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← Back to all essays | Author's essays The True History of Islamic Extremism in West Asia
by Alaki123
Published: (last update: 2024-10-05)
5-15 minutes
All of these claims are false.
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There is a narrative common in the West that claims that West Asia (often incorrectly referred to as the “Middle East”) is somehow inherently violent. That its people have been at war for thousands of years and just cannot be peaceful. It also promotes an Orientalist view of West Asia, claiming that the root of instability in the region is religious differences going back thousands of years. This is then contrasted with the “modern” and “civilized” Europe, which has been at peace for a long time and presumably would remain at peace forever if only those Muslims would leave them alone!
All of these claims are false.
While it’s true that there have been many wars in West Asia in antiquity and the Middle Ages, there have been large amounts of wars during these periods in all places on Earth, especially in Europe. This is not in any way unique to West Asia, nor is it an interesting observation that explains something inherent to the area.
Not only that, but West Asia had been more peaceful than Europe for several recent centuries in the Early Modern Era. This was due to the simple fact that during this era, as opposed to Europe which encompassed many small nations constantly going to war with each other, most of West Asia was united under the Ottoman Empire and, as such, would not go to war with itself. While wars still occurred in West Asia between Ottomans, Persians, and sometimes Russians, these were few and far between compared to Europe.
It was only after WW1 and the subsequent fall of the Ottoman Empire that West Asia began experiencing major instabilities, mostly due to the Sykes–Picot Agreement, secretly signed between the UK and France, which split up the region between themselves along arbitrary lines, leading to the formation of unstable nations.
Meanwhile, the Saudis had been a group that had originally formed in the 18th century through an alliance between the Al Saud family and Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the founder of Wahhabism. They were initially a minor force in the Arabian Peninsula and contained by the Ottoman Empire, but when the Ottomans fell they gradually expanded control over the region, which was often deemed geopolitically insignificant, sparing them major challenges from significant powers. However, a turning point came in the 1930s with the discovery of oil in the Arabian Peninsula. The United States forged an agreement with the Saudis, and through a stroke of luck, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) transformed into a wealthy nation.
And with that, through sheer serendipity, Wahhabism had transformed from a fringe ideology of an unimportant group during the rule of the Ottomans into the official ideology of a wealthy state.
But what is Wahhabism?
Salafism and Wahhabism are conservative Sunni interpretations of Islam favored by Saudi Arabia and Gulf monarchies. They promote strict adherence to the literal interpretation of the Quran and Hadith, and a return to the practices of the early generations of Muslims (Salaf). This is in contrast to moderate interpretations of Islam (including Shia Islam), which often consider the broader context, cultural influences, and human reasoning when interpreting religious texts.
As an example, consider the Quranic verse 5:38. It states, “As for […] thieves, cut off their hands for what they have done.” A literal interpretation of this verse suggests that the hand must be literally amputated. However, moderate clerics consider this verse to be metaphorical, suggesting that thieves must be prevented from committing theft again, and their hands are “cut off” metaphorically from theft. This would, in practice, lead to punishments such as jail time or even rehabilitation instead of amputation.
In 1978, a substantial shift occurred in West Asia with the emergence of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini. The revolution toppled the Iranian monarchy, asserted its identity as both Islamic and democratic, and was staunchly anti-West. This situation deeply unsettled Saudi Arabia, situated across the Persian Gulf, which shared resemblances with the pre-revolution Iran, being a pro-Western monarchy. The Iranian revolution’s potential impact raised concerns about Saudi Arabia’s close ties with the West, possibly empowering critics and inspiring Saudi citizens to seek their own form of Islamic democracy.
Up until this point, the main challenge to KSA’s legitimacy came from Arab nationalism, a secular movement that had emerged after the fall of the Ottoman Empire as a reaction to the British and French arbitrary carving up of West Asia. It promoted the idea of a united Arab state encompassing diverse Arab-speaking countries. KSA obviously did not like this. It was a monarchy, and monarchs would likely be irrelevant in a unified Arab state potentially led by socialists. Instead, KSA promoted unity among the world’s Muslims, with itself as the leader, owing to its custodianship of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina.
In short, West Asia was intentionally divided yet yearned for unity, with one faction considering Arab ethnicity as the cohesive element and the other perceiving Islam as the binding force. The majority of Arabs were not wealthy like the Saudis and rightly attributed their plight to past Western imperialism. In contrast, the Saudis maintained friendly ties with the West and garnered support in other Arab nations through religious fervor.
That was until 1978, when an unexpected figure named Khomeini swiftly ascended to power in a key West Asian nation through a revolution. He advocated an ideology that blended Islamism with anti-Western sentiments, triggering a legitimacy crisis for all other nations in the region.
It was here that Wahhabism emerged as a political force. Adhering closely to a strict and literal interpretation of Islam, Salafis argued that moderate Muslims, particularly Shia, could be labeled as kuffar (heretics) because of perceived “alterations” they make to “true Islam.” This process, known as “Takfir” (declaring a Muslim as a non-believer), served the interests of KSA: If the majority of Muslims considered Shia as heretics, the Islamic revolution’s credibility would diminish, bolstering KSA’s claim as the legitimate custodian of Islam.
The 1973 and 1979 oil crisis had significantly enriched KSA by this time, and this newfound wealth enabled Saudi Arabia to launch an extensive propaganda campaign to significantly increase the influence of Wahhabism around the world. The campaign involved building Islamic institutions, including colleges, centers, mosques, and schools, with over $75 billion spent from 1982 to 2005. The propaganda included strict Sunni Islam, suppression of alternative viewpoints, opposition to Western influences, adherence to Sharia law, and armed jihad.
KSA institutions trained teachers and preachers in Salafi ideology, with the Islamic University of Madinah serving as a hub for spreading Salafi teachings to students from different Muslim countries. Figures like Zakir Naik and his Peace TV channel spread Salafism even among English-speaking Muslims. The facilities and religious education provided to Hajj pilgrims were used to promote Wahhabism, and the economic boom led to workers migrating to Gulf countries, where they would be exposed to Wahhabi teachings. The influence of Salafism prompted many Muslims in countries such as Egypt, Pakistan, Jordan, and Nigeria to support strict traditional penalties like stoning, whippings, and the death penalty.
In addition to the propaganda campaign, KSA also forged alliances and began substantial financial investments in various other Sunni groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Jamaat-e-Islami. These movements shared a strict approach to sharia law, opposition to Western influence, and a focus on armed jihad.
Concurrently, the United States found Saudi Arabia’s religious strategy valuable for countering the Soviet Union and restraining Iran’s Shia influence. Running from 1979 to 1992, Operation Cyclone was a CIA initiative that provided financial and military backing to Afghan mujahideen fighters against the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. The U.S. focused on collaborating with militant Islamic groups aligned with Pakistan’s leadership under Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, prioritizing jihadist-affiliated factions over less ideologically driven Afghan resistance forces. By 1987, the U.S. expenditure on arming extremist groups had reached $630 million per year, supplying advanced weaponry including FIM-92 Stinger missiles. This financial aid persisted even after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, supporting the mujahideen in their conflict against President Najibullah’s forces during the Afghan Civil War (1989–1992).
During this time, the United States Agency for International Development allocated millions of dollars to the University of Nebraska at Omaha. Their task was to create, print, and discreetly distribute schoolbooks to the Taliban, promoting militant Islamic teachings (jihad) and featuring images of weapons and soldiers. The goal of this endeavor was to instill anti-foreigner sentiments in children.
By the 1990s, these substantial investments by both KSA and the USA had shifted Salafism and Wahhabism from fringe ideologies to prevailing doctrines in many Sunni Muslim communities. In 2011, the USA initiated support and armament of Sunni extremists in Syria opposing Assad, the Shia leader. The resultant destabilization in Syria, coupled with the pre-existing power vacuum in northern Iraq due to the 2003 US invasion, facilitated the emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).
The leadership of ISIS claimed adherence to Wahhabi principles, even using Saudi religious curriculum in its educational centers. ISIS sought to establish a global caliphate and departed from the historical Wahhabi political integration with the KSA monarchy. The group employed the works of scholars like Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab to legitimize their actions in the Muslim world, linking modern times with historical struggles against adversaries like the Crusaders.
ISIS was eventually largely defeated by Iran and the Iraqi government, and Syrian Sunni extremists like Al-Nusra struggled to replicate the achievements of their Afghan counterparts, eventually facing defeat by the Syrian government with support from Iran and Russia. As of 2023, Islamic extremism and terrorism are not prominent concerns in West Asia. With the USA focusing on countering Russia and China in Europe and the South China Sea, West Asia appears to be enjoying a period of relative calm.
Nonetheless, Wahhabism as an ideology remains highly prevalent within Sunni Muslim communities, and should a fresh power vacuum emerge in West Asia, another ISIS could come back with a vengeance.