Library:Limitation on Incumbency

Limitation on Incumbency
Author	Michael Parenti
Publisher	PS: Political Science & Politics
First published	1991-06
Type	Letter
Source	https://www.jstor.org/stable/419921

Limitation on Incumbency is a letter by Michael Parenti, published in PS: Political Science & Politics in June 1991.

Text

The article by Robert Struble and Z. W. Jahre (PS, March 1991) proposing a limitation on incumbency in the House glowingly predicts all sorts of salutary effects: "Oligarchy" would be vanquished. "Careerist monopoly" would end. The quality of candidates for the House—and indirectly even the Senate—would improve. Capable members would rise to leadership "at the outset." The de facto power of the House would actually increase. New drive and enthusiasm would profoundly energise the House, and so forth.

These are dazzling promises. But as I read the article I kept wondering why George Bush, Dan Quayle, and so many other conservatives are suddenly in favour of a greater rotation of congressional office. Could it be they are interested in all the benefits imagined by Struble and Jahre? I suspect not. Some of these same conservatives, most notably President Reagan, want to abolish the 22nd Amendment which places a two-term limit on presidential incumbency.

For decades we political scientists pointed out that the congressional seniority system allowed for the undemocratic entrenchment of conservatives of both parties presiding over self-ruling committee satrapies. And for decades our criticisms were ignored. Today the seniority system isn't what it used to be but it is still operative. And for the first time, liberals and even left progressives, some of them African-Americans like John Conyers, are moving into powerful committee chairs, and now for the first time, the issue of incumbency is being targetted by conservatives and getting publicised in the national media.

Just before leaving office Reagan commented that the executive and judiciary "are fine" but Congress still remains "a problem." He meant that there still survives a liberal political formation in that branch. The same holds for the state legislatures. During the last election campaign, Bush and Quayle made a point of supporting a proposition to limit incumbency in the California state legislature, which is dominated by a relatively liberal contingent.

I suspect that's why conservatives, who dislike the 22nd Amendment and see nothing wrong with presidentially appointed, life-long federal judgeships, are suddenly so enthusiastic about the rotation of legislative office. A more fluid rotation of office would wipe out the leaders and the seniority of the Democratic liberals in Congress. Unlike some political scientists, Reagan, Bush, and Quayle do not treat process and performance as if existing in a social vacuum. They are keenly aware of how ongoing institutional arrangements advance or retard their political interests. They understand power because they have so much of it and have so much to protect with it.

In contrast, it is still remarkable how the scholarship of so many of our colleagues continues to reduce essence to form, studying everything except the impelling content and purpose of political interest. That's what was missing from the Struble and Jahre article; there was no consideration of the partisan political effects and interests behind rotation of office.