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Itsraining (talk | contribs) (Added some history context from a source available on the Internet Archive. (While a bourgeois point of view pervades it, some facts can still be carefully extracted from it.)) Tag: Visual edit |
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== History == | == History == | ||
After the Second World War, officials in the United States expressed anxiety over the so-called "communist threat" fearing that the Soviet Union would come to dominate Greece and Türkiye, essentially establishing socialist states. In 1946, the State Department issued a recommendation for readiness to intervene into the affairs of Greece not only diplomatically, but also by providing financial support and sending military equipment.<ref>{{Citation|author=Athanasios Lykogiannis|year=2002|title=Britain and the Greek Economic Crisis, 1944-1947: from liberation to the Truman Doctrine|title-url=https://archive.org/details/britaingreekecon00lyko|chapter=The American Aftermath|page= | After the Second World War, officials in the United States expressed anxiety over the so-called "communist threat" fearing that the Soviet Union would come to dominate Greece and Türkiye, essentially establishing socialist states. In 1946, the State Department issued a recommendation for readiness to intervene into the affairs of Greece not only diplomatically, but also by providing financial support and sending military equipment.<ref>{{Citation|author=Athanasios Lykogiannis|year=2002|title=Britain and the Greek Economic Crisis, 1944-1947: from liberation to the Truman Doctrine|title-url=https://archive.org/details/britaingreekecon00lyko|chapter=The American Aftermath|page=211|quote=Within weeks, such cautious optimism was replaced by a growing sense of anxiety, originating not so much from any reassessment of the economic situation but instead from increasing fears arising from regional and international developments. Growing perceptions of the communist threat both within and outside Greece proved crucial in reshaping American attitudes. With wider issues at stake, reservations about becoming associated with the British rapidly became irrelevant. | ||
At the end of September Byrnes privately expressed his anxiety about recent world developments, particularly the attitude of the Soviet Union. He emphasized the necessity of offering American support to Turkey and Greece. [...] Within weeks, the State Department cited a long list of anti-Greek activities undertaken by Moscow and its satellites to demonstrate that Greece and Turkey constituted the “sole obstacle to Soviet domination of the Eastern Mediterranean.” It recommended that Washington should announce its readiness to “take suitable measures” to safeguard the “territorial and political integrity of Greece,” including diplomatic and moral support, and practical assistance in the form of credits and military equipment. | At the end of September Byrnes privately expressed his anxiety about recent world developments, particularly the attitude of the Soviet Union. He emphasized the necessity of offering American support to Turkey and Greece. [...] Within weeks, the State Department cited a long list of anti-Greek activities undertaken by Moscow and its satellites to demonstrate that Greece and Turkey constituted the “sole obstacle to Soviet domination of the Eastern Mediterranean.” It recommended that Washington should announce its readiness to “take suitable measures” to safeguard the “territorial and political integrity of Greece,” including diplomatic and moral support, and practical assistance in the form of credits and military equipment.|city=Columbia|publisher=University of Missouri Press|isbn=0826214223}}</ref> | ||
Meanwhile in Greece the People's Democratic Army (ΔΣΕ) was already waging a war trying to liberate the country from British and bourgeois influence. | Meanwhile in Greece the People's Democratic Army (ΔΣΕ) was already waging a war trying to liberate the country from British and bourgeois influence. | ||
In early 1947 the United States diplomats considered a [[revolution]] to be highly probable. Reacting to signals from diplomatic U.S. personnel stationed in Athens, the Truman Doctrine was articulated in February, aiming to "contain" the expansion of communism.<ref>{{Citation|author=Athanasios Lykogiannis|year=2002|title=Britain and the Greek Economic Crisis, 1944-1947: from liberation to the Truman Doctrine|title-url=https://archive.org/details/britaingreekecon00lyko|chapter=The American Aftermath|page= | In early 1947 the United States diplomats considered a [[revolution]] to be highly probable. Reacting to signals from diplomatic U.S. personnel stationed in Athens, the Truman Doctrine was articulated in February, aiming to "contain" the expansion of communism.<ref>{{Citation|author=Athanasios Lykogiannis|year=2002|title=Britain and the Greek Economic Crisis, 1944-1947: from liberation to the Truman Doctrine|title-url=https://archive.org/details/britaingreekecon00lyko|chapter=The American Aftermath|page=212-213|quote=By early 1947 the tone of dispatches from U.S. personnel in Athens had become positively alarmist. MacVeagh pointed out that the combination of external pressure and internal unrest was likely to lead to revolution and “Soviet control,” while Mark Ethridge, the U.S. representative on the UN Commission of Investigation, compared Greece to a “ripe plum” likely to fall into Soviet hands within weeks. | ||
[...] Given the sense of urgency already pervading Washington, the receipt of the British note on February 21 had an immediate effect. Within weeks the Truman Doctrine had been articulated, and the way was open for the policy of all-out containment of Soviet communism and the accompanying ideological crusade. | [...] Given the sense of urgency already pervading Washington, the receipt of the British note on February 21 had an immediate effect. Within weeks the Truman Doctrine had been articulated, and the way was open for the policy of all-out containment of Soviet communism and the accompanying ideological crusade.|city=Columbia|publisher=University of Missouri Press|isbn=0826214223}}</ref> | ||
== See also == | == See also == | ||
Latest revision as of 21:48, 17 March 2024
The Truman Doctrine is an imperialist foreign policy position of the United States created by President Harry S. Truman. It allows unlimited interventionism to maintain the dictatorship of capitalist markets from socialism.[1] This doctrine was used to stop communists from achieving socialism in Greece and Türkiye after the Second World War.
History[edit | edit source]
After the Second World War, officials in the United States expressed anxiety over the so-called "communist threat" fearing that the Soviet Union would come to dominate Greece and Türkiye, essentially establishing socialist states. In 1946, the State Department issued a recommendation for readiness to intervene into the affairs of Greece not only diplomatically, but also by providing financial support and sending military equipment.[2]
Meanwhile in Greece the People's Democratic Army (ΔΣΕ) was already waging a war trying to liberate the country from British and bourgeois influence.
In early 1947 the United States diplomats considered a revolution to be highly probable. Reacting to signals from diplomatic U.S. personnel stationed in Athens, the Truman Doctrine was articulated in February, aiming to "contain" the expansion of communism.[3]
See also[edit | edit source]
References[edit | edit source]
- ↑ Ludo Martens (1996). Another View of Stalin: 'From Stalin to Khrushchev' (p. 242). [PDF] Editions EPO. ISBN 9782872620814
- ↑ “Within weeks, such cautious optimism was replaced by a growing sense of anxiety, originating not so much from any reassessment of the economic situation but instead from increasing fears arising from regional and international developments. Growing perceptions of the communist threat both within and outside Greece proved crucial in reshaping American attitudes. With wider issues at stake, reservations about becoming associated with the British rapidly became irrelevant.
At the end of September Byrnes privately expressed his anxiety about recent world developments, particularly the attitude of the Soviet Union. He emphasized the necessity of offering American support to Turkey and Greece. [...] Within weeks, the State Department cited a long list of anti-Greek activities undertaken by Moscow and its satellites to demonstrate that Greece and Turkey constituted the “sole obstacle to Soviet domination of the Eastern Mediterranean.” It recommended that Washington should announce its readiness to “take suitable measures” to safeguard the “territorial and political integrity of Greece,” including diplomatic and moral support, and practical assistance in the form of credits and military equipment.”
Athanasios Lykogiannis (2002). Britain and the Greek Economic Crisis, 1944-1947: from liberation to the Truman Doctrine: 'The American Aftermath' (p. 211). Columbia: University of Missouri Press. ISBN 0826214223 - ↑ “By early 1947 the tone of dispatches from U.S. personnel in Athens had become positively alarmist. MacVeagh pointed out that the combination of external pressure and internal unrest was likely to lead to revolution and “Soviet control,” while Mark Ethridge, the U.S. representative on the UN Commission of Investigation, compared Greece to a “ripe plum” likely to fall into Soviet hands within weeks.
[...] Given the sense of urgency already pervading Washington, the receipt of the British note on February 21 had an immediate effect. Within weeks the Truman Doctrine had been articulated, and the way was open for the policy of all-out containment of Soviet communism and the accompanying ideological crusade.”
Athanasios Lykogiannis (2002). Britain and the Greek Economic Crisis, 1944-1947: from liberation to the Truman Doctrine: 'The American Aftermath' (pp. 212-213). Columbia: University of Missouri Press. ISBN 0826214223