Vladimir Lenin/Materialism and empirio-criticism - Preface to the first edition

Table of contents

1. Prefaces
   1. Preface to the first edition
   2. Preface to the second edition
   3. In lieu of an introduction
2. The theory of knowledge of empirio-criticism and of dialectical materialism
   1. Part I
      1. Sensations and complexes of sensations
      2. “The discovery of the world-elements”
      3. The principal co-ordination and “naive realism”
      4. Did nature exist prior to man?
      5. Does man think with the help of the brain?
      6. The solipsism of Mach and Avenarius
   2. Part II
      1. The “thing-in-itself,” or V. Chernov refutes Frederich Engels
      2. “Transcendence,” or Bazarov “revises” Engels
      3. L. Feuerbach and J. Dietzgen on the thing-in-itself
      4. Does objective truth exist?
      5. Absolute and relative truth, or the eclecticism of Engels as discovered by A. Bogdanov
      6. The criterion of practice in the theory of knowledge
   3. Part III
      1. What is matter? What is experience?
      2. Plekhanov’s error concerning the concept “experience”
      3. Causality and necessity in nature
      4. The “principle of economy of thought” and the problem of the “unity of the world”
      5. Space and time
      6. Freedom and necessity
3. The philosophical idealists as comrades-in-arms and successors of empirio-criticism
   1. The criticism of kantianism from the Left and from the Right
   2. How the “empirio-symbolist” Yushkevich ridiculed the “empirio-criticist” Chernov
   3. The immanentists as comrades-in-arms of Mach and Avenarius
   4. Whither is empirio-criticism tending?
   5. A. Bogdanov’s “empirio-monism”
   6. The “theory of symbols” (or hieroglyphs) and the criticism of Helmholtz
   7. Two kinds of criticism of Dühring
   8. How ould J. Dietzgen have found favour with the reactionary philosophers?
4. The recent revolution in natural science and philosophical idealism
   1. The crisis in modern Physics
   2. “Matter has disappeared”
   3. Is motion without matter conceivable?
   4. The two trends in modern Physics and English spiritualism
   5. The two trends in modern Physics, and German idealism
   6. The two trends in modern Physics and French fideism
   7. A Russian “idealist physicist”
   8. The essence and significance of “physical” idealism
5. Empirio-criticism and historical materialism
   1. The excursions of the German empirio-criticists into the field of the social sciences
   2. How Bogdanov corrects and “develops” Marx
   3. Suvorov’s “Foundations of Social Philosophy”
   4. Parties in philosophy and philosophical blockheads
   5. Ernst Haeckel and Ernst Mach
   6. Conclusion
   7. Supplement to chapter four, section I
      1. From what angle did N. G. Chernyshevsky criticise kantianism?

A number of writers, would-be Marxists, have this year undertaken a veritable campaign against the philosophy of Marxism. In the course of less than half a year four books devoted mainly and almost exclusively to attacks on dialectical materialism have made their appearance. These include first and foremost Studies in [?—it would have been more proper to say “against”] the Philosophy of Marxism (St. Petersburg, 1908), a symposium by Bazarov, Bogdanov, Lunacharsky, Berman, Helfond, Yushkevich and Suvorov; Yushkevich’s Materialism and Critical Realism ; Berman’s Dialectics in the Light of the Modern Theory of Knowledge and Valentinov’s The Philosophical Constructions of Marxism.

All these people could not have been ignorant of the fact that Marx and Engels scores of times termed their philosophical views dialectical materialism. Yet all these people, who, despite the sharp divergence of their political views, are united in their hostility towards dialectical materialism, at the same time claim to be Marxists in philosophy! Engels’ dialectics is “mysticism,” says Berman. Engels’ views have become “antiquated,” remarks Bazarov casually, as though it were a self-evident fact. Materialism thus appears to be refuted by our bold warriors, who proudly allude to the “modern theory of knowledge,” “recent philosophy” (or “recent positivism”), the “philosophy of modern natural science,” or even the “philosophy of natural science of the twentieth century.” Supported by all these supposedly recent doctrines, our destroyers of dialectical materialism proceed fearlessly to downright fideism (in the case of Lunacharsky it is most evident, but by no means in his case alone!). Yet when it comes to an explicit definition of their attitude towards Marx and Engels, all their courage and all their respect for their own convictions at once disappear. In deed—a complete renunciation of dialectical materialism, i.e., of Marxism; in word—endless subterfuges, attempts to evade the essence of the question, to cover their retreat, to put some materialist or other in place of materialism in general, and a determined refusal to make a direct analysis of the innumerable materialist declarations of Marx and Engels. This is truly “mutiny on one’s knees,” as it was justly characterised by one Marxist. This is typical philosophical revisionism, for it was only the revisionists who gained a sad notoriety for themselves by their departure from the fundamental views of Marxism and by their fear, or inability, to “settle accounts” openly, explicitly, resolutely and clearly with the views they had abandoned. When orthodox Marxists had occasion to pronounce against some antiquated views of Marx (for instance, Mehring when he opposed certain historical propositions), it was always done with such precision and thoroughness that no one has ever found anything ambiguous in such literary utterances.

For the rest, there is in the Studies “in” the Philosophy of Marxism one phrase which resembles the truth. This is Lunacharsky’s phrase: “Perhaps we [i.e., all the collaborators of the Studies evidently] have gone astray, but we are seeking” (p. 161). That the first half of this phrase contains an absolute and the second a relative truth, I shall endeavour to demonstrate circumstantially in the present book. At the moment I would only remark that if our philosophers had spoken not in the name of Marxism but in the name of a few “seeking” Marxists, they would have shown more respect for themselves and for Marxism.

As for myself, I too am a “seeker” in philosophy. Namely, the task I have set myself in these comments is to find out what was the stumbling block to these people who under the guise of Marxism are offering something incredibly muddled, confused and reactionary.

— Vladimir Lenin. September 1908.

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