Trotsky and the Military Conspiracy (Grover Furr, Vladimir L. Bobrov, Sven-Eric Holmström)

Trotsky and the Military Conspiracy
Author	Grover Furr, Vladimir L. Bobrov, Sven-Eric Holmström
Publisher	Erythros Press and Media
First published	5 January 2021
Type	Book
ISBN	0578816032

Trotsky and the Military Conspiracy: Soviet and Non-Soviet Evidence Evidence; with the Complete Transcript of the "Tukhachevsky Affair" Trial is a 2021 book by historian Grover Furr, published by Erythros Press and Media.

Acknowledgements and Dedication

I wish to express my gratitude to Kevin Prendergast, Arthur Hudson – Arthur, may you enjoy your well-deserved retirement! — and Siobhan McCarthy, the skilled and tireless Inter-Library Loan librarians at Harry S. Sprague Library, Montclair State University.

Without their help, my research would simply not be possible. With their continued help, I can persevere.

I would like to recognise Montclair State University for giving me a sabbatical leave in the fall semester of 2015, and special research travel funds in 2017, 2019, and 2020, which have been invaluable in my research on this book.

This book is dedicated to

Ушкалов Вячеслав Николаевич

Vyacheslav Nikolaevich Ushkalov

The Authorship of This Book

This book is the result of a collective effort. The research has been done primarily by Vladimir L. Bobrov, of Moscow, and secondarily by me, Grover Furr.

Since before he first contacted me in March, 1999, Vladimir Bobrov has been diligently scouring published materials in order to identify and collect primary source evidence and scholarship on the Tukhachevsky Affair. During the past decade, he and a colleague have spent countless hours in the archive of the Federal Security Service, where the records of the former NKVD are stored, locating, reading, and transcribing by hand a great many primary source documents concerning the military conspiracy.

Vladimir has also carefully read and critiqued drafts of this book. I have included most, if not all, of his suggestions in the final text. Without his work, the present book would not have been possible.

Sven-Eric Holström has ably translated the entire transcript of the trial of the defendants in the "Tukhachevsky Affair." I have carefully studied this translation and made a small number of changes.

I have written the text of the book and am responsible for the final draft.

Grover Furr

Montclair, NJ USA

25 November 2020

Foreword: How to Read This Book

The principal document presented here is the complete translation of the transcript of the trial of the defendants in the "Tukhachevsky Affair" – Marshal of the Soviet Union Mikhail N. Tukhachevsky and his seven co-defendants, all top-ranking Red Army officers.

Read this text carefully and – preferably – several times.

Properly understood, this document, and this book, overturn the mainstream history of the Soviet Union, of World War II, and also, in a number of important respects, of the world in the twentieth century.

The other chapters contain confirmatory evidence, with careful and appropriate analysis. They are important, because dishonest historians will claim that Tukhachevsky et al. were not guilty; rather that they were "framed." They will further claim that Leon Trotsky, who is deeply implicated in the Military Conspiracy, was also "framed." These claims are demonstrably false. This book presents the evidence. So these chapters are important.

But read the text carefully. Objective, discerning readers will see for themselves.

Introduction – The Tukhachevsky Affair

On 10 June 1937, the front page of The New York Times broke the story with the following headline:

PURGE OF RED ARMY HINTED IN REMOVAL OF FOUR GENERALS

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Five Commands Are Changed, Causing Belief Momentous Events Are Occurring

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TUKHACHEVSKY IS OUSTED

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Former Marshal Is Thought to Be Under Arrest With Other High Officers

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TALK OF COUP DISCOUNTED Marshal Budyonny, Close Friend of Stalin, Is Appointed Head of Moscow Military District

Subheads in the body of the article gave more of the shocking details:

Rumors of Arrests Reinforced

All Distinguished Officers

PURGE OF RED ARMY HINTED IN OUSTINGS

Purges Baffle Diplomats

From the beginning, the guilt of the arrested commanders was widely doubted. On 12 June, Leon Trotsky, living in exile in Mexico, once again predicted Stalin's doom:

TROTSKY SEES STALIN NEAR END OF REIGN Says Interests of Defense Have Yielded to Attempts to Save 'the Ruling Clique'

Trotsky was lying. He himself and his supporters outside and especially inside the Soviet Union, were deeply implicated in this conspiracy which, as we shall see, was a joint military-civilian affair. Indeed, Trotsky himself was one of its leaders.

What Happened

During May, 1937, an undetermined number of officers of the Red Army (formal name: Workers and Peasants Red Army, Russian initials RKKA) were arrested in connection with the investigation of a conspiracy involving high-ranking military officers, together with civilian co-conspirators, to sabotage the Red Army and Soviet defences; open the front in the event of war with hostile powers; and to arrest and/or assassinate Soviet leaders, including Stalin and Marshal Kliment E. Voroshilov, People's Commissar for Defence.

The officers of the highest rank who were ultimately tried, convicted, and executed on 11-12 June 1937, were:

Mikhail Nikolaevich Tukhachevsky, one of the five Marshals of the Soviet Union. Tukhachevsky was arrested on 22 May 1937.

Yona Emmanuilovich Yakir, Komandarm 1st rank, arrested on 28 May 1937.

Yeronim Petrovich Uborevich, Komandarm 1st rank, arrested on 29 May 1937.

Avgust Ivanovich Kork, Komandarm 2nd rank, arrested on 12 May 1937.

Robert Petrovich Eideman, Komkor, arrested on 22 May 1937.

Vitovt Kasimirovich Putna, Komkor, arrested on 20 August 1936.

Boris Mironovich Fel'dman, Komkor, arrested on 15 May 1937.

Vitalii Markovich Primakov, Komkor, arrested on 14 August 1936.

Putna had been named by defendants in the second Moscow Trial of January, 1937, as a secret Trotskyist conspirator within the army. Putna had also been mentioned in the first Moscow Trial of August, 1936.

On 20 May 1937, Yan Borisovich Gamarnik, Army Commissar 1st rank, was removed from his post as Chief of the Political Directorate of the Army. On 30 May 1937, the Politburo dismissed him from his military positions because of his "close group ties with Yakir, now expelled from the Party for participation in a military-fascist conspiracy." On 31 May 1937, two officers, acting under Voroshilov's orders, visited Gamarnik at his apartment to inform him that he was being dismissed from the army. When they left, Gamarnik committed suicide by gunshot.

Interrogations of the eight accused continued throughout the last part of May until the trial, which took place on 11 June 1937.

Meanwhile, between 1 June and 4 June 1937, an enlarged session of the Military Soviet (Council) with the People's Commissar for Defence was held in Moscow. The transcript of the discussions was published in 2008. Its purpose was to explain to high-ranking military officers the evidence against the eight commanders in what would come to be known as the "Tukhachevsky Affair;" to present them with that evidence in written form; and to hear what they had to say about it.

The documents presented, evidently in multiple copies, to the officers who attended the Military Soviet, are listed in the transcript of the enlarged session of the Military Soviet. On 1 June 1937, the first day of the meeting, the officers in attendance, 173 of them, were given copies of the confession statements of Tukhachevsky, Kork, Fel'dman, and Yefimov. Other materials may have been distributed after 1 June – an excerpt from a 2 June 1937 confession by Putna is included in the published transcript of the session of the Military Soviet. As of 2020, most of the investigative materials are now available to researchers at the FSB archive in Moscow.

Interrogators of and confessions by these eight men evidently continued right up until 10 June 1937, the day before the trial. On 11 June the eight former commanders were put on trial by a military court consisting of high-ranking officers. The accused and the judges were all well acquainted with one another. The presiding judge was Vasilii Vasil'evich Ul'rikh, an Old Bolshevik and a trained and experienced jurist.

The trial took place on 11 June 1937. All eight defendants confessed, were convicted, and sentenced to execution. They were shot on 12 June 1937. The transcript of this trial is the primary document presented in the present book.

Soviet Archival Documents

Since the end of the Soviet Union in late December, 1991, a great many documents from former Soviet archives have been published. Beginning as a relative trickle, a decade later the total number of former Soviet documents published had become a flood, one that continues until the present day. These documents demand a complete revision of the history of the Soviet Union during the time when Joseph Stalin was in the leadership, roughly 1929 to 1953.

In Russia today there is a law according to which secret documents are to be made public after the passage of 75 years. 2012 marked seventy-five years since the Tukhachevsky Affair. By 2012, many interrogations, statements, and confessions of military men accused of involvement in the military-civilian conspiracy had indeed been declassified.

In 2015 historian Vladimir L. Bobrov, together with a colleague, applied to the archive of the FSB, the agency that is the direct descendent of the OGPU-NKVD-KGB, to request that the transcript of the Tukhachevsky trial be declassified and made available for study. The FSB archive refused, stating that the case was still under investigation by the prosecutor's office.

The Trial Transcript Declassified

In May 2018, a copy of the trial transcript held in a different archive, RGASPI, the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History, was silently published by being placed on two web pages, one in Ukraine, the other in Russia. This is the text we present here, in English translation. We still do not have access to the copy held in the FSB archive.

The trial transcript is contained in several different archival volumes. Volume 16 ("tom 16") is the first typewritten transcript of the handwritten transcripts recorded by stenographers. It contains only light editing. Volume 17 ("tom 17"), also a typescript of the transcript, contains copious revisions in blue, red, green ink and pencil. The version from the RGASPI archive, which we translate here, is a retyped version of volume 17.

Other Arrests and Trials of Military Men

The trial transcript makes it clear that many other officers were involved in this conspiracy. Today there is a massive amount of evidence to this effect – so much, indeed, that a multi-volume set would be needed to contain it all. We will cover a very small part of this evidence in some of the chapters in this book.

A great many officers were either charged with serious crimes or dismissed from the military under a cloud of suspicion. A significant number were put on trial and either executed or sentenced to terms in a labour camp. Some were acquitted. Others were arrested, held during an investigation, and ultimately released.

A great deal of material has now been declassified and is available to researchers. It is likely that all, or almost all, of the investigative materials on thousands of officers who were under investigation, is still extant and could be accessed and studied by researchers.

But it appears that there is very little research being conducted on these men, or on the subject of the military conspiracy generally.

The main reason for this neglect is the fact that the question of the military conspiracy is widely considered a "closed book." Tukhachevsky and his seven co-defendants have long since been declared to have been innocent victims of a frame-up by Stalin. There is no indication that the mainstream historical profession in Russia or elsewhere is willing to revisit these events, regardless of how much evidence of their guilt we now have.

The Anti-Stalin Paradigm

Refusal to be objective – to consider the possibility that not just the Tukhachevsky Affair defendants, but many other military officers, may have indeed been guilty, to decide the matter of guilt or innocent on the basis of evidence rather than of preconceived ideas, outright bias, or political expediency – is a product of the anticommunism, in the form of anti-Stalinism.

Leon Trotsky did his best to demonise Stalin – to accuse him of every conceivable crime, always without any evidence – in order to further his, Trotsky's, own anti-Soviet conspiracies and his collaboration with Nazi Germany and militarist Japan, and with fascists, German spies, and his own followers within the Soviet Union. After Stalin's death Nikita Khrushchev falsely accused Stalin of many crimes in his famous "Secret Speech" to the XX Party Congress of 25 February 1956. Thanks to evidence from former Soviet archives we now know that all of Khrushchev's accusations against Stalin in that speech are false, most of them deliberate lies.

At the XXII Party Congress in October, 1961, Khrushchev sponsored further accusations against Stalin, some of them citing evidence that we can now show was false. After the XXII Congress, Khrushchev sponsored a virtual avalanche of dishonest writings, disguised as history but devoid of evidence, in which Stalin was accused of yet more crimes. This wave of anti-Stalin fabrications ceased shortly after Khrushchev was ousted in October, 1964.

Beginning in 1987 Mikhail Gorbachev, the final leader of the Soviet Union, launched an even more fierce attack on Stalin, again with the aid of phony historians and with either falsified evidence or no evidence at all. This last anti-Stalin onslaught has continued to the present day.

The unwritten rules of this Anti-Stalin Paradigm (ASP) include the following: It is considered illegitimate to question Stalin's guilt in any crime he has been charged with in the past, regardless of the evidence now available. Confirmation bias, "the tendency to search for, interpret, favor, and recall information that confirms or support one's prior beliefs or values," trumps evidence, trumps the truth, trumps everything.

In 1956, shortly after his "Secret Speech," Khrushchev assigned a commission under the chairmanship of Vyacheslav Molotov, a long-time close associate of Stalin's, to investigate some of the crimes that Khrushchev had accused Stalin of. The Molotov Commission included a few other longtime Stalin supporters, but also some Khrushchev loyalists. The result was that the commission could not agree that the defendants in the three Moscow Trials had been innocent. But it did "rehabilitate" the principal defendants in the Tukhachevsky Affair, although it cited no evidence in doing so.

Just prior to the XXII Party Congress Khrushchev appointed another commission under the chairmanship of another Old Bolshevik, Nikolai Shvernik, and composed solely of Khrushchev loyalists and Stalin-haters. This commission investigated the Tukhachevsky Affair again, and again found the defendants innocent. Once again, they were unable to find any evidence of innocence, and were forced to falsify the evidence that they did cite. We examine some of the falsifications of the Shvernik Commission in the present book.

My Road to the Tukhachevsky Affair

I first became interested in the Tukhachevsky Affair in the 1970s. At a huge demonstration in Manhattan in 1967 against the U.S. Invasion of Vietnam, I was told by a friendly but clearly anticommunist onlooker that I should not oppose the American war in Vietnam. Why not? I asked. Because – came the answer – the Vietnamese nationalists were led by the Communist Party, the Communist Party was led by Ho Chi Minh, Ho had been trained by Joseph Stalin, and "Stalin had murdered 20 million people."

I did not believe this – but neither did I disbelieve or dismiss it. In 1968 Robert Conquest published The Great Terror: Stalin's Purge of the 'Thirties. I was still curious about the claim that Stalin was a mass murderer, so in the early 1970s I read Conquest's book very carefully. From my study of mediaeval literature, I knew not to take the fact-claims of "experts" on trust, but to always scrutinise the primary-source evidence. So I paid particularly close attention to Conquest's footnotes – where the evidence is. Or, rather, where it is supposed to be.

I had a contradictory reaction to Conquest's book. On the one hand, I was shocked and troubled by the enormous number of accusations of terrible crimes that Conquest levelled at Stalin. On the other hand, I noted that Conquest cited little – if indeed any – primary-source evidence to support his sweeping allegations against Stalin and the Soviets.

Once I was securely situated in my new college teaching job and had completed most of the research for my doctoral dissertation, I set about checking Conquest's book further with the resources of the New York Public Library. I created a 3x5 file card for every citation that Conquest used in The Great Terror and I systematically checked all of them. What I discovered was enlightening. Conquest had no primary source evidence. All of the materials he cited as "evidence" were assertions by Soviet or Western anticommunist writers. I noted especially the fact that the Soviet references also had no evidence.

When I completed by doctoral dissertation in 1978, I determined that I would do some serious research on the "Great Terror." I decided to concentrate on the Tukhachevsky Affair because it seemed to me that there was more information available about it than about the other alleged "crimes of Stalin" in Conquest's book. I began to collect articles and books, and to make notes.

In 1980 I obtained a copy of J. Arch Getty's doctoral dissertation, which he had completed at Boston College the previous year. I read it with enthusiasm. Here was a younger scholar who really knew how to use evidence, and who saw through many of the falsifications that were spread around as "truth" by mainstream scholars like Conquest.

I met Getty, and he suggested that I draft an article for a journal, Russian History / Histoire Russe, for which he was one of the editors. I did this, and after many rewrites, Getty recommended it for publication. But the publisher of the journal, Charles Schlacks, rejected my article on the grounds that "it made Stalin look good." Of course, my article did not do that at all. But it did conclude that the accepted version of Tukhachevsky's innocence was not supported by any evidence, and that in fact we did not know whether Tukhachevsky was innocent or not. The publisher found such responsible, scholarly caution to be unacceptable.

But Getty stood up for my article. He told the publisher that it must be published, because it had gone through a very careful vetting by himself and some colleagues. The publisher backed down. But when the article was published, in 1988 (the issue is dated 1986), the prefatory essay to the issue contained an introductory paragraph discussing every article – except mine! This was my first exposure to what I now call the Anti-Stalin Paradigm.

In 1996 I learnt how to create a simple web page. On it I put retyped versions of all the articles I had published by that time, including the 1986/88 article on Tukhachevsky. In March 1999 I received an email from Vladimir L'vovich Bobrov in Moscow about my article. He told me the article was good but that it should be updated by the study of some of the many documents from former Soviet archives that had begun to appear in Russia.

Vladimir had been collecting and retyping documents related to the Tukhachevsky Affair and generously shared them with me. He wanted us to write an article or a book about it. I agreed, and for a while I did some work on it. But then I stumbled across evidence that Nikita Khrushchev had lied – indeed, had virtually done nothing but lie – in his famous "Secret Speech." So I stopped working on Tukhachevsky and began years of researching and writing on other important questions of Soviet history of the Stalin period, beginning with Khrushchev Lied.

In 2007-8 I undertook a systematic review of all the documents in the Volkogonov Archive pertaining to the Stalin years. I discovered a report by Marshal Semyon Budyonny to Marshal Voroshilov in which Budyonny, a member of the judicial panel, describes the Tukhachevsky trial. This document was classified – secret, unavailable to researchers – in Russia at that time. In 2012 Vladimir and I published this document in the St. Petersburg historical journal Klio. Our article, including our analysis of Budyonny's letter and how it has been dishonestly described over the years, is also available online, though only in Russian.

Now that the transcript of the trial has been made public, along with a great many other documents relating to the military conspiracy, it is time to return to the Tukhachevsky Affair.

— Grover Furr, 2020

The Trial Transcript

The main feature of this book is the presentation of a complete English translation of the transcript of the trial of Tukhachevsky and his seven co-conspirators. This translation was expertly done by my Swedish colleague and fine historian Sven-Eric Holström. I take responsibility for its accuracy, since I have gone over it and corrected it on some minor points.

Annotations to the Transcript

Within the transcript itself I have included footnotes to clarify some issues. In addition, there is one chapter on the "Spravka" (report) of Shvernik Commission, set up by Khrushchev to whitewash Tukhachevsky et al. This chapter is not an exhaustive study of the Spravka – it is far too long, and there are far too many lies and fabrications in it. Rather, this chapter only covers the parts of the Spravka that deal directly with the trial transcript.

There are two chapters on books that lie about the Tukhachevsky Affair. These chapters are very far from exhaustive – all books by mainstream historians that mention the trial lie about it. I have chosen these specific books as exemplary.

Confirmatory Evidence

There follows six chapters on Soviet evidence and three chapters on non-Soviet evidence that confirms the existence of the military conspiracy. I have selected only evidence that I regard as unimpeachable – that cannot have been fabricated or faked. Much of this evidence has been available for years.

In fact, there has never been any evidentiary reason to doubt the existence of this conspiracy. Neither Khrushchev's nor Gorbachev's writers, nor any scholars or writers outside the Soviet Union, have ever presented any evidence that Tukhachevsky & Co. were innocent or that the conspiracy did not really exist.

But the combined impact of decades of assertions from supposedly authoritative persons, plus the effects of anticommunism, which incline even scholars who ought to know better towards confirmation bias – believing what they want to believe, i.e. that Stalin framed everybody – has done its work. It has convinced most people who were concerned about the Tukhachevsky Affair at all, to believe the claims that the defendants were innocent.

The Anti-Stalin Paradigm: Lies and Denial

In the professional field of Soviet history it is considered not just inappropriate, but unthinkable, "taboo," to conclude that Stalin did not commit some crime of which he has been previously charged. It doesn't matter how flimsy the evidence – or if, indeed, there ever were any evidence – of Stalin's guilt is. Nor does it matter how good the evidence is that Stalin did not commit the alleged crime. Evidence, literally, does not matter. What matters is "political correctness" – the imperative to condemn Stalin, to find him guilty of the crime alleged. Therefore, this book will be ignored by professionals in the field of Soviet history.

It will also be ignored by adherents of the cult around Leon Trotsky. Trotskyists (as they prefer to be called) uncritically repeat not only all the lies and fabrications that Trotsky himself produced – and we have shown in previous books that Trotsky produced a great many demonstrable lies.

Trotskyists also publicise, as loudly and as widely as they are able, any and all lies and fabrications produced by professional researchers in the field of Soviet history. It does not matter how overtly anticommunist, or even how anti-Trotsky, these researchers may be. As long as they blame Stalin for crimes – any crimes – their fictions are repeated as truths by the Trotsky cult.

Likewise, there are many people who self-identify as socialists and/or as Marxists who will reject the evidence and analysis in this book. Such socialists, sometimes known as social democrats, are ideologically committed to anticommunism and especially to hostility towards Joseph Stalin, about whom they know nothing except falsehoods. Like the Trotskyists, these socialists have been drinking from the poisoned well of mainstream anticommunist scholarship for so long that they have become incapable of thinking rationally and objectively.

But there are far more people who want to know the truth about the first socialist state in world history. Many tens of millions of people around the world respect the role the USSR played, especially during the Stalin period, in organising the fight against the murderous, exploitative imperialism of the so-called "democratic" countries.

They know that the USSR went in little more than a decade from being a backward agricultural society to an industrial power that was able to defeat the fascist invasion that was led by the German Wehrmacht, the most powerful military machine the world had ever known.

They know that the Soviet Union gave unprecedented benefits to working people – cheap rent, transportation, free medical care, guaranteed vacations, maternity leave, sick leave, old age pensions – benefits that, for example, few citizens of the United States of America enjoy. They remember when the Soviet Union, during Stalin's time, promised to push ever forward from socialism toward a classless society of justice – communism.

These people are the crucial force that will bring a better world into being. This book is for them.

Chapter 1. The Shvernik Report – Khrushchev-era Falsifications

At the XXII Party Congress of 17 – 31 October 1961, Nikita Khrushchev oversaw a large-scale attack on Joseph Stalin and his main supporters in the Party leadership. The accusations directed against Stalin were fraudulent – accusations of crimes that Stalin did not commit and, in many cases, that were not crimes at all.

The attacks against Stalin descended to the absurd when Dora Abramovna Lazurkina, an Old Bolshevik who had spent 18 years in the GULAG told the Congress that she had "spoken" with the long-dead Lenin.

"Товарищи! Мы приедем на места, нам надо будет рассказать по-честному, как учил нас Ленин, правду рабочим, правду народу о том, что было на съезде, о чем было сказано, что было вскрыто, рядом с Ильичей остается Сталин.

Я всегда в сердце ношу Ильича и всегда, товарищи, в самые трудные минуты, только потому и выжила, что у меня в сердце был Ильич и я с ним советовалась, как быть. (Аплодисменты). Вчера я советовалась с Ильичем, будто бы он передо мной как живой стоял и сказал: мне неприятно быть рядом со Сталиным, который столько бед принес партии. (Бурные, продолжительные аплодисменты)."

"Comrades. We have arrived at the place where we must tell honestly, as Lenin taught us to do, the truth to the workers, the truth to the people about what has happened and what we have discussed at the Congress. And it would be incredible if, after everything that has been said and disclosed here, Stalin remained beside Lenin.

I always carry Ilich in my heart and always, comrades, in my most difficult moments, the only reason I survived is that Ilich was in my heart and I could consult with him what to do. (Applause) Yesterday I consulted with Ilich, as though he were alive and stood before me and he said: It is unpleasant to be next to Stalin, who brought so many disasters to the Party. (Stormy, prolonged applause.)"

The Congress voted, and Stalin's body was removed from the Lenin Mausoleum on Red Square.

The Shvernik Report is composed of two parts: the "Spravka", or Report, and the "Zapiska," or Memorandum. They were submitted to Khrushchev at different times. We are concerned with the Spravka which, according to the editors' note accompanying it, was completed not later than 26 June 1964. The Spravka is devoted to the rehabilitation of the defendants in the Tukhachevsky Affair; the Zapiska, to many other Party members who had been repressed during the Stalin period.

Neither the Spravka nor the Zapiska was published while the Soviet Union existed. Beginning about 1993, they were published in a number of different journals. Some of these early editions are still cited by historians today. At length they were published in the second volume of the semi-official series of volumes titled Reabilitatsiia. Kak Eto Bylo – "Rehabilitation. How It Happened." The Spravka is on pages 671-788 of this volume. This is by far the most accessible print version of the Shvernik Report and we will use it here. A transcription of the Spravka is also available online.

Both parts of the Shvernik Report are blatant falsifications. At the time the Shvernik Report was first published, in the 1990s, relatively few documents from former Soviet archives had yet been published. So when the Report first appeared, it was widely accepted as truthful. Today we can identify many of these deliberate lies, thanks to the publication of a great many documents from former Soviet archives since the end of the USSR in 1991.

Here we will focus on lies of omission in the Spravka about the Tukhachevsky Trial transcript. The Spravka reproduces sentences taken out of context in order to argue that the defendants were innocent.

First passage: Blyukher and Yakir

... when Blucher, trying to specify the preparations for the defeat of the Red Army aviation in a future war, asked a question about this, Yakir answered: "I really can't tell you anything, apart from what I wrote to the investigation."

When asked by the chairman of the court how the sabotage of combat training expressed itself, Yakir evasively stated: "I wrote about this issue in a special letter."

(RKEB 2, 690)

From these two short passages it appears that Yakir simply refused to answer. In reality, this was not at all the case. Here are the passages in the text of the trial transcript:

Blyukher: Accused Yakir, what exactly were your preparations for the defeat of the Red Army aviation in a future war?

Yakir: I really can't tell you anything, apart from what I wrote to the investigation. I said that, firstly, I imagine in such a way that in parallel with our wrecking work, which only slightly related to aviation, some central organisation carried out very large wrecking cases in aviation, both in matters of materiel (about which I testified in detail), and in a whole series of other questions: staffing, logistics, etc. .. Firstly, the Shepetovsky airdrome was built in a wrecking manner, which was done by an air force engineer named Kikachi, despite the fact that Veingauz was present there and did not notice anything. Secondly, they surely sabotaged in the construction of other airfields. They sabotaged the organisation of the airfield network, which in the vast majority, would either not allow, or would complicate the work of high-speed aviation. Aviation moves at high speeds, needing large take-off spaces, and airfield sites are not growing enough and can put aviation in a difficult position. In addition, much wrecking work was carried out on the material and technical areas, on material and technical supply and personnel. Thirdly, there was a lack of haste and lack of encouragement of the aviation units which were absolutely necessary and without which it was impossible to work during night flights, especially in high-speed aviation. (16-17)

The President: How did the sabotage of combat training manifest itself, aside from limiting aviation night flights?

Yakir: I spoke about this issue in a special letter. I think that there was no need to apply special sabotage, since there were many disorders in this matter. We slowed down work in field high-speed night flight and relied on a similar line coming from Moscow, which did not give us anything. This business was simple, since everything was being rebuilt in our country, and therefore it did not present any difficulties. (19-20)

Second passage: Dybenko and Yakir The Spravka reads:

T. DYBENKO: - When exactly did you personally begin to conduct espionage work in favour of the German General Staff? Yakir: I did not personally and directly begin this work. (RKEB 2, 700)

But in Yakir's confessions we find the following passages:

I heard about espionage twice about the Tukhachevsky about the Red Army, once through Colonel Koestring and the second time through General Runstedt. (л.д.21об)

I understand that I, as a member of the Central Committee, bear more responsibility than all other participants of the conspiracy. With access to all the most secret party and government documents I was aware of all matters and could inform the centre about them. (л.д.31)

In addition, I informed at different times members of the Centre of the Military Conspiracy on the relations in the Ukrainian leadership. For my testimony, this question does not matter for this is a well-known business. (л.д.87об)

That is, Yakir did not transmit information directly to the General Staff of Germany, but passed it to the members of the conspiratorial centre.

We should bear in mind that, in accordance with Soviet law, the crime of espionage is not considered committed when the fact of recruitment is established or when espionage information is transferred to a representative of a foreign state. A crime is considered to have been committed when actions are taken to collect information for the purpose of transferring it. It does not matter to whom it was directly planned to transfer such information – foreign states, counterrevolutionary organisations, or private individuals. Therefore, the accusations of espionage against Yakir were true.

Third passage: Dybenko and Uborevich

Dybenko: Did you directly conduct espionage work with the German General Staff? Uborevich: I never did that. (RKEB 2, 700)

This gives the impression that Uborevich was innocent of any crime. The passage in the trial transcript tells a different story.

Dybenko: Did you directly conduct espionage work with the German General Staff?

Uborevich: I never did that.

Dybenko: Do you consider your work to be espionage and sabotage?

Uborevich: Since 1935, I have been a saboteur [lit. wrecker], a traitor, and an enemy. (78)

Uborevich did refuse to plead guilty of espionage, but he fully confirmed the commission of crimes of treason – something directly opposite to what is suggested in the Spravka. Fourth passage:

Feldman, like Kork, was the "hope" of the investigating authorities ... Feldman's speech occupied 12 pages of the transcript. (RKEB 2, 690)

In reality, the interrogation of Tukhachevsky occupies 35 pages of the transcript; of Yakir, 33 pages; of Kork, 28 pages, and of Fel'dman, 14 pages (not 12). Tukhachevsky and Yakir confessed at much greater length during the trial than the rest of the defendants.

Chapter 2. Evidence that the Defendants' Testimony was Genuine

An important episode in the trial occurs when Tukhachevsky addresses Ul'rikh with a request to give additional details to his confession about sabotage. Ul'rikh agrees.

The President: Have you met with a representative of Polish intelligence in recent years?

Tukhachevsky: No. May I supplement my confession?

The President: Please do.

Tukhachevsky: I would like to add concerning some basic questions of wrecking. (54)

Shortly thereafter Ul'rikh interrupts Tukhachevsky with a leading question.

The President: I have another question. Who, handed over to Polish intelligence some data of the Letichev district, and who issued this assignment?

Tukhachevsky: I personally.

The President; Please add what you wanted. (55)

Tukhachevsky then tries to briefly summarise some of the facts that he had described in detail in his note dated 1 June 1937. Ulrich loses patience with these theoretical remarks:

The President: Please stick more closely to the question than you wanted to talk about. (56)

But Tukhachevsky continues to speak in the same manner. Ul'rikh interrupts him again:

The President: Stick closer to the subject. (56)

Tukhachevsky continues to go on and on. At last, Ul'rikh loses patience:

The President: You are not giving a lecture or a report. You are making a confession. (62)

Tukhachevsky: I am talking about those wrecking cases that we did. These are the main points of wrecking, espionage, and sabotage, which I can tell you about.

I want to assure you that I said all that I know on the basic questions. (62-3)

This fragment of the transcript clearly proves that the trial was not staged. Moreover, for whom could it have been staged? Who could have been a spectator of such a production? The trial took place behind closed doors. The transcript was in secret storage for 75 years. Even after this period it remained inaccessible to researchers for several more years.

The Absence of Any Prepared Scenario for the Trial

Dialogues about who became a participant in the conspiracy and when they did are clear evidence of an absence of any scenario prepared by the investigators and/or by preliminary collusion between the defendants. The judges listen to the parties in order to clarify and correct discrepancies in the testimony.

Dybenko: In 1929, when you were sent to Germany, were you not connected with the German Reichswehr?

Kork: Not yet at that time. Communication was established only in 1931, when I stepped down from the position of an honest Soviet citizen to the position of betrayer and traitor to the motherland, and together with me on the road to struggle against the party followed Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Uborevich, and others.

Dybenko: So it can be stated that Uborevich and Yakir, giving confession to the court, falsely stated that they were involved in a counterrevolutionary organisation in 1934?

Kork: Yes, I insist on my confession. I know that they were not involved in the organisation in 1934, but in 1931 simultaneously with me. (101-2)

Judge Ul'rikh then breaks in to check to see what Uborevich has to say about this.

The President: Accused Uborevich, from what year did you consider yourself a member of a military organisation when you joined the fascist military organisation?

Uborevich: Defeatist assignments were set before me in March, 1935, and conversations were conducted from the end of 1934. Prior to this, I did not engage in counterrevolution.

The President: So, the confession of Kork that you entered the organisation in 1931 is wrong? How to explain these confessions of Kork?

Uborevich: I do not know.

Failing to get satisfactory clarification from Uborevich, Ul'rikh turns to Tukhachevsky:

The President: Tell me, Tukhachevsky, how to explain the difference between your confession and Kork's?

Tukhachevsky: I involved Kork in the organisation during the advanced manoeuvres. That was in 1933, and not in 1931, as he claims.

The President: Could it have been conversations of an anti-Soviet character, that was not related to specific actions?

Tukhachevsky: I said that Kork was recruited in 1933. There were conversations of discontent against Voroshilov, against our leadership. There was no concrete talk of a conspiracy until 1933.

The President: Did Kork tell you about the negotiations with Yenukidze concerning the capture of the Kremlin?

Tukhachevsky: Quite right, I informed Yenukidze about this situation after having had a conversation with Gorbachev, and then I informed Kork.

The President: When did you have a conversation about the capture of the Kremlin?

Tukhachevsky: In 1933-1934, when Gorbachev returned. Here, Kork confuses dates. (102-3)

As can be seen, the disagreements are never really cleared up.

Moreover, it is not important for the ultimate outcome of the trial – for the guilt or innocence of any of the defendants – that the defendants agree with one another. Rather, Judge Ul'rikh's purpose is to find out more about the conspiracy. The investigation into the conspiracy, the arrests, interrogations, and trials of more suspects would follow.

We will see below that not all of the military men named by these defendants would be sentenced either to death or to imprisonment. Some would only be cashiered from the service. This is further evidence that the investigation, far from being a frame-up of innocent men, was in reality a serious attempt to uncover a dangerous plot and to save the Red Army and, by doing so, save the Soviet Union.

More about Contradictions in the Defendants' Confessions

In addition to Kork the investigation found that there are some inconsistencies between the testimony of Tukhachevsky and that of Primakov. Such passages indicate the veracity of the testimony.

The President: Accused Tukhachevsky, what do you know about preparing a terrorist attack against Voroshilov?

Tukhachevsky: In a conversation with Primakov I learnt that Turovsky and Shmidt were organising a terrorist group against Voroshilov in the Ukraine. In 1936, from conversations with Primakov, I realised that he was organising a similar group in Leningrad.

The President: Did you hear Tukhachevsky's confessions?

Primakov: Nothing was proposed to me except to organise an armed uprising. (124-5)

Primakov goes on to give more details about his important assignment, in order to explain why Tukhachevsky's statements about him must be incorrect.

Primakov: I had the following basic instruction: Until 1934 I worked for the most part as an organiser, in gathering Trotskyite cadres. In 1934, I received an order from Piatakov to break off with the group of Dreitser and old Trotskyites, who were assigned to prepare terrorist acts, and I myself was to prepare, in the military district where I worked, to foment an armed uprising that would be called forth either by a terrorist act or by military action. This was the assignment I was given. The military Trotskyite organisational centre considered this assignment to be very important and its importance was stressed to me. I was told to break any personal acquaintance with old Trotskyites with whom I was in contact. This is the reason why I moved away from Dreitser's group, this is why I worked at the assignment that had been given to me. (125-6)

It is important to note that the contradictions in the testimony of the trial defendants prove that they did not tailor their testimony according to a prepared scenario. Equally important, it is clear that the prosecution did not falsify the record of the trial – the transcript – in order to eliminate inconsistencies.

During the preliminary investigation, in order to find out the reasons for the contradictions in the testimony of Kork and Tukhachevsky, the investigators drew on the testimony of Yenukidze, Gorbachev, and Primakov. The investigators approached the study of such contradictions more thoroughly than the future authors of the Shvernik Report, which passes as certification of "rehabilitation."

If all the testimonies of Tukhachevsky and others had been imposed on them by a team of investigators, where did these contradictions come from? How could they survive before the trial?

The presence of these contradictions, the attempts of investigators and judges to understand them, constitutes the strongest evidence that the persons under investigation and the defendants testified as they chose to testify – that is, gave mainly truthful testimonies. At the same time, everyone described the events as they remembered them, and not in the way that the investigators and judges would have liked.

The Trial Exposed Zybin and Tkachev

On 11 June 1937 – that is, the very day of the Tukhachevsky trial – I.M. Leplevsky, Chief of the Special Department of the Main Directorate for State Security of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the Soviet Union, appealed to Kliment E. Voroshilov:

According to the testimony of the arrested member of the anti-Soviet military conspiracy Primakov V.M., Zybin, commander of the 26th cavalry division, is a participant in this conspiracy. I ask your permission to arrest Zybin. Two days later, a resolution appears on this memorandum: "Arrest him. KV. 13 / VI.37."

The passage above is quoted from O.F. Suvenirov, Tragediia RKKA 1937-1938 (Moscow: Terra, 1993), page 93. Suvenirov's book takes for granted the Khrushchev – Gorbachev contention that there was no military conspiracy (or, for that matter, any other conspiracies) at all, that all of the arrested and repressed military men were innocent, and that all those repressed were "innocent victims of Stalin." Suvenirov makes no attempt to prove this contention; he simply assumes it. But the factual information in this book appears to be accurate, which makes it a valuable resource if used for this purpose only.

The President: Did you manage to recruit people in Leningrad from the leadership of the units?

Primakov: I recruited some people in Leningrad, got contact with some people, transferred some people from Leningrad to other places. I had to appoint the commander of the Shmidt corps as commander of the 7th corps, I achieved the transfer of Tkachev. I talked to Zybin in Pskov and could count on him during the uprising. I almost finished preparing the commander of the 10th corps, Dobrovolsky, with whom we failed to agree organisationally, and as such he shared our attitude.

Dybenko: And what about the district chief of staff?

Primakov: I didn't directly reach an agreement with Fedotov, but I submitted a statement to the investigator that all the signs that I had about him showed that he was a member of the Tukhachevsky organisation. (128-9)

According to N.S. Cherushev, Viktor Petrovich Dobrovolsky was arrested – but not until either 9 October or 15 October 1937. He was relieved of his command in June 1937 – no doubt as a result of this trial. On 20 September 1938, he was tried and convicted of participation in the military conspiracy, and executed the same day. He was "rehabilitated" under Khrushchev.

Anatolii Vasli'evich Fedotov was relieved of his command in July, 1937. He was arrested on 22 October 1937, tried, convicted, and executed on 20 September 1938, for participation in the military conspiracy. He was "rehabilitated" on 17 October 1957, under Khrushchev.

Mark L'vovich Tkachev was arrested on 4 June 1937. He was tried, convicted, and executed on 1 September 1937, for participation in the military conspiracy. According to Cherushev, he was "rehabilitated," but no date is given.

Sergei Petrovich Zybin was commander of the 25th cavalry division, located in Pskov. He was "under investigation" – which means in detention – from June, 1937, which is the correct time if he is the Zybin named by Primakov. But he was released in April, 1940, the investigation was ended and he was reinstated in the Red Army.

Vladimir Bobrov has obtained Primakov's interrogation of 11 May 1937, in which Zybin is mentioned five times. In it Primakov talks about the plan to bring Trotsky to Leningrad during the course of the armed insurrection, which Primakov was in charge of.

QUESTION: – From whom did you receive the instruction on the development of a plan for the preparation and support of Trotsky's crossing in the USSR? ANSWER: – I did not receive such instructions from the Trotskyist centre. I independently developed a plan for ensuring Trotsky's crossing in the USSR, which I intended to propose to the Trotskyist military centre in the fall of 1936 when developing this plan. I proceeded from the premise that at the moment of the acute struggle for the seizure of power by the Trotskyists, Trotsky should appear not just anywhere, but among the troops that are prepared for this. My calculations included Trotsky's crossing from abroad or from the Estonian side, and in this case ensures the crossing and meeting of Trotsky ZYBIN, or from Finland on the border with which there are units of the XIX rifle corps of DOBROVOLSKY, which in this case ensures the crossing and meeting Trotsky.

In his interrogation of 14 May 1937, Primakov states that he did not tell Zybin or Dobrovolsky about his plan for an armed insurrection, but believed that he could count on them when the time came. Evidently the prosecution believed that Zybin had been guilty of nothing more than what Primakov called "anti-Soviet words and attitude."

During World War II, on 5 August 1941, Kombrig Zybin was killed as he led his surrounded division to break out of encirclement near Uman' in the Ukraine.

Chapter 3. Soviet and Russian Books That Lie About the Tukhachevsky Affair

Boris A. Viktorov (1916-1993) was a lieutenant-general of Justice. From 1967 to his retirement in 1978 he was Assistant Minister of Internal Affairs. From 1955 throughout the Khrushchev period, Viktorov was Assistant to the Chief Military Procurator Artyom G. Gorniy. There Viktorov worked in a special group evaluating appeals for rehabilitations of persons imprisoned or executed during the Stalin period.

During the late Gorbachev period Viktorov wrote several articles about supposedly unjust repression of persons whose cases he had studied. In 1990 he published a book, Without the "Secret" Stamp (Bez grifa 'sekretno'). This book, published during Gorbachev's attack on Stalin and massive dishonest rehabilitations of persons falsely claimed to have been unjustly repressed, was published in 200,000 copies – an enormous press run for what is basically an academic-style study of alleged unjust repressions.

The fact-claims in Viktorov's books could not be vetted – checked for accuracy – when it was published. Gorbachev's USSR was still in existence. The flood of documents from former Soviet archives had not yet begun.

Now, however, we can check many of the assertions that Viktorov made. Those that we have checked turn out to be false. The book is not an objective study of unjust repressions, but a cover-up of the evidence that many "rehabilitated" persons were actually guilty.

This is the case with Tukhachevsky. The example below gives an idea about the extent of the dishonesty in Viktorov's book.

p. 224:

Александр Чехлов в рассказе «Расстрелянные звезды» так охарактеризовал облик следователя М. Н. Тухачевского: Alexander Chekhlov, in the story "The Stars that were Shot", described the appearance of M. N. Tukhachevsky's investigators as follows:

Short stories are, of course, not evidence! p. 231:

Перед нами стенограмма протокола заседания Специального судебного присутствия Верховного Суда СССР, состоявшегося 11 июня 1937 г. Председательствовал армвоенюрист В.В.Ульрих...

Стенограмма содержала всего несколько страниц, свидетельствуюших о примитивности разбирательства со столь тяжкими многочисленными обвинениями.

Before us is the transcript of the minutes of the meeting of the Special Judicial Presence of the Supreme Court of the USSR, held on 11 June 1937. Military jurist V.V. Ulrich presided

the transcript contained only a few pages, which testifies to the primitiveness of the proceedings with such grave and numerous charges.

Page 232:

Аналогичные показания об отношении к Родине лали Уборевич, Корк, Фельдман, Якир, Путна. Якир сообщил, что учился в 1929 году в академии генерального штаба Германии, читал там лекции о Красной Армии, а Корк некоторое время исполнял обязанности военного атташе в Германии. Uborevich, Kork, Feldman, Yakir, Putna gave similar testimonies about their attitude to the Motherland. Yakir said that he studied at the Academy of the General Staff of Germany in 1929, read lectures about the Red Army there, and Kork for some time served as a military attaché in Germany.

So what? In 1929 these men had not yet joined the conspiracy. Page 233:

Каким мог быть пригоров? Его содержание было предрешено приказом наркома обороны СССР К. Е. Ворошилова N2 96 от 12 июня 1937 г. What else could the verdict be? Its content was predetermined by order of the People's Commissar of Defence of the USSR K.E. Voroshilov No. 96 of 12 June 1937.

Again, either dishonest or incompetent. The verdict was not "predetermined." The court rendered its verdict on 11 June. It was signed by Voroshilov on 12 June.

In reality, the transcript is 172 pages long. Viktorov may have been deliberately lying. Or, it may be that he himself had not been permitted to see the transcript. It may even be the case that Viktorov did not write this book, but allowed some ghostwriters to do it for him.

Whatever the case, Viktorov's book is a good example of the utter dishonesty of Gorbachev's "rehabilitations" of people supposedly repressed unjustly.

S. Yu. Ushakov and A.A. Stukalov, The Front of the Military Procurators ("Front voetnnykh prokurorov"). Vyatka, 2000. This widely-cited book is in two parts. The first claims to be the memoir of Nikolai Porfir'evich Afanas'ev, who was active in the office of the military prosecutor in Moscow during the 1930s.

Afanas'ev supposedly wrote his memoir during the 1950s. Ushakov claims that Afanas'ev was afraid to publish them during the Khrushchev "thaw" and afterwards – a claim that sounds doubtful on the face of it, since the contents of this book would fit in perfectly with the falsifications that Khrushchev sponsored by the bushel. According to Ushakov, Afanas'ev's granddaughter asked him to publish them.

We are not concerned here with the question of whether the memoir is genuine – that is, whether it represents what Afanas'ev actually wrote. In the light of documents from former Soviet archives published after the end of the USSR, and particularly after the publication of this book in 2000, we can tell that many statements in it are simply false.

Тухачевский упорно отрицал ка кую-либо свою вину в измене или каком-либо другом преступлении. Не дали результатов и длительные допросы, Тухачевский все время твердил одно - он ни в чем не виновен.

... Пришлось доложить, что Тухачевский категорически отрицает какую-либо свою вину.

... Тухачевский, по словам Ежова, так ни в чем и не признался, хотя к нему и применялись «санкции», как он выразился.

Tukhachevsky stubbornly denied any guilt of treason or any other crime. Long interrogations did not produce results either, Tukhachevsky kept saying one thing - he was not guilty of anything.

... He had to report that Tukhachevsky categorically denied any guilt on his part.

... Tukhachevsky, according to Ezhov, admitted no guilt, even though they applied "sanctions" to him, as he expressed it. (70, 71)

This is entirely false. Two of Tukhachevsky's confessions were published in 1991. In those he did confess guilt. Today we have several hundred pages of Tukhachevsky's investigation file, with a great many confessions of guilt in considerable detail, plus the trial transcript, with many more confession by Tukhachevsky.

Iulia Kantor

Iulia Zorakhovna Kantor is a Russian journalist and historian who in the 1990s obtained permission from the Tukhachevsky family to gain access to the still-classified Tukhachevsky investigation material. She has written several articles and three books dealing with Tukhachevsky.

Kantor has clearly read the transcript of the Tukhachevsky trial. Yet she still insists that Tukhachevsky was innocent! See her very dishonest but nevertheless revealing article in the Russian newspaper Izvestiia of 21 February 2004, page 10-11. It is no longer on line at the Izvestiia site so I have put it online here:

http://msuweb.montclair.edu/~furrg/research/kantor_izvestiia_022104.pdf

On the first page (numbered page 10), upper right corner, can be seen the cover of the trial transcript. It is exactly the same as the one made public in May 2018, and which we have translated here.

On the second page (page 11), upper left corner: the famous "blood spots" appear. But see Tukhachevsky's very regular signature right beside them. In fact, no one knows what they are or, if they are blood, whose blood it may be. We examine these "blood spots" in a separate chapter of this book.

Vladimir Bobrov has studied the Tukhachevsky investigative file and informs me that there are no spots, whether "blood" or otherwise, on this file. There are holes that appear to have been cut out by a sharp instrument, perhaps a razor blade. It appears as though Kantor claimed that she saw the "blood spots" that are mentioned in the "Spravka" in order to facilitate the myth that Tukhachevsky had been beaten.

In 2006, Kantor wrote four articles for the journal Istoriia gosudarstva i prava (History of the state and the law) titled "Hitherto unknown documents from the 'Tukhachevsky Affair'" ("Neizvestnye dokumenty o 'dele voennykh'"). I have put these texts online, though they are not translated into English. In them are many confessions of guilt by Tukhachevsky and the other defendants.

Iulia Kantor, The War and Peace of Mikhail Tukhachevsky (Voina i mir Mikhaila Tukhachevskogo) Moscow: Dialog, 2005).

According to Russian law, documents are declassified after 75 years. When Kantor researched and wrote this book that period had not yet been reached. But since the Gorbachev period direct relatives of any person have been able to obtain access to investigative and judicial records. Kantor obtained permission from the Tukhachevsky family to use family documents and to interview relatives. As can be seen in the reproduction of her 2004 Izvestiia article, she also received access to the trial transcript.

Kantor's book is a continuation of the Khrushchev – Gorbachev cover-up about Tukhachevsky. Presumably, she would not have obtained from the Marshal's descendants access to still-classified documents if she had not agreed from the outset to "prove" Tukhachevsky innocent. Writing at a time before researchers could gain access to classified documents from 1937, Kantor ran no risk that anyone would be able to compare what she wrote with the primary sources that only she had permission to read.

The principal dishonesty in Kantor's book is that she pretends to her readers that the investigative materials of Tukhachevsky prove his innocence and confirm the point of view of the Khrushchev-era rehabilitation. Kantor claims that in these documents she did not find even a single bit of evidence of the slightest wrongdoing by Tukhachevsky.

Kantor has recourse to the pseudo-science of graphology – handwriting analysis – in order to argue that Tukhachevsky was under "stress" when he wrote some of his handwritten confessions. My colleague, Vladimir Bobrov, who has accessed and transcribed many documents from the NKVD files of Tukhachevsky and others in the military conspiracy, says that this is untrue, that Tukhachevsky's handwriting is very even and regular.

В рукописных текстах показаний пляшут буквы, смазываются строчки. (Kantor, 387) In his handwritten testimony the letters dance, lines are blurred.

Vladimir Bobrov comments:

Это утверждение лживо: наоборот, рукописные показания Тухачевского отличаются строгостью соблюдения высоты строчек, границ полей, размером букв, разборчивостью почерка. Множество вставок, замечаний, уточнений свидетельствует о том, что текст писался не под диктовку, а самим подследственным, т.е. факты и формулировки принадлежат Тухачевскому. This statement is false. On the contrary, Tukhachevsky's handwritten confessions are distinguished by strict observance of the height of lines, margin boundaries, letter size, and the legibility of handwriting. The many inserts, remarks, and clarifications indicate that the text was written not under dictation, but by the person under investigation, i.e. the facts and language belong to Tukhachevsky.

I have put three samples of Tukhachevsky's handwriting in his confession file (P-9000) on the Internet. These samples prove that Bobrov's remarks are correct. They may be seen here:

https://msuweb.montclair.edu/~furrg/research/tukh_handwriting_kantor.html

Chapter 4. Western books that lie about the Tukhachevsky affair – Stephen Kotkin

Today we have a great deal of evidence that Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky and the seven other high-ranking military commanders who were tried, convicted, and executed with him on 11-12 June 1937, were guilty, as charged, of conspiracy with the Nazis and Japanese, and with Leon Trotsky, to defeat the Soviet Union in a war. Indeed, we have so much evidence that a single volume with appropriate commentary could not hold all of it. But the "official" viewpoint – the only one acceptable in academic, political, and public discussion because it is the only one consistent with the Anti-Stalin Paradigm (ASP) – is that Tukhachevsky and all the rest were innocent, victims of a "frame up" by Stalin for reasons unknown. In order to sustain this viewpoint, all the evidence must be either dismissed as "faked" in some way or simply ignored. Stephen Kotkin chooses the latter strategy: he ignores the evidence.

Stephen Kotkin is a full professor of history at Princeton University. He is also a fellow of the super-anticommunist Hoover Institution, which never sponsors any publication or any scholar that is not intensely anticommunist. Kotkin has spent his entire academic career since graduate school on the Stalin period of Soviet history.

In addition Kotkin has recourse to argument by scare quote. He puts scare quotes around words like "confession" when they contradict the ASP. But he has no evidence to refute them. Let the reader not be fooled! Argument by scare quote is the refuge of those who refuse to question their own preconceived ideas and biases but have no evidence to support those biases. No honest, competent historian falls back on this tawdry, deceptive insult to the reader's intelligence.

Has Kotkin ever seriously researched the Tukhachevsky Affair and related military purges? I doubt it, because of the many erroneous references he makes. We will point out some of them below.

Kotkin:

Failing that, he [Artuzov] wrote to Yezhov on January 25 that NKVD foreign intelligence possessed information from foreign sources, dating back many years but never forwarded to higher-ups, revealing a "Trotskyite organisation" in the Red Army. Sensationally, the documents linked Marshal Tukhachevsky to foreign powers.[3] (377) Note 3 (991): Lebedev, "M. N. Tukhachevskii i 'voennofashistskii zagovor,'" 7–20, 255; Voennye arkhivy Rossii, 111; Khaustov, "Deiatel'nost' organov," 188–9.

Here and elsewhere in Kotkin's mammoth book – more than 900 pages of text, 5200+ footnotes, and 47 pages of bibliography in tiny print – "Lebedev" is the journal Voenno-Istorivcheskii Arkhiv, vypusk (issue) 2, 1997. This is our old friend, the "Spravka" of the Shvernik Commission. It has been published several times in a number of different places. Kotkin cites this same text but in different printed editions, as though he were citing different sources, though in reality they are all the same source.

For example, Voennye Arkhivy Rossii, 111, is the same document and the same passage! Why quote them both? To give readers the false impression that they are different sources that confirm each other? Dishonest – but what other reason could there be?

There is nothing about any of this in Khaustov, "Deiatel'nost' organov," 188-9. This is Khaustov's doctoral dissertation, available at Yale. Pages 188-9 do not mention Tukhachevsky at all! This is a phony reference.

Kotkin:

Artuzov knew full well how such compromising materials had been planted in Europe in order to make their way back to Moscow: in the 1920s he had helped lead just such an operation ("The Trust").4 (377) Note 4 (991): Mlechin, KGB, 162–3.

Mlechin does suggest that Artuzov, who had directed the "Trust" disinformation operation in the 1920s, had framed Tukhachevsky. But Mlechin cites no evidence whatever! Naturally, Kotkin's readers will not know this. Here is what Lieutenant General of the Russian FSB Aleksandr Zdanovich, who worked in the FSB (former NKVD) archive for many years, says about this apocryphal story:

In this "Report" (the "Spravka"), I am sorry to say, as a historian of the special services, a lot was written as if the Chekist authorities themselves had a hand in ensuring that this process took place and the accumulation of materials went on for many years before the trial. And [the writers of the "Spravka"] involved all our well-known operations carried out by the GPU. The GPU-OGPU in the 1920s and early 30s was both foreign intelligence and counterintelligence, which were actively working. It was allegedly in the "Trust" case that information was brought abroad that Tukhachevsky was the head of a military group that opposed Soviet power, the Bolsheviks, and Stalin specifically. I can say with conviction that I have not seen a single document, not a single line to confirm this. Moreover, there is a directive of Dzerzhinsky's, which is recorded in the documents, that under no circumstances should the name and surname of Tukhachevsky be used in this matter.

So this is yet another phony footnote. It is dishonest of Kotkin to cite Mlechin's unsupported speculation as though it were evidence. The veracity of one person's unsupported opinion – Kotkin's, in this case – is not confirmed by the equally unsupported opinion of one, or of any number, of other persons – in this case, Mlechin.

No evidence of "Fabrication"

Kotkin:

Now, to these fabricated documents he appended a list of thirty-four "Trotskyites" in military intelligence. His cynical efforts at ingratiation and revenge would not save his own life, but Artuzov had guessed right about Stalin's intentions.[5] Note 5 (991): Radek at his public trial on 24 January 1937, had mentioned Tukhachevsky's name as a co-conspirator. Radek then tried to retract, but the deed had been done. Report of Court Proceedings, 105, 146. After the first Moscow trial, Werner von Tippelskirch, a German military attaché in Moscow, had reported to Berlin (28 September 1936) the speculation about a pending trial of Red Army commanders. Erickson, Soviet High Command, 427 (citing Serial 6487/E486016–120: Report A/2037).

Yet another phony footnote! There is nothing about "Stalin's intentions" in these works, nor could there be. Kotkin is "channelling" the spirit of the long-dead Stalin!

Nor is there any evidence that these documents were "fabricated," as Kotkin claims – not only none in the works he refers to, but there is no such evidence anywhere. Nor is there any evidence that Artuzov "planted" these documents.

As for the list of thirty-four Trotskyites – note the argument by scare quote – this is in all the editions of the "Spravka" of the Shvernik Commission, since all are identical. In "Lebedev" (Voenno-Istoricheskii Arkhiv, 1997) it is on pages 11-12:

Артузов направил Ежову 25 января 1937 года записку, в которой доложил ему об имевшихся ранее в ОГПУ агентурных донесениях < > о «военной партии." К своей записке Артузов приложил «Список бывших сотрудников Разведупра, принимавших активное участие в троцкизме» (в списке 34 человека). На записке Артузова Ежов 26 января 1937 года написал:

«тт. Курискому и Леплевскому. Надо учесть этот материал. Несомненно, в армии существует троцкистск[ая] организация. Это показывает, в частности, и недоследованное дело «Клубок». Может, и здесь найдется зацепка».

Artuzov sent a note to Yezhov on 25 January 1937, in which he reported to him about the agent's reports on the "military party" that had previously existed in the OGPU. To his note Artuzov appended "A list of former employees of the Razvedupr (Intelligence), who took an active part in Trotskyism" (34 people in the list). On a note by Artuzov Yezhov wrote on 26 January 1937:

"Comrades Kursky and Leplevsky. It is necessary to take into account this material. Undoubtedly, a Trotskyite organisation exists in the army. This is also evident, in particular, from the "Tangle" case, not fully investigated. Maybe there's a clue here too."

What Kotkin fails to reveal to his readers is that Artuzov's note to Yezhov was well motivated. On the previous day, 24 January 1937, Karl Radek had named Putna at the second Moscow Trial. Radek also mentioned Tukhachevsky, then tried to retract what he said, but it was too late.

"Claptrap?" Look In The Mirror!

Kotkin:

Explanations for Stalin's rampage through his own officer corps have ranged from his unquenchable thirst for power to the existence of an actual conspiracy.[6] Nearly every dictator lusts for power, and in this case there was no military conspiracy. (377) Note 6 (991): Wollenberg, Red Army, 224; Erickson, Soviet High Command, 465; Conquest, Great Terror: Reassessment, 201–35; Ulam, Stalin, 457–8; Tucker, Stalin in Power; Volkogonov, Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy. Assertions of a real plot go back to the time and have persisted: Duranty, USSR, 222; Davies, Mission to Moscow, I: 111. The claptrap persists: Prudnikova and Kolpakidi, Dvoinoi zagovor.

This is true nonsense! By definition, there can be no evidence that "there was no military conspiracy," so Kotkin cannot possibly know this. Even if there were no evidence of a conspiracy, that would not prove that no conspiracy had existed, for the point of a conspiracy is to leave no evidence.

The most any historian could say is: "We have no evidence that such a conspiracy existed." But Kotkin can't say this! – not honestly, anyway. For in the case of the Tukhachevsky Affair there is an enormous amount of evidence that the conspiracy existed. Moreover, we have no evidence that this evidence was faked. Kotkin is no one to accuse others of "claptrap!"

Note that Kotkin cites the book The Red Army by Erich Wollenberg as though the author agreed with Kotkin that there was no military conspiracy. But here is what Wollenberg actually wrote – that the military conspiracy did in fact exist!

I therefore owe a debt of gratitude to my English publisher, for although my book was just about to appear he has kindly permitted me to include this addendum, which is based on the latest official Russian statements and certain private information. A portion of the latter has been supplied to me by officers belonging to the Tukhachevsky group. (233) According to reliable sources of information, there was actually a plan for a "palace revolution" and the overthrow of Stalin's dictatorship by forcible means. It is also true that the Red Army was allowed a decisive role in the execution of this plan, which was to be carried out under the leadership of Tukhachevsky and Gamarnik. The Moscow Proletarian Rifle Division, led by General Petrovsky, a son of the President of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, was to occupy the Kremlin and break the resistance of the G.P.U. troops, which were commanded by Yagoda until the autumn of 1936, when Yeshov took his place. The conspirators reckoned on the support of the workers and the benevolent neutrality of the peasants; in the event of stiffening resistance from the motorized and excellently armed G.P.U. Army, Ukrainian troops commanded by General Dubovoi were to be rushed into Moscow. (241-2).

Here is a passage from Joseph Davies, Mission to Moscow concerning what Davies learnt on 16 January 1937, from "the head of the Russian desk at the German Foreign Office":

Had an extended conference with the head of the "Russian desk" at the German Foreign Office. To my surprise he stated that my views as to the stability of internal Russian political conditions and the security of the Stalin regime would bear investigation. My information, he thought, was all wrong: Stalin was not firmly entrenched. He stated that I probably would find that there was much revolutionary activity there which might shortly break out into the open. (17)

There's much other evidence along these lines. Kotkin does not mention this passage. He does cite another one, from Davies' letter of 28 June 1937, to Sumner Wells:

... the best judgement seems to believe that in all probability there was a definite conspiracy in the making looking to a coup d'état by the army not necessarily anti-Stalin, but anti-political and anti-party, and that Stalin struck with characteristic speed, boldness, and strength.

Note that the passage Kotkin omits contains evidence that the Germans expected a revolt against the Stalin government, while the one he cites contains no such evidence.

Again, No Evidence

Kotkin:

... out of approximately 144,000 officers, some 33,000 were removed in 1937–38, and Stalin ordered or incited the irreversible arrest of around 9,500 and the execution of perhaps 7,000 of them.[14] (378) Note 14 (991): Reese, Stalin's Reluctant Soldiers, 134–46. From 1937 to 1938, 34,501 Red Army officers, air force officers, and military political personnel were discharged, either because of expulsion from the party or arrest; 11,596 would be reinstated by 1940. As Voroshilov noted, some 47,000 officers had been discharged in the years following the civil war, almost half of them (22,000) in the years 1934–36; around 10,000 of these discharged were arrested. Few were higher-ups, however. Confusingly, sometimes the totals include the Red Air Force, and sometimes not. "Nakanune voiny (dokumenty 1935–1940 gg.)," 188; Suvenirov, Tragediia RKKA, 137. In 1939, when Stalin turned off the pandemonium, 73 Red Army personnel would be arrested.

The bottom line: Kotkin offers no evidence for his claim that "perhaps 7000" officers were executed. Reese's 1996 book is far too old for the flood of Soviet documents available since then. A well-known study by Gerasimov published in 1999, states:

В 1937 году было репрессировано[3] 11034 чел. или 8% списочной численности начальствующего состава, в 1938 году - 4523 чел. или 2,5%[4]. В это же время некомплект начсостава в эти годы достигал 34 тыс. и 39 тыс. соответственно[5], т.е. доля репрессированных в некомплекте начсостава составляла 32% и 11%.

3. К репрессированным автор относит лиц командно-начальствующего состава, уволенных из РККА за связь "ц заговорщиками," арестованных и не восстановленных впоследствии в армии.

4. РГВА.-Ф.4.-Оп.10-Д. 141.Л.205.

5. См.: Мельтюхов М.И. Указ. Соч.-Ц. 114.

In 1937 11,034 persons were subjected to repression or 8% of the listed size of the officer corps; in 1938 - 4,523 persons, or 2.5%. At the same time, a shortage of officers in these years reached 34 thousand and 39 thousand, respectively, i.e. The proportion of repressed of the shortage of the officer corps was 32% and 11%.

3. By "repressed persons" the author refers to command personnel dismissed from the Red Army for ties "with conspirators," arrested and not restored later to the army.

4. RGVA. F.4. Op. 10. D 141. L. 205. [This is an archival document.—GF]

5. Cf. Mel'tiukhov, M.I., p. 114.

Gerasimov states that a total of 11,034+4523=15,557 officers were "repressed," not "executed."

Gerasimov references Mel'tiukhov's article from Otechestvennaia Istoriia 5 (1997), 109-121. In that article Mel'tiukhov notes that there is insufficient evidence for any definite conclusion. That was also the situation three or more years earlier, when Reese researched his article.

Углублению изучения этих вопросов препятствует недостаточно широкая источниковая база. Несмотря на довольно бурное обсуждение этой проблематики в конце 80-х - начале 90-х гг., введение в научный оборот документов было не столь значительно, как можно было бы ожидать. Появившиеся документы, хотя и конкретизировали некоторые аспекты, но не позволили всесторонне рассмотреть данную проблему. В результате в литературе сохраняется разноголосица по основным вопросам темы. (188) An in-depth study of these issues is hindered by an insufficiently wide source base. Despite the rather stormy discussion of this problem in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the introduction of documents into scientific circulation was not as significant as one would expect. The documents that did appear, although they specified certain issues, did not allow a comprehensive study of this problem. As a result, disagreement over the main issues of this topic remains.

Chapter 5. Soviet evidence — Yakir letter to Stalin

Thanks to documents published since the dissolution of the USSR we can now see that some of the speeches at the XXII Party Congress (October, 1961) also contained blatant lies about the oppositionists of the 1930s.

As one example of the degree of falsification at the XXII Party Congress and under Khrushchev generally we cite Marshal Georgii Zhukov's remarks at the June, 1957, Central Committee Plenum at which Khrushchev and his supporters expelled the "Stalinists" Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich for having plotted to have Khrushchev removed as First Secretary. Zhukov read from a falsified letter from Komandarm (General) Iona Yakir who had been tried and executed together with Marshal Tukhachevskii.

Marshal Zhukov quoted Yakir's letter as follows:

On 29 June 1937 on the eve of his own death he [Yakir – GF] wrote a letter to Stalin in which he says:

'Dear, close comrade Stalin! I dare address you in this way because I have told everything and it seems to me that I am that honourable warrior, devoted to Party, state, and people, that I was for many years. All my conscious life has been passed in selfless, honourable work in the sight of the Party and its leaders. I die with words of love to you, the Party, the country, with a fervent belief in the victory of communism.'

On this declaration we find the following resolution: "Into my archive. St. A Scoundrel and prostitute. Stalin. A Precisely accurate description. Molotov. For a villain, swine, and b****, there is only one punishment – the death penalty. Kaganovich.

Aside from relatively inconsequential errors in Zhukov's account – Yakir's letter was written on 9 June 1937, not 29 June – there are important falsifications. In this letter Yakir repeatedly confirmed his guilt. Voroshilov, as well as Stalin, Molotov, and Kaganovich wrote on the letter, a detail Zhukov omitted. In 1957 Voroshilov had backed away from the plot to remove Khrushchev. The latter, though criticising the old Marshal severely, spared him the punishment meted out to the others. At the XXII Party Congress in October 1961, Aleksandr Shelepin also quoted Yakir's letter dishonestly, but somewhat differently. In Shelepin's quotation from Yakir's letter to Stalin of 9 June 1937, I put the text read by Shelepin in boldface. The text in the original letter but omitted by Shelepin is in italics.

A series of cynical resolutions by Stalin, Kaganovich, Molotov, Malenkov, and Voroshilov on the letters and declarations made by those imprisoned testifies to the cruel treatment of people, of leading comrades, who found themselves under investigation. For example when it was his turn Yakir – the former commander of a military region – appealed to Stalin in a letter in which he swore his own complete innocence.

Here is what Yakir actually wrote:

"Dear, close comrade Stalin. I dare address you in this manner because I have said everything, given everything up, and it seems that I am a noble warrior, devoted to the Party, the state, and the people, as I was for many years. My whole conscious life has been passed in selfless, honest work in the sight of the Party and of its leaders – then the fall into the nightmare, into the irreparable horror of betrayal. And during that short period of my life there were always within me two persons: onne who had worked much and honestly for the army, the soviets, the party, and another, who thought up and was preparing vile acts hostile to the country. The investigation is completed. I have admitted my guilt, I have fully repented. I have unlimited faith in the justice and propriety of the decision of the court and the state. I know that there can and must be only one sentence – death. I am prepared for this sentence. Nevertheless I appeal to you and to the government and beg you, beg you to believe in the possibility of my correction, to believe that I can still be of use to the state, to which I dedicate my whole being. Perhaps you will consider and decide to allow me to go somewhere in the far North or East, in Kolyma, to work and on rare occasions to learn about the magnificent Land of the Soviets, mine again. I ask you to permit me, even though rarely, to take up "Pravda" and to see, by the amount of the sowing, the production, the transportation, the victories of the party, of the soviets, and of the people, whom I have betrayed.

I beg you and I understand that I do not have any right to do so. Now I am honest in my every word, I will die with words of love for you, the Party, and the country, with an unlimited faith in the victory of communism."

As Shelepin read it, the letter is from an honest, loyal man protesting his innocence, in reality Yakir fully admitted his guilt. Yakir was one of the military figures involved both in collaboration with Germany and with Trotsky. Here is the text from the "Shvernik Report" on the Tukhachevskii case given to Khrushchev in 1964, shortly before his ouster, but not published until 1994.

Dear, close com. Stalin. I dare address you in this way because I have told everything and and it seems to me that I am once more that honourable warrior, devoted to Party, state, and people, that I was for many years. My entire conscious life has been passed in selfless, honest, work in the sight of the Party and its leaders. – then I fell into a nightmare, into the irreparable horror of treason... the investigation is finished. The indictment of treason to the state has been presented to me, I have admitted my guilt, I have repented completely. I have unlimited faith in the justice and appropriateness of the decision of the court and the government. Now each of my words is honest, I die with words of love to you, the Party, the country, with a fervent belief in the victory of communism.

The falsification goes far beyond these three examples. Now that the archival, original text of Yakir's letter is available, we can see that Zhukov, Shelepin, the "Shvernik Report" writers, then later Gorbachev, and the historians who wrote under their direction, lied consistently about the events of the Stalin years to an extent that would be scarcely imaginable if we did not have primary source evidence that proves beyond doubt the extent of their lies.

A large number of documents from formerly secret Soviet archives have been published since the end of the USSR. This is a very small proportion of what we know exists. Especially as regards the oppositions of the 1930s, the Moscow Trials, the military "purges," and the massive repressions of 1937-38, the vast majority of the documents are still top-secret, hidden away even from privileged, official researchers.

Yet no system of censorship is without its failures. Many documents have been published. Even this small number enables us to see that the contours of Soviet history in the 1930s are very different from the "official" version.

On the following pages we reproduce the archival copy of Yakir's letter. This is actually two copies, the original, in Yakir's own handwriting, and a typed copy, with Stalin's famous comment on it: "Scoundrel and prostitute. J. St." Molotov signed his name in agreement. Voroshilov, as important a target for the military conspirators as Stalin, wrote: "A completely accurate description." Kaganovich wrote: "for a traitor, a swine, and a bliad' [roughly, "foul whore"] there is only one punishment – the death penalty."

The handwritten copy shows a very regular handwriting, with no sign of nervousness, much less of torture.

To my knowledge, this is the first time this letter has been published anywhere.

Chapter 6. Soviet evidence – Hitler reacted to Tukhachevsky Affair, August 1937

During the past several years many documents that relate to the Tukhachevsky Affair have been declassified without any public announcement, let alone any explanation. The most striking of these is, of course, the transcript of the trial, which is the main document discussed in the present book.

Another is a report from "Razvedupr," the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army, dated 21 August 1937, a little more than two months after the trial and execution of Tukhachevsky and the other seven high-ranking officers. It was made public on the site of the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation. We learnt of it from an article in the newspaper Komsomol'skaia Pravda of 22 June 2020.

The report quotes Hitler as criticising the German military leadership because they had been counting on Tukhachevsky's conspiracy and it had failed.

Hitler is currently mocking the leadership of the army and says roughly the following: "You see how these gentlemen know how to brilliantly conduct their foreign policy. If I followed their advice, where would I be now? Where is Tukhachevsky's group, this imaginary "Russian trump card", this "second leg" on which German foreign policy should stand? It is under the ground!"

The report concludes:

In Hitler's eyes the Tukhachevsky affair is the last big, decisive blow that was inflicted upon the competence of the army in foreign political affairs.

This intelligence testimony is consistent with other evidence we cite in the present book that Nazi leaders knew about the Tukhachevsky Affair. A translation of the document follows.

[Note: On letterhead of the Intelligence Directorate (RU) of the army. Dated 21 August 1937. Stamped "Declassified" over typed note "Top Secret."

Handwritten initials "KV" for Kliment Voroshilov. Handwritten note: "Copy to comrades S-n and M-v" for "to Stalin" and "to Molotov"]

TO PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR DEFENCE OF THE USSR

MARSHAL OF THE SOVIET UNION

Com. VOROSHILOV

REPORT

(About the loss of the command of the German army on German foreign policy)

I present a copy of the intelligence report received by us from our source close to German political and naval circles.

Worthy of attention:

1. Hitler's opinion about the failure of foreign policy pursued by the German military command, especially in connection with the Tukhachevsky case.

Disagreements between Hitler and the German military command over the sending of German troops and navy to Spain.

ATTACHMENT: Copy of the report in "2" pages.

Head of the 1st Section

RU RUKKA [= Razvedupr, or Intelligence Directorate] Workers and Peasants Red Army

DIVISION COMMANDER

(Stigga)

REPORT

In German diplomatic circles, it is said that since the time of the Tukhachevsky case the alleged influence of the army on German foreign policy has ceased.

Hitler is currently mocking the leadership of the army and says roughly the following:

"You see how these gentlemen know how to brilliantly conduct foreign policy. If I followed their advice, where would I be now? Where is Tukhachevsky's group, this imaginary "Russian trump card", this "second leg" on which German foreign policy should stand? It is under the ground!"

Disagreements between Hitler and the leadership of the army escalated in May 1937.

Around the middle of May, Hitler and the leadership of the National Socialist Party decided to undertake an open intervention in Spain and send 60,000 men together with the German navy for this purpose.

Ostensibly, Admiral Raeder objected to this. He said: "If a guarantee is given that the navy will not be needed off the German coast during its absence, then I agree that it can go to Spain.

But if we have to reckon with the possibility that it will be needed at home, then I am against. The fact is that in the event of a conflict it will not be possible to bring the fleet back to our homeland. England and France could prevent its return at any time.

General Fritsch has joined this opinion. He said, "If I get a guarantee that during the absence of those 60,000 men on the borders of Spain there will be no conflicts, then I can do without these people at home. Otherwise, I will be forced to refuse to give my consent." Blomberg, who initially agreed with Hitler, ultimately supported Raeder and Fritsch. After this, Hitler decided to abandon the project. Two weeks later he scolded the generals and said that it was still possible and correct to send the fleet and 60,000 mn to Spain, but he let himself be misled by military specialists. Military experts have failed in every external political situation: this was the case with Spain. In Hitler's eyes the Tukhachevsky affair is the last big, decisive blow that was inflicted on the competence of the army in foreign political affairs. Since that time, supposedly, no one can say anymore that the army is an influential factor in foreign policy in Germany.

Accurate:

Deputy Head of Division I

RU RKKA

MAJOR

(Starunin)

Source: https://www.prlib.ru/item/1297712

This intelligence report is consistent with other evidence that we present in this book that Hitler, high-ranking Nazis, diplomats, and military officers, knew about the Tukhachevsky conspiracy and had high hopes for it.

The first page of this document is reproduced in facsimile on the next page.

Chapter 7. Soviet evidence – Ustrialov's testimony

Ustrialov on Tukhachevsky's Contacts with the Japanese

Considerations of Nikolai Ustrialov's confession requires some explanation. Ustrialov's is a Soviet – NKVD confession-interrogation. This will raise in the minds of some readers the possibility that Ustrialov might have been "forced" to falsely confess, that these confessions might be fabrications, and so on.

In reality, there is no evidence that this is the case and much evidence against it. Therefore, it may be useful to examine this issue here.

Ustrialov's confession cannot have been an attempt to "frame" Tukhachevsky or even to get additional evidence against him, since by the date it was given – 14 July 1937 – Tukhachevsky, executed on 12 June 1937, had been dead for more than a month.

Might it be an attempt to "frame," or at least get more evidence against, Bukharin and the Rights? As we shall see, they are in fact mentioned in the confession. But this is impossible for a number of reasons:

• The allusions to Bukharin and the Rights are all hearsay. Ustrialov simply reported what one Japanese journalist-spy who called himself Nakamura had told him. Nakamura had no direct knowledge about the Rights. He just repeated what he had been told by still other parties. Such testimony would have been useless in any criminal trial, including in the USSR in the 1930s.

• Why would the NKVD or prosecution fabricate material that could not be used? When, during the Yezhovshchina or "Great Terror" the NKVD, under the leadership of Nikolai Yezhov, fabricated confessions, they did so to falsely incriminate innocent people. In this case they would have fabricated direct testimony, forced Ustrialov to say that he had direct knowledge of the Rights' desires to overthrow the Soviet government, make deals with Japan and Germany, and so on. But they did not do that.

• Liudmila A. Bystrianseva, the expert on Ustrialov's life and thought who edited and introduced this confession, is convinced that it is genuine, despite the fact that it contradicts the reigning historical paradigm according to which Tukhachevsky et al. were innocent, "framed" by Stalin, Yezhov, or both. At the end of this chapter we will review what she says.

• The confession might well be useful to the NKVD for further investigation. But that would mean that the investigators were in fact trying to discover the truth. That, in turn, would mean that they did not fabricate Ustrialov's confession.

• Ustrialov's confession is consistent with the Soviet charges against Tukhachevsky and the Rights. We now have good corroborative evidence, including non-Soviet evidence, that these charges were accurate. The prevailing paradigm of the Moscow Trials and the Tukhachevsky Affair cannot account for this evidence. Therefore, the prevailing paradigm must be discarded.

All this suggests that the confession is genuine. We have no grounds to think that it might be a fabrication by the investigators or the prosecution, and every reason to think it was not. And the confession itself is very interesting – in fact, a bombshell. Not surprisingly, it has been virtually ignored by those who are committed not to discovering the truth but to what I have elsewhere called the "Anti-Stalin Paradigm" of Soviet history.

These are our grounds for including this somewhat lengthy discussion of Ustrialov's confession here. Nikolai Vasil'evich Ustrialov was a Russian philosopher who had taught law at Moscow University during World War I. He had been a member of the Kadet (Constitutional Democratic) Party, the leading party of businessmen and intellectuals. During the Civil War he supported the White generals Kolchak and Denikin against the Bolsheviks.

Eventually he settled in Harbin, China, and worked for the China East Railroad, jointly owned by China and the USSR. During his years of exile he visited Japan several times and met with Japanese government figures. When the railroad was sold to Japan in 1935 Ustrialov returned voluntarily to the USSR with other Russian nationals.

Once back in the USSR Ustrialov was hired to teach as a professor of economic geography at two universities in Moscow. Soviet authorities believed that he had become reconciled with the Bolshevik Revolution and accepted his stated desire to support the USSR for nationalist reasons.

Ustrialov was arrested on 6 June 1937.

In the USSR he worked as a professor of Economic Geography at the Moscow Institute of Transport Engineers and for a time at Moscow State University. But on 6 June 9137, he was arrested by the NKVD of the USSR, and on 14 September 1937, he was sentenced to be shot by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR for "espionage, counterrevolutionary activity and anti-Soviet agitation" (articles 58-1, 58-8 and 58-11 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Republic). The sentence was carried out on the same day in Moscow.

From another source we learn that Ustrialov pled guilty at trial to espionage for Japan.

Ustrialov was declared guilty by the court in that "since 1928 he has been an agent of Japanese intelligence and has carried out espionage. In 1925 he established counterrevolutionary contact with Tukhachevsky, from whom he learnt about the preparation of terrorist attacks against the leaders of the VPK(b) and the Soviet government and about the anti-Soviet terrorist organisation of the Rights. In addition Ustrialov conducted active counterrevolutionary propaganda and slandered the leadership of the VKP(b)" (from the sentence, p. 52). "The sentence against Ustrialov N.V. was carried out the same day (p. 53)." ... The accusation of espionage and other counterrevolutionary activity was based solely on Ustrialov's confessions, which he gave during preliminary investigation and confirmed at trial.

Ustrialov was himself convicted of espionage for Japan. This constitutes our main interest in him here. It is important to note, however, that Ustrialov did not confess to everything his interrogator accused him of. Specifically, he rejected the accusation that he had returned to the USSR at the instruction of the Japanese.

QUESTION: It is useless for you to reduce your activity only to counterrevolutionary propaganda. The investigation is aware that you arrived in the USSR upon the direct proposal of Japanese intelligence with special assignments – do you admit this? ANSWER: I do not admit this.

This kind of differentiated confession – confession of guilt to some charges while rejecting other charges – suggests an effort on the part of the defendant to be truthful at least about the charges to which the defendant has confessed guilt.

Bystriantseva argues convincingly that Ustrialov did not "spy" in the ordinary sense of the word, and in the sense that the NKVD interrogator at first accused him of. But she fails to point out the obvious: that Ustrialov's discussion with the Japanese agent Nakamura (see below) itself constituted a form of espionage – secret collaboration with a hostile foreign power – if not reported to the authorities.

The transcript of one of his interrogations, that of 14 July 1937, was published in 1999. Here we quote only those sections of the interview that are directly relevant to the question of Japanese collaboration.

In this interrogation Ustrialov outlined the contents of a conversation he had with Tukhachevsky at Tukhachevsky's own home sometime in the autumn, probably September, of 1936. He then summarises a ninety-minute discussion he had in late December 1936 with a Japanese agent, one Nakamura, who was travelling under journalistic cover.

We will comment on these two sections of Ustrialov's confession separately. After that, we will consider issues of authenticity.

Part One. Autumn 1936: Ustrialov discusses his talk with Marshal Tukhachevsky

QUESTION: Describe the contents of this conversation.

ANSWER: I will try to present our conversation word for word insofar as I am able to remember it. Tukhachevsky first touched upon the main problems of our politics and expressed interest in my point of view. I told him that, in my opinion, in the current historic situation, Soviet foreign policy is being conducted upon the only possible line, if we bear in mind the orientation towards peace. I felt that my companion did not share this point of view. In very careful, laconic, roundabout terms, he began to say that the orientation towards peace would require some mitigation of our relations with Germany, which now poison the whole international atmosphere.

I immediately remarked that we are not to blame for the tensions in these relations; that I firmly believed that as long as fascism is in power in Germany no improvement of our relations is possible.

Expansion to the East is the cornerstone of Hitler's foreign policy. "Yes, but to the East of Germany is Poland – replied Tukhachevsky. - Territorial questions allow for a variety of solutions." From his further, although cautious, statements it turned out that he had a very difficult picture of the European equilibrium than the one that now exists. In his words the well-known concept of the so-called "German orientation" was revived, about which so much was said and written at one time.

It was clear at whose expense in such a case the settlement of the disputed territorial problems was conceived. "Not every Polish campaign ended in a Treaty of Riga. History also knows the Congress of Vienna."

This aphorism by my interlocutor was a more than clear hint.

1 - "But our contradictions with Germany are not limited to territorial problems. We cannot lose sight of the profound opposition of our social and political regimes."

Tukhachevsky - "Yes, of course, but regimes develop, they evolve. In politics, we need flexibility. Every conflict is the beginning of an agreement."

<p.253>

I - "However, there are basic, fundamental conditions which constitute the essence of the political system. With us these conditions are defined by the programme of the ruling party."

Tukhachevsky - "Yes, but besides the programme there are people. The party is people. In the Party there are realist politicians, and the future belongs to them."

From his further remarks it was clear that he was not only "theorising," but already felt a certain amount of ground under his feet. The "realist politicians" in the Party were not a fiction but a reality. Not fiction either were the words about a new course towards Germany.

From these words, somewhat disjointed but still quite clear, it was not hard for me to understand the basic political aspirations of my interlocutor. It only remained for me to ask him one question about the specific domestic programme of those "realist politicians" in the Party that he had mentioned. To this question Tukhachevsky replied that their internal political programme was based on the need to smooth the acuteness of the contradictions between the Soviet state and the outside world, even at the cost of a certain retreat from the political line currently being carried out by the Party. Since this lessening of contradictions is dictated by the situation – it was necessary to take this path.

After this response I finally realised that under the nickname of "realist politicians" Tukhachevsky had in mind the Right opposition in the party, the Bukharin-Rykov group.

Analysis

A significant point for our purposes is that the main subject of Ustrialov's interrogation was Marshal Tukhachevsky. At the date of the interrogation, 14 July 1937, Tukhachevsky and the seven other high-ranking military leaders who had been arrested with him had all been tried and executed. What would have been the purpose of fabricating an interrogation that implicated a person already dead and other minor figures some of whom, as we shall see, were never repressed?

Ustrialov had been arrested on 6 June 1937, a few days before the trial and execution of Tukhachevsky and the rest and during the continuing investigation of the military conspiracy. We don't know what led to Ustrialov's arrest.

As an attempt to investigate networks of Japanese espionage the interrogation makes perfect sense. The NKVD was also gathering further information on the Rights, on their connection to the military conspirators and others. Bukharin had already begun to confess about this in his first confession of 2 June 1937. So had Iagoda, Krestinsky, and others who would eventually figure in the March 1938 Moscow Trial.

Ustrialov knew that Bukharin and Rykov had been arrested – their arrests had taken place on 27 February 1937, during the February-March 1937 Central Committee Plenum. But he could not have known how closely the confessions they had already made were consistent with what he, Ustrialov, reported about Tukhachevsky's views.

As Ustrialov described his conversation with Tukhachevsky, it began by his professing his loyalty to the Soviet "orientation to peace" – no doubt the attempted rapprochement with the Western capitalists, entry into the League of Nations, the new Constitution, and other reforms. Tukhachevsky immediately began to question this policy, which was also predicated on an attempt to build "collective security" – a set of alliances – against Hitler's Germany.

The Marshal said that "some degree of softening" (nekotorogo smiagcheniia) of Soviet opposition to Nazi Germany was needed. He said that the hostile relations between the USSR and Nazi Germany were "poisoning the whole international atmosphere." That is, Tukhachevsky was telling Ustrialov that he thought the whole policy of anti-Fascism and collective security against Nazi Germany was wrong.

In Ustrialov's words Tukhachevsky was "resurrecting" the notion of a "German orientation." The two "losers" of the Versailles peace after World War I, the USSR and Weimar Germany, had collaborated secretly under the provisions of the Treaty of Rapallo. Tukhachevsky and many other Soviet officers, including most of those executed along with him, had trained in Germany, such ties had been terminated at Hitler's rise to power.

When Ustrialov referred to Hitler's Drang nach Osten, the cornerstone of his foreign policy since the beginning and enshrined in his credo Mein Kampf, Tukhachevsky replied that Poland, not the USSR, could satisfy Hitler's territorial ambitions. He referred to the Treaty of Riga (March 1921) in which Poland had acquired much of Ukraine and Belorussia at the expense of the newly socialist Russian Republic.

To that treaty Tukhachevsky counterposed the Congress of Vienna at which in 1815 Russian imperial control over Poland had been established with a fig leaf of Polish independence which was snuffed out by the Tsar in 1832. In effect Tukhachevsky seemed to be hinting that under a new political leadership the USSR could be a German ally once again and help to put an end to the Polish state.

To this Ustrialov objected in surprise that the socio-political differences between Germany and the USSR were "deeply contradictory to one another." Tukhachevsky's response was that "regimes develop and evolve." But the only "evolution" he spoke of was of a change in the Soviet regime and Party, guided by "realist politicians" (real'nye politiki). According to Ustrialov, Tukhachevsky said nothing about Nazi Germany's "evolving."

Tukhachevsky then said that the "internal political programme" of these "realist politicians" would flow from the "necessity to remove the sharpness of the contradictions between the Soviet state and the outside world." Given what he had already said, however, it is clear Tukhachevsky meant the contradictions between Nazi Germany and the USSR, on the one hand, and the existence of the Comintern on the other. By the autumn of 1936 there were already serious and deepening contradictions between France and Germany. But all the capitalist countries were in agreement in their hostility in the Comintern.

The exact same term "realist politicians" (real'nye politiki) was used by Karl Radek in the Second Moscow Trial of 23-30 January 1937, in the same way that, in Ustrialov's account Tukhachevsky used it in speaking to Ustrialov in the autumn of 1936.

Radek:

"I told Mr. K. that it was absolutely useless expecting any concessions from the present government, but that the ... government could count upon receiving concessions from realist politicians in the U.S.S.R., i.e., from the bloc, when the latter came to power.

(1937 Trial 9)

Radek:

RADEK: This was in May 1934. In the autumn of 1934, at a diplomatic reception, a diplomatic representative of a Central European country who was known to me, sat down besides me and started a conversation. Well, he started this conversation in a manner that was not very stylish. He said (speaking German): "I feel I want to spew....Every day I get German newspapers and they go for you tooth and nail; and I get Soviet newspapers and you throw mud at Germany. What can one do under these circumstances?" He said: "Our leaders" (he said that more explicitly) "know that Mr. Trotsky is striving for a rapprochement with Germany. Our leader wants to know, what does this idea of Mr. Trotsky's signify? Perhaps it is the idea of an émigré who sleeps badly? Who is behind these ideas?" It was clear that I was being asked about the attitude of the bloc. I could not suppose that this was an echo of any of Trotsky's articles, because I read everything that was written by Trotsky, watched what he wrote both in the American and in the French press; I was fully informed about what Trotsky wrote, and I knew that Trotsky had never advocated the idea of a rapprochement with Germany in the press. If this representative said that he knew Trotsky's views, that meant that this representative, while not, by virtue of his position, a man whom his leader treated confidentially, was consequently a representative who had been commissioned to ask me. Of course, his talk with me lasted only a couple of minutes; the atmosphere of a diplomatic reception is not suited for lengthy perorations. I had to make my decision literally in one second and give him an answer, and I told him that altercation between two countries, even if they represent [diametrically opposite social systems] is a fruitless matter, but that sole attention must not be paid to these newspaper altercations. I told him that realist politicians in the U.S.S.R. understand the significance of a German-Soviet rapprochement and are prepared to make the necessary concessions to achieve this rapprochement. This representative understood that since I was speaking about realist politicians it meant that there were realist politicians and unrealist politicians in the U.S.S.R.; the unrealist politicians were the Soviet government, while the realist politicians were the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc. And he also understood that what I meant was: if the bloc comes into power it will make concessions in order to bring about rapprochement with your government and the country which it represents. (1937 Trial 108-109)

RADEK:

RADEK: Several months later, approximately, November 1935, at one of the regular diplomatic receptions, the military representative of that country...

THE PRESIDENT: Do not mention his name or the country.

RADEK: ... approached me and began to complain about the complete change of atmosphere between the two countries. After the first few words he said that during Mr. Trotsky's time the relations between the armies of the two countries were better.

He went on to say that Trotsky had remained true to his old opinion about the need for Soviet-German friendship. After speaking in this strain for a little while longer he began to press me hard as one who had formerly pursued the Rapallo line. I replied to this by uttering the same formula which I had uttered when I was first sounded, namely, that the realist politicians of the U.S.S.R. appreciate the significance of Soviet-German friendship and are prepared to make necessary concessions in order to ensure this friendship. To this he replied that we ought to last to get together somehow and jointly discuss the details, definitely, about ways of reaching a rapprochement.

I told him that when the circumstances permitted I would be glad to spend an evening with him. This second conversation revealed to me that there was an attempt on the part of military circles to take over the connections which Trotsky had established with certain circles in Germany, or that it was an attempt to verify the real content of the negotiations that were being conducted. Perhaps, also, it was an attempt to ascertain whether we knew definitely what Trotsky had proposed. (1937 Trial 444-445)

In his summing-up statement to the court Prosecutor Vyshinsky referred repeatedly and sarcastically to Radek's use of the term "realist politicians." (1937 Trial 480).

Ustrialov concludes this part of the interrogation with the remark that he realised this was the plan of the "Rightist Party opposition, the Bukharin-Rykov group." Evidently enough information about the political programme of the Rights had been published by this time, or at least bruited about in conversations, perhaps at Izvestiia of which Bukharin was the editor and where Ustrialov himself was to publish an article in December 1936. The programme of the bloc was shared by both the Trotskyists and the Rights. Ustrialov would have naturally been drawn more to the Rights.

If there were any reason to think that Ustrialov's confession were an NKVD fabrication we might attribute the use of the term "realist politicians" to an NKVD attempt to falsely link the confession, and thereby the Rights, with the Trotskyists of the Second Moscow Trial of January 1937, which had taken place only a few months earlier. But, as we have seen, there is no reason to think that Ustrialov's confession is a fabrication.

Therefore the recurrence of the term "realist politicians" represents what Radek meant by it: a coded reference to the bloc of Trotskyists, Zinovievites, Rights, and other oppositionists that, in collaboration with the Tukhachevsky group and Germany, planned to overthrow the Stalin leadership.

Part Two. Late December 1936: Ustrialov Meets with a Japanese Agent

Ustrialov:

[USTRIALOV]: However, soon I learnt much more concrete things that forced me to think about possible cardinal changes in the leadership of the VKP(b) and of the whole political line of the Soviet government, and learnt about the direct connection between the Bukharin-Rykov group and Tukhachevsky.

QUESTION: From whom did you learn this?

ANSWER: A Japanese man told me about this when I met him at the end of 1936.

QUESTION: What Japanese man? Where did you meet with him?

ANSWER: Soon after my article "The Self-Awareness of Socialism" appeared in the December issue (1936) of Izvestia a person unknown to me called me on the telephone and asked for a meeting, giving me greetings from "Harbin acquaintances." When I asked to whom I had the honour of speaking the latter answered: "You do not know me, so my name is irrelevant, but it is essential for me that I meet personally with you and transmit to you greetings from 'Harbin friends.'"

After some hesitation I consented to a meeting and we agreed to meet each other the same day around ten o'clock in the evening in the Losinka, not far from the Institute of the People's Commissariat of Transportation. At the agreed-upon time I arrived at that place. Soon after 10 p.m. an automobile approached the Institute. Out of it stepped a man, Japanese in appearance, wrapped in a fur coat. The Japanese man approached me, called me by my name, said his name was Nakamura, and stated that he was a correspondent of one of the Tokyo newspapers and that he was in transit from Japan to Europe and was staying for several days in Moscow.

Nakamura gave me greetings from Tanaka and expressed the desire to exchange views with me about a few questions that interested him.

<p. 254>

Our whole conversation was carried on in French.

QUESTION: The circumstances of your meeting with Nakamura, as you describe them, unquestionably show that this meeting had been arranged by the two of you when you left Harbin for the USSR. Otherwise the motives that prompted you to meet in Moscow with a Japanese man completely unknown to you are incomprehensible. Do you admit this?

ANSWER: You are quite correct, I do not at all intend to conceal the fact that at the end of 1934 Tanaka, during a conversation with me in Harbin, warned me that if it became essential to receive a consultation from me about one or another question connected with the so-called Russian problem, the Japanese would try to seek the possibility of establishing contact with me in Moscow. I assert, however, that no final agreement about the circumstances of this meeting between us had been agreed upon.

QUESTION: Let us return to the circumstances of your meeting with Nakamura. Where and about what did you talk with him?

ANSWER: Nakamura invited me to sit in his automobile and for about an hour and a half we drove between Moscow and the Losinka, talking all the while. At the outset he spoke about my article in "Izvestiia," asked whether I had worked at this newspaper long and whether I was acquainted with Bukharin and his friends. To this I answered in the negative. He was further interested to learn what circles I frequented, and again spoke of the milieu of the Bukharin-Rykov group, which he called the group of realist politicians, much more far-sighted and possessing more social support than the Zinoviev-Kamenev group that had recently failed. To my reply that now it was scarcely possible to speak seriously about any role for the Bukharin-Rykov group, he noted that this group, in his opinion, was not at all as weak as it seemed, and that it had many overt and secret supporters in the different links of the Soviet apparatus. Then he asked me about the mood of the Soviet intelligentsia and about my own evaluation of the political situation. I briefly informed him about my point of view.

QUESTION: What did you tell Nakamura?

ANSWER: I set forth to Nakamura my evaluation of the situation in the country from the viewpoint of my theory of "Bonapartism." I said that the revolution was steadily moving along a Bonapartist road, that this Bonapartism of a certain sort was developing – above all as the principle of the limitless personal power of the leader.

Then I turned Nakamura's attention to such measures of the government as the establishment of titles, awards, the institution of the rank of Marshal, the reestablishment of the Cossacks, etc. ... The emergence of "notable people" as it were emphasised the creation of a new aristocracy, that is, it once again reminded one of the analogy to the Bonaparte epoch. I said that the execution of the Zinovievites was the first example in the history of the Russian Revolution of the acceptance of the methods of the Jacobins in struggle with revolutionaries: the "wet" guillotine instead of the "dry." In this spirit I gave him my evaluation about other events of the internal life of the country.

QUESTION: How did Nakamura react to the questions you laid out?

ANSWER: As though in answer to these "Bonapartist notes" of my remarks my interlocutor, unexpectedly for me, began to speak on the topic of the Red Army and mentioned that, according to his information, the Rights had supports in its ranks also, more precisely in the milieu of its high command. That the Rights were not as powerless as I believed. The Japanese had reliable information about this, not only their own, but also that obtained from an allied source, just as interested as they were in the struggle against the Comintern. There were reasons to affirm that the hopes and plans of the Rights were not at all baseless. And, so as not to be too vague, he could even name one name that was, in relation to this, rather weighty. According to his information "Mister Tukhachevsky" was connected by close political sympathies with the group of the Right communists. And Tukhachevsky was an impressive name, well known to political circles of all foreign governments, and that even the Russian emigration predicted that he was a "Russian Napoleon." Moreover, as one of the marshals, he was popular in the USSR.

To my question how he imagined the political programme of such a Right-Military bloc he developed to me a series of conceptions that reminded me of the judgements expressed by Tanaka in 1934.

In the event of political success, the government of the Bukharin-Rykov group would fundamentally change the course of Soviet politics towards the side of coming closer to the desires of foreign states. In particular, Japan expected that this government would stop the work of the Comintern in China and would give Japan full freedom of action in China. At the same time Japan was expecting the significant expansion of various concessions in the Soviet Far East, possibly even an amicable agreement about the sale to it on acceptable terms of the northern part of Sakhalin. All this would radically lessen the current tense relations between Japan and the USSR.

To my question about the position of such a government in the sphere of European foreign policy Nakamura answered that a sharp improvement in Soviet-German relations would take place. A change in the system of the monopoly of foreign trade would reinvigorate commercial ties between both countries and German commercial expansion in the USSR. Territorial-political difficulties could be decided, to a significant extent, at the expense of Poland. The decommissioning of the activities of the Comintern would meet Hitler's basic conditions. In a word, here we could expect a decisive turn in the whole contemporary international situation and the establishment of a peaceful equilibrium on a new basis. The Soviet Union would firmly enter the society of "normal" states that carry out the politics of healthy national egoism.

...

As he said goodbye to me the Japanese man gave me to understand that he would be very interested to hear more detailed and concrete thoughts from me about the questions touched upon in our talk. He expressed the hope that on the basis of my collaboration on "Izvestiia" I would succeed in seeing Bukharin or some other Right communists, and also with their help meet with Tukhachevsky. He added that in a few months on his way back from Europe to Japan he would like to meet with me again. On this note our conversation, which had lasted about one and a half hours, ended.

QUESTION: After your talk with Nakamura did you try to get in touch with Bukharin and his circle?

<p. 255>

ANSWER: No, I did not. The meeting with Nakamura took place at the end of December [1936], and in the middle of January 1937 we already knew about the upcoming trial of the parallel centre [the Second Moscow Trial of 23-30 January 1937], and a month after that there came the rumour of the arrests of Bukharin and Rykov. All these events impelled me to take a position of waiting, and during this period came my arrest.

Ustrialov believed there was a connection between his publication of a philosophical article in Izvestiia in December 1936 and his being contacted by a Japanese agent and subsequently meeting with him at the end of that month. At this same time Bukharin was editor of Izvestiia and was publishing articles by well-known former oppositionists. Ustrialov was a former leading member of the Kadet (Constitutional Democrat) Party, the main capitalist party at the time of the Revolution, and former minister in the White Russian government of Admiral Kolchak. He had returned to the USSR when the Soviet share of the Chinese-Eastern Railway had been sold to Japan in 1935.

Though by this time he had "accepted" the Soviet regime as a Russian patriot he was also known as a right-winger in politics, founder of the Smenovekhist movement of exiled Russian intellectuals who believed that the Soviet regime would "evolve" into something less radical. In essence this was a political perspective that counted on the Russian Revolution's evolving along similar lines to the French Revolution. Ustrialov saw in Stalin the "new Napoleon," or "Caesarism," as he put it.

Harbin, the city in Heilongjiang Province occupied by the Japanese from February 1932 was the largest settlement of White Russians in the world and teemed with agents and spies from all over the world. Ustrialov lived there between 1920, when it was still an outpost of the White Russian military resistance to the Bolshevik Revolution, and 1935, when Russian employees of the railroad were permitted to repatriate to the USSR if they wished, as Ustrialov chose to do.

In the course of this second part of his interrogation Ustrialov admitted that he had been contacted by Tanaka, whom Bystriantseva identifies as a member of the Upper House of the Japanese Diet (Parliament), an expert on Russian affairs, and as such, an agent of the Japanese government. Ustrialov had met Tanaka as early as 1926.

Tanaka had told Ustrialov in 1934 in Harbin that the Japanese government would try to reestablish contact with him in Moscow in order to ask his advice "on the so-called Russian problem." Nakamura, the Japanese correspondent, and, obviously, intelligence agent who contacted Ustrialov and met with him in late December 1936, gave an introduction – "greetings" – from "Harbin friends" and, when they met in person, from Tanaka. "Harbin friends" would have either been anti-Soviet Russian émigrés who had refused to repatriate or, more likely, the Japanese themselves.

Ustrialov agreed to meet him in a clandestine manner. Ustrialov also did not volunteer this information, but only divulged it when his interrogator suggested that he knew this already. In the eyes of the NKVD and prosecution this would have been another mark against him. Citizens were supposed to report to the proper authorities any attempts by suspected agents of foreign powers to meet with them. The ninety-minute talk also took place in Tanaka's automobile. This was obviously an attempt at secrecy too.

Failure to contact the Soviet government at this point to inform them of the attempt by an obvious Japanese agent to contact him would certainly have put Ustrialov outside the law. The Soviet government would have regarded this as an agreement by Ustrialov to be a Japanese spy. Ustrialov did not notify the government, but was evidently found out anyway. He was in fact convicted and executed in September 1937 for espionage for Japan.

Nakamura asked about Bukharin "and his friends," showed much interest in them, and called them "realist politicians, much more far-sighted and having more social support than the Zinoviev-Kamenev group that had recently failed." He called them "not at all as weak as it seemed" and said they had much open and secret support within different areas of the Soviet Party and apparatus.

Nakamura then revealed that support for the Right opposition existed in the highest echelons of the Red Army, saying that the Japanese knew this not only from their own information but from "another anti-Comintern ally." This was certainly Germany. The "anti-Comintern pact" between Germany and Japan had been formed in November 1936 and no other countries had joined it by July 1937 (Mussolini's Italy did not join it until November 1937).

The Programme of the Rights

Nakamura named Tukhachevsky as one of those who were very sympathetic to the Rights. He outlined the political programme of the Rights in the same way Tanaka had done in 1934. According to Nakamura the Bukharin-Rykov group would, if they came to power, sharply change Soviet policy in the following ways.

• Halt Comintern work in China. That would mean stopping all support for the Chinese Communist Party of Mao Zedong.
• Let Japan have "a free hand" in China – that is, to make it a Japanese colony.
• Give Japan "significant concessions" in the Soviet Far East, including perhaps selling back to Japan the northern part of Sakhalin Island.
• Effect a sharp improvement in Soviet-German relations.
• Expand trade with Germany and German markets in the USSR.
• Stop supporting the Comintern. This presumably meant in Axis and pro-German countries at least, unless it meant shutting down the Comintern entirely.
• Enter into some kind of alliance with Germany against Poland.

This outline of the programme of the Rights corresponds closely to that given briefly by Bukharin in his first confession of 2 June 1937, and that emerges from the testimony of Bukharin, Rykov, and the other defendants at the March 1938 Moscow Trial. It would mean that the USSR would then, in Ustrialov's words, "enter the society of 'normal' states," promoting national, rather than internationalist and class, interests.

Nakamura expressed the wish that Ustrialov should meet with Bukharin or other Rightists and hopefully, with their help, with Tukhachevsky again. This confirms that the Japanese government believed the possibilities for a Rightist–Military seizure of power was still very much alive in December 1936. And this is consistent with the information surrounding the Trauttmansdorff–Mastný talks only a few weeks later in early 1937. We discuss these talks in another chapter of the present book.

In short, we have much evidence that at this time Hitler was still hoping the Rights and military could still take power.

Bystriantseva's Analysis

In her introduction to the text of this interrogation Bystriantseva, an expert on Ustrialov's life and works, admits that she is unable to establish that the remarks in it were forced upon Ustrialov by the interrogators. Despite whatever doubts she has, she goes on to take the interview seriously anyway and, in her other remarks, assumes it does indeed express Ustrialov's own views.

She states:

I wish to emphasize a rule that it seems, should be generally understood but is frequently broken: the analysis of this document presupposes the obligatory knowledge not only of all of the activity of N.V. Ustrialov but also of his world-view as a whole.

...

It can be said that his transcript represents the final conversation, by Ustrialov with the generation of the future.

This argues strongly for the genuineness of Ustrialov's confessions In two ways. For one thing, how would an NKVD interrogator know Ustrialov's views so well that he could forge or "script" the transcript of an interrogation that sounded genuine to an expert like Bystriantseva? For another, Bystriantseva herself is expert in Ustrialov's works and worldview. Yet she admits that she is unable to conclude the transcript of the interview with Tukhachevsky was faked.

Bystriantseva herself obviously believes that the interrogation was not falsified. She writes that she considers this interrogation Ustrialov's "last thoughts, his hopes, his words to the future." Her words are further evidence that the interrogation is genuine, and that the remarks attributed to Ustrialov in it were, in fact, his own.

But if the interrogation was not falsified in those parts of it where Ustrialov expresses his political and philosophical views, then this is additional strong evidence that the rest of the interrogation is genuine as well, including the sections that interest us.

Elsewhere in the article Bystriantseva notes that in the transcript Ustrialov's friend, the jurist Nikolai Pavlovich Sheremet'evskii, is called Nikolai Borisovich – an error that the real Ustrialov could not possibly make in the case of a friend. She is undoubtedly right that Ustrialov would not have made such a mistake. But this is an error that a typist working from a shorthand transcript could easily make. It proves nothing in itself.

Ustrialov's cousin Ekaterina Grigor'evna Shaposhnikova did in fact tutor Tukhachevsky's daughter in the Russian language, as Ustrialov states elsewhere in the transcript. Bystriantseva notes that Shaposhnikova's son's denial that the meeting took place has no significance.

Ustrialov states that his cousin Shaposhnikova was "an elderly woman of about fifty" and completely apolitical. As Bystriantseva suggests, Ustrialov undoubtedly said this to keep suspicion away from her. In fact Shaposhnikova was born in 1896 and would have been no more than forty-one at the time of the meeting with Tukhachevsky. She did in fact escape arrest and lived until 1983. In any event, this detail seems to be genuine.

Bystriantseva also published notes on the "rehabilitation hearings" held in Ustrialov’s case in 1988. This was a time when rehabilitations of the "victims of Stalinism" were proceeding at a high rate and in large numbers. But the military prosecutor failed to recommend Ustrialov's rehabilitation based on the evidence he had. The documents reveal that a previous rehabilitation investigation in 1955-56 also failed to reach any conclusive results, and left a number of unanswered questions. This earlier study confirmed that Ustrialov had been a leading member of the Kadet Party and had been personally singled out by Lenin as an enemy of the Soviet regime. During this period, Ustrialov had certainly been an outspoken opponent of the Soviet regime.

Ustrialov confessed as well to long contact with Japanese intelligence. In effect this made him a Japanese agent. The Khrushchev- and early Gorbachev-era rehabilitation commissions must have considered this in their decisions not to rehabilitate him. Although Ustrialov was at length rehabilitated on 17 October 1989, the materials Bystriantseva cites suggest that these points were not cleared up even at that time. By the late Gorbachev period almost every application for rehabilitation was being accepted.

The earlier rehabilitation study of Ustrialov's criminal case file reveals that Ustrialov confirmed his guilt at his trial, while it states that no other inculpatory materials were presented at the trial other than his own confessions in the preliminary investigation and again at his trial on 14 September 1937. We would expect that the indictment would state the grounds on which the suspicion of "counterrevolutionary activity" was based – that 15, what circumstances had excited the interest of the NKVD and led to Ustrialov's arrest.

Ustrialov named a number of his friends among whom, he said, he had "set forth his counterrevolutionary views." Some of them were repressed between 1937 and 1940. But others were evidently not repressed in any way and lived into the '50s, '60s, '70s and even '80s.

The names named by Ustrialov – if it was he – were no secret to the "organs" (and we consider it essential to specially emphasise the fact that most of these persons not only were repressed, but even continued to work and received awards from the Soviet government.)

This suggests that the names were not suggested by the interrogators in order to find a pretext to arrest and repress these people. The only logical conclusion that remains is that Ustrialov did in fact name them himself.

Ustrialov’s statement is consistent with Tukhachevsky’s confessions; with the pre-trial confessions we have from Bukharin and Krestinsky; and with the testimony at the March 1938 Moscow trial. Both Tukhachevsky and Nakamura referred to the Rights, or Bukharin-Rykov group, as the “realist politicians.” Radek said that he used the same term for the bloc of Rights and Trotskyists in his discussions with the German military attaché General K. (evidently German military attaché General Ernst Koestring).

In this context there seems little reason to doubt the genuineness of the Arao document, since it is obviously compatible with Nakamura’s knowledge of Tukhachevsky’s political orientation against the Soviet government and towards the Axis. Ustrialov's confession also argues in favor of its being genuine.

The Ustrialov Evidence and the Tukhachevsky Affair

The relevance of Ustrialov's confession to our evaluation of the Tukhachevsky Affair, including the accusations made by the defendants of Trotsky's collaboration with the Germans and Japanese, are very clear. The bloc of Rights and Trotskyites was accused of working with Tukhachevsky and his military co-conspirators and confessed to doing that.

In The Moscow Trials As Evidence we reproduced passages from the testimony of Rozengol'ts, Rykov, Grinko, Krestinsky, and Bukharin concerning the Tukhachevsky conspiracy. In them the defendants at the Third Moscow Trial admit collaboration with Tukhachevsky and his group of military men, and indicate that Trotsky was involved in this collaboration also.

Ustrialov's confession is thus strong evidence in support of the essentially reliable nature of Moscow Trials confessions as evidence, as well as of Trotsky's involvement in the conspiracy of the bloc – something we know from the Trotsky Archive is true in any case.

During the Khrushchev and Gorbachev years "rehabilitations" were often justified by the statement that the only evidence against the defendant presented at trial was the defendant's own confessions. Works by anticommunist scholars repeat this charge as though it represented some kind of tyrannical practice.

This is deliberately misleading. In the American criminal justice system the prosecution does not go to the expense and trouble of presenting a case, calling witnesses, and presenting evidence, if the defendant has pled guilty. A defendant's guilty plea does not imply that the prosecution did not have evidence and witnesses in case the defendant pled innocent. In the Soviet criminal justice system in the 1930s a defendant had to confirm his confessions of guilt (if he had made any) at trial. Many defendants confessed before trial, confirmed their confessions to the investigation before trial, and then refused to confirm them at trial. In those cases the prosecution had to present the evidence it possessed. This happened in the case of Nikolai Yezhov in February 1940. Despite the fact that he refused to confirm his many confessions at trial Yezhov was convicted on the testimony of others who testified against him.

Chapter 8. Soviet evidence – Bloodstains Issue

On page 414 of his book Stalin: Waiting for Hitler, 1929–1941, Stephen Kotkin writes the following:

In the cellars on May 26, a mere four days after his arrest, Tukhachevsky began to sign whatever interrogators put in front of him. Zinovy Ushakov, who prided himself on obtaining confessions no other investigator could extract, mercilessly beat Tukhachevsky, whose blood dripped onto the pages of a confession to crimes he did not commit.

It might be hard to cram more utter falsehoods into two sentences than Kotkin does here! Naturally, Kotkin has no evidence whatsoever for any of these statements, and all are demonstrably false. The claim that these bloodstains prove that Tukhachevsky was beaten into false confessions is repeated by many other writers. For example:

...Yezhov's investigators tortured the officers mercilessly until they confessed. Analysis many years later showed that there were bloodstains on the confession signed by Tukhachevsky. (Getty, Road to Terror, 447-8).

Their reference is to Izvestiia TsK KPSS n. 4, 1989, p. 50. This is in fact the "Spravka" of the Shvernik Commission, prepared for Khrushchev in 1964 but not published until Gorbachev's anti-Stalin campaign. In the authoritative publication of the "Spravka" in the volume RKEB 2 it is on page 682. Here is that passage (I quote this passage in Russian as well, so that the readers who can read Russian can see exactly what claim the writers of the Spravka made.)

В процессе изучения дела Тухачевского на отдельных листах его показаний обнаружены пятна буро-коричневого цвета. В связи с этим было проведено судебномедицинское исследование отдельных листов дела. В заключении Центральной судебно-медицинской лаборатории Военно-медицинского управления Министерства обороны СССР от 28 июня 1956. г. говорится:

«В пятнах и мазках на листах 165-166 дела № 967581 обнаружена кровь... Некоторые пятна крови имеют форму восклицательных знаков. Такая форма пятен крови наблюдается в движени, или при попадании крови на поверхность под углом...»

- RKEB 2, 682.

Translation:

In the process of studying the case of M.N. Tukhachevsky, spots of a brownish colour were found on separate sheets of his testimony. In the conclusion of the Central Forensic Laboratory of the Military Medical Directorate of the Ministry of Defence of the USSR of 28 June 1956 it is stated: "Blood has been found on stains and smears on sheets 165, 166 of case No. 967581... Some bloodstains have the form of an exclamation mark. This form of bloodstains is usually observed when the blood falls from an object in motion, or when blood falls to a surface at an angle..."

Khrushchev "rehabilitated" Tukhachevsky et al. in 1956-57. But he was evidently unsatisfied with the Molotov Commission, so he set the Shvernik Commission to collect evidence that Tukhachevsky et al. were innocent. They found none.

In the early 2000s journalist Iulia Kantor was given permission by the Tukhachevsky family to view his interrogation file. She published two books about this, both cited by Kotkin. Kantor was utterly unable to find any evidence that Tukhachevsky was innocent, although she is certain that he was, and she covers up this fact with lots of assertions.

On 21 February 2004, Kantor published an article in Izvestiia. In that article she reproduced a photo of the place in one of Tukhachevsky's confessions that has the stains. Years ago, I put this photograph online:

https://msuweb.montclair.edu/~furrg/research/tukh_confess_with_blood.jpg

It is important to note a few details here:

• These are the same stains that are identified in the "Spravka" of 1963. The stain in "the form of an exclamation mark" is at the lower left corner.
• This confession is a carbon copy. This has been confirmed by Vladimir Bobrov, who has been working in the FSB (formerly the KGB-NKVD) archive.
• Tukhachevsky's signature is visible. Normally, each page of a confession is signed. That was the custom with all interrogation transcripts.

Let's sum up:

• This discovery was made by Khrushchev's men when Khrushchev was falsely "rehabilitating" lots of people and blaming Stalin, after his 25 February 1956 "Secret Speech." I have written about these false "rehabilitations" in Khrushchev Lied, Chapter 11. Later, Gorbachev's men often just copied the unpublished Khrushchev material stuff verbatim.
• Why should we trust Khrushchev and his men? We shouldn't! In anything! They lied big-time. So, we don't know whether these stains are blood or not.
• Assuming they are blood, are they Tukhachevsky's blood? Khrushchev's men may or may not have had the technology to determine that in 1962-3. But by 1989, and certainly today, the technology still exists, and many Tukhachevsky family members are still around.
• If it were Tukhachevsky's blood, wouldn't Khrushchev and Gorbachev tell us that? But they do not mention it. Maybe they "do not want to know," in case the test shows that it is not Tukhachevsky's blood? Imagine a courtroom in which this is presented as evidence against somebody — say, Zinovy Ushakov, Tukhachevsky's interrogators. The defence attorney could make a mincemeat of this so-called "evidence," get it excluded from consideration. That's because it proves nothing.
• Even if these stains are blood – and even if they are Tukhachevsky's blood (let's remember, this has not been established) – they are on a carbon copy. That means that Tukhachevsky has already made the confession, and it has been typed up. So why would they still beat him? To force him to sign each page? But look at the signature. It's a regular signature, nothing shaky or hesitant. It's like he is signing an order or a check.
• Most important: Is this "blood spatter"? Read the Wikipedia page on this:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bloodstain_pattern_analysis

This is not "blood spatter." There is no "spatter" at all. But if Tukhachevsky were being beaten, there would be "spatter." A blow produces spatter, not drops.

Let's assume these are bloodstains. What might have caused them? A noseblood. A paper cut. Whose blood? It could be anybody's: the interrogator's; the secretary-typist's; from one of the archivists handling the document. Or, it could be Tukhachevsky's.

What it cannot be is the sign of a beating. A beating produces "blood spatter," which these stains are not.

Even if these stains are blood; even if they are Tukhachevsky's blood; and even if they were "blood spatter" – they still would not prove anything at all. Blood spatter analysis is very far indeed from a science.

There is very little empirical evidence to support the use of blood spatter analysis in court or any other aspect of the legal system.[4] Like many other forms of forensic science, bloodstains analysis rests on the analyst interpreting ambiguity. This ambiguity can contribute to various forms of bias. For example, confirmation bias is the tendency to search for or interpret information in a way that confirms one's preconceptions or favoured theory and to steer clear of the information that many disagree with those preconceptions. When analysts have theories or preconceptions entering a crime scene, it may unintentionally influence how they interpret the blood stain. In addition, there are often no guidelines when analysts interpret a crime scene, and discretion is often involved. Compounding the matter is the fact not all human blood characteristics are alike across populations, and differences can make generalisations based on a single experiment difficult. For these reasons, the validity of bloodstains analysis is likely not as high as juries may believe.

This dubious science has contributed to the wrongful conviction of many persons in the United States alone. It is worthless as evidence.

There is nothing ingenious or obscure about this evidence, or this analysis of it. Khrushchev's and Gorbachev's men could have done it. But they didn't. They had been tasked by their bosses to find evidence that Tukhachevsky was innocent. So they did not look too closely.

Kotkin could have done it too. But, like Khrushchev's and Gorbachev's men, Kotkin was not looking for the truth either. Like Khrushchev and his men, Kotkin was looking for a good anti-Stalin story. So he turned off his critical faculties and fabricated a beating. And not just any beating, but a "merciless beating."

Pure invention! And yet Kotkin is perhaps the foremost historian of the Stalin period in the world today.

Are These "Bloodstains" Fakes?

Here is a link to the article in Izvestiia of 21 February 2004, pages 10 and 11.

https://msuweb.montclair.edu/~furrg/research/kantor_izvestiia_022104.pdf

It contains many interesting details, all of which attest not to Tukhachevsky's innocence – which Kantor insists upon – but on his guilt. For example, in the second column of page 11 we can see the even, unhurried handwriting of Tukhachevsky's first confession of guilt dated 26 May 1937.

But we are interested in the photograph at the upper left-hand corner of page 11. This is the part of one of Tukhachevsky's confessions – in fact, a carbon copy, typed up, with his signature, as we mentioned above. At the lower left are the supposed stains and purported bloodstains.

Here is the part of this photo with the stains:

https://msuweb.montclair.edu/~furrg/research/Tukh_confess_with_blood.jpg

Notice the stain at the right of the "exclamation point." Its border is made up of lines that are virtually straight.

Notice the stain above the exclamation point." It too has a left border that is almost a straight line.

No liquid dropped on a surface has straight lines.

Here is a sample of ink dropped onto paper:

Here is a sample of a stain made by drops of blood:

There is nothing like a straight line in any of these stains.

This means that the stains on the carbon copy of one of Tukhachevsky's confessions were not made by blood or any other liquid being dropped on the page.

Look at the stain that the "Central Forensic Laboratory of the Military Medical Directorate of the Ministry of Defence of the USSR of 28 June 1956" identified as having "the form of an exclamation mark." The left side is almost a perfect curve. We know that this stain was not made by any liquid dropping on the paper.

It looks like it may be an incision with a sharp instrument. That is, something may have been cut out. That is also what the stain to the right, the one with four virtually straight sides, looks like.

So, what happened? We don't know. It is possible that some kind of stain was originally present, and was carefully cut out so that the stain could be examined. That would account for the straight lines and the almost perfect curve. If that is the case, we can be sure that whatever was examined was not blood, or the forensic laboratory would have so stated. After all, this is exactly what Khrushchev and his men wanted – evidence that Tukhachevsky had been beaten.

Here is an image of the "stains" in question magnified 4 times:

It shows that to the left of this stained area someone has drawn an elongated question mark! The photographs in Kantor's 2004 article were carefully cropped to omit this question mark.

The photo editor has drawn lines to emphasise the almost straight lines and almost regular curves.

Whatever these marks are, they are not bloodstains. Nor are they stains from any other liquid having been dropped on the corner of this document. They may be evidence of cutting with an instrument with a sharp blade. We can't be sure without examining the actual document. But researchers are not permitted to directly examine or photograph this file, though presumably Kantor had such permission.

Conclusion: There are no bloodstains on Tukhachevsky's confession. This claim has been fraudulent since it was first made in 1956, and then in the Shvernik Report in 1963.

Chapter 9. Soviet evidence – The Arao Telegramme

The Arao Document

Nikita Khrushchev had Marshal Tukhachevsky "rehabilitated" in 1957. According to the information now public the sentence passed by the Military Collegium of the Soviet Supreme Court on 11 June 1937 was set aside on 31 January 1957. All the executed military leaders were reinstated in their Party memberships by the Party Control Commission on 27 February 1957. (Viktorov 234)

Normally there was some kind of study or report prepared beforehand – usually an appeal, or "Protest" by the Soviet Prosecutor, and a following report by the Supreme Court. Normally too, the Soviet Prosecutor's "Protest" was based on some kind of investigation. Viktorov gives a very general idea of what kind of investigation took place in 1956. But we can't tell much about it.

It's clear that there had been a decision to exculpate the military leaders beforehand, and that the decision was a political one. We have the decree of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU posthumously reinstated Tukhachevsky and the others tried with him to their Party membership. The "Molotov Commission" set up in 1956 by Khrushchev evidently in order to officially rehabilitate the Tukhachevsky defendants among others, was sharply divided. Within weeks after it ceased its operation Molotov, Malenkov, and Kaganovich tried to oust Khrushchev but failed and were ousted themselves instead.

For reasons never made clear, in the months before the XXII Party Congress in 1961 Khrushchev decided to sponsor another investigative report on the Tukhachevsky case. A commission was established under the chairmanship of Nikolai M. Shvernik, an Old Bolshevik of working-class origins who had spent most of his Party career as a trade union bureaucrat and was at the time the Chairman of the Party Control Commission. It is possible that Khrushchev was hoping that Shvernik's researchers would discover some "smoking gun" evidence of, perhaps, a frame-up of the military men. If so, he was disappointed. The commission found nothing of the kind. This may account for the fact that the report was not published during either Khrushchev's or Gorbachev's tenure.

Shvernik's Commission issued a report addressed to Khrushchev, to which Shvernik added the following note:

To Comrade N.S. Khrushchev. I am sending to you a report concerning the verification of the accusations presented in 1937 by judicial and party organs against comrades Tukhachevsky M.N., Iakir I.E., Uborevich I.P. and other military figures, of treason to the motherland, terror, and military conspiracy.

The materials about the causes and conditions in which the case against com. Tukhachevsky M.N. and other prominent military figures arose, have been studied by a Commission created by the Presidium of the CC CPSU by decisions of 5 January 1961, and 6 May 1961. N. Shvernik, 26 June 1964.

- RKEB 2, 671

The Arao Document

It is reasonable to suppose that the purpose of the Shvernik commission was to uncover evidence that would justify the rehabilitation of the Party members convicted in the three public Moscow trials and the Military purges. The mere fact of such a study implies that whatever reports had been prepared in 1956 for the official "rehabilitations" had been lacking in such evidence. No doubt the commission had the additional goals of further blackening Stalin's name and, especially, the names of his leading supporters who were still alive – people like Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, and Voroshilov.

The Commission duly reached the predetermined conclusion that Tukhachevsky and those tried and executed with him were innocent. But rather than proving their innocence, the report contained evidence that contradicted it.

One bit of such evidence is the "Arao document." Here is what we know of it, from the 1964 "Shvernik" report to Khrushchev, first published in 1993. I include this important text in the Russian original.

г) Действия разведки Японии и ее роль в «деле» Тухачевского

В ходе проверки «дела» Тухачевского был обнаружен в Центральном государственном архиве Советской Армии важный документ, спецсообщение 3-го отдела ГУГБ НКВД СССР, которое было направлено Ежовым наркому обороны Ворошилову с пометкой «лично» 20 апреля 1937 г., то есть в момент, непосредственно предшествовавший арестам крупных советских военачальников. На этом документе, кроме личной подписи Ежова, есть резолюция Ворошилова, датированная 21 апреля 1937 г.: «Доложено. Решения приняты, проследить. К. В.» Судя по важности документа, следует предположить, что доложен он был Сталину. Ниже приводится это спецсообщение в том виде, в каком оно поступило к Ворошилову.

«СПЕЦСООБЩЕНИЕ

3-м отделом ГУГБ сфотографирован документ на японском языке, идущий транзитом из Польши в Японию диппочтой и ишодящий от японского военного атташе в Польше - Савада Сигеру, в адрес лично начальника Главного управления Генерального штаба Японии Накадзима Тецудзо. Письмо налисано почерком помощника военного атташе в Польше Арао.

Текст документа следующий:

«Об установлении связи с видным советским деятелем.

12 апреля 1937 года.

Военный атташе в Польше Саваду Сигеру.

По вопросу, указанному в заголовке, удалось установить связь с тайным посланцем маршала Красной Армии Тухачевского.

Суть беседы заключалась в том, чтобы обсудить (2 иепоглифа и один знак непонятны) относительно известного Вам тайного посланца от Красной Армии № 304.»

Спецсообщение подписано заместителем начальника 3-го отдела ГУГВ НКВД СССР комиссаром государственной безопасности 3-го ранга Минаевым. Фотопленки с этим документом и подлинник перевода в архиве НКВД не обнаружены.

Translated:

(c) Actions of Japanese intelligence and its role in the Tukhachevsky "case"

In the course of verifying the "case" of Tukhachevsky an important document was discovered in the Central State Archive of the Soviet Army, a special communication of the 3rd department of the GUGB [Main Directorate for State Security] of the NKVD [People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs] of the USSR, which had been sent by Yezhov to Voroshilov, the People's Commissar of Defence, with the annotation "personal," on 20 April 1937, that is at the time immediately before the arrests of the major Soviet military commanders ... We reproduce here this special communication in the form in which it reached Voroshilov:

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION

The 3rd department of the GUGB has photographed a document in the Japanese language that was in transit from Poland to Japan by diplomatic pouch and that originated with the Japanese military attaché to Poland, Savada Sigeru, addressed personally to the director of the Main department of the Japanese General Staff Nakazima Tetsudzo. The letter is written in the hand of Arao, aide to the military attaché in Poland.

The text of the document is as follows:

"Concerning the establishment of ties with a prominent Soviet figure.

12 April 1937 The Military Attaché in Poland Savada Sigeru.

On the matter mentioned in the title, we have been successful in establishing contact with a secret emissary of Marshal of the Red Army Tukhachevsky. The essence of the conversation concluded that there should be a discussion (2 characters and one sign indecipherable) concerning the secret emissary from the Red Army No. 304 who is known to you."

The special communication is signed by the assistant head of the 3rd section of the GUGB NKVD USSR, Commissar of State Security 3rd class Minaev. Neither the photograph that accompanied this document nor the original of the translation have been discovered in the archive of the NKVD.

The authors of the Shvernik report went on to claim that they believed this document was a "provocation," faked to incriminate Tukhachevsky.

This disinformation was passed by one means or another to the Soviet organs [of security – GF] by Japanese intelligence, perhaps in cooperation with Polish intelligence, or perhaps with the Germans.

The Arao Document evidently presented the researchers on Shvernik's Commission with a considerable problem. Here was documentary evidence that Tukhachevsky was in contact with Japanese intelligence – was, in fact, a Japanese spy! The Commission attempted damage control to try to discredit their discovery. They claimed that in 1937 the document had been turned over to a prisoner, a certain R.N. Kim, an NKVD "worker" – his former job was not specified – who had himself been arrested as a Japanese spy. The whole sequence of events merits a careful look.

Since the quality of the photographic copy of the document was poor and the Foreign Section of the NKVD, where it had been sent for the decoding of the document, could not accomplish this work, the Assistant Chief of the 3rd Office of the GUGB Minaev-Tsikanovskii proposed to M.E. Sokolov, who during that period worked as the chief of the 7th section of this Office, to take the document to the Lefortovo prison to R.N. Kim, an arrested employee of the Foreign Section of the NKVD who was imprisoned there, and to assign him, as a qualified expert in the Japanese language, to decode the document. Kim had been arrested on 2 April 1937, under suspicion of espionage for Japan and the investigation of his case was led by the staff of the section headed by Sokolov. Sokolov has now informed the CC of the CPSU that Kim succeeded in decoding this poorly photographed document after two or three visits. Kim was very excited when he informed Sokolov that in the document Marshal Tukhachevsky is mentioned as a foreign spy. Sokolov confirms that the contents of the special communication that was sent to Voroshilov agrees with the contents of the translation done by Kim. Moreover, at the time Sokolov and other coworkers who knew the document's contents were convinced that it was genuine. Now, however, Sokolov considers that they were then deeply mistaken and that the document was obviously disinformation by Polish or Japanese intelligence who counted upon our seizing upon this forgery.

There are some issues to consider here.

• Why would a document of this importance be turned over to a suspected Japanese spy for a reliable translation? If Kim had in fact been a Japanese agent, the possibilities this presented to him for creating a havoc of distrust within the Soviet leadership would have been immense. And were there in truth no experts in the Japanese language who were at liberty, and not under suspicion of being Japanese agents, to whom the NKVD could have turned?

In his explanation to the CC of the CPSU Kim, who is now living in Moscow, confirms that in reality in April 1937 Sokolov, referring to an order by People's Commissar Yezhov, assigned him to translate from the Japanese a document that none of the employees of the GUGB, because of their knowledge of the Japanese language was weak, could read because of the defective nature of the photograph. Kim was promised that if he decoded the document, that would have a positive effect on his fate.

• The Commission claims that it located and questioned Kim, living in Moscow in the early 1960s. Kim supposedly told them that he had been given the document at the instruction of Yezhov along with an unspecific promise that it would "affect his fate in a positive manner."

The Kim of 1962, however, did not testify that he had been pressured to concoct a false reading of the document. Instead he claimed that he had doubted the genuineness of the document from the first, and had written a note suggesting that this was Japanese disinformation.

Kim asserts that after he had translated the document he also wrote a conclusion in which he deduced that the document had been passed to us by the Japanese. This conclusion cannot be found in the archives. The document that Kim dealt with was composed, in his own words, of one page and was written on the official form of the military attaché in the handwriting of the Assistant Military Attaché in Poland Arao (Kim knew this handwriting well since he had previously read a series of documents written by Arao). The document stated that a document had been sent to the General Staff concerning the fact that contact had been established with Marshal Tukhachevsky. Kim reported all these facts to the CC of the CPSU before the text of the special report had been presented to him.

This story provides a possible avenue of refutation of the "Arao document." Kim, the Japanese language expert, wrote that it was a fake, disinformation (though not a forgery – see below), but the NKVD did not pass this on.

That created an opportunity for placing the blame on Yezhov, who had supposedly directed that it be given to a person who might be amenable to concluding whatever Yezhov wanted. Blaming Yezhov would have allowed for blaming Stalin, Khrushchev's main target, since Khrushchev had claimed that Yezhov did nothing without checking with Stalin first. But Kim instead wrote a note exculpating Tukhachevsky. In this scenario Yezhov did not pass Kim's note along to the Politburo, but also failed to punish Kim for coming to the "wrong" conclusion.

A further difficulty in the Shvernik Commission's discussion of the document is that GUGB officer Sokolov, who had brought the Arao document to Kim, knew nothing about Kim's "note" in the early 1960s. For if he had known, he would never have given the testimony that he did give to the Commission.

Sokolov confirms that the contents of the special communication that was sent to Voroshilov agrees with the contents of the translation done by Kim. Moreover, at the time Sokolov and other coworkers who knew the document's contents were convinced that it was genuine.

Sokolov, who had supposedly dealt with Kim directly, could not have believed the document was genuine in 1937 if Kim really had written a note saying that he suspected the document was phony, disinformation. Obviously Sokolov's view about the document bona fides would have come from Kim. But Sokolov and his coworkers did believe in April 1937 that it was genuine. Therefore, at that time Kim believed that too.

Moreover, how could Kim, a man imprisoned for suspected espionage for Japan, have gotten out of prison to "communicate these matters to the Central Committee" – much less "before he had been presented with the text"? If he had done this, how could Sokolov and his coworkers not have known about all this?

The Shvernik Commission report states that Kim was able to identify the handwriting of the document as that of Arao because "he had previously read a series of documents written by Arao." The Assistant Military Attaché of Japan to Poland would not have been writing to the Soviets at all, much less in handwritten Japanese. So we can conclude that Soviet intelligence had intercepted other handwritten documents by Arao, intended for delivery to Japan, before this, and had given them to the same R.N. Kim to translate. This specific Arao Document was indeed a bombshell, or so it appears to us today. But it must have been far from the first document by Arao that Soviet intelligence had received.

This means that Kim's story of the early '60s about his "note" was itself a lie. Everyone concerned – Kim, Sokolov, and no doubt Yezhov and Voroshilov – had believed the note was genuine.

The Commission chose not to confront these problems, and dismissed the Arao Document as follows:

After evaluation of the available Japanese materials it is possible to make the following deductions.

First: we must consider the Arao Document that Yezhov sent to Voroshilov as a provocation. This disinformation was passed by one means or another to the Soviet organs by Japanese intelligence, perhaps in cooperation with Polish intelligence, and possibly also with German intelligence.

This possibility cannot be excluded that the document was fabricated by the NKVD with a directly provocational purpose or that the secret sender, if he called himself that in Warsaw, was in reality an NKVD agent.

Second, despite the dubious value as evidence against Tukhachevsky the Arao Document that reached Yezhov, Voroshilov, and probably Stalin also, could have been taken under consideration by them and in April – May 1937 could have played a certain role in the formation of accusations against Tukhachevsky.

At the same time, the fact that during the investigation the question about the "secret representative of Tukhachevsky" and about his ties with Japanese intelligence played no role in the interrogations could be explained precisely by the implausibility of this document. In the [Tukhachevsky Affair] case file there is neither the document itself nor a copy of it. No operational work was developed concerning this seized Japanese document; it was used against Tukhachevsky in the same form in which it existed in the hands of the NKVD worker.

According to the Commission's analysis, the Document was some kind of provocation by either Japanese, Polish, or German intelligence, or some combination of them, or possibly even an NKVD forgery – despite Kim's attestation that he recognised Arao's handwriting.

The Commission then contradicted itself by claiming that the fact the document was not used in the investigation and prosecution of Tukhachevsky at all and that this could be explained by "precisely the improbability of this document" – and then claims that "it was used against Tukhachevsky." But if the case against Tukhachevsky was intentionally fabricated from the beginning, the "improbability" of the document – assuming that it was "improbable" – would not have been an issue. Furthermore, NKVD man Sokolov, who dealt with Kim, thought it was genuine.

We can best make sense of all the contradictions in Shvernik Commission's report about the Arao Document by recognising that its editors were trying to find a reason to dismiss this document, since they had been tasked to find evidence to exonerate Tukhachevsky and the rest. One hypothesis would be that those who compiled the report did not wish to conceal from their powerful superiors this document that their researchers had uncovered, so they supplied an explanation that would permit their superiors to disregard it, if they so wished.

Since the Commission's report informs us that Voroshilov had seen the document and, therefore, that Stalin knew about it too, the most likely reason it was not used in the prosecution of Tukhachevsky is that it was not needed – other evidence was available. We can't know for certain, since the Tukhachevsky case file (delo), like those of all the other military defendants, has only been declassified in part, and only in 2017-2018. As yet very few researchers have been able see even parts of it. The fact that the Arao document was not used in the case against Tukhachevsky does not imply anything about whether it was genuine or not.

We do not know whether the actual Arao Document is still extant somewhere. We know about it only from the Shvernik Report. Either it is among the Tukhachevsky investigation materials that are still top-secret in Russia today, or it has been destroyed. It is not mentioned by Iulia Kantor, author of three books on Tukhachevsky, who was given special permission by the Marshal's family to see his investigative file and in whose works a great deal of evidence pointing not towards Tukhachevsky's innocence, but towards his guilt, may be found. Kantor herself, with no pretense of objectivity, firmly takes the position that all the military commanders were innocent victims of a frame-up.

But we now have some more information, if not about the document, at least about some of the persons involved. "Arao"'s name was evidently really "Arai." Vitalii Grigor'evich Pavlov, who worked for Soviet intelligence for fifty years, describes how they opened Japanese diplomatic pouches in the 1930s:

The Japanese Foreign Ministry delivered its diplomatic mail, packed in bags, to Vladivostok, where they were sent by Japanese couriers with a mail train unaccompanied, and in Moscow, employees of the Japanese embassy accepted the diplomatic mail directly from the mail car. Thus, an opportunity was created to get acquainted with Japanese bags on the way from Vladivostok to Moscow, which at that time lasted from 6 to 8 days. The plan of the special department was to organise a small laboratory right in the mail car, in which to open the bags, photograph their contents and re-seal them so that no traces of the opening [lit. "autopsy"] would remain on the diplomatic bag.

The Arao Document represents good evidence that Tukhachevsky was in direct contact with the Japanese military figures in Poland. The attempted refutation of the Document contained in that report is filled with contradictions and should be discarded.

Chapter 10. Soviet evidence – The Romanov Letter of 1938

The arrests of Tukhachevsky and other military commanders in the conspiracy continued throughout the month of May. On 1 – 4 June 1937, there was held in Moscow an Expanded Session of the Military Soviet (Soviet = Council). The purpose was to tell high-ranking military officers about the conspiracy, to present the evidence to them, and to expand the political situation. The proceedings were published in 2008.

In the morning session of the closing day, 4 June, Marshal Kliment Voroshilov made a presentation. The passage below is excerpted from it.

Voroshilov. I have one document that I showed to comrades Stalin and Yezhov, a very original document. The document that one aircraft mechanic of the Vitebsk brigade in 1935, in the month of March, demanding that he be fired from the Red Army. To the question: "Why do not you want to serve?" - he said: "I do not want to, I don't believe," he says, "in all that is being done here. Please release me." They worked on him a long time, persuading him, asking him questions. "No," he says, "I do not want to serve." They take him to Uborevich. Uborevich talks with him for a long time, then says: "Go to the brigade and tell them that a new Korolyov is here." Korolyov arrives at the air brigade and again says: "Please dismiss me immediately" - "Why?" - "I don't believe". They consider him crazy, they write about this to Troyanker. Comrade Troyanker must have forgotten. Troyanker reports to Gamarnik, and they decided to remove Korolyov ... No, first examine him. They examine him and assert that he fell ill with schizophrenia - a slight craziness. They find his diary, page through it and read (written with his own hand): "I am trying to get myself dismissed from the army, because a new party has been formed in the army, that is, there are members of a new party, which dates back to [19] 25–26. This party sets as it task treason against the motherland and country. The Vitebsk brigade has already been sold to the Poles."

Stalin. The air brigade.

Voroshilov. Sold to the Poles – the Vitebsk air brigade. "This group," he says, "is led by people like Gamarnik, Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Yagoda, Uborevich, and a couple more people I don't want to name now." This was in 1935 - in March, 1935, 1936, half 1937, two and a half years ago. This document was passed around the office and was with com. Troyanker. Comrade Troyanker sent it to different places. The matter is very serious.

Budyonny. Political.

Voroshilov. Politically serious.

Stalin. In March, 1935!

Voroshilov. This is consistent with what we have now. The characteristic of this person – what kind of person is he? The chief of the Vitebsk political department writes: "A very smart, intelligent, thinking person." After some time in the hospital, he was released for lack of any reason (laughter) to keep him in the hospital, his schizophrenia was weak. There it is!

Stalin. They called him a counter-revolutionary.

Voroshilov. Yes, a counter-revolutionary, and he was dismissed from the army. Now you need to find and ask this Korolyov - he is an educated, knowledgeable and reasonable, judging by the remarks about him ...

A voice. Someone told him.

Voroshilov. I don't remember everything. There is an indication that many people campaigned against him, they say: you're finished, you had better come to us, otherwise you will fall into the clutches of those who come tomorrow, in the clutches of the new owners. Therefore, he sought to leave the army. Here's the kind of signal, Comrade Troyanker, but because Tukhachevsky and Gamarnik, and Yagoda, and Uborevich and Yakir were mentioned — that means that only a madman can talk like that, obviously they decided that, and this was the end of the matter.

Voroshilov revealed that his office was given evidence of the conspiracy as early as March 1935. But the conspirators were clever enough to classify the technician, Korolyov, as insane, have him hospitalised, and then cashiered from the army.

In 2008 I discovered striking confirmation of this story in a two-page document in the Volkogonov Archive in the Library of Congress. The document was copied carelessly, and some letters on the left margin were not reproduced, but the date is sometime after May 1938.

According to this document, the technician's last name was Romanov, not Korolyov. But all the other details are the same. Romanov was probably the soldier's real name, since the document below is by an officer in a unit close to the one in question.

DEP. CHIEF OF THE POLITICAL DIRECTORATE OF THE WORKERS AND PEASANTS RED ARMY TO THE DIVISION COMMISSIONER

COM. KUZNETSOV

In June 1937, in the personnel department of the Air Forces of the Red Army during a review of old cases, in 1935 a copy of the diary of aviation technician Romanov of the Bobruisk Aviation Brigade was discovered.

In this diary at the end was recorded, roughly, the following: the commander of the brigade (whose last name I don't remember now) suggested to him, Romanov, "to work together with them in their organisation." For more "weight", Romanov was told that their military-fascist organisation consists of: commander and VK brigade, XXX Special. Departments Uborevich, Smirnov, Alksnis, Troyanker, Tukhachevsky, Gamarnik, Yagoda, and others.

Despite persuasion, and then threats, technician Romanov remained committed to the cause of the Party of Lenin-Stalin and refused to join their organisation. After that, they began to persecute Romanov. He was declared crazy and dismissed from the Red Army "because of illness." When member of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) XX Ikononostsev informed me that this document had been found, I wrote down all these facts and decided to report it to the Special Department (since there was anarchy in Political Directorate of the Army at that time). I went to the party bureau of the People's Commissariat of Defence to warn them, informed Yakovsky about this, and together with him went to the Special Department and explained it all.

The next day I received a call from the Special Department and was asked [whose] materials this was. When I explained, it turned out that Gaydukevich, now an enemy of the people, had phoned the Secretariat of the People's Commissar (Comrade Petukhov, it seems) and transferred the whole matter to the Secretariat for report to comrade Voroshilov — which I reported to the Special Division.

This document was found at the moment when the expanded plenary session of the Military Council was held in the second half of June 1937 and where, I was told, Comrade Voroshilov in his closing remarks cited the example of the Romanov case as example of how enemies of the people got out of the way in an honest person, devoted to the cause of the Lenin-Stalin party, so that they were not disturbed.

After that, Comrade Voroshilov allegedly said: "Stop talking about this case."

When I heard about the latter, I understood that in this document there were names such as Alksnis, Troyanker, Smirnov, which had not yet been exposed, held responsible posts in the Red Army, and that all this had to be checked.

Now of all the persons I mentioned above, only Comrade Smirnov (Commissar of the Navy) still remains at work.

I am writing all this because at the beginning of May 1938, I learn from Comrade Ikonopistsev (Airborne Division of Human Resources) that he could not find the file in which Romanov's diary was located and which, supposedly, was referred to the Secretariat of the People's Commissariat of Defence. I questioned whether they did report it to Comrade Voroshilov and whether its content had been fully reported? Maybe the enemies of the people (like the same Gaidukevich) destroyed it?

In mid-May 1938, I went to the Secretary of the Party Commission of the People's Commissariat of Defence Comrade Nikolaev and outlined my doubts to him. Comrade Nikolaev promised to check it, but I still don't know the results.

XX p.p. Regimental Commissioner - P. Moskvichev.

XX 38 g.

Correct

Instructor of the personnel department of the PU [Political Directorate] of the Red Army – Belyaev

We can assume that the technician's correct last name was Romanov, not Korolyov. We do not know how Voroshilov came to make this error. Was he deliberately misinformed somewhere along the paper trail of reports? That is quite likely. Voroshilov says:

They consider him crazy, they write about this to Troyanker. Comrade Troyanker must have forgotten. Troyanker reports to Gamarnik, and they decide to remove Korolyov ...

Both Troyanker and Gamarnik turned out to be part of the conspiracy. Naturally, they were eager to get Romanov out of the way.

If Voroshilov had received the report on Romanov and his diary in a timely fashion, he might have arranged to have the former technician interviewed. The whole military conspiracy might have been nipped in the bud more than two years earlier.

The Men Named in Moskvichev's Report

Genrikh Grigor'evich Yagoda, former Commissar of Internal Affairs, had been arrested on 31 March 1937, and had already been giving confessions. Yagoda was a major defendant at the third Moscow trial of March 1938, at which he confessed to serious crimes, was found guilty, and was executed. His appeal for clemency has been published. In it, Yagoda reiterates his guilt.

We have seen above that at the 1-4 June 1937 Expanded Session of the Military Council, Corps Commissar Benedikt Ustinovich Troyanker was addressed by name by Voroshilov. Troyanker also spoke at the Expanded Session of the Military Council. He was arrested on 21 November 1937, put on trial, and condemned to execution on 28 July 1938, and executed. Yakov Ivanovich Alksnis also attended the Expanded Session of the Military Council and spoke at it. He had been made Deputy Commissar of Defence for aviation in January 1937. On 11 June 1937, he had been a member of the special judicial panel of the Supreme Court that tried and convicted Tukhachevsky and the rest. Alksnis was arrested on 23 November 1937, tried and executed on 28 July 1938.

Brigade Commissar Leontii Filippovich Gaidukevich had attended the Expanded Session of the Military Council. He too also spoke at it. By the time Moskvichev wrote his letter, Gaidukevich had already been arrested, on 28 November 1937. He was tried and executed on 7 May 1938.

Petr Aleksandrovich Smirnov was made People's Commissar of the Navy on 30 December 1937. Smirnov attended the Expanded Session of the Military Council and spoke at it, like Troyanker. In his letter Moskvichev says that at the time of his writing, which we have estimated to be sometime in June 1938, Smirnov was the only one of the conspirators named by Romanov in 1935 who had not been arrested. Smirnov was arrested on 30 June 1938, tried and convicted not under Yezhov but under Beria, on 22 February 1939, and executed the same day.

The "official story" about the men above and a great many others is that they were innocent victims of Stalin, who for some reason wanted to kill them. Thus, according to this version of Soviet history, which I have termed the "Anti-Stalin Paradigm," there were no conspiracies. Therefore, all those who were tried and executed for conspiracy, whether they confessed to their guilt or not, were innocent victims of a diabolical frame-up.

But this is all wrong. There has never been any evidence that the men listed above, the defendants of the "Tukhachevsky Affair" trial, the Moscow Trials, or a great many others who were executed during the 1930s, were innocent. The theory that "everybody was innocent," "everybody was framed," "there were no conspiracies," was vigorously promoted during the 1930s by Leon Trotsky. Following Trotsky's assassination in August, 1940, the followers of Trotsky were just about the only people who continued to promote this notion.

After Khrushchev began wholesale "rehabilitations" of persons tried, convicted, and executed for conspiracy during the Stalin period, and especially after Mikhail Gorbachev continued and even intensified this practice, "mainstream" Soviet historians have assumed that no conspiracies existed and thus that all those tried, convicted, and executed for conspiracy were innocent victims.

Today, thanks to the partial but significant opening of Soviet archives and the publication of a great many (though only a small proportion of the whole) documents from the 1930s, it is clear that the men above, the defendants at all the public trials of the 1930s, of the "Tukhachevsky Affair" trial of 11 June 1937, and a great many other persons arrested, tried, convicted, and executed or imprisoned, were in fact guilty.

It should not be surprising that neither under Khrushchev nor under Gorbachev – nor since the end of the Soviet Union – was any evidence published to support the claims that these persons were innocent victims of frame-ups.

Moskvichev's report of May, 1938

Moskvichev's report of May, 1938, continued

Chapter 11. Non-Soviet evidence – Lyushkov to the Japanese

Genrikh Samoilovich Lyushkov was an NKVD general who defected to the Japanese on 13 June 1938, from the Far Eastern Region, where he had been sent to root out opposition conspiracies among the military command and the Party.

The late Professor Alvin D. Coox of San Diego University spent many years studying Japanese-Soviet relations. In 1968 he published a preliminary survey of what he could discover about Lyushkov's defection from the Japanese side. Thirty years later in 1998 he published two long articles with many more details. Coox managed to locate Lyushkov papers long believed lost. He also studied the surviving report on Lyushkov made by Soviet spy Richard Sorge.

Most important, he was able to conduct extensive interviews with some of the Japanese military men who were in charge of Lyushkov, worked with him, and spent much time with him. What follows here is a summary of those parts of Coox's study that are most relevant to our present purposes.

In part one of his two-part article Coox identified one of his Japanese informants as Kohtani Etsuo.

Section draws particularly on author's interviews with Yabe Chula and Kohtani Etsuo ...

This is evidently the same Kohtani who, in July 1937, sent a report to his superiors via the Japanese diplomatic pouch stating that there was no military conspiracy, and that Tukhachevsky and the others had been executed for reasons that he could not understand. Like the "Arao document" this report was captured and copied by Soviet intelligence, translated into Russian, and sent to Stalin by Yezhov in December, 1937. It was published in an important collection of Soviet documents in 2004, and has been cited as evidence that Tukhachevsky et al. were not in touch with the Japanese. Obviously, Lyushkov’s testimony changed Kohtani/Kootani's opinion, as he reported decades later to Coox. For our purposes Coox's most important discovery is this: Lyushkov confirmed to the Japanese that real military and Rightist conspiracies did indeed exist in the USSR. Before being sent to the Far East Lyushkov had a private meeting with Stalin during which Stalin made it clear that he believed that a military plot did exist. According to Lyushkov Stalin informed him:

War with Japan is inevitable; the Far East is undoubtedly a theater of war. It is necessary to clean up the army and its rear in the most determined manner from hostile spy and pro-Japanese elements. The plot of Tukhachevsky, Gamarnik, and others, and also the arrest of Sangurski, Aronshtam, and Kashcheev show that all is not well with the army, that there are plotters with the leaders of the NKVD in the Far East. Deribas, Zapadni, and Barminski are Japanese spies, and Japan has a large base for spying and insurrection work by means of Koreans and Chinese. (Coox 1, 151)

Sent to the Far East to deal with these conspiracies Lyushkov reported to the Japanese that they did indeed exist. By mentioning Gamarnik, who committed suicide after NKVD men went to inform him that he had been dismissed from the army, Lyushkov indirectly confirmed the genuineness of the charges against Tukhachevsky and the other seven high-ranking officers tried and executed together with him, as Gamarnik was one of them.

According to Lyushkov, the interrogations of Deribas, Zapadni, and Barminski established that in the NKVD and the border guard forces, a plot centering on Gamarnik had been fomented.

Lyushkov also confirmed the connection of the Rights, convicted in the March 1938 Moscow Trial, with the military conspirators. For example, Lyushkov told the Japanese:

For a long time Deribas had been in contact with Rykov and was the latter's ‘hidden conspirator.’

Lyushkov mentioned Rykov elsewhere as well (see below). He also revealed that the charges against Lavrent’ev (Kartvelishvili), arrested in July 1937 but not tried and executed until August 1938, were true. Khrushchev's man Aleksei V. Snegov later charged Beria with framing and then killing Lavrent'ev; Lyushkov's testimony here proves that Snegov was wrong. Lyushkov also confirmed at least the intention of these Party and military conspirators to conspire with the Japanese.

In concert with Lavrenty Lavrentiev (former First Secretary of the Regional Committee of the Party until January 1937), with Grigory Krutov (shot in April 1938), and with the army plotters Sangurski, Aronshtam, and others, Deribas supposedly intended to conduct a putsch in the Far East and to reach agreement with the Japanese for help and for combined operations against the Soviet Union. In the NKVD the plotters had recruited Transtok, Chief of the 274 Section, and many others. Lyushkov gave the names of about 20 officials, mostly NKVD types, and of ten border guards, all of whom he asserted were involved in the plots. (Coox 1, 156)

Coox emphasizes that Lyushkov outlined this information to the Japanese in a manner that convinced them that he believed they were genuine:

About this murderous period as a whole, Lyushkov said little to the Japanese, but his enumeration of the suspects was straightforward, without any admission of NKVD-fabricated evidence, such as he said had occurred at Leningrad in the era of the Kirov assassination. (Coox 1, 156).

It is important to note that Coox's account of what Lyushkov had to say about the Kirov murder is taken exclusively from an interview in Asahi Shimbun of 2 July 1938. (Coox 1, 149) Though we have not been able to obtain that specific newspaper, we assume the Lyushkov interview reported in it must be the same interview printed in Yomiuri Shimbun on 3 July 1938, which is a report of the same news conference. We will discuss the importance of this fact in some detail below. Briefly, however, it is this: Lyushkov said one thing in public, but contradicted his public statements in private. For example, in the Yomiuri Shimbun article Lyushkov said:

At the trial that took place in August 1936 the accusations that the Trotskyites through Ol'berg 1) had contact with the German Gestapo, the accusations of espionage against Zinoviev and Kamenev, the accusations that Zinoviev and Kamenev were connected with the so-called “Right center” through Tomskii, 2) Rykov and Bukharin - are complete fabrications. Zinoviev, Kamenev, Tomskii, Rykov, Bukharin and many others were executed as enemies of Stalin who acted to oppose his destructive policies. Stalin used the convenient possibility which the Kirov case presented to him in order to rid himself of these people by fabricating broad anti-Stalin conspiracies, espionage trials, and terrorist organisations. [Emphasis added, GF]

But in private conversations to Japanese officers and others with whom he interacted Lyushkov incriminated Rykov along with Marshal Blyukher and others:

[One] group of traitors belonging to the staff of the Far Eastern Army, people near to Blyukher himself, such as [Yan] Pokus, Gulin, Vasenov, Kropachev and others, tried to get round Blyukher and to draw him into politically dangerous conversations. Blyukher showed them the secret confessions of arrested plotters [without] the authority to do so. After his arrest Gulin told me that after the recall of Pokus to Moscow, Blyukher, when drinking with them, cursed the NKVD and the arrests recently carried out, and also Voroshilov, [Lazar] Kaganovich and others. Blyukher told Gulin that before the removal of Rykov he was in connection with him and had often written that the 'right wing' wished to see him at the head of the armed forces of the country. (Coox 1, 158)

Publicly Lyushkov was saying that all the conspiracies were fabrications by Stalin. But at the same time he was privately informing the Japanese that these same serious conspiracies did in fact exist. Moreover, what Lyushkov told the Japanese is consistent with the charges at the January 1937 and March 1938 Moscow Trials (the guilt of Rykov) and with the charges against the military conspirators, both the Tukhachevsky Affair figures (Gamarnik) and those against military and Party officials in the Far East.

This is important for our purposes because Lyushkov spoke about the Kirov assassination in published articles only. Coox did not know of any such remarks made privately to the Japanese. Since Lyushkov lied in his published materials – writings that were first and foremost anti-Soviet propaganda – and since it was only in those published materials that Lyushkov discussed the Kirov assassination, then it follows that, at a minimum, we can't put any store at all in what Lyushkov wrote about the Kirov affair.

What's more, Lyushkov wrote in his public article in Kaizo that "no conspiracy did or could exist" while at the same time he confirmed to the Japanese that a number of serious conspiracies had indeed existed. That is, we know that the existence of conspiracies is one of the things that Lyushkov deliberately lied about in his public statements.

At a news conference on 13 July 1938 called by the Japanese to give the press a chance to ask Lyushkov questions, Lyushkov said the following, as summarized by Coox:

... though Lyushkov doubted that there was any basis for it, Gamarnik had been charged with conspiring with elements in the Soviet Far East. In particular, Stalin fabricated allegations that the party secretaries in Siberia – Y.M. Vareikis, Karlenev, and L.Y. Lavrentiev – plotted with Gamarnik and other important individuals to wreck military preparations in the Far East. (Coox 1, 175)

Here Lyushkov directly contradicted what he was saying privately to the Japanese, to whom he affirmed the existence of a conspiracy or conspiracies involving Gamarnik, Lavrent'ev, and others (see quotations from Coox 1, 156 above and Coox 2, 85 below). Head of the Political Directorate of the Red Army lan Gamarnik was questioned by NKVD men in connection with the arrests of Marshal Tukhachevsky and others, after which he committed suicide.

Lyushkov's Kaizo Article As Propaganda

Coox discovered that during August 1938, only two months after his defection, Lyushkov was transferred from the 5th or Russia Section of the 2nd Bureau of the Japanese Army to "the 11th (Propaganda and Subversion) Subsection of the 8th (Psychological Warfare and Sabotage) Section." According to Coox’s informants the Japanese felt that Lyushkov’s military knowledge had been exhausted. He was, after all, NKVD, not regular Soviet army.

Yabe’s successor Asada agrees that Lyushkov came to be viewed as possessing no further intelligence value for the 5th Section, which is why he was moved to the 8th Section to work in the area of propaganda and subversion, in anticipation of an ultimate outbreak of hostilities between Japan and the Soviet Union. (Coox 1, 179)

In addition to writing articles and an introduction to at least one anti-Soviet book Lyushkov recorded "anti-Stalin speeches addressed to the Russian people in case of war" and wrote leaflets. Lyushkov related other facts to the Japanese that confirmed Soviet accusations made at the time. For example, he cited many instances of genuine acts of sabotage. (Coox 2, 80, 81, 82, 83) Coox also recounts more of Lyushkov's informations about real military conspiracies in the Far East:

Lyushkov's opinion that, with respect to the situation of the Red Army in Siberia, the influence of the 'anti'-group was great and discontent was pent up in the military. (Coox 2, 73)

Perhaps of most interest to historians of the USSR generally, as well as to our present study, is Lyushkov's outline of the various conspiracies that existed within the Soviet military.

Within the Soviet armed forces, elements hostile to the regime existed, universally hostile to Stalin but nurturing differing objectives. One group of commanders had been sincerely loyal to Trotsky; for example, V. K. Putna, V. M. Primakov, and others working in his favor. Another group of Soviet commanders of Polish, German, Lettish, and similar minority backgrounds were disappointed with the course of communism and had resurrected historic feelings; for example, A. I. Kork and R. P. Eideman. Still another grouping of commanders had served in the Tsarist Army, favored a military putsch, and had been prepared to cooperate with any other groups; e.g. Tukhachevsky, I. P. Uborevich, N. D. Kashirin, V. M. Orlov, etc. Others who were hostile to the regime and ready to work in opposition had included Gamarnik, I.Y. Yakir, Sangurski, Aronshtam, P.E. Dybenko, N. V. Kuibyshev, I. P. Belov, and M. K. Levandovsky. (Coox 2, 85)

This account shows some similarities to the description of the different groups of military conspirators that Yezhov gave after his arrest at his interrogation of 26 April 1939:

After three or four days Yegorov came to my place again and this time told me in detail about the existence in the WPRA of a group of conspirators consisting of important military men and headed by himself, Yegorov.

Yegorov further gave me the names of the participants of the conspiratorial group that he led: Budyonny, Dybenko, Shaposhnikov, Kashirin, Fed'ko, the commander of the Transbaikal military district, and a number of other important commanders whose names I will remember and give in a supplement.

Further Yegorov said that in the WPRA there exist two more groups competing with each other: the Trotskyist group of Gamarnik, Yakir and Uborevich, and the officer-Bonapartist group of Tukhachevsky.

Yezhov called the Gamarnik-Yakir group "Trotskyist." Putna and Primakov had been closely connected to Trotsky in the 1920s. Yezhov's "Bonapartist" group headed by Tukhachevsky corresponds to Lyushkov's group that had been Tsarist officers and "favoured a military putsch."

To the Japanese, Lyushkov named Budyonny, Dybenko, Kashirin, and Blyukher as as conspirators. Romanov named Alksnis. All were members of the court that tried Tukhachevsky and the others. Vladimir Bobrov, together with a colleague, have studied the confessions of Belov, Blyukher, Dybenko, Kashirin, and Yegorov, and have told me that each of these men confessed that they were afraid that the defendants would expose them as co-conspirators. But they did not.

Of interest as well is that both Lyushkov and Yezhov described Marshal Semion Budyonny as a conspirator. Lyushkov informed the Japanese as follows:

What was happening to Blyukher was happening to others at the top of the army. Thus Marshal S. M. Budyonny's difficulties were caused by his playing with various plotters. (Coox 2, 85)

In this second article Coox confirms that Lyushkov was working "on anti-Stalinist strategy and propaganda" in late 1938. (Coox 2, 92)

The Importance of Lyushkov's Testimony

Lenoe correctly notes that Lyushkov had inside knowledge of the investigation of the Kirov assassination. He could have added: of the investigation of Zinoviev and Kamenev, and of the Far Eastern Region as well. Lenoe also writes:

Moreover, Lyushkov gave his evidence outside the Soviet Union, free from the dictates of the party line, and under the protection of the Japanese military police (after World War II Japanese officers who worked with Lyushkov testified that he did fear a Soviet assassination attempt. (687)

Lenoe also draws upon Coox's important articles, to which he refers repeatedly (687 and 808 nn. 11, 13, 16, 17 and 18). Lenoe correctly points out that Lyushkov's testimony about NKVD operations is consistent with other sources; that he told the truth about his private meeting with Stalin that Lyushkov's estimate of the numbers of arrests and executions is in line with what recent research has disclosed. (687-688)

But Lenoe neglects to mention the important information in Coox's article outlined above, although he obviously knows about it. Lyushkov's confirmation to the Japanese of the existence of a number of important conspiracies, plus the knowledge that he deliberately concealed their existence in his public writings, undermines Lenoe's hypothesis about the Kirov case and the other conspiracies and trials of the 1930s. This is the ASP (Anti-Stalin Paradigm) at work – Lenoe does not wish to admit that the conspiracies existed, since it is "taboo" in mainstream Soviet history to fail to blame Stalin for "framing" the defendants.

To summarise:

• Coox showed that there is a big contradiction between what Lyushkov said in his news conference and published articles, and what he privately told the Japanese.
• Lyushkov informed the Japanese that real conspiracies did exist and were widespread in the USSR.
• Coox pointed out that Lyushkov was explicitly working for Japanese military propaganda.
• Lyushkov inculcated many of the military figures tried and executed as conspirators.
• Lyushkov explicitly implicated Rykov. He told the Japanese:

For a long time Deribas had been in contact with Rykov and was the latter's 'hidden conspirator.' (Coox 1, 156) Blyukher told Gulin that before the removal of Rykov he was in connection with him and had often written that the 'right wing' wished to see him at the head of the armed forces of the country. (Coox 1, 158)

These statements are broadly consistent with testimony at the March 1938 Moscow Trial, at which Rykov was a defendant. Rykov, Bukharin and others testified there about their contacts with conspirators in Siberia. We also now have a few selections of interrogations of Blyukher in 1938. In one of them Blyukher explicitly mentions a letter from Rykov that stated exactly what Lyushkov said.

The beginning of my contact with the Rights took place in 1930... These political waverings and unsteadiness of mine became known to Rykov and permitted Rykov in 1930 to write to me an anti-Party and anti-Soviet letter, which I hid from the Party, and in which he spoke of his desire to see me at the head of the military...

This agrees with Coox's account of what his Japanese informants told him about Lyushkov's words, already quoted above:

Blyukher told Gulin that before the removal of Rykov he was in connection with him and had often written that the ‘right wing’ wished to see him at the head of the armed forces of the country. (Coox 1, 158)

Other snippets of interrogations of Blyukher implicate Deribas, Lavrent'ev, Pokus, Aronshtam, and other figures whom Lyushkov identified as participants in the military conspiracy in the Far East. Lyushkov's statements to the Japanese confirm them. By the same token, Lyushkov's statements to the Japanese refute the notion that these statements were false, the result of torture, threat, or simple NKVD fabrication.

Lenoe's Hypothesis Refuted

Lenoe wrote that Lyushkov's testimony "is in fact the most important in the [Kirov murder] case." (687) We can now see that Lenoe's statement, in the form he meant it, is false – as referring to Lyushkov's statements at the July 1938 press conference and his March 1939 Kaizo article.

Ironically, however, Lenoe's statement is true – but in a sense opposite to that which Lenoe intended. For the information Lyushkov gave privately about the conspiracies to the Japanese military was indeed given "outside the Soviet Union, free from the dictates of the party line, and under the protection of the Japanese military police," as Lenoe stated.

Someone might object to this conclusion on the following grounds:

"Thanks to Coox we know that Lyushkov lied when he stated in pages 118-119 of his Kaizo article, quoted above, that 'no conspiracy did or could exist.' We know that because he privately informed the Japanese that serious conspiracies did indeed exist. So we know Lyushkov lied about those conspiracies about which he told the Japanese.

But Coox does not cite any evidence that Lyushkov spoke to the Japanese privately about the Kirov assassination. Coox only records what Lyushkov said publicly about the Kirov assassination, and publicly he said it was a frame-up and that only Nikolaev was guilty (and, in an accessory capacity, perhaps Shatsky).

No liar lies all the time. Any skilled liar must interweave his real lies with some truth, in order for the lies to be credible.

Therefore it is possible that Lyushkov, while lying about the other conspiracies, was telling the truth about the Kirov assassination in asserting that it was a frame-up, though the other conspiracies which he also called frameups really were not."

To such an objection I would reply as follows: it is a principle of logic and of historiography that one can draw no conclusion e silentio – in this case, from Lyushkov's silence. The fact that, as far as Coox (and we) know, Lyushkov did nottell the Japanese privately that the Kirov defendants (except for Nikolaev and Shatsky) were falsely accused or "framed" does not permit us to say anything about what he might have told them.

It's easy to imagine why Lyushkov might well not have discussed this subject with the Japanese. These were military men, not historians. They were vitally interested in opposition movements against the Stalin regime and especially within the military. They would have had little interest in purely civilian conspiracies that had taken place years before. So either Lyushkov did not tell them privately about the Kirov assassination, or they did not pay much attention and did not remember it when they spoke with Coox many years later.

But Lyushkov confirmed to the Japanese that Rykov was a participant in the anti-Soviet conspiracy. One of Lyushkov's two statements about Rykov agrees very closely with a statement in Marshal Blyukher's confession. Therefore, Lyushkov's statements about Rykov partially corroborate not only Blyukher's confession but some of the testimony at the March 1938 Moscow trial. Lenoe hid this very important information from his readers.

In his remarks about the military purge and particularly about Tukhachevsky's involvement in it, and about Rykov's role in the Right-Trotskyite conspiracy Lyushkov provides us with something very rare. He gives us evidence from outside the Soviet Union that confirms the existence of real anti-Stalin and anti-Soviet conspiracies and the guilt of Rykov and Tukhachevsky.

But Rykov and Tukhachevsky implicated all the other major figures in the network of interlocking conspiracies alleged in the three public Moscow Trials and the Tukhachevsky Affair. In this way Lyushkov's statements to the Japanese constitute strong evidence not only that the 1938 Moscow Trial was not a fabrication but that the previous Moscow Trials were not fabrications either.

Chapter 12. Non-Soviet evidence – Himmler, Vlasov, Hitler, Goebbels, Davies

In 1974 a newly-discovered document from the German Foreign Office files that were captured and microfilmed by the Allies after World War 2 was examined by British historian Frederick L. Carsten. It is a report concerning high-level rumors current in Munich in early 1937, which ended up in the Vienna Bureau of the Austrian Chancellor.

Among other matters it deals with relations between the German and Soviet military commanders, about which it makes four points:

1) It claims that the top men in the German General Staff, including Generaloberst Freiherr Werner von Fritsch, Chief of Staff of the German Army (Chef der Heeresleitung), were at that time involved in trying to form an alliance with the Soviet military.

2) It claims that Marshal Tukhachevsky had been present at the German army's autumn manoeuvres in the past year (den vorjährigen deutschen Herbstmanövern).

At the time Tukhachevsky is said to have proposed a toast to the German Army "as the champion (Vorkämpferin) against world Jewry," and to Goering.

4) It claims that the German military was closely following the "power struggle presently taking place in Russia," in hopes that Stalin would be overthrown in favour of a military dictatorship.

The relevant part of this document is as follows:

... Nach wie vor sind innerhalb der Wehrmacht Bestrebungen im Gange, die auf die Möglichkeit eines Bündnisses mit der russischen Armee abzielen. Die argumentation ist einfach: mit Gewalt ist die russische Armee nicht zu erledigen, also soll es in Freundschaft geschehen. Sowohl Fritsch wie Admiral Raeder, aber auch General von Reichenau gelten als Verfechter dieses Planes. Blomberg wird immer also blosser Figurant angesehen. Diesel Bestrebungen finden aber vornehmlich in der jungen Schule des Generalstabes hire Verfechter. Bei seiner Anwesenheit in Berlin hat sich der Bei den vorjährigen deutschen Herbstmanövern anwesende Marschall Tuchatschewski für den Toast des Generaloberst Fritsch auf die russische Armee in Würzburg mit einem Trinkspruch auf die Deutsche Armee als Vorkämpferin gegen das Weltjudentum und auf General Göring revanchiert. Der gegenwärtig in Russland sich abspielende Machtkampf, der möglicherweise mit dem Sturze Stalins und der Errichtung einer Militärdiktatur enden könnte, wird von der Wehrmacht auf das aufmerksamste und mit unverhohlener Sympathie für eine derartige Lösung verfolgt... Now as always there are efforts under way within the Wehrmacht which aim at the possibility of an alliance with the Russian army. The argument is simple: the Russian army cannot be taken care of by force; therefore it should happen in friendship. Fritsch, Admiral Raeder, and even General von Reichenau are rumoured to be proponents of this plan. Blomberg is seen as a mere accessory (Figurant). But the proponents of these efforts are found chiefly among the younger school of the General Staff. When he was in Berlin on the occasion of last year's German autumn maneuvers, Marshal Tukhachevsky offered, in return for Colonel-General Fritsch's toast to the Russian army in Würzburg, a toast to the German army as the champion against world Jewry, and to General Göring. The power struggle presently taking place in Russia, which might possibly end with Stalin's fall and the establishment of a military dictatorship, is being followed by the Wehrmacht with closest attention, and with unconcealed sympathy for a solution of that kind.

Himmler is reported to have discussed the Tukhachevsky Affair in a conversation with the renegade Soviet General A. A. Vlasov on 16 September 1944, at Himmler's HQ in Rastenburg (East Prussia; now Kętrzyn, Poland) in a manner which makes it clear he believed Tukhachevsky had been guilty of some plotting:

Himmler fragte Wlassow nach der Tuchatschewski-Affäre. Warum diesel schief gegangen sei. Wlassow gab eine unverhohlene Antwort: "Tuchatschewski machete denselben Fehler, den Ihre Leute am 20. Juli machten. Er kannte das Gesetz der Masse nicht." Himmler asked Vlasov about the Tukhachevsky Affair. Why this had gone awry. Vlasov gave a frank answer: "Tukhachevsky made the same mistake that your people made on 20 July. He did not know the law of masses."

In an important speech in Posen on 4 October 1943, Himmler stated:

When – I believe it was in 1937 or 1938 – the great show trials took place in Moscow, and the former czarist military cadet, later Bolshevik general, Tukhachevsky, and other generals were executed, all of us in Europe, including us in the [Nazi] Party and in the SS, were of the opinion that here the Bolshevik system and Stalin had committed one of their greatest mistakes. In making this judgement of the situation we greatly deceived ourselves. We can truthfully and confidently state that. I believe that Russia would never have lasted through these two years of war – and she is now in the third year of war – if she had retained the former czarist generals.

This probably reflected Hitler's assessment as well, for, according to Goebbels (diary entry of 8 May 1943):

The conference of the Reichsleiters and Gauleiters followed.... The Führer recalled the case of Tukhachevsky and expressed the opinion that we were entirely wrong then in believing that Stalin would ruin the Red Army by the way he handled it. The opposite was true: Stalin got rid of all opposition in the Red Army and thereby brought an end to defeatism.

Joseph Davies

Davies was American ambassador to the Soviet Union from November 1936 until June 1938. He was also a very experienced lawyer. In his memoir Mission to Moscow (1941) Davies accepted the Soviet version of the Moscow Trials and the Tukhachevsky Affair. He has been sharply criticised for doing so for decades, although – as we can now prove from primary source evidence – he was correct! But this part of his book is not evidence, of course. It simply reflects Davies' belief that the official Soviet version of these events – the "Stalin" version – was correct.

But early in his memoir there is a passage that is usually overlooked, and that does constitute evidence – confirmatory evidence – of the Tukhachevsky conspiracy. Davies describes a stop-over in Berlin and a talk with an unnamed official at the German Foreign Office.

DIARY

Berlin January 16, 1937

We stopped off here for a few days' rest. Ambassador and Mrs. Dodd gave us a very pleasant luncheon. Dr. Schacht and his wife, the former German Ambassador to Washington, Von Gaffron-Prittwitz, the Polish Ambassador Lipski and the Russian Ambassador and Madame Suretz, along with my old University of Wisconsin classmate and friend, Louis Lochner, made it a very pleasant occasion.

Had an extended conference with the head of the "Russian desk" at the German Foreign Office. To my surprise he stated that my views as to the "stability of internal Russian political conditions and the security of the Stalin regime would bear investigation. My information, he thought, was all wrong – Stalin was not firmly entrenched. He stated that I probably would find that there was much revolutionary activity there which might shortly break out into the open.

Davies was told this at the same time that (a) von Trauttmansdorff was negotiating with Mastný on the point of being informed by the same German Foreign Office, if not by Hitler himself, that Hitler was expecting a pro-German – that is, a pro-Nazi – military coup in the USSR; (b) von Neurath was writing to Hjalmar Schacht about the possibility of a pro-German military coup in the Soviet Union; (c) the German military were calling up their folder on Tukhachevsky's career in the First World War; (d) the Austrian Bundeskanzleramt report discussed by Carsten was outlining the German desire for Stalin's overthrow and a turn towards Germany in the USSR.

All of this information is mutually confirming, and would be even if we did not have the great deal of more direct evidence that we do in fact possess today to prove that the Tukhachevsky conspiracy did indeed exist.

Chapter 13. Non-Soviet Evidence – The Mastný–Beneš Report

The Trauttmansdorff–Mastný Talks

Further confirmation that Hitler himself knew of the conspiracy by Soviet military leaders is also contained in a document from the archive of a Czechoslovak diplomat. In this chapter we will examine that document and put it into context with other documents from German or Austrian sources.

Between August 1936 and January 1937 secret discussions took place between representatives of Germany and Czechoslovakia about a possible nonaggression pact. The government of Czech President Beneš was eager for such a treaty. Drafts of an agreement to be proposed to both governments were being discussed between German diplomat Maximilian Karl Graf zu Trauttmansdorff and Vojtěch Mastný, Czech ambassador to Germany.

In 1960 American researcher Gerhard Weinberg studied the documentary evidence concerning these German-Czech negotiations. From the published and archival information available at the time Weinberg realised that Hitler had called off these negotiations sometime in January 1937. But he could not tell why Hitler had done that. Weinberg concluded that Hitler "was never seriously interested in an agreement with the Czech government." (374) Of course that did not explain why Hitler permitted the negotiations to take place until he suddenly called them off sometime in January 1937.

In 1987, writing in the German scholarly journal Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte Czech researcher Ivan Pfaff revealed that he had discovered in the Czech government archives a document that explained why Hitler had halted these negotiations with Czechoslovakia. The document, a private memorandum from Mastny to Czech President Edvard Beneš, was a record of Mastný's confidential discussion with diplomat Graf zu Truattmansdorff who was representing Germany.

The memorandum proves that Hitler was in touch with secret circles within the USSR. According to Mastný's report of what Trauttmansdorff had confidentially told him, Soviet contacts whom Trauttmansdorff did not name had given Hitler the expectation that the Stalin government would soon be overthrown from within by a military coup.

This coup would be one in a direction more compatible with German interests. Therefore it would change Germany's political orientation towards the USSR and towards Czechoslovakia. Such a cardinal development in relations with the USSR would transform the balance of forces in Europe. This appeared to Hitler to be likely enough so that he called off any attempt to reach an agreement with Czechoslovakia.

The Russian Translation of Pfaff's Article

The important of Pfaff's 1987 discovery was not lost in Mikhail Gorbachev's Moscow. In the following year Pfaff's article was reprinted in Russian translation in three successive issues of the official journal Voenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal. It is worth our while to take a look at this translation tos ee what was added to it and what was omitted from it.

The Soviet editors made some changes – additions and deletions – to Pfaff's article when it was published. The main material added was an unsigned editorial preface printed at the top of the first article in the series. These alterations reflect the Gorbachev-era Soviet desire to keep denying the truth that the Tukhachevsky conspiracy really existed. We'll comment here on its most important assertions.

The preface says that Tukhachevsky was arrested on Stalin's order, "po prikazaniiu Stalina", and then that Tukhachevsky's wife and two brothers were "annihilated" ("unichtozheny"), his three sisters sent to a camp, his daughter, still a child, also arrested, "on Stalin's order." The implication is that there was no pretrial investigation, no recommendation from the NKVD – that everything was done simply because Stalin ordered it.

This is false. The Gorbachev-era fabricators had all the Soviet archives at their disposal, but they cite no evidence to prove these claims. Now, of course, we know why: they were lying. We know there was a full-scale investigation in the case of Tukhachevsky and of the other military men arrested and put on trial with him. Transcripts of many interrogations involving Tukhachevsky and the other military men have been declassified. Even more such documents certainly exist in various archives. There was a trial, of which we now have the full transcript. If the rest of Tukhachevsky's family were arrested by Stalin's order alone neither the Soviet nor the Russian government has released the evidence to show that.

The readers were then told the following:

People continue to ask questions: how could it happen that during the period of the threat of fascist aggression our best military personnel were destroyed?

We remind the reader how at the XXII Congress of the CPSU N.S. Khrushchev said that the leadership of Nazi Germany, through its intelligence service, planted Stalin's fabricated documents – "evidence" of the conspiracy led by Marshal Tukhachevsky and other prominent military leaders, as well as their cooperation with the Wehrmacht. The highets representatives of Nazi Germany participated in the preparation of the dossier with the "genuine" documents. Hitler and Heydrich, knowing the cruelty of Stalin, his suspiciousness and suspicion, believed that they had the opportunity to decapitate the Red Army. Their calculation was simple: if Stalin suspects senior officers of the conspiracy, then he must look for evidence of their betrayal. And if this evidence does not exist, then it must be created.

This "evidence" – supposedly secret documents – came to the President of Czechoslovakia Beneš, and he, apparently guided by good wishes, sent them to Stalin.

There's more to the preface, but we will pause to examine the passage above. It is a study in deliberate misdirection. The deception starts with the first sentence, which assumes two things that ought, on the contrary, to be proven or at least argued. What evidence do we have that these military leaders were "the best"? Moreover, whether they were "the best" or not, what about the charge that they were in treasonable collaboration with the Germans and Japanese? These charges are simply not considered, as though no consideration were necessary. The next paragraph begins with an outright lie. Khrushchev did not "declare" that the Germans had forged documents and passed them to Stalin. Here are Khrushchev's actual words at the XXII Party Congress:

Somehow, a rather curious message flashed in the foreign press, as though Hitler, preparing an attack on our country, created a fabricated document through his intelligence that comrades Yakir, Tukhachevsky, and others were agents of the German General Staff. This "document", supposedly a secret one, came to the President of Czechoslovakia Beneš, and he, in turn, guided, apparently, with good intentions, sent it to Stalin. Yakir, Tukhachevsky, and other comrades were arrested, and after that destroyed." (Emphasis added, GF)

The 1988 Soviet preface to the Pfaff series states that Khrushchev asserts the German forgery plot was a fact. But in reality Khrushchev did nothing of the kind. Instead he carefully qualified his statement, referring to accounts of this forgery story in the foreign press that had made these claims.

That the journal editors made this false statement deliberately is obvious from the fact that their words in 1988 closely followed Khrushchev's wording in his 1961 speech. We reproduce the Russian originals here and italicise the words that were repeated by the Soviet journal in 1988 from Khrushchev's 1961 speech.

Khrushchev, 1961:

Этот “документ”, якобы секретный, попал к президенту Чехословакии Бенешу, и тот, в свою очередь, руководствуясь, видимо, добрыми намерениями, переслал его Сталину.

Voenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal editors, 1988:

Эти «доказамельства» – якобы секретные документы – попали к президенту Чехословакии Бенешу, и мом, руководсмвуясь, видимо, добрыми пожеланиями, переслал их Сталину.

The fact that the 1988 editors had Khrushchev's Spech in front of them proves that they deliberately lied about what Khrushchev had said. There can be no doubt that they intended to deceive their readers, for few persons, if indeed anyone, would trouble to find the bulky transcript of the XXII Party Congress in a library and compare the two.

Their purpose in deceiving their readers in this way is clear. Pfaff's article sets forth the "German SD forgery plot" theory as fact. In reality, not only did no such German forgery plot ever exist, but this fact was known to Party leaders in Khrushchev's day.

We will argue that the ideological purpose of the Pfaff series as reprinted in the Soviet journal was to provide a convincing story for Soviet readers, while accounting for the document which was Pfaff's premier discovery – The Mastný–Beneš note of 9 February 1937. That was important because the Mastný–Beneš note provides good evidence to support the theory – official in Stalin's day but hotly denied since Khrushchev – that Tukhachevsky and other military leaders really were in collusion with the top Nazi leadership, including Hitler. The only way to try to explain Mastný–Beneš note away was through the assertion that the information it contains was false, planted on the Czechs as a part of the "German SD forgery plot".

The Shvernik Commission

After the XXII Party Congress Khrushchev set up a commission charged with investigating the Moscow Trials and the "Tukhachevsky Affair" of the 1930s. We have examined evidence from the "Shvernik" Commission in The Murder of Sergei Kirov. Here Vladimir L. Bobrov takes a look at what it says about the "German forgery story."

But less than three years after the XXII Congress, the "Khrushchev version" was sharply criticised by the Rehabilitation Commission under the Central Committee of the CPSU. The top secret "Information", sent to the First Secretary shortly before his removal from office in October 1964, stated that the story of Nazi "fakes" was untrue and that, aside from the "literary works of the Nazis themselves, there was no other evidence regarding this operation of Hitler's intelligence."

The version of Heydrich's fabrication of documents against Tukhachevsky as presented in the publications of former Hitler agents (Höttl, Schellenberg, and others) does not find confirmation on the basis of archival or other documentary sources. First of all, the most important evidence has not yet been found – the "documents" themselves. All attempts to find these "documents" in the archives of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the archives of the Soviet Army, the OGPU-NKVD, as well as in the judicial investigations of Tukhachevsky and other Soviet military leaders did not lead to anything. There is no evidence that these "documents" were presented to the group members during the investigation. These "documents" did not appear in court. Nobody even mentioned these "documents" during the investigation or at the hearing. No convincing indirect evidence came to light, to some extent reflecting the real existence of these "documents."

... At the various operational-service and party meetings and meetings in the NKVD of the USSR that followed Tukhachevsky's conviction, no one ever mentioned any German "documents" that supposedly formed the basis for evidence of the betrayal of Soviet military leaders.

... In the West to this day, not a single attempt has been made to publish a detailed description of these "documents", according to some versions, Hitler's intelligence handed over to the Soviet representatives only photocopies, not the original documents. It would seem that the originals of the fakes should have remained in the archives of the SD or other German archives. However, there are no indications in the published sources that the German archives contained any documentary data about this operation that was allegedly carried out by Heydrich. There is no such data in the German archives captured during the war by the Soviet services. Finally, it should be emphasised that the authors of various published books are far from united in the list of documents allegedly fabricated by the Germans. On the contrary, their options are very different from each other.

The section of the "report" cited contrasts with all the rest of its content. There was no room for either crude anti-Stalinist rhetoric or charges of the OPGU-NKVD deliberately fabricating evidence against an executed marshal. Evidently the criticism of the Commission on the rehabilitation of baseless assertions at the XXII Congress of the CPSU carried clear signs of political struggle within the Soviet leadership: three of the six signatories of the "Inquiry" on the "Tukhachevsky case" – Shelepin, Mironov, and Semichastny – became the main organisers of the October conspiracy against Khrushchev in 1964. Since one part of the "Report" was written in line with the Khrushchev-era rehabilitation, while the other contained criticism of Khrushchev's statements, this, of course, does not give us the right to classify this document as an objective source. On the contrary, instead of one untenable version – the story of "SD fabrication" – another, equally dubious, was put forward. Nevertheless, the publication of the "Spravka" even in this form could have already in the 1960s put an end to the dissemination of fabrications about the role of "fake SD" in the "case" of Tukhachevsky and other high-ranking military personnel. But it happened differently: the explanations of the rehabilitation Commission did not receive any publicity until the declassification and publication of the "Spravka" in the 1990s.

So Party leaders had known at least since Khrushchev's day that the "German forgery plot" story was a fraud. In fact, of course, they knew much more than this. They knew – or they could have known but, perhaps, did not want to know – that Tukhachevsky & Co. were guilty as charged.

They knew, or could have known, the truth because they had access to the original investigative materials and the trial transcript of Tukhachevsky and the rest. But, like Khrushchev, the top CPSU Party leaders decided to go along with Khrushchev's falsehoods about Stalin, including the Tukhachevsky Affair.

Iulia Kantor, author of two recent books on Tukhachevsky, a person who claims to have had privileged access to Tukhachevsky investigative materials, consistently takes the position of the Shvernik Commission: that there is no evidence of any "German forgeries" and probably never was any such forgery.

On the basis of archival materials, the course of the "Military affair," its forerunners and consequences, is analysed in detail ... In the German archives there are no materials confirming the existence of such a dossier. In addition, in secondary German sources (in particular, V. Schellenberg's memoirs), the transmission time is indicated as spring 1937, whilel some significant persons involved in the process – Putna, Primakov, and others were arrested much earlier). In the case file there are no signs of a "German trace", nor is there any general argumentative evidence base.

But Kantor omits any mention of the Mastný–Beneš note, though Pfaff's article announcing its discovery was published more than 20 years before Kantor's book! The most obvious reason for Kantor's striking omission is that, absent any German forgery plot, there is no way to account for what Trauttmansdorff told Mastný except by conceding that the military conspiracy had been real and that Tukhachevsky & Co. were guilty.

In another chapter of this work we analyse the "Arao Telegramme", a document attesting to Tukhachevsky's illicit contacts with the Japanese, and to examine th eattmept by the Shvernik Report compilers to explain it away. But the "Arao Telegramme" had been found by Shvernik Report researchers in a Soviet archive. A hypothesis that it had been fabricated to "frame" Tukhachevsky could always be concocted and, once mentioned, assumed to have been proven.

But the Mastný–Beneš note is not subject to any easy dismissal. In fact there is no way to account for it, even hypothetically, within what we call the reigning "Anti-Stalin Paradigm." Any honest, objective, and competent investigator who was sincerely trying to solve this mystery would never simply ignore a vital peice of evidence like this.

Instead, an honest investigator would question her hypothesis of the crime and look for alternative, even contradictory, explanations. Kantor does not do this. Rather she simply omits any mention of the Mastný–Beneš note. This marks her as a politically-motivated ideologue rather than a historian.

Omissions

A minor but suggestive omission from the Russian version of the Pfaff article is that of two sentences – seven lines – from the top of page 103 of Pfaff's original German language article. In these lines Pfaff declares that there is no way Beneš could have informed the Soviets immediately upon learning, in February 1937, that Hitler was expecting a military coup in the USSR. But this was what Khrushchev had suggested in 1961, and what, in their dishonest summary of his remarks, the Soviet editors had claimed in 1988. Perhaps the editors felt that would confuse the falsification they were attempting to put over on their Soviet readership.

The main omissions are even more significant. Two false documents – documents that Pfaff either believed to be genuine or wanted his readers to think were genuine – are omitted from the Soviet translation. They are

1. A false Politburo decision of 24 May 1937 (Pfaff No. 3, pp. 122-125);
2. A false Politburo decision of 10 December 1937 (Pfaff No. 7, pp. 130).

One document reprinted by Pfaff and included in the Soviet version purports to be a letter from German Minister Franz von Papen to Hitler in which both of the documents above are mentioned. We do not know whether this document too is false, or whether the false documents date from the 1930s and had actually been sent by Papen to Hitler. False Soviet documents, the "Informazioni Stojko", had been purchased by the Germans and taken seriously earlier in the 1930s. In either case the attentive Soviet reader would be puzzled by its inclusion, for he would have no way of knowing what the two documents were. Perhaps the Soviet editors hoped their readers would not notice.

That these Politburo documents are fakes has been established by other scholars. They may have been fraudulent documents pawned off on the Germans by some clever forger. If so, that would explain von Papen's letter to Hitler. Or, they may not exist at all. Michal Reiman and Ingmar Sütterlin could not find them in the archive where Pfaff said they were to be found. Pfaff fabricated them out of whole cloth.

A third document published by Pfaff (No. 10, pp. 132-134) was also omitted. We don't know why, but a good guess might be that this letter makes those in France who believed war was inevitable and a military treaty with the USSR desirable, appear both virtuous (on the right side) and prophetic. This included the communists as well as certain bourgeois politicians, notably Paul Reynaud. It does not attribute France's failure to make such a treaty with the USSR to the Tukhachevsky Affair, putative Soviet military weakness, or anything that would tend to support the argument that the Stalin government had done anything wrong.

Quite the contrary! That is, the document tends to vindicate the Stalin government's position. After all, the French communists were unlikely to take any position that was not approved by the Soviets – that is, by "Stalin." Therefore, to suggest that the French communists were correct would be to suggest that Stalin was correct too. The Gorbachev-era Soviet editors would not have wanted to do this.

As Igor Lukes and others have shown, Pfaff's version of the "German forgery" story is based on phony documents and is therefore incorrect. Lukes himself offered yet another version of the forgery story. But as we have seen there was, and is, no set of documents forged by the Germans or anyone else, and Soviet authorities have known this at least since the Shvernik Commission report in 1964. We are led to the conclusion that the reprinting of Pfaff's article was an attempt to deceive Soviet readers – to give new life to the story that Tukhachevsky and the others convicted with him, and by extension all the defendants at the Moscow Trials, were innocent of conspiracy to overthrow the Stalin government and of collaborating with the Germans against their own country.

But the Mastný–Beneš note of 9 February 1937 is genuine. We have obtained a photocopy of the Czech original from the archives in the National Museum in Prague, and reproduce the first at the end of this chapter, together with an English translation of the entire document.

A brief summary of the context that produced this document is necessary here. Here is Igor Lukes' account:

... As he [Mastný] returned to Berlin on 8 January 1937, the diplomat had reason to feel satisfied. He had assumed his post determined to improve Czechoslovakia's relations with Germany, and at last, after long years of tension and propaganda wars, he seemed to be near the end of the tunnel. Three days after Mastný had returned from Prague, zu Trauttmansdorff sent Haushofer [an advisor to von Ribbentrop, Hitler's Foreign Minister] a report on his last solo trip and also a draft of the proposed treaty, which he had apparently received from Beneš. Haushofer passed the text to Hitler on 14 January 1937. The Fuehrer, however, told the two German negotiators to drop the whole project. It never be resurrected.

President Beneš did not want to appear too eager, but soon the silence from Berlin became defeaning. At long last, Mastný was instructed to approach zu Trauttmansdorff and inquire about the status of the talks. Prague demanded an explanation for the unexpected breakdown, and Mastný did his best to get to the bottom of the mystery. He met with zu Trauttmansdorff on 9 February 1937 and then immediately summed up their conversation in a top secret message exclusively for the president. According to Mastný's record, the German aristocrat suggested diplomatically that in the Führer's opinion the time was not right for Berlin and Prague to proceed any further. Then, as if searching for a plausible explanation, zu Trauttmansdorff made a statement that linked the failure of the secret negotiations with the Tukhachevsky affair. Swearing the Czechoslovak minister to secrecy, he told him that:

... the real reason behind the Chancellor's [i.e. Hitler's] hesitation is his assumption, based on certain information which he received from Russia, that in the near future there may be a possibility for an imminent reversal in Moscow, the fall of Stalin and Litvinov and the imposition of a military dictatorship. Should that happen the Chancellor would substantially change his Russian policy; he would be ready to deal simultaneously with both east and west–albeit only by means of bilateral agreements.

... Mastný's reply of 21 March 1937 further underlined Prague's awareness of the allegations regarding a coup d'état in Moscow. He reminded Beneš that:

the Reich Chancellor was said to have accepted the possibility of a sudden reversal in Russia in the near future, of the fall of Stalin and Litvinov, and [the imposition of] a military dictatorship in Moscow. This could result in a fundamental reversal of German policy toward[s] Russia for which, as is well known, there is still much sympathy in the German army even under the present circumstances.

Lukes himself wrote under the influence of the viewpoint, predominant since the Khrushchev era, that the Soviet generals had been framed either by Stalin or by the Germans themselves using forged documents. At the time Lukes did his research there was still no confirmation of the existence of the military conspiracies and German collaboration from the former Soviet archives.

Perhaps this is why Lukes added the words in boldface above: "Then, as if searching for a plausible explanation." Whatever Lukes' reason for adding this clause, however, it was dishonest of him to do so. There is no language in Mastný's note to Beneš that even remotely suggests this meaning.

Lukes took it for granted that what Trauttmansdorff told Mastný was disinformation intended to make the supposed "forged German documents" more believable. As we argued in 1986, the tales of German forgery plots were never credible in the first place. In this case as in so many others anticommunist scholars were misled by Khrushchev and abetted here by dishonest, self-aggrandising memoirs of former Nazis.

Mastný's records of his talks with Trauttmansdorff confirm Hitler's knowledge of a military conspiracy in the USSR. This fact was also reflected, though somewhat darkly, in documents from German Foreign Office documents published as far back as 1974. As these have been studied in detail already we will only allude to them briefly here.

In 1986 we described one of those documents as follows:

In 1974 a newly-discovered document from these files was examined by British historian Frederick L. Carsten. It is a report concerning high-level rumours current in Munich in early 1937, which ended up in the Vienna Bureau of the Austrian Chancellor. Among other matters it deals with relations between the German and Soviet military commanders, about which it makes four points: 1) It claims that the top men in the German General Staff, including Generaloberst Freiherr Werner von Fritsch, Chief of Staff of the German Army (Chef der Heeresleitung), were at that time involved in trying to form an alliance with the Soviet military. 2) It claims that Marshal Tukhachevskii had been present at the German army's autumn manoeuvres in the past year (den vorjährigen deutschen Herbstmanoevern). 3) At that time Tukhachevskii is said to have proposed a toast to the German Army "as the champion (Vorkämpferin) against world Jewry," and to Göring. 4) It claims that the German military was closely following the "power struggle presently taking place in Russia," in hopes that Stalin would be overthrown in favour of a military dictatorship.

At that time we demonstrated that this was entirely consistent with other documents from outside the USSR that had come to light. One of these, also from the German archives, is a letter from German Foreign Minister Constantine von Neurath to Reichsbank head Dr. Hjalmar Schacht. Schacht was the person with whom David Kandelaki, Soviet trade negotiator, had been in contact with. This is a letter to Dr. Hjalmar Schacht (head of the Reichsbank and the person whom Kandelaki had approached concerning the Soviet Government's desire for formal secret talks) from the German Foreign Minister, Baron Constantine von Neurath. In this letter Neurath summarises Hitler's view, with which Neurath also declares his agreement. This is expressed as follows:

As concerning the eventual acceptance of talks with the Russian government, I am, in agreement with the Führer, of the view that they could not lead to any result at this time, would rather be made great use of by the Russians to achieve the goal they seek of a closer military alliance with France and, if possible, to achieve as well a further rapprochement with England. A declaration by the Russian government that it dissociates itself from Comintern agitation, after the experience with these declarations in England and France, would be of no practical use whatever and therefore be unsatisfactory.

Neurath adds a qualification. We put it in boldface here to emphasise its importance for our study.

It would be another thing if matters in Russia should develop in the direction of an absolute despotism propped up by the military. In this event we should not let the opportunity pass us by to involve ourselves in Russia again.

The Neurath-Schacht letter is dated 11 February 1937, while the cover letter to the Austrian BKA document, on BKA stationery, is dated four days later. and the report itself deals with the previous month. Thus the letter proves that the rumour set down in the report does, in fact, reflect the real views of the Nazi hierarchy at precisely the time it claims. The Neurath-Schacht letter strikingly verifies point four of the Austrian BKA report.

Neurath's meaning is clear. By late January 1937 Hitler himself had spoken in Neurath's presence about the possibility that a military dictatorship would soon come to power in the USSR. Hitler took it for granted that such an eventuality would be advantageous to Germany.

Meanwhile, according to rumours that reached the desk of the Chancellor of Austria, the German High Command were trying to form an alliance with the Soviet military hoping Stalin would be overthrown in favour of a military dictatorship. Tukhachevskii had given a strongly pro-Nazi and anti-Semitic toast at German military maneuvres in either 1936 or 1935, one that reflected views he had expressed years before.

Both of these documents, but especially the letter from Neurath to Schacht, strikingly confirm what Trauttmansdorff told Mastný and at almost exactly the same point in time. But the Mastný note says something more. According to Trauttmansdorff, Hitler had learnt about the "imminent" overthrow, "in the near future", of Stalin by the Soviet military from a source within the USSR.

He also made it clear that this would lead to a "reversal in Moscow." He said that Hitler "would substantially change his Russian policy." That could only mean that Hitler expected a "military dictatorship" would be friendlier to Nazi Germany than the current Stalin government. And that is the way the Czechs understood it. As Lukes put it,

For Beneš, the prospect of a military coup d'état in Moscow that would turn Russia into an ally of Nazi Germany was a nightmare. (98)

This is what Tukhachevsky and the other generals confessed to planning. It is also exactly what Bukharin, Rykov, Iagoda, Krestinsky et al., the defendants in the 1938 Moscow Trial, confessed that they were counting on. Now we see that, four months before Tukhachevsky's arrest and trial and over a year before the March 1938 trial Hitler was expecting precisely the same thing to occur "in the near future."

Is all this merely a coincidence? Neither Pfaff nor Lukes thought so. They assumed it was part of a disinformation scheme surrounding the "German forgery plot" documents. But we know there was no such forgery plot.

Some may object that this does not constitute absolute proof that a military conspiracy existed and that the conspirators were in touch with Germany. That is true only in the sense that no such thing as "absolute proof" exists. But it is also the case that the Mastný–Beneš memorandum of 9 February 1937 does constitute:

• important circumstantial evidence for the existence of such a coinspiracy;
• important corroboration of the other evidence we have that such a conspiracy existed.

We contend that this document constitutes the kind of evidence we might reasonably expect to find. We would expect that very few people in Germany would know about such a conspiracy, and that those persons would not speak of it. In this context it is important to note that Trauttmansdorff explicitly denied having told Mastný the contents of this note – which we know he did tell him. As Lukes points out, Trauttmansdorff's denials are simply not credible (101-2). We believe that such denials are to be expected in a case like this. After all, even though Nazi Germany was long gone, Trauttmansdorff was still a German diplomat, and Hitler's state was the predecessor state to the West German government. So, what the head of state had told him in confidence was something that Trauttmansdorff was not prepared to reveal.

We should keep Trauttmansdorff's denial firmly in mind when we consider the similar denials by General Ernst Koestring and General Oskar Ritter von Niedermayer, both of whom were named by Russian defendants. So far as we know there has been no attempt to comb the unpublished papers of the other German political and military figures named by the alleged Soviet conspirators. But Trauttmansdorff's example shows that, even if this kind of search took place, we should expect not to find anything.

Both Pfaff and Lukes attempted to cram the Mastný–Beneš note and the other documents into the Procrustean bed of the "German forgery plot." Each of them tries to reconstruct the details of this "plot" by weaving a thick web of scholarly citations. But there was no such plot, and there never was any serious evidence of one. Why, then, did they believe so firmly that the "forgery plot" story, in one version or another, was truthful?

Possibly they did so for the same reason as, we suspect, Khrushchev and the Soviet Party leadership did – because the alternative was ideologically unacceptable. To concede that the Moscow Trial and Tukhachevsky Affair defendants had really been trying to build an alliance with Nazi Germany would have been utterly incompatible with the Khrushchev – Cold War version of Soviet history during the Stalin years.

It would have meant, for example, that Stalin and the Bolsheviks had saved Europe from Hitler not once – by defeating the Nazis in the war – but twice, by defeating the Opposition and the military conspiracy, all of whom wanted an alliance with Nazi Germany. It would have meant calling not only Khrushchev himself, but all the Khrushchev-inspired historical reconstructions and "rehabilitations" into question. This they are unwilling to do.

On 5 August 1937, Edvard Beneš, President of Czechoslovakia, gave an interview to a Yugoslav journalist in Prague, during which he recounted a version of his "foreknowledge" of the Tukhachevsky Affair. After a short excursus into history Beneš turned to the theme of German-Soviet cooperation, of which, he remarked, there still remained influential proponents in both Germany and the USSR.

Pay attention to what I am telling you: In Russia there are many Germanophiles who are ready to negotiate with Berlin at any moment, just as in Berlin there is a very strong current that is ready to negotiate with Moscow, and thus it could very easily to get to the realisation of the Bismarck covenant. Stalin was not for this agreement, but due to the fact that Russia was not discussing, but ordering, Stalin eliminated those who were in favour of cooperation with Germany and who had already discussed the details of political cooperation with her. If Tukhachevsky had won, he would have definitely eliminated Stalin and Stalin's friends, and thus, today in Europe, Germany and Russia would act together." When the Yugoslav journalist spoke out that all this seemed somehow obscure and rather doubtful to him, Benesh answered with conviction: "I saw the acts and documents, I held in my hands evidence that I am telling you now, but I tell you this is in all seriousness, trying to convince you and show you that I'm not keeping up with Russia not because you think that I'm not a Bolshevik, and that Czechoslovakia is not a Bolshevik country, as they often write and say abroad, but because I have before my eyes a much wider and larger plan."

Beneš repeated substantially the same thing to the U.S. ambassador as well.

The second testimony was recorded by the American envoy Carr, to whom Beneš said in September 1937 that he knew for sure that Tukhachevsky was in contact with Germany; in the summer, they say, in Berlin a plan was prepared for an agreement with the USSR, on the basis that a military dictatorship would have won in Moscow; an agreement with the USSR, Germany would have free hands, which would be a disaster, including for Czechoslovakia.

In his memoirs written some years later Beneš later claimed that he had alerted the Soviets to Trauttmansdorff's warning. This is false. There is no evidence that the Soviet ambassador or any other Soviet official received any explicit information of this kind from Beneš before the arrests, trial, and execution of Tukhachevsky et al.

Beneš understood clearly that by stopping Tukhachevsky Stalin had saved Europe. This fact is a bone in the throat of those who are loyal not to historical truth but to the "Anti-Stalin Paradigm." But all the evidence supports it.

Schacht and Kandelaki named by Yezhov

The letter from Neurath that we cited above was addressed to Hjalmar Schacht, the man with whom David Kandelaki had been negotiating on behalf of the Soviet government. According to a confession of 27 April 1939 by Yezhov published for the first time in early 2006 Kandelaki was a party to the pro-German conspiracy among Soviet oppositionists.

Question: What did Kandelaki say to you concretely about his contacts with Goering?

Answer: At one of his meetings with me, at the end of 1936 or the beginning of 1937, Kandelaki informed me that he had made contact with Goering through Hammerstein.

Goering had directed Kandelaki upon his arrival in the Soviet Union to inform the Soviet government that he, Kandelaki, had succeeded in pressuring the German government in the sense of offering the USSR a loan and that Economic Minister Schacht, under pressure from German business circles, was ready to make several concessions and offer the Soviet Union credit.

Kandelaki said further that Goering had informed Hammerstein about my [Yezhov's] collaboration with German intelligence and asked me to work in concert with the conclusion of a credit agreement between the USSR and Germany.

The letter from Neurath to Schacht is dated 11 February 1937. Only two days earlier, on 9 February, the conversation between Trauttmansdorff and Mastný had taken place in which the former informed the Czech minister that Hitler was awaiting "the possibility of a sudden reversal in Russia in the near future, of the fall of Stalin and Litvinov, and a military dictatorship in Moscow." This was also about the same time – "the end of 1936 or the beginning of 1937" – that Yezhov said Kandelaki had told him he was in touch with Hermann Göring.

Since the 1950s scholars have asserted that there was no confirmation of any "treasonable contact with the Germans" on the part of the executed Soviet generals. The Mastný archives, stemming from talks with a German diplomat, together with the allusions in the documents from the German Foreign Office files cited above, show that such confirmation does in fact exist.

It is an astounding stroke of fortune that such confirmation from the German side, completely independently of Soviet sources, exists at all. We should note that Trauttmansdorff did not give anything in writing to Mastný, and nothing explicit has been found in German archives. Evidently it was on his sole initiative that the German diplomat told Mastný of the military conspiracy. Had he not done so, we would not have this striking evidence of German knowledge of the conspiracy.

If the Mastný document was all that we had, we might conclude that German agents in the USSR had simply learnt of the conspiracy through its intelligence activities. But it is also consistent with the evidence of Soviet oppositional involvement directly with German intelligence, and so confirms it.

The Mastný–Beneš Note

[Translation from Czech]

SECRET.

MINUTES

of a conversation with Count Tr. on 9 February 1937

Today, Count Tr. visited me with news that the pourparlers regarding the agreement were somewhat delayed; that the Reich Chancellor was upset about the case of Šeba's book about Russia and the Little Entente which reveals how strongly Czechoslovakia was engaged with Russia; that this was the reason why the Reich Chancellor wanted to postpone further negotiations with Czechoslovakia for 10-14 days, until the Šeba affair cleared up; that this didn't mean that Hitler had changed his mind but that now was not the appropriate time. I said that I had difficulty understanding that Šeba's book, from which the propaganda fabricated things against us that were not there, could have had such an effect on the Reich Chancellor – after statements were given by our side, by the president himself, about the character of our political agreement with Russia – but that we were left with no other choice but only to duly note the fact. I see, I said, that actually during the period of preliminary talks, when we sincerely stressed our interest in an agreement–settlement with Germany, the situation changed so that we had very clearly indicated good will on our part to solve the economic relations as per German demands, which we answered with our readiness to concessions already during the talks that were underway in Prague and that, according to the reports that I received, were progressing satisfactorily, mainly because the president of the republic himself emphasised that he had a special interest in meeting the German demands as much as possible – assuming of course that the German side would do the same. [I said] that I didn't doubt it, after speaking with Dr. Schacht on 25 January who assured me that he had given similar instructions to the German delegation. [I said] that in this state of promising development of economic relations, and with regards to apparent serious progress in the question of minority policy in our country, I couldn't understand that the campaign against Czechoslovakia not only did not cease, but just yesterday we were newly surprised by an exhibition at a technical school [??] which under the slogan "Kampf der Sudetendeutschen" presented outrageously offensive material against the republic and the head of state; that tomorrow, I would submit a strong protest to the state secretary Diechhofr, and that I was concerned that this exhibition could jeopardise the economic talks in Prague. Finally [I said] that I absolutely didn't understand that, after my extensive discussions with Goebbels, Funke, and Rosenberg, the campaign could still continue, especially during the pourparlers, when one directive from the Reich Chancellor would be sufficient to stop things; that after the Chancellor's own initiative to personally meet with the president of the republic we couldn't have expected such an "accompaniment" to our pourparlers. Count Tr. agreed, with utmost politeness, with my complaints and arguments. Most importantly, with regards to the current delays, he considered the possibility, requesting absolute secrecy, that the real reason behind the Chancellor's hesitation was his assumption that, according to certain reports which he received from Russia, there was a growing probability of a sudden turn of events very soon, the fall of Stalin and Litvinov, and the imposition of a military dictatorship. Should that happen, the Reich Chancellor would supposedly change the entire position towards Russia and would be ready to settle simultaneously with both, the west and the east – although again only by way of bilateral agreements.

I gave Count Tr. an explanation about Russia, how we see it, together with my serious doubts about the imminence of a coup towards a military dictatorship and fall of Stalin – but I said that I didn't know if and what information Prague had in the last few days.

With regards to the campaign against Czechoslovakia, Count Tr. condemns the entire tactic of Goebbels (N.B. - Count Tr. strongly despises Goebbels under whom he served for 2 years at the Ministry of Propaganda/) He thinks that the reason why the campaign still continues is because Goebbels is not well informed about what is going on. And at the same time, the Reich Chancellor himself, leaving the press totally in Goebbels' hands, is not informed about details of such propaganda, especially lately when, as it sometimes happens, he is not accessible and isolates himself. [He said] that anyhow there is no need to give the campaign too much importance; that it could change with the turn of a hand.

With regards to the exhibition at the technical school [??], Count Tr. took care of it briskly. He phoned Dr. Haushofer right from my room and promised that together with him he would make sure that everything that was inaccurate and offensive would be removed from the exhibition, [and] eventually that the exhibition would be closed. However, I didn't agree to his request for not submitting my protest. Leaving after a two-hour talk, Count Tr. assured me that the Reich Chancellor had not reversed his view on the need for an agreement, and that this was just a short delay.

Dr. V. Mastný m.p. [manu propia]

In Berlin, 9 February 1937

Addendum: Count Tr. informed me on the morning of 10 February that he had personally arranged for removal of the offensive exhibits and that he did so after an approval and at the direct order of the Reich Chancellor, and that he hoped that in a few days the exhibition would be closed. That happened the same week.

I submitted my protest to the foreign office on 10 February, at time when, de facto, the most inaccurate exhibits had been already removed.

ADDENDUM

Certified translation of the Mastný–Beneš report by Suzanna Halsey, Czech and Slovak Language Services, Brooklyn, NY June 2008

First page of the Mastný–Beneš report of 9 February 1937

Chapter 14. The Judges Judged

At the 11 June 1937 trial of Tukhachevsky and the other commanders, the President (presiding officer) was Colonel-General of Justice Vasilii Vasil'evich Ul'rikh. The judges were: Komandarm 2nd rank Yakov Ivanovich Alksnis, Marshal of the Soviet Union Vasilii Konstantinovich Blyukher, Marshal Semion Mikhailovich Budyonny, Komandarm 1st rank Boris Mikilovich Shaposhnikov, Komandarm 1st rank Ivan Panfilovich Belov, Komandarm 2nd rank Pavel Efimovich Dybenko, Komandarm 2nd rank Nikolai Dmitrievich Kashirin, and Komkor Elisei Ivanovich Goryachev.

Five of these judges – Alksnis, Belov, Blyukher, Dybenko, and Kashirin – were to be arrested and charged with participating in the military conspiracy. Blyukher died in detention of a heart attack while under investigation. Alksnis, Belov, Dybenko, and Kashirin were tried, convicted, and executed, all during 1938.

"Rehabilitations"

Khrushchev-era rehabilitation reports on some of these men have been published. These reports are dishonest. None of them contain any evidence that the accused were innocent. Tukhachevsky and the other seven commanders whose trial we investigate here were also "rehabilitated" without any evidence.

Mark Junge, a strongly anti-Stalin scholar, has described post-Stalin Soviet "rehabilitations" in this way:

Mit der vorliegenden Arbeit wurde das Ergebnis der Studie des Utrechter Historikers van Goudoever bestätigt, daß Rehabilitierungen in der Sowjetunion grundsätzlich ein politisches und nicht juristisches oder gar ethisch-moralisches Phänomen darstellen. The present work confirms the result of the study by the Utrecht historian van Goudoever that rehabilitations in the Soviet Union were fundamentally a political and not a legal or even ethnical-moral phenomenon.

It is vital to understand that "rehabilitation" was determined by politics, not by evidence ("legal") criteria. The fact that someone has been "rehabilitated" whether during Khrushchev's time or later, is not evidence that that person was innocent. But certainly, one of the central purposes of the "rehabilitation" process was to convey the false impression that the individual "rehabilitated" had been proven innocent.

In 2011 I devoted Chapter 11 of my book Khrushchev Lied to an examination of the fraudulent "rehabilitations" of some of the men who Khrushchev claimed Stalin had falsely executed. In a separate study, Vladimir Bobrov and I have demonstrated that in 1988 the Soviet Supreme Court falsified an important document in order to justify the rehabilitation of Nikolai Bukharin. That document is the April 1939 confession statement by Mikhail Frinovsky. It was published only in 2006. In 1988, no one could consult it to see that the Soviet Supreme Court had quoted it dishonestly. And just to make sure no one did, Bukharin's "rehabilitation" document is still secret to this day in Russia.

Erenburg on Belov (and Meyerhold)

The famous Soviet writer Il'ya Erenburg was on good terms with Stalin during the latter's lifetime. But Erenburg completely accepted Nikita Khrushchev's accusations against Stalin. This is reflected in his voluminous memoirs.

In them Erenburg records the following incident concerning Belov.

I remember a terrible day at Meyerhold's. We were sitting peacefully looking through an illustrated monograph on Renoir, when a friend of Meyerhold, the Corps Commander I. P. Belov, arrived. He was very worked up and, without paying any attention to our presence, began to describe the trial of Tukhachevsky and other high ranking officers. Belov was a member of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court. 'They were sitting like that – facing us. Uborevich looked me in the eyes...' I remember another phrase of Belov's: 'And tomorrow I'll be put in the same place.'

Erenburg mistakenly interpreted this remark to mean that Tukhachevsky et al. had been innocent and that Belov was too. By the time Erenburg wrote all the Tukhachevsky defendants, plus Belov and the other judges had been "rehabilitated" – declared to be innocent.

It may also shed some light on the subsequent arrest, trial, and execution of Vsevolog Meyerhold, a famous producer of plays for the stage. Meyerhold was arrested on 26 June 1939, long after Lavrentii Beria had taken over as commissar of the NKVD from Yezhov, and after the arrests of Yezhov and many of his henchmen. Meyerhold was arrested at the time Yezhov's men were being rounded up, and was tried and executed together with them, in February, 1940. Meyerhold was named in confessions by Mikhail Kol'tsov and Isaak Babel', among others. He has been "rehabilitated" – but again, this is not evidence that he was innocent. It may be significant that Belov was a friend of his.

Belov was arrested on 7 January 1938. He confessed immediately, at the preliminary investigation.

Belov pleaded guilty at the preliminary investigation. At the same time, he confessed that he had personally recruited more than 20 people into the counterrevolutionary organisation.

According to his "rehabilitation" report, Belov submitted evidence against other conspirators, but this was hidden from the authorities by Yezhov, who is here called "the enemy of the people".

... The trial record states that Belov also pleaded guilty at the trial, but submitted a written request that he had additional evidence that he would like to give in the presence of J.V. Stalin. This petition from the court was withdrawn by the enemy of the people Yezhov and hidden from the Central Committee of the CPSU. (RKEB 1, 253)

This is interesting in that Yezhov, not Stalin, is specifically blamed. That must be due to the early date of this "rehabilitation" report, 20 August 1955.

On 1 February 1956, in a meeting of the Presidium called to discuss criticism of the "cult of personality" around Stalin planned for the forthcoming XX Party Congress, Khrushchev called Yezhov an "honest person" and said that "Stalin is guilty." (RKEB 1, 308) After that, accusations against Yezhov – who was, indeed, the real culprit – became hard to find. Even today, the Anti-Stalin Paradigm dictates that Yezhov must be called "Stalin's faithful executioner," "Stalin's child," or otherwise treated as though he simply did what Stalin told him. This is completely false, as we can prove today.

Yezhov was not "rehabilitated." But neither were many of the other NKVD men who were tried and punished, often by execution, for the Yezhovshchina. Even Khrushchev, despite calling Yezhov "honest," evidently did not want to go that far.

Blyukher was declared innocent on 9 February 1956 (RKEB 1, 333), but strong evidence of his guilt has been published since then. Dybenko was declared innocent in the Spravka of the Shvernik Commission (RKEB 2, 771). Kashirin was accused by Primakov in a confession statement of 10 June 1937 and arrested on 19 August 1937. He too was declared innocent in the Spravka (RKEB 2, 689; 741). That is, in the cases of Dybenko, Blyukher, and Kashirin, it appears that there was not even a pro forma procedure for a phony study of their cases and predetermined finding of their "innocence."

The Judges Confess

The following are excerpts from the confessions of some of the judges at the Tukhachevsky trial, taken from their investigative files at the FSB Archive in Moscow by Vladimir L. Bobrov.

From the confessions of KASHIRIN Nikolai Dmitrievich

of 9-11 November 1937

LD 211-212

In May 1937, I was again in Moscow. I was summoned to the plenum of the Military Soviet, which also took place under the Central Committee. At this time, the entire centre of the military conspiracy - TUKHACHEVSKY and others were arrested, and GAMARNIK shot himself.

It was with horror and trepidation that I familiarised myself with the testimonies of those arrested, fearing that they had named me. However, this did not happen. But even then a terrible fear attacked me for the heinous treacherous deed we had committed ...

At the trial, although I was a member of the court, I felt like a defendant ...

I was afraid that in their speeches TUKHACHEVSKY, YAKIR, UBOREVICH, PRIMAKOV and FEL'DMAN would name me and accuse me. However, this did not happen - they did not name me.

I understood this behaviour at the trial of the leaders of the conspiracy and the suicide of GAMARNIK as a signal for further anti-Soviet struggle for all participants in the conspiracy and for me.

LD 215

... As you know, I was a member of the Extraordinary Session of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court in the case of TUKHACHEVSKY, YAKIR and other conspirators. In the course of the trial, I not only found out that the conspirators - TUKHACHEVSKY, YAKIR, UBOREVICH, FELDMAN and PRIMAKOV, with whom I was involved in the conspiracy, did not betray me, but from their behaviour during the investigation and at trial I realised that we must continue to fight against Soviet power, in no case should we betray our accomplices and their plans.

From the confessions of KASHIRIN Nikolai Dmitrievich

of 29 November 1937

... I was appointed one of the judges in the case of TUKHACHEVSKY and others, but I must say that from this fact I did not have any illusions for myself - at the trial I felt more like a defendant than a judge. It all seemed to me during the trial that TUKHACHEVSKY, YAKIR, UBOREVICH, PRIMAKOV and FELDMAN, with whom I was directly involved in the conspiracy, were about to name me as their accomplice. But that didn't happen.

This behaviour at the trial of the arrested leaders of the conspiracy, like the suicide of GAMARNIK, I understood as a signal for further conspiratorial work.

From the transcript of the interrogation of BELOV Ivan Panfilovich

of 18 January 1936

LD 112, 114

I must say frankly that after the liquidation of the leadership of the anti-Soviet conspiracy at the beginning of 1937, I had a mixed feeling - fear for my hate, fears that they would get to me, - fear that they would crush the large number of our cadres, the lower ranks of the organisation - and then, at the same time, the well-known Schadenfreude about the elimination of their rival enemies from among the leaders.

From the case file of V.K. Blyukher From the transcript of the interrogation of KHAKHAN'IAN Grigorii Davydovich

of 25 October 1938

LD 101

... I learnt that BLYUKHER was a member of a military conspiratorial organisation from GAMARNIK in 1936.

LD 109-110

QUESTION: - In June 1937 BLYUKHER was in Moscow, did you also come with him?

ANSWER: - Yes, in June 1937 I came to Moscow together with BLYUKHER to the plenum of the Military Council. I'll tell you about this now. From the words of BLYUKHER, I know that he was connected from the centre of the military conspiratorial organisation with GAMARNIK, TUKHACHEVSKY, YAKIR, and EGOROV.

QUESTION: - How do you know this?

ANSWER: - BLYUKHER himself told me about this.

QUESTION: - He also named Egorov?

ANSWER: - Yes.

From the transcript of an interrogation of BLYUKHER Paul Konstantinovich

of 28 October 1938

LD 159-160

In May 1937, my brother was summoned to Moscow, where he took part in the trial as a member of the trial over the participants in the anti-Soviet military conspiracy TUKHACHEVSKY, YAKIR, UBOREVICH, FELDMAN, and others.

After the trial, he was pleased that none of them named him - he was afraid of that.

He himself was personally somewhat pleased with the outcome of the trial. He believed that in the absence of competition from TUKHACHEVSKY, YAKIR, and UBOREVICH, after a possible coup, he - BLYUKHER - would certainly advance to the front ranks.

From the confessions of Yegorov Aleksandr Il'ich

28 March - 8 April 1938

LD 317-318

... I repeat, Budyonny basically knew everything and, for the sake of disguise and double-dealing, behaved the same way as we do.

He played this role easily and only once did I see him extremely confused and depressed. This was after his participation in the trial of Tukhachevsky. I remember that I had to reassure Budyonny when after the trial we gathered at his dacha to discuss our tactics in connection with the failure of the conspiracy.

QUESTION: - Tell us about it.

ANSWER: - Even before the arrest of TUKHACHEVSKY, when the arrests of the military began, I, having met with TUKHACHEVSKY, asked him, what should we do? He replied: "What to do, we must continue to act, but carefully." I told him - look, Mikhail Nikolaevich, if that - mind you, don't betray each other.

TUKHACHEVSKY flushed all over and replied: "Alexander Ilyich, you and I are officers and we know what honour is."

After a while, he was arrested. DYBENKO was in Moscow and together with Budyonny was a member of the court. Immediately after the trial, we gathered at Budyonny's dacha to discuss our taks after the disclosure of the conspiracy and exchange impressions of the trial.

QUESTION: - Tell us in detail about this meeting of yours.

ANSWER: - BUDYONNY with great excitement told us how he looked into Tukhachevsky's eyes, literally drilled him, fearing that he would give us away.

We don't know why Budyonny was not arrested, tried, and executed. Personal friendship with Stalin is unlikely to be the explanation since Yegorov was also a friend of Stalin's from the Civil War days, and Stalin held him in high regard. It is possible that Budyonny took advantage of Voroshilov's Order No. 082 and informed on the conspiracy.

The Tukhachevsky Defendants Were Lying to the End

From their last words in the trial transcript we can see that every one of the Tukhachevsky defendants claimed that they were no longer conspirators, no longer enemies, but had returned to being loyal Soviet citizens.

In his letter to Stalin Yona Yakir swore that he was now reformed:

Dear, close comrade Stalin. I dare address you in this manner because I have said everything, given everything up, and it seems to me that I am a noble warrior, devoted to the Party, the state and the people, as I was for many years ... I have admitted by guilt, I have fully repented ... I appeal to you and to the government and beg you, beg you to believe in the possibility of my correction, to believe that I can still be of use to the state, to which I dedicate my whole being.

In his last words at trial Yakir stated:

... I have nothing to hide from my people, from my court. That I have returned in the last minute of my life completely, without any restrictions, to my people, to my party, to the Soviet power, to what I have lived for throughout the vast part of my conscious life.

Tukhachevsky:

I want to assure the court that I have completely broken with everything vile and counterrevolutionary, and with the vile, counterrevolutionary work that I entered ... I ask the Court to believe me that I have completely revealed everything and that I have no secrets before the Soviet government, no secrets before the party ... I want to assure the court that I have completely broken with everything vile and counterrevolutionary ... I completely repented.

Uborevich:

I beg the party, the Soviet people, and the army forgiveness for my last and greatest crimes.

Kork:

I ask you to believe me now, that I sincerely have repented. I have honestly confessed to the investigation ... why it would be absurd, it would be crazy for me to hide something for you, citizen judges ...

Putna:

... now, in a very short time, in my own internal feelings, I have returned to my former self ... there remain still some pockets that have not completely died, that have given me the physical and moral strength to tell the investigation and the court everything that I know about this criminal activity ...

Primakov:

In my last words, citizen judges, I must tell the final truth about our conspiracy ...

Feldman:

... finally, put on the scales that I have nothing left hidden in my breast. I have scrapped everything from my scraper, I have been sincere, I have repented, I did not wait for confessions or face-to-face confrontations, but gave everything that there was to the court and the investigation.

From the documents we now have, we can't be certain that all of the defendants knew about the participation of Alksnis, Blyukher, Budyonny, Belov, Dybenko, and Kashirin in the conspiracy. Tukhachevsky surely knew. Since the release at least some of the investigative files on the judges, we know that Blyukher, Budyonny, and Kashirin feared being exposed by the defendants at trial. Kashirin interpreted the fact that Tukhachevsky and the rest did not expose him as a signal to continue the conspiracy.

But it is probable that all the defendants knew that six of their judges were their co-conspirators. So Tukhachevsky, at least, was lying when he claimed that he had "completely revealed everything." Probably all of them knew about the participation of their judges in the conspiracy, and were all lying.

That was probably what Stalin thought. He had been through this before. What follows is an excerpt from the transcript of the December 1936 Central Committee Plenum, at which Nikolai Bukharin was accused of being a part of an opposition conspiracy. Bukharin hotly denied this accusation, and pleaded with the Plenum to believe him. Stalin explained why they could not simply "believe" accused oppositionists' oaths of loyalty any longer.

Stalin. I want to say a few words about the fact that Bukharin has completely failed to understand what is going on here. He has not understood. And he does not understand the kind of position he find himself in, and why we have put him as a question at this plenum. He does not understand this at all. He keeps talking about his sincerity, he demands our trust. All right, let's talk about sincerity and about trust.

When Kamenev and Zinoviev declared in 1932 that they had renounced their mistakes and declare that the Party's position was correct, we believed them. We believed them because we supposed that a communist – former or current – is accustomed to ideological struggle, that this ideological communist, former or current, is struggling for his idea. If a person has openly said that he adheres to the Party's line then, according to traditions confirmed in the Party of Lenin and known to everyone, the Party considers that this means that person values the Party's positions and that he has really renounced his mistakes and now stands on the Party's positions.

We believed them and we were mistaken. We were mistaken, com. Bukharin. Yes, yes, they declared this openly in the press and we believed them. They had also proceeded from their position, their ideas, they do not hide them, they fight for them. We believed them; we gave them the Order of Lenin, we promoted them – and we were mistaken. Is that true, com. Bukharin? (Bukharin. True, true, I said the same thing.)

When Sosnovsky made a declaration that he was renouncing his mistakes, he explained the reasons for thus, and explained well from a Marxist point of view, we believed him and really did say to Bukharin: "You want to take him on at Izvestiia, good, he writes well, take him, we shall see what comes of it." We were mistaken.

Believe in the sincerity of people after that! We have drawn a conclusion: Do not take former oppositionists at their word. (Excitement in the hall. Voices from the floor: Right, Right!) We must not be naïve, and Il'ich taught that to be naïve in politics is to commit a crime. We don't want to be criminals. For this reason we have drawn a conclusion: Don't believe the word of a single former oppositionist.

A few facts. When we arrested Piatakov's wife we wrote him a telegramme, he was somewhere in the South, maybe Kislovodsk. From there he briefly replied that he can't find any arguments against his wife but since we in Moscow considered it necessary to arrest her, that means it's necessary. He arrived. We gave him all the confessions to read. He said that Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Mrachkovsky were slandering him in their confessions. That's what others also said, when they had just been arrested or taken to trial. He came to us and said: "Well, what can I say against these people, how can I justify myself? They are lying, they want to ruin me".

We tried to talk to him: "All right, but you were the public prosecutor against the SRs. Agree to be the public prosecutor against them". – "Good, with pleasure." He started to prepare for this. But we thought about it further and decied that that would not be good. Still, this attempt started to convince us for a minute that maybe this man is right. What would it look like to put him up as the public prosecutor? He would say one thing, and then the accused would object, they would say: "Look where you are, the prosecutor. And you were working with us?!" And what woul result from all this? It would turn the trial into comedy and ruin the trial.

Therefore we said to Piatakov: "No, even though it was we who suggested that you be the public prosecutor, this won't work." He became sad: "Then how can I prove that I am right? Let me shoot with my own hand all those who you sentence to death, all this filth, all these swine. What other proof do you need? Publish in the press both after the sentence and after the sentence has been carried out that it was com. Piatakov who carried out the sentence."

This also made us hesitate somewhat. But on the other hand we have never made public who carries out the sentences. And we decided that if we did that, no one would bbelieve that we had not forced him to do it. We said that that won't work either, it's awkward, no one would believe that you had volunteered to do this, that you were not forced. And on top of that we have never released the names of those who carry out the sentences. "Then what am I to do? Give me a solution. Let me write an article against the Trotskyites." "Good, write it." He wrote an article, he really smashed Trotsky and the Trotskyites.

But as for how things have turned out, you can see yourself! After that we questioned about 50 people, at least. They really turned Piatakov inside out. It turns out thaat he's a monster of a person!

So why did he agree to be the public prosecutor? Why did he agree to shoot the comrades himself? It turns out that they have a rule like this: If your fellow Trotskyist is arrested and has begun to give up the names of others, he must be destroyed. You can see what kind of hellish joke this comes to. Believe after this in the sincerity of former oppositionists! We can't take former oppositionists at their word even when they volunteer to shoot their friends with their own hands.

Radek, until most recently, until yesterday, was writing me letters. We held back his arrest, although there were as many denunciations of him as you want, and from different sides. Everybody, from above, from below, is denouncing Radek. We held back his arrest, and then we arrested him. Yesterday and the day before yesterday I received long letters from him in which he writes: A terrible crime is being committed. They want to bring him down, him, a sincere person, devoted to the party, one who loves the party, who loves the CC, and so on and so forth. This is wrong. You can shoot me or not, that's your affair. But he did not want his honour to be shamed.

And what did he confess today? That, com. Bukharin is what hass happened. (Bukharin. But I have nothing to confess, not today, not tomorrow, not the day after tomorrow. Noise in the hall.) I am not saying anything about you personally. Maybe you're right, maybe not. But you just can't stand up and say that we don't trust you, we don't believe in my, Bukharin's, sincerity. That's old stuff now. And the events of the last two years had obviously proven this to us, because what has been proven in fact, that sincerity is a relative thing. And as for trusting in former oppositionists, we have shown them so much trust... (Noise in the hall. Voices from the floor. That's right!) We should be flogged for that maximum trust, that boundless trust that we showed to them.

There is your sincerity and there is your trust! That is why we have put this question before the plenum of the CC. But because Bukharin might take offence and get upset, we are supposed to cover this up? No, in order not to cover it up we must put this question to the plenum.

... And you, com. Bukharin, want us to believe you at your word? (Bukharin. No, I don't want that.) Never, by no means. (Bukharin. No, I don't want that).

But if you don't want that, then do not be upset that we have put this question to the plenum of the CC. It's possible that you are right, this is difficult for you, but after all these facts that I've told you about, and there are a great many of them, we have to look carefully into things. We have to look carefully, objectively, quietly. We do not want anything except the truth, we do not want, we will not permit anyone to be ruined by anybody. We want to seek out and find the whole truth objectively, honestly, with courage.

Bukharin continued to insist upon his innocence. And evidently, despite his own words, Stalin continued to believe him, at least in part. At the next Central Committee Plenum of February-March 1937, a subcommittee was formed to consider what to do with Bukharin and Aleksei Rykov, against whom there were by that time dozens of accusations by their associates in the opposition conspiracy. Stalin was a member of this subcommittee. The document recorded the votes of this subcommittee has survived and his reproduced in Getty and Naumov, pages 415-416. Here is how Getty summarises what this document shows:

In the initial polling of thirty-six members of the commission, six spoke for executing Bukharin and Rykov. Eight, including the partilarly vituperative Postyshev and Shkiriatov, were for arresting and trying Bukharin and Rykov but for sentencing them to prison rather than to death ... In the original document, Stalin spoke out against the death penalty, a prison sentence, or even a trial, and for the relatively lenient punishment of internal exile.

Much later, after several more letters to Stalin in which he fervently denied his guilt, Bukharin finally confessed, on 2 June 1937. In 2007 Vladimir Bobrov and I published Bukharin's confession for the first time and examined it.

Bukharin had proven that it was foolish to believe anything he said! It is no surprise that Bukharin's appeals for clemency were dneied and he was executed after the March 1937 Moscow trial. He had proven himself to be as dishonest as can be imagined.

It should not surprise us that the oaths of repentance and loyalty voiced by the Tukhachevsky defendants in their last words did not dissuade the court from sentencing them to execution. Surely the court, and the Stalin leadership, knew that the words of these conspirators must not be taken at face value. As we know now, they were correct. The defendants were not being truthful. They were trying to hide what was left of the conspiracy so that it still might have a chance for success after they themselves were no more.

Chapter 15. Trotsky in the Transcript of the Tukhachevsky Affair Trial of 11 June 1937

In May and June 1937, eight high-ranking military commanders of the Soviet Union were arrested. The most famous among them was Mikhail Nikolaevich Tukhachevsky, one of the five marshals of the Soviet Union. The case is often called the "Tukhachevsky Affair" after him. The others were Yona E. Yakir, Yeronim P. Uborevich, Avgust I. Kork, Robert P. Eideman, Boris M. Fel'dman, Vitalii M. Primakov, and Vitovt K. Putna.

All of thesse officers confessed very quickly to various charges amounting to treason. They were put on trial on 11 June 1937, sentenced to death, and executed immediately.

On 25 February 1956, Nikita Khrushchev delivered his infamous "Secret Speech" (in Russian: "Zakrytyi Doklad" – "Closed Report") to the XX Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In it, he accused Joseph Stalin and secondarily, Lavrentii Beria, of serious crimes, principally of the frame-up and execution of leading Party members. Khrushchev specifically stated that the Party leaders whom he named in his Speech and who had been executed during the 1930s had in fact been innocent, falsely framed on Stalin's orders.

Later in 1956, Khrushchev convened a high-level commission, the "Molotov Commission", to study this issue. Balanced between former long-time associates of Stalin and supporters of Khrushchev, the Molotov Commission did not agree to "rehabilitate" – declare innocent – most of the defendants in the three public Moscow Trials of 1936, 1937, and 1938.

The commission members did agree to declare innocent Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky and the seven other military commanders tried and executed with him.

Комиссия также считает, что обвинения, выдвинутые против Тухачевского, Якира и других осужденных по делу «Военно-фашистского заговора» в июне 1937 года, являются необоснованными и должны быть с них сняты. The commission also considers that the charges against Tukhachevsky, Yakir and other convicts in the case of the "Military Fascist Conspiracy" in June 1937 are unfounded and should be removed from them.

This appears to have been a compromise. Khrushchev's men wanted the rehabilitation of all the accused, while the former Stalin associates probably wanted no rehabilitations at all. After the XXII Party Congress in October 1961, Khrushchev authorised a large number of books and articles praising the Tukhachevsky Affair defendants and a great many others who had been executed during the late 1930s.

Under Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko, few rehabilitations took place, virtually all of these being unpublicised. A year or so after Mikhail Gorbachev became First Secretary of the CPSU (March 1985) he began to sponsor a flood of "rehabilitations" and a large number of books and articles concerning the Tukhachevsky Affair defendants.

Since Khrushchev, the innocence of Tukhachevsky and his co-defendants, along with a great many other military, Party, and other figures executed during the 1930s, has been taken for granted. However, neither under Khrushchev nor under Gorbachev, nor since then, has any evidence been discovered that might support the contention that the Tukhachevsky defendants were innocent.

Since the end of the USSR in 1991 a great many documents from former Soviet archives have been published. These documents permit us to see that many – even, quite possibly, all – of the Khrushchev-era and Gorbachev-era accusations against Stalin are lies. A large amount of primary source evidence has been published that points to the guilt of Tukhachevsky and his co-defendants. However, the central documents – the investigation files, including interrogations and confessions of Tukhachevsky et al., and especially the transcript of the trial of 11 June 1937, remained top-secret inaccessible to all researchers.

The Tukhachevsky File Is Declassified

In 2017, Tukhachevsky's investigative file was quietly made available to researchers, in that it is available to be studied at the FSB Archive in Moscow. In May 2018, the transcript of the Tukhachevsky trial was published, again without any announcement, on one Ukrainian and one Russian internet site.

A study of Tukhachevsky's investigative file and the trial transcript will be sufficient to prove to any objective student that Tukhachevsky and the commanders were convicted and executed with him were guilty beyond doubt. They all confessed their guilt and gave detailed, and interestingly differentiated, confessions.

Trotsky in the Tukhachevsky Trial Transcript

Our specific interest in this chapter is the trial transcript, and the additional evidence it contains that Leon Trotsky did indeed collaborate and conspire with the Germans and Japanese against the Soviet government. I have discussed much important evidence of Trotsky's collaboration with the fascists in my 2017 book Leon Trotsky's Collaboration with Germany and Japan: Trotsky's Conspiracies of the 1930s, Volume 2, and my 2020 book, New Evidence of Trotsky's Conspiracy.

I have included in this chapter a translation of all those sections of the trial transcript in which Leon Trotsky and his conspiracy are mentioned. The present chapter presents an analysis of those passages in the Tukhachevsky Trial transcript that directly concern Leon Trotsky, his son Leon Sedov, and the main Soviet-based leaders of the clandestine Trotskyist movement, Ivan Nikitich Smirnov and Yuri Piatakov. As with the transcript itself, the numbers in parenthesis in this chapter are to the pages of the 172-page Russian-language transcript of the trial of Tukhachevsky et al. of 11 June 1937, in the English translation by Sven-Eric Holström included in the present book.

Conclusion