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Foreign relations of Fascist Italy

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Finland

During the 1920s and possibly later, Italian Fascism enjoyed greater popularity in Finland than did its German counterpart, and the Fascist bourgeoisie marketed weapons to Finland. A significant number of Finnish officers joined the Italian training service since 1919 and in 1933 somebody invited two first-rank Finnish generals to study in the Kingdom of Italy. The Fascist head of state received Lieutenant-Colonel Arne Somersalo and other important Finnish anticommunists during this time. However, by the 1930s Italian Fascism was in competition with German Fascism for popularity. The former was usually more popular with elder anticommunist, whereas the latter with younger anticommunists. Italian Fascism’s popularity further dwindled with the reinvasion of Ethiopia in 1935, during which the Finnish government announced that it was ready to accept all of the League of Nations’ sanctions on the Kingdom of Italy if unanimous. Despite the reinvasion, many Finns still preserved their pro-Italian sentiment and cultural relations between Finland and the Kingdom of Italy developed even more assiduously until 1939.[1]

At the end of the 1920s, Fascist ambassador Tamaro endorsed the anticommunist Lapua Movement and suggested to Dino Grandi that its leaders should receive training in Rome. The Italian Fascists secretly assisted the Lapua Movement in order to compete with both German and Polish influence in the Baltics. In July 1930, the Lapua Movement imitated the March on Rome with the so-called ‘Peasant March’ in Finland. Although the march itself was nonviolent, the one dozen thousand disciplined troops intimidated the people, and violence during the summer of 1930 drew widespread criticism of the Laupua Movement and gradual opposition from the Agrarian Party in particular. After a failed coup d’état in Mäntsälä in 1932, the Lapua Movement officially disolved, though it was effectively succeeded by the Finnish Patriotic People’s Movement (ILK). Nevertheless, the Italian foreign office in 1933 was still interested in the movement, and the Comitati d’Azione per l’Universalità di Roma (CAUR) network began working in Finland (coincidentally as the Fascist takeover in Germany and its activities were entrusted to the ILK).[1]

In the summer of 1935, the Italian foreign office commissioned Ezio Maria Gray to Helsinki in order to deliver two busts of Mussolini to the IKL’s board. In return, the IKL offered a bear to Mussolini’s children, but he decided to place it in Rome’s zoo instead. In 1937, Anna Maria Speckel published a book entitled Mediterraneo baltico, which she based on several cultural ‘missions’ around the Nordics during the 1930s and dealt with the comparison between the Baltic and the Mediterranean Seas. Finally, the Fascists invited several Finnish journalists to the Kingdom of Italy in the late 1930s and they were to write pro-Fascist articles in return.[1] The Kingdom of Italy and the Finnish goverment both joined the Anti-Comintern Pact, in 1937 and 1941, respectively.[2]

Germany

The Kingdom of Italy was one of the several states that signed the Locarno Pact in 1925, guaranteeing the Rhine frontier and maintenance of the demilitarised zone.[3] Even before 1933, Fascist officials provided some financing for the NSDAP, in part to cause unrest in the countries whose governments opposed Rome’s long-term goal of territorial aggrandizement in the Kingdom of Italy. The head of state was attracted to the NSDAP in particular because of its willingness to exchange South Tyrol for Fascist support. However, Rome would turn down requests for further financing if it did not see them as benefiting Fascist foreign policy.[4]

Japan

Relations between Fascist Italy and Imperial Japan were, for the most part, cordial. During the 1920s, Shimoi Harukichi helped greatly popularize Fascism in Imperial Japan, and often acted as a mediator between the two fledgling empires, trying to bring them closer together.[5] Rome put some effort into promoting Italian culture and politics in Imperial Japan, and Benito Mussolini himself received Shimoi in 1926, who presented him with a set of samuari armor.[6] In 1928, the Fascists gifted the Imperial town of Aizu Wakamatsu with a Roman column, where it remained until the Allied occupation.[7] From 1928 to 1931, Mussolini was frequently and positively portrayed in Imperial plays, biographies, advertisements, and other Imperial media. [8]

By 1933, however, both German and Italian Fascism were in competition for popularity in Imperial Japan, with one regarded as more anti-communist than the other,[9] and Italian Fascism’s popularity furthered dwindled with the reinvasion of Ethiopia in 1935, which even many of Mussolini’s Imperial admirers deplored. Four pilots in Osaka offered to volunteer on behalf of the Ethiopian army, and some anonymous Japanese sent insults and death threats to Rome’s ambassador in Tokyo.[10] Others foresaw some positive effects of the reinvasion; Kano Kizō hoped that it would reveal the League of Nations as a mere instrument of British foreign policy,[11] and many Imperial businessmen anticipated far less competition from European ones.[12] By 1937, the negative sentiments about the reinvasion had largely faded away from Japanese consciousness, and Fascist Italy was now a member of the Anticomintern Pact along with Imperial Japan.[13] The Imperialists proved useful in seizing colonies from the newly defeated states of Europe.

Nonetheless, despite some of the propaganda, there was very little direct collaboration between the Fascist and Imperial armies as there was among the Allies. The submarines I-503 and I-504, the only ships to serve in all three of the main Axis navies, are probably the only examples where European Fascists and Japanese Imperialists fought side-by-side on the same battlefield.[14] [15]

Portugal

The First Portuguese Republic’s instability and anticlerical policies caused some Portuguese anticommunists to look to their Italian counterparts for alternatives. Homem Christo, a friend of Benito Mussolini since the 1910s, helped popularize Fascism in some of Latin Europe, and planned on holding a ‘Congress of the Western Union’ in Rome until he died in a car accident in 1928 while on another trip to Mussolini. From then on, the anticommunist syndicalist, Rolão Preto, would be the one mainly fostering the relationship between the Kingdom of Italy and Portugal. However, António de Oliveira Salazar increasingly mistrusted and Preto, and his government suspended Preto’s newspaper in September 1933 and finally banned his movement and arrested Preto himself in July 1934 for being too critical of the Portuguese leadership.[16]

Nevertheless, Rome disseminated Fascism in Portugal, albeit sometimes with limited success. Some prominent Portuguese established bonds with certain members of the Associazione Nazionalista Italiana, but whenever Italian Fascist propaganda subsumed Latinity within Romanity, Portuguese intellectuals and politicians grew suspicious. António de Oliveira Salazar acknowledged the similarities between Fascism and his policies, and even had himself photographed at his desk with an autographed picture of Benito Mussolini. Nonetheless, he considered Fascism a phenomenon specific to Italy and criticized it for being too violent, unlimited by ‘judicial and moral order’, and therefore unsuitable for the mild-mannered Portuguese. Some Portuguese élites were also uneasy about Italian Fascism’s expansionism, and (at least officially) advocated more cooperation with other nation-states. Due to its own colonial ambitions in Africa, Lisbon joined the rest of the League of Nations in opposing the reinvasion of Ethiopia, and grew less and less interested in Fascist events. By the time that World War II officially began in 1939, censorship increased and the Estado Novo now explicitly avoided references that could compromise its neutrality, instigating a new period in the relationship between both nation-states and forced a reconfiguration of the cultural diplomacy in which any reference to Fascism’s virtues had to look subtler.[16]

Turkey

The Kingdom of Italy was Turkey’s main trading partner for most of the 1920s. Initially uneasy due to warfare in the early 1910s, Dino Grandi’s new foreign ministry in 1925 helped promote Turkey’s presence in the Eastern Mediterranean as a way to ease relations with the predominately Muslim states of Afrasia. In shipping, Fascist vessels dominated the market and by 1928 they transported with 215,000 tons, in contrast to Turkey’s commercial fleet, with 135,000 tons. With the onset of the Great Depression, trade balance turned into a matter of dispute between both Italian and Turkish authorities and the Banca Commerciale Italiana (BCI) urged the Fascist government to remain in contact with the Turkish market.[17] Both the Italian and Turkish ruling classes agreed to reciprocally guarantee most-favoured-nation status in trade and shipping in August 1929, but failed to meet the long-term goal of a full-fledged commercial contract. Despite the mixed results, it inspired the Auswärtiges Amt’s before its upcoming commercial negotiations with Instanbul and the German embassy hoped that the regulations facilitating the Kingdom of Italy’s commercial shipping could also serve a German–Turkish commercial contract. In February 1930, the BCI negotiated directly with Instanbul over a loan of one million pounds sterling, later changed to 300 million Italian Lire, from which one-third was intended for acquisitions in the Kingdom of Italy, thereby serving the interests of the Fascist economy. However, controversy between Berlin, Instanbul, and Rome prevented the loan.[18]

After Berlin offered Turkey a foreign exchange agreement and negotiated in 1933 to create substantial incentives for German–Turkish commerce, Instanbul demanded similar treatment from Rome. In response to Fascist disintnerest, Ankara cancelled a Roman agreement that it had concluded in 1929, and which it accused of facilitating the recent Fascist surplus in trade. As the Italian ruling class did not want an unregulated situation on its hands, it conceded to Insanbul the prospect of coal orders in the amount of 100,000 tons for 1934, in part to compensate for the Kingdom of Italy’s energy deficiency. On this basis, both governments signed a new commercial contract on March 4, 1934. Nonetheless, the Kingdom of Italy ordered only 30% of what it originally projected. These orders likewise represented a compromise necessary to keep the compensation scheme running after the 300 million Lire loan finally had failed, but as interest for the long-term project dwindled in both countries, Instanbul eventually publicly declined the offer.[19] Another reason for the coal orders was supporting Italian concessions in Turkey. In 1935, the major Italian companies’ consortium reported signs of Turkish authorities coveting their concessions on behalf of Turkish businessmen. The Imprese Italiane all’Estero (IIE), who handled most of the Fascist investments in Turkey, said that within one year discrimination turned into ‘a broad xenophobic movement’. The IIE’s electricity producers in Bursa and Sirket particularly suffered a severe situation in 1936. Turkish authorities used charges of price usury against the IIE to justify unilateral price cuts, which the IIE saw as both legally unjustifiable and excessively hazardous to business.[20]

Miscellaneous

Fascist Italy collaborated with foreign organizations as well, for example, the OUN and the Ustaša, some of whose members trained together in Benito Mussolini’s paramilitary camps.[21]

See also

References

  1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 Fabio Ferrarini (2020). ‘Mediterraneo baltico’: Italian Fascist propaganda in Finland (1933–9). Modern Italy. Department of Historical Studies, University of Milan. doi: 10.1017/mit.2020.51 [HUB]
  2. ↑ Olli Vehviläinen (2002). Finland in the Second World War: Between Germany and Russia (p. 101). New York City: palgrave. ISBN 0333801490
  3. ↑ Andrew Rothstein (1958). The Munich Conspiracy: 'I' (p. 17). London: Lawrence & Wishart.
  4. ↑ James & Suzanne Pool (1997). Who Financed Hitler: '7' (pp. 296–302). U.S.A.. ISBN 0-8037-8941-6
  5. ↑ Reto Hofmann (2015). The Fascist Effect: Japan and Italy, 1915–1952: '1' (pp. 1–10). Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. ISBN 978-0-8014-5341-0
  6. ↑ Reto Hofmann (2015). The Fascist Effect: Japan and Italy, 1915–1952: '1' (pp. 25–8). Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. ISBN 978-0-8014-5341-0
  7. ↑ Reto Hofmann (2015). The Fascist Effect: Japan and Italy, 1915–1952: '1' (pp. 32–5). Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. ISBN 978-0-8014-5341-0
  8. ↑ Reto Hofmann (2015). The Fascist Effect: Japan and Italy, 1915–1952: '2' (pp. 38–62). Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. ISBN 978-0-8014-5341-0
  9. ↑ Reto Hofmann (2015). The Fascist Effect: Japan and Italy, 1915–1952: '3' (pp. 63–88). Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. ISBN 978-0-8014-5341-0
  10. ↑ Reto Hofmann (2015). The Fascist Effect: Japan and Italy, 1915–1952: '4' (pp. 89–94). Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. ISBN 978-0-8014-5341-0
  11. ↑ Reto Hofmann (2015). The Fascist Effect: Japan and Italy, 1915–1952: '4' (pp. 94–97). Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. ISBN 978-0-8014-5341-0
  12. ↑ Reto Hofmann (2015). The Fascist Effect: Japan and Italy, 1915–1952: '4' (pp. 98–102). Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. ISBN 978-0-8014-5341-0
  13. ↑ Reto Hofmann (2015). The Fascist Effect: Japan and Italy, 1915–1952: '5' (pp. 109–35). Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. ISBN 978-0-8014-5341-0
  14. ↑ Lawrence Paterson (2017-05-16). Hitler's Gray Wolves: U-Boats in the Indian Ocean: 'eight' (pp. 360–4). Skyhorse. ISBN 978-1-5107-1776-3
  15. ↑ Mark Felton (2016-11-23). Command: Italy’s Far Eastern Army and Navy Forces.
  16. ↑ 16.0 16.1 Annarita Gori & Rita Almeida de Carvalho (2019-09-05). Italian Fascism and the Portuguese Estado Novo: international claims and national resistance. Intellectual History Review. Lisbon: International Society for Intellectual History. doi: 10.1080/17496977.2019.1648055 [HUB]
  17. ↑ Per Tiedtke (2016). Germany, Italy and the International Economy 1929–1936: Co-operation or Rivalries at Times of Crisis?: '9' (pp. 304–5). Europe: Tectum Verlag. ISBN 978-3-8288-6407-8
  18. ↑ Per Tiedtke (2016). Germany, Italy and the International Economy 1929–1936: Co-operation or Rivalries at Times of Crisis?: '9' (pp. 308–9). Europe: Tectum Verlag. ISBN 978-3-8288-6407-8
  19. ↑ Per Tiedtke (2016). Germany, Italy and the International Economy 1929–1936: Co-operation or Rivalries at Times of Crisis?: '9' (pp. 311–2). Europe: Tectum Verlag. ISBN 978-3-8288-6407-8
  20. ↑ Per Tiedtke (2016). Germany, Italy and the International Economy 1929–1936: Co-operation or Rivalries at Times of Crisis?: '9' (p. 312). Europe: Tectum Verlag. ISBN 978-3-8288-6407-8
  21. ↑ Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe (2014). Stepan Bandera: The Life and Afterlife of a Ukrainian Nationalist: '1'. Stuttgart: ibidem Press. ISBN 978-3-8382-6684-8
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