Hezbollah: The Story From Within (Qāsim, Naʻīm; Khalil, Dalia)

Hezbollah: The Story From Within
Author	Qāsim, Naʻīm; Khalil, Dalia
Written in	2005
Publisher	London : Saqi
Source	https://archive.org/details/hizbullahstoryfr00qasi

Preface

At a time when the Islamic banner was perceived as an unattractive, inadequate source of persuasion in the face of confrontation against Israeli occupation and international pressure, Hizbullah emerged as a distinct party because of its very adoption of this Islamic banner, as well as of its conduct as a resistance force. Islamic resistance operations were of such unique success that they earned the praise of supporters of liberation and adherents of justice, as well as the wonder and disbelief of the occupiers. Enemy aggression was thwarted many times, and the occupiers’ dominant position shaken. Hizbullah’s importance rose further with actual victory, achieved on May 25, 2000, when Israeli troops were forced to withdraw from Lebanon as a result of Hizbullah operations – an unprecedented achievement in fifty years of struggle with the Israeli enemy.

Many questions surrounded Hizbullah: about the Party’s reasons for its inception, its goals, vision and values, about the time-frame it has set as an objective … Is Hizbullah a temporary faction playing a definite role, it has been asked, or does it have the potential for continuity?

Equally, many answers, analyses and assumptions were put forward. Numerous published writings blemished the Party’s image, with shreds of facts gathered mostly in presumptuous fashion. Gradually, the truth emerged through Hizbullah’s open and declared mode of work, through its field operations, the expressions of its leaders and the practical implementation by its partisans and institutions. Where, then, is the truth amidst this amalgam of facts and suppositions?

Since the circumstances surrounding the Party’s inception forced the deployment of all recruits directly in the field of operational resistance, little time was left for Party leaders to draw up frameworks and articulate visions or write manifestos, raisons d’être and manuals. Although such guiding beliefs were quite clear to Party leaders, they had yet to be laid in a format that addressed the queries of intellectuals, academics and concerned groups.

Many attempts were made to write about Hizbullah, by close Party supporters, the non-aligned and challengers alike. The Party itself had gathered and published many speeches, declarations, interviews and records of activist work, in order to create an asset base to aid in the Party’s overall direction. A number of researchers conducted special interviews with Party leaders and activists, the better to present their direct and personal opinions. However, given the Party’s level of recognition, presence and achievement – all realized within a short and critical time-span in the midst of a blazing region that is set for many more developments – whatever has been written thus far is insufficient to document and analyze this robust experience.

I found myself facing the responsibility of contributing to such documentation, so I embarked on this self-set mission despite my time constraints and the effort required. This work expresses my understanding of the Hizbullah order and its experience and future plans as gathered through my direct involvement with the Party since its inception and in various capacities.

Speaking of the ‘order’ is imperative, for it delineates the vision and goals of this Party that have sprung from a profound belief in Islam: The religion before Allah is Islam [surrender to God’s will and guidance]. Hizbullah’s framing of all issues emanates from such belief, and the Party’s practical path is interconnected with the principles of faith it carries. It is not possible to generalize as to what ‘Islamic’ experiences concern, for many rationalizations exist and factions differ in their direction. The necessity to specify and scrutinize details thus emerges. The Islamic Resistance found a place in the hearts of many Middle Eastern populations, and the core reason for achieving such stature has to do with the order it followed: that order which reveals the foundations of the experience.

The ‘experience’ in this book reveals a resistance project characterized by a bountiful jihad (holy war) offering. The approach to Party organization and public action, and the more important milestones in Hizbullah’s history, are laid out. The Party’s stance with respect to the Palestinian cause, liberating the land from occupation, participation in a non-Islamic governmental system, issues of concern to the populace, and relationships with various parties and factions whether local or regional are all laid out. A summarized chronicle of the Party’s key milestones is provided, along with its viewpoints and approach, and the circumstances surrounding these major issues.

As for the future, this outlook is based on our perception of historical divine intercession and of the state of nations and what governs their actions. As such, we were able to envisage a number of possibilities, all of which are worth consideration. Irrespective of the extent to which international players dominate our world, their influence cannot determine the fate of nations and peoples. Such days (of varying fortunes) We give to men and men by turns. I could only find it appropriate to relay my personal view of the future.

This book can be used to draw an outline for further academic work on Hizbullah, which could fill volumes. I have sought brevity, and the provision of a general overview that can answer many key questions, and describe the approach adopted by this Party and its general direction. This is a book for those who would like to know or increase their knowledge, for those who would like to remember or document their memories, or for those who would like to research or benefit from material for their subjects.

While first outlining this book, I was under the impression that my library of information and documents would suffice as a research tool. The need for more soon became obvious. Many fellow partisans provided actual recollections and details, and research was extended to cover Hizbullah Council decisions and reports, issues of Al-‘Ahd (Al-Intiqad) newspaper since its inception in 1948 and many other documents that served towards creating this book. References were quoted where the source was a clear document (book, newspaper or circular); recollections and analysis were used where sources were unavailable. I would hereby like to thank all of those who have assisted in attaining this work and in making it available to readers.

As a Hizbullah insider, I hope that I have successfully managed to communicate the facts and to inform the reader, with whom the final judgement rests.

To God I owe any success. Peace be upon you.

Naim Qassem

Introduction to the Third English Edition

Praise be to God, the guide, protector and benefactor; prayers and peace be upon the great Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), the leader and exemplar; on the Imams (PBUT), the protectors of the faith and the custodians of the message; on the martyrs who have lit the way for humankind; and upon you and the mercy of God and his blessings.

The Middle East has been subjected to successive waves of imperialist exploitation over the years, which have shaped its current realities and territorial boundaries. The Sykes-Picot Treaty in 1916 and the Balfour Declaration in 1917 created the Israeli entity, leading to recurrent challenges that continue to impact upon the region. High-handed attempts by the United States have subsequently been made to control the region and establish a secure and powerful Israel, whether by occupying Afghanistan and Iraq, making repeated threats against Syria, preventing Iran from developing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes or attacking resistance movements such as Hizbullah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad at every opportunity.

How can the Middle East achieve stability and lasting peace, given the challenges it faces? Is it possible to find reasonable solutions to the problems of the region while two issues contrary to the interests of its peoples persist? These are, namely: the American project for a new Middle East that will allow the US to dominate the area and divide it geopolitically according to its interests, and an ambitious Israel that continues to occupy, expand and settle territory at the expense of Palestinian people and forms the pole around which the countries of the region orbit as economic and political dependents.

Although there are vague proposals that advocate sovereignty and independence for countries in the region, the US and the international community shamelessly intervene to impose conditions and resort to force if they encounter resistance – as happened in the case of the US invasion and occupation of Iraq as well as the Israeli aggression against Lebanon in July 2006. While the major powers pay lip-service to notions of democracy and popular choice, they support repressive authoritarian regimes and reject the outcome of popular elections such as the one that brought Hamas to power. Where is the democracy in that?

There is talk about human rights, but such slogans are selectively applied. Israel is said to be acting in legitimate self-defence when it kills and injures Palestinians, but the wounding of one Israeli is regarded as an act of aggression that must be condemned. The massacres carried out by Israel in Qana and elsewhere during the 2006 war against Lebanon have also gone unpunished.

Iraq under US Occupation

When George W. Bush assumed the presidency of the US in 2001, he commissioned a group of advisors, headed by Richard N. Haass, to formulate a working programme on the US role in the Middle East. Among its conclusions was a proposal that the US should distract the region by concentrating on Iraq, taking advantage of the fact that the Arab world had been in conflict since Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait. Haass counselled against trying to find an ultimate solution to the Palestine–Israel question, as the key issues dividing the two sides were unlikely to be resolved. As he put it: ‘The best way to deal with conflicts that are not yet nearing a solution is to lessen interference.’ Iraq, on the other hand, was ‘a special case when compared with Israel. It represents a threat to the neighbouring countries, while Israel faces a terrorist threat from within.’ In addition, the case of Palestine united Arabs against Israel, while the case of Iraq was contentious and divided them – thereby making it easier for the US to gain control in the region.

The events in New York of September 11, 2001 directed the US’s attention away from the Middle East to Afghanistan, where al-Qa‘ida, the group held responsible for the attacks, was based. The war against Afghanistan took precedence; Iraq was relegated to the second stage of the campaign rather than the first, as Haass and his group had originally suggested.

Though an international team of inspectors had failed to find any evidence of ‘weapons of mass destruction’ in Iraq, the Bush administration launched its invasion and occupation of that country on the pretext of the existence of such weapons. US politicians, along with military and security officials, bombarded the world and the American people with fictitious and mendacious evidence that, although quickly shown to be false, nevertheless became the accepted version of events in the media. However, the lack of sufficient and compelling evidence meant that the invasion failed to obtain the backing of the United Nations Security Council, and countries such as France, Russia and Germany withheld their support. The US remained determined to proceed with its plans and the invasion eventually took place in March 2003. The US invasion of Iraq had three main objectives:

1. To gain control of Iraq’s immense oil reserves, the second largest in the world, thereby enabling the US to control the oil market and guarantee its own oil requirements.
2. To allay Israeli concerns about Iraq’s growing military power. Backed by various international sources and openly funded by the Gulf States, Iraq had obtained an arsenal of heavy and sophisticated weaponry as a result of Saddam’s war against the Islamic Republic of Iran (1980–8) and now had the strongest army in the region after Israel. Israel, like its US sponsor, believes that the only way to guarantee its dominant position in the region is by ensuring that it is militarily superior to its neighbours.
3. To strengthen political control of the wider Arab region, using Iraq as a gateway. Iraq enjoys a significant geopolitical location, surrounded by the Gulf States, Iran – with which it shares the longest land border of any country in the region – and Syria. Control of Iraq, therefore, is a key factor in shaping the Middle East.

Although the occupation has lasted for more than five years to date, the US will not leave the country until it has concluded a political security treaty that will make Iraq a US protectorate, stripped of decision-making power at regional and international levels, and which will allow the US to control the country’s politics, security, oil and culture. It is in US interests for the contagious sectarian civil war to continue, as it provides an excuse for it to remain in the country on the pretext of maintaining security. However, the situation has got partly out of control.

Parliamentary and presidential elections are not enough to provide for popular choice and independence, because they are conducted under occupation and are therefore subject to control by the occupying power. Ministers are unable to take decisions or carry out activities without first receiving the consent of the US representative in charge of the ministry.

Hizbullah considers that the continued US occupation of Iraq is unacceptable on whatever pretext, and that the Security Council has the power to help Iraq by bringing in a limited and targeted international force to replace US rule and provide international cover. It also believes that the Iraqi resistance has the right to act to expel the occupiers. Hizbullah condemns every bombing and attack on civilians and Iraqis in general, and regards such attacks as completely unjustified. It rejects all forms of factional strife, and believes that Iraqis themselves have the capability and competence to maintain their territorial integrity in the face of US occupation and to make political, security, economic, legal and future decisions that will benefit their country.

The US has failed both to impose its authority on Iraq and to drag Iraq’s neighbours into the problem because it is in the position of occupier. Despite statements from officials that the political process is moving forward, and that conditions in the country are improving, Haass – in an article about the new Middle East – described the situation in Iraq after three years of occupation as follows: ‘Iraq, traditionally a center of Arab power, will remain messy for years to come, with a weak central government, a divided society, and regular sectarian violence. At worst, it will become a failed state wracked by an all-out civil war that will draw in its neighbors.’

The peoples of the region will not put up with a return to colonialism, mandates or high commissioners any longer. Other countries in the region, particularly Iran and Syria, have realized the magnitude of the damage inflicted by the occupation and are working to weaken the US position in Iraq in order to protect their own interests and security. The only solution now is for the US to withdraw from Iraq, to stop tearing it apart and using it as a base from which to tear the region itself apart. Perhaps what has taken place in Iraq will make Americans as well as the rest of the world realize that stability can only be achieved through the establishment of a properly thought-out political process within Iraq and between the countries in the region. Such a solution would respect the interests of Iraq and take into account the interests of the region as well. It is no longer possible to use international military or political might to impose a solution by force against the wishes of the people, who have become more conscious of what is appropriate for them in a changing and complex world.

The Iran–Syria Axis

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, a new, unipolar world order came into existence, dominated by a US intent on promoting its own policies and securing its interests. Given its vital significance, the Middle East was at the top of the US agenda. The US was not new to the area. It already had, as allies, Israel as well as a large number of Arab countries classified as ‘moderate’ because their policies were in line with US interests.

The Islamic Republic of Iran, which was brought into being by Imam Khomeini (May God sanctify his secret) on February 11, 1979, has refused to submit to US demands and has pursued a policy of non-alignment since its inception. It regards autonomy and political independence as the best way of serving its interests, and has rejected attempts to keep it as a base for the US as it had been during the time of the Shah. Iran has consistently espoused the cause of Palestinian resistance. It opened the first Palestinian embassy, and has continued to support Palestinian aspirations for an autonomous state with the right to defend its territory. Angered by this stance, and fearing that it was losing control of the country, the US instigated a boycott and a campaign of oppression that has continued to the present. It incited Iraq to launch an eight-year war against Iran, supported groups opposed to the regime and attempted to bring about regime change from within. Recently it has raised the issue of Iran’s ‘nuclear power’ at the UN Security Council and urged the international community to stop Iran from acquiring a nuclear capability on the pretext that it will be used for military rather than peaceful means.

Syria, as the only state not to have accepted a humiliating treaty with Israel, has played a distinctive role in the region following the signing of the Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel and the Wadi Araba Treaty between Israel and Jordan. It remains determined to regain all its territory in the Golan Heights, though it is unable to ignore the fact that the balance of military power is weighted in favour of Israel; it fears that it will be exposed to a debilitating embargo, which will end its role in the region and destabilize its regime.

Syria believes that supporting the Palestinian resistance will not only help the Palestinians liberate their land but also establish a new balance of power in the area more suited to Syrian stability than the constant threat of Israeli expansion. Similarly, it has supported the Hizbullah-led resistance in Lebanon, believing that a strong and resistant Lebanon able to withstand Israeli pressure will strengthen its own position, while a vulnerable one will only damage it.

The political map has been redrawn, and the region is now polarized between those who accept US plans for it and those who oppose them. The US has effectively created two axes – one that complies with American policy (an essential component of which is unequivocal support for Israel) and an opposition axis consisting of bodies that reject it, namely Iran, Syria, the Palestinian resistance led by Hamas and Islamic Jihad and the Lebanese resistance led by Hizbullah.

Since its inception, the Islamic Republic of Iran has adopted policies in keeping with its principles and vision. It has supported the Lebanese and Palestinian resistance movements against Israel, and now rejects the US occupation of Iraq, which it regards as contrary to Iraqi as well as Iranian interests. It believes that the US presence in a neighbouring country, as well as American plans for a Greater Middle East, pose a threat to its own security. It has forged a fundamental and important alliance with Syria based on Islamic solidarity and the need for a united front against US aggression that will enable both countries to survive and maintain their roles in the region.

Syria has been involved in the struggle against the Israeli entity since its establishment. It has backed resistance movements in Lebanon and in occupied Palestine, not only for reasons of geographical proximity but also because the existence of strong resistance movements in both countries strengthens its own position. It has obtained a strong regional ally and actor through its relationship with Iran; Iran, for its part, has obtained a means of communicating and interacting with Arab countries with which it shares common concerns.

The resistance movements in Palestine and Lebanon stem from the same root. Both parties are defending their land against occupation and the continuing dangers posed by Israel’s expansionism. By cooperating, they are able to continue their struggle against Israel and prevent it from gaining power and achieving its objectives at the expense of the peoples of Palestine, Lebanon and the region as a whole. Such resistance requires support. If such support exists unconditionally and complies with the interests of the recipients and providers alike, there is no reason not to be clear and open about it. The Lebanese and Palestinian resistance movements are proud to acknowledge the help they receive from Iran and Syria, as it is compatible with their aspirations and is given freely and without any political strings attached. Is it reasonable to deny the resistance the right to seek support while Israel receives US$3 billion in aid every year, in addition to arms and others forms of assistance? If other Arab or Islamic countries were to offer unconditional support to the resistance, they would accept it as they have accepted Iran’s and Syria’s support.

The Iran–Syria axis that has developed in opposition to the US–Israel axis is a defensive alliance that stands counter to subordination and occupation, the imposition of US hegemony and the legalization of the Israeli entity at the expense of the peoples of occupied Palestine and the region. The struggle between the two blocs has impacted upon the region as a whole, as countries have been drawn into the crisis brought about by the Israeli and US occupiers and their expansionist aims.

Palestine is a Central Issue

The proposed solutions to the Palestinian issue have always been based on giving Israel the territory and stability it wants and depriving the Palestinians of the simplest sustenance, preventing the return of refugees and refusing to recognize the most sacred nature of Jerusalem. This course will not bring about a solution, but will only generate more problems.

The decision to use excessive force against Palestinians has deepened the crisis, made a solution more difficult and made the Palestinians more determined to resist. American and Israeli strategies, which have included fomenting sedition among Palestinians, creating dissension between the Fatah and Hamas authorities and besieging Hamas in Gaza in order to bring about its downfall, achieve nothing. Such moves are clearly aimed at destroying the ability of the Palestinian people and their representatives to choose freely, and forcing them to come to the negotiating table not as equal partners in dialogue but as supplicants to whom the Israelis will dictate a solution. The pursuit of such actions by Israel and its sponsors, starting with Madrid and Oslo and followed over the years by the ‘Road Map’ and most recently the Annapolis conference, has only led to more complications.

The Bush proposal for a Palestinian–Israeli state amounts to nothing but a useless slogan. Experience has shown that its only purpose is to demonstrate US interest in the Palestinian issue. The administration has merely put a muddled framework for a solution in place and made no serious effort to put pressure on Israel, provide justice for Palestinians or draw up practical steps or a timetable that would shape the substance of the solution.

The US realizes that in order to secure support from influential Arab countries for its plans for a new Middle East, it must demonstrate its interest in finding a solution to the Palestinian issue. These regimes can then justify their subordination to US policy by pretending they are lobbying on behalf of the Palestinians.

We believe that agreement on a solution is deadlocked. Israel wants nominal negotiations that do not come close to obtaining a final solution and do not answer difficult questions such as the status of Jerusalem, the issue of refugees and the nature of the Palestinian state. It wants a say in the form of the Palestinian Authority with which it negotiates and refuses to recognize the choices made by the Palestinian people, who have voted for a legislative assembly in which Hamas commands a majority.

Palestinian National Authority President Mahmoud Abbas is not able to give the security guarantees that Israel is looking for, nor does he possess the legal authority that qualifies him to speak on behalf of all Palestinians. He and his movement in the West Bank are subject to Israeli restrictions as well as Arab and international pressures, which make him ineffectual. His position is further undermined by Israeli statements about his weakness, and their mistrust in his ability to bring about any progress.

Hamas, along with other Palestinian resistance factions and the Palestinian people as a whole – most notably in Gaza – believes that resistance is the only means of guaranteeing the continuance of the Palestinian project and ensuring that a solution is not simply imposed on the people for which future generations will have to pay. What is proposed is humiliating and unacceptable; however, shored up by its ideological beliefs, Hamas is prepared for sacrifice, martyrdom and patience. The brutal attacks on Gaza and the killing of women, children and the elderly in an effort to bring down Hamas will not benefit anyone; rather, such aggression will increase Palestinian commitment to the cause. Resistance offers the possibility of cherished hope, while submission only leads to certain loss.

It is impossible for Bush to fulfill his promise to find a solution before the end of his presidency in 2009. Any action undertaken by the US under this administration has been, like those in Israel, no more than a way of gaining time while waiting for fundamental changes in the region.

Lebanon in the Eye of the Storm

The Bush administration has made many efforts to eradicate Hizbullah in Lebanon. It believes that the resistance poses an obstacle to its new Middle Eastern strategy and also stands in the way of Israeli plans for resettling Palestinians in Lebanon and for securing its northern front in the same way it has secured its other Arab fronts, in order to isolate the Palestinians and restrict their options.

Israel, like the US, has persistently attempted to eliminate Hizbullah; to this end, it launched a major offensive against the resistance in July 1993, followed by an even larger offensive in April 1996 – but in both cases it failed to meet its objective. Exhausted by the military campaign waged by the resistance, Israel was forced to withdraw its troops from Lebanon on July 25, 2000, though it continues to occupy land near the border including the Shebaa Farms and Kfar Shouba Hills, which has justified the need for continued resistance. Hizbullah remained extremely cautious about the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, and believed it was necessary to be prepared for the onset of a new Israeli war.

On September 2, 2004, at the joint request of the US and France, the Security Council issued Resolution 1559. This marked the beginning of the dangerous political stalemate that has persisted in Lebanon ever since, and was the first serious expression of the US’s determination to take control of the Lebanese dossier from Syria. It was also the beginning of regional and international confrontation over how to influence the choices of Lebanon. Resolution 1559 states that the Security Council:

1. Reaffirms its call for strict respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence of Lebanon under the sole and exclusive authority of the Government of Lebanon throughout Lebanon.
2. Calls upon all remaining foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon.
3. Calls for the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias.
4. Supports the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon to all Lebanese territories.
5. Declares its support for a free and fair electoral process in Lebanon’s upcoming presidential election, conducted according to Lebanese constitutional rules devised without foreign interference or influence.Four points in the resolution proved particularly contentious. First was the call for the withdrawal of the Syrian army from Lebanon referred to in articles 1 and 2; second was the call for the disarming of Hizbullah and the elimination of its resistance wing, implied by the phrase, ‘all the Lebanese militias’ in article 3; third, also in article 3, was the call for the disarming of Palestinian camps in a manner that did not form part of an overall solution to the Palestinian question in the region, implied by the phrase ‘non-Lebanese’; fourth was interference in the choice of a new president, by preventing the extension of Emile Lahhoud’s mandate for a further three years after it came to an end on November 24, 2004, implied in article 5.

In order to put pressure on the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies not to renew President Lahhoud’s mandate, on the basis of article 5 of the resolution, the Security Council rushed through publication of Resolution 1559 one day ahead of the sitting on September 3, in which deputies were due to vote on extending the presidential term of office. However, in accordance with authorized Lebanese constitutional mechanisms, the Chamber of Deputies approved a constitutional amendment that would allow the president to stay in office for a further one-off period of three years, with 96 out of the 128 deputies voting in favour – representing 75 per cent of the total number of deputies. An international campaign to not recognize the outcome of the presidential election was begun, which lasted for a further three years characterized by turbulence, insecurity and political instability.

The assassination of Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri on February 14, 2005 marked a distinct and dangerous development in Lebanese affairs and provided an excuse for further international interference. The US believed that the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon, which took place on April 30, would weaken Hizbullah and put the question of ‘Hizbullah’s disarmament’ on the negotiating table in accordance with Resolution 1559. However, the so-called Quartet Agreement – the electoral alliance concluded ahead of the May 29, 2005 elections between Hizbullah, the Amal Movement, the Future Movement (headed by Saad al-Hariri) and the Progressive Socialist Movement (headed by Walid Jumblatt) – eased pressure on Hizbullah. Under the agreement, the four parties pledged the following: to form an alliance in the parliamentary elections in different regions in Lebanon; to use every means in their power to uncover the perpetrators of al-Hariri’s assassination; and to commit to the view, held by the late prime minister, that the resistance should hold onto its weapons until the remaining Lebanese territory was liberated and until it could be seen whether developments in the region would lead to a settlement. The agreement gave the Future Movement and the Progressive Socialist Party a majority of deputies in the Chamber of Deputies in return for an assurance that they would not touch the resistance or its weapons.

The Party Participates in Government

On April 18, 2005, a minister accountable to Hizbullah joined Prime Minister Najib Mikati’s cabinet. This was the first time since its inception that the Party had participated in government, and the decision to do so came about after a series of important events – the most significant of which were the adoption of Resolution 1559, the assassination of al-Hariri and the start of discussions on the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon, which took place on April 3. It was based on the following rationales:

1. That the government would be responsible for the transition period leading up to the holding of parliamentary elections on May 29, and for establishing the role of the incoming government. Unlike governments formed under the Syrians’ presence in Lebanon, the new government would play an active role in delivering policy rather than refusing this role as it had done in the past. It was this responsibility that would make the government’s role so essential.
2. That Hizbullah expected the US and the international community to continue to intervene in Lebanese affairs in order to force the country to pursue policies that would benefit Israel and harm Lebanese interests – despite the continuing threat posed by Israel, its occupation of the Shebaa Farms, the Lebanese prisoners under its control and its daily violations of Lebanese airspace. Hizbullah believed that by having representatives in government, joining with allies to protect the resistance and discussing this position with other forces in the government, it could bring about a shift in the balance of power that would help get policies adopted that were consistent with its vision. It also believed representation could provide it with a suitable means to defend its political programme and facilitate its adoption by the government.

The number of ministerial positions held by a party would not be its only means of influencing political, economic and social decisions within the government. Its public presence would also have a bearing on the formulation of policy, as would the popularity of its political allies and the nature of its alliances. The ministerial statement would be of fundamental importance in charting the way forward for the government as it interacted with influential countries in the region on matters requiring decisions. The government would exercise an active role in determining the direction of the country, rather than merely acting in an executive capacity as it had done in the past.

For the above reasons, the Party played an even more active role in the government that followed, which was formed by Prime Minister Fouad Siniora on July 19, after parliamentary elections were held. This time, the cabinet included a minister from Hizbullah, another who was close to the Party and a third who was selected in agreement with the Amal Movement. Following a prolonged debate on the resistance, a statement was issued in the interests of continuity and support. It referred to the resistance in two paragraphs, declaring ‘support for our brave resistance’ in the first, and calling for ‘quiet dialogue on the options available to us all within the framework of the Arab struggle against Israel and its occupation and ambitions, and the need to fortify Lebanon at the same time’.

The second paragraph was more explicit: ‘The government considers that the Lebanese resistance is a true and natural expression of the national right of the Lebanese people to liberate their land and to defend their honour in the face of Israeli aggression and threats and ambitions, and believes that it is working for the complete liberation of Lebanese territory.’

In the second half of November 2005, about seven months after it had been set up, Progressive Socialist Party leader Walid Jumblatt declared that the Quartet Agreement was dead. ‘The Quartet Agreement never existed and will never exist,’ he said, giving Hizbullah’s stance on Syria and its unnecessary retention of its weapons as his reasons for leaving. In a parallel development, ministers from the Amal Movement and Hizbullah suspended their participation in the cabinet on December 12. This followed the assassination of the journalist Gebran Tueni and the subsequent decision by the government, taken at a rapidly convened session held on the same day, to call for the setting up of an international tribunal to look into the assassination of al-Hariri without studying or discussing its status or powers. The ministers concerned believed this contradicted the spirit of the Quartet Agreement and the national partnership government.

A short while later, deputy Saad al-Hariri announced he was leaving the Quartet Agreement and no longer considered himself bound by obligations to it. This, in turn, precipitated an announcement by the Secretary General of Hizbullah, His Eminence Hassan Nasrallah, that the Quartet Agreement no longer existed. When the ministers of Hizbullah and the Amal Movement returned to government seven weeks later, he said: ‘Today we are once again returning to government. The first political outcome is the ending of the Quartet Agreement. A member of the Quartet has ignored it and denied its origin and existence.’

The Memorandum of Joint Understanding

Hizbullah and the Free Patriotic Movement headed by General Michel Aoun reached an understanding during this period that marked a significant development in Lebanese politics. Officially titled ‘The Memorandum of Joint Understanding between Hizbullah and the Free Patriotic Movement’, the agreement was reached after several months of negotiations and announced on February 6, 2006 at a joint meeting at the Church of St Michael, which was attended by Secretary General Nasrallah and General Aoun. The understanding had an undeniable impact on the Lebanese political scene, creating an effective bridge of communication between the Shi‘ite and Christian religious blocs, in which Hizbullah and the Free Patriotic Movement enjoyed broad representation, respectively. It strengthened the position of both parties domestically and laid the essential foundations for what later came to be known as the Lebanese opposition. The understanding also identified a mechanism for dealing with the weapons of the resistance as part of an overall national defence strategy. Such a strategy should be based on dialogue about the role of the resistance and its weapons rather than calls for its disarmament as outlined in Resolution 1559. This was made clear in item 10 of the document.

Protecting Lebanon

The protection of Lebanon and the preservation of its independence and sovereignty are national responsibilities and duties, guaranteed by international charters and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights – particularly in confronting any threats or dangers that may harm them, irrespective of where these dangers come from. Therefore, carrying arms is not an objective in itself, but a noble and sacred means that is exercised by any group whose land is occupied, as political resistance. In this context, the question of Hizbullah’s arms must be addressed as part of a comprehensive approach that falls within two parameters: first, retaining these arms relies on justifications reflecting national consensus and constituting sources of strength for Lebanon. Second, conditions must be objectively defined that would eliminate the justifications for keeping these weapons.

Since Israel occupies the Shebaa Farms, imprisons Lebanese resistance fighters and threatens Lebanon, the Lebanese people must assume their responsibilities and share the burden of protecting their country, safeguarding its existence and security and preserving its independence by:

1. Liberating the Shebaa Farms from Israeli occupation.
2. Liberating Lebanese prisoners from Israeli jails.
3. Protecting Lebanon from the dangers posed by Israel by formulating a national defence strategy to which the Lebanese agree and in which they are involved by assuming its burdens and benefiting from its outcomes.

Lebanese Dialogue

The period following the dissolution of the Quartet Agreement witnessed changes in the Lebanese political line-up as the various parties regrouped; the Future Movement and Progressive Socialist Party adopted opposing positions to Hizbullah and the Amal Movement, and Hizbullah and the Free Patriotic Movement concluded the Memorandum of Joint Understanding – even though the latter had been part of what was later to be called the March 14 Coalition (named after the popular rally organized to mark the four-week anniversary of Prime Minister al-Hariri’s assassination). Political disagreements threatened to further complicate an already turbulent situation. The Speaker of Parliament, Nabih Berri, invited representatives from all parties with members in the Chamber of Deputies to take part in a round-table discussion. Everyone agreed, and the talks were scheduled to start in the Chamber on March 2, 2006. Fourteen leaders, representing the various political forces, attended together with their assistants; the agenda included the following points:

1. The investigation into Prime Minister al-Hariri’s assassination.
2. The situation in the Palestinian camps with particular reference to weapons.
3. Syrian-Lebanese relations.
4. Lebanese claims to the Shebaa Farms.
5. The position of President of the Republic.
6. The resistance and its weapons.

Several discussions were held, which led to agreement on the first four items; however, the fifth proved more difficult. The Future Movement, the Progressive Socialist Party and the Christian Qornet Shehwan coalition took the decision to bring down President Émile Lahhoud before his legal mandate expired on November 24, 2007, arguing that Resolution 1559 had ‘declared its support for a free and fair electoral process in the coming presidential elections’ and that President Lahhoud had been elected for a further three years as a result of Syrian pressure; they called for his mandate to be terminated and for new elections to be held, a move rejected by the opposition (comprising Hizbullah, the Amal Movement, the Free Patriotic Movement, various leading authorities including Sunni former Prime Minister Omar Karami, Dr Fathi Yakan, former Druze minister Talal Arslan, former minister Wiam Wahhab, and former MP Faisal Daoud, as well as members of other secular, popular and nationalist parties).

Delegates were unable to agree on the presidency, and it was decided to defer talks on the subject and discuss the question of the resistance and its weapons instead. At a meeting on May 16, 2006, it was concurred that the problem needed to be addressed through dialogue and agreement rather than by force or foreign interference, and that a defensive strategy should be drawn up by Lebanon itself; but the discussion was not concluded.

Israel’s War against Lebanon

On July 12, 2006, Hizbullah captured two Israeli soldiers on the Lebanese Palestine border in the hope that the Party could exchange them for Lebanese prisoners being held by Israel despite attempts to gain their release through political channels. Using the liberation of its soldiers as a pretext, Israel launched an all-out war on Hizbullah, which it subsequently called ‘The Second Lebanese War’. The thirty-four-day-long conflict was called ‘The True Promise’ by Hizbullah.

The Party did not expect the capture of the soldiers to result in a full-scale war, though it had been prepared for possible Israeli reprisals on Lebanon before or after the incident. Nevertheless, it had readied itself for some form of attack; the liberation of Lebanon on May 25, 2000 convinced the Party that Israel would renew hostilities against the country at some point in the future in order to minimize Hizbullah’s offensive capability and prevent it from opposing Israeli expansionist plans in the region.

The decision to go to war was taken by the US and implemented by Israel. American and Israeli statements, informed press reports and the Israeli-commissioned Winograd Report enquiring into the 2006 war have subsequently made clear that the US put pressure on Israel to rush into war even though at least another two or three months were required to get ready. (Reports also indicate that Israel had intended to launch a war on Hizbullah between September and October that same year.) This meant that Israel was under-prepared, lacking an overall understanding of what was required if it was to achieve its desired ends.

Why did the US take such a step?

There are several reasons. The US had failed to secure Hizbullah’s disarmament politically through Resolution 1559; rather than being weakened by the Syrian exit from Lebanon, the Party had consolidated its position. It participated in government and a ministerial statement was issued supporting the resistance and ensuring its political protection; Hizbullah was enjoying increased popularity, especially after concluding the Memorandum with the Free Patriotic Movement. The US also realized that any hopes it had of pitting the Lebanese army against the resistance were doomed to failure given the sectarian composition of the army and its anti-Israeli stance, formed according to the political reality in Lebanon. Furthermore, the March 14 Coalition had been unable to commit itself to a timetable that would address the existence of the Party’s weapons despite international pressure – particularly from the US. It was later revealed that key figures from the Coalition had told Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and other US officials that, as they were unable to do anything and time was against them, the only remaining option was for Israel to launch a war against the Party and disarm it by striking at its power base.

The July 2006 attack was the start of a global war against Hizbullah and its supporters, carried out by Israel with the backing of many leading countries, the Security Council, some Arab states and the March 14 Coalition in Lebanon. The latter parties attempted to justify the Israeli aggression; they claimed that Hizbullah was responsible for the war and its consequences, and urged it to end its armed presence in Lebanon.

It is impossible to describe the brutality of the Israeli attacks and the widespread killing of Lebanese people that took place during the conflict. About 1,000 people were martyred and 3,000 people wounded; houses and buildings, particularly in the south and the southern suburbs of Beirut and the Bekaa, were destroyed. Israel dropped more than 4 million cluster bombs. But the resistance wing of Hizbullah survived; not only did it prevent an Israeli advance on land, but its equipment and soldiers also inflicted heavy losses on the enemy, perhaps most prominently on August 12 when more than thirty-nine tanks and bulldozers were destroyed, killing more than twenty Israeli officers and soldiers and wounding more than 110 in what was described as a ‘tank incineration’ in the region of Wadi al-Hajir, in southern Lebanon. By the time the ceasefire came into effect, at 8 am on August 14 (as a result of Security Council Resolution 1701), Israel had suffered a heavy defeat both morally and militarily, instead of the victory it had hoped to achieve. Its failure was further compounded by the fact that it was unable to enter villages or outposts on the border such as Bint Jubail, Aita al-Shaab and al-Khayam.

Lebanon was united in the face of Israeli aggression; the Lebanese army came out in support of the resistance, and many of its soldiers died as martyrs or were wounded; people in the target areas, who bore the brunt of the war and were exposed to displacement and suffering, expressed their support for the resistance under the most difficult circumstances, as did people in other areas who sympathized with the displaced, and who gave them shelter and aid no matter where they came from or which sect they belonged to. Although some politicians did attempt to place the blame for the war on the resistance, this suggestion had little impact on the wave of national solidarity that greeted the Israeli aggression.

Hizbullah successfully prevented Israel from achieving the two main objectives of its second war against Lebanon, namely: ‘the return of Israeli soldiers, and the implementation of Resolution 1559, including the disarming of Hizbullah’, which Prime Minister Ehud Olmert set out before the Israeli Knesset on the sixth day of the war as conditions for a ceasefire. Defence Minister Amir Peretz, who ‘threatened to invade Lebanon’, failed to realize his dream; and any hopes Chief of Staff Dan Halutz had had of ‘eliminating the missiles and stopping the people from launching them’ were dashed as the Party continued to launch as many missiles as previously, right up to the moment when the ‘ceasefire’ came into effect, after the implementation of UN Resolution 1701. Secretary of State Rice, who had rejected calls for a ceasefire on the ninth day of the war, justifying the vicious attacks on Lebanon as ‘the birth pangs of a new Middle East in Lebanon’, was also disappointed, as this ‘new Middle East’ failed to materialize. Since this notable strategic victory, the first of its kind in the history of the Arab–Israeli struggle, the Party has become an inspirational force for the peoples of the region.

Hizbullah’s success in foiling Israeli military objectives and defeating the Israeli entity had far-reaching consequences within Israel. A large number of army leaders resigned, most prominent among them Chief of Staff Halutz. Defence Minister Peretz failed in his re-election bid as president of the Labour Party, and the Winograd Commission investigating the conduct of the war enumerated the many failures and shortcomings in the political and military systems as well as in the management of the home front.

Israel’s thirty-four-day war had a severe impact on the Lebanese economy and on the country’s infrastructure; 104,000 housing units were damaged and 16,000 completely destroyed, at an estimated total cost, according to the Lebanese government, of between $1–3 billion. In addition, economic institutions as well as crops, livestock, poultry and machinery to an estimated value of $580,000 were also destroyed, according to the Consultation Centre for Studies and Documentation – and this figure does not take into account the large number of workers who lost their jobs. In a report to the Paris 3 Summit, the Lebanese government estimated that losses incurred during the 2006 aggression totalled $2.8 billion, ‘which includes the cost of reconstruction, restoration and rebuilding of private and public infrastructure, replacement of destroyed plants, and compensation for private housing which constitutes the bulk of losses’. (Hizbullah’s own statistics indicate that costs were nearer the $2 billion mark.)

Hizbullah was quick to tackle the social impact of the war. It guaranteed financial aid to all those affected, and rented and furnished temporary housing to the value of $168 million while repairs or building work took place on property destroyed by Israel. It commissioned the Jihad Construction Company, which belongs to the Party, to repair communal sections of houses in the southern suburbs of Beirut, and met the costs of repair to homes in the Bekaa, the south, the suburbs and elsewhere in Lebanon to a total value of $188 million. In addition, it established the Wa’ad architectural firm to draw up plans for the rebuilding of the southern suburbs, in which 274 apartment blocks containing 6,000 housing units had been completely destroyed by the Israelis. It put the projects out to tender to major companies specializing in this field. Those who were hoping that the crisis would adversely affect relations between the people and the Party were disappointed, and observers and those hostile to the Party were taken by surprise.

There was no let-up for Hizbullah after August 14, when ‘hostilities’ came to an end. It studied the war and its outcome, and made use of the positive and negative lessons it had learned. In addition, it repaired and consolidated its position, helped by a surge of popular sympathy, a rise in the number of young people joining the Party and broad and effective cooperation with the Lebanese opposition parties.

The Political Conflict Intensifies

Following the failure of the Israeli military aggression on Lebanon, the US renewed its campaign of political aggression against the country, thereby compounding the political crisis. After the war, the Lebanese leadership rejected calls for the formation of a government of national unity that would include General Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement. In addition, it agreed to the setting up of an international tribunal without first discussing the matter with Hizbullah and the Amal Movement, both of whom were part of the government. This time and on November 11, 2006, the ministers from both parties left the cabinet. They demanded that the government resign, and called for the formation of a national unity government that would be more representative and include members of the Free Patriotic Movement. In such a government, the opposition would have a blocking minority – that is, a third of the total number of cabinet positions plus at least one more – and would have the power to veto fundamental political decisions regarding Lebanese sovereignty and the role of the resistance as, according to the Lebanese constitution, ‘fundamental issues require the agreement of two thirds of the members of the government’. Given that the opposition made up 45 per cent of the Chamber of Deputies versus the ruling bloc’s 55 per cent, its members considered their request logical and normal. They believed that the nature of the Chamber, with its sectarian composition, required consensus between the various factions, and that a coalition government of national unity was the only way of finding a solution to political instability, insecurity and intractable economic problems, which the government had failed to address. However, supporters of the ruling bloc, backed by the US, refused to compromise and give the opposition seats totalling a third-plus-one, thereby plunging the country into a complex crisis. Opposition members refused to recognize the government and called on it to resign, while loyalists insisted that it remain in power, ignoring the fact that six ministers had already resigned, including all five representing the Shi‘ite faction, and that the government was further weakened by the absence of any members of the Free Patriotic Movement, which represented a great number of Christians.

The opposition organized the largest demonstration ever held in Lebanon on December 10, 2006, calling for the overthrow of the government; when it failed to bring this about on the same day, it called on demonstrators to occupy the commercial centre of Beirut. The sit-in lasted for 538 days, but there was no let-up in the government crisis and the country was completely paralyzed. To make matters worse, the presidency was also in deep trouble. Government loyalists refused to deal with the president according to his constitutional powers, and behaved as if he wasn’t there, although his mandate did not expire for another year.

When President Lahhoud’s mandate came to an end on November 24, 2007, the Chamber of Deputies was unable to agree on a new president. As a result of the ruling bloc’s continuing refusal to form a properly representative government of national unity, the opposition blocked the election by refusing to provide the necessary two-thirds quorum in Parliament. The publicly declared US position was that the country should continue without a president, and that Prime Minister Siniora should run the government; this was to prevent the election of a president from within the political equation who would legitimize the resistance and give a role to the effective opposition in Lebanon.

On February 12, 2008, Israel assassinated the great jihadi leader of Hizbullah, Imad Mughniyeh (Hajj Radwan) in Syria, setting off a bomb as he was about to enter his car. Aware of the role he had played in the July 2006 victory and in building up and managing Hizbullah’s military capability, it hoped that targeting him would weaken Hizbullah’s resistance work. However, the Party quickly addressed any problems caused by the assassination and made a series of appointments that ensured its continuing strength and effectiveness, demonstrating that it had become a cohesive apparatus that could pursue its course with energy and skill in a precise, professional and prompt manner.

The Bush administration continued to intervene to prevent Hizbullah and the opposition from becoming a natural part of Lebanese political life, using Hizbullah’s resistance as an excuse. A US-sponsored line-up of countries accused Iran and Syria of being responsible for the situation in Lebanon – a stand also adopted by government loyalists, who spread rumours that the crisis had come about because of Iranian–Syrian support for the opposition. But such accusations ignore reality. The resistance retains its right to carry arms because Israel poses an imminent and continuing danger to Lebanon. It occupies the Shebaa Farms and Kfar Shouba Hills, and its planes carry out several spy missions a day over different parts of Lebanese territory in order to photograph and compile a database of military targets. In a briefing on the situation in the Middle East presented to the Security Council on April 23, 2008, Angela Kane, UN Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, stated in paragraph 35: ‘UNIFIL recorded a marked escalation in the number of Israeli air violations committed daily, which rose from 282 in February 2008 to 692 in March, and amounted to 476 during the first half of April. Such sorties constitute a breach of Lebanese sovereignty and the Blue Line, and continue to reduce the credibility of UNIFIL and the Lebanese armed forces.’ Hizbullah believes that the Lebanese have the right to express their rejection of foreign tutelage; to cooperate with each other, as Lebanese; to establish an independent state; to reject the continued occupation of any part of their land; and to retrieve their prisoners held by Israel.

The Communications Network Crisis

The political crisis remained unresolved and the situation, which had its origins in the adoption of Resolution 1559 three years earlier, grew ever more complicated. The post of president had remained vacant for almost six months, and investigations into the assassinations had proved inconclusive. Arab, Iranian–Saudi and French initiatives had failed to come up with a solution. The ‘unconstitutional’ Siniora government had assumed presidential powers and was making decisions without being sanctioned to do so – a development that was to have surprising consequences. On May 5, 2008, the cabinet met in the evening and remained in session for more than ten hours, until 4.30 am, emerging with a resolution that Hizbullah regarded as dangerous and confrontational. The resolution stated the following:

In view of the fact that the communications network, which Hizbullah has established in the Lebanese territories, is illegal and unlawful, and constitutes an assault on the sovereignty of the state and public property, [the government] will start criminal prosecutions against all those found to be involved in the action as individuals, parties, associations or companies.

[The government] rejects the claim that Hizbullah’s protection merits the setting up of such a network, or that it is an integral part of the party’s weaponry, and also rejects statements linking it to jamming carried out by Israel, Syria or international parties, which the government has and continues to condemn and is constantly working to stop.

[The government] has provided the Arab League and international organizations with details of this new attack on the rule of law in Lebanon, and exposed the role played, and being played, by Iranian organizations in this field.

[The government] entrusts the relevant departments and the security forces to follow up and address the existing anomaly, given that this network belongs by law to the State of Lebanon, which has the right to remove it.

The Party rejected the resolution and called on the government to withdraw it. Secretary General Nasrallah announced the Party’s position explicitly at a press conference on May 8, which contained the following points:

III: The purpose of this resolution is to disarm the most important element [of the resistance’s security apparatus], which protects its leadership, cadres and underlying infrastructure, and is intended to expose the resistance to assassination, murder and the destruction of its infrastructure. It follows, therefore, that those who are responsible for the resolution are complicit in any killing or assassination that results, by allowing them to happen if not carrying them out directly. IV: The purpose of this resolution is to set the national army and Lebanese security forces against the Lebanese resistance.

During the press conference, the Secretary General also made the following statement:

After the black decisions taken by the government, we consider that a war has been launched against us, and that it is our duty to defend ourselves and our weapons; he who warns is excused. All red lines have been crossed; we will be lenient with no one, whosoever they may be. We have information that getting rid of the communications network is only the first step in stripping the resistance of its capabilities.

The situation deteriorated very quickly; armed militia groups belonging to the Future Movement and the Progressive Socialist Party moved into Beirut on May 7 and held up, at gunpoint, a demonstration called by the General Labour Union; the following day, the groups took control of some streets in the capital and began firing at offices and at young men belonging to the opposition. This move, taken in conjunction with the government’s decision to prosecute the communications network, appears to have had the following objectives:

1.  To force the army and security forces to intervene on the side of the ruling party; this would, in turn, result in clashes between members of the resistance and their supporters and the army and security forces.
2. To tie down the resistance in an armed, internal conflict, forcing Hizbullah to use its weapons against other militias rather than keeping them for use against Israel.

Hizbullah believed that allowing itself to become embroiled in either of the preceding scenarios would only serve the government’s interests and lead to further measures against the resistance; it decided instead, along with other opposition parties, to take limited and swift defensive action that would put a stop to the fighting. It confronted the gunmen deployed in the streets and offices in different parts of the capital, the overwhelming majority of whom had been brought from the north and the Bekaa; some of them surrendered, and others fled. Following these events, which took place on May 8, the Party quickly handed back the offices of the armed militias to the Lebanese army and its armed men withdrew from the streets. The Lebanese army took back overall responsibility for the security of the capital, and calm returned. On May 5, the Progressive Socialist Party killed two members of Hizbullah, but an agreement was reached several hours later that put an end to the incidents. The Lebanese army resumed responsibility for security in Mount Lebanon as well as in the offices and arsenals belonging to the Progressive Socialist Party. Parallel to these events, supporters of the Future Movement carried out several unprovoked attacks in the north, the Bekaa and on the international road into southern Lebanon. Several roads leading to the border were cut, and a massacre occurred in the town of Halba in Akkar, northern Lebanon, in which members of the opposition Syrian Social Nationalist Party were killed.

Hizbullah believed that its actions in Beirut and the mountains were necessary to defend the resistance, which was being targeted both by the government’s resolution and by the movement of armed militia groups belonging to the ruling party. It did what was required to defend itself but limited its actions to areas that had been attacked. It did not leave an armed presence on the streets, nor did it consider imposing its authority on any part of Lebanon, but handed all areas back to the Lebanese army immediately. This limited defensive objective was clearly visible in the solution, which subsequently resulted in the Doha agreement (see below). The opposition did not try to benefit from what had happened; it was a direct result of the government’s resolution on the communications network.

Given the generally held desire not to plunge the country into civil war, and the opposition’s determination to continue the campaign of civil disobedience – announced on May 8 – until the government rescinded its resolution, there was a swift and favourable response to proposals put forward by the Arab League delegation headed by the Prime Minister of Qatar, Sheikh Hamad bin Jassem bin Jabr Al Thani, that the country return to the situation prior to the events caused by the cabinet’s actions on May 5. Once the government reversed its decision regarding the resistance’s communications network and the sacking of the head of the airport’s security service, Brigadier General Wafik Shukair, the way was clear for an agreement. It was decided to convene a conference of national dialogue in Doha, Qatar. The head of the Arab League delegation announced the agreement at the Phoenicia Hotel in Beirut, in the presence of representatives of the opposition and those loyal to the government.

The Doha Agreement

The conference in Doha was convened on May 16, 2008. Agreement was reached on the three main points that had been the subject of controversy for the previous year and a half following the opposition ministers’ resignation from the government. Hizbullah made the same demands at Doha that it had been making for the last year and a half. The parties agreed on the following:

1. The Speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, based on the rules in effect, should invite Parliament to convene within twenty-four hours to elect the consensus candidate, General Michel Sleiman, as President of the Republic.
2. A national unity government should be formed, composed of thirty ministers distributed among the majority (sixteen ministers), the opposition (eleven ministers, i.e. one-thirdplus-one) and the President (three ministers), and by virtue of this agreement, all parties would be committed to not resigning or obstructing the government’s actions.
3. The adoption of the caza (administrative district) as an electoral constituency in conformity with the 1960 law (using the majority system).

The Doha agreement was concluded against a backdrop of regional and international concern that the situation in Lebanon was getting out of control and could have damaging repercussions for the region at a time when calm was needed by all sides. Influential Arab parties were particularly concerned by the following: overall instability in the region, caused by the approaching end of the Bush administration and Bush’s many failures in the Middle East; a possible change in the balance of power in Lebanon should the situation be allowed to develop any further; the dangerous and unforeseen events, precipitated by the May 5 decision; and the inability of the loyalists to apply pressure to the resistance despite the use of government resolutions, armed militias and official security forces.

The Doha agreement put the country on a new path. It revitalized Lebanese constitutional institutions by allowing the election of General Sleiman as president on May 25, 2008, and also paved the way for the holding of new parliamentary elections in June 2009, which will restore legitimacy to the country; in addition, it put the question of Hizbullah’s weapons into the framework of discussions on a national defence strategy. These will be led by the President of the Republic and will address Lebanon’s defence requirements in the light of threats posed by Israel to its territory, waters and airspace.

It is impossible to turn the clock back; continuing to ignore the preference of the Lebanese people for a strong country will not lead to a stable solution. If decisions were based on strictly applied laws and popular will, then the region as a whole would reject this disregard of national will and free choice. US policies in the region, as pursued by the Bush administration, have only prolonged the crisis and made it more complicated. There should be a different approach, based on the legal rights of citizens to their homeland and their right to liberate that land; respect for people’s choices and the laws of their countries; an end to political interference by foreign countries, which favour one group’s interests over another’s; a recognition of the degree of Islamic awakening taking place across the Islamic world, and the extent of rejection and resistance among those who wish to solve the region’s problems; an end to international alignment with Israel; confiscation of Israel’s nuclear arsenal; fair and equitable treatment of the Palestinian people by giving them their rights, restoring their land, lifting the siege and stopping aggression; a serious effort to end the US occupation of Iraq; letting Iran possess nuclear energy for peaceful means, which is its natural right; and the return of occupied Syrian and Lebanese territories to their rightful owners.

The Vision of Hizbullah

Hizbullah believes that it owes its success in the divine victory of July 2006 to God and to the soundness of its programme and the political and jihadi management of the Islamic resistance. It was comprehensive and far-reaching, much more than just a military victory. It was a victory for the frontline forces, for the broad mass of people who flocked to the resistance and for those who wish for liberation and independence.

The resistance wing of Hizbullah is part of an integrated philosophical and political vision of jihad, which aims to build a strong, stable and independent country in Lebanon. The Party gives expression to it through legitimate means; it receives popular approval and support, and is based on divine and tolerant teachings and the human right to justice, freedom, dignity and humanity. It has two main objectives: to liberate the land from occupation and to defend Lebanon against the threat posed by Israel.

Hizbullah is clear in its vision. The resistance is not merely an armed group that wishes to liberate a piece of land, nor is it a circumstantial tool whose role will end when the pretext for using it comes to an end. It is a vision and approach, not only a military reaction. Hizbullah believes in the need to build a resistance society in Lebanon in order to strengthen the country and reinforce its independence and sovereignty in light of Israel’s expansionist project. The alternative is a weak state that will be dictated to by Israel. The resistance programme Hizbullah proposes is sustainable. It must be discussed with the Lebanese people so that agreement can be reached on the steps forward that should be taken.

Hizbullah’s vision of a resistance society is one in which resistance takes place at all levels, be they military, cultural, political or media; it is resistance by the people and the fighters, by the rulers and the nation; it is resistance with a free conscience. We consistently advocate building a resistance society, and do not believe in resistance groups. A resistance society implies continuity, while resistance groups only have a circumstantial use.

You may ask whether Lebanon can bear the cost of resistance. I ask instead whether Lebanon can bear the cost and consequences of occupation, for this is not a debate about the resistance and its weapons, but about the kind of Lebanon we want. If we want a free, independent and sovereign Lebanon, then it must be able to defend itself. Since we have a resistance with an organized defence capability, let us work to strengthen the Lebanese army, to put a defence strategy in place that will allow it to benefit from the ample elements of force available and to organize it in a manner that will enable it to achieve its goals. Since we agree we must build a powerful and just state, it would be wrong to abandon the very thing that makes us strong. There is no conflict between state and resistance; the resistance’s objectives, to defend the land and to confront the occupation, serve the interests of the state’s interests in a very fundamental way. The resistance should be considered an instrument of the state and not in competition with it. The resistance should be regarded as a support for the state and not a substitute for it.

Not surprisingly, there has been a growing desire among intellectuals, journalists, academics and the general public to learn more about Hizbullah’s vision, methodology, experiences and aspirations for the future. To this end, we decided to publish Hizbullah: al-munhaju, al-tajribah, al-mustaqbal in English in November 2002, as it provided a rich source of material for researchers. We did not modify it in the present edition, as its fundamental perspective on the Party’s programme, history, vision and outlook for the future has remained constant and true. We have added a new introduction, which provides a brief chronology of events that have occurred since 2004, beginning with UN Security Council Resolution 1559 on Lebanon (passed on September 2, 2004) and ending with the incidents of May 2008, along with the Party’s reaction to them. Thus we can look at the most significant developments, though we recognize that a new book would be required to fully record and analyse this historic, sensitive and important stage in Lebanon’s history and the role Hizbullah has played in it.

I hope this book will provide the reader with an opportunity to learn from Hizbullah’s contemporary experience, which has been such an inspiration to the peoples of the Middle East and to the resistance movement, and that this book can serve as a fundamental tool for all those who wish to be liberated from occupation, by pursuing a conscious and genuine jihadi political model.

Naim Qassem, 2008

One: Vision and Goals

Hizbullah’s Foundation

The early 1960s in Lebanon witnessed the beginnings of an active clerical movement that served to re-invigorate Islam’s key principles. Initiated by a number of Islamic clerics just back from the holy schools of religion in Najaf in Iraq, the clerical teachings, speeches and cultural dialogue that ensued prompted many concerns and queries about Islam’s proposed role in life. Until then, neither the cultural nor political scene – both preoccupied with various core concerns – had lent any attention to the Islamic direction or foreseen a role for it.

Activity was initially limited to leading the faithful at mosque prayers and teaching religion at village schools and nearby environs. Gradually, cultural events proliferated across the various Lebanese districts, albeit within tight and limited circles. A number of young men with a serious interest in Islam attended, and then so did whole congregations. They all soon followed the clerics, forming small groups of individuals to watch over communities and playing educational and community service roles, always hinging on the cleric who oversaw and supported all efforts.

University students were rare at these gatherings, while highly motivated men actively participated in community work and gathered around the cleric and his activities. Female presence was scarce and underwhelming, and children who attended mosque prayers at the time were seen as the promising hope of the future. Indeed, this phase witnessed the Islamic condition’s humble, embryonic beginnings.

Soon, three of the active clerics drew the spotlight. Their ideological visions were comprehensive; their cultural capabilities were high and they shared a belief in the necessity of taking action to trigger a change in then-prevalent living conditions. Each had his approach, practical logic and plan of action. They met in many gatherings with peer clerics and engaged in crucial discussions over the requirements for Islamic activity in Lebanon. Each had his personal agenda, and at the practical level their approaches were independent and different, solidifying later depending on the chosen course. While core groups gathered around each cleric and were considered to be his followers, an important number of those faithful attendants participated in the various activities of all three. These clerics are:

1. Imam¹ Mussa al-Sadr. The majority of his religious schooling was accomplished in sacred Qum in Iran and later resumed in holy Najaf. His activity started in the Lebanese city of Tyre, particularly through the ‘Charity and Philanthropy Association’. Soon, a regional outreach was reflected in all of his activities, which expanded at the cultural level to cover all of Lebanon. He carried obvious weight on the local scene, with many a speech given at various cultural and educational forums and a number presented inside churches. Prominent figures as well-cultured individuals from diverse backgrounds gathered around him. His attractive personality, which was easily capable of drawing favourable public opinion, was complemented with solid, substantiated logic. His concern for the socio-political movement was early, and culminated in 1967 in the creation of the Highest Islamic Shi‘ite Council as an official religious institution set up to support and see to the concerns of the Shi‘ite congregation in tandem with peer institutions of other congregations in Lebanon. While this achievement came in spite of the disagreement and plain opposition he faced from prominent Shi‘i politicians, he nevertheless believed that the role of this Council was to group the eminent members of the Shi‘ite congregation, and is thus a specific role. The need to found a framework that bears the concerns and issues of the masses had posed itself. In response, Imam al-Sadr founded the ‘Movement of the Oppressed’, a socio-political group with the primary mission of alleviating poverty, especially as represented by the hardship befalling South Lebanon, the Eastern Bekaa district and the so-called ‘boroughs of misery’ around the capital, Beirut (resulting from mass urbanization). Both religious as well as other types of groups joined, many simply drawn to the personality of the Imam and his ability to set the movement on its right path irrespective of the variety of individual ideologies present in its ranks. Imam al-Sadr held large-scale events in the name of the movement, rallying to drive his political statements home in the face of a neglectful and derelict government. Imam al-Sadr also founded ‘The Ranks of Lebanese Resistance [Amal]’ – the military arm of the Movement of the Oppressed whose mission was to resist Israeli occupation. The movement was openly declared in 1974 following a bombing incident at a training camp,² one that clearly exposed the ongoing military training and necessitated its declaration. Author of the famous slogan ‘Israel is an utter evil’, Imam al-Sadr never ceased to call for waging war on Israel and freeing the land from its occupation. At the time, the Palestinian Liberation Organization had supervised the majority of resistance activity against occupation in South Lebanon, and Amal’s participation in a number of confrontations with Israel was recorded. But the Imam’s mission was, alas, discontinued. He was kidnapped in Libya following an invitation received from Libyan President Muammar al-Qaddafi to attend the annual September national celebrations. The date was August 31, 1978. To date, Imam al-Sadr’s fate remains unknown.
2. Ayatullah³ Muhammad Mahdi Shamseddine. Starting his activity in East Beirut, Shamseddine led prayers at the Dekwaneh mosque and looked after the social and cultural aspects of that congregation. He later moved to Beirut’s southern suburb of Chiyah, where he chaired the Cultural and Charity Association, which worked to produce and distribute the set of ‘Cultural Direction’ educational booklets. The association was also active at the forum and discussion levels, later expanding its scope of activity to include a number of auxiliary institutions, the most significant of which was the Islamic Institution of the Arts. He was notable for his intellectual capacity – a remarkable capability to shape words into well-founded expressions of depth and precision. He gave many lectures, held conferences for intellectuals throughout the Arab world and wrote many books. His prominence and distinguished cultural presence in many an intellectual forum was palpable. Shamseddine’s participation in public life was initially weak, despite his qualifications, according to many, for the post of Deputy Head of the Highest Islamic Shi‘ite Council. During the tenure of Imam al-Sadr, his involvement was not proactive at the level of the Council, especially given his intellectual orientation. He was thus not part of any existing organizational frameworks, opting to ‘remain at an equal distance from all’ – as he famously chose to put it. Indeed, such a stance summarized his view of the Council’s role: that of taking all of the Shi‘ite congregation’s divergent influences under its wing. In the context of freedom from Israeli occupation, the Ayatullah’s attempts to establish some form of large-scale civil resistance did not bear fruit, given the scope of the structure suggested by the concept. Though he was clear in his call to fight Israel and achieve liberation, his longing – as he had so many times expressed – was for assigning the larger portion of his efforts to intellectual work.
3. Ayatullah al-Sayyed⁴ Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah. East Beirut also saw the beginnings of a third cleric’s activity. Al-Sayyed Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah founded the Brotherhood Association in Naba’a, where a cultural centre was built grouping together a mosque, house of worship, school of religion and dispensary. His dedication to mosque activity was apparent, and he adopted a messenger role, continuously preaching across various Lebanese regions and holding regular weekly classes in many Beirut neighbourhoods and suburbs. Relocating to Beirut’s southern suburbs, he led mosque prayers at the Imam al-Rida mosque, which later became an icon of Islamic work in Lebanon. Cultural work, lectures and education were his primary concerns, in addition to the publication of many books. The messenger role dominated his activities, with political speeches emerging only after the Israeli invasion. He founded the Association of Philanthropic Organizations, which groups together a large number of educational, religious and social institutions. It was a framework directly falling under his supervision and encompassing the variety of institutional activity that formed part of his concerns. During the early years of the Party, the name of Ayatullah al-Sayyed Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah was closely associated with its own. He was a symbol of many ideological concepts within the Party, guiding Hizbullah through a mature vision of Islam and of the Islamic movement, supporting the Islamic revolution’s leader in Iran, Ayatullah Khomeini. This prompted many to nominate him for a leading position in this nascent faction. But al-Sayyed Fadlallah refused any participation in organized factional activity, opting to remain a cleric, overseeing all fields from his vantage point and supporting those Party directives that he deemed harmonious with his views. On a broad spectrum of issues, al-Sayyed Fadlallah’s views and propositions were harmonious with those of the Party, a fact demonstrated through his speeches in the majority of the Party’s chief forums and conferences. In those early days prior to Hizbullah’s formal declaration through the Open Letter (see Chapter Three), the absence of Party leaders, especially at the media and political level, led both local and international media as well as the bulk of political leaderships to consider al-Sayyed Fadlallah as Hizbullah’s spiritual leader, the guiding figure in the arena of active Islamic groups. This impression came in spite of repeated denials by both the Party and al-Sayyed Fadlallah of any such relationship. This prevalent perception altered only of late, following the emergence of a clear Hizbullah leadership, most notably at the level of the Secretary General, as well as a number of independent activities which clarified the real context of the relationship.

Lebanese Islamists divided their allegiance among Amal, the range of Islamic committees, the missionary faction and the independents. The theoretical cultural foundation for all of these courses was subject to the influence of all or some of the three leading clerics, as well as to clerical activity in general. Given that Amal was the only political movement at the time, it attracted some activists either as a result of conviction in the organization’s ideology or out of a belief that this was a transitory phase while awaiting alternatives. Others participated in the work of the various Islamic committees – essentially groups of local young men volunteering in areas such as education or mosque service; speaking in the name of the faithful youth; concentrating on providing religious education to communities; and following spiritual and cultural mobilization programmes in terms of organizing such religious events as the commemoration of Ashura⁵ and Ramadan night rituals. A student movement under the name of ‘The Lebanese Muslim Students’ Association’, concerned mainly with students’ problems, found harmony with Amal, and worked to organize lectures and education sessions targeting youth. At the time, general political matters were not part of Amal’s concerns.

During this time, in 1979, the Iranian Revolution led by Ayatullah Khomeini saw victory, drawing the faithful closer to Islam. Massive support was evident in demonstrations organized under the banner of ‘Supportive Committees to the Islamic Revolution in Iran’, a movement which eventually led to communication with the pillars of the young Islamic government in Iran, at the head of which was the religious leader of the Islamic umma, the Jurist-Theologian (al-wali al-faqih), Ayatullah Khomeini.

Prior to this development, there had been no connection with the Iranian Revolution, as such matters were in the realm of clerical issues. Such is the practice of the Shi‘ite congregation, where ‘interpretative judgment’⁶ is possible, and where subjects are required to follow the religious interpretation of the more learned among the living clerics. Given that the majority of Lebanese clerics completed their disciplinary studies at Najaf in Iraq, thus did their summons concentrate on a relationship with the references and clerics of Najaf, and so was the call for imitating Imam al-Kho’i, and, on a tighter scale, the martyr al-Sayyed Muhammad Baqr al-Sadr. As soon as the Iranian Revolution was declared victorious, Ayatullah Khomeini was designated the leading religious authority, and the inquisition began into the appropriate means of liaising with the Islamic Revolution’s leadership.

Thirst for an Islamic revolution came in tandem with a rising and insistent need for political revitalization in a country like Lebanon, a need that was not fulfilled by practical Islamic activity at the time of the Revolution. Perhaps the circumstances surrounding the Najaf clerical teachings in Lebanon and the nature of their concerns, together with the rise of youth activity, resulted in a dominance of intellectual and cultural aspects. Such was markedly different from the teachings and concerns of Qum clerics, who were inspired by an effective and influential political experience that culminated in the creation of a modern Islamic state in Iran.

Within their circles, Islamists discussed the issue of their own resurgence, the requirements of the then-prevailing political phase in Lebanon and the possibilities of benefiting from new insights brought about by the Iranian experience. They found that the organizational frameworks within which they operated did not serve their goals and aspirations, as they were unable to change and develop and could not be forged together if each was to preserve its particularity; such a formula would be simply a mere ‘grouping’, not a solid, united organization, and would therefore be unable to fulfill objectives.

Such discussions were taking place at a time when communication with the new pillars of the Iranian state increased, the objective being to remain informed of achievements there. At the same time, Israel invaded Lebanon. Groups of faithful men participated in confrontations at the outskirts of Beirut, collaborating with the Syrian army and a few Palestinian and Lebanese resistance fighters. Their efforts resulted in crippling Israel’s advancement towards Beirut. However, none of the Islamic factional frameworks had been prepared for this grand mission. The concern for and need to found a united Islamic organization surfaced. Such an organization was to rest on three pivotal objectives:

1. Islam is the comprehensive, complete and appropriate programme for a better life. It is the intellectual, religious, ideological and practical foundation for the proposed organization.
2. Resistance against Israeli occupation, which is a danger to both the present and future, receives ultimate confrontation priority given the anticipated effects of such occupation on Lebanon and the region. This necessitates the creation of a jihad structure that should further this obligation, and in favour of which all capabilities are to be employed.
3. The legitimate leadership is designated to the Jurist-Theologian who is considered to be the successor to the Prophet and the Imams (PBUT).⁷ The Jurist-Theologian draws the general guiding direction for the nation of Islam. His commands and proscriptions are enforceable.

To achieve these ends, a number of representatives of the main Islamic groups launched many discussions regarding their perception of Islamic activity in Lebanon. Results were summarized in a final document, following which nine representatives were elected to speak for the convening parties: three stood for the clerical congregation of the Bekaa (East Lebanon); three represented the various Islamic committees; and three spoke for the Islamic Movement, Amal.⁸ The document thus became known as the ‘Manifesto of the Nine’, which upheld the objectives mentioned above and was presented to Ayatullah Khomeini – who granted his approval, thereby bestowing the custodianship of the Jurist-Theologian.

Various Islamic groups then adopted the manifesto, dissolving their existing organizations in favour of one new framework, which later came to be known as ‘Hizbullah’.⁹ Its founding leadership was chosen following much deliberation, and the first steps towards capitalizing on the Party’s potential were taken. Membership programmes were roughly drafted, and effective mobilization activity was launched with clerics summoning members to join military training and work towards the resistance of Israeli occupation. All of this took place within the Islamic framework guided by the Jurist-Theologian.

These developments occurred at a time of Iranian solidarity with Lebanon and Syria. Ayatullah Khomeini ordered the Iranian Revolutionary Guard to support Lebanon’s confrontation with Israel, primarily through military training and the provision of the necessary infrastructure. A delegation of high-ranking Iranian military officials visited Syria for coordination. Syria agreed to the passage of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard into Lebanon, and training camps were set up in the Western Bekaa district. An advanced system of training, religious practice and personal as well as moral cultivation was devised, and large numbers of young men joined these camps. Hizbullah’s participation was marked, and the Party had by then attracted many more believers in its goals.

The time lapse between training and execution of military activity in the occupied areas of the South and Western Bekaa was not considerable. A number of trained youth who had benefited from the experience provided through Palestinian resistance had already started their confrontations. Though their means were limited, their dedication was fervent, and so was their willingness to sacrifice. These developments rolled consecutively in the months following the Israeli invasion.

The Three Pillars of Hizbullah

In order to clearly present Hizbullah’s intellectual background, we dedicate the rest of this chapter to the three objectives that represent the primary pillar on which Hizbullah is based.

First: Belief in Islam

Islam is the last and most comprehensive of heavenly messages. As God Almighty states in the Holy Qur’an:

This is in the former scrolls, the Books of Abraham and Moses¹⁰ … This day have I perfected your religion for you and completed My favour unto you, and have chosen for you as religion al-Islam.¹¹

It is a conviction, and code of law. The conviction speaks to the mind, calling on it to believe in one God, the Creator of this universe. For it is unthinkable that the sky and what is in it, the land and what lurks beneath it and lives on it, life with all its diversity and continuity as represented by the sum of creatures and the interrelationships between all of these subjects within such an accurate system, could have been the work of less than a powerful and mighty Creator.

He sent His messengers with miracles in order to alert humankind to its role on this earth, and to the good it has been created for, the most prominent of those messengers being those decisive five: Noah, Abraham, Moses, Jesus and Muhammad (PBUT). They dispensed their messages, and left us with heavenly books of religion, the last of which is the Holy Qur’an – that miracle book of which not a letter has been altered since the Lord gave it in its entirety to Muhammad through the Angel Gabriel. The Prophet’s message and enlightenment continued through the infallible Imams, sons of Imam Ali (PBUT).

God has not created life in vain (Deemed ye then that We had created you for naught, and that ye would not be returned unto Us?¹²). His justice rewards the faithful – those who properly abide by God’s principles – with Paradise, and punishes the blasphemous, divergent, and wrong-doers with Hell; on the Day of Resurrection, all creation will be assembled for punishment and reward. All Heavenly messages have concurred on the belief in a Day of Resurrection and on the importance of preparing oneself for it through rectitude and good deeds.

As for the code of law, it covers all of humankind’s needs, both individual and social, and touches on all aspects of life through its provision of overall guidelines as well as small details. Both the Holy Qur’an and the Prophet’s Noble Mores (Sunnah) have clarified these issues.

Islam as a Comprehensive Religion

In order to provide a thorough overview of Islam’s comprehensive nature, we hereby use examples of a number of domains it encompasses:

1. Belief in God Almighty. Compliance with one’s religion and avoidance of what it prohibits is attested in God’s words:

   And verily We have raised in every nation a messenger [proclaiming]: Serve Allah and shun false gods. Then some of them [there were] whom Allah guided, and some of them [there were] upon whom error had just hold. Do but travel in the land and see the nature of the consequence for the deniers!¹³

   Settlement and consideration on the Day of Resurrection shall be on the basis of such compliance, and on not wasting one’s time on earth in pursuit of life’s pleasures; for as God said:

   Every soul will taste of death. And ye will be paid on the Day of Resurrection only that which ye have fairly earned. Whoso is removed from the Fire and is made to enter Paradise, he indeed is triumphant. The life of this world is but comfort of illusion.¹⁴

   Henceforth, consent between the Lord and His servant is mutual pending the results, for as God Almighty said:

   And the first to lead the way, of the muhajirin¹⁵ and the ansar¹⁶ and those who followed them in goodness, Allah is well pleased with them and they are well pleased with Him and He hath made ready for them gardens underneath which rivers flow, wherein they will abide for ever. That is the supreme triumph17

2. Worship. This is the means by which the believer cultivates his personality in terms of his relationship with his Lord. Worship is requested in such actions as prayer, fasting, pilgrimage and charity.¹⁸ God’s words in this context are clear:

   And the believers, men and women, are protecting friends one of another; they enjoin the right and forbid the wrong, and they establish worship and they pay the poor-due, and they obey Allah and His messenger. As for these, Allah will have mercy on them. Allah is mighty, wise.¹⁹

   From the same perspective²⁰ the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) clarified the pillars of Islam in these words: Islam was built on ten pillars:
   • a.   Testimony that there is no other god but Allah – and that is the creed;
   • b.   Prayer, which is an obligation;
   • c.   Fasting, which is the shield;
   • d.   Charity – and that is purity;
   • e.   Pilgrimage,²¹ which is the code of law(Shari‘a);²²
   • f.   Jihad, the struggle;
   • g.   Ordinance, to do what is kind and right – and that is fidelity;
   • h.   Forbiddance of the prohibited – and that is the proof;
   • i.   The Group, representing affinity and harmony;
   • j.   Infallibility, which is obedience.²³
3. Self-Discipline. This is subject to man’s direction and requires daily follow-up given its susceptibility to evil. God said:

   … by the soul and its moulding and inspiration [with conscience of] what is wrong for it and [what is] right for it … He is indeed successful who causeth it to grow, And he is indeed a failure who stunteth it.²⁴

   The victor is one who succeeds in controlling the self, preventing it from disobedience and indulgence of whims. God Almighty has explained:

   But as for him who feared to stand before his Lord and restrained his soul from lust, lo! The Garden will be his home.²⁵

   In Imam al-Sadeq’s interpretation of God’s words, But for him who feareth the standing before his Lord there are two gardens,²⁶ we read ‘He who knows that God sees him, hears his words, knows his good and bad deeds, and then seals himself from wrong-doing, is one who has feared God’s standing and forbade himself from whims.’²⁷
4. Concern for Politics. In the context of concern for the issues of Islam, the Prophet (PBUH) said: that ‘he who ceases to be concerned with issues of fellow Muslims ceases to be Muslim.’²⁸ In terms of mistrusting tyrants, God clarifies:

   So tread thou the straight path as thou art commanded, and those who turn (unto Allah) with thee, and transgress not. He is Seer of what ye do. And incline not toward those who do wrong lest the Fire touch you, and ye have no protecting friends against Allah, and afterward ye would not be helped.²⁹

5. Jihad in the Name of God. Jihad is to be carried out even using the dearest of man’s belongings of soul and wealth without hesitation and whenever obliged to. God Almighty’s words on this were: Go forth, light armed and heavy armed, and strive with your wealth and your lives in the way of Allah! That is best for you if ye but knew.³⁰
6. Economics. Islam calls for executing trading operations on the basis of sale and not through interest-bearing transactions. As God said: Allah permitteth trading and forbiddeth usury.³¹ Islam has also directed rulers to the appropriate taxation methods intended to increase wealth. The focus here is on re-investment for development as a basis for drawing taxes, not the reverse. Commander of the Faithful³² Imam Ali (PBUH) said in this context:

   And let your foresight for development be wiser than your aim of collecting tax, for tax could only be achieved through development. That who seeks to tax without development is but ruining the land and oppressing its people. His reign shall endure only shortly. And if they complain of burden, an ailment, lack of water or production, or land retirement resulting from floods or a drought, do reduce their liability so as to improve their stance. Do not be burdened by that with which you ease their burden, for it is only a saving which will return as development of your country and flourish of your rule, in addition to summoning their praise of you.³³

7. Joint Social Responsibility. This is invoked through distribution of charity (zakat) funds among society’s needy and in favour of God, who said:

   The alms are only for the poor and the needy, and those who collect them, and those whose hearts are to be reconciled, and to free the captives and the debtors, and for the cause of Allah, and [ for] the wayfarers; a duty imposed by Allah. Allah is knower, wise.³⁴

   On the other hand, whoever rebuffs the orphan and does not strive to feed the needy is perceived to be in practical denial of the Day of Resurrection, as God Almighty said: Hast thou observed him who belieth religion? That is he who repelleth the orphan, And urgeth not the feeding of the needy.³⁵
8. Using reason and refusing subordination. This is the call for proof to be the basis for belief or disbelief:

   Is not He (best), Who produceth creation, then reproduceth it, and Who provideth for you from the heaven and the earth? Is there any God beside Allah? Say: Bring your proof, if ye are truthful!³⁶

   Following straying parents and family is thus wrong, despite the factors of birth and social status. In this context God said:

   And when it is said unto them: Follow that which Allah hath revealed, they say: We follow that wherein we found our fathers. What! Even though their fathers were wholly unintelligent and had no guidance?³⁷

9. Communication. There is no need for pressure and tension: There is no compulsion in religion. The right direction is henceforth distinct from error.³⁸ One’s ideas and convictions must be presented in an appropriate manner, as one is not responsible for others’ convictions, and everyone’s final return is to the Creator, as the Holy Qur’an puts it:

   Call unto the way of thy Lord with wisdom and fair exhortation, and reason with them in the better way. Thy Lord is best aware of him who strayeth from His way, and He is best aware of those who go aright.³⁹

10. Justice. This is the adopted basis for every action. Its controlling factor is being on God’s straight path, shunning whatever is loathed, immoral, oppressive or represents straying from the right path. As God said:

    Allah enjoineth justice, kindness and giving to kinsfolk, and forbiddeth lewdness and abomination and wickedness. He exhorteth you in order that ye may take heed.⁴⁰

11. Piety. A person’s value is not determined by race, gender, colour or beauty, but by the level of devotion to religion – by piety. God Almighty said:

    O mankind! We have created you male and female, and have made you nations and tribes that ye may know one another. The noblest of you, in the sight of Allah, is the best in conduct.⁴¹

    In the Prophet’s words: ‘There is no preference for an Arab over a non-Arab, or for a non-Arab over an Arab, or for a black man over a red, or for a red man over a black, except in devotion.’⁴²

Based on the above, Islam is both worship and a policy applicable for both life and the afterlife, relevant to the individual and society, the mosque and the ruling authority, calling for mercy and firmness, jihad and peace. It is thus that the Prophet (PBUH) was a ruler, leader, politician and worshipper, portraying man at his best. By holding Islam’s banner, we worship God in every position or situation, for our prayers are worship, and so is our jihad, our justice and our service of society. It becomes difficult to distinguish that which is done for the sake of God from that which is to please the ruler, or even to please humankind, for all at the end is for God: He knoweth all that is before them and all that is behind them, and unto Allah all things are returned.⁴³ In other words, in everything he does, man is concerned with looking after God’s orders and forbiddances, for there is no circle to which God has not entered and which is solely left for the individual to shape. Even that space which was left by the Creator to man is also within the realm of the organized circle of life, and is governed by the fixed general rules of the sacred Shari‘a.

As such, an individual has no right to remain isolated in the name of worship, or to detach oneself from society, confining it to the mosque. He is responsible both as an individual and as part of the nation. One cannot get closer to God by moving further from the realm of this world: But seek the abode of the Hereafter in that which Allah hath given thee and neglect not thy portion of the world.⁴⁴

Three faithful men decided to abstain from life’s permitted pleasures, each in his manner. One decided to devote all his nights to prayer and obedience of God. Another decided to fast every day of his life, while the third took a vow of chastity. When the Prophet (PBUH) learned of this, his retort was: ‘What is the matter with those who have vowed so and so? Here I am, praying then sleeping, fasting then breaking fast, and marrying women. He who has preferred another custom than mine is not of me.’⁴⁵

Islam and Modern Society

But can Islam keep pace with present ways of life? The religion’s comprehensiveness could have served well at the time of its dispense, but after 1,400 years of change, is it logical to implement what was fit for the past in today’s day and age?

The answer becomes easy when we distinguish the fixed from the changing in Islam. The religion has rested on a number of permanent basics and verdicts related to the creation of man and the nature of his disposition, and these are harmonious with epochal changes. Prayer, for instance, is a form of worship destined to the cultivation and refinement of the human spirit, in whatever era the spirit may be existent. Fasting is a challenge to the willpower, providing it with strength for the sake of achieving that level of fidelity that leads to piety and directness. Marriage is needed for feeding the instinct and building the world’s existence, based on permanent rules that protect progeny and family ties. Oppression is refused, whether its originator is a king, an emperor, a tribal chief or an elected representative of the people. And justice is required of the individual and society, while respect for high morals is a foundation for social stability.

The observer of Islamic verdicts and permanent policies, whether general or specific, notes their applicability to the individual and his interests irrespective of time and place.

This being said, what is considered to be ‘varying’ as opposed to permanent is, indeed, quite a lot. Open interpretations of Shari‘a, the body of Islamic law addressing all societal concerns, discuss all the requirements of modernity and answer to current events and arising queries, reconsidering previous interpretations and taking new circumstances into consideration. This creates the space needed to develop and keep pace with change.

Islam has set guidelines for the ‘good’ governor or leader while leaving the choice of government framework up to that leader. As such, electing a president could be through direct popular vote or through a parliament. So is the question of forming a government left free of strict rules; the existence of any form of government, its membership, role assignment, or authority are all issues left to choice. Likewise, there is no interference with the chosen method for electing representative members, whether these are individuals or groups or in any other form. Islam thus permits the creation of what is deemed to be an appropriate set-up for each epoch.

Islam has also drawn the basics of educational organization in terms of the obligations of the student and the teacher and the responsibility of family and society in cultivating generations. Nevertheless, the religion is open on the issues of coordination, organization and management as the time and age deem fit. Thus, whether education is provided under the tree, in the mosque, at school or in mobile buildings, and whether it is dispensed through a book, multi-media tools, the computer or the Internet, is a matter falling within the realm of allowable choice.

Islam urges cleanliness; as the Prophet (PBUH) said: ‘Cleanliness is a form of belief.’⁴⁶ The Prophet (PBUH) concentrated on the importance of water as a means for achieving desired purity, and also defined the specifics of using water in order to achieve the cleanliness needed to complete certain forms of worship. Having said that, he left the possibilities open as to the methods to be followed for achieving general cleanliness and safety of the environment, be that through the use of water or other alternative cleaning means, and be it applied to houses, streets, agricultural pastures, seas or rivers.

Rules that appropriately serve the human condition have thus been set by Islam and were deemed permanent for all time, akin to man’s permanent need for them. In contrast, a wide margin was left to accommodate change, and keep pace with any place and age. Such space is what Martyr Muhammad Baqr al-Sadr termed ‘the gap’ in his discussion of the economic perspective in Islam:

The economic point of view in Islam has two aspects. One has been completely filled by religion and is deemed invariably permanent, and the other represents a gap left to the governing bodies or custodians of the state to fill according to Islam’s objectives and their requirements at any time. When we mention this ‘gap’, we thus refer to the reality present in Islam’s Shari‘a or doctrinal writings, and not to Islam’s applicable reality in its early days. The Prophet (PBUH) had amply filled this gap based on the objectives of the doctrine in what concerns economic subject matters and in light of Islamic society’s circumstances at the time. He filled this gap not as a prophet (PBUH) whose duty is to convey God’s permanent message, thus expressing fixed doctrinal practices, but rather as a custodian of the people, charged by doctrine to fill this gap based on time and circumstance.⁴⁷

What applies to economics in terms of an open space permitting change is also true of Islam’s other doctrinal disciplines. As such, response to contemporary needs hinges on human choice, which in turn excels when man realizes the multiple facets of such needs and becomes proficient at implementing the appropriate rules for every situation.

But whatever man’s capabilities, they will not achieve the level of God’s exemplary system. If we undertake but a preliminary and general comparison between a legislation that God had decided for His servants, He being the All-knower, and one that is constantly amended by powerless humankind, thereby subjecting humanity to dire and painful experiments ranging from slavery to repression to capitalism, then communism, of which the world emerges exhausted if only from the dangerous aftermaths that affect life – despite a number of positive enlightenments here and there – the obvious result would be in favour of Heavenly legislation. Such is what Islam portrays in its all-encompassing message covering all previous Heavenly religions. It is therefore imperative for us to listen to, become acquainted with and understand this true religion before refuting it for religious, ethnic or constituency reasons. We are similarly obliged not to burden it with the errors of those who have borne the religion erroneously, nor with the responsibility for those conspiracies woven by Islam’s prejudiced enemies whose purpose is to tarnish the religion’s image.

Establishing an Islamic State

Do these arguments represent a prologue to the call for establishing an Islamic state? Such a project is the natural expression of allegiance for any committed Muslim holding on to Islamic conviction and persuaded by its code. It represents the ultimate justice to which man aspires. However, we seek here to detail the difference between the intellectual vision and its practical manifestation: in the first we summon the creation of an Islamic state and encourage others to adopt it as the supreme representation of human happiness; while on the second, practical level, we recognize that such development requires a proper foundation that accommodates the creation of the state.

Such a foundation is the represented by the populace to whom the freedom to choose a ruling body has been provided in Qur’an’s holy words:

There is no compulsion in religion. The right direction is henceforth distinct from error. And he who rejects false deities and believeth in Allah hath grasped a firm handhold which will never break. Allah is Hearer, Knower.⁴⁸

The creation of an Islamic state is thus not a function of adoption by one group or branch and a subsequent imposition on other groups. Such a path is refused for both this project and others, irrespective of who its originators are.

The first official expression in this context was issued through the Open Letter declared by Hizbullah in 1985, through which it was stated: ‘We confirm our conviction in Islam as a tenet and system, both intellectual and legislative, calling on all to learn of it and abide by its code. And we summon the people to adopt it and commit to its instructions, at the individual, political and social levels. Where the freedom of choosing a governing system is attributed to our people in Lebanon, they will not find a better alternative to Islam. Hence, we call for the implementation of the Islamic system based on a direct and free choice of the people, and not through forceful imposition as may be assumed by some.’⁴⁹

The message is clear, and beckons the creation of an Islamic state based on free public choice. We are hence in perfect harmony with our convictions and with the practical, objective circumstances surrounding us. As long as such circumstances are not in support of the project, either due to people’s diverging opinions or for any other reasons, we would consider ourselves forgivable in the sense that we have conveyed the message and declared our stance, thereby leaving it up to the people to choose their governing system and bear the responsibility for such choice: And if thy Lord willed, all who are on the earth would have believed together. Wouldst thou [Muhammad] compel men until they are believers?⁵⁰

We strive to project our convictions in the context of the social work in which we participate, hoping to diminish those negative effects of distancing from God’s code. We believe that our political experience in Lebanon has proved a pattern that is harmonious with an Islamic vision within a mixed society – a country not following the Islamic mode of thinking, neither in public administration nor through an overall vision or fundamental belief in Islam as a governing system. As such, we can state that our belief is in harmony with Islamic thought, which no one has a right to obliterate, create a new design that refutes any of its content or correct interpretation or object to such conviction which is tied to belief in the righteous claim for God’s system over any other. But practical accomplishment has its foundations and objective circumstances. Our duty is thus to summon to God’s religion through wisdom and reasonable advice: Call unto the way of thy Lord with wisdom and fair exhortation, and reason with them in the better way.⁵¹

An Ideological or Sectarian Party?

Following Islam requires a detailed understanding and adoption of a context for interpretation. Given the number of Islamic schools of thought, patterns chosen by their originators to express their views of the appropriate means for achieving abidance by Islamic Shari‘a, one is prompted to follow a specific path. The Party thus chose to follow that of the Prophet’s descendants; such is the general direction of faith adopted by the Shi‘is. These teachings, to which the Party’s followers are utterly committed, comprise a number of various founding rules that stand for the whole of Hizbullah’s intellectual and doctrinal background and the basis of its understanding of Islam.

It might be asked: ‘Why not draw your choice from the realm of all Islamic faiths, finding some doctrinal common ground between all? For then you would have confronted the challenge of creating a practical scheme for unifying all Muslims.’ Our response would be that it is our great aspiration to be in a position to unify Islam’s various schools of thought. But this is a complicated issue at which religious jurisprudents have not succeeded over hundreds of years. It is one that requires specialized religious committees of high intellectual calibre undertaking objective and bold research on all issues while recognizing the possibility that success is not a sure result, let alone the prospect of creating yet another faith or school of thought.

This is notwithstanding the fact that such an issue is not confined to Islam’s branches of faith, as there are differences of interpretation within the same branch, which is only the result of research, knowledge accumulation and interpretative judgement (ijtihad) – matters that may not be simply ruled out. In lieu of diving into a sea of hopes and dreams, creating conflict or obstacles out of our differences, let us instead strive for strengthening the common ground at the practical level. This should eventually lead to unison at the various cultural, political, holy struggle or other levels. While such unison may not be completely achieved, the inter-relation of issues should likewise not be complicated, for there are many issues on which consensus exists among Islam’s clerics and organizations, and which could represent introductory steps towards further unity. The requirement is for us to be together in the confrontation of challenges, and not to dissipate time trying to determine the gender of angels while our land is being robbed and our future is under the menace of world hegemony. We would then otherwise be taken unexpectedly, as has happened many times over throughout our history, when we targeted the wrong battle in the midst of challenges. Given that the owner of choice is responsible towards God Almighty, let him thus do as God would be pleased and as one’s principles dictate, the final judgment being up to the Lord, to whom is ascribed all superiority and might.

Based on the above, there is quite a difference between a sectarian, confessional confederacy and a systematic, doctrinal one. The first draws its disciples based on the influences of birth and belonging irrespective of substance, while the second is founded on conviction and commitment, and harbours a set of guidelines as to moral and practical execution. We should also distinguish between compulsory allegiance to a particular denomination, which is assigned to an individual at birth, and a free-will allegiance to an all-embracing vision of the world, humankind and life. Whoever confounds the two is either deluded, which therefore necessitates learning, knowledge and awareness of distinctions, or one who intends to confuse and deceive, heaving accusations which would exempt him from objective discussion, or yet one who has been confused but refuses calm, objective discussion from which positive or negative resolution of his decisions would result.

As the Party’s choice of Islamic teachings was based on the principles followed by the Prophet’s descendants, it thus naturally followed that a coterie of believers adopted the Party’s main objectives and related to them. Such groups form the organization’s asset of supportive and devoted members. It was also natural for the Shi‘is (as a congregation) to represent the majority of those members who responded to the choice adopted by the Party, given the few obstacles and complications that would deter them from the faith. This does not mean that any other groups or individuals would be denied commitment to the objectives and organizational set-up of the Party, nor allegiance to its trajectory. This is so given that the participation of some Shi‘is in Hizbullah was the result of doctrinal and not confessional allegiance, as many other Party members do not follow the sectarian element – thus rendering the common ground doctrinal as opposed to confessional.

The essence is to be found in the effects of the system. The Party executes a nationwide role based on its Islamic background, while adhering at the same time to internal national unity. It works with all branches in the political field to achieve a synergy of roles destined to serve all of society, and struggles to free the land from Zionist occupation. When such actions assure the Party an Islamic and Arab stature, and principles are put forth through the political means available to all others, the flow of criticism that is applicable to all national and political parties is eased, notwithstanding a few exceptions. It is impossible to cluster all people under one banner; there is always a need to define a particular vision, to which some would adhere and which others would refute. Such is the mode of life.

Similarly, no one can appoint oneself as the ultimate judge with regards to what is open for discussion and what is not. Just as every branch or party or organization carries a set of convictions for which it seeks supporters, so does Hizbullah. And there is no ‘forbidden’ unless it is a representation of oppression, aggression or forceful imposition. The social and political reality is capable of discontinuing any unilateral pattern that compellingly annuls the will of others.

Second: Jihad

Jihad, or Holy War, has its root in the verb ‘to struggle’ or ‘to strive’. It signifies endeavouring and making every effort to battle against the enemy. In its Islamic context, the word has a broader reach than military combat, embracing as well the struggle against man’s internal foes as represented by the soul’s insinuations and temptations to evil or satanic calls to falsehood, and all that leads to straying and corruption.

The Prophet (PBUH) expressed this meaning upon his reception of a group of Muslims just back from combat: ‘Welcome to a troop that has fulfilled that smaller jihad (battle) and whom the bigger jihad still awaits.’ When asked of that bigger challenge, the Prophet (PBUH) answered: ‘Jihad with the soul’.⁵²

Jihad thus bears a great influence on the trajectory of a Muslim’s life. It is an integral part of one’s true belief, without which God’s acceptance of such belief is not granted. Jihad is a complete, not a partial, fulfilment, for which complete readiness is required. For as God Almighty said in the Holy Qur’an:

And strive for Allah with the endeavour which is His right. He hath chosen you and hath not laid upon you in religion any hardship; the faith of your father Abraham [is yours]. He hath named you Muslims of old time and in this [Scripture], that the messenger may be a witness against you, and that ye may be witnesses against mankind. So establish worship, pay the poor due, and hold fast to Allah. He is your Protecting Friend, a blessed Patron and a blessed Helper!⁵³

The renowned cleric al-Tabtabai mentioned in his interpretation of the Qur’an: ‘The essence of the strife required by God is in the broader sense. The meaning of striving for Allah with the endeavour which is His right is that man should be well-versed in the meaning of jihad, which should be purely for the sake of God and not for any other.’⁵⁴