Library:The Russians Are Coming: The Politics of Anti-Sovietism/Chapter 1: The Enemy

Types of Enemy

The Soviet Union is regarded as the enemy of Western capitalist countries but in what ways and for what reasons? It is said that every country needs an enemy in order to project and preserve its own identity and unity. There is a long list of illustrations showing how those countries which have domestic difficulties divert attention to external forces. In doing so they generate chauvinistic, jingoistic attitudes which temporarily over-ride internal divisions. The USA, with its diverse geography, competitive economic interests and ethnic complexity, has a clear need for an over-riding interest to maintain its cohesion as a single, unified nation which defence against an enemy fulfils. When the US has entered wars, as in 1917 and 1942, it has done so with extreme, aggressive nationalistic fervour. Since 1917 it has always had an enemy of sorts, supplemented in the post Second World War period by a number of minor enemies such as Cuba, Vietnam, Grenada and Nicaragua. An enemy for the USA is therapeutic. This is not quite the case with Britain though the war against the Argentine over the Falklands in 1982 was a recent sad reminder of the use of an enemy to divert public attention from deep social and economic issues. It was, of course, war, national aggression, which created the shabby unity, not the enemy though an enemy was necessary to justify the war.

Enemies of this kind emerge in an ad hoc fashion. Their main qualities must be that they are not truly threatening, are geographically remote, and give rise to emotional rather than material consequences. In any event they must not pose the possibility of defeat and dispossession. In retrospect conflicts with them appear as a sort of game though this was not the appearance at the time. War of this kind, moreover must not be unduly destructive of property.

The Soviet Union is not perceived as an enemy necessary for nationalistic therapy though anti-Bolshevism and anti-Sovietism

have been used, not to achieve national unity, but to suppress internal dissent. The Soviet Union, and before that Czarist Russia, has never been a therapeutic enemy. Mr. Lloyd George aptly described the reason in his Guildhall speech on November 8th, 1919 after a decision had been made to withdraw British troops from the war of intervention in Bolshevik Russia.

“Our troops are out of Russia”, he said, “Frankly I am glad. Russia is a quicksand. Victories are easily won in Russia, but you sink in victories, and great armies and great Empires in the past have been overwhelmed in the sands of barren victories. Russia is a dangerous land to intervene in. We discounted it in the Crimea. But true to the instinct which has always saved us, we never went far from the sea, and we were able to extricate ourselves from there . . .”

Hitler could have echoed Lloyd George’s words in 1945, except that the German armies were far from the sea and sank in the Russian quicksands.

Nor is the Soviet Union a traditional enemy of Britain. The choice of enemies in the past has normally been determined by geo-political factors; by common frontiers and overlapping interests or competing ambitions. Wars between traditional enemies have moved frontiers, extended the hegemony of one country over another, provided labour supplies through enslavement, created outlets for overpopulation or ensured access to sources of raw materials or new markets. Many countries bordering each other have traditional hostile relations with each other. Such is the case with China and Vietnam, Greece and Turkey and France and Germany. Although many such countries still oppose each other militarily, guns have in some instances been replaced by jokes as a more innocuous means of expressing dislike. In Central Africa, previously warring tribes have developed joking relationships to express attitudes of superiority or inferiority. Maybe French jokes about the English perform this function. The English prefer to joke about ethnic minorities, the Welsh, Irish and Scots, whereas in Soviet Union ethnic jokes are often about Georgians and Armenians. The Russians and the English do not normally joke about each other. There was a ditty which was popular in Bolshevik Russia late in 1918 after the British, French, Italian, American and Japanese had intervened to help the White Russian armies topple Lenin’s government but it was not a joke. It

went:

“Uniforms BritishEpaulettes from France,Japanese tobaccoKolchak leads the dance”2

But by 1920 this was purely of historical interest. Since then the Russians and the British have had little need to communicate their feelings for each other through any medium, except for the episode of the Second World War when there was a deep sense of admiration in Britain for the Red Army.

Of course, in order for jokes to have any impact people need to have some acquaintance with each other. The British and the Soviet people do not meet except in trickles as tourists after long and relatively expensive journeys. Britain does not have a common frontier with Soviet Union at any point. Moscow is 1549 miles from London across many frontiers. It is the capital of a distant, mysterious country. Information about it comes either from the tales of travellers or through the media.

In war Britain and Russia have been on the same side more often than not. Russia has never invaded Britain though the horror of hordes of Russians arriving with snow on their boots is still conjured as a possibility as if at some time it had been a reality. Britain has, however, invaded Russia on two occasions. In 1854 British troops invaded the Crimea in an unprepared and futile act of aggression. In 1918 they entered Russia through Archangel and Vladivostock and fought with armies of 13 nations against the Bolsheviks. The British government told the Russian people on August 8th, 1918: “We are coming to help you save yourselves from dismemberment and destruction at the hands of Germany. We wish solemnly to assure you that we shall not retain one foot of your territory. The destinies of Russia are in the hands of the Russian people. It is for them, and them alone to decide their forms of Government, and to find a solution for their social problems.” The British troops were still in Russia after the war with Germany had ended, not to protect Russians against Germans but, in the words of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, “to create a ring of States all round Bolshevik Russia ... to prevent Bolshevism from spreading (and) . . . with a view to crushing Bolshevism definitely at the earliest possible date." 4 They left at the instigation of the Russian people who decided for themselves that their destiny lay with the Bolsheviks.

In the great conflicts in the world since 1800, the Napoleonic Wars and the two World Wars, Britain and Russia have been allies and on each occasion the Russian people have suffered greatly in a cause which benefited us. By the time of the Bolshevik Revolution in October, 1917, the Russian Army had suffered more fatal casualties than Britain, France and Italy combined. About 2.8 million Russians were killed, 2.5 million were missing, presumed dead, and almost 5 million were wounded. Many Russian losses occurred in order to relieve pressure on the Western front. In the Second World War, 20 million Soviet citizens died, more than 50 times greater than the American losses in the war. 25 million people were made homeless. This was the extent of Soviet sacrifices to win a war which enabled Britain to survive. There is no doubt that the outcome of the Second World War would have been different if the Soviet Union had not defeated the Nazis on their Eastern Front. 90 per cent of all German casualties in the war were caused by the Soviet armed forces. Mr. Winston Churchill was in no doubt about the Red Army’s contribution when he told Parliament on August 2nd, 1944 “that the obvious fact... (is that) ... it is the Russians who have done the main work in tearing the guts out of the German army.” The Soviet Union was clearly not an ordinary ally in the Second World War.

On this reckoning the Russian have been traditional allies and not enemies. Yet today the Soviet Union is indicted as an enemy so evil, so potentially destructive of Western civilization that both Britain and the USA have refused to say that they will not engage in a pre-emptive strike with nuclear weapons to destroy it. They refuse even to accept a moratorium on nuclear tests. So far they have rejected the Soviet proposal to destroy the arsenal of nuclear missiles. What kind of society must it be to provoke such hatred and fear that Britain and the USA are prepared to risk genocide against themselves in order to protect themselves from it? What qualities caused the Soviet Union to be transformed from a heroic ally in 1945 to an implacable enemy in 1946? What is it that has generated such undiminished hatred from British governments, Labour and Conservative alike, since that time?

The intensity of Western opposition to the Soviet Union can be gauged from the scale of investment of resources in the American Strategic Defence Initiative or the Star Wars programme. The SDI is intended to be a three-layered defence shield against attack from the Soviet Union. Its effectiveness will depend upon the ability of the Americans to disable Soviet missiles near to their launching

pads, maybe on their launching pads. The first and primary layer of the shield is therefore a military one over the Soviet Union and not a protective cover for the USA. In order to construct this nuclear- powered straight-jacket for the Soviet Union the American government is prepared to spend, at 1986 prices, up to $1.5 trillion. Such costs will jeopardize conventional defence expenditure, divert resources from social issues, including education, and will in general create serious destabilizing tendencies in the American economy. All of this damage, then, to protect itself from the enemy.

The reasons for ethnic enmity are important at all times but the advent of nuclear technology has transformed their importance. The character of war has been changed. War with nuclear weapons cannot be used as a release valve for a country in crisis by generating patriotism. A war which destroys all people makes frontiers irrelevant and market gains unnecessary. Even if the ghoulish consequences could be discounted a war technology which is so intensely capital intensive could not be utilized as a means of breaking out of an economic depression. It is said that there are American capitalists who would be prepared to countenance 20 to 40 million American deaths in order to maintain their control over world markets but as it is highly likely they would be included in the body count this seems a highly improbable suggestion. An enemy in the nuclear age is of more significance than any other enemy in history.

Enemy by Assumption

One would have thought that the question “who is the enemy and why?” would be uppermost in the minds of people in the West and at the centre of a continuous debate. After all, Western societies surely need to be absolutely certain of their ground before embarking on a course which could lead to the virtual destruction of human society. It does not require much world-wiseness to see the criminal futility of arming against a non-enemy, an enemy by assumption, without any empirical evidence to support the assumption.

One would have thought, too, that successive British governments, starting with the Labour government led by Clement Attlee in 1945, which have committed ordinary people to a nuclear war strategy, would have paused at every decision-making stage to say “are we really sure? Does the Soviet Union really

pose such a threat as to risk a nuclear holocaust?” In addition, one would have thought, the same governments would have wanted to provide information about the Soviet Union in order to provoke an informed general discussion; in other words to inform and consult the electorate before embarking on, continuing, accelerating a build-up of nuclear arms. But for a seemingly unaccountable reason this has never happened.

Those governments, in fact, did the very opposite. Shabby deals contracted in high secrecy by cabals of favoured Cabinet Ministers have been the norm. Neither the British Parliament, nor even the Cabinet, has ever seriously and profoundly discussed the identity of Britain’s enemy or how it should react to it. In the speedy and dramatic transition of the Soviet Union from wartime ally to ‘Cold War’ enemy, the Prime Minister did not consult the British people, or even his own party, but engaged in shady, humiliating diplomatic deals with President Truman.

This crazy, criminally bizarre situation has persisted ever since. The decision of the Labour government to replace Polaris in 1978, taken under the code-name Chevaline at a cost of more than £1 billion, was taken by a group of four Cabinet Ministers, without reference to the Cabinet, Government or Parliament. Tony Benn, who was a member of that Cabinet, complained that he only learned about the decision after the defeat of the Labour Government in 1979. He asked “why have successive governments . . . misled successive Parliaments about the development of Britain’s nuclear weapons?” and added that “The British Parliament has never been told the whole truth, and even today, we do not know under what arrangements American nuclear missiles in this country are controlled.” He said “It is the extraParliamentary powers of successive prime ministers and defence chiefs, and not the peace campaigners, which threaten parliamentary democracy.6 When Mr Denis Healey, who was one of the four Ministers concerned, responded to Tony Benn’s allegation he said that the decision had been “a mistake” which he regretted not having investigated more thoroughly.7 The enormously costly replacement for Polaris was intended to match the Soviet ABM system which was never deployed.

The government then, and at other times, used the need to keep vital information out of the hands of the enemy as the reason for not informing Parliament or the electorate of its decisions. Sometimes it engaged in deceit to divert attention from its real motives. The post-war Churchill government planned the announcement of its decision to build Britain’s first nuclear reactor for civil purposes to deflect public opposition from its nuclear bomb programme. This became clear after Cabinet papers were released for public perusal under the 30 year rule. The decision to manufacture the H-bomb was taken by the Cabinet in July 1954. Six months later the Cabinet’s defence committee decided “that the time has now arrived where a public announcement of this decision should be made.” Both the Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden and the Prime Minister, Mr Churchill were worried about the effect on the public of disclosure. Mr Churchill noted that “The Government would be embarrassed if there were any premature disclosure of this decision . . . there would be an advantage in publishing the Government’s programme for civil development of atomic energy before announcing their decision to produce therm- nuclear weapons.”8 The announcement about nuclear power preceded that concerning nuclear weapons by two days. The issue was duly clouded.

National security was given as the reason for secrecy at the end of 1982 when the decision to locate the US European Command War Headquarters in Britain was leaked to the public through a report in the Guardian. Mr Michael Meacher, MP, commenting on this, said “Life and death decisions are either kept secret from the British people ... (as in the case of the Chevaline project) ... or excluded from a parliamentary vote”, as in the case of the decision to locate Cruise missiles in Britain.9 Prime Ministers, who have carried the main responsibility for this insane behaviour, have acted as if battles were still fought only by professional soldiers with hand-weapons in field formations. They have behaved as if democratic decision-making was not only irrelevant for contemporary warfare, but was subversive. In consequence the British public has depended upon ‘leaks’ and gossip for its information. Politicians have talked to their constituents about defence through cliches, slogans, smears, innuendos, half-truths and downright lies.

It is essential that the whole question of nuclear defence is opened up for public discussion. Decisions which affect the survival of people should never be taken from their purview. Secret diplomacy and privileged decision-making are not simply inappropriate in the age of nuclear technology but confer impossible responsibilities on individuals which create their own grave dangers. All questions concerning war should be public property. There was a possibility of debating nuclear disarmament

in the elections of 1983 and 1987 but the issue was spoiled by the government’s use of cliches. Political parties in the main have not wanted to explore their prejudices concerning international relations, to examine their assumptions in public, to publicize their real intentions. The chances are that if this were done the people would turn away in disgust. That is surely what would have happened in 1945 if Clement Attlee had informed the British public that his government was about to embark on a policy of acute anti-Sovietism.

So, forty-two years after the explosion of the first atomic bomb, after a continuous accumulation and refinement of nuclear weapons and after an extension of the arms race into space, the question still remains to be answered. What kind of enemy is it with which a country will engage in mutual genocidal conflict. What hideous qualities does it display? Can it possibly be inhabited by human beings?

FOOTNOTES# History of Anglo-Soviet Relations by W P and Zelda K Coates, 1943, p. 2.

1. The Great Conspiracy Against Russia by Michael Sayers and Albert E Kahn, 1946, p. 66.
2. ibid, pp. 62-3.
3. Secrets from Whitehall and Downing Street, by Fyodor Volkov, 1986, p. 69.
4. Socialism and Capitalism: Score and Prospects edited by Yuri Sdobnikov, Moscow, 1971, p. 44.
5. The Guardian. 18 December 1985.
6. The Guardian. 20 December 1985.
7. The Guardian. 2 January 1984.
8. The Guardian. 18 December 1985.