the working ■class and the middle peasants, rejected all these proposals which could only have led to disaster.

The Defeat of the White Poles and Wrangel

War with Gentry-ridden Poland

The respite which the Soviet Republic enjoyed came to an end in the spring of 1920, when the Entente launched another campaign against the country. This time the Entente chose for its tools gentry-ridden Poland and the Whiteguard General Wrangel, who had mustered the remnants of Denikin’s army in the Crimea,

Describing this third Entente campaign against Soviet Russia, Comrade Stalin wrote: “ . . . The campaign which gentry -ridden Poland has launched against workers’ and peasants’ Russia is in fact an Entente campaign. . . . The point is, &st, that Poland could not have organized her attack on Russia without the assistance of the En- tente; that primarily France, and then Great Britain and America, are giving every support to Poland’s offensive with arms, equipment, money and instructors” (J. Stalin, Articles and Speeches on tM Ukraine^ Kiev, 1936, Russ, ed., p. 90).

The Polish imperialists had taken an active part in all the En- tente’s campaigns against Soviet Russia, and in obedience to the French imperialists, Pilsudski, the head of the Polish state, had an- swered the Soviet government’s repeated peace offers by proposing terms that were nothing more than the provocation of another war.

In April 1920, the Whiteguard Poles', believing that Soviet Russia was not ready for another war and that the Red Army was war- wearv , invaded the Ukraine without declaring war . Their aim was to seize the XJkraine, Byelorussia and Lithuania, and by annexing these Soviet Republics to form a “Great Poland” that was to stretch from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. The Polish gentry hoped to gain control of Ukrainian grain and Donetz coal. They received the help of those betrayers of the Ukrainian people, the Petliura-ites, who promised to grant estates to the Polish landlords if their government recognized Petliura as head of the Ukrainian (counter- revolutionary) government. The Poles oommenced their offensive by hurling an army of 50,000 men against a force of 15,000 Red Army men, which was then operating in the Ukraine. Thanks to their numerical superiority, Pil- sudski’s troops were able, on May 6, to capture Kiev, and soon cap- tured nearly the whole of the Ukraine on the right bank of the Dnieper. To those districts where Polish landlords had formerly owned estates the interventionists sent punitive detachments which robbed the peas- ants not only of their land, but of all their grain stocks and cattle; and if they met with the slightest resistance they burned down vil- * lages and shot and flogged the peasants. In the village of Kocheriny (Byelorussia), for example, the miscreants, after setting fire to the peasants’ cottages, prevented the inmates, even women and children, from leaving them, and 200 persons were burned to death. In t‘ie towns and villages where Jews resided, the White Poles organized pogroms.

Thousands of Ukrainian and Byelorussian workers and peasants rose up to fight the Polish gentry.

The command of the Red Army that was operating against the White Poles on the Southwestern Front was entrusted to Comrade Stalin. The First Cavalry Army, led by Voroshilov and Budyonny, was placed at the disposal of Comrade Stalin. It performed a heroic march of a thousand kilometres in full fighting order from Maikop to Uman, on the way clearing the rear of the Petliura and Makhno bands who were plundering the Ulcrainian villages.

In the beginning of June 1920, the First Cavalry Army pierced the Polish Front in the region of Kazatin, occupied Zhitomir and moved into the rear of the Polish forces. This break-through'' was of decisive importance in turning the tide of the war. On Pilsudski’s own confession, the First Cavalry Army roused dismay and panic in the ranks of the Polish army, which began rapidly to retreat from the region of Kiev and Berdichev. On Jime 12, Kiev was liberated from the White Poles.

Meanwhile, the Red Army was preparing for an offensive on the Western Front. By the beginning of July nearly 100,000 Soviet troops were concentrated here against 76,000 Poles. On July 4, the Red Army launched its offensive along the whole of the Lithuanian-Byelorussian Front and on July 11 liberated Minsk, which the Poles had occupied since August 1919. The masses of the working people in the Ukraine and Byelorussia welcomed their liberators with enthusiasm and joy.

In this war against the White Poles the Bed Army displayed not only exceptional heroism but also a high level of political under- standing. Many of the heroes of the Civil War greatly distinguished themselves. One of these was Grigori Ivanovich Kotovsky, “the bravest among the modest and the most modest among the brave,” as Comrade Stalin described him. In the beginning of 1918,Kotov- sky organized a partisan detach- ment to fight the Rumanian in- vaders. Later his detachment was incorporated in the Red Army and remained with it throughout the Civil War. He became a terror to the White Poles, and led the cavalry brigade which he com- manded, in the boldest attacks.

About the middle of Au- gust 1920, the Red Array com- menced a drive on Warsaw and Lvov. Alarmed by the victories ■of the Red Army, the Entente hastened to the aid of the Polish gentry. Thousands of machine guns and arti llery pieces and hun- dreds of aeroplanes and motor trucks were sent to Warsaw from France, and the French General Weygand arrived in Warsaw to organize the defence of Poland.

Earlier, Lord Curzon, the British Foreign Secretary, had called upon the Soviet government to stop the offensive and conclude an armi- stice with Poland, threatening to declare war in the event of a refus- al. Curzon ’s aim was to secure a respite for the Poles, and conse- quently, the Soviet government rejected this note.

The Red Army continued its offensive, but the Soviet government declared that it was willing to open peace negotiations with Poland, but without intermediaries.

On July 22, the Polish government sent a request for the opening of peace negotiations. The Soviet government agreed. Negotiations were opened, but were broken off several days later by Poland. The Red Army resumed its offensive.

At this time the First Cavalry Army laid siege to Lvov. In a telegram to Red Army General Headquarters dated August 21, Comrade Voroshilov urged the necessity of capturing Lvov in order to inflict a crushing defeat upon the Poles. The High Command, however, which was headed by the traitor Trotsky , ordered the siege of Lvov to be raised, ostensibly for the purpose of reinforcing the drive against War- saw. This was downright treachery, for Trotsky’s orders deprived the Southwestern Front of its major striking force. The capture of Lvov and the further advance of the First Red Cavalry Army to the principal industrial centres of Poland would have been the best assistance that could be rendered the Western Front. By his action Trotsky rendered direct assistance to the Poles and the Entente. As for the Red Army offensive on Warsaw, it proceeded in an absolutely disorganized fashion, through the fault of the traitors Trotsky and Tukhachevsky* The Red Army, after fighting its way forward for almost 600 kilometres, became separated from its reserves. Supplies of ammunition were late in arriving. Reinforcements failed to keep up with the rapidly advanc- ing main force. So strenuous was the advance that the Red Army men wore out their footwear and many were obliged to proceed barefooted. Although the badly-organized offensive on Warsaw ended in failure and the Red Army was obliged to retreat, gentry-ridden Poland, exhausted as a result of the war, was unable to fight any longer and offered to conclude peace.

Peace between Soviet Russia and Poland was signed in Riga in March 1921. In conformity with the Riga Peace Treaty the part of Byelorussia which the Poles had occupied at the beginning of the war was restored to Soviet Russia, but Western Byelorussia and Ukrainian Galicia were retained by Poland.

The Defeat of Wrangel

The Polish gentry ’ were to have re- ceived assistance from Baron Wrangel, who had established himself in the Crimea. As Lenin put it, gentry-ridden Poland and Wrangel were the two hands of international imperialism which wanted to strangle the Land of Soviets. With the assistance of the Entente, Wran- gel reorganized the remnants of Denikin’s army which had been trans- ported to the Crimea in Entente ships from ports in the Ukraine and Caucasia. The remnants of the Russian forces which had fought in France during the imperialist war were also sent to the Crimea to reinforce WrangeFsarmy. That was how Wrangel’s army was formed. The Entente also supplied him with arms, ammunition and provisions.

Lenin saw the danger looming in the Crimea, and as early as March 1920 demanded of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic that it prevent the concentration of a White army there. “Pay close attention to the obvious blunder which has hem committed in con- nection with the Crimea (failure to dispatch sufficient forces in time); concentrate all efforts on rectifying this blunder. . . he wrote. But the War Department failed to carry out Lenin’s instructions.

Lenin’s warning was particular^ justified because when the Whiteguard Poles launched their attack the Entente increased its pressure upon Soviet Russia. British naval forces were concentrated off the coasts of the Black and Baltic Seas. On April 4 and 6, 1920, Japan renewed her intervention in the Far East. France and Great Britain were supplying Wrangel with arms and helping him to prepare for an offenaive^ the first objective of which, on the demand of the French bourgeoisie, he was to make the occupy, tion of the Donctz Basin.

On July 7, 1920, Wrangel marched his forces out of the Crimea and occupied Northern Taurida. The Crimean ‘‘thorn” grew into a formidable danger, for Wrangel had got into the rear of the Ked Army which was operating on the Polish Front.

Comrade Stalin, who was directing operations on the South- western Front, took measures to smash WrangePs forces' which were creeping uji from the Crimea. By the beginning of August 1920, the units of the Red Army in action against Wiangel received additional reinforcements. The Red divisions } assed to the offensive, inflicted several defeats upon the enemy, but failed to exterminate him completely. Nevertheless, as a result of this offensive, the Red Army entrenched itself at Kakhovka, on the left bank of the Dnieper. Thus 'was established the famous Kakhovka bridgehead which threatened the rear of WrangePs army. Wrangel hurled his picked troops, rein- forced with tanks, against Kakhovka, but failed to capture it. The Kakhovka bridgehead, the formation of which had been planned by Comrade Stalin, was an extremely important factor in bringing about the utter defeat of the "‘Black Baron,” as Wrangel w^as called.

In the beginning of August the forces operating against Wrangel were formed into a sei^arate fi:ont. The Party instructed Comrade Stalin to concentrate his efforts entirely upon this front, but illness prevented him from consummating the liquidation of Wrangel. M. V. Frunze was placed in command of the Southern Front. Frunze’s plan of operations was to cut off WrangePs army from the Isthmus of Perekop and inflict defeat upon him before he could take cover behind the fortifications of Perekop. Using the Kakhovka bridgehead as his base, he laimched a drive with the object of surrounding WrangePs forces. The First Cavalry Army', which had been transferred to the Southern Front, broke through into the rear of WrangePs army. In the beginning of October, Wrangel made another attempt to capture Kakhovka and hurled fouiteen tanks, ten ar- moured cars and infantry armed with 600 heavy machine guns against it. But the tank attack was repulsed. The Red Army men rushed at the tanks and pelting them with hand grenades, (kove them off. The October battles at Kakhovka marked the beginning of WrangePs defeat.

On October 28 the Red Army launched a general offensive on the Southern Front. Sanguinary fighting raged in Northern Taurida.

As a result of the battles fought from October 28 to November 2, WrangePs army was defeated. Nearly 20,000 prisoners were taken. Nevertheless, WrangePs best troops succeeded in retreating to the Crimea and in taking cover behind the Perekop fortifications.

The Isthmus of Perekop is eight kilometres wide, and was intersected by the Turkish Wall, which was twenty metres high. In front of this wall there was a deep ditch stretching from the Black Sea on the one side to the swampy Sivash (or Putrid Sea — an inlet of the Azov Sea) on the other. On the wall were mounted about 200 guns. The whole Isthmus was covered with a dense network of barbed-wire entanglements. Near the village of Yushun, south of the Isthmus-, a second line of strong fortifications had been iDuilt. The Isthmus of Chongar, east of Perekop, was fortified no less strongly than Perekop, and a Whiteguard fleet was stationed there. With the aid of French army engineers Perekop was transformed into a first-class fortress. The only way to attack it was across a completely open and level terrain, or by wading across the Sivash. It proved impossible to make an outflanking movement viath& Tongue of Arabat, as this needed the support of the Red Fleet, which, however, was icebound in Taganrog Bay. Consequently, Frunze, ignor- ing the advice of high military experts who regarded this as an absolutely hopeless undertaking, issued the order to storm Perekop. In the biting cold, in threadbare clothes, half starved, and lacking the necessary technical implements, the Red Army men proceeded with the preparations for breaking through the Perekop fortifications.

The Red Army was burning with desire to put an end to Wrangel as speedily as possible. One night the forward units of the 15th and 52nd Divisions, taking advantage of the fact that the wind had driv- en back the water of the Sivash, waded knee -deep across the muddy bed of the Rotten Sea to get into the rear of the Perekop fortifica- tions, dragging artillery and machine guns through the briny and icy water. When they reached the opposite shore, which was covered with barbed-wire entanglements, the wind changed, drove the water back into the Sivash, and cut off their retreat. The enemy opened a ter- rific fire. The heroic Red Army men rushed at the entanglements, threw their greatcoats over them and climbed over the barbed-wire obstacles. On November 8, the Soviet troops entrenched themselves on the shore of Litovsky Peninsula, threatening the rear of Perekop.

At about midday on November 8, the 51st Division launched a frontal attack against Perekop, but the first attempt to capture the Turkish Wall failed. Reinforcements were needed for a second assault, but by this time the water was returning to the Sivash, threatening to cut off the forces that were fighting on the Litovsky Peninsula. Calling in the assistance of the local Revolutionary Committees, Frunze mobi- lized the peasants of the surrounding villages to fight the incoming wa- ter. The peasants came out en massey brought along straw, dug ditch- es, and within a few hours built a dam which held up the incoming water. In this way, fresh reinforcements, ammunition and provisions were sent across the Sivash. At 2 a. m. the 61st Division made another assault on the Turkish Wall, and this time succeeded in capturing it.

After the capture of Perekop the last fortifications in the hands of the Whites were those near the village of Yushun. Frunze ordered the position to be attacked from the front and rear. On the night of November 10, the Yushun positions were captured and the White& retreated in panic. At this juncture a revolt against Wrangel broke out in the Crimea. Crimean partisans came down from the mountains and struck at the retreating White cavalry.

On November 10, Frunze telegraphed to Lenin: “Today our cavalry occupied Kerch. The Southern Front is liquidated."^ The remnants of Wrangers troops boarded Entente ships and sailed for Turkey. The capture of Perekop marked the victory of the Soviets on the last front of the Civil War.

The Civil War in the Border Regions

The Liberation of Kazakhstan and Central Asia

The Military-Political Alliance of the Peoples of Russia

In the struggle against the interventionists and the counter-revolution the alliance was strengthened between the peoples fighting jointly against the common enemy. The heroic struggle of the Russian people against the landlords, the bourgeoisie and tlie foreign interventionists developed into a patriotic war of the working people of all the na- tionalities inhabiting Russia for their fi’eedom and independence.

Under the leadership of the Party of Lenin and Stalin these nationalities consolidated the military and political alliance they had voluntarily established. It was this alliance^ operated under the leadership of the working class and the Bolshevik Party that ensured victory on all fronts during tlie Civil War,

As Stalin wrote: ”... The Russian workers could not have defeated Kolchak, Denikin and Wrangel had they not enjoyed the sympathy and confidence of the oppressed masses of the border regions of for- mer Russia. It must not be forgotten that the field of action of these mutinous generals was confined to the area of the border regions inhabited mainly by non-Russian nationalities, and the latter could not but hate Kolchak, Denikin and Wrangel for their imperialist policy and policy of Russification. The Entente, intervening and supporting these generals, could rely only on the elements in the border regions who were the vehicles of Russification. And thereby it only inflamed the hatred of the population of the border regions for the mutinous generals and increased the sympathy of the poi)ulation for the Soviet government. “This accounted for the intrinsic weakness of the Kolchak, Denikin and Wrangel rear, and therefore for the weakness of their fronts, that is, in the long run, for their defeat” (J. Stalin, Marxism and the National and Colonial Question, Moscow, 1940, pp. 105-106).

The Liberation of Kazakhstan

At the end of 1918, Soviet rule prevailed over the greater part of Kazakhstan. The People’s Com- missariat of Nationalities set the Bolsheviks in Kazakhstan the task of establishing an Autonomous Soviet Republic, However, some of the leading members of the Party and Soviet bodies hin- dered the proclamation of the autonomy of Kazakhstan. The Kazakh nationalists took advantage of this, and in the spring of 1919, while Kolchak was developing his offensive, they carried out, with the assistance of Kolchak’s agents, a counter-revolutionary coup in the Turgai Region and captured and shot the Soviet leaders, including Amangeldy Imanov, the national hero of Kazakhstan.

Continuing its drive against the forces of Kolchak and Dutov, the Red Army went to the aid of the Kazakh people. Comrade Frunze, who was in command of the Turkestan army that was fighting Dutov, issued an appeal to the working people of Kazakhstan to set up Soviets and support the Red Army ^at was bringing the Kazakh people free- dom and independence. In July 1919, a Revolutionary Committee was set up to administer the Kirghiz territory (now Kazakhstan). This committee set up organs of Soviet power in Kazakhstan.

The Liberation of Central Asia

The counter-revolutionary re- volts of the Urals, Orenburg and Semirechensk Cossacks cut off Tur- kestan from Soviet Russia; Turkestan itself saw the development of a counter-revolutionary movement of native feudalists and kulaks, known as the Basmachi. The British imperialists and Russian White - guards who had occupied the Transcaspian Region tried to link up with the White Cossacks and Kolchak’s forces and seize Soviet Turkestan. The situation in Turkestan during the Civil War was very grave. The region was cut off from its grain supplies and the population and the cattle died of starvation. The Basmachi plundered and wrecked the vil- lages. The Red Army men were almost in rags and were badly armed; shells and small-arms ammunition for the Turkestan Red Army were manufactured in a primitive way in the railway workshops. Lenin and Stalin paid special attention to the struggle to maintain Soviet rule in Turkestan and sent Red Army units, munitions and provisions to help the working people of Turkestan.

The fighting in Central Asia proceeded mainly along the railways. Trains of an unusual appearance could be seen creeping along the dilap- idated tracks. In front of a worn-out locomotive there was a flat car, “fortified” with bales of cotton; behind .the locomotive were freight, wagons carrying Red Army men, war materiel and supplies and a first- aid station. On the flat car carrying the cotton bales machine guns were mounted. These trains were called “armoured trains.” Owing to the shortage of petrol and wood, the locomotives were often fueled with cottonseed oil.

When Kolchak and Dutov were defeated, the Turkestan Soviet Republic united again with Soviet Russia. In the autumn of 1919, a commission of the Central Com- mittee of the Russian Commu- nist Party (Bolsheviks) and of the All-Russian Central Execu- tive Committee headed by Com- rades Frunze and Kuibyshev, went to Turkestan. They had instruc- tions from the C.C. and Lenin to help the working people of Cen- tral Asia to wipe out the remnants of the Whiteguards and to consol- idate Soviet rule there.

After defeating the remnants of Kolchak’s Southern Army and liberating Kazaldistan, Frunze ordered his army to effect a junction witli the Red Army of Turkestan. In fighting to liberate Turkmenia from the British interventionists and the Whiteguards, the Red Army employed the tactics of widely outflanking the enemy’s positions by marching through the Kara-Kum Desert, or over the Kopet-dagh Mountains. Tn the summer the Red Army men had to march for days through the waterless desert in a temperature of 60° Centigrade, receiving a meagre water ration of three glasses per day. An equally diflhcult trek was undertaken by Red Army units under the command of V. V. Kuibyshev at the end of 19103 iR winter time, the weather being exceptionally cold for Turkmenia. The march of men, horses, and camels loaded with guns and supplies, went on for four days and nights. The sudden appearance of the Red Army from the desert caused the Whiteguards to flee in panic.

In February 1920, the Red Army, after heavy fighting, captured Krasnovodsk, the last British and V^iteguard stronghold in Tur- kestan. The railway from Ashkhabad to Krasnovodsk was cleared and Soviet power was restored all over Turkmenia.

Between Soviet Turkestan and the Transcaspian Region, which the Whiteguards sfcill controlled, lay Khiva and Bokhara, the most back- ward regions in Central Asia. These territories, with their mediae- val order of life, served as the refuge for alHhe counter-revolutionary forces that were attacking Soviet Turkestan. Bokhara was ruled by an Emir who invited British officers to organize his army. In the beginning of 1918, the working people of Bokhara rose in revolt against the Emir, but the revolt was suppressed with great cruelty. In Feb- ruary 1920, a revolt broke out in KJiiva against the Khan, and Khi- va was proclaimed the Khoresm People *s Riepublio. In August 1920, another revolt broke out against the Emir of Bokhara. The Bed Army came to the aid of the rebels and finally liberated Bokhara. The Emir fled to Afghanistan under the protection of the British. Bokhara was also proclaimed a People’s Republic.

The Turkestan Commission headed by Frunze and Kuibyshev did a great deal to restore confidence and friendship among the peoples of Central Asia and also to strengthen their economic and cultural ties with the Russian and other peoples of Soviet Russia. Thanks to the work of Comrades Frunze and Kuibyshev, the working people of Central Asia began better to understand that the Soviet State is the friend of the toiling and oppressed peoples.

The correct policy on the national question pursued by the Bolshevik Party, the policy of Lenin and Stalin, helped the peoples of Central Asia to outlive national strife, and resulted in the consoli- dation of the Central -Asian Soviet Republics. This facilitated the defeat of the Basmachi bands. An era of peace set in for the peoples of Central Asia.

Soviet Power Is Established in Transcaucasia

The Victory of the Soviet Regime in Azerbaijan

In the spring of 1920, after Denikin was defeated, the Red Army on the Cau- casian Front, led by G. K. Orjonikidze and S. M. Kirov, drew near to the borders of Transcaucasia.

The masses of the working people of the Caucasus appealed to the Red Army for assistance in fighting the counter-revolutionaries. In their appeal they wrote: “We do not wish to remain slaves, particu- larly now, when by our side stands the emancipated proletariat of Russia, with whom we want to form a single proletarian international family.”

The conditions of the workers and peasants in all the Transcau- casian Republics were extremely hard. Power had been seized by the respective nationalist counter-revolutionary parties — ^the Menshe- viks in Georgia, the Mussavatists in Azerbaijan and the Dashnacks in Armenia — ^who were in the service of the foreign imperialists and did all in their power to help the Russian counter-revolutionaries. In Jan- uary 1920, the Transcaucasian Republics, governed as they were by the counter-revolutionary nationalist parties, were officially recog- nized by the Supreme Council of the Entente. The workers and peasants rose in rebellion^ but they were suppressed with the aid of foreign interventionists. The land remained in the possession of the landlords. In Azerbaijan the khans and begs continued to exploit the peasants.

In response to the appeal of the working people of Caucasia the Red Army of Soviet Russia launched an offensive against the Cau- casian counter-revolutionaries and on March 30, 1920 liberated the highlanders of North Caucasus and Daghestan. Soviet power was established in the whole of the liberated territory.

The establishment of Soviet power in Daghestan gave a further impetus to the revolutionary movement in Azerbaijan. The workers of Baku, led by A. I. Mikoyan, who was then working underground in that city, made preparations for an insurrection against the coun- ter-revolutionary Mussavatists. In response to the request of the underground Revolutionary Committee, the Eleventh Red Army, under the command of Kirov and Orjonikidze, went to the assist- ance of the insurgent Baku workers and on April 27, 1920, the Mussavatists were defeated and put to flight. Azerbaijan was pro- claimed a Soviet Republic.

The Establishment of Soviet Power in Armenia

In May 1920, a popular revolt broke out in Armenia against the Daslmaeks, wlio had been openly supporting the foreign imj)erialists and the Armenian exploiters. The Dashnaoks succeeded in crushing this revolt and dealt ruthlessly with the rebels. The days of the Dashiiack regime were numbered, however. The revolutionary movement grew month after month. Another rebellion broke out in the autumn •of 1920. The Armenian Revolutionary Committee, which directed this rebellion, appealed to the Red Army for assistance, and with its aid the Dashnacks were overthrown. On November 29, 1920, Armenia be- came a Soviet Republic

The Fight to Establish Soviet Power in Georgia

The Georgian Mensheviks pursued the same anti-popular policy as was pursued by the Mussavatists in Azerbaijan and the Dashnacks in Armenia. In January 1919, the Menshevik government of Georgia passed a law for the sale of "surplus’* land by landlords to private purchasers. As a result of this "agrarian reform” all the best land was taken by the landlords and kulaks. In dividing the land the landlord was given one share of the land, another share went to his wife, a third to his sister. Thus, all the land was distributed between the land- lord’s nearest relatives. That meant the restoration of the landed proprietorship in existence before the promulgation of the law of 1919. Deprived of the land, the peasants rose in revolt, seized the land by force and divided it among themselves. The Menshevik rulers sent punitive expeditions against the peasants and set up field courts- martial. The Georgian Mensheviks claimed that theirs was democratic rule, but actually there was no democracy in Georgia. The"* Mensheviks would not permit tree elections to the Constituent Assembly. There was not a single worker or peasant in the Georgian government. All the laws that were passed were in the interests of the landlords, kulaks and capitalists. Trade unions and workers’ newspapers were suppressed, strikes were banned, Bolsheviks were fiung into prison. The Mensheviks pursued a chauvinist great-power policy^ persecuting the national minorities in Georgia.

In December 1918, the Mensheviks launched a fratricidal war against Armenia with the object of annexing villages on the Armenian-Georgian border with mixed Georgian and Armenian populations. Taking advantage of Georgia’s advantageous geograph- ical situation, the Georgian Mensheviks prevented the transit of goods over the Georgian railways by imposing exorbitant transit dues.

In view of the fact that the Red Army was drawing near, the Georgian Mensheviks, in the spring of 1920, offered to conclude peace with Soviet Russia, and in May 1920, a peace treaty was signed. S, M, Kirov was sent to Georgia as the Soviet plenipotentiary repre- sentative. He vigorously exposed the refusal of th^ Georgian Menshe- viks honestly to carry out the terms of the treaty they had signed with the Soviet government. - The situation in Georgia became increasingly critical for the Menshevik rulers. The revolutionary movement of the workers and peasants, led by the Georgian Bolsheviks, grew all over the country. Revolts broke out, first in one county and then in another, and the rebels established Soviet power in those districts.

In the middle of January 1921, the Armenian peasants in the border regions annexed by Menshevik Georgia rose in revolt. The revolt vSpread to the Georgian districts. On February 16, a Georgian Revolu- tionary Committee was set up, which took the lead in the struggle to establish Soviet rule. The Eleventh Red Army, under the com- mand of Sergo Orjonikidze, was sent to the aid of the insurgent Geor- gian workers and peasants. Masses of Georgian workers, peasants and soldiers went over to the side of the Red Army. On February 25, 1921, Orjonikidze sent Lenin and Stalin the following telegram: “The Red flag of Soviet power is flying over Tiflis. Long live Soviet Georgia! ”

Several days later a successful insurrection took place in Abkhasia. On March 4, 1921, the Abkliasian Revolutionary Committee sent the following radio message to Lenin and Stalin: “By the will of the working people, a new Socialist Soviet Republic has been born — Abkhasia, The Soviet Republic of this small nation servos as a strik- ing illustration of the groat role of liberator being jolayed by the Red Army.’’

The MeAsheviks fled from Tiflis to Batum in the hope of receiving assistance from the Turkish government, to whom they promised to cede Batum; but an insurrection against the Menshevik traitors broke out in that city too. On March 19, 1921, Batum and the whole of Adjaristan were proclaimed Soviet.

The bankrupt Menshevik government of Georgia fled abroad on a French torpedo boat, taking with them -a large amount of treas- ure that belonged to the Georgian people.

The Defeat of the Japanese Interventionists

The Fight Against Japanese Intervention in the Far East

The Japanese imperialists, by agreement with the Entente imperial- ists, seized the Far East as early as 1918. Japan was the pioneer of military intervention in Siberia and the Far East,

The Japanese imperialists had long coveted the vast and rich Far Eastern territory. The first landing of Japanese troops in Vladi- vostok took place on April 6, 1918. This marked the beginning of Allied intervention. By September 1918, 100,000 Japanese troops had been landed in Vladivostok, from where Japanese units marched northward to the region of the rivers Ussuri and Amur, and westwards to Blagoveshchensk, Chita and the Transbaikalia. The principal area of activity of the Japanese imperialists was the Amur and the Maritime Regions.

At the same time the Japanese imperialists began to supply Kolchak’s army lavishly with arms, ammunition and money, and to form Whiteguard detachments on their own account. Their tools were the Whiteguard bandits Ataman Semyonov and Ataman Kalmy- kov, who were notorious for the incredible atrocities they perpetrat- ed. In August 1918, Semyonov’s bandit forces, supplied with Japa- nese artillery, captured Chita; in September, Kalmykov’s bands cap- tured Khabarovsk. On September 18, the Whiteguards captured the- last stronghold of Soviet power in the Far East, namely, Blago- veshchensk.

After the fall of the Soviets, power passed into the hands of coun- ter-revolutionary govemments-~Bemyonov’s government in Trans- baikalia, and Kalmykov’s government in Khabarovsk. The Japanese- seized the Soviet fleet on the Amur, robbed the Russian fishermen of their catch and the peasants of their grain stocks and cattle. They shipped to Japan huge quantities of provisions and timber.

The Japanese imperialists cruelly suppressed the slightest attempt at resistance.- The village of Ivanovka, for example, was subjected to repeated raids by the Japanese. One day the Japanese burst into- the village, drove 300 peasants onto the village green, lined them up in rows, and mowed them down with machine-gun fire, row after row. Then they set fire to the village, surrounded it, and allowed no one to escape from the conflagration. The inhabitants perished in the flames. The school, packed with children, and the hospital with its bed-ridden patients, were burned to the ground. The horses, cattle and poultry were roasted alive. The hearts of the peasants in the Far East became filled with burning hatred for the Japanese imperialists. Partisan units were formed in the taiga all over the Far East. Their battle cry was: ‘Tor Soviet power!”

Exceptionally popular among the leaders of the partisan war in the Far East was Sergei Lazo. At the time the February revolution broke out he was a sublieutenant in Krasnoyards:. He removed his officer’s shoulder straps and placed his company at the command of the Krasnoyarsk Soviet. In 1918, he joined the Bolshevik Party and began a heroic struggle against the Japanese imperialists. After the fall of the Soviet regime in the Far East he retreated to the taiga together with the other Bolsheviks. Soon he became a popular parti- san commander.

After defeating Kolchak, the Red Army drew close to the Far East, but after capturing Verkhne-Udinsk its advance eastward was halted. Its next objective was Chita, where large Japanese forces were concentrated. To attack Chita meant coming into direct collision with the Japanese troops, and that meant open war between Japan and Soviet Russia. The Soviet Republic could not afford to plunge into such a war, for a new danger was threatening on its western frontiers — the Entente’s third campaign, in which gentry -ridden Poland played the leading role. To defeat the Wliite Poles and Wrangel the Soviet Republic needed a respite in the Far East, and* it was evident that to call for the establishment of Soviet power there would have meant coming into immediate collision with Japan.

The Party and the Soviet government were of the opinion that it was not worth while running the risk of war with the Japanese imperialists, whose forces were still quite formidable. The thing to do was to direct the struggle of the workers and peasants of the Far East against the Japanese imperialists while avoiding a direct military conflict with Japan.

The Party and the Soviet government therefore agreed to the formation in the Far East of a ‘‘buffer state” which would, for a time, save the R.S.F.S.R. from direct contact with Japan. Lenin sent the Revolutionary Committee of Siberia and the command of the Fifth Amy instructions to set about the establishment of a buffer state. In this way the Far Eastern Republic arose in 1920. In form it was a bourgeois-democratic state, but it was directed by Bolshe- viks. The formation of this state enabled the Soviet Republic to avoid war with Japan under unfavourable conditions, and to muster forces for a decisive struggle against Japanese imperialism. Realizing that their position in .the Far East was becoming more and more untenable, the Japanese imperialists made repeated efforts to create pretexts for continuing their intervention. In January 1920, after a successful revolt Vladivostok had passed under the control of a Revolutionary Committee headed by Sergei Lazo. On April 4 and 5, the Japanese attacked Vladivostok, arrested Lazo, Lutsky and Sibir- tsev, the Bolshevik leaders in the Far East, and handed them over to the Whiteguard bandits who burnt them alive in a locomotive furnace. The Japanese committed similar atrocities in other towns in the Far East,

The savage cruelty of the Japanese imperialists in the Far East gave rise to universal indignation, A revolt began in Transbaikalia. In October the partisans and the People ’s Revolutionary Army of the Far Eastern Republic captured Chita. Fearing that Japan would become too strong in the Far East, the United States brought pressure to bear upon her to open negotiations with the government of the Far Eastern Republic for the evacuation of the Japanese troops. The negotiations were conducted in Dairen, where the Japanese imperialists presented seventeen demands, which, if accepted, would have transformed the Russian Far East into a Japanese colony. They demanded that Vladivostok be placed under foreign control, that they be granted unlimited fishing, mining and navigation rights, that all fortresses in the Russian Far East be razed, that the Soviet Pacific Fleet be de- stroyed and that the northern half of Sakhalin be leased to Japan for eighty years. Finally they demanded a guarantee that a Commu- nist regime would be barred ‘Tor all time” from the Far Eastern

Republic. The Soviet delegation rejected these demands of the Japanese imperialists.

Japanese intervention in the Rar East was on its last legs- That was why the imperialists began still more actively to assist the Russian Whiteguards. In 1921, they set up a new counter-revolutionary government in Vladivostok.

The People’s Revolutionary Army was sent to the aid of the Mari- time Region.

The Battle of Volochayevka

The counter-revolutionaries’ main stronghold on the road to Khabarovsk was the fortress of Volochayevka, which had been built by the Japanese. All the hills around Volochay- evka were strongly fortified, and these fortifications could be reached only by crossing a plain covered with deep snow- On February 10, 1922, the People’s Revolutionary Army, with the battle cry of “Conquer or die!” launched an assault upon Volochayevka. Neither the twelve rows of bar bed- wire entanglements, the hurricane fire of the enemy, the frost, 40*^ below zero Centigrade, nor the biting wind could stop the he- roic onrush of the Red warriors. They hacked at the entanglements with their swords, demolished them with the butts of their rifles, threw their greatcoats over them and crept towards the enemy’s trenches under machine-gun fire. After two days’ fighting the Whites could no longer withstand the onslaught and retreated to Khabarovsk. On February 14, 1922, the People’s Revolutionary Army captured Khabarovsk. Continuing its advance it cleared the Maritime Region of Whites. In October Spassk, the last Whiteguard stronghold, was captured, and on October 25, 1922, the revolutionary troops occupied Vladivostok.

This concluding stage of the struggle for Soviet power in the Far East is commemorated in the following words of the popular parti-

san song:

The Atamans' hordes we shattered

We put the Whites to flight.

And on the shore of the Pacific

We terminated the fight.

Commenting on this victory when the Civil War was over,

Lenin said: “Vladivostok is very far away, but it is our town.” This explains why the brave sons of the Russian people fought so heroically in the Far East until they had driven the last of the interventionists from Soviet soil.

In November 1922, on the fifth anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, Soviet rule was restored in the Far East.

Soviet Russia’s Fraternal Assistance to the Working People of Mongolia

The Japanese imperialists had long harboured designs of seizing Manchuria, Mongolia and the Russian Far East, right up to Lake Baikal, with the object of converting this vast area into a “Great Mongolia” which was to be a dependency of Japan. At the end of 1918, the Japanese ordered the Whiteguard Ataman Semyonov to form a “Great Mongolian State,” to consist of Outer Mon- golia and the present Buryat-Mongolia, which is inhabited by Buryats, kinsmen of the Mongols.

When the Red Army defeated Ataman Semyonov, the latter’s partner, the Whiteguard General Baron Ungern, retreated, in 1920, with his hordes of bandits into Mongolia. In February 1921, Ungern captured Urga, the capital of Mongolia. The Mongolian people took to arms to fight the Whiteguard Ungern and the Japanese imperialists. At the head of this struggle was the Mongolian People’s Revolution- ary Party, the leader of which was Sukhe-Bator, a printer by trade, who organized the partisan movement. In March 1921, a Mongolian Pro- visional People’s Revolutionary Government was set up and it appealed to Soviet Russia for assistance. The combined forces of the Soviet Red Army and the Mongolian People ’s Army launched an attack upon Urga.

The whole of Mongolia was cleared of Whiteguards. Urga was lib- erated and renamed Ulan-Bator-Hoto, which means “City of the Red Warrior.”

In 1924, the first Great Hural, or Assembly, proclaimed Mongolia an independent People’s Republic. It concluded a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Hepublic* In an address to the. Soviet government the government of Mongolia expressed its gratitude to Soviet Russia, for the fraternal and disinterested assistance it had rendered Mongolia. The Red Army, the liberator of the Mongolian people, was given a ceremonial send-off that continued right to the Soviet frontier.

The Bolshevik Party, the Organizer of Victory at the Fronts

During the Civil War years the military and political alliance of the working class and the peasantry took definite shape. The same period saw the realization of an alliance between the working people of all the oppressed nationalities, under the leadership of the Russian proletariat.

The enemies of the Soviet regime were convinced that its defeat was inevitable, for the Red Army, which was formed in the course of the war, in the beginning lacked experienced commanding personnel, good weapons and the necessary quantities of ammunition. Further^ more, the interventionists had captured the parts of Russia that were richest in raw materials and food.

Ill spite of all this, however, the Red Army vanquished the com- bined forces of tlie foreign interventionists and tho Russian bour- geois and landlord counter-revolutionaries. “The Red Anny was victorious because tho Soviet government’s policy for which the Red Army was fighting was a right policy, one that corresponded to the interests of the people, and because the people understood and realized that it was the right policy, their own j)olicy, and supported it unre- servedly” {History of the Oonmunist Party of the Soviet Union [BoU sheviks], Short Course, Moscow,' 1945, p. 244). The Red Army was victorious in the Civil War because the Red Army men understood the aims and purposes of the war and recognized their justice.

“The Red Army was victorious because its leading core, both at the front and in the rear, was the Bolshevik Party, united in its soli- darity and discipline, strong in its revolutionary spirit and readiness for any sacrifice in the common cause, and unsurpassed in its ability to or- ganize millions and to lead them properly in complex situations. . . .

“The Red Army was victorious because the Soviet Republic was not alone in its struggle against Whiteguard counter-revolution and foreign intervention, because the struggle of the Soviet government and its successes enlisted the sympathy and support of the ]:)roletarians of the whole world” {History of the Ooynmunist Party of the Soviet Union [Bolsheviks] y Short Goursey Moscow, 1945, pp. 245-246),

The Bolshevik Party trained splendid commanders and commis- sars who led the Red divisions and armies into battle. The heroic strug- gle of the Soviet people and of the Red Army was directed by the greatest geniuses in the history of mankind — ^Lenin and Stalin.

The Bolshevik Party, Lenin and Stalin created a body of military commissars who gave political training to the Red Army men, established indissoluble bonds between the Red Army men and their commanders and imbued them with the spirit of discipline revolutionary courage and military ardour.

The Transition to the Peaceful Work of Economic Restoration

The Struggle to Restore the Country's Economy

The Soviet State's Transition from War to Peaceful Economic Construction

The International Position of Soviet Russia in 1921

At the end of 1920, after achieving victory in the Civil War, Soviet Russia pro- ceeded to the peaceful work of economic construction. This transition was made in an extremely tense situation.

The defeat of the Entente's military intervention fundamentally changed the international position of the Soviet Republic. Describing this situation in November 1920, Lenin said: "... We have not only a respite— we have a new stage, in which our fundamental interna- tional existence within the network of capitalist states has been won” (V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. XXV, Moscow, 1937, Russ, ed., p. 486).

The Soviet Republic was recognized by a number of capitalist countries, which resumed commercial relations with our country. In 1920, peace treaties were concluded between the Soviet Republic c'lnd Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Finland and Poland. In 1921, the Soviet Republic concluded treaties with Persia, Afghanistan and Tur- key, and trade agreements with Great Britain, Germany, Norway, Austria and Italy.

The improvement of the Soviet Republic's international position was due not only to the military victories it had achieved, but also to the strained situation in the capitalist countries. At the end of 1920, a grave economic crisis affected the capitalist world. In Europe, at the beginning of 1921, there were 10,000,000 unemployed and 30,000,000 workers working part time. Huge strikes took place in all the EurO' pean countries and a movement for national liberation arose in the colonial countries. In all those countries the workers and the progressive intelligentsia energetically came out in defence of the Soviet Eepublic, their watchword being “Hands off Soviet Russia!”

Under these circumstances, the governments of the capitalist countries were obliged to recognize Soviet Russia, but this did not mean that they had abandoned the struggle against the Soviets; this struggle merely assumed different forms. In the endeavour to cause the utmost ruin in the country the foreign imperialists and the Russian counter-revolutionaries sent spies and saboteurs into the country and plotted new revolts against the Soviet State.

During the whole of 1921, the foreign imperialists continued to send bandit gangs into Soviet territory. Assisted by the landlords of Poland Petliura’s bands operated in the Ukraine. The bandits led by Makhno found refuge in Rumania and from there they were sent back to work against Soviet Ukraine. In Byelorussia the bands of the Polish agent Bulak-Balakhovieh were rampant. In Karelia, White Finnish army officers, directed by the Finnish Baron Mannerheim, organized a counter-revolutionary revolt. In the Far East, the Japa- nese imperialists, jointly with the Russian Whiteguards, terrorized the inhabitants of Transbaikalia and the Maritime Region. Di the heart of Soviet Russia, the agents of imperialism — ^the Socialist-Revolu- tionaries — organized a kulak bandit movement. In the Tambov Gu- bernia its ringleader was that bandit, the Socialist-Revolutionary Antonov, and in the Saratov Gubernia just the same sort of Whiteguard, the Socialist-Revolutionary Sapozhkov. In the Urals and in Siberia, the kulaks, organized by the Socialist-Revolutionaries, incited the peasants to resist the Soviet authorities, disrupted the supply of grain to the industrial centres, buried the grain in pits and let it rot, wrecked railways, and killed Soviet officials

Economic Ruin in Soviet Russia

The seven years of war — ^the impe- rialist and civil wars — caused economic ruin in Soviet Russia to a degree that no other belligerent country experienced.

During the period of the Civil War only a ninth part of the terri- tory of Russia remained under Soviet rule; the rest was under the heel of the different foreign interventionists who succeeded each other.^ The productive forces of the country were in a state of ruin. In the course of the Civil War a large part of the railway tracks and over 7,000 bridges, of which 3,500 were railway bridges, were wrecked. The damage resulting from the wrecking of industrial plants and the flooding of mines amounted to hundreds of millions of rubies, and the loss inflicted upon the entire national economy of the Land of Soviets was estimated at tens of billions of rubles. The total output of agri- culture in 1920 was only a half of the pre-war amount, while the pre^ war level itself was that of the poverty-stricken rural districts of tsarist Russia. In many gubernias the crop failed, and throughout the country about 20,000,000 hectares of land remained unsown. Peasant farming was in a state of acute crisis. Industry was also ruined* The output of large-scale industry was about one-seventh of the pre-war output. Tlie output of pig iron in 1921 amounted to only 116,300 tons, i.e., about 3 per cent of the pre-war output; the amount of metal produced in Soviet Russia at that time was equal to that produced in the reign of Peter I. The output of fuel diminished. The railways were completely dislocated. The number of sound rolling stock — locomotives and cars — ^was only about a third of what it was before the war. Trains travelled slowly and irregularly; it took eight to ten days to travel from Moscow to Kharkov. The streets in towns were unlit at night as neither gas nor electricity was available. The tramways ceased running. Dwellings and offices were freezing in the winter owing to the absence of fuel. The country lacked the prime necessities of life: bread, fats, fuel, footwear, clothing and soap. The productivity of labour dropped. The peoples of the Land of Soviets received as a legacy from the past a country that was not only technically backward and semi -pauperized, but was also absolutely ruined.

The political situation too was extremely tense. In the winter of 1920-1921, the peasants delivered very little grain. By the end of 1920, the surplus-grain appropriations produced over 3,200,000 tons of grain and the Soviet government was able to accumulate a grain reserve. While the war was in progress, the peasants put up with the surplus- appropriations system, but on the victorious termination of the Civil War, when the danger that the landlords would return passed away and the peasants felt firmly in possession of the land, they strongly opposed this system. Furthermore, they lacked textile goods, footwear, hardware, agricultural machines, and other things they needed, and demanded that the government should supply them in exchange for the grain they delivered. But the factories were idle, and the Soviet State was unable, at that time, to supply the peasants with manu- factured goods.

The situation in the country was still further complicated by the difficulties connected with the demobilization of the army and the reconversion of industry to peacetime production. Tens and hundreds of thousands of demobilized workers were unable immediately to find employment. Part of the workers went to the rural districts. The working class was becoming scattered (declassed).

The bread ration of the workers amounted to 100 grams per day, and hunger and weariness caused discontent among a section of the workers.

The Kronstadt Mutiny

The internal and external enemies of the Soviet regime hastened to take advantage of these economic and political difficulties. The activities of the counter-revolutionary elements— Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries, Wliiteguards and bourgeois-nationalists— revived. Posing as non-party people, they dropped their former slogan of “Down with the Soviets” and issued a new one “Por the Soviets, but without Communists!” These new tactics of the class enemy found most vivid expression during the counter-revo- lutionary mutiny that broke out in Kronstadt in March 1921.

Kronstadt was the chief base of the Baltic Fleet. During the revolu- tion and the Civil War, the Baltic Fleet sent many thousands of devot- ed revolutionary fighters to the different fronts. Among the new recruits for the navy at that time were casual individuals, fre- quently declassed elements, who had not been steeled by the revolution. The work of political education was at that time badly organized in the Baltic Fleet, and the Trotskyites, who managed to get into leading positions in the fleet, caused the degeneration of a group, a small one, of Communist sailors. Posing as “non-party” people the Social- ist-Bevolutionaries, Mensheviks and Anarchists intensified their dis- ruptive activities in the fleet and at a meeting of sailors held on March 1, they succeeded in securing the adoption of a counter-revo- lutionary resolution. Kromtadt fell into the hands of a bunch of Whiteguard agents.

The military operations of the Kronstadt mutineers were direct- ed by Whiteguard military experts, headed by General Kozlovsky. The mutineers had the support of all the counter-revolutionary forces at home and abroad. The T^iteguard Emigres in Paris organized col- lections of money and provisions for the mutineers, and the American Red Cross sent food supplies to Kronstadt xmder its flag. The Con- stitutional-Democrat, Milynkov, supplied the Kronstadt counter- revolutionaries with the watchword “Soviets without Communists. ”

In an exposure of the manoeuvres of the class enemy Comrade Stalin said subsequently: “Soviets without Communists — such was then the watchword of the chief of the Russian counter-revolution, Milyukov. The counter-revolutionaries understood that it was not only a matter of the Soviets themselves, but, first and foremost, of who would direct them” (J. Stalin, Articles and Speeches, Moscow, 1934, , Russ, ed., p. 217).

Kronstadt remained in the hands of the Whiteguards for seven- teen days. The Committee of Defence of the Petrograd Fortified Area failed to crush the mutiny at its birth. Zinoviev negotiated with the traitors for seven whole days, thereby giving them time to fortify themselves. Picked units of the Red Army were sent to crush the Kronstadt counter-revolution. The Tenth Congress of the Party, which was in session at that time, sent 300 of its delegates, headed by K. E. Voroshilov, to reinforce them. On March 16, the revolution- ary soldiers, camouflaged in white coveralls, commenced an assault upon the main forts of Kronstadt, rushing forward in spite of con- tinuous machine-gun fire and the bursting shells which broke the already fragile ice over wEich they were advancing. In the front ranks of the assault columns was Voroshilov, setting aii example of .Bolshevik courage and valour.

On March 17, the hotbed of counter-revolution in Kronstadt was liquidated.

The Trade Union Discussion in the Party

The situation in the country was still further aggravated by the fact that the unity of the Party was being undermined from within by various anti-Leninist group lets which had revived as a consequence of the difficulties connect- ed with the transition from war to the peaceful work of economic construction.

The Leninist Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party was of the opinion that at this new stage the economic ruin in the country was as dangerous an enemy to the proletarian dictatorship as interven- tion and blockade had been during the period of the Civil War; that the economic chaos could be vanquished only if millions of workers and peasants were drawn into tlie struggle against it. The Party Central Committee considered that there was no justification for the furtlier maintenance of the regime of War Communism called into existence by the war, and that tho way to operate was not by issuing military commands but by employing methods of ]}er- suaaion.

At the end of 1 920 and the beginning of 3 921 , a fierce discussion arose in the Party over the question of the role and tasks of the trade unions. The promoter of the discussion and of tho struggle against Lenin was Trotsky. He demanded that “the trade unions be given a shaking up, opposed the method of persuading the masses and the development of trade union democracy, and stood for downright coer- cion and the issuing of orders from above in the workers’ organiza- tions. In the wake of Trotsky came the so-called “Workers’ Opposi- tion,” which used this name to cover up its potty-bourgeois nature. This group demanded that the Party and the State should refrain from all interference in the economic life of the country, and that the management of the entire national economy should be transferred to an “All-Eussian Producers’ Congress.” The “Workers’ Opposition” regarded not the Party but the trade unions as the highest form of organization of the working class, Trotsky was assisted in his struggle against Lenin by Bukharin, who formed a “buffer group,” and later openly imited with the Trotskyites. The Trotskyites and Bukharin- ites tried to undermine the Party as the leading force in the prole- tarian state, and worked to split the working class, weaken the leadership it gave to the peasantry, and undermine the dictatorship nf the proletariat.

Lenin countered the platforms of the opposition groups with the Party platform which declared that the trade unions are a school of administration, a school of economic management, a school of Communism. The trade unions should work by methods of persuasion, for in that way they would succeed in drawing the workers into so- cialist construction, in mobilizing them for the speediest liquidation of the economic chaos in the country. The Party supported Lenin; the oppositionists were utterly routed.

Comrade Stalin lias described the situation in Soviet Russia on the termination of the Civil War in the following words; “Ruined by four years of imperialist war, and ruined again by three years of civil war, a country with a semi-literate population, with a low technical level, with isolated industrial oases lost in a sea of dwarf peasant farms — such was the country we inherited from the past. The task was to transfer this country from mediaeval darkness to modem industry and mechanized agriculture” (J. Stalin, Probhms of Leninism, Moscow, 1947, p. 520). This was ,a task of unprecedented difficulty.

The Eighth Congress of Soviets and the GOELRO Plan

The Soviet State exerted all efforts to remove as speedily as possible the grave domestic difficulties being experienced by the country after the termination of the Civil War.

The Eighth Congress of Soviets, which met in December 1920, drew up a whole series of measures to bring about the economic revival of the country. The congress was held in the Bolshoi Theatre, in Moscow; owing to the lack of fuel the theatre was unheated and the delegates were obliged to sit in their felt boots and overcoats. On the stage hung a huge map of the future electrification of the Land of Soviets. Small shining electric lamps indicated where electric power plants were to be built in the future. Lenin explained the importance of the plan for the electrification of the country as a means of passing from poverty and ruin to socialist construction. On Lenin’s initiative, and under his direction, there was drawn up the so-called “plan of the GOELRO” (the Russian initials of State Commission for the Electrification of Russia), Lenin's GOELRO plan was the first economic plan of the Soviet State, the prototype of Stalin’s Five-Year Plans. The plan provided for the erection of thirty large power plants throughout the country within the next ten years. Comrade Stalin wrote the following to Lenin about the GOELRO plan: “It is a masterly draft of a really unified and really state -economic plan. It is the only Marxist attempt made in our day to build up for the Soviet superstructure of economically backward Russia a really technical and production foundation — ^the only foundation feasible in the present conditions” (Lenin and Stalin, Selected Worhs^ Vol, II, Russ, ed., p. 365).

By the electrification of the country Lenin and Stalin meant not only the building of power plants, but the gradual reorganization of the entire economy of the country, including agriculture, on the basis of modern technique, of modern large-scale machine production. Only such a reorganization, carried through by the Soviet State, could finally uproot capitalism in the country and ensure the construc- tion of an unshakable foundation of socialist economy. Lenin said that ^"Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country” (V. I. Lenin, Selected Worles, Vol. VIII, Moscow, 1936, p. 276).

The Eighth Congress of Soviets called upon the working people of the Land of Soviets to work with self-sacrificing devotion to restore the country’s economy, and it instituted the decoration of The Red Banner of Labour to be awarded to those who distinguished themselves on the labour front.

Transition to the New Economic Policy

To tear the country out of the clutches of economic ruin and successfully develop the building of Socialism, it was first of all necessary to abolish the ])olicy of War Communism, which had been a temporary measure and no longer suited the new situation. The military-political alliance established between the working class and the peasantry during the Civil War rested on a certain economic basis — ^the peasants received from the workers land and protection against the landlords and the kulaks, and the workers received from the peasants grain, on loan. With the termination of the Civil War a different economic basis for this alliance was needed. The peasants had to be given the right freely to dispose of their produce.

The correct policy for the proletariat, which was exercising ' its dictatorship in a small-peasant country, was to give in exchange for grain the manufactured goods which the peasants needed. The tax in kind marked the transition to this policy. The law intro- * duoing a tax in kind was passed as early as the autumn of 1918, but could not at that time be operated owing to the outbreak of the Civil War, Lenin proposed a return to the tax in kind and that tax assessments should be lower than the surplus appropriations had been.

Under this law the peasant could sell on the market all that was left over after he had made his tax deliveries to the state. Thus, he secured complete control of his surplus food stocks. To permit free trade meant a certain revival of capitalism in the country. Lenin emphasized, however, that as political power was in the hands of the working class, which also occupied the economic key positions in the country — ^the land, large-scale socialist industry, the transport system, and the monopoly of foreign trade — ^there was no danger in permitting capitalism within certain limits, and under the control of the Soviet State. When it secured a leading position in trade, the Soviet State would succeed in linking up socialist industry with peasant farming and create the conditions for liquidating capitalism in the country.

In March 1921, the Tenth Congress of the Bolshevik Party was held. This congress adopted the historic decision to abolish the surplus- appropriations system and to introduce the tax in kind instead. This meant the adoption by the j)roletarian state of a new economic policy when the war was over. The New Economic Policy (NEP) — a prod- uct of Lenin's genius — was conceived by him as a plan for the transition to Socialism. The main significance and point of this plan, in his opinion, was that it fully ensured the building of the foundation of socialist economy. The struggle between Socialism and capitalism was transferred to the economic arena. Here, said Lenin,

• a fierce struggle lay ahead, but the country possessed all that was /needed to ensure that in this struggle Socialism achieved complete victory over capitalism.

The . enemies of. Socialism maliciously distorted Lenin's the- ory of the New Economic Policy. The Trotskyites and Bukharin- ites argued that it was nothing hut a retreat; it was in their interests to argue in this way because the^r line was to restore capitalism in Russia. While Lenin regarded the New Economic Policy as the road to Socialism, the Trotskyites and Bukharinites regarded it as the road to capitalism. Comrade Stalin upheld and* developed Lenin's theory of the New Economic Policy as the only correct economic policy the victorious proletariat could adopt for the purpose of building Socialism. He gave the New Economic Policy the following classical definition: “NEP is a special policy of the proletarian state calculated on permit- ting capitalism while the key positions are held by the proletarian state, calculated on a struggle between the elements of capitalism and the elements of Socialism, calculated on an increase in the role of the socialist elements to the detriment of the capitalist elements, calculat- ed on the victory of the socialist elements over the capitalist elements, calculated on the abolition of classes and on the building of the foundations of socialist economy” (J. Stalin, Collected Worics, VoL VII, Moscow, 1947, Buss, ed., p. 364).

The transition to the peaceful work of economic construction on the basis of the New Economic Policy marked a sharp historic turn in the policy of the Soviet State. In proclaiming this turn the Tenth Congress of the Bolshevik Party declared that the fundamental and decisive condition for its success was the unity and solidarity of the Party.

In a resolution “On Party Unity” proposed by Lenin, the con- gress ordered “the immediate dissolution of all groups without excep- tion which have been formed on the basis of one platform or another,” and prohibited all factional pronouncements on pain of immediate expulsion from the Party.

The Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) also heard a report from Comrade Stalin on the national question and adopted the program that he proposed for making an actual reality of the equal rights possessed by the non-Bussian nationalities.

The First Results of NEP

After the Tenth Congress of the Party, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Coun- cil of People’s Commissars issued the first decrees giving a now direction to the economic policy of the Soviet State, By a law passed by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on March 21, 1921, the surplus-appropriations system was replaced by a tax in kind, the total return from which was to be a little over half of that obtained from the surplus appropriations. On April 22, the Council of People’s Commissars fixed the total amount of the tax in kind at 3,850,000 tons, as against 6,800,000 tons obtained from the surplus appropriations. Hie Council of People’s Commissars issued a series of decrees permitting free trade in grain and withdrawing the food patrols from those gubernias which had completed their grain-sur- plus deliveries. The restrictions which had been imposed upon the co-operative societies with respect to the purchasing of food were removed. The co-operative societies were granted the right to pur- chase all kinds of agricultural produce and to lease industrial en- terprises. Small artisans and handicraftsmen were granted the right freely to purchase raw materials and to sell their finished goods.

The Party launched an extensive campaign to explain its policy. On April 9, 1921, Lenin addressed a meeting of leading members of the Moscow Party organizations at which" he dealt with the main question troubling large numbers of workers, namely, to what extent were free trade and individual production compatible with socialist production, and did free trade mean the abandonment of the build- ing of Socialism in our country. In answer to these questions Lenin reminded his listeners that with the dictatorship of the proletariat in force, trade, and therefore capitalism, which was permitted within certain limits, must be controlled and regulated by the proletarian state.

Lenin set the proletarian state the following task: it “must be- come a cautious, assiduous and shrewd ‘businessman,’ a punctilious toJiolesale merchant — otherwise it will never succeed in putting this small-peasant country economically on its feet” (V. I. Lenin, Selected Works, Two-Vol. ed., Vol. II, Moscow, 1947, p. 752).

Trade, to use Lenin’s expression, was — in 1921-1922 — the ‘Tink” which had to be grasped in order to pull up the whole “chain,” i. e., to ensure the successful building of Socialism. “Com- munists,” said Lenin, “must learn to trade.” Some Communists said: “We were not taught to trade when we were in prison.” To this Lenin answered: “There were lots of things we were not taught in prison which we were obliged to learn after the revolution , but we learned them and learned them very well” (V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, VoL XXVII, Moscow, 1937, Russ, ed., p. 75).

At first, economic development proceeded slowly on the basis of the New Economic Policy, for the consequences of the Civil War, the blockade and the general state of ruin made themselves severely felt. In 1921, there was a grave failure of the harvest and 20,000,000 people starved. The Volga Region, which had been devastated by the Whiteguards, was particularly hard hit.

The Soviet government mobilized resources to assist the famine- stricken ; voluntary contributions were collected all over the country, tlie slogan being “Ten persons who have food must feed one starving person.”

The capitalist world tried to take advantage of these new difficulties, and saboteurs and spies set fire to and blew up Soviet enterprises. The American Relief Administration adapted its operations to this hostile, subversive work.

The New Economic Policy, however, strengthened the alliance between the workers and peasants. Agriculture began to revive, and the autumn sowing in 1921 was carried out successfully. Even the famine-stricken districts sowed 75 per cent of their winter crop area. Kulak bandit ism was wiped out, the peasants assisting the Red Army in this. Industry and transport began to be restored.

The first results of the New Economic Policy were summed up at the Ninth Congress of Soviets, which opened at the end of December 1921. The congress took a number of decisions which were to adjust the entire work of Soviet bodies and the whole of Soviet legisla- tion to the new conditions. It proclaimed the raising of agriculture as the most important task of the period immediately ahead; it called upon industry to supply the peasants with larger quantities of manufactured goods. To demonstrate the first achievements of agriculture it was decided to organize an agricultural exhibition in 1922.

This congress adopted a special declaration on the international position of the R.8.F.S.R., stating that world imperialism had not abandoned its designs to overthrow the Soviet State. The declaration went on to say: “The congress warns the governments of neighbouring oountries that if they, in future, encroach upon or support encroachments upon the integrity of Soviet territory and the security of the Soviet Republics, the latter, in their legitimate and just defence against those who threaten the security and welfare of the republics, will be compelled to retaliate in a way that may prove fatal for the at- tacker and his accomplices.”

The Economic Restoration of Soviet Russia

Failure of Attempts to Conduct Economic War Against Soviet Russia

After their plans to crush Soviet Russia by armed force had failed, the foreign imperialists began to plan economic war against her with the object of transforming her into their colony by “peaceful” means with the aid of their capital.

At a meeting of the Supreme Council of the Entente that was held at Cannes in the beginning of 1922, the British Prime Minister Lloyd George proposed that an international conference be called “to restore the vitality of the European system.” In addition to the Entente countries, Germany, Austria and Soviet Russia were invited. The conference was held in Genoa in April 1922. Aiming to “restore Europe” at Soviet Russia’s expense, the Entente presented the Soviet delegation with a memorandum in which it demanded the repayment of the foreign loans contracted by the tsarist government and the Provisional Government, the restitution to the foreign capitalists of their enterprises which had been confiscated by the Soviet State, and the cessation of Communist propaganda in other countries. The Soviet delegation rejected the claims of the imperialists and presented coun- ter-claims for damage caused by the blockade and intervention. The Soviet government agreed to pay the pre-war debts, but demanded postponement for thirty years and also credits for the restoration of Russia’s national economy. '

The attempt to enslave the Soviet Republic failed. An attempt to form a united front of capitalist states against it also fell through. The Soviet government broke this front by concluding in Rapallo, a health resort near Genoa, a treaty with Germany establishing normal diplomatic relations with her. This took place in April 1922.

When the Genoa Conference closed, the “Russian question,’^ on Lloyd George’s proposal, was submitted to a Committee of Experts which met at The Hague in July 1922; but at The Hague the Soviet delegation upheld the economic independence of the Soviet Bepublics as vigorously as it had done in Genoa. After the Genoa and Hague Conferences the Soviet Republic’s international position was greatly strengthened. Its prestige was raised particularly by the fact that the Soviet delegation at the Genoa Conference had demanded a universal reduction of armaments.

The Offensive Undertaken on the Basis of NEP

In his report at the Eleventh Congress of the Party that was held in March 1922, Trf,uiT) stated that the transition from War Communism to the New Economic Policy had been, in the main, completed. “The retreat has ended,” he said, and called for the regrouping of all the forces of the Party and the Soviet State for the purpose of launching an offen- sive upon private capital.

Building the foundation of socialist economy meant building up a highly developed industry, for that is the foundation of Socialism; but the start had to be made with agriculture. As Comrade Stalin wrote: ‘Industry cannot be developed in a vacuum, industry cannot be developed if there are no raw materials in the country, if there is no food for the workers, and if agriculture, the principal market for our industry has not to some extent been developed” (Lenin anxd Stalin, Selected Works, Vol. Ill, Moscow, Russ. ed.,p. 56).

At that time there were in the U.S.S.R. 20,000,000 small, individ- ual, peasant farms, three-fourths of which were poor farms. These small and dwarf farms were still being run on the old and backward three-field system. About 40,000,000 desyatins of land lay fallow every year. Pastures, wasteland and bog amounted to 50,000,000 desyatins. In tsarist Russia, the area of land that was left uncultivat- ed was equal to the amount that was cultivated, namely, 90,000,000 desyatins.

In 1922-1923, agriculture showed a marked improvement. The good harvest that was reaped in 1922 enabled the gubernias which had suffered from the famine to recuperate. The peasants were success- fully restoring their livestock. The Soviet government called urgently for the transition to the rotation of crops system.

The growth of the productive forces in agriculture created the basis for the rehabilitation of industry. Strict accounting was intro- duced into the operation of industrial enterprises. The workers began to retmm to the towns from the rural districts. Productivity of labour increased.

Hie restoration of agriculture ensured the development first of all of the light industry, i. e,, those industries which produce consum- ers’ goods. The value of the entire industrial output of Soviet Rus- sia rose from 550,000,000 gold rubles in 1921 to 750,000,000 rubles in 1922, but the latter amounted to only 26 per cent of the pre-war output.

The old skilled workers who had preserved the factories during the Civil War were now the first to set to work to start them rumiing again, and carried out the first assignments of the Soviet State with tremendous enthusiasm. In the spring of 1922, the Kashira Power Plant, which was built during the Civil War, was put into operation. In October of the same, year, tlie first Soviet automobile was assembled. At that time too the first Soviet aeroplane was built.

With the transition to the New Economic Policy the invest- ment of Russian and foreign private capital was temporarily per- mitted in the U.S.S.R. During the first two years about 4,000 small enterprises were leased. The Soviet State retained possession of over 4,500 large enterprises, the work of which had considerably improved.

As state industry grew and became firmly established, private capital was squeezed out, but still occupied an important place in trade, mainly in the retail trade. Here too state and co-operative trade gradually developed and established itself in opposition to the private trader. Effect was given to Lenin’s watchword of “Learn to trade!” The Party, led by Lenin, perseveringly and methodically waged the offensive against private capital within the framework of the New Economic Policy.

The Struggle Against Counter-Revolution in the Period of Restoration

The fact that capital had been permitted to function within certain limits gave a new impetus to the class struggle in the U.S.S.R. As Lenin wi*ote: “The enemy is the petty-bourgeois element which surrounds us like the air, and penetrates deep into the ranks of the proletariat. . . . The petty-bourgeois element in the comitry is backed by the whole international bourgeoisie, which is still world-powerful” (V. I. Lenin, Selected WorJcs, Two-Vol. ed., Vol. II, Moscow, 1947, p, 740).

Having lost all hope of overthrowing Soviet rule by force of arms, the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie began to base their hopes on its degeneration under NEP conditions.

For example, the bourgeois ideologist, Professor Ustryalov, in a symposium entitled Smena Vekh, called upon the boui’geois intel- ligentsia to go into the service of the Soviet State, with a view to gaining control of the entire economic and cultural life of the country and accelerating the degeneration of the Soviet State into a bour- geois state. Dealing with the class basis of this trend, Lenin said: “Tlie Smena Vekli-iiOi^ express the sentiments of thousands and tens of thousands of all sorts of bourgeois people, or of Soviet employees, who are participating in the operation of our new economic policy. This is the real and main danger” (V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. XXVII, Moscow, 1937, Russ, ed., p. 243).

The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries had utterly ex- posed their true character while the Civil War was still going on. Now they disguised themselves as non-party people and conducted a furious campaign against the New Economic Policy, speaking often at conferences of non-partj’^ workers.

Abroad there was a Socialist-Revolutionary terrorist organization which received funds from foreign governments for the purpose of organizing revolts in the Land of Soviets and of conducting espionage, sabotage and terrorist activities. The G.P.U. (State Political Admin- istration), discovered an underground Socialist-Revolutionary organ- ization, The members of this organization were arrested and brought up for trial before the Supreme Revolutionary Tribunal on the charge of conducting counter-revolutionary terroristic activities against the Soviet State. The Second International sent lawyers to Moscow to defend these conspirators. The workers of Moscow met these advocates of the counter-revolution with a mighty demonstration of anger and derision. The Soviet court proved incontrovertibly the guilt of the Socialist-Eevolutionaries. Without even attempting to say anything in court tlie lawyers of the Second International left Moscow. The Supreme Tribunal passed sentence of death on 12 of the principal culprits, but ordered that the sentence was to be carried out only if the Socialist-Eovolutionary Party continued their tactics of terrorism and sedition.

The defeat of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Eevolutionaries, the split in the camp of the counter-revolution, and the differentiation developing among the bourgeois intelligentsia showed that the proletarian dictatorship was becoming more and more firmly estab- lished and was successfully repelling the attacks of the counter- revolution.

The Formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

The Building of the Soviet System in the Non-Russian Regions of the R.S.F.S.R.

The People’s Commissariat of Nationalities, which Comrade Stalin had directed since the beginning of the proletarian revolution, did a great deal to carry out the Bolshevik program of national self-determination by organizing autonomous national republics and regions and protecting the interests of the national minorities. As early as 1920, Russia was divided into adminis- trative areas according to nationality, and the coimection between the outlying regions and Central Russia assumed the concrete form of autonomous national republics united in a federation of Soviet Republics based on common defence and economic tasks.

During the period of 1920-1922 a number of autonomous Soviet Republics and autonomous regions were formed and these affiliated to the R.S.F.S.R.

The Autonomous Bashkir Republic was formed as early as March 1919. Its first act was to restore to the Bashkir peasants the land which had been seized by the landlords and kulaks under the tsar. This en- couraged the nomad Bashkirs to take up agriculture and helped to convert them to a settled way of life. Bashkir schools were set up, and in 1924 there were already 2,000 Bashkir elementary schools. The Bashkir Republic incorporated the South Urals, including its industrial region, and this served as a basis for creating a Bashkir working class.

In the spring of 1920, tho Tatar Autonomous Soviet Republic was formed. The First Congress of Soviets of the Tatar Republic elected a government and adopted a decision to affiliate to the Russian Soviet Federation. The Tatar Republic, which was severely affected by the crop failure and famine of 1921 , received assistance from the government of the R.S.F.S.R. in restoring its agriculture. In the spring of 1921, the Central Executive Committee of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic issued a decree making the Tatar language the official language of the Republic on a par with Russian. Under the tsar there were only 70 Russian village schools in the area of the Tatar Republic, but not a single Tatar school, except for the Mohammedan religious schools; in 1924, however, there were already in the Republic 1,700 elementary schools, conducted in the Tatar language.

In October 1920, the First Congress of Soviets of Kazakhstan proclaimed the formation of the Kirghiz Autonomous Republic on the territory of Kazakhstan. One of the first decrees issued by the Kirghiz Soviet government was that discontinuing further migration from Central Russia to Kazakhstan. This ensured security of tenure for the Kirghiz inhabitants and eased the task of converting the Kazakhs to a settled agricultural life. The Central Executive Committee and the Council of People’s Commissars of the Kirghiz Republic also issued a series of decrees concerning marriage law and abolished a number of ancient laws and customs which had perpetuated the survivals of the patriarchal-tribal system among the working people of Kazakhstan.

The Soviet State conducted similar activitievS in North Caucasus and in Daghestan aimed at the national emancipation of the peoples forming part of the R.S.F.S.R.

The Daghestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was pro- claimed at the First Daghestan Congress of Soviets, held immedi- ately after the termination of the Civil War. The specific feature of Daghestan is that its population is divided up into nxunerous tribes speaking six different languages and thirty-two dialects. Before Soviet power was established many of the peoples of Daghestan had no alphabet. By 1924, however, there were already over a thousand schools in the Republic. Shortly after the establishment of Soviet power industry and agriculture began to develop in Daghestan. Irri- gation canals were dug to facilitate the further development of agriculture.

The Karelian Soviet Republic was formed in the summer of 1920. The White Finns exerted all efforts to destroy the Karelian Republic. In the autumn of 1921, White Finnish bands invaded Karelia. This invasion had been organized by the heads of the Vyborg Bank and the big Finnish lumber companies.

In February 1922, the White Finns were driven out of Karelia by the Red Army with the active assistance of the Karelian peas- ants. After firmly establishing itself in Karelia the Soviet State proceeded to develop the immense power resources of the Karelian waterfalls. The erection of a hydroelectric power plant was soon begun on the river Konda. Education made great strides; a large number of elementary and secondary schools, conducted in the native language, were opened. Before the revolution there were scarcely any schools in Karelia, not even Russian schools.

The Yakut Soviet Socialist Republic was proclaimed in 1922. Under the tsar, Yakutia had been a place of exile for revolutionaries. The inhabitants were subjected to monstrous exploitation and were dying out. The chief task of the new Yakut Soviet Republic was to regenerate the nationalities that inhabited its territory and to raise their material and cultural standards.

In addition to the Autonomous Soviet Republics, the R.S.F.S.R. included small autonomous regions possessing their own administra- tions, such as the Adygei, Votyak or Udmurt, Mari, Oirot, Komi and other regions.

Soviet autonomy helped the peoples of Soviet Russia to strength- en the fraternal alliance and mutual confidence without which the proletarian state could not have existed. This mutual confildence and voluntary accord between the peo]3los constituting the R.S.F.S.R. gave the Russian Federation a durability that no multi-national bourgeois state could possess.

As Comrade Stalin wrote: ‘Tf the R.S.F.S.R. is the only country in the world in which the experiment in the peaceable co-existence and fraternal collaboration of a whole nmnber of nations and peoples has succeeded, it is because it contains neither ruling nor subject peoples, neither a metro2)olis nor colonies, neither imperialism nor national oppression. In the R.S.F.S.R. federation rests on mutual confidence and a voluntary desire for union on the part of the toiling masses of the various nations. This voluntary character of the federa- tion must absolutely be preserved in the future, for only a federation of this kind can serve as a transition stage to that supreme unity of the toilers of all countries in a single world economic system, the necessity for which is growing more and more palpable’^ (J. Stalin, Marxism and the National and Colonial Question ^ Russ, ed., 1939, p. 92).

Formation of the U.S.S.R

The Party’s national policy, di- rected by Comrade Stalin, led to the close collaboration of the Soviet peoples. Six independent Soviet Republics were formed — ^the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (R.S.F.S.R.), the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (Uk. S.S.R.), the Byelorussian Soviet Social- ist Republic (B.S.S.R.), the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic, the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Georgian Soviet Social- ist Republic. At first, all these Soviet Republics existed as independ- ent states; they had their own armies, their own currency, etc. During the Civil War they combined their forces to wage a joint struggle against the interventionists and Whiteguards. When the Civil War terminat- ed, the fraternal alliance of the Soviet Republics was still further strengthened. In December 1920, a treaty was concluded between the Uk.S^S.R. and the R.S.F-S.R. establishing a military and economic alliance. Some of the People’s Commissariats, such as the Commis- sariats of War and the Navy, Finance, Railways, Foreign Trade, etc., were amalgamated. Similar treaty relations were established between the R.S.F.S.R. and the other Soviet Socialist Republics — ^Byelorussia, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia.

Experience showed, however, that these ties were not enough. Economic development called primarily for the further strengthen- ing of the alliance between the peoples. Their meagre economic resources had to be combined in order that the best use could be made of them. The economic division of labour between the different regions made the separate existence of the national republics impossible. For example, the Donetz Basin, i, e., the Ukraine, was then the centre of the coal and iron and steel industry. Baku, in Azerbaijan, was the centre of the oil industry. Chiatury, in Georgia, was the centre of the manganese industry. Central Asia, i. c., Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, was the cotton growing region. The Moscow Region was the centre of the cotton textile industry and Petrograd of the engineering industry, and these are in the R.S.F.S.R. With such a division of labour, the building of Socialism was possible only if the national republics were economically and politically united. Unification was also dictated by the interests of defending the Soviet land. The successful activ- ities of the joint Soviet delegation in Genoa and The Hague had proved the necessity of conducting a joint foreign policy. Unity was also prompted by the necessity of ensuring the all-round develop- ment of all the nationalities in the Soviet State, where power is based not upon the exploitation of man by man but upon uniting all the peoples to form one socialist family.

Thus, life itself dictated closer and more expedient forms of collabo- ration between the Soviet Republics. In March 1922, the three Trans- caucasian Soviet Republics concluded among themselves a treaty of military, political and economic alliance. Thus was formed the Trans- caucasian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. The First Transcauca- sian Congress of Soviets ratified the formation of the Transcaucasian S.F,S.R., set up a Transcaucasian Central Executive Committee and Council of People’s Commissars, and sent a proposal to the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee to call a joint Congress of Soviets of the four republics — ^R.S.F.S.R., Transcaucasian S.F.S.R., Uk.S.S.R. and B.S.S.R. — to discuss the formation of a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Similar decisions were adopted by the All-Ukrainian and All-Byelorussian Congresses of Soviets.

On December 26, 1922, the* Tenth All-Russian Congress of So- viets unanimously supported the proposal of the non-Russian repub- lics. The speeches delivered at this congress by the representatives of the fraternal Soviet Republics were a mighty demonstration of peoples uniting voluntarily for the purpose of building Socialism. This community of tasks to be performed found splendid expression in tlio speeoli of the representative of Azerbaijan. “Azerbaijan,” he said, ‘^is embodied in the Baku proletariat. The Baku proletariat has a revolu- tionary history. From its ranks sprang heroes and martyi‘s like the twenty-six Commissars who laid down their lives in the steppes of Turlonenia for proletarian ideas. The Baku proletariat has produced leaders like Comrade Stalin. And these Baku workers, jointly with the Azerbaijan peasants, have declared ever since Azerbaijan was Sovietized, that the oil which Azerbaijan' supplies to all Soviet coun- tries is not the property of the Azerbaijan proletariat alone, but the property of the proletariat of all the Soviet countries.” The Tenth All-Russian Congress of Soviets unanimously adopted the resolution moved by Comrade Stalin urging the necessity of forming theU,S.S.R.

The First Congress of Soviets of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was opened on December 30, 1922. In the speech ho delivered at this congress, Comrade Stalin said: “But, comrades, today is not only a day of retrospect, it is also a day which marks the triumph of the new Russia over the old Russia, the Russia which was the gendarme of Europe and the hangman of Asia. Today is a day of triumph for the new Russia, which has smashed the chains .of national oppression, organized victory over capital, created a dictatorship of the proletariat, awakened the peoples of the East, inspired the workers of the West, transformed the Red flag from a Party banner into a state banner, and rallied around that banner the peoples of the Soviet Republics in order to unite them into a single state, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the prototype of the future World Soviet Socialist Re- public” (J. Stalin, Marxism and the National and Colonial Question^ Moscow, 1940, p. 115). On Comrade Stalin’s motion the congress unani- mously adopted the declaration and treaty on the formation of the U.S.S.R., and instructed the Central Executive Committee to draft thft Constitution of the U.S,S.R.

Notwithstanding his illness, Lenin devoted considerable attention to the work of forming the U.S .S .B, He approved the initiative taken in forming the Transcaucasian S .E .8 .R . and called upon the Transcaucasian Communists to explain to the broad masses how necessary a federation was for the purpose of establishing national peace among the numerous peoples of Transcaucasia who, in the past, had been torn by national enmity. In greetings that he sent to the Ukrainian Congress of Soviets which had gathered to discuss the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Lenin stressed the world-historical importance of the fraternal union of the peoples. In a speech made in 1923 Lenin said that questions concerning nationalities are such as “for hundreds of years have occupied the European states and as have been settled only to an infinitesimal degree in democratic republics. We are settling them, and we need somebody to whom the representative of any na- tion can go and give a detailed account of wi at is wanted. Where can we find such a man?. . He went on to say that the only suitable man for this job was Comrade Stalin who, as People’s Commissar of Nationalities, had without interruption directed the work of forming the fraternal union of Soviet Republics. “Nobody,” he added, . could name a candidate other than Comrade Stalin” (V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. XXVII, Moscow, 1937, Russ, ed., pp. 263-264).

Comrade Stalin rendered enormous service in bi'inging about the formation of the U.S.S.R. and in drawing up the first Constitution of the Soviet Union.

The First Constitution of the U.S.S.R.

The structure of the Soviet State and of its organs, and the rights and duties of Soviet citizens were defined in the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. The Consti- tution was finally ratified by the Second Congress of Soviets in Janu- ary 1924. Every Union Republic had its own Constitution. The Con- stitution of the R.S.E.S.R., like the Constitutions of the other Union Republics, set itself the task of “guaranteeing the dictatorship of the proletariat with the object of suppressing the bourgeoisie, of abolishing the exploitation of man by man and of bringing aboul; Commun’sm. , .

According to the Union Constitution, the supreme organ of the U.S.S.R. was the Congress of Soviets of the Union, In the intervals between congresses, the supreme organ of Soviet power was the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. The Central Executive Committee consisted of two Chambers — the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities. All the republics, irrespective of the num- ber of their inhabitants, were given the right to send an equal number of representatives to the Soviet of Nationalities.

The Union and Autonomous Republics set up their own Councils of People’s Commissars.

According to the 1924 Constitution of the U.S.S.R. the right to elect and be elected to Soviets was granted to all citizens of both sexes who had reached the age of eighteen on election day, irre- spective of religion, race, nationality or domicile. Only those citizens were de| rived of electoral r'ghts who exploited hired labour, private traders, ministers of rel’g’on, former police officers and gendarmes and also those sentenced by a court to deprivation of political rights.

Thus, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics constituted an en- tirely new type of state, o ie which ensures the unity and friendship of the peoples inhabiting it in the work of building Socialism and of de- fending the state against the imperialists, ensures the free national development of the peoples, their independence and constructive initiative in their internal affairs. Every republic was guaranteed the right freely to secede from the Union if it so desired, and affiliation to the Union was open to all existing Soviet Socialist Republics, as well as .to those which might arise in the future.

Lenin's Behests

Lenin's Last Public Utterances

In the spring of 1922, Lenin fell seriously ill. After the Eleventh Congress of the R.O.P.(B.) the Central Committee of the Party elected Comrade Stalin as its General Secretary. The Party and the working class regarded Comrade Stalin as Lenin’s militant and tried comrade-in-arms, his most faithful disciple, and the continuator of his cause.

In October 1922, Lenin’s health somewhat improved and he re- sumed his functions for a short time. He presided at the meetings of the Council of People’s Commissars, attended the meetings of the Party Central Committee and spoke at a meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. On November 15, 1922, he delivered a report at the Fourth Congress of the Comintern, in which he summed up the five years of the revolution in Russia and the pros- pects of the world revolution. Lenin said: ‘The peasants realize that w© captured power for the workers and that our aim is to oroabo a so- -ciali&t system with the aid of this power. Therefore, the economic prep- aration for socialist economy was most important for us. We could not do this in a direct way. We had to do it in a roundabout way" (V. I. Lenin, Selected Works, Vol. X, Moscow, 1938, p. 329).

Lenin amplified this idea at a plenary session of the Moscow Soviet held on November 20, 1922, when he stressed with even greater emphasis that in the conditions prevailing in Russia, the New Economic Policy was the only road to Socialism. He concluded his speech by expressing the firm conviction that . We shall all, not in one day, but in the course of several years, all of us together, fulfil this task, come what may; and NEP Russia will be transformed into Socialist Russia’’ (V. I. Lenin, OoUected Works, Vol. XXVII, 3rd Russ, ed., p. 366).

This was Lenin’s last public speech. His illness took a grave turn for the worse. In January and February 1923, hurrying to take advan- tage of every moment between the attacks of his illness, he managed to dictate his last testame it to the Party and to the country. It was contained in his articles “Pages from a Diary,’’ “On Co-operation," “Our Revolution,’’ “How We Should Reorganize the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspection," and “Better Fewer, but Better."

These articles of Lenin taught the Party and the working class how to use the New Economic Policy as a means of building Socialism in our country, surrounded as it is by capitalist countries. In the article “How We Should Eeorganize the Workers’ and Peasants’ lu- speotion” he urged the necessity of preserving and strengthening the unity of the Party, as the vital condition for the further success of the proletarian dictatorship. In his last article, “Better Fewer, but Better,” he urged the necessity of strengthening the alliance between the working class and the peasantry and of achieving the utmost development of large-scale machine industry, the basis of Socialism. As he put it figuratively, it was necessary to change “firom the peas- ant, muzhik horse of poverty ... to the horse of large-scale machine industry, of electrification, of Volkhovstroy, etc/’ (V. I. Lenin, Selected TForfcs, Two-Vol. ed., VoL II, Moscow, 1947, p. 855.) In all his last articles and speeches Lenin gave concrete directions as to how this was to be accomplished.

He was of the opinion that Socialism could be achieved in agricul- ture by uniting the individual peasant farms to form co-operative farms, and by reorganizing agriculture on the basis of machine industry and electrification. In his article “On Co-operation” he showed that the Land of Soviets possessed all that was needed to build complete socialist society. Amplifying Iiis co-operative plan, Lenin showed tliat the medium through which the ];easants were to bo drawn into socialist construction was co-oxieration; but complete co-oper- ation and the transition to Socialism could not be achieved without a cultural revolution, for the cultural backwardness of the peasants was the most serious obstacle to the socialist re-organization of agriculture.

Lenin called for the raising of cultural standards in the U.S.S.R. and in this regard urged that a start should be made by abolishing that shameful survival of tsarism — illiteracy. The standard of literacy in Russia was still far below that of the more cultured countries in West- ern Europe. In 1920, the rate of literacy in Russia was 319 per 1,000 and in some districts it was even lower. Lenin demanded that school- teachers should be placed on a level on which they had never stood nor ever could stand in bourgeois society.

The main points of Lenin’s great plan for the building of Socialism in our country may be enumerated as follows: having seized power, hold the key positions in the economic life of the country; place the country’s economy on. the basis of modern advanced tech- nique; build socialist industry and by means of it technically re-equip agriculture; organize the peasants in co-operative societies and convert small individual backward agriculture into large-scale collective so- cialist agriculture; secure the economic independence of the Land of Soviets and build up its defences; strengthen the U.S.S.R. as the base of the struggle for Socialism all over the world.

The Twelfth Congress of the Bolshevik Party

In March 1923, Lenin suffered a severe relapse. He was taken to the village of Gorki near Moscow. His condition roused grave apprehensions. The entire people waited anxiously e^ery morning for the bulletin of their leader’s health.

In April 1923, while Ijenin was ill, the Twelfth Congress of the Party was held. The proceedings were directed by Comrade Stalin. In its decisions the congress took into account all the directives Lenin had given in his last articles and letters.

The congress strongly rebuffed all those who interpreted the New Economic Policy as a retreat from the socialist position and wanted to divert the development of the Land of Soviets to the path of tie res- toratioi of capitalism. The Trotskyites and Bukharinites proposed that vital branches of industry should be leased to foreign capitalists, and Trotsky even wanted to have the Putilov and Brj^ansk Plants closed because they were not showing a f^rofit. Trotsky’s supporters tried to thrust upon the Party tjie disastrous policy of d'sru^>ting the alliance between the working class and the peasantry. They proposed that iiidusory should be developed by ex )loitiag the peasaits. They also proposed that the debts contracted by I'.he tsar’s government sl^oiiJd be j?aid to tie foreign ca 2 htalists and that t)ie mono^ioly of foreign trade be abandoned.

The Twelfth Congress of the Bolshevik Party unanimously reject- od and condemned all these defeatist proposals of the Trotskyites and Bukharinites. It proposed that industry should be developed not at the expense of the peasants, but in close conjunof.^on witiii tliem. The congress devoted considerable attention to jiroblems concern- ing tlie policy of the Soviet Stale on the national question.

The reporter on this subject was Comrade Stalin, who unfolded a broad program of naeasures for abolishing the economic and cultural inequality that existed among the peoples of the Soviet Union. He par- ticularly emphasized that the Russian proletariat, who had ren- dered the oppressed nationalities fraternal assistance in their struggle against their enslavers, should now render them “real, systematic, sincere and genuine proletarian assistance” in economic and cultural development. “The Russian proletariat,” he said, “must takn every necessary measure to establish centres of industry in those republics” (J. Stalin, Marxism and the National and Colonial Question, Moscow, 1940, pp. 137-138). The congress denounced the Georgian national- deviators who had opposed the formation of the Transcaucasian Pederation and the cementing of friendship among the Transcaucasian people. The Trotskyites and Bukharinites supported these Georgian nationalists.

The Foreign Imperialists Attempt to Drag the U.S.S.R. into War

The foreign imperialists resolved to take advantage of tJie grave sit- uation created in the country and in the Party by Lenin’s illness and, by means of new acts of provocation, tried to drag the U.S.S.R. into war and thus disrupt the work of socialist construction. Foreign spies developed extensive espionage and sabotage activities in the U.S.S.R. The Soviet government had a number of British spies arrested and deported them. Lord Curzon, the British Foreign Secretary, sent the Soviet government an ultimatum demanding “damages” for the arrest of the spies, that the Soviet plenipoten- tiary representatives be recalled from Persia and Afghanistan because of their alleged anti-British activities, and that British fishermen be per- mitted to fish off the Soviet coasts. The ultimatum was accompanied by a threat of new intervention.

The bourgeoi's press in Great Britain and France launched a fierce anti-Soviet campaign. Encouraged by Curzon ’s ultimatum, the dregs of the various Whiteguard gangs abroad became active again. In May 1923, V. V. Vorovsky, the Soviet representative in Italy, a most prom- inent Bolshevik and outstanding Soviet diplomat, was assassinated while in Switzerland, by a Whiteguard,

The working people of the U.S.S.E.. answered Curzon ’s ultimatum and the assassination of Vorovsky with huge protest demonstrations in which they expressed their determination to resist. All over the country funds were collected for the construction of an aircraft squadron which was named “Ultimatum. ” At that time also the society known as the Friends of the Air Fleet was inaugurated.

In answer to all acts of provocation the Soviet government sent a note contai liiig the categorical warning that “the position of the Soviet Republic has not, cannot have, nor will have anything in common with dependence upon the will of a foreign government.”

Curzon ’s act of provocation roused a storm of protest and indigna- tion among the British workers, and the Conservative government was forced to resign. At the end of 1923, the so-called “Labour govern- ment,” headed by Ramsay MacDonald, came into office in Great Brit- ain, and in February 1924, yielding to the demands of the British workers, the MacDonald government recognized the Soviet government and established diplomatic relations with it.

The Difficulties of Restoring the National Economy

International complications were aggravated by the difficulties of restoring the na- tional economy. The growth of industry lagged behind the country's requirements. At the end of 1923, there were about a million unem- ployed in the country. In July 1923, the Supreme Council of National Economy, which was headed by the Trotskyite Pyatakov, issued an order to the State Trusts to make the highest possible profit by raising the prices of manufactured goods. The price paid for, grain, oa the other hand, was kept at a low level.

The result was that the peasants found it difficult to buy manufac- tured goods and the factories had no market for their products. Co-oper- ative and state trade lacked working capital. The Soviet currency became unstable. This affected the economic position of the workers and peasants. The Trotsky ites declared that these temporary economic difficulties were indicative of a “crisis” of the whole economic sys- tem of the U.S.S.R. under the New Economic Policy.

At this time the Soviet government was exerting efforts to reform the currency by replacing the depreciated paper currency with chervon- tsi, or ten-ruble notes, having a firm gold backing. The Trotsky ites sabotaged this financial reform by issuing orders to raise the prices of manufactured goods and declared that the reform and stabilization of the currency was unprofitable for industry. Instead of reducing prices, the Trotskyites advocated “commodity intervention,” that is to say, the purchase abroad of deficient goods. As a means of obtaining funds they advocated the raising of taxes, the raising of prices of manufactured goods, and so forth. Their object in pressing for these measures was to frustrate the building of Socialism, which had successfully begun, to cause a rupture between the working class and the peasants, and to convert the economy of the U.S.S.R, into an appendage of capitalist Europe.

Taking advantage of the aggravation of the international situa- tion, the economic difficulties in the U.S.S.R. and of Lenin’s illness, the Trotskyites began secretly to rally the remnants of the defeated anti-Leninist groups for another attack upon the Party. Tliey wore joined by the “Democratic Centralists,” remnants of tlio “Workers’ Opposition,” former “Left Communists,” Menshevik typos expelled from the Party, and similar scum, who were united by their common hatred for the Leninist Central Committee of the Party.

In the autumn of 1923, the Trotskyites dragged the Party ijito an- other fierce discussion, but the Party rallied around Comrade Stalin who was fighting for Leninism against Trotskyism. The Trotsky- ites were exposed and defeated. The platform of the Trotskyite op])03i- tion was unanimously condemned and defined as a potty-bourgeois deviation, as the revision of Leninism.

Death of Lenin

As he laid the foundation stones of social- ist society Lenin dreamed of seeing backward, ruined, wretched and impotent Russia replaced by anew, mighty and happy land of flour- ishing Socialism. He was destined, however, to see only the very first, comparatively small, successes of the grand reconstruction of the Soviet Union that he had planned. He who had caused such mighty transformations to take place was struck down by death at the very beginning of the historic road taken by our country towards the victory of » Socialism. From the beginning of his conscious life to the day ho drew his last breath, Lenin had devoted himself entirely to the cause of the revolution. The enormous, superhuman labours of this greatest man of our age had sapped his health, and his death wm hastened by the severe wounds that had been inilioted upon him by ihe vicious bullets of the enemies of the revolution. V. I. Lenin jmscd airay on Jannaiy 21, 1924. Tiie death of the leader filled the hearts of millions with grief. In its manifesto to the Party and to all the working people announcing the death of our great leader, the Central Coininittoe of the R,C.P.(B.) stated: “JSIover sinco Marx has the groat proletarian movement for emancipation produced such a titanic figure as our late leader, teacher and friend.”

Briefly and concisely describing Lenin’s greatness and the gigantic work he performed, the nia lifosto went on to say: “Lenin x^osscssod all the trul^r great and heroic virtues of the x^roletariat — b > fearless mind, an iron, inflexible and indomitable will which surmounts all obstacles, a holy and mortal hatred of slavery and tyranny, revolution- ary ardour which moves mountains, boundless faith in the creativt* powers of the masses, and vast organizing talent. His name has be- come the symbol of the new world fcomWest to East, and from South to North.”

The Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party called upon the working class to mark the death of tlieir leader by mustering all tlieir strength to carry out Lenin’s behests.

In the factories talks were delivered on the life of Lenin, after which the workers passed the curt but emjphatio resolution: “Wo vow to carry out Lenin’s behests.”

The workers of tl e Third Moscow Printing Plant, in sending a de- legation to the funeral of the'r leader, handed it a banner bearing the inscription: “Lot us form a solid ring round the Communist Party and carry out Ilych’s behests to the last!”

At a meeting held at the Moskvoretsky Textile Mills an old woman weaver mounted the platform and in a voice trembling with emotion said: “If I have wavered bill now, thinking that I was almost illit- erate and w'thout trailing, then during these last days I have mihesitatingly decided to join the Party created by our infinitely be- loved Ilyich, May ho rest in poace in his grave; we millions, the workers, will carry the cause begin by him to the end.”

During those hours of grief hundreds of thousands of proletarians all over the country, like this old Moscow weaver, handed in applica- tions to jom Lenin’s Party.

At memorial meetings the workers passed resolutions pledging themselves to carry out Lenin’s behests and to send their best sons to reinforce the Party.

The men in the Red Army passed similar resolutions. A meeting of Red Army men and commanders of the Sivash Division declared: “We must now guard not only our Red frontiers, but also the invio- lability of the grave of our great leader and teacher.”

Lenin’s death caused profound grief and mourning in the settle- ments of the Yakuts, in the camps of the nomad Nenets reindeer breeders, and in the villages of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The

working people in the most remote parts of the country sent delegations to Moscow to attend Lenin’s funeral. The peasants in the Volga Region collected grain for a fund to build a monument to Lenin. The workers and peasants named towns, streets, factories and villages after Lenin. At the request of the workers, Petrograd, where Lenin had commenced his revolutionary activities as the leader of the proletariat and where he had led the working class in a victorious insurrection and to the capture of power, was named in his hon- our, Leningrad.

On January 23, the peasants from the villages surrounding Gorki, where Lenin died, accompanied their friend and teacher on his last journey to Moscow. The workers of Moscow took their last leave of Lenin. For five days and nights a continuous stream of people flowed tlirough the Column Hall of the House of Trade Unions, where Lenin lay in state. Millions of working people waited their turn to bid their leader a last farewell.

Stalin’s Vow

On the death of our beloved leader. Comrade Stalin, in the name of the Party and of the whole Soviet people, took a great vow .to carry out Lenin’s behests.

At the Second Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R. on January 26, 1924, Comrade Stalin said:

“Departing jfrom us. Comrade Lenin adjured us to hold high and guard the purity of the great title of member of the Party. We vow to you. Comrade Lenin, that we will fulfil your behest with credit! . . .

“Departing from us, Comrade Lenin adjured us to guard the unity of our Party as the apple of our eye. We vow to you, Comrade Lenin, that this behest too, we will fulfil with credit! . . .

“Departing from us. Comrade Lenin adjured us to guard and strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat. We vow to you, Comrade Lenin, that we will spare no efforts to fulfil this behest too, with credit! . . .

“Departing from us, Comrade Lenin adjured us to strengthen with all our might the alliance of the workers and the peasants. We vow to you. Comrade Lenin, that this behest too, we will fulfil with credit! . . .

“Departing from us. Comrade Lenin adjured us to consolidate and extend the Union of Republics. We vow to you. Comrade Lenin, that this behest, too, we will fulfil with credit! . . .

“More than once did Lenin point out to us that the strengthening of the Red Army and the improvement of its condition is one of the most important tasks of our Party. . . . Let us vow then, comrades, that we will spare no effort to strengthen our Red Army and our Red ISTavy. . . .

“Departing from us. Comrade Lenin adjured us to remain faithful to the principles of the Communist International. We vow to you, Comrade Lonin, that we will not spare our lives to strengthen and extend the Union of the toilers of the whole world — ^the Communist International!” {Stalin on Lenin, Moscow, 1946, pp. 30-36.)

Stalin’s great vow became the program of action of the Party and the Soviet State which ensured our country’s victorious progress along the road to Socialism.

At 4 p, m. on January 27, amid the thunder of an artillery salute, the body of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin was placed in the Mauso- leum erected during those days in the Red Square, Moscow. A last and mournful salute to the leader was sounded by sirens and hooters. Life throughout the country came to a standstill for the space of five minutes. Trains stopped in their tracks, the buzz of ma- chinery in the factories was silenced. Five minutes of silence was also observed by working people in all capitalist countries.

The End of the Period of Restoration in the U.S.S.R.

The First Year Without Lenin

On the death of Lenin the working class of the U.S.S.R. rallied more closely than ever around Lenin’s Party. Thousands of workers handed in applications to join its ranlis in order the bettor to carry out the behests of the do]iarted leader. The Central Committee proclaimed a mass admission of advanced workers into the Party’s ranks. Over 240,000 of the most class-conscious and revolutionary workers made up the “Lenin Enrol- ment” into the Party. Interest in the study of Leninist theory increased to an enormous degree. “Lenin is dead, but Leninism lives!” said the workers, and souglit to acquire a better knowledge of the principles of Lenin’s teachings.

To satisfy this urge, Comrade Stalin, in the beginning of April 1924, delivered a series of lectures on “The Foundations of Lenin- ism” at the ‘"Sverdlov” Communist University. In these lectures, which shortly afterwards were published in book form, he gave a sys- tematic exposition of Lenin’s great teachings about the proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat, of the historical roots and theory of Leninism, of Lenin’s teachings about the Party, and of his views on the peasant and the national and colonial ques- tions, He emphas'zed that Leninism was not only a Russian but an international doctrine. Leninism not only revived the reyolut ionary teachings of Marx and Engels, which had been distorted by the oxDpor- tunists of the Second International, but developed them further, enriching them with the now experience of the proletarian class sti'ug- gle in the epoch of imperialism. “Leninism,” said Comrade Stalin, “is Marxism of the era of imperialism and of the proletarian revo- lution.” This splendid book, which is a further development of the Marxian theory, armed ideologically the working class of the U.S.S.R and of the whole world in their struggle for Sooialism. Comrade Stalin’s book The Foundations of Leninism^ also played an enormous part in

bringing about the ideological defeat of Trotskyism.

Remember, love and study Lenin, our teacher and leader. Fight and vanquish the enemies, internal and foreign — as Lenin taught ns.

Build the new life, the new existence, the new culture — as Lenin taught us.

Never refuse to do the little things, for from little things are built the

big things — this is one of Lcnin*s important behests.

In May 1924, the Thirteenth Congress of the Party was hold. At

this congress Trotsky hypocritically stated that ho and his followers were giving up the factional struggle. Actually, ho had instruefcod his followers to make declarations about renouno ng Trotskyism while ill fact forming a counter-revolutionary underground organi- zation.

The Thirteenth Congi'ess emphasized that tlie operation of the Party line laid down by Lenin at the time of the adoption of the New Economic Policy had strengthened the alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry and had created the conditions for the speedy liquidation of economic ruin. The congress called for assistance for the rural districts, for the organization of the rural poor and for the for- mation of peasant mutual-aid committees. While demandirg an inten- sification of the struggle against the kulaks and an improvement in activity among the poor and middle peasants, the congress confirmed the line of developing the co-operative movement as a means of achieving Sooialism. The congress indicated measures for improving the work of the state trading organizations and co-operativo societies, 'which under the New Economic Policy were to help in establishing the link between industry and peasant farming.

The New -Economic Policy created a considerable revival in the country after the ruin which had been caused by war and interven- tion.

From 1924 to 1925 total industrial output increased 60 per cent and the number of workers employed in industry increased 27 per cent. The material conditions of the working class improved.

The currency reform of 1924 introduced a stable currency in place of the former depreciated paper money and strengthened the finan- cial position of the Soviet State.

The revival of state and co-operative trade increased the proportion of the socialist forms of economy in the total economy of the country. Soviet trade began to squeeze the private trader out of the market. Peasant farming showed a marked improvement. The Soviet govern- ment rendered the working peasantry considerable assistance. In the period from 1924 to 1925 the state assigned out of its limited re- sources 290,000,000 rubles for the purpose of assisting the loovev peasants.

The Soviet Union’s successes during the four years of tho operation of the New Economic Policy were achieved in a stubborn struggle against the resisting capitalist elements. In an endeavour to exploit the discontent of the peasant masses caused by tho shortage of manu- factured goods, the high prices of these goodB, and tho survivals of “War Communism” that persisted in some parts of the rural districts, the kulaks tried to organize revolts.

The elections to the Soviets which took place at this time revealed that in a number of districts the middle peasants were inclined to swing over to the side of the kulaks. Comrade Stalin set the task of rallying the middle peasants around the proletariat and of enlisting the masses of the peasants in the work of building up the Soviets. At a plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Party held on October 26, 1924, he said: “All those who are active, honest, possess initiative and are politically conscious, especially former Red Army men, who are politically the most conscious and possess most initiative among the peasants, must be drawn into the work of the Soviets.”

The Soviets are bodies which establish a bond between the work- ing class and peasantry, with the proletariat playing the leading role. Hence, enlivening and strengthening the Soviets meant strength- ening the alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry in the joint struggle for Socialism.

Strengthening the Alliance Between the Proletariat of the U.S.S.R. and the Peasants of the Non-Russian Republics

After the U.S.S.R. was formed, the Russian proletariat increased its assistance to the peoples of the U.S,S.R. and thereby strengthened its alliance with the peasants in the non-Russian regions. The task of uniting the peoples in a single, fraternal union of state was hindered by three factors, viz,^ the actual inequality existing between the different na- tionalities, the dominant-nation chauvinism of a section of the Russian Communists, and local nationalism. The Tenth and Twelfth Congresses of the Party, after hearing reports by Comrade Stalin, adopted a program of measures for combating the still existing ac- tual inequality between the peoples of the U.S.S.R.

Under the New Economic Policy there was a revival and growth of dominant-nation chauvinism, a reflection of the former privileged position of the Great-Russians. This chauvinism found expression in tl.e neglect shown by certain Soviet and Party officials towards the needs and requirements of the non-Russian republics, and theatened to underini .ethe confidence of the peasant masses of the non-Russian areas in the U.S.S.R. towards the proletariat, which was exercising its dictatorship.

At the same time, there was a revival of local nationalism among the peoples who had not yet forgotten the national oppression they had suffered from Russian tsarism and the Russian bourgeoisie. The local nationalists sowed distrust in everything Russian, and tried to disrupt She alliance between the peasants of the non-Russian republics and the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. which was leading the struggle or Socialism in all the Soviet Republics.

In June 1923, the Central Committee of the Party held a joint conference with responsible officials from the non-Russian republics and regions. This conference, which was directed by Comrade Sialin, emphatically condemned both dominant-nation chauvinism and the nationalistic tendencies of individual Party members. At this con- ference there wore exposed a group of Tatar bourgeois nationalists and a group of Uzbek nationalists.

The bourgeois-nationalists had become agents of foreign imperial- ism and conducted subversive activities with the object of disrupting the work of building up the Soviet system in the border regions. The Georgian Mensheviks, assisted by the foreign imperialists, even at- tempted to rouse the peasants of Georgia to revolt against the Soviets. In the summer of 1924, they captured Chiatury, the centre of the manganese industry in Georgia, dispersed the Soviets in Guria and other districts, and began to organize kulak and landlord fighting detachments. The Georgian peasantry, however, far from allowing themselves to be drawn into this reckless venture of the Georgian Mensheviks, resolutely helped in liquidati ig it in the course of a few days. The organizers of this revolt — a group of prominent Georgian Mensheviks — were tried before a Soviet court and mot with well-de- served punishment.

The Soviet government rendered the peoples of the non-Russian republics considerable economic, organizational and cultural assist- ance. A number of factories, with all their equipment, were trans- ferred from Moscow to Georgia, Bokhara and Uzbekistan. Loans were granted to the industries and co-operative societies in the various republics. In all the non-Russian regions a drive was launched to enliven and strengthen the Soviets.

The National Delimitation of Central Asia

When the Soviet Republics in Turkestan were firmly established their national delim- itation was carried into effect. The tsarist government, in intro- ducing its administrative division of the country, had taken no ao- oount of the specific national features and the territorial distribution of the peoples inhabiting it. The result was that the old boundaii 'S of gubernias and regions brought together into administrative units territories populated by different nationalities, and split up ho- mogeneous nationalities. Particularly scattered 9,bout were the peoples of Central Asia. Some of the peoples Kad no administrative centre, •republic or region of their own, and this hindered their economic and cultural development.

In 1924, all the peoples of Central Asia reached a voluntary agree- ment and established an absolutely new political and administrative •division of Central Asia, one that took into account the economic and •political interests of each nation. Two Union Soviet Socialist Republics were formed — ^the Uzbek and Turkmen Republics. Later, a third one, .the Tajik Republic, was formed, being detached from the Uzbek S.S.R., of which it had till then been a part, as an autonomous republic. Two autonomous Soviet Republics were also formed, namely, the Kirghiz and the Kara-Kalpak Republics. The part of Northeastern Turkestan inhabited by Kazakhs was incorporated in Kazakhstan. In the autumn of 1924, the Congresses of Soviets of Bokhara and Khiva resolved to rename their People’s Republics, Socialist Republics. The Second Session of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. ratified the decision of the peoples of Central Asia regarding national delimitation. The Uzbek and Turk- men Republics joined the U.S.S.R. as Union Republics.

In an estimation of the importance of national delimitation, Comrade Stalin wrote: ‘The time has now come when these scattered fragments can be reiinited into independent states, so that the toil- ing masses of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan can be united and welded with the organs of government. The delimitation of frontiers in Tur- kestan is primarily the reunion of the scattered parts of these coun- tries into independent states. The fact that these states then desired to join the Soviet Union as equal members thereof, merely signifies that the Bolsheviks have found the key to the profound aspirations of the masses of the East, and that the Soviet Union is the only volun- tary union of the toiling masses of various nationalities in the world’' (J. Stalin, Marxism and the National and Colonial Question, Moscow, 1940, pp. 182-183).

Thus, for the first time in their history, the Uzbek, Turkmen and Tajik peoples were able to unite in their national states. This they did on the basis of Soviet power, which is cherished and understood by the masses. National delimitation strengthened the alliance be- tween the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. and the toiling peasantry of Central Asia and stimulated the economic and cultural development of the peoi)les of Soviet Central Asia.

The Struggle for Socialist Industrialization (1926–1929)

Steering a Course for Industrialization

The Soviet Republic’s International Position Is Strengthened

After the prolonged post-war revolutionary crisis, world capitalism entered a phase of temporary, partial stabilization. As a result of the defeat of the revolutionary movement in 1923, counter-revolu* tionary coups were carried out in Germany, Italy, Bulgaria and Poland. The tide of revolution temporarily subsided in Western Europe and capitalism partially stabilized its position. This partial stabili- zation of capitalism intensified the antagonisms between the differ- ent capitalist countries and also between the workers and capitalists in each country. A desire to form a united front against the offensive of capital arose among the proletarian masses in the capitalist conn- tries. Delegations of foreign workers streamed into the U.S.S.R.

Comrade Stalin made the following comment: “At the one i)ole we find capitalism stabilizing itself, consolidating the position it has reached and continuing its development. At the other pole we find the Soviet system stabilizing itself, consolidating the position it has won and marching forward on the road to victory. Who will defeat whom? — ^That is the essence of the question” (J. Stalin, Lenin- ism, Vol, I, Moscow, 1934, p. 162).

The successes which the working class of the U.S.S.R, achieved on the economic firont strengthened and consolidated the Soviet Union’s international position. In 1924 and in the beginning of 1926, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan and many other bourgeois countries ofidoially recognized the Soviet Union. In the summer of 1924, a “Gen- eral Treaty between Great Britain and the U,S.S.R.” was signed, but the reactionary British bourgeoisie launched a campaign against this, their argument being that “Great Britain had surrendered to Bolshevism.”

The Program for Building Socialism in the U.S.S.R

The process of restoring the national economy of the U.S.8.R. was draw- ing to a close. In 1925–1926, agriculture in the U.S,S.R. reached the pre-war level and produced 103 per cent of the pre-war output. The volume of industrial output also approached the pre-war level. But it was not enough for the Land of Soviets, which was building Socialism, merely to restore its economy, merely to reach the pre-war level, for that was the level of a backward and poverty-stricken country. It was necessary to go beyond that.

At the end of April 1926, the Fourteenth Conference of the Party was held. Guided by Lenin’s thesis that Socialism could be victorious in one country, the conference passed a resolution which stated that the Party “must exert all efforts to build socialist society in the con- viction that this work of construction can be, and certainly will be, successful if we succeed in safeguarding the country against all at- tempts at restoration.”

In substantiating Lenin’s thesis that Socialism could be victo- rious in our country, Comrade Stalin repeatedly emphasized that it was necessary to distinguish between two aspects of this question, namely, the domestic and the international aspect.

'The domestic aspect of the question was the relationships between the classes within the country: the country possessed all that was needed to build complete socialist society; the working class, which had established its political dictatorship and had converted the land, factories, mills, banks and means of communication into public prop-- erty, could now further socialist construction and, relying on its? alliance with the peasantry, economically rout capitalism within the country.

But there was also an international aspect to the question of the victory of Socialism. For the time being the U.S.S.R. was the only socialist country in the world; it still existed in a capitalist encircle- ment, and this was fraught with the danger of capitalist intervention. Complete guarantees against intervention could be provided only by the victory of Socialism on an international scale. Hence, the final victory of Socialism, meaning that it was guaranteed against inter- vention, was possible only if the proletarian revolution was victo- rious in a number of countries. If the world revolution was delayed, the proletariat of the U.S.S.B. could overcome the economic and technical backwardness of the country and ensure its independence only by its own internal forces and resources, by creating the indus- trial basis for Socialism and reconstructing the national economy on socialist lines.

The Fourteenth Conference of the Party emphatically condemned Trotsky’s theory that the victory of Socialism in the U.S.S.R. was impossible, and called upon the working class to work with the ut- most strain to ensure this victory. In May 1925, Comrade Stalin de- livered a report in which, summing up the proceedings of this confer- ence, he substantiated and amplified Lenin’s teachings regarding the possibility of the victory of Socialism, and formulated the pro- gram for the building of Socialism in the following few words: need from fifteen to twenty million industrial proletarians; we need the electrification of the principal regions of our country; we need the organization of agriculture on a co-operative basis; we need a highly developed metal industry. Then we need fear no danger. Then we shall be victorious on an international scale” (Lenin and Stalin, Selected Works ^ Vol. Ill, Russ, ed., p. 27).

The decisions of the Fourteenth Party Conference served as the basis for the proceedings of the Third All-Union Congress of Soviets which opened on May 13, 1925. The congress discussed the following reports: the state of industry; measures to raise and strengthen peas- ant farming; agricultural co-operative societies; building up the So- viets, and the Red Army. The congress passed a series of measures to improve the work of the Soviets, It also ratified the admission into the U.S.S.R. of the two new Union Republics — ^the Turkmen S-S.R. and the Uzbek S.S.R. and in doing so emphasized that “the entry of the afore-mentioned republics into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is fresh proof that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is indeed a voluntary union of equal nations and a reliable bulwark of the formerly 0 ]jpressed nations” {The Congresses of Soviets of the U.S.S,M. — Decisions and Resolutions, Moscow, 1939, Russ, ed., p. 78).

The congress devoted special attention to the problem of strength- ening the defensive capacity of the country and the Red Army. Jn the resolution adopted on the report of M. V. Frunze it emphasized the general strengthening of the international position of the U.S.S.R. and went on to say: “The Third Congress of Soviets of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics deems it necessary to declare to the work- ing people of the Soviet Union and of the whole world that notwith- standing the efforts of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Government, and notwithstanding the treaties and agreements already concluded with a number of countries, the Soviet Union is not guaranteed against attempts on the part of world capital to disturb the peaceful labours of the workers and peasants” {The Congresses of Soviets of the TJ.S.SM . — Decisions and Resolutions, Moscow, 1939, Russ, cd., p. 82).

The congress approved the reform of tlio armed forces of the TT.S.S.R. carried out by the People’s Commissariat of Military and Naval Affairs and which helped still further to improve the fighting efficiency of the Red Army and the Red Navy.

In the congrefcs’ decision on M* V. Frunze’s report the government was instructed to strengthen the defensive might of the country by the following measures:

'‘a) Secure a corresponding expansion of tlie armaments industry and run all the rest of tlie state industry of the Union in such a way as will in peacetime take into account the needs of wartime; b) improve armaments and saturate the Red Army with them; c) correspondingly improve and build a network of ways of communication — ^luilways, freight and motor traction; d) develop all forms of communication; e) develop horse-breeding, with the object of supplying the needs not only of agriculture, but also of the Red Army, and of its cava by in particular; f) pay profound attention to tiic military training of the entire population. ...” {The Congresses of Soviets of the U.S.S^R , — Decisions and Resolutions, Moscow, 1939, Russ, ed., j)* 83.)

The decisions which the Third Congress of Soviets adopted on Com- rade Frunze’s report were an important factor in strengthening the defensive capacity of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Comrade Frunze, however, was not destined to carry out this program of mil- itary development; he died on October 31, 1925. His death was a severe loss to the Party and to the Soviet people. He was succeeded at the post of People ’s Commissar of Military and Naval Affairs by that hero of the Civil War and comrade-in-arms of Stalin and Frunze — K. E. Voroshilov.

In December 1926, the Fourteenth Congress ofthe Party was opened. In his report to the congress, Comrade Stalin set the Party the immediate task of transforming our country from an agrarian into an industrial state. The congress approved of the leader’s proposal and it resolved: “To ensure for the U.S.S.R. economic independence, which will safeguard the U.S.S.R. against becoming an appendage of ca];)italist world economy, and for this purpose to steer a course to- wards the industrialization of the country, the development of the production of means of production. ...”

The Fourteenth Party Congress has gone into the history of the Party and of our country as the Industrialization Congress. In view of the formation of the U S.S.R. the congress decided to rename the Eussian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks).

In deciding firmly to steer a course towards industrialization, the congress denounced the bourgeois views of the so-called “new op- position” which sought to drag the Party and the working class back — to the path of restoring capitalism. The Zinovievites had secured elec- tion as delegates to the congress by downright fraud (at the Party Conference in Leningrad that was held before the congress, they hypo- critically voted for the Party line). The congress decided to send to Leningrad a group of its delegates, consisting of Comrades Molotov, Kirov, Voroshilov, Kalinin, Andreyev and others, to explain to the members of the Leningrad Party organization the duplicity which had been practised by their delegates at the Party Congress.

An Extraordinary Conference of the Leningrad Party organiza- tion unanimously condemned the hypocritical Zinovievites and elected a new Regional Committee of the Party, headed by S. M. Kirov, under whose leadership the Leningrad Bolsheviks launched a struggle for socialist industrialization.

The Difficulties and Successes of Socialist Industrialization

The U.S.S.R. Becomes an Industrial Country

During the period of restoration the task had been to put agriculture on its feet and to restore the existing mills and factories. But these were old enterprises equipped with obsolete machinery. The task now was to re-equip these old plants with up-to-date machinery.

During the period of restoration it was mainly light industry that was developed. The task now was to expand and strengthen heavy industry, without which neither light industry nor agriculture could grow. It was necessary to build a number of new plants and to create new branches of industry that had not existed at all in tsarist Rus- sia, Le., to build plants for the manufacture of machines, machine tools, automobiles, chemicals, aircraft and tractors, a new defence industry, etc. The cun*ent task was to bring about the socialist industrialization of the country.

The erection of industrial plants involves huge expenditure. Caj)- italist countries, as a rule, build up their industries out of funds obtained from outside, by plundering colonies, by wars of conquest, by foreign credits and loans, and also by exploiting their own workers and peasants. The Land of Socialism could not on principle resort to such sources for its industrialization. There was only oire way open for the proletarian state, the way of the socialist accumulation of in- ternal revenues and savings, of industrialization out of the internal resources of the country. The most important source of accumulation was the revenue of nationalized industries, state trade, and also the current funds of credit institutions and savings banks. Wide masses of the working people took up the slogan of the "'fight to effect econ- omies.” Stern measures were undertaken to eliminate the unproductive expenditure of state and public funds. At the same time the Soviet government permitted no reduction in expenditure on the protection of labour, and prohibited economies to be effected at the expense of the workers.

In capitalist countries industrialization usually starts with the development of light industry. Only after light industry has accumu- lated the necessary funds docs the development of heavy industry begin. This process takes a long time; that was why the Communist Party did not take this path. "The Communist Party of our country therefore rejected the ^ordinary’ path of industrialization and commenced the industrialization of the country by developing heavy industry” (J. Stalin, “Speech Delivered at an Election Meeting in the Stalin Election District, Moscow, February 9, 1946,” Moscow, 1946, p. 16).

The very first year of the Party's course towards industrializa- tion produced positive results. In 1926, the year’s state grain purchases plan was carried out and the market price of grain dropped. The rate of the chervonets became stabilized. Trade turnover increased. Large- scale industry also fulfilled its plan and showed a 40 per cent increase in output, the heavy industry showing an increase of nearly 60 per cent. The metal industry developed with exceptional rapidity; in 1924 its output had been less than half of the pre-war output, but in 1926 it already exceeded that of 1913.

Investments for the re-equipment of old i)lants and the building of new ones amounted to 811 ,000,000 rubles, compared with 385 ,000,000 in the preceding year.

Old plants which had been idle wore restarted, and now plants which had been built by the Soviet government were put into opera- tion. In the spring of 1925, the first blast furnace of the Dniepropet- rovsk Steel Plant, the largest in the South, which had been idle since 1917, was started. A month later the Karabash Copi)er Smelting Plant in the Urals was started. In the beginning of December 1926, the Shatura district power plant near Moscow, the largest peat-fuel power plant in the world, was opened. During the May Day festival in 1926, two large hydroelectric power stations were opened, one in Tashkent and one in Erevan.

In July 1926, traffic was started on the first electric railway in the U.S.S.R., that connecting Baku with the oil fields and the town-* ship of Sabunchi; and the foundation stone was officially laid of the Stalingrad Tractor Plant,

The enormous increase, xmder the leadership of the Party, in the activities and constructive initiative of the masses resulted in rapid economic successes. In September 1926, the output of Soviet industry for the first time exceeded the pre-war level. Beginning with the new economic year of 1926-1927, the industries of the U.S.S.Rf. produced more than in tsarist Russia at the peak of her economic development, viz., in 1913. Agricultural output and the national income of the Land of Soviets reached the pre-war level.

When the first decade of the existence of the Soviet State was reached the results of socialist industrialization were already palpable. Over a billion rubles had been invested in capital construction and a number of new large plants had been put into operation. The build- ing of new giants of socialist industry was commenced. In December 1926, the Volkhov Electric Power Plant, the first-born of Soviet electrification, was officially opened. The building of this plant was begun on Lenin’s proposal as far back as 1918. In 1927, the Trans- caucasian district hydroelectric plant, which provided power for Tbi- lisi, the capital of Soviet Georgia, was opened, the Red Putilov Plant turned out its first twenty-one tractors, and the AMO Automobile Plant (now the Stalin Plant) in Moscow turned out its first ten motor trucks. In the same year the construction was begun of the Turksib Railway which, running through the waterless desert of Kazakhstan, was to unite Siberia with Central Asia. Thus, all over the country intense work was in progress in building new factories, mills, mines, power stations and railways.

The proportion of industry to the entire national economy rose to 42 per cent and reached the pre-war level. Still more rapid was the growth of large-scale socialist industry, the output of which was 18 per cent higher than the preceding year. This was a record in- crease, such as the large-scale industry of the most advanced capitalist countries never reached even in the period of their highest develop- ment.

The jubilee session of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. held on the occasion of the Tenth Anniversary of the victory of the October Revolution took a decision to introduce a 7-hour day in industry.

U.S.S.R.—Land of Socialism