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=== Jewish Liberalism === | === Jewish Liberalism === | ||
One of the more striking examples of the influence of religious subculture is to be found in American Jewry. By most objective measures of class level, Jews occupy as high a status as the more well-to-do white Protestants. Yet support of civil rights and civil liberties, and, more significantly, support of welfare expenditures and reforms on behalf of lower strata groups (along with an addiction to the Democratic Party) remains characteristic of Jewish political behaviour.<ref>The Allinsmiths find that while Jews are like Presbyterians and Congregationalists in their professional and white collar SES level, their opinions on policies affecting job security are like those of the Baptist and Catholic urban workers. Wesley and Beverly Allinsmith, "Religious Affiliation and Politico-Economic Attitude," ''Public Opinion Quarterly'', XII (1948), 377–389. See also Lawrence Fuchs, ''The Political Behavior of the American Jews'' (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1956).</ref> | |||
It may be that Jews, despite high income and occupational status, still suffer many of the social disabilities of an "underdog" group, as evidenced by the exclusionist practices of an unofficial but quite prevalent upper-class antisemitism.<ref>''Cf''. E. Digby Baltzell, ''The Protestant Establishment, Aristocracy and Caste in America'' (New York: Random House, 1964). On the distinction between the Jews' high economic status and their social "subordination," see W. Lloyd Warner and Leo Srole, ''The Social System of American Ethnic Groups'' (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1945), p. 96.</ref> Nor is this underdog sensitivity weakened by a history of ruthless oppression. Thus, it might be said that Jewish liberalism is a reaction to the marginality that challenges a seemingly solid economic position. | |||
Without denying what was affirmed at the onset, ''viz''., the importance of the group's position in the social system in determining its perspectives, we might still wonder where such explanation take all factors into account. First, it might be noted that Catholic ethnic groups such as the Irish, Italians, and Poles have had somewhat comparable centuries of hardship behind them. Starvation, oppression, and harsh military occupation is the history of Ireland, Poland, and Southern Italy. Similarly, the discrimination and exploitation accorded the Catholic newcomers in America were at least as severe as anything the Jewish immigrants encountered. Yet among the Catholic groups we find few traces of that liberal reform-mindedness which seems a substantial sentiment in the Jewish community.<ref>See Allinsmith, ''op. cit''.; also Milton Himmelfarb, "The Jew: Subject or Object?" ''Commentary'', XL (1965), 54–57.</ref> | |||
If oppression and marginality have been, then, the common lot of many, it may be said that the various groups have defined and reacted in accordance with their respective value systems. Is there anything in the Judaic view of life that might help explain Jewish liberalism? Fuchs and others have observed several distinct themes:<ref>Fuchs, ''op. cit''., pp. 171–203; also Himmelfarb, ''op. cit''.; Werner J. Cahnman, "The Cultural Consciousness of Jewish Youth," ''Jewish Social Studies'', XIV (1952), 198–199; Israel S. Chipin, "Judaism and Social Welfare" in Louis Finkelstein, ''The Jews, Their History, Culture, and Religion'' (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949), Vol. I, Chapter 16.</ref> | |||
(1) The usual tension between faith and intellect does not grip Judaism. If anything, the spiritual leader in the Jewish community was traditionally not one who cultivated an inner-worldly asceticism or other-worldly spirituality, but one who was an expert in the interpretation and application of the law. The synagogue was also the ''shul'', a place of study as well as a place of worship. Given this intimate connection between learning and religion, "the religious virtuoso was not the saint but the scholar."<ref>Marshall Sklare, ''Conservative Judaism: An American Religious Movement'' (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1955).</ref> Historically, for Jews, the intellectual has not been an object of scorn, but a man to be esteemed and entrusted with the responsibilities of leadership and power.<ref>The Israeli "Knesset is as packed with historians and economists as our Congress is studded with lawyers." Fuchs, ''op. cit''., p. 180 fn.</ref> | |||
(2) In modern times, Judaism has been less an other-worldly theology and formulated creed than a system of practices, observances, and moral commitments. An important component of the morality of Judaism is the continuing obligation to live with some dedication to social betterment and justice. Prayer and personal piety alone do not make one a Jew. Redemption is to be found in the worldly enactment of God's love and charity as evidenced by one's efforts on behalf of his fellow men and his community: one must be "a Jew for the world." Closely associated with the idea of social justice is the belief that the Jews, as the chosen people, serve a distinct missionary purpose in the world. Exile is not seen as the punishment of a wrathful Yahweh, but as fulfilment of the divine purpose: they are to serve God by working for social righteousness wherever Jews be found. "Our secret weapon as a people," David Ben-Gurion instructs, "is our moral, intellectual, and spiritual superiority which we inherited from the Bible."<ref>Quoted in ''The New York Times'', 26 May 1965, "Ben-Gurion Urges Jewish Renewal." See also Oscar Handlin, "Judaism in the United States," in James Ward Smith and A. Leland Jamison, ''The Shaping of American Religion'' (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 121–161.</ref> | |||
(3) Whatever may be said of orthodox Old testament strictures, Judaism does not, like traditional Christianity, teach ascetic renunciation as the prime means to personal salvation. A high value is placed on life in this world. Bodily appetites are understood to be natural and acceptable rather than sinful, and one does not face the world in a chronic state of antagonistic, guilt-ridden self-denial. Liberal reforms designed to maximise man's wellbeing and happiness on Earth are part of a noble quest untainted by a fear of worldliness, sin, or loss of salvation. Life is reaffirmed rather than renounced. | |||
Even if we were to grant Nathan Glazer's contention that contemporary Jewish liberalisim derives more from nineteenth century liberalism and socialism than from the Judaic religious tradition,<ref>Nathan Glazer, ''American Judaism'' (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), Chapter 8.</ref> we might still wonder why Jews of that day responded to and initiated such political traditions rather than electing any one of several other alternatives open to them. Jewish liberalism today may be an example of how the value commitments of a religion persist as an "idea of life" well after the specific theological underpinnings are discarded. This is what Weber meant when he spoke of the "ghost of dead religious beliefs." To the extent that Jews today are concerned with questions like "What examples of Jewish life shall we present to the world?" and "What are the special ethical demands made upon a man who calls himself a Jew?", they are still involved in a distinct ethno-religious tradition. | |||
=== Catholic Conservatism === | === Catholic Conservatism === | ||
Revision as of 20:25, 8 March 2024
Political Values and Religious Cultures: Jews, Catholics, and Protestants | |
|---|---|
| Author | Michael Parenti |
| Publisher | Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion |
| First published | 1967 |
| Type | Article |
| Source | https://www.jstor.org/stable/1384052 |
Political Values and Religious Cultures: Jews, Catholics, and Protestants is an article by Michael Parenti, published in Autumn 1967 in the Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion. It is a revised version of a paper presented at the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion's annual meeting on 29 October 1965. Some of the language within the article which would be considered outdated by today's standards has been changed.
Text
Instances of political behaviour which bear no rational relationship to maximising a group's material and social self-interest may be explained as responses to subcultural factors. Religious groups in America, despite their generally high level of acculturation, still retain ethical and belief systems which influence basic conservative-liberal political orientations. The criteria used to distinguish sect from church seem to be of less importance in shaping political predispositions than beliefs centring around revealed dogma, salvation, impulse life, intellectualism vs. faith, and the nature of evil. The cultural belief systems of the various denominations operate as independent variables within the social structure.
The literature on pressure groups and voting behaviour demonstrates that American politics are, for the most part, "rational." That is to say: group attitudes and actions are generally directed towards promoting some kind of substantive measure which the group deems beneficial to its interests. Thus we can observe party-class voting correlations, union support of the closed shop, business opposition to certain state regulations, rural opposition to reapportionment, Black support of civil rights, Catholic support of parochial school aid, et cetera. The objective position an individual or group occupies in the social structure, and the material conditions operating therein, determine much about individual or group perceptions and evaluations of life, including political life.
Corresponding to the above definition of "rational," "irrational" political behaviour would be that kind of action or attitude which is intended to minimise rather than maximise socio-economic self interest (for instance, unions opposing the closed shop and Blacks supporting an inferior status for themselves). Are there such instances of political behaviour, and if so, how might they be explained?
In the Wilson and Banfield study[1] of twenty referenda elections for bond issues to pay for public services such as hospitals, schools, and parks, it was found that the groups which because of their income level would pay little or nothing at all and yet benefit most from the services were also the groups which were most opposed to such services. These were the Poles, Czechs, Italians, Irish, and other Catholic ethnic groups. Conversely, upper income white Protestants and Jews, the very groups that would be paying the costs while benefitting the least, were the strongest supporters of the proposed expenditures. (The only group acting according to rational self interest were the low-income Blacks, who were supporters of public services.) The correlations were too compelling to assume that the voters of all groups were acting out of ignorance of their actual material interests; such ignorance would have produced more random results. It might be that upper-income groups place less value on the dollar or are better schooled civically, but these appear to be, at best, only partial explanations. More likely, the authors conclude, the WASP and Jewish subcultures tend "to be more public-regarding and less private-(self or family) regarding" than are the Catholic ethnic subcultural groups.[2]
While no delineation of these cultural ingredients was attempted by Wilson and banfield, their findings do lead us directly to Max Weber's consideration of culture as a force operating independently of the objective or material factors, an understanding Weber submitted not to confound but to complement the usually recognised materialist interpretations of casuality.[3] According to Weber, different social groups possess some kind of "style of life" and operate under the influence of distinct, albeit sometimes implicit, moral ideas, among which are those associated (or originally associated) with religion. These ideas or values, while frequently a response to the material conditions, are also often the product of other ideas which persist in the face of drastically changing material conditions.[4] Ideas, for Weber, are also an expression of human aspirations and longings that seem to transcend a particular material environment, frequently in response to some deep-seated spiritual challenge.[5] Religious belief systems possess both the inspirational and the durable traditional qualities and through much of history have played a key role in the determination of moral and normative codes. While not all religions afford guidance on the many particulars of secular life (some are relatively indifferent to certain economic and political questions), the belief systems of all do provide principles and assumptions that shape many of the basic orientations towards worldly activity.
Herein, I shall attempt to trace the religio-political value derivatives of the major American denominations. Despite the allegedly growing "Americanisation," "homogenisation," and secularisation of religions in this society,[6] there exists significant differences in the ideational content of sectarian systems, especially in regards to beliefs about man's nature, his redemption, and his commitments to the temporal world. These beliefs may produce, or help explain, political orientations that cannot readily be explained as manifestations of rational material self-interest.
The following discussion is to be considered suggestive rather than exhaustive in its scope. At no time is it being contended that socio-economic interests are of no importance for the shaping of group political attitudes. Nor is it to be assumed that there may not be normative persuasions other than those of a religious origin that lead to responses counter to rational self-interest (e.g., some of those propagated in the name of "patriotism"). Our concern here, however, is with certain of the key components of religious subcultures.
Jewish Liberalism
One of the more striking examples of the influence of religious subculture is to be found in American Jewry. By most objective measures of class level, Jews occupy as high a status as the more well-to-do white Protestants. Yet support of civil rights and civil liberties, and, more significantly, support of welfare expenditures and reforms on behalf of lower strata groups (along with an addiction to the Democratic Party) remains characteristic of Jewish political behaviour.[7]
It may be that Jews, despite high income and occupational status, still suffer many of the social disabilities of an "underdog" group, as evidenced by the exclusionist practices of an unofficial but quite prevalent upper-class antisemitism.[8] Nor is this underdog sensitivity weakened by a history of ruthless oppression. Thus, it might be said that Jewish liberalism is a reaction to the marginality that challenges a seemingly solid economic position.
Without denying what was affirmed at the onset, viz., the importance of the group's position in the social system in determining its perspectives, we might still wonder where such explanation take all factors into account. First, it might be noted that Catholic ethnic groups such as the Irish, Italians, and Poles have had somewhat comparable centuries of hardship behind them. Starvation, oppression, and harsh military occupation is the history of Ireland, Poland, and Southern Italy. Similarly, the discrimination and exploitation accorded the Catholic newcomers in America were at least as severe as anything the Jewish immigrants encountered. Yet among the Catholic groups we find few traces of that liberal reform-mindedness which seems a substantial sentiment in the Jewish community.[9]
If oppression and marginality have been, then, the common lot of many, it may be said that the various groups have defined and reacted in accordance with their respective value systems. Is there anything in the Judaic view of life that might help explain Jewish liberalism? Fuchs and others have observed several distinct themes:[10]
(1) The usual tension between faith and intellect does not grip Judaism. If anything, the spiritual leader in the Jewish community was traditionally not one who cultivated an inner-worldly asceticism or other-worldly spirituality, but one who was an expert in the interpretation and application of the law. The synagogue was also the shul, a place of study as well as a place of worship. Given this intimate connection between learning and religion, "the religious virtuoso was not the saint but the scholar."[11] Historically, for Jews, the intellectual has not been an object of scorn, but a man to be esteemed and entrusted with the responsibilities of leadership and power.[12]
(2) In modern times, Judaism has been less an other-worldly theology and formulated creed than a system of practices, observances, and moral commitments. An important component of the morality of Judaism is the continuing obligation to live with some dedication to social betterment and justice. Prayer and personal piety alone do not make one a Jew. Redemption is to be found in the worldly enactment of God's love and charity as evidenced by one's efforts on behalf of his fellow men and his community: one must be "a Jew for the world." Closely associated with the idea of social justice is the belief that the Jews, as the chosen people, serve a distinct missionary purpose in the world. Exile is not seen as the punishment of a wrathful Yahweh, but as fulfilment of the divine purpose: they are to serve God by working for social righteousness wherever Jews be found. "Our secret weapon as a people," David Ben-Gurion instructs, "is our moral, intellectual, and spiritual superiority which we inherited from the Bible."[13]
(3) Whatever may be said of orthodox Old testament strictures, Judaism does not, like traditional Christianity, teach ascetic renunciation as the prime means to personal salvation. A high value is placed on life in this world. Bodily appetites are understood to be natural and acceptable rather than sinful, and one does not face the world in a chronic state of antagonistic, guilt-ridden self-denial. Liberal reforms designed to maximise man's wellbeing and happiness on Earth are part of a noble quest untainted by a fear of worldliness, sin, or loss of salvation. Life is reaffirmed rather than renounced.
Even if we were to grant Nathan Glazer's contention that contemporary Jewish liberalisim derives more from nineteenth century liberalism and socialism than from the Judaic religious tradition,[14] we might still wonder why Jews of that day responded to and initiated such political traditions rather than electing any one of several other alternatives open to them. Jewish liberalism today may be an example of how the value commitments of a religion persist as an "idea of life" well after the specific theological underpinnings are discarded. This is what Weber meant when he spoke of the "ghost of dead religious beliefs." To the extent that Jews today are concerned with questions like "What examples of Jewish life shall we present to the world?" and "What are the special ethical demands made upon a man who calls himself a Jew?", they are still involved in a distinct ethno-religious tradition.
Catholic Conservatism
Protestant Fundamentalism and Modernism
Conclusion
Notes
- ↑ James Q. Wilson and Edward C. Banfield, "Public Regardingness As a Value Premise in Voting Behavior," American Political Science Review, 58 (1964), 876–887. These elections were held in seven major cities between 1956 and 1963.
- ↑ Ibid., 882–885. Wilson's study of the Democratic reform movement in New York shows a similar division between liberal-activist-reformist Jews and WASPs on the one hand, and conservative, non-ideological, politically traditional Irish and Italian Democrats on the other. See James Q. Wilson, The Amateur Democrat, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).
- ↑ Weber's best known and probably most pertinent work on this question is The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958).
- ↑ For application of this proposition to the American scene, see Seymour Martin Lipset, The First New Nation (New York: Basic Books, 1963), especially the sections entitled "The Unchanging American Values and Their Connection with American Character" and "The Inadequacy of a Materialistic Interpretation of Change," pp. 110–129.
- ↑ See Reinhard Bendix's discussion of these points in Max Weber, an Intellectual Portrait (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1962), pp. 59ff. For a broader statement on the transcendent quest, see Benjamin Nelson, "The Future of Illusions," in Contemporary Civilization Staff, Columbia University (eds.), Man in Contemporary Society (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956), II, 958–976. I wish to acknowledge a personal debt to my former colleague, nelson, for much of my own interest in, and understanding of, Weber's work.
- ↑ Representation of the homogenisation theme may be found in Will Herberg, Protestant, Catholic, Jew (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, rev. ed. 1960); Martin E. Marty, Varieties of Unbelief (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1964). For a discussion of the theological and material factors that foster denominational consensus in America, see Talcott Parsons, "The Cultural Background of American Religious Organization" in Harlan Cleveland & Harold D. Lasswell, Ethics and Bigness, Scientific, Academic, Religious, Political and Military (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1962), p. 141–167.
- ↑ The Allinsmiths find that while Jews are like Presbyterians and Congregationalists in their professional and white collar SES level, their opinions on policies affecting job security are like those of the Baptist and Catholic urban workers. Wesley and Beverly Allinsmith, "Religious Affiliation and Politico-Economic Attitude," Public Opinion Quarterly, XII (1948), 377–389. See also Lawrence Fuchs, The Political Behavior of the American Jews (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1956).
- ↑ Cf. E. Digby Baltzell, The Protestant Establishment, Aristocracy and Caste in America (New York: Random House, 1964). On the distinction between the Jews' high economic status and their social "subordination," see W. Lloyd Warner and Leo Srole, The Social System of American Ethnic Groups (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1945), p. 96.
- ↑ See Allinsmith, op. cit.; also Milton Himmelfarb, "The Jew: Subject or Object?" Commentary, XL (1965), 54–57.
- ↑ Fuchs, op. cit., pp. 171–203; also Himmelfarb, op. cit.; Werner J. Cahnman, "The Cultural Consciousness of Jewish Youth," Jewish Social Studies, XIV (1952), 198–199; Israel S. Chipin, "Judaism and Social Welfare" in Louis Finkelstein, The Jews, Their History, Culture, and Religion (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949), Vol. I, Chapter 16.
- ↑ Marshall Sklare, Conservative Judaism: An American Religious Movement (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1955).
- ↑ The Israeli "Knesset is as packed with historians and economists as our Congress is studded with lawyers." Fuchs, op. cit., p. 180 fn.
- ↑ Quoted in The New York Times, 26 May 1965, "Ben-Gurion Urges Jewish Renewal." See also Oscar Handlin, "Judaism in the United States," in James Ward Smith and A. Leland Jamison, The Shaping of American Religion (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 121–161.
- ↑ Nathan Glazer, American Judaism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), Chapter 8.