The Assassination of Julius Caesar (Michael Parenti)

The Assassination of Julius Caesar
Author	Michael Parenti
First published	2003

The Assassination of Julius Caesar: A People's History of Ancient Rome is a book written by Statesian political scientist Michael Parenti, published in 2003 by The New Press. The book discusses "the issues of popular struggle and oligarchic power that were being played out decades before [Caesar] was born, continuing into his life and leading to his death."

Acknowledgements

Over the years Charles Briody tried to improve upon my childhood altar boy's Latin with ad hoc lessons, mostly on the telephone now that we live at opposite ends of North America.  I must confess that all his best efforts never got me much beyond the Gallĭa es omnis divisa in partes tres level.  For this I have only myself to blame.  Luckily, all the major (and most minor) ancient sources are available in various English translations.  Briody also generously provided me with some crucial literature and notes of his own, and did a most helpful reading of the manuscript.  So too did Iain Boal and Daniel Shoup who, like Briody, gave me the benefit of their substantive criticisms and their classical education.

Peggy Karp did a close and especially valuable reading of the manuscript.  Jane Scantlebury helped me locate sources, and tendered advice and encouragement over the long duration of writing.  She also contributed a useful critique of the manuscript.  Susan McAllister went over an early version of the opening chapter for me, and provided other needed assistance.

Peter Livingston saved the day—and the book—labouring hard to snatch from the jaws of my treacherous computer precious text and endnotes that had been mysteriously devoured.  He thereby saved me many impossible months of reconstructive effort.  Willa Madden, my webmeister, also conducted helpful operations against the wanton vicissitudes of electronic storage.  Richard Wiebe and Andrea Segall brought several useful sources to my attention.  And Sheeda Jamsheed helped me navigate my way through the University of California library to dig up some materials.  My editor at The New Press, Colin Robinson, was enthusiastic and supportive all the way.  His assistant, Abby Aguirre, was most helpful.  Production editor Sarah Fan walked the book through its various phases with reassuring proficiency.  And Holly Knowles provided an excellent index.

To all these fine people I extend my heartfelt thanks.

Introduction: Tyrannicide or Treason

"O, what a fall was there, my countrymen!  Then I, and you, and all of us fell down, whilst bloody treason flourish'd over us."  —JULIUS CAESAR ACT III, SCENE 2

On the fifteenth of March, 44 B.C.E., in a meeting hall adjacent to Pompey's theatre, the Roman Senate awaited the arrival of the Republic's supreme commander, Julius Caesar.  This particular session did not promise to be an eventful one for most of the senators.  But others among them were fully alive to what was in the offing.  They stood about trying to maintain a calm and casual pose—with daggers concealed beneath their togas.

Finally Caesar entered the chamber.  He had an imposing presence, augmented by an air of command that came with being at the height of his power.  Moving quickly to the front of the hall, he sat himself in the place of honour.  First to approach him was a senator who pretended to enter a personal plea on behalf of a relative.  Close behind came a group of others who crowded around the ceremonial chair.  At a given signal, they began to slash at their prey with their knives, delivering fatal wounds.  By this act, the assailants believed they had saved the Roman Republic.  In fact, they had set the stage for its complete undoing.

The question that informs this book is, why did a coterie of Roman senators assassinate their fellow aristocrat and celebrated ruler, Julius Caesar?  An inquiry into this incident reveals something important about the nature of political rule, class power, and a people's struggle for democracy and social justice—issues that are still very much with us.  The assassination also marked a turning point in the history of Rome.  It set in motion a civil war, and put an end to whatever democracy there had been, ushering in an absolutist rule that would prevail over Western Europe for centuries to come.

The prevailing opinion among historians, ancient and modern alike, is that the senatorial assassins were intent upon restoring republican liberties by doing away with a despotic usurper.  This is the justification proffered by the assassins themselves.  In this book I present an alternative explanation:  The Senate aristocrats killed Caesar because they perceived him to be a popular leader who threatened their privileged interests.  By this view, the deed was more an act of treason than tyrannicide, one incident in a line of political murders dating back across the better part of a century, a dramatic manifestation of a long-standing struggle between opulent conservatives and popularly supported reformers.  This struggle and these earlier assassinations will be treated in the pages ahead.

This book is not only about the history of the Late Republic but about how that history has been distorted by those writers who regularly downplay the importance of material interests, those who ideological taboos about class realities dim their perception of the past.  This distortion is also manifested in the way many historians, both ancient and modern, have portrayed the common people of Rome as being little better than a noisome rabble and riotous mob.

In word and action, wealthy Romans made no secret of their fear and hatred of the common people and of anyone else who infringed upon their class prerogatives.  History is full of examples of politico-economic elites who equate any challenge to their privileged social order as a challenge to all social order, an invitation to chaos and perdition.

The oligarchs of Rome were no exception.  Steeped in utter opulence and luxury, they remained forever inhospitable to Rome's democratic element.  They valued the Republic only as long as it served their way of life.  They dismissed as "demagogues" and "usurpers" the dedicated leaders who took up the popular cause.  The historians of that day, often wealthy slaveholders themselves, usually agreed with this assessment.  So too classical historians of the modern era, many of whom adopt a viewpoint not too different from the one held by the Roman aristocracy.

Caesar's sin, I shall argue, was not that he was subverting the Roman constitution—which was an unwritten one—but that he was loosening the oligarchy's overbearing grip on it.  Worse still, he used state power to effect some limited benefits for small farmers, debtors, and urban proletariat, at the expense of the wealthy few.  No matter how limited these reforms proved to be, the oligarchs never forgave him.  And so Caesar met the same fate as other Roman reformers before him.

My primary interest is not in Julius Caesar as an individual but in the issues of popular struggle and oligarchic power that were being played out decades before he was born, continuing into his life and leading to his death.  Well into my adulthood, most of what I knew about ancient Rome was learnt from Hollywood and television.  In my head were images of men in togas, striding about marbled palaces, mouthing lapidary phrases in stage-mannered accents, and of course images of chariot races and frenzied arena crowds giving thumbs-down to hapless victims.

In my woeful ignorance I was no different from many other educated Americans who have passed from grade school to the postdoctoral level without ever learning anything sensible about Roman history.  Aside from the tableaux furnished by Hollywood and television, all that I knew of Julius Caesar I owed to two playwrights, William Shakespeare and George Bernard Shaw.  If one has to be misinformed about a subject, it might as well be from the wonderful pens of Shakespeare and Shaw.  Fictional representations of history do not usually strive for accuracy, their primary goal being to entertain rather than to educate.  Still they often are more literal than literary in the way they impact upon our minds.  And we had best monitor our tendency to treat the fictional as factual.

Shakespeare's Julius Caesar is a powerful play that draws heavily from Plutarch, in an imaginative yet surprisingly faithful way.  Literary critics do not agree on whether Shakespeare wants us to consider the assassination as execrable or laudable.  We are left to wonder whether Caesar is to be admired or denounced, whether Brutus is noble or loathsome, and whether he or Caesar or Antony or anyone is the hero of the play.  For all its ambiguities, Shakespeare's treatment is a politically safe rendition.  He focuses on immediate questions of tyranny versus republican freedom.  Those are exactly the parameters within which the senatorial assassins confined the debate.

Likewise, Shakespeare shares the Roman elite's view of the common crowd as a mindless aggregation easily led hither and thither, first adulating Pompey, then bowing to Caesar, later hailing Brutus for saving them from tyranny, only in the next breath to be swayed by Antony.  In Julius Caesar, the common people seemingly are capable only of mindless violence and degraded disportment.  All this is in keeping with the dominant stereotype of the Roman proletariat that has come down to us.

George Bernard Shaw's Caesar and Cleopatra is charmingly written and highly engaging.  Shaw's Caesar is a benign aging fellow, who reluctantly settles for an avuncular relationship with Cleopatra.  Upon their first encounter, when she has yet to discover his identity, she repeatedly calls him "old gentleman."  It is clear from the outset that there can be no romantic interest between them because of Caesar's age and the young queen's immaturity.  At the end of the play, as Caesar departs for Rome, he voices his doubts that he will ever see Cleopatra again, but he promises to send her the young handsome Mark Antony, much to her delight.

In real life, when she was still in her teens, well before she met Caesar, Cleopatra already had slept with Antony.  It happened in 55 B.C.E. when a Roman expeditionary force was in Egypt to restore Ptolemy to the throne.  Antony was serving as commander of the cavalry.  Some time later, still predating Caesar's arrival, Cleopatra bestowed her favours upon a second Roman lover, Pompey's son Gnaeus, who was in Africa raising troops for his father.  And Shaw notwithstanding, in late 48 B.C.E., though Caesar was fifty-three and she but twenty-three or so, she proved ready enough to bed her third Roman.  It is said that Cleopatra was a woman of lively turn and enticing talents.  She also had a keen sense of the political.  That this Roman conqueror had the power to secure the Egyptian throne for her must have added to the attraction she felt for him.  It developed into a protracted love affair.  Eventually, she bore  Caesar a son and moved to Rome in order to be closer to him, thereby demonstrating that some things never change.

Although he was engaged in other sexual liaisons and possessed of a wife, Caesar found time to give Cleopatra a lavish welcome befitting a queen, erecting a gold effigy of her in a consecrated area.  He established her in a sumptuous villa across the Tiber, from which she held court, while political leaders, financiers, and men of letters, including the renowned Cicero, danced in attendance.

To his credit, Shaw does insert an iconoclastic sentiment not found in Shakespeare or among regiments of historians who have written about the Late Republic.  In a prologue to Caesar and Cleopatra that is almost never performed, the god Ra tells the audience how Rome discovered that "the road to riches and greatness is through robbery of the poor and slaughter of the weak."  In conformity with that dictum, the Romans "robbed their own poor until they became great masters of that art, and knew by what laws it could be made to appear seemly and honest."  And after squeezing their own people dry, they stripped the poor throughout the many other lands they conquered.  "And I, Ra, laughed; for the minds of the Romans remained the same size whilst their dominion spread over the earth."  Very likely SHaw was inviting his audience to draw a parallel to the small colonialist minds that held sway over the vast British empire of his own day.

There is another instance of Shaw's iconoclasm.  In Act II of Caesar and Cleopatra, Lucius Septimius refuses Caesar's invitation to join his ranks and prepares to depart.  Caesar's loyal comrade-in-arms, Rufus, angrily observes:  "That means he is a Republican."  Lucius turns defiantly and asks, "And what are you?"  To which Rufus responds, "A Caesarian, like all of Caesar's soldiers."  Left at that, we have the standard view espoused by Shakespeare and most historians:  The struggle is between those fighting to preserve the Republic and those who make themselves an instrument of Caesar's power.  But Shaw goes a step further, hinting that Republicanism vs. Caesarism is not really the issue.  So he has Caesar interjecting:  "Lucius:  believe me, Caesar is no Caesarian.  Were Rome a true republic, then were Caesar the first of Republicans."

That response invites the dissident query pursued in this book:  how republican was the Late Republic?  More than 2,000 years after Caesar, most students of that period have yet to bid farewell to the misapprehensions about the republicanism embraced by Lucius and most others of his social set.  They have yet to consider that republicanism might largely be a cloak for oligarchic privilege—as it often is to this day—worn grudgingly by the elites as long as it proved serviceable to their interests.  At the same time, as we shall see, ordinary Roman citizens had been able to win limited but important rights under the Republic, and did at times make important democratic gains, including occasional successes around land redistribution, rent control, debt cancellation, and other reforms.  As far as the Senate oligarchs were concerned, such agitation and popular victories were the major problem, perceived by them as the first steps down the path of class revolution.

To this day, dubious film representations about ancient Rome continue to be mass-marketed.  In 2000, while I was working on this book, Hollywood brought forth Gladiator, a swashbuckling epic about revenge and heroism, offering endless episodes of arena bloodletting.  Unencumbered by any trace of artistic merit, Gladiator played before packing houses in the United States and abroad, winning a Golden Globe Award and an Academy Award.  The story takes place during the reign of the venal Emperor Commodus, more than two centuries after Julius Caesar's death.  Worth noting is how the Roman Senate is depicted.  We are asked to believe that the Senate was populated by public-spirited men devoted to the people's welfare.  But the people themselves are portrayed as little more than a rabble.  In one scene, two Senate leaders are seated in the Colosseum.  When one of them complains of the unsavoury proceedings below, the other opines that the crowd is interested only in bread and circuses, war and violence:  "Rome is the mob. [...] The beating heart of Rome is not the marble of the Senate.  It is the sands of the Colosseum.  [The emperor] will bring them death and they will love him for it."  This view of the Roman populace as mindless bloodthirsty riffraff unfortunately remains the anti-people's history purveyed by both the entertainment media and many classical scholars.

I cannot recall exactly when I moved beyond the stage and screen images of Rome and Caesar and became seriously interested in the Late Republic as a subject of intensive study.  It was years ago, by way of my self-directed readings in ancient Greek history and political philosophy.  At first, it appeared to me that the Romans could never be as compelling and absorbing as their Mediterranean cousins.  But indeed they are, at least from 133 B.C.E. to about 40 B.C.E., the years covered in this book, most of which fall in that period designated the Late Republic.

To assist the many readers who might be unfamiliar with ancient Rome, the first three chapters deal with Rome's history and sociopolitical life.  Chapter Four treats the plutocracy's bloody repression of popular reformers and their followers from Tiberius Gracchus (133 B.C.E.) down to Caesar's early days.  Chapter Five offers a critical portrait of the historians' hero, Cicero, with a narrative of how he mobilised the forces of political repression on behalf of elite interests.  The next five chapters deal with Caesar's life and related political issues, his death and its aftermath.  The final chapter caps the whole subject of ancient Rome, taking to task the stereotype of the Roman people as a "rabble" and "mob."

When the editors of The New Press told me they wanted to include this book in their People's History Series, I agreed.  By my view, any history that deals with the efforts of the populace to defend itself from the abuses of wealth and tyranny is people's history.  Such history has been written over the past century by such notables as W.E.B. Du Bois, Philip Foner, Herbert Aptheker, Albert Mathiez, A.L. Morton, George Rudé, Richard Boyer, Herbert Morais, Jesse Lemisch, Howard Zinn, G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, and others.

But writing "history from the bottom up" is not an easy task when it comes to the Roman Republic, for there exists no trove of ordinary people's letters, diaries, and memoirs; no back issues of labour publications and newspapers; no court, police, and government documents of the kind that compose the historical record of more recent centuries.  Most of Rome's written histories, libraries, and archives were lost over time or were deliberately destroyed by the fanatical proselytisers of Christianity who conducted a systematic war of eradication against pagan scholarship and culture after they came to power in the fifth century C.E.  In any case, as far as we know, the small farmers, proletarians, and slaves of Rome left no written record to speak of.

So one must read against the grain, looking for evidence of the Roman people's struggle in the self-serving words and repressive deeds of the wealthy oligarchs.  A people's history should be not only an account of popular struggle against oppression but an exposé of the anti-people's history that has prevailed among generations of mainstream historians.  It should be a critical history about a people's oppressors, those who propagated an elitist ideology and a loathing of the common people that distorts the historical record down to this day.

Here is a story of latifundia and death squads, masters and slaves, patriarchs and subordinated women, self-enriching capitalists and plundered provinces, profiteering slumlords and urban rioters.  Here is a struggle between the plutocratic few and the indigent many, the privileged versus the proletariat, featuring corrupt politicians, money-driven elections, and the political assassination of popular leaders.  I leave it to the reader to decide whether any of this might resonate with the temper of our own times.

1 - Gentlemen's History: Empire, Class, and Patriarchy

"Rome, thou hast lost the breed of noble bloods!" —JULIUS CAESAR ACT I, SCENE 2

The writing of history has long been a privileged calling undertaken within the church, royal court, landed estate, affluent town house, government agency, university, and corporate-funded foundation.  The social and ideological context in which historians labour greatly influences the kind of history produced.  While this does not tell us everything there is to know about historiography, it is certainly worth some attention.

Historians are fond of saying, as did Benedetto Croce, that history reflects the age in which it is written.  The history of seemingly remote events vibrate "to present needs and present situations."  Collingwood made a similar point:  "St. Augustine looked at Roman history from the point of view of an early Christian; Tillemont, from that of a seventeenth-century Frenchman; Gibbon, from that of an eighteenth-century Englishman...."

Something is left unsaid here, for there is no unanimity in how the people of any epoch view the past, let alone the events of their own day.  The differences in perception range not only across the ages and between civilisations but within any one society at any one time.  Gibbon was not just "an eighteenth-century Englishman," but an eighteenth-century English gentleman; in his own words, a "youth of family and fortune," enjoying "the luxury and freedom of a wealthy house."  As heir to "a considerable estate," he attended Oxford where he wore the velvet cap and silk gown of a gentleman.  While serving as an officer in the militia, he soured in the company of "rustic officers, who were alike deficient in the knowledge of scholars and the manners of gentlemen."

To say that Gibbon and his Oxford peers were "gentlemen" is not to imply that they were graciously practiced in the etiquette of fair play toward all persons regardless of social standing, or that they were endowed with compassion for the more vulnerable of their fellow humans, taking pains to save them from hurtful indignities, as real gentlemen might do.  If anything, they were likely to be unencumbered by such sentiments, uncomprehending of any social need beyond their own select circle.  For them, a "gentleman" was one who sported an uncommonly polished manner and affluent lifestyle, and who presented himself as prosperous, politically conservative, and properly schooled in the art of ethno-class supremacism.

Like most other people, Gibbon tended to perceive reality in accordance with the position he occupied in the social structure.  As a gentleman scholar, he produced what elsewhere I have called "gentlemen's history," a genre heavily indebted to an upper-class ideological perspective.  In 1773, we find him beginning work on his magnum opus, A History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, while settled in a comfortable town house tended by half-a-dozen servants.  Being immersed in what he calls the "decent luxuries," and saturated with his own upper-class pre-possession, Edward Gibbon was able to look kindly upon ancient Rome's violently acquisitive aristocracy.  He might have produced a much different history had he been a self-educated cobbler, sitting in a cold shed, writing into the wee hours after a long day of unrewarding toil.  No accident that the impoverished labourer, even if literate, seldom had the agency to produce scholarly tomes.  Gibbon himself was aware of the class realities behind the writing of history:  "A gentleman possessed of leisure and independence, of books and talents, may be encouraged to write by the distant prospect of honour and reward:  but wretched is the author, and wretched will be the work, where daily diligence is stimulated by daily hunger."

As one who hobnobbed with nobility, Gibbon abhorred the "wild theories of equal and boundless freedom" of the French Revolution.  He was a firm supporter of the British empire.  While serving as a member of Parliament he voted against extending liberties to the American colonies.  Unsurprisingly he had no difficulty conjuring a glowing pastoral image of the Roman empire:  "Domestic peace and union were the natural consequences of the moderate and comprehensive policy embraced by the Romans. [...] The obedience of the Roman world was uniform, voluntary, and permanent.  The vanquished nations, blended into one great people, resigned the hope, nay even the wish, of resuming their independence. [...] The vast extent of the Roman empire was governed by absolute power, under the guidance of virtue and wisdom."  Not a word here about an empire built upon sacked towns, shattered armies, slaughtered villagers, raped women, enslaved prisoners, plundered lands, burnt crops, and mercilessly overtaxed populations.

The gentlemen historians who lived during antiquity painted much the same idyllic picture, especially of Rome's earlier epoch.  The theme they repeatedly visited was of olden times as golden times, when men were more given to duty than luxury, women were chaste and unsparingly devoted to their family patriarchs, youth were ever respectful of their elders, and the common people were modest in their expectations and served valiantly in Rome's army.  Writing during the Late Republic, Sallust offers this fairy tale of Roman times earlier than his own:  "In peace and war [...] virtus [valour, manliness, virtue] was held in high esteem [...] and avarice was a thing almost unknown.  Justice and righteousness were upheld not so much by law as by natural instinct. [...] They governed by conferring benefits on their subjects, not by intimidation."

A more realistic picture of Roman imperialism comes from some of its victims.  In the first century B.C.E., King Mithridates, driven from his land in northern Anatolia, wrote, "The Romans have constantly had the same cause, a cause of the greatest antiquity, for making war upon all nations, peoples, and kings, the insatiable desire for empire and wealth."  Likewise, the Caledonian chief Calgacus, speaking toward the end of the first century C.E., observed:

"[Y]ou find in [the Romans] an arrogance which no reasonable submission can elude.  Brigands of the world, they have exhausted the land by their indiscriminate plunder, and now they ransack the sea.  The wealth of an enemy excites their cupidity, his poverty their lust of power. [...]  Robbery, butchery, rapine, the liars call Empire; they create a desolation and call it peace. [...] [Our loved ones] are now being torn from us by conscription to slave in other lands.  Our wives and sisters, even if they are not raped by enemy soldiers, are seduced by men who are supposed to be our friends and guests.  Our goods and money are consumed by taxation; our land is stripped of its harvest to fill their granaries; our hands and limbs are crippled by building roads through forests and swamps under the lash of our oppressors. [...]  We Britons are sold into slavery anew every day; we have to pay purchase-price ourselves and feed our masters in addition."

For centuries, written history was considered a patrician literary genre, much like epic and tragedy, concerned with the monumental deeds of great personages, a world in which ordinary men played no role other than nameless spear-carriers, and ordinary women not even that.  Antiquity gives us numerous gentlemen chroniclers—Homer, Herodotus, Thucydides, Polybius, Cicero, Livy, Plutarch, Suetonius, Appian, Dio Cassius, Valerius Maximus, Velleius Paterculus, Josephus, and Tacitus—just about all of whom had a pronouncedly low opinion of the common people.  Dio Cassius, for one, assures us that "many monarchs are the source of blessings to their subjects [...] whereas many who live under a democracy work innumerable evils to themselves."

The political biases of ancient historians were not interred with their bones.  Our historical perceptions are shaped not only by present socioeconomic status but by the ideological and class biases of the past historians upon whom we rely.  As John Gager notes, it is difficult to alter our habitual ways of thinking about history because "without knowing it, we perceive the past according to paradigms first created many centuries ago."  And the creators of those ancient paradigms usually spoke with decidedly upper-class accents.

In sum, Gibbon's view of history was not only that of an eighteenth-century English gentleman but one of a whole line of gentlemen historians from bygone times, similarly situated in the upper strata of their respective societies.  What would have made it so difficult for Gibbon to gain a critical perspective of his own ideological limitations—had he ever thought of doing so—was the fact that he kept intellectual company with like-minded scholars of yore, in that centuries-old unanimity of bias that is often mistaken for objectivity.

To be sure, there were some few observers in ancient Rome, such as the satirist Juvenal, who offer a glimpse of the empire as it really was, a system of rapacious expropriation.  Addressing the proconsuls, Juvenal says:  "When at last you leave to go out to govern your province, limit your anger and greed.  Pity our destitute allies, whose poor bones you see sucked dry of their pith and their marrow."

In 1919, noted conservative economist Joseph Schumpeter presented a surprisingly critical picture of Roman imperialism, in words that might sound familiar to present-day critics of U.S. "globalism":

"...That policy which pretends to aspire to peace but unerringly generated war, the policy of continual preparation for war, the policy of meddlesome interventionism.  There was no corner of the known world where some interest was not alleged to be in danger or under actual attack.  If the interests were not Roman, they were those of Rome's allies; and if Rome had no allies, then allies would be invented.  When it was utterly impossible to contrive such an interest—why, then it was the national honour that had been insulted.  The fight was always invested with an aura of legality.  Rome was always being attacked by evil-minded neighbours, always fighting for a breathing space.  The whole world was pervaded by a host of enemies, and it was manifestly Rome's duty to guard against their indubitably aggressive designs."

Still, the Roman empire has its twentieth-century apologists.  British historian Cyril Robinson tenders the familiar image of an empire achieved stochastically, without deliberate design:  "It was perhaps almost as true of Rome as of Great Britain that she acquired her world-dominion in a fit of absence of mind."  An imperialism without imperialists, a design of conquest devoid of human agency or forethought, such a notion applies neither to Rome nor to any other empire in history.

Despite their common class perspective, gentlemen historians do not achieve perfect accord on all issues.  Gibbon himself was roundly condemned for his comments about early Christianity in the Roman empire.  He was attacked as an atheist by clergy and others who believed that their religion had flourished exclusively through divine agency and in a morally flawless manner.  Gibbon credits Christianity's divine origin as being the primary impetus for its triumph, but he gives only a sentence or two to that notion, being more interested as a secular historian in the natural rather than supernatural causes of the church's triumph.  Furthermore, he does not hesitate to point out instances of worldly opportunism and fanatical intolerance among Christian proselytes.  Some readers may find his treatment of the rise of Christianity to be not only the most controversial part of his work but also the most interesting.

Along with his class hauteur, the gentleman scholar is likely to be a male supremacist.  So Gibbon describes Emperor Severus' second wife Julia Domna as "united to a lively imagination, a firmness of mind, and strength of judgement, seldom bestowed on her sex."  Historians do take note of the more notorious female perpetrators in the imperial family, such as Messalina, wife of Emperor Claudius, and Agrippina.  They tell us that Agrippina grabbed the throne for her son Nero by poisoning her uncle and then her husband, the reigning Claudius.  Upon becoming emperor, Nero showed his gratitude to his mother by killing her.  Nero was not what we would call a family man; he also murdered his aunt, his ex-wife, and a half-brother who had a claim to the throne.

Except for a few high-placed and notably lethal females, Roman women are virtually invisible in the works of most gentlemen historians.  Even when noticed, they are not likely to be seen as of any consequence.  That there were no female historians to speak of in antiquity, nor for many centuries thereafter, only compounded the deficiency.  In the last few decades, thanks mostly to the emergence of feminist scholarship, the research on Roman women has improved, despite the paucity of surviving data.  Ordinary Roman women, we know, tended to die younger than their male counterparts because of malnourishment, mistreatment, exhaustion, and childbirth.  Almost half of all Roman brides were under the age of fourteen, many as young as twelve, with consummation coming at the time of marriage even if before menarche.  Women of all ages almost invariably lived under the rule of some male, be it husband, guardian, or paterfamilias (head of the extended family or clan).

Through much of Roman history, females were denied individually given names as well as surnames.  Prominent gens names such as Claudius, Julius, and Lucretius gave forth the obligatory feminine derivatives of Claudia, Julia, and Lucretia.  Sisters therefore all had the same name and were distinguished from each other by adding "the elder" or "the younger" or "the first," "the second," and "the third."  Thus Gaius Octavius' daughters were Octavia the elder and Octavia the younger.  Denying them an individually named identity was one way of treating females as family property, mere fractional derivatives of the paterfamilias.

Women of common caste performed much of the onerous work of society as laundresses, domestic servants, millers, weavers, spinners, and sometimes even construction workers, all in addition to their quotidian household chores.  As far as we know, even when they laboured in the same occupations as men, they were not permitted to belong to craft guilds.  Bereft of opportunities for decent livelihood, some of the more impecunious females were driven to selling their sexual favours.  Prostitution was given standing as an employment and taxed as such.  Owning a brothel was considered a respectable venture by some investors.  In general, the great mass of poor women had little hope of exercising an influence on political issues, though numbers of them must have participated in public protests.

The devoted, self-sacrificing wife was a prized character in Roman writing.  Examples abound of matrons who faced exile or risked death to stand fast with their husbands.  But Roman matrons could also be rebellious on occasion.  As early as 195 B.C.E., they successfully pressured the magistrates to repeal the lex Oppia, a law passed during the austerity of the Second Punic War restricting the use of personal ornaments and carriages by women.  That they would mobilise themselves in this willful manner sorely vexed many a patriarch.

By the Late Republic (approximately 80–40 B.C.E.) and during the first century of the empire, Roman matrons made a number of important gains relating to marriage, divorce, property rights, and personal independence.  Some of them even owned substantial property, and administered commercial operations.  During the civil strife following Caesar's death, the Second Triumvirate posted a list of 1,400 particularly wealthy women whose property was to be assessed.  The women organised a protest in the Forum before the magistrates' tribunal, and demanded to know why they had to share in the punishment of the civil war when they had not collaborated in the crime.  "Why should we be taxed when we have no share in magistracies, or honours, or military commands, or in public affairs at all, where your conflicts have brought us this terrible state?"  Whatever influence women exercised in business affairs, they never gained full civil rights, nor could they sustain much visibility on the political landscape.

Upper-class wives had the reputation of being overly generous with their sexual favours.  Sallust clucks about the women who "publicly sold their chastity."  Horace fumes about the matron who becomes well practiced "in lewd loves, then seeks younger adulterers, while her husband's at wine."  Writing early in the second century C.E., Juvenal seems to anticipate the venomous misogyny that would soon pour from the pens of the Christian church fathers.  Roman matrons, he tells us, are wanton hussies, engaged in their illicit pursuits at the expense of the hapless cuckolds who are their husbands.  They have long discarded the virtuous devotions of the forebears, along with the "naturally feminine" traits of modesty, chastity, and domestic servitude.  In like fashion, a historian from our own era registers his disapproval of the growing sway exercised by high-placed improvident women in the Late Republic whose "unwholesome influence" engendered a "growing license" and "did much to debase the moral and social standards of the day."

In truth, Roman matrons were doubtless no more promiscuous than their own husbands, whose own commonplace dalliances were largely overlooked, given the double standard of that day.  Under the patriarchal system, a man was free to kill an allegedly unfaithful wife, while himself patronising prostitutes or keeping a concubine.  The codes against adultery initiated by Emperor Augustus were aimed at wives, with no prohibitions imposed upon husbands.  One of the many Roman writers who see only virtue in Rome's earliest epoch and decadence in their own times is Valerius Maximus.  He approvingly cites examples of husbands of yore who divorced their wives or otherwise treated them severely for acting in what we might consider mildly independent ways, such as walking abroad with head uncovered, talking to a common freedwoman, or attending public games without the husband's knowledge.  "While women were thus checked in the old days, their minds stayed away from wrongdoing," Valerius assures us.

Powerful men such as Julius Caesar often treated women from well-placed families as disposable strategic assets, to be bartered in arranged marriages designed to fortify one's fortune or help forge political coalitions—a practice that continued within European aristocratic circles down through the ages.  Women were also a source of sensual divertissement for Caesar as for most other Roman men.  A few—such as his first wife Cornelia, his longtime mistress Servilia, and, in his last years, Cleopatra—did win Caesar's love, though none could ever claim exclusive command of his sexual attentions.

Many Roman husbands were hopeless philanderers who fixed upon loveless marriages to advance their careers, pocket ample dowries, or simply enjoy a convenient concupiscence.  Still there were instances of deep conjugal links being forged.  Valerius gives several examples of husbands who were stricken at the loss of their wives.  So does the younger Pliny, who himself expressed genuine love for his wife.

Along with the gender bias, some gentlemen historians let slip a noticeable ethno-class bigotry.  The progenitor of all historians of the Late Republic is Cicero.  Hailed by Balsdon as "perhaps the most civilised man who has ever lived," Cicero has been revered by classics professors and Latin teachers throughout the ages.  This most civilised man was not above stoking the crassest ethno-class prejudices.  Cicero sneered at the Greeks and Jews, both the slaves and freedmen among them, who rallied to the side of democratic leaders, declaring that "men of those nations often throw [...] our assemblies into confusion."  The Greeks are given to "shameless lying," the Jews to "barbaric superstition."

Some latter-day historians have taken their cue from Cicero.  Theodor Mommsen describes the Roman Forum as a shouting fest for "everyone in the shape of a man" with Egyptians, Jews, and Greeks, both freedmen and slaves, being the loudest participants in the public assemblies.  Cyril Robinson notes that many proletarians were "of Greek or Oriental origin [...] [whose] loose and feeble character made them bad citizens."  The "purity of Roman blood began to be contaminated by the admixture of this alien element."  Those of "Oriental blood" were "incapable of assimilating the national habits of decency and restraint," although "not all Greeks, of course, were vicious or unwholesome characters."

J.F.C. Fuller tells us that Rome's "Latin stock was increasingly mongrelised as Greeks, Asiatics, Spaniards, Gauls, and other [slaves] were absorbed through manumission and became citizens."  Another esteemed classicist, Jérôme Carcopino, flirts with a racist blood theory of history, writing that interbreeding between Roman aristocrats and their female slaves or freedwomen, followed by frequent emancipation or adoption of the offspring, left "many of the best families in the city infected with an actual hybridisation, similar to that which has more recently contaminated other slave-owning peoples."  This mixed breeding "strongly accentuated the national and social decomposition" of Rome.

In ancient Rome, as in societies before and since, class oppression was supported by class bias.  The lowly were considered low because of deficiencies within themselves.  Class bias, in turn, was often buttressed by ethnic prejudice.  Many of the poor, both slaves and free, were from "barbarian" stock, and this further fueled the tendency to loathe them as wastrels and brigands, troublesome contaminants of respectable society.  So ethnic and class bias conveniently dovetailed for those who looked at their world de haut en bas, and this included not only the likes of Cicero but many of the writers who came after him.

2 - Slaves, Proletarians, and Masters

"Our hearts you see not; they are pitiful;

And pity to the general wrong of Rome—"

—JULIUS CAESAR ACT III, SCENE 1

Rome's social pyramid rested upon the backs of slaves (servi) who composed approximately one-third the population of Italy, with probably a smaller proportion within Rome property.  Their numbers were maintained by conquests, piratical kidnappings, and procreation by the slaves themselves.  Slavery also was the final destination for individuals convicted of capital crimes, for destitute persons unable to repay debts, and for children sold off by destitute families.  War captives were worked to death in the mines and quarries and on plantations (latifundia) at such a rate that their ranks were constantly on the wane.

A step above the servi was the great mass of propertyless proletariat (proletarii), consisting of city-dwelling citizens (plebs urbana), foreigners, and freedmen (ex-slaves).  Rome had a downtown urban centre of temples, ceremonial sites, emporia, public forums, and government offices.  Downtown was encircled by a dense ring of slums.  There being no public transportation, the proletarians had to be housed within walking distance of work sites and markets.  The solution was to pile them into thousands of poorly lit inner-city tenements along narrow streets.  Such dwellings were sometimes seven or eight floors high, all lacking toilets, running water, and decent ventilation.  The rents for those fetid, disease-ridden warrens were usually more than the plebs could afford, forcing them to double and triple up, with entire families residing in one room.  Some luckless renters could afford only dank cellars or cramped garrets not high enough to stand in.

Charcoal braziers and oil lamps were a constant fire hazard.  Building codes were not to appear in Rome for centuries to come.  Tenants who escaped the typhoid, typhus, and fires that plagued the slums still lived in fear of having the structures collapse upon them, as happened all too frequently.  The ingenuity for which Roman architecture is known was not lavished upon the domiciles of the poor.  As Juvenal ironically describes it:  "Rome is supported on pipe-stems, matchsticks; it's cheaper thus for the landlord to shore up his ruins, patch up the old cracked walls, and notify the tenants.  They are expected to sleep secure though the beams are about to crash above them.  Cicero himself owned tenement properties whose rental income he used to maintain his son as a student in Athens.  In a letter to a friend, he sounds every bit the speculative slumlord:  "[T]wo of my shops have collapsed and the others are showing cracks, so that even the mice have moved elsewhere, to say nothing of the tenants.  Other people call this a disaster, I don't call it even a nuisance. [...] [T]here is a building scheme under way [...] which will turn this loss into a source of profit."

The narrow rutted streets were crowded with tradesmen, artisans, jobbers, beggars, shoppers, and loiterers.  Street vendors hawked salted fish, warm pans of smoking sausages, cups of pudding, and jars of wine.  Musicians, acrobats, and jugglers, with their sad little trained animals, performed for the passing crowd.  Large dirty pots placed at intervals along the streets served as pissoirs for passerby, a concession to fullers and laundry workers who—soap being unknown to the Romans—used the accumulated urine to treat or wash their cloth.  (Uric acid is still applied today in such cleansers as borax.)  We can presume that the clothes were given a final rinse in freshwater.

For those who could afford it, wine was imbibed during and between meals.  Romans of the Late Republic usually drank it more than half diluted with water.  Wine was their coffee, tea, and spirits.  "And olive oil was their butter, soap, and electricity:  they cooked with it, anointed themselves with it at the baths, and burnt it in their lamps."  The poor person's sustenance was grain, consumed in the form of bread and porridge.

With rampant poverty came a high crime rate.  Rome had no street lighting and no police force to speak of.  As night fell, the populace secured itself behind bolted doors.  Only the opulent few, who could afford an ensemble of slaves and strongmen to light the way and serve as bodyguards, dared to venture abroad, and even they thought twice about it.  Juvenal writes acerbically of the hazards posed by street toughs:  "It makes no difference whether you try to say something or retreat without a word, they beat you up all the same. [...] You know what the poor man's freedom amounts to?  The freedom, after being punched and pounded to pieces, to beg and implore that he be allowed to go home with a few teeth left.

Most plebs urbana and their families lived from hand to mouth, toiling long hours for trifling sums.  In the countryside, the plebs rustica fared no better than their city cousins.  When possible, they would try to ease their straitened circumstances by taking on the more perilous chores offered by latifundia lords who, like American plantation owners of the antebellum South, sometimes preferred to use free labourers for risky tasks.  By the owner's reckoning, the death of a day jobber merely increased the population of the netherworld, whereas the death of a slave represented the loss of a tidy investment.

A rung above the propertyless proletarii were the small farmers, settled on their own parcels of land in the provinces around the city, with enough property to qualify for military service.  And just above them was a small middle class of minor officials, merchants, and industrial employers, who lived in apartments situated away from the stench and noise of the inner city but still within the manageable distance of the Forum and the baths.

Looming over the toiling multitude of Rome in "almost incredible opulence" were "a few thousand multimillionaires."  One magistrate estimated that the number of solidly rich families was not more than 2,000.  This elite stratum, the "officer class," included the equites or equestrians, a class of knights, so designated because their property qualified them to serve in the cavalry—although by the Late Republic many of them probably had never been on a horse.  The equestrians were state contractors, bankers, moneylenders, traders, tax collectors, and landowners.  They occupied a social rank just below aristocrats and well above commoners, serving as a reservoir for recruits into the aristocratic class, as families of old lineage died out from time to time.  Being large property holders who generally had little sympathy for the poor, the knights shared many of the same interests as the nobility, although occasional conflicts did arise between the two elite groups.

At the very apex of the social pyramid was the nobilitas, an aristocratic oligarchy representing families whose lineage could claim one or more members who had served as consul (the highest office of the Republic).  Equestrians and nobles differed more in political lineage than family fortune.  Both groups were members of the officer class; both held wealth in land, slaves, trade, and finance.  Both lived in seemly mansions, enjoying gourmet meals served on plates of gold and silver, lavish gardens, game preserves, aviaries, stables of the finest horses, fish ponds, private libraries, private baths, and water closets.  Their estates were situated on tracts the size of veritable townships, large enough to house swollen retinues of slaves and personal servants.  Cicero was an equestrian who owned seven or eight estates and several smaller farms, along with his urban tenements and other business ventures.

The old nobility too was not above pursuing speculative capitalist ventures.  Thus Julius Caesar's friend and ally Crassus, a landed aristocrat, became one of the wealthiest men of the Late Republic by buying up urban sites upon which tenements had collapsed or been ruined by fire, then rebuilding new tenements whose rents provided ample recompense for his capital outlay.

Class supremacism permeated republican Roman society right down to its domestic codes.  There was a strict prohibition against marriage between a member of the aristocratic class and a citizen who had risen from the class of freedmen.  Aristocrats also were forbidden to marry actresses and women of other such dubious professions.

In Rome's Late Republic, as in any plutocracy, it was a disgrace to be poor and an honour to be rich.  The rich, who lived parasitically off the labour of others, were hailed as men of quality and worth; while the impecunious, who struggled along the paltry earnings of their own hard labour, were considered vulgar and deficient.  Though he wrote later on, during the time of emperors, Juvenal might as well have been speaking of earlier republican society when he noted that a rich man's word was treated as good as gold because he was possessed of gold, but a poor man's oath "has no standing in court [...] Men do not easily rise whose poverty hinders their merit."

Rome's oppressive class nature was nowhere more evident than in the widespread practice of slavery.  Roman slavery was long treated none too harshly by gentlemen historians.  Gibbon, for instance, tells us that a slave did not live without hope, given "the benevolence of the master."  If he showed diligence and fidelity for "a few years" he might very naturally expect to be granted his freedom.  More recently, Jérôme Carcopino enthuses about Roman laws that "lightened [the slaves'] chains and favoured their emancipation [...] The practical good sense of the Romans, no less than the fundamental humanity instinctive in their peasant hearts, had always kept them from showing cruelty toward the servi.  They had always treated their slaves with consideration. [...] With few exceptions, slavery in Rome was neither eternal nor, while it lasted, intolerable."  No slaveholder could have said it better.

"It is not until recent times," notes K.R. Bradley, "that the realisation has begun to set in among scholars that there is something distinctly unpalatable about slavery in antiquity.  Indeed in some quarters apologetic influences are still at work."  One reputable historian who still celebrates the happy side of slavery is Lionel Casson.  He accords a grudging nod to the ill-fated souls who laboured under the whip in the fields or died in such numbers in the mines, saying only that they were burdened by "tasks that involved sweat and drudgery."  Then he dwells upon the favourable conditions supposedly enjoyed by slaves who assisted in running luxurious households, or occupied government posts.  Some even amassed substantial fortunes as investors.  Sometimes "free men with bleak prospects would sell themselves into slavery in order to qualify" for these plum positions.  A great many manumitted servi, rhapsodises Casson, "were able to escape from slavery and mount the steps of the social ladder, in some cases to the very top."  One former servus gave his son an excellent education, and the boy grew up to be the famous writer Horace.  "In but two generations the family had risen from slavery to literary immortality."

The impression one gets is that Roman slavery was a kind of affirmative action programme, and Rome was a land of opportunity ouverte aux talents.  In fact, such impressive instances of upward mobility were the rare exception.  Manumission was usually granted only after many years of servitude.  Even then, liberty was fettered with liabilities.  Frequently the manumitted servus had to leave behind his spouse or children as slaves.  Freedmen could neither serve in the military nor seek public office.  They bore the names of their former masters to whom they continued to owe service and make payments.

Slaves usually had to buy their freedom by meeting the original purchasing price.  Obviously, the vast majority could not hope to accumulate such a sum.  Some of the luckier ones had their freedom paid for by relatives who were already free and working.  Only a select few had the opportunity to pocket tips as doorkeepers or performers, or glean windfall gratuities in specialised occupations such as skilled craftsmen, doctors, and prostitutes.

Manumission was largely motivated by the owner's desire to escape the onerous expense of having to feed and shelter chattel for their entire lives, especially ones no longer in the full productive vigour of their youth.  Many of the manumitted were granted testimonial emancipation in the master's will, that is, only after his death deprived him of any further opportunity to exploit them would they be set free.  As Bradley reckons, "most of the servile population probably never achieved freedom at all [...] [M]anumission was a real but fragile prospect for slaves, and it conceals the years of hardship that preceded its attainment."

All slavocracies develop a racist ideology to justify their dehumanised social relationships.  In Rome, male slaves of any age were habitually addressed as puer or "boy."  A similar degrading appellation was applied to slaves in ancient Greece and in the slavocracy of the United States, persisting into the postbellum segregationist South of the twentieth century.  The slave as a low-grade being or subhuman is a theme found in the writings of Plato and Aristotle.  In the minds of Roman slaveholders, the servi—including the foreigners who composed the larger portion of the slave population—were substandard in moral and mental capacity, a notch or two above animals.  Cicero assures us that Jews, Syrians, and all other Asian barbarians are "born to slavery."  The Roman historian Florus sees the Spartacus slave rebellion not as a monumental struggle for liberty but a disgraceful undertaking perpetrated "by persons of the meanest class" led by "men of the worst character [...] eager to take vengeance on their masters."  Gibbon describes Rome's slave population as "a mean and promiscuous multitude."  More recently we have Sir Ronald Syme asserting that the Roman slave market was flooded with "captives of alien and often inferior stock."  Most present-day classical writers, however, do not embrace the slaveholder's supremacism, at least not overtly.

By definition the relationship between master and slave is a coercive one.  Not surprisingly the master is preoccupied with questions of control, with instilling loyalty and obedience into these recalcitrant underlings, using a combination of lenient and harsh methods.  In the first century C.E. the Roman agricultural writer Columella set forth advice on how best to manage servile farm labour.  The slaveholder had to avoid excessive severity and gratuitous cruelty not out of humane consideration but because such things were counterproductive.  Slaves could be better controlled if provided with decent living conditions, time off from work, and occasional opportunity to voice grievances.

The uncertain promise of eventual emancipation sometimes made manumission an effective control mechanism.  The slave was encouraged to observe long-term compliance in the hope of eventual freedom.  Servile family attachments were another useful restraint.  Married slaves with children were less likely to abscond and more ready to cooperate.  And their offspring added to the owner's wealth.  But the slave family existed only as long as it served the interests of the master.  It was constantly in danger of disruption since the slave was a disposable form of property.  Slave owners readily broke up servile families "when economic considerations made the sale of their slaves attractive or necessary."

Good treatment did not guarantee good slaves.  One might recall Frederick Douglass' observation drawn from his own unhappy bondage in the American South:  The slave who has a cruel master wishes for a kind one, and the slave who has a kind master wishes for freedom.  Kindly treatment alone could eventually undermine control by nursing heightened expectations.  It was necessary then to impose a coercive, fear-inspiring dominion.  A Roman slave could be flogged, branded, mutilated, starved, raped, or crucified, without recourse to self-defence.  "Against a slave everything is permitted," wrote Seneca, the Stoic, who inveighed against the cruel treatment of servi while availing himself of their services.

In accordance with an ancient rule, if a master was murdered by one of his slaves, all the others in his household faced execution.  In this way every servus might feel an interest in guarding the master's safety.  A failure to report suspicious doings or secret plots could cost slaves their lives.  One could only pray that one's master expired in an unambiguously natural fashion, for if there was any suspicion of foul play, the investigating authorities would put all the late owner's slaves to the torture.  Roman law did not admit the torture of a free man but required it to exact evidence from slaves, both male and female.  But servi who betrayed their masters by volunteering damning information against them in court ended up being punished rather than rewarded.  For while prosecutors and plaintiffs wanted to win cases, they were disinclined to encourage disloyalty among slaves.

Those who think Roman slavery was such a benign institution have not explained why fugitive slaves were a constant problem.  Owners did not lightly countenance the loss of valuable property.  They regularly used chains, metal collars, and other restraining devices.  Slaves who fled were hunted down and returned to irate masters who were keen to inflict a severe retribution.  Slaveholders consulted oracles and astrologers to divine the whereabouts of runaways; they posted bills offering rewards; they appealed to state authorities and engaged professional slave catchers (fugitivarii).

Cicero enlisted two successive provincial governors in search for a slave who had purloined some of his valuable books and fled abroad.

Every slave society has known its uprisings.  Rome was no exception.  The three biggest rebellions, occurring in the last two centuries of the Republic, reached the level of open warfare, with many thousands of armed men on both sides, including the famous one waged by Spartacus and his brave hearts in 74–70 B.C.E.  All were mercilessly crushed.  There were numerous other slave uprisings but they were small-scale, short-lived, and unsuccessful, apart from the relatively few slaves who managed a permanent escape.

Some domestic slaves who enjoyed the favoured circumstances of a wealthy household doubtless were materially better off than many slum-dwelling plebs, though servile accommodations and food rations on even the richest estate were usually kept at meager levels.  Some urban slaves could sneak away and participate in marketplace debates or even join guilds.  But most endured long hours of service, daily humiliations, whimsical mistreatment, and the threat of heavy whippings.  Ammianus Marcellinus tells of owners in his day who might have slaves flogged 300 times for a minor offence such as being slow to bring hot water.  The younger Seneca describes some of the indignities endured by household slaves:

"When we recline at a banquet, one slave mops up the disgorged food, another crouches beneath the table and gathers up the leftovers of the tipsy guests.  Another carves the priceless game birds; with unerring strokes and skilled hand, he cuts choice morsels along the breast or the rump.  Luckless fellow, to live only for the purpose of cutting fat capons correctly... another, who serves the wine, must dress like a woman and wrestle with his advancing years, he cannot get away from his boyhood; he is dragged back to it; and though he has already acquired a soldier's figure, he is kept beardless by having his hair swooped away or plucked out by the roots, and he must remain awake throughout the night, dividing his time between his master's drunkenness and lust; in the chamber he must be a man, at the feast a boy."

Sexual exploitation of Rome's servi by their masters, though pandemic, is ignored by virtually all present-day historians.  Among ancient writers it was openly acknowledged that slaves should make their bodies available on demand.  Horace parades his preference for household slaves, both male and female:  "I like my sex easy and ready at hand."  And Petronius has an ex-slave in his Satyricon reminisce about how he sexually serviced both his master and mistress for fourteen years, an arrangement that Roman readers doubtless found familiar and believable.

The poet Martial—who was the closest thing ancient Rome had to a gossip columnist—alludes repeatedly to sexual intimacies that masters enjoyed with their household servi.  He ironically hails a certain Quirinalis for not needing a wife because he fornicates with maid servants and fills his townhouse and country place with the resultant offspring.  "A genuine paterfamilias is Quirinalis."  We hear nothing about how the maid servants felt about all this.

Affluent women sometimes took advantage of their class status to pursue carnal knowledge.  So Martial chides one man whose seven sons all advertise the features of their mother's servile adulterers, among whom are the cook, the baker, and even the husband's own sodomite underling.  The poet refers to a woman of advanced years who uses her entire dowry to redeem her favourite lover from slavery, thereby ensuring regular satisfaction for herself; a master who beds his housekeeper; another who buys back his maid in order to keep her as his concubine; those who seek out slave boys for their pleasure; and a husband who lingers with maid servants while his wife accommodates litter-bearers:  "You are quite a pair, Alauda."

Martial himself longs for "a plump home-born slave."  When he passes up the chance to buy "a lad" for 100,000 sesterces, a friend of his immediately meets the price.  In his unsparingly coarse manner, Martial tells how his "cock grieves" over the lost opportunity.  Of course, the boy in question had no say in the matter.  The owner unilaterally set the boundaries and chose the mode of gratification, using the child as he pleased.  Slavers regularly catered to pedophilic tastes, selling young boys and girls for sexual purposes.  Depilatories were used to remove the hair on a boy's body, keeping him as young-looking as possible.  Boys were made to ingest various potions thought to delay the onset of puberty.  Even worse, slave dealers frequently resorted to castration, despite successive laws forbidding it.

Such instances of child barter, rape, and sexual mutilation go unmentioned by those latter-day scholars who, like the slaveholders themselves, seem to have a keener sense of slavery's hidden benefits than of its manifest evils.

The image of a mutually loving master-slave relationship in ancient Rome, as Finley notes, seems "to draw modern commentators irresistibly into sentimentality and bathos."  But the relationship was anything but mutual.  No matter how mawkishly costumed, Roman slavery cannot be passed off as a love relationship.

When a favourite of his named Sositheus, "a delightful fellow," died, Cicero observed "I am more upset than perhaps I ought to be over the death of a slave."  Here Cicero is monitoring his feelings, aware that the slaveholder must maintain proper class boundaries by not growing too attached to a mere servus.  The love a master feels for his slave is patronising and paternalistic.  While the love a slave feels for his master is at least partially exacted by the steeply asymmetrical power relationship, generated as much by uneasy necessity as by genuine affection.  No wonder it existed more firmly in the master's imagination than in the slave's heart.  We will never know how Cicero's Sositheus, who lived and died in servitude, may have felt about their relationship had he been given an opportunity for freedom and decent employment.

During the American Civil War, many masters and mistresses in the Confederacy were astonished to find that their slaves—supposedly so well treated and so devoted and faithful—would manifest the most outrageous ingratitude at the first opportunity, insolently disregarding commands that could no longer be enforced, or fleeing to freedom, even enlisting in the ranks of the Union Army to fight for the emancipation of their brethren.  The journalist Whitelaw Reid, travelling through the South immediately after the war, noted the refrain repeated tirelessly by erstwhile slaveholders, "We have been the best friends the n***er ever had.  Yet this is the way they treat us."  We can safely assume that this kind of hidden "ingratitude" existed among many Roman household slaves.

The "faithful slave" was a favourite theme among ancient writers, most of whom were themselves slaveholders.  Both Valerius and Appian provide a number of stories of slaves who showed extraordinary devotion to their masters.  No doubt, touching friendships could blossom between master and slave.  Vulnerable captives, torn from hearth and home, will sometimes seek survival and security by attaching themselves emotionally to those who would life-and-death power over them.  But we should not make too much of it.  The Roman slaveholders, like the American slaveholders of the antebellum South, lived in persistent fear that their "faithfully devoted" slaves were quite capable of rising up and massacring their overlords.  In the younger Pliny's words, slaveholders were permanently exposed to "dangers, outrages and insult [...] No master can feel safe because he is kind and considerate:  for it is their brutality, not their reasoning capacity, which leads slaves to murder masters."  Hence the Roman proverb, "A hundred slaves, a hundred enemies."

The Panglossian view of benign bondage ignores the inhumanity that inheres in forced servitude.  Slaves had to truckle to their masters and all other superiors.  They were marginalised creatures often denied the most elementary social bonds.  They suffered a nearly total lack of control over their labour, their persons, and in most regards their very personalities.  Slaves themselves—not just their labour power—were commodities.  Presumably not thinking of his delightful Sositheus, Cicero made this perfectly clear when he remarked that it was preferable to lighten a ship in emergency by throwing an old slave overboard rather than a good horse.  And the elder Cato advises his readers to sell old or sick slaves along with old or sick draught animals "and everything else that is superfluous."  So every slaveholder was locked into an intrinsically injurious construct that is the inescapable essence of slavery:  The degrading exploitation of one human being so that another may pursue whatever comforts and advantages wealth might confer.  Ultimately, the same can be said of all exploitative class relations perpetrated by those who accumulate wealth for themselves by reducing others to poverty.

3 - A Republic for the Few

"So often shall the knot of us be call'd

The men that gave their country liberty."

—JULIUS CAESAR ACT III, SCENE 1

As legend has it, Rome was founded in 753 B.C.E. and named after its first monarch Romulus. Early in the sixth century B.C.E., a succession of Etruscan kings reigned over the city. Detested by the common people because of its exploitative rule, the monarchy was overthrown around 510–509 B.C.E. and a republic was proclaimed. Executive rule passed to a pair of consuls, elected for one-year terms and subject to each other's veto. The consuls remained the highest magistrates throughout the history of the Republic. They levied and commanded Rome's armies, enforced the laws, gave audience to foreign delegations, and presided in the Senate over the popular assemblies.

Early Roman society was sharply divided between a landed aristocracy of patricians and a mass of commoners called plebeians. Only patricians could enter the Senate or occupy leading governmental or religious posts. During the fourth century B.C.E., some of the more affluent plebeian families won access to top official positions, gaining seats in the Senate and entry into the nobility by winning the consulship. By the middle of the third century, plebeians and patricians had won the right to intermarry, and the richer elements of both groups melded into one aristocracy.

The Republic was also an empire. During the fourth and third centuries B.C.E., Rome embarked upon a series of conquests and alliances that extended its dominion over most of the Italian peninsula. With the defeat of its arch commercial rival, Carthage, in what is known as the First Punic War (264–261 B.C.E.), Rome took control of Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica. In the Second Punic War (218–202 B.C.E.), the Carthaginian general Hannibal launched his famed invasion of Italy, crossing the snow-covered Alps with an army and a troop of elephants. Hannibal fought his way down the peninsula, destroying two Roman armies in the doing, only to be worn down and eventually defeated. Rome expelled Carthage from Spain, turning the greater part of the Iberian peninsula into Roman provinces.

In 146 B.C.E., after a half-century of peace, Rome attacked and destroyed Carthage itself, transforming its territory into a colonial province called Africa (roughly coextensive with present-day Tunisia). Contrary to popular myth, the invaders did not pour salt or lime into Carthage's topsoil in order to leave it forever barren. Carthage eventually flourished once again but as a Roman provincial city.

The Roman imperialists then moved eastward to fish in troubled waters, intervening to assist Greek cities threatened by Macedonian and Syrian armies. But after beating off these threats, Rome subjugated the Greeks themselves, welding their numerous polities into one province. By the end of the second century B.C.E., Rome reigned as supreme mistress of the Mediterranean.

As with other imperial powers before and since, the Roman empire brought immense wealth to its ruling class and imposed heavy burdens on its common citizenry. The aristocracy pursued a policy of almost continuous warfare. War offered opportunities to plunder the treasure of other countries and take advantage of depressed land markets in Italy itself. Many small landholders, the mainstay of the Roman infantry, fell in battle. Many more had to serve long enlistments that left them unable to tend their farms. Wealthy investors bought up these holdings for a pittance. War also brought a replenished supply of captive slaves to till the newly acquired tracts.

The ager publicus, the publicly-owned fertile lands in regions south and east of Rome, had been farmed for generations by collectives of smallholders who paid a modest rent to the state treasury. These collectives, run by free labour, had produced enough to victual the entire city. That Rome could be fed by common farmers, with not a penny of profit extracted by the rich, was more than the rich were willing to tolerate. To protect the smallholders a law was passed that forbade any individual to hold more than 500 iugera (about 310 acres). "For a while," writes Plutarch, "this law restrained the greed of the rich and helped the poor. [...] But after a time the wealthy men, by using the names of fictitious tenants, contrived to transfer many of these holdings to themselves, and finally they openly took possession of the greater part of the land under their own names."

By the second century B.C.E., through a combination of opportunistic buyouts and sheer violence, the wealthy few carved out from the ager publicus vast estates for themselves, to which they had no right except that imposed by their money and their hired thugs. In time, the laws were changed to allow unlimited concentration of public and private lands in their hands. As Appian reports, "the powerful [landholders] were becoming extremely rich, and the number of slaves in the country was reaching large proportions. Meanwhile the Italian people were suffering from depopulation and a shortage of men, worn down by poverty, taxes and military service."

The dispossessed farmers emigrated to towns and provinces where they joined the ranks of the proletariat, serving as a cheap labour supply and contributing to the growth of new urban markets and city slum congestion. Some remained in the countryside, living from hand to mouth as landless jobbers.

Large-scale mining and agriculture were carried out, then as now, by rich owners whose prime concern was the maximisation of profits, with little thought given to the attrition visited upon the workforce or the land. As the elder Pliny observed, men relentlessly accumulated landed property and probed the earth, "digging into her veins of gold and silver and mines of copper and lead; we actually drive shafts down into the depth to search for gems and certain tiny stones; we drag out her entrails in search of a jewel merely to be worn upon a finger! How many hands are worn away with toil that a single knuckle may shine resplendent! [...] All these avenues from which wealth issues lead but to crime and slaughter and warfare..."

With a further touch of wisdom Pliny continued: When compared to all the universe, the earth is "but a pinprick," yet "here it is that we fill positions of power and covet wealth, and throw mankind into an uproar." Here we launch "civil wars and slaughter one another to make the land more spacious!" and here "we expel the tenants next to us and add a patch of turf to our own estate by stealing from our neighbours—to the end that he who has marked out his acres most widely and banished his neighbours beyond all record may rejoice in owning—how small a fraction of the earth's surface? Or when he has stretched his boundaries to the full measure of his avarice, may still retain—what portion, pray, of his estate when he is dead?"

The Republic's political structure was not fashioned whole in accordance with some rational design. It emerged from prolonged conflict between the citizenry and the aristocracy, a jerry-built mixture of popular protections and elite entrenchments. Less than two decades after the kings were expelled, the people began a struggle, lasting over 200 years, to win the right to popular elections and legislative assemblage. The commoners demonstrated and rioted, embarking on highly organised strike actions or "secessions" when called upon to serve as soldiers. Democracy, a wonderful invention by the people of history to defend themselves from the power of the wealthy, took tenuous root in ancient Rome.

Still, as a democracy Rome left much to be desired. In the Forum, the central marketplace and open plaza of the city, candidates and commoners could mill about in informal groups, dilating on sundry issues. But full-dress debates before the entire assemblage were limited to those invited to speak by the summoning magistrate. Ordinary citizens could not directly participate, except occasionally to applaud, cheer, shout, or groan. And citizens could vote only "yea" or "nay" on proposals submitted by one of the magistrates, without the right to amend any clause.

Lacking a representative system, the assemblies were open to all citizens. In actual practice, only a relatively small portion of the eligible population could be accommodated in the open-air venues, usually the more prosperous and mobile who had the time and wherewithal to attend. Yet common plebs and to a much lesser degree even foreigners and slaves sometimes made their presence felt. In the Centurial Assembly (comitia centuriata), which elected consuls and praetors, voting took place in block units organised around traditional military groupings that were heavily rigged to favour the propertied classes. More democratic was the Tribal Assembly of the People (comitia tributa), in which each family tribal group voted as a unit. Reformers like the Gracchi brothers and Julius Caesar regularly preferred the Tribal Assembly to the Centurial Assembly when trying to pass reform legislation. With enough unity and mass mobilisation, poor city dwellers in alliance with voters from outlying districts might pass measures that were opposed by the dominant aristocratic faction in the Senate.

The various magistrates (consuls, praetors, aediles, and quaestors) were elected by the assemblies. To be elected to any of these top four ranks of magistracy carried life membership in the Senate. The closest thing to a popular democratic office was the Tribunate of the People, created after decades of popular agitation and threats of armed secession. Ten tribunes elected each year by the assemblies were to act as the protectors of popular rights. They could veto bills and even senatorial decrees. They eventually gained the right to submit legislation themselves and prosecute errant officials. One had to be of plebeian lineage to qualify as a tribune, one of the few instances in the Late Republic when the patrician-plebeian distinction still obtained.

A tribune who won favourable attention from the senatorial elites might eventually be supported by them in running for the quaestorship. If victorious, he gained admission into the Senate. The promise of such a prestigious advancement blunted the democratic verve of many a tribune. Furthermore, one tribune's proposals could be vetoed by any of the other nine, thus dampening the efforts of a dedicated innovator. By the second century B.C.E.—despite exceptional moments of independence—tribunes were as likely to be instruments of the Senate as champions of the people. Members of the Senate (if they were of plebeian ancestry) could hamstring the tribunate by getting themselves elected tribunes, as did the conservative Cato. Still the tribunate was greatly valued by the common people as the key protection of their republican liberties.

Ordinarily, elections were contested by candidates who were either wealthy themselves or bankrolled by wealthy backers. Those with modest purses had but a dim chance at the polls. Bribery and the buying of votes were widespread. Rarely did candidates proffer discernible programmes. To distinguish himself from his opponents, a candidate emphasised his personal integrity and leadership, the prestige of his family name, his association with important personalities of the day, his public service, and his heroic war record—a favouring of style over substance that present-day voters might find familiar.

In sum, the Roman political system permitted the wealthy few to prevail on most issues. One historian finds nothing wrong with this: "There was, indeed, some justice in a system whereby those who bore the chief burden of fighting and financing the city's wars, should also possess the chief voice in directing the city's course." In fact, the very rich did not bear the chief burden of fighting. That dangerous task fell mostly on the shoulders of yeomen and townsmen, and later even the proletariat. The rich did bear much of the financial burdens of war, often using their own funds to raise armies. But they usually were more than recompensed by pocketing the lion's share of the booty.

Rather than contributing to the commonweal, the wealthy fed off it. They avoided paying rents for the public lands they or their forebears had expropriated. Cicero's aristocratic wife, for instance, paid no taxes or fees for public forest lands whose timber she marketed for personal profit. Senators paid no taxes and little of the other costs of governance. The money they lent to the state was paid back to them with interest from funds the state raised by taxing less privileged populations at home and abroad. This system of deficit spending—of borrowing from the rich and paying them back from taxing poor commoners—amounted to an upward redistribution of income much like the kind practiced by indebted governments today, including our own.

The most powerful governing body was the Roman Senate. Numbering several hundred men of wealthy background who had served, or continued to serve, as magistrates, the Senate determined foreign policy, appointed provincial governors, and held the purse strings of the Republic. The Senate's approval was sought for most measures before they were submitted to the assemblies. The Senate controlled recruitment and deployment of army units and top military appointments. And it made decisions on war and peace, after formal consultation with the popular assembly.

Within the Senate itself was the inner circle of nobles (nobiles) who exercised a controlling influence over the election of major magistrates, especially the consuls and praetors who wielded executive and military power, and the censors who supervised public morals and voting lists. Candidates from families of senatorial renown generally won the higher magisterial offices. During most times, "twenty or thirty men from a dozen families" held what was almost "a monopoly of power." Thus, seven Metelli gained the consulship within fifteen years.

Inequalities prevailed within the Senate itself. No senator could speak unless called upon by the presiding consul, and those of consular rank (the nobility) were always invited to speak first, often leaving little time for senators of lesser eminence. Sallust, himself a low-ranking senatorial newcomer, complained that a small faction of senators governed, "giving and taking away as they please; oppressing the innocent, and raising their partisans to honour; while no wickedness, no dishonesty or disgrace, is a bar to the attainment of office. Whatever appears desirable, they seize and render their own, and transform their will and pleasure into their law, as arbitrarily as victors in a conquered city."

The nobles maintained their influence mostly with their wealth, social prestige, and the protection and patronage they extended to their paid followers or clientele (clientela), along with the threats and actual applications of force they might employ. As necessity dictated, they used their clientele as voting blocs, agitators, and armed cadres. This system wedded portions of the lower class to the rich. Influential patrons spent many a morning at home in audience to a throng of followers who came to press for a favour, pass on useful information, receive an assignment, pay their respects, and secure a modest hangout of money or food. As Max Weber notes, patronage created relationships of personal dependence that gave Roman political life its private armies and lasting semi-feudal character.

In the second century B.C.E., the senatorial nobles began to divide into two groups, the larger being self-designated as the optimates ("best men"), who were devoted to upholding the politico-economic prerogatives of the well-born. Cicero describes the optimates as "the foremost men and saviours of the state." The smaller faction within the nobility, styled the populares or "demagogues" by their opponents, were reformers who sided with the common people on various issues. Julius Caesar is considered the leading popularis and the last in a line extending from 133 to 44 B.C.E.

The optimates sometimes encountered opposition within the Senate itself, and not just from the smaller group of populares. Asconius notes that the optimates opposed a quorum requirement because low attendance in the Senate allowed them more readily to carry the vote. Brunt believes that many senators, even a majority, were open to compromise with Caesar, but they were overawed or in other ways beholden to the Senate's leading figures.

Sympathy for the optimates is part of a long-standing tradition. Tacitus, himself a senator, describes the Senate oligarchs who assassinated Caesar and fought against Octavian and Mark Antony as "the most ardent patriots" and "the last army of the Republic." Four centuries later, St. Augustine would write that the assassins were "a party of noble senators, who had conspired to defend the liberty of the Republic." And in the late eighteenth century, Gibbon saw the oligarchs as "the republicans of spirit and ability [who] perished in the field of battle."

Many present-day historians also look with undampened enthusiasm upon this Republic for the Few. Dickinson waxes rhapsodic about Rome's constitutionalism while saying next to nothing about its severe economic inequality and undemocratic political features. Grant would have us believe that senatorial consulship candidates "possessed the inherited training of their class, which very often produces [...] an attitude of selfless sacrifice to the needs of the community as a whole." Robinson heaps praise on senatorial elites bred to a strong tradition of subordinating their individual ambitions to the commonweal. And Scullard reassures us that the Roman constitution—a "balanced" mix of regal, aristocratic, and democratic powers, as represented respectively by the consuls, the Senate, and the assembly as never seriously threatened by the enormous influence of the Senate. That august body "contained the men who possessed the greatest administrative experience and political wisdom."

The practice of hailing a "balanced" or "mixed" constitution as the finest and most stable of all governing arrangements goes back to ancient times. Referring to the three forms of governance: "kingship, aristocracy, and democracy," Polybius argues, "It is clear that we should regard as the best constitution one which includes elements of all three species..." Cicero concurs, favouring a system with all three, though seemingly not in equal measure. Indeed, it is not clear what an "equal" blend of the three could be, given their inherently contradictory and antagonistic essences. It has long been presumed that the diversity of constitutional forms makes for an optimal result. In reality, it creates a system of impediments that makes popular reform nearly impossible.

As with Polybius and Cicero, so with Aristotle, and so with the framers of the United States Constitution in 1787 (who were heavily influenced by their reading of the classics and their own propertied-class concerns)—all have been mindful of the levelling threats of democratic forces and the need for a constitutional "mix" that allows only limited participation by the demos, with a dominant role allotted to an elite executive power. That same concern predominated among those who contrived the constitution of today's capitalist Russia. Such has been the real nature of the mixed constitution. Diluting democratic power with a preponderantly undemocratic mix does not create an admirable "balance" and "stability." In actual practice, the diversity of form more often has been a subterfuge, allowing an appearance of popular participation in order to lend legitimacy to oligarchic dominance.

Unfortunately, many classical historians are less discomforted by senatorial plutocracy than by proletarian egalitarianism. Their fear is that the people and their demagogic leaders are given to committing "democratic excesses," a concern that goes back at least to Plato. Theodor Mommsen, for one, could not contain his distaste for radical reformers of the Late Republic such as the praetor Marcus Caelius Rufus, an aristocrat who in 48 B.C.E. launched a campaign to cancel all debts and free the slaves. Rufus was accused of planning to seize the town of Capua with armed slaves. The following year, the tribune Publius Dolabella and others incited street frays against house rents and creditor claims. To Mommsen, both Rufus and Dolabella were "fools" and "the communists of that day," instigators of "a rabble engaged not in political activity but solely in a bandit war against poverty."

The impetuous multitude, we are told, needs to be restrained by aristocratic moderation and probity, the latter ingredients existing more persistently in the imaginations of some commentators than in actual history. There is no denying that the Senate oligarchs were concerned about preserving the rule of law—as long as it served the interests of wealth, and thwarted the reformers who sought some modest redistribution of income and privilege. In Roman constitutional practice, there was nothing to prevent the Senate from passing any decree it so desired. The nobles protected the constitution—an unwritten one based on custom and practice—to the extent that it fortified their oligarchy. It was their constitution, their law, and indeed their Republic, made to accommodate "sacred traditions" including, above all, their long-standing class interests. This point is regularly eschewed by those who hail the senatorial aristocrats as defenders of republican virtue.

4 - "Demagogues" and Death Squads

"Set honour in one eye and death i' the other. —JULIUS CAESAR ACT I, SCENE 2

Throughout the ages, in keeping with their ideological proclivities, gentlemen historians have tended to dismiss the populares of the Roman Republic as self-aggrandising demagogues who affronted constitutional principles by encroaching upon the Senate's domain. Among the first to impress this image upon history is Cicero, who charged that popular agitators were psychologically unbalanced "owing to a sort of inborn revolutionary madness, [they] batten on civil discord and sedition." They are "reckless and abandoned men" possessed of "vicious aims," whose "own natural disposition incites them against the state." In our own era, historians such as P. A. Brunt tell us, "[Rome's] established structure was under attack only by agitators, often or always self-interested adventurers..."

One of the more prominent of these "agitators" was Tiberius Gracchus, a man of aristocratic birth and strong democratic leanings. More than three decades before Julius Caesar was born, Tiberius addressed some of the afflictions that beset Rome and Italy, most notably the crying need for a more equitable land distribution. Elected to serve as a tribune in 133 B.C.E., Tiberius Gracchus mobilised people from within and without the city in order to pass his lex agraria, which sought to revive the dead-letter law of 367 B.C.E., limiting the amount of public land that could be leased to any individual. The surplus acreage expropriated by large holders was to be redistributed to the poor by three elected commissioners.

In drafting his law, Tiberius consulted a number of eminent citizens including magistrates and former magistrates. Wealthy individuals who deserved to be penalised for the crimes associated with their land grabs were only obliged to surrender their illegal holdings to those most in need of land. "And for this they were compensated. Surely many would agree that no law directed against injustice and avarice was ever framed in milder or more conciliatory terms," argues Plutarch in a surprisingly sympathetic cast. The land was being bought back at a fair market price from those who had stolen it. "Even though this act of restitution manifested such tender regard for the wrongdoers, the common people were content to forget the past so long as they could be assured of protection against future injustice." The wealthy landowners, however, detested the lex agraria "out of sheer greed," and they hated Tiberius for proposing it, continues Plutarch. They did their utmost to turn the people against the law, alleging that Tiberius' real intent was to foment revolution, impose his autocratic will, and undermine the foundations of the Republic. These same charges were to be levelled against Caesar almost a century later.

Fragments of Tiberius' speech, by which he introduced his lex agraria have come down to us. With bitter eloquence he describes the plight of landless commoners, many of whom were army veterans: "Heartless and homeless, they must take their wives and families and tramp the roads like beggars. [...] They fight and fall to serve no other end but to multiply the possessions and comforts of the rich. They are called masters of the world but they possess not a clod of earth that is truly their own." Such class-conscious sentiments voiced before an assemblage of plebs stoked the rancor of the oligarchs. "[T]he conspiracy that formed against [Tiberius] seems to have had its origins in the hatred and malevolence of the rich rather than in the excuses that they put forward for their actions," writes Plutarch, who describes Tiberius Gracchus as one who chose his words with care while appealing to men's sense of compassion.

Most other historians have a different view. Dio Cassius sees Tiberius as "turning aside from what was best" (his prominent family connections and fine education) in order to drift "into what was worst" by bedeviling and disturbing all established customs," and making "any statement or promise whatever to anybody." A chorus of latter-day scholars agree, claiming that Gracchus "did untold harm to the Republic," was "high-handed," "rash," "self-righteous," "plunged into illegal courses," and "unnecessarily provocative and ill-judged."

What exactly were the rash and illegal methods that Tiberius Gracchus pursued? Instead of putting his land-reform bill before the Senate, which was loath to consider it, he chose a more democratic course established a hundred years earlier, though seldom invoked since. He took the measure straight to the Tribal Assembly of the People, which was well attended by commoners far and wide in anticipation of such a move. The bill passed but was unexpectedly vetoed by another tribune, Marcus Octavius, an ally of the optimate coterie. This move arguably was itself unconstitutional since a tribune's veto was intended to protect the citizenry against official tyranny and not stifle the vox populi on substantive issues.

On the advice of some leading citizens, Tiberius took the dispute about Octavius' veto to the Senate, where "he was treated so contemptuously by the rich," according to Appian, that he returned posthaste to the Forum. There he proposed that Octavius be deposed. True a tribune was inviolate because he stood as the people's protector. "But if a tribune should depart from his duty, oppress the people, cripple their powers, and take away their right to vote," argued Gracchus, "he has by his own actions deprived himself of his honourable office by not fulfilling the conditions upon which he accepted it." Tiberius overwhelmingly won the votes of the tribes, and Octavius was removed from office, thus allowing passage of the lex agraria.

Tiberius proposed other reforms. He wanted to reduce the period of military service (at the time it went from age seventeen to forty-six), give people the right to appeal jury verdicts, and allow equestrians to sit on juries hitherto composed exclusively of senators. After noting these efforts, Plutarch departs from his otherwise sympathetic view of Gracchus and concludes: "In short, Tiberius' programme was designed to cripple the power of the Senate in every possible way, and it was inspired by motives of anger and party politics rather than by considerations of justice and the common good."

Shortly after the lex agraria was passed, an Asian king bequeathed his kingdom and its revenues to the Roman state. Tiberius proposed that some of this windfall be used as a start-up capital for the needy farmers who were allotted land parcels under the new law. This incurs the disapproval of some latter-day historians. For Mommsen, his move was tantamount to "tampering with the public finances." For Handford, it was a "serious encroachment on the Senate's hitherto undisputed control of financial and foreign affairs."

Tiberius then sought reelection to a second term. As officers of the state, senior magistrates were prohibited from seeking immediate reelection to the same office, but the tribunate was an office of the plebs. TIberius' bid was neither illegal nor unprecedented. Yet this move too has been roundly condemned by various modern-day historians as "tactless and provocative," symptomatic of "mob leadership," "transgressing traditional observances," and showing "undue hastiness and folly."

Tiberius Gracchus' lex agraria would have given thousands of uprooted families a chance to work the land, thereby easing the congestion within Rome. It would have reversed the depopulation of the Italian countryside, and replenished the yeomen stock. Facing a popular upsurge against their illegal land holdings, the oligarchs could not easily attack Tiberius' law. So they attacked Tiberius himself. They took every opportunity to denounce him as a demagogue and tyrant who was intent upon crowning himself king. They deprived him of a sufficient expense allowance to administer the land-reform programme. The chief promoter of these affronts was the Publius Nasica, one of the largest owners of public lands, who bitterly resented being obliged to surrender any of the ager publicus, and who, as Plutarch writes, "abandoned himself completely to his hatred of Tiberius." Having stolen the ager publicus for themselves, the big owners now were convinced it rightfully belonged to them.

Tiberius feared he would be assassinated for his reformist efforts. His apprehension proved well grounded. When the Tribal Assembly gathered to vote on TIberius' reelection, Nasica, with other senators and a large gang of hired thugs, descended upon the meeting and slaughtered him and some 300 of his supporters, none of whom had taken up arms. When Mommsen writes that Gracchus had a "bodyguard from the gutter," he is referring to this complement of unarmed Romans of humble station who stood by Tiberius and gave their lives on behalf of equitable reforms.

The common people felt bitterly about the killings and spoke openly of revenge. When they encountered Nasica, writes Plutarch, "they did not try to hide their hatred of him, but grew savage and cried out upon him wherever he chanced to be, calling him an accursed man and a tyrant" who murdered "an inviolable and sacred person." Fearing for Nasica's safety, the Senate voted to send him to Asia though it had no need of him there. Nasica departed Italy undercover even though he was Rome's high priest (pontifex maximus). He wandered about ignominiously in foreign lands for a brief period, then took his own life at Pergamum (close to the Aegean coast of present-day Turkey).

By recourse to an improbable anecdote, Lucius Annaeus Florus condones Tiberius' murder. He tells us that the tribune fled to the Capital with his attackers in hot pursuit. There he exhorted the people to save his life, but he touched his head with his hand suggesting that "he was asking for royalty and a diadem." This gesture so incensed the crowd that they were easily roused to take up arms and join in putting Tiberius to death "with apparent justice." That Tiberius would start negotiating for a crown while being pursued by a gang of assassins, and that an otherwise sympathetic audience would suddenly turn upon him with weapons because he touched his head, all seems perfectly plausible to Florus.

It is a time-honoured practice to blame "rush" and "provocative" reformers for the violence delivered upon them by reactionary forces. Speaking for any number of modern-day historians, Andrew Lintott says the hostility of those who attacked Tiberius Gracchus "was not simply inspired by the land bill itself but by the tactics which Gracchus employed." Cyril Robinson blames the hecatomb of 133 B.C.E. on its victims, referring to "the reckless and irregular tactics of the Gracchian democrats." The civil violence that brought death to Tiberius is something "for which partially at least he shared the blame." Scullard goes further: the oligarchs, the murderers themselves, are not to be blamed at all. The "prudent" senators were forced to confront "the overzealous reformer." "The urban mob that thronged the assembly in Rome [...] was becoming increasingly irresponsible and unrepresentative of the needs of the people as a whole," leading to "mob-rule or dictatorship."

These critics do not tell us what reform programme Tiberius could possibly have legislated that would not have incurred the ire of the wealthy landholders. Even if he had followed the traditional course, leaving the lex agraria to the tender mercies of the Senate, and had employed the utmost finesse and moderation, the large holders still would have buried the measure. As it was, Tiberius' law was more than generous in offering an undeserved compensation to the rich, undeserved because they themselves had never paid restitution for the land they had swiped years before, nor for the injuries they had inflicted on the smallholders of that day.

The truth is, TIberius' sin was more substantive than stylistic. It was not that he failed to hew closely to established practice. The Senate itself often departed from its own constitutional procedures when expediency dictated—as when they launched their armed assault to massacre Tiberius and hundreds of his supporters. It was that he attempted to reverse the upward redistribution of wealth. He had the audacity to advocate reforms that gave something to the poor and infringed upon the rapacity of the rich.

After Tiberius Gracchus' assassination, the Senate hesitated to abolish the three-person commission that was in charge of land reform. "From fear of the multitude," as Plutarch puts it, the nobles allowed the distribution of public land to proceed. But they contrived to undermine the commission's workings. By 129, they had taken many disputed cases out of its hands and entrusted them to the consuls, whose frequent and deliberate absences greatly impeded the programme. In time, land reform was entirely undone.

Considered among the greatest of populares, second perhaps only to Julius Caesar, was Tiberius' younger brother, Gaius Gracchus. Being keenly aware of his brother's fate, Gaius was reluctant to pursue office. His mother Cornelia, a woman of some note, demanded that he refrain from the perils of public life sot hat she might have some peace from pain: "You [...] the only survivor of all the children I have had. [...] Stand for the tribunate after I am dead [...] when I shall no longer be aware of it." But Gaius found it impossible to withstand the entreaties of those who desired reform. He eventually emerged as an eloquent and fiery speaker, one of the greatest orators Rome ever produced. Against the combined opposition of all the distinguished nobles, he was elected tribune in 123 B.C.E.

Upon assuming office, he embarked on a comprehensive reform programme that included the redistribution of public lands on behalf of the indigent, the construction of roads into more fertile districts in order to advance Italian agriculture, the sale of grain to impoverished plebs at a reduced price, and shorter enlistment terms and free clothing for soldiers. Gaius also advocated granting Italian allies the same voting rights as Romans so that they might live as citizens rather than subjects. He put equestrians on juries, thus breaking the Senate's monopolistic privilege of serving as jurors in criminal cases. And he proposed adding 200 new seats to the Senate, to be occupied by the knightly order.

Gaius Gracchus recommended that the various classes should vote not in hierarchical sequence that favoured the nobility but by lot, "thus all being made equal in political influence whatever their wealth." He introduced a bill that prohibited any magistrate who had been deposed by the people from holding office again. Another bill of his reaffirmed the ancient principle that protected a citizen's life against summary judgements by magistrates—as when the Senate put his brother Tiberius to death without trial, and murdered many of his supporters.

Plutarch notes that Gaius Gracchus supervised every project with extraordinary speed and application, impressing even those who disliked him. Gaius was "attended by a host of contractors, craftsmen, ambassadors, magistrates, soldiers, and men of letters, all of whom he handled with a courteous ease that enabled him to show kindness to all his associates. [...] In this way he gave the clearest possible proof that those who had represented him as a tyrannical, overbearing, or violent man were uttering nothing but malicious slanders."

In 121, in response to Gaius' initiatives, the Senate passed what was later called the senatus consultum ultimum, a decree that allowed for a suspension of republican rights "in defence of the Republic." It gave magistrates license to discharge absolutist power, including political repression and mass murder. After repeated threats against his life, Gaius and 250 supporters, including another popularis, Fulvius Flaccus, were massacred by the optimates' death squads in 121 B.C.E. These assassins then rounded up and summarily executed an additional 3,000 democrats. The victims' relatives were forbidden to mourn publicly for the dead.

Given the magnitude of these crimes, it is disheartening to find that through the ages, many historians have been more critical of the victims than of their victimisers. Cicero is among the earliest commentators to denounce the Gracchi and voice approval of their murders. He saw them as demagogues who pandered to the worst elements. Likewise Dio writes that Gaius "was naturally intractable" and easily "played the rogue," becoming a mortal threat to "the nobility and the senatorial party." Florus dismisses the reform struggles waged by the Gracchi as "seditions." Valerius Maximus repeatedly denounces the Gracchi for engaging in "villainous attempts." He treats Gaius' death as "a good example," and applauds the Senate's "wisdom" in killing Tiberius Gracchus "who dared to promulgate an agrarian law." The Gracchi and their "criminal supporters [...] paid the penalty they deserved." For Velleius Paterculus, the Gracchi were animated by "pernicious views." Gaius was prompted by a desire "to prepare a way for himself to a kingship." And the murder of Fulvius Flaccus, his ally, was justified because he shared Gaius' "king-like power" and "was equally inclined to noxious measures."

In the early Christian era we have St. Augustine telling us that the Gracchi transgressed against society "when they threw everything into confusion"; they and other populares that came after them pursued "civil wars, most iniquitous and justifiable in their causes." Modern writers like H.H. Scullard say that Gaius "unwisely formed a bodyguard of friends" that "provoked" the optimates into killing him. Christian Meier justifies the optimates' homicidal fury, arguing that Gaius defied the "unwritten law" as defined by the Senate, and "it seems" his supporters were the first to resort to violence. Otto Kiefer sidesteps the whole issue of aristocratic culpability by using a neutral construction: the Gracchi "perish[ed] in furious street fighting."

That the senatus consultum ultimum was used to cut down Gaius Gracchus and thousands of his followers seems not to trouble P. A. Brunt, who argues legalistically that the decree did not confer any new authority but simply allowed the magistrates to disregard existing statutes by "acting on the principle that the highest law was the public safety." But the "highest law" is often a cloak for the lowest deeds. Were the Gracchian reformers endangering society? Or were they infringing upon the prerogatives of the few? To be sure, like most ruling elites, the optimates saw no difference; to them, any trespass against their privileged interests was tantamount to endangering the social order as they knew it.

After the massacres of 121, violent expropriation of land by the rich and powerful owners accelerated. The land commission was dissolved outright in 118 at the instigation of the Senate, and allotments to smallholders became a thing of the past. By 111, the rents that the big landholders had paid to the state for use of public lands were abolished, thereby effecting a complete privatisation of the ager publicus. The fertile public lands now belonged completely to wealthy absentee slaveholders.

About twenty years after Gaius Gracchus was murdered, another popularis, Lucius Appuleius Saturninus, while serving as a tribune, proposed a law to distribute affordable grain to the proletariat. He also sought to establish a court to hear cases of "debasing the majesty of the state," a measure directed against the optimate faction. He was joined by another reform-minded senator, Gaius Servilius Glaucia. In 100 B.C.E., the Senate declared another senatus consultum ultimum, under which both men were placed under custody in the Senate House. An optimate death squad broke into the Senate House from the roof and murdered them. The killers were never prosecuted.

Marcus Livius Drusus, a tribune, wanted to extend the voting franchise to larger portions of Italy, distribute corn at subsidised prices,provide land allotments in the manner of the Gracchi, and set up a compromise plan for reforming the law courts. For his efforts he was stabbed to death in 91. His assassin was never sought out.

Another tribune, Sulpicius Rufus, a friend of Drusus, attempted to carry on with these reforms. After a number of open clashes with reactionary forces, he was hunted down by the optimates' death squads and killed, probably in 88 B.C.E. Even a conservative like Velleius allowed that the limited concessions advocated by Drusus were intended to placate the multitude so that, being grateful for small favours, they might consent to the far larger rewards dispensed to the wealthy. Most ancient and modern historians dismiss these post-Gracchian reformers as "demagogues."

A leading popularis was Gaius Marius (Caesar's uncle by marriage), who came from a minor provincial family and lived the life of a peasant and soldier in his earlier years, eventually winning fame as a general. In 119 B.C.E. he was elected a tribune of the people, then consul in 107 and five more times thereafter, an unusual honour. Marius was the first to waive property qualifications for military service and enlist even the penniless proletarians, a reform largely impelled by the increasing shortage of property-owning yeomen. In alliance with Saturninus and Glaucia, he pushed for the provision of land for his army veterans and for subsidised grain sales. Eventually he broke with Saturninus and failed to stop his death. In 87, locked in struggle against Sulla, Marius joined with Lucius Cornelius Cinna to storm Rome and kill hundreds of aristocrats and their collaborators. He died of pleurisy the following year at the age of seventy-one. Despite his spectacular career, Marius had no clear policy for political reform. Much of his popularity and subsequent legendary reputation among the common people came from his relatively modest provincial origins, his early military exploits, his willingness to promote commoners to responsible positions, and his occasional ability to scourge the nobility.

Foremost among reactionary leaders who regularly transgressed republican rights in service to aristocratic interests was Lucius Cornelius Sulla, who in 88 B.C.E. marched his forces right into Rome in violation of an ancient constitutional prohibition against bringing armies within city limits. In 87, thousands of unarmed citizens, including a number of wealthy equestrians who were followers of Cinna, were slaughtered by Sulla's death squads, their primary crime being the desire to revive the egalitarian reforms of Sulpicius Rufus, including a more democratic voting system for the Tribal Assembly. "[T]he Forum was heaped with bodies and the sewers ran with blood" is the way one writer describes the slaughter of Cinna's democrats. Cinna himself was murdered by traitorous lieutenants soon afterwards.

After several years of foreign wars, Sulla reentered Rome in 82. He defeated a rebellious Samnite army and butchered all its troops including those who had surrendered. He then issued a proscription (proscriptio) against hundreds of Romans, to which hundreds more were added in the passing months. A proscription consisted of a list of persons who were declared outlaws by the state authority. Their property and possessions were confiscated, and in effect a bounty was put on their heads. Their killers were rewarded and their protectors punished. As a method of political purge, proscription was brought to brutal perfection by Sulla. He slaughtered some fifty senatorial opponents suspected of not being cooperative enough, along with 1,600 knights and 2,000 commoners (some estimate as many as 10,000 victims), so determined was he to eradicate the democratic faction that opposed him. Many fell victim on the flimsiest suspicions, some because their possessions were coveted by the executioners. As in any inquisitional terror, many came forward as accusers, pointing their finger at others in order to demonstrate their own loyalty and keep themselves above suspicion.

Like other dedicated reactionaries before and since, Sulla also employed his dictatorial power to accumulate a huge personal fortune. Declaring himself dictator not for the usual six months but indefinitely, he removed control of the criminal courts from the Assembly and gave it to the Senate. He appointed 300 new members to the Senate selected primarily for their conservative proclivities, and increased the number of state priests. He ruled that tribunes could never aspire to higher office, so to block the ascent of democratic leaders like the Gracchi. Nor could they any longer convene meetings of the people or initiate legislation in the Assembly. All legislative proposals had to receive the Senate's preliminary assent. And although the tribunate's veto power was not abolished—probably because the Senate could use it to block a troublesome consul—it was seriously circumscribed.

Sulla undid Gaius Gracchus' court reform, restoring a senatorial monopoly over the judiciary. In sum, he rolled back hard-won democratic gains and installed a strikingly reactionary constitution. The Senate emerged with nearly complete control over legislation, courts, and executive magistrates, with more powers than it had enjoyed centuries past.

Sulla abolished the right of the plebs to buy cheap grain, thereby imposing serious hardship on them. During his dictatorship, and into the following decades, usurers or larger landholders drove half the rural residents of Italy from the countryside. Their farms were transformed into plantations, vineyards, olive groves, orchards, and pastures for cattle and sheep, worked by slave labour and tenant farmers—a momentous social upheaval involving immeasurable suffering, yet scarcely mentioned by public figures or historians of that day.

The struggle around Sulla's new order continued long after his retirement in 81 and his death in 78. An immediate demand made by the democrats was for the restoration of the rights and prerogatives of the people's tribunate. In 76, the tribune Gnaeus Sicinius dared to speak of restoration, for which he died a victim of "patrician perfidy," reports Sallust. A popularis proscribed by Sulla was Quintus Sertorius, who advocated citizenship for the peoples of the Iberian peninsula, and who for a number of years waged a resourceful guerrilla war against Sulla's forces in Spain. One of Sulla's colleagues offered any Roman who killed Sertorius a huge cash award and 20,000 acres of land. Sertorius was eventually hunted down and assassinated in 73. Looking back on Sulla's reign, Cicero wrote, "All was basically admirable, though temper and moderation were somewhat lacking."

Some historians have not a critical word about Sulla's "reforms." Scullard manifests none of the concern about the loss of constitutional balance and freedom that he unfailingly evinces when discussing the Gracchi: "As army commander and dictator [Sulla] could act with greater independence." Sulla understood that the Senate had to "resume firm control and become an effective governing body once again." In a similar vein, Mommsen refers to Sulla's "patriotic and judicious moderation" and his steadfastness in establishing the oligarchy on a more independent footing. Meier tells us that Sulla "was simply a realist" who "simply performed the tasks that he felt incumbent upon him, though admittedly in a somewhat unconventional fashion." And Keaveney devotes an entire book to promoting a mostly positive view of the dictator, with appreciation for his restorative efforts and republican virtues.

In 66 B.C.E., the reform-minded tribune Gaius Manilius introduced a law to democratise the voting system in the tribal assembly. Domitius Ahenobarbus, a leading protagonist in Sulla's reign of terror and a violent opponent of popular reform, had members of his clientela attack the assembly and kill a number of Manilius' partisans. The Senate congratulated Ahenobarbus for his civic spirit and annulled Manilius' law.

Of special note is Publius Clodius Pulcher, a tribune allied with Julius Caesar. Clodius affected an older spelling of his patrician family name, Claudius, as being more in keeping with common-style pronunciation. He even renounced his patrician rank and had himself adopted into a noted plebeian family so that he might serve as a tribune in 58. From that office he sponsored a law to curb the partisan use of censors. He outlawed executions of citizens without trial, a measure aimed at the death-squad killings. And he got a law passed that reestablished the right to organise the collegia, the popular craft guilds and unions. Many guilds had been abolished by senatorial decree six years earlier. Clodius' law put these peoples' organisations on a legal footing and on a paramilitary basis, readying them for armed defensive action against the optimates' private armies. Their ranks consisted of freedmen, the poorer citizenry, and even slaves. He proposed a law to give full political rights to all freedmen and many slaves. The Senate oligarchs constantly tried to drive a wedge between Clodius and the citizenry by alleging that his followers were made up exclusively of slaves and criminals.

Clodius fought to have free grain allotted to the proletariat, and he prohibited the magistrates from using "bad omens" and other priestly pap to obstruct popular assemblies. The free grain distribution modestly improved the material welfare of the plebs, the liberalising of assembly procedures enhanced their sovereignty, and the organising of collegia augmented their political power.

Most of our gentlemen historians, both ancient and modern, disapprove of Clodius' efforts at grassroots mobilisation on behalf of a popular agenda. In 57, a scandalised Cicero denounced Clodius as a rapscallion of the worst sort for going "from street to street openly offering the slaves their freedom [...] and he takes slaves for his advisors." Others uncritically embrace Cicero's opinion. Plutarch calls Clodius "the boldest and vilest" and "the most notorious and low-lived demagogue of his time." Asconius dislikes Clodius for inciting "the sediment of the city's slave population." Velleius looks not too harshly upon his murder (discussed below), calling it "an act of bad precedent, but beneficial to the public."

Latter-day historians are almost unanimous in denouncing Clodius as "loose and dissolute," a "rogue," "scoundrel," "unscrupulous adventurer," "reckless demagogue," and "gang leader" who "organised street-rowdyism" and "recruit[ed] men for violence," "an anarchic tribune of the people." Gelzer labels Clodius "a demagogue of the wildest kind" for advocating free grain distribution and organising political clubs among the proletariat. Lintott, sounding much like Cicero, assures us that Clodius pursued "urban political power as an end in itself," and needed to be resisted "by bands of professional fighters, whether mercenary thugs, gladiators, or soldiers."

To be sure, Clodius was capable of raffish ventures. In 61 he was accused of dressing as a woman and stealing into the inner sanctum of the Vestal Virgins in order to tryst with Caesar's second wife, Pompeia. The authorities pronounced the incident a sacrilege. Caesar did not react too harshly against his political ally Clodius, but he did divorce Pompeia. He insisted that she had not slept with Clodius, nevertheless "Caesar's wife must be above suspicion." Clodius was brought to trial but acquitted by a 31–25 vote because, Cicero charged, the jury was populated by a needy disreputable lot whose sympathy for the accused was won with bribery. Afterwards in the Senate, Cicero pronounced a sentence on him: "Clodius, [...] the jury has not preserved you for the streets of Rome, but for the death chamber," a menacing prognostication that was to prove all too true.

On 18 January 52, Clodius was travelling along the Appian Way with about thirty slaves. He encountered a band of 300 mercenaries, mostly gladiators, led by the optimate Titus Annius Milo, a friend of Cicero and husband to Sulla's daughter. Wounded in the ensuing fray, Clodius was carried to a nearby inn. At Milo's command, the gladiators pursued their prey, killed the innkeeper, then dragged Clodius out to the highway, stabbing him repeatedly until they finished him off.

As word spread around the city, the stunned population lingered all night in the Forum. THe next day, an outraged crowd carried the corpse, naked so as to expose its many lacerations, into the Senate House. There they made a pyre of seats and tables and burnt the body and the building. They then proceeded to the murderer's house, holding it under siege until driven off by Milo's archers. The proletariats rampaged through the city, beating and killing those they suspected of sympathy with Milo, attacking especially persons who were richly attired.

Milo was brought to trial, with Cicero serving as his attorney. In that time-honoured fashion of defence lawyers who have no case, Cicero defended his client by attacking the victim, accusing "the audacious and despicable monster" Clodius of being "a robber and a traitor," who incited "the frenzied attacks of scum." In contrast, Milo was "a fine and gallant gentleman" who acted only to defend himself. Clodius had sought to thwart Milo's bid for the consulship; he was a revolutionary menace to the Republic while Milo was Rome's stalwart defender. Clodius repeatedly threatened Milo's life, but "[n]othing in the world could have induced Milo either to [kill Clodius] or even want it done." Clodius had been lying in wait to ambush Milo because he was driven by rage and hatred. But in Milo "there was no trace of such sentiments."

Here Cicero was dissembling, as was his wont. In an earlier private letter he himself had acknowledged that Milo was openly threatening to murder Clodius: "I think Publius [Clodius] will be brought to trial by Milo, unless he is killed first. If he now puts himself in Milo's way in a rough-and-tumble I don't doubt that Milo will dispatch him with his own hands. he has no qualms or hesitations about doing so."

During the trial, popular feelings were running so high against Milo as to unnerve Cicero, preventing him from finishing his defence oration. Milo was found guilty and forced into exile, the severest penalty that could be imposed upon an aristocrat. To their credit, many historians do not accept Cicero's charge that Clodius attacked Milo. An armed body of thirty is not likely to ambush an armed contingent of 300, especially if the latter includes a substantial number of highly-trained gladiators. Most describe the murder on the Appian Way as a chance encounter: the two parties just happened to be passing each other, and sparks flew causing an unpremeditated clash. Appian tells us that Clodius and Milo eyed each other suspiciously as they passed by, but then one of Milo's slaves, "either by order or because he wanted to kill his master's enemy," drove a dagger into Clodius' back. It is difficult to imagine that a slave could gain such easy access to the well-guarded Clodius, or that he would take such a risky and consequential initiative on his own.

A month after Clodius' death, Q. Metellus Scipio charged that Milo's defence had been a lie. Metellus maintained that Clodius, accompanied by twenty-six slaves, had set out from Rome to address officials in Aricia, and that Milo, with a complement of over 300 armed men, had rushed to overtake him. Eleven of Clodius' men lost their lives in the attack and others were wounded, while only three of Milo's men sustained injuries. According to Metellus, the next day Milo rewarded twelve of his men, probably gladiators, with payments for their service against Clodius. He also freed a number of them, so they could testify in court as freedmen if need be.

Some time after Metellus went public, a well-known freedman named Aemilius Philemon announced that he and four other persons had witnessed the murder of Clodius. When they protested, they were abducted and held captive for two months in a house belonging to Milo. This report stirred much feeling against Milo. In his trial statement, Cicero never once refers to the particulars raised by Metellus or Philemon, not even for purpose of refutation. Nor does he explain why Milo was coursing the Appian Way with such a large, heavily armed force of professional killers. Instead Cicero claims with a straight face that Milo's retinue consisted largely of a boy's choir and a collection of female servants, "whereas Clodius, who was habitually escorted by whores, prostitutes, and homosexuals" now had a group of toughs who looked like they could have been handpicked.

Why then did Clodius get the worst of it? Because Milo always made it a practice of being ready for him, argued Cicero. And, as the gods of war would have it, the outcome of armed clashes are never predictable. Furthermore, Clodius, "drowsy from too much lunch and drink," mistakenly thought he had cut off his prey from the rear, only to find himself in the midst of Milo's followers. We are left to conclude that, having thus blundered, he and a number of his accomplices were then cut to pieces by Milo's implacable choirboys and maids.

Four years after killing Clodius, Milo returned from exile to join forces with others in Italy in an attempt to stir a rebellion against Julius Caesar. He was swiftly captured and executed by the praetor Pedius, Caesar's nephew.

With Clodius out of the way, the optimates launched death-squad attacks upon his partisans, similar to the kind they had employed in the past against the followers of the Gracchi and other populares. In sum, just about every leader of the Middle and Late Republics who took up the popular cause met a violent end, beginning with Tiberius Gracchus in 133 and continuing on to Gaius Gracchus, Fulvius Flaccus, Livius Drusus, Sulpicius Rufus, Cornelius Cinna, Marius Gratidianus, Appuleius Saturninus, Gnaeus Sicinius, Quintus Sertorius, Servilius Glaucia, Sergius Catilina (discussed in the next chapter), Clodius Pulcher, and Julius Caesar. Even more reprehensible, the optimates and their hired goons killed thousands of the populares' supporters.

Could it really be that the reformers' tactics were so disquieting as to justify mass murder by the "bludgeon-men" (as Mommsen calls the optimates' death squads)? Something other than procedural niceties and personal rivalry was at the root of all this ruling-class butchery. The populares' real sin lay not in their supposedly unconstitutional methods but in the economic democracy of their programmes. Were the Gracchi violating custom and constitution when they essayed under the law to reclaim the ager publicus for the smallholders whose forebears had tilled it for centuries? In any case, what constitutional right justified the repeated use of death-squad violence against them and other populares and thousands of their followers for the better part of a century?

As with just about every ruling class in history, the Roman nobility reacted fiercely when their interests were infringed upon, especially their untrammelled "right" to accumulate as much wealth as possible at the public's expense. If not their only concern, accumulation was a major preoccupation. In a word, the nobles were less devoted to traditional procedures and laws than to the class privileges those procedures and laws were designed to protect. They never hesitated to depart from their own "hereditary constitution," resorting to extraordinary acts of bloody repression when expediency dictated. They treated egalitarian reforms and attempts to democratise the Republic's decision-making process as subversive of republican rule. What should not go unnoted is how readily some past and present historians embrace this same position.

5 - Cicero's Witch-hunt

"But men may construe things after their fashion,

Clean from the purpose of the things themselves."

—–JULIUS CAESAR ACT I, SCENE 3

The great orator Marcus Tullius Cicero looms large in any consideration of the Late Republic. He was a key participant in its affairs, and his writings constitute by far the largest surviving primary source we have of that era. Moreover, his ideological proclivities dovetail with those of regiments of historians down through the ages, making him a great favourite among them. Sir Ronald Syme hails Cicero as "a humane and cultivated man, an enduring influence upon the course of all European civilisation." Other admirers trumpet him as a "constitutionalist" of "honourable and unselfish ideals," a leader devoted to "standards of duty, kindliness, and public spirit," "singularly genuine, refined and lovable," "one of Rome's leading sons" and "most precious gems," who refused "to live under tyranny."

Almost everyone shares that opinion of Cicero. "Contemporary American and British ancient historians are divided between Ciceronians (95 percent) and Caesarians (a mere handful), and the division reflects their current political attitudes," observes Arthur Kahn, one of the handful. Another of the handful is Friedrich Engels, who called Cicero "the most contemptible scoundrel in history."

Born in Arpinum (a municipality southeast of Rome) of a wealthy equestrian family, Cicero went to Rome for his education and eventually established himself as the city's leading barrister. Early in his career he proved himself an able mouthpiece for the aristocracy by successfully pleading the cases of "large numbers of young men of illustrious and noble families" accused of ill-discipline and cowardice in war. Quaestor in 75, aedile in 69, and praetor in 66, he forged links with leading citizens whenever possible, learning the locations of their town and country dwellings, and what friends and neighbours they had.

For all his prodigious kowtowing to the nobles, they never considered him much more than a useful upstart. Cicero himself fretted about their ingratitude: they "have never made me the slightest return or recompense, material or even verbal." In 56, he complained of "certain gentlemen" who objected to his owning of a villa that once belonged to a leading optimate. When the aristocratic Metellus sneeringly asked Cicero, "Who was your father?" it must have cut at the orator's heart. We can forgive his retort and even favour it with a smile: "I can scarcely ask you the same question since your mother has made it rather difficult to answer."

Cicero fumed in particular about Brutus' gaucherie in declining his hospitality, and for taking "a brusque, arrogant, ungracious tone towards me even when he is asking for a favour." Yet he managed to convince himself that Brutus was very fond of him. At one point, he concluded rather plaintively, "Now it's time for me to love myself since they won't love me whatever I do." And love himself he did. Dio Cassius notes that Cicero "was the greatest boaster alive and thought no one equal to himself."

A self-enriching slaveholder, slumlord, and senator, Cicero deplored even the palest moves towards democracy. Rulers, he insisted, should always be persons of the affluent class. "When you appoint a judge it is perfectly proper to be guided by considerations of property and rank." In 66, when Gaius Manilius, a people's tribune, introduced a law that granted freedmen the right to vote along with their former masters, Cicero was part of the senatorial majority that immediately rejected it. He also denounced the secret ballot, introduced several generations earlier in 139 B.C.E. by Aulus Gabinius, a tribune and grandson of a slave, whom Cicero dismissed as "a vulgar and insignificant fellow." The secret ballot made it easier for the plebs to do mischief, he believed. It was "a subterfuge" that "ensured the secrecy of a wrong-headed vote, thus keeping the aristocracy in the dark about what each man thought."

He regarded the people as worthless groundlings, akin to criminals and degenerates, "the common herd," the "masses and worst elements [...] many of them simply out for revolution." He denounced those of pedestrian occupation, "the artisans and shopkeepers and all that kind of scum" who align themselves with dangerous demagogues, "the wretched half-starved commoners who attend mass meetings and suck the blood of the treasury." To him, their restiveness was an outgrowth of their own personal malevolence rather than a response to unforgiving material circumstances. Privately he referred to "my army of the rich" and noted that "the safety of the state is to the advantage of all good men, but most clearly benefits men of fortune"—which was the way he thought it should be. In 59, he wrote to his wealthy confidant Atticus, "My only policy now is hatred of the radicals."

While unsparingly praised by generations of classicists for his principled ways, Cicero was often an unprincipled opportunist and dissembler. In 50 B.C.E. for example, with Caesar's fame and power ascendant, he persuaded the Senate to decree a thanksgiving service in Caesar's honour, and himself delivered a hypocritical panegyric—which he privately recanted shortly thereafter in a letter to Atticus: "I was not exactly proud of my palinode. But goodnight to principle, sincerity, and honour!"

Celebrated throughout the ages as a champion of constitutionalism, Cicero actually was quite capable of playing fast with constitutional rights. His role in what became known as "the Catiline conspiracy" affords sorry evidence of this.

Born of an old patrician family in decline, Lucius Sergius Catiline had served with Sulla in his occupation of Rome and participated in the dictator's ruthless proscriptions in 81–80 B.C.E. After holding several magistracies over the years, he was indicted for extortion while serving as governor of Africa in 66, but won acquittal. About this time Catiline emerged as a late-blooming popularis. Most writers see Catiline as propelled purely by ambition, lacking any dedicated attachment to the popular cause. But he did take up the cudgel on behalf of the poor with pronouncements like the following: "Ever since the state fell under the jurisdiction and sway of a few powerful men, it is always they who receive tribute from foreign kings and princes and rake in taxes from every people and tribe. [...] Thus all influence, power, office, and wealth are in their hands or where they choose to bestow them; all they leave for us is danger, defeat, prosecutions, and poverty."

Catiline's diatribes registered in Cicero's mind as nothing less than subversion, a revolutionary assault upon the constitution and all of Roman society. He charged Catiline with plotting murderous deeds to grab state power. Writing twenty years after the events, Sallust (though no friend of Cicero's) uncritically accepts all of Cicero's worst criminations. He maintains that Catiline and a confederate made ready to assassinate the consuls-elect on 1 January 65 and grab the offices for themselves. "Because their murderous intent was discovered, they postponed its execution until 5 February, when they planned to destroy most of the senators as well as the consuls." But Catiline was in too great a hurry to give the signal to his accomplices in front of the Senate House, asserts Sallust, and the attack never came off. Hence they failed in what would have been the "most heinous crime in the annals of Rome."

As is often the case, Sallust leaves us with more questions than answers. He does not explain how the conspirators could hope to make themselves consuls by murdering the two consuls-elect. And once uncovered, why were they not prosecuted by the authorities? Instead, they felt perfectly free to reschedule their skulduggery for the following month, even escalating it to include the massacre of hundreds of senators. Then why was this grandiose scheme permanently called off merely because of a premature signal?

In 64, acting not at all like an aspiring mass murderer, Catiline waged an electoral campaign for consul, perhaps with the backing of Crassus and Caesar, gathering much popular support in the doing. In an attempt to stop him, the nobles reluctantly threw their weight behind Cicero's candidacy. Their problem with Cicero was that he was a novus homo, a "new man," the first in his family ever to serve in the Senate. The Roman nobility was composed of individuals, both patrician and plebeian, who could claim a consul in their lineage. Occasionally the nobles recruited a candidate for consulship—and thereby for the aristocracy—whose senatorial ancestry had stopped at a lower office, but rarely would they deign to support a novus homo, someone like Cicero who had no senatorial ancestors whatsoever. Sallust, himself a novus homo, explains it, "A self-made man, however distinguished he might be or however admirable his achievements, was invariably considered unworthy of [the consulship], almost as if he were unclean."

But in 64, Cicero was proving himself a capable paladin to the plutocracy, while Catiline was emerging as a patrician turncoat, who roiled the optimates with bruising broadsides calling for debt cancellation and land redistribution. Forced to choose between their class snobbery and their class interests, the oligarchs decided on their interests. When necessity dictates, every ruling class has recruited serviceable talent from the ranks below. So the optimates held their noses and threw their weight behind the pushy orator from Arpinum. By being the first man in his family to hold a consulship, a new man thereby won aristocratic status for himself and his descendants. It was a relatively rare achievement and it was Cicero's, as he never tired of reminding others.

In the 64 campaign, Cicero drew upon the advice set down by his brother Quintus in a manual summarising their discussions about campaign tactics. He was to avoid specific issues, and generally present himself as an unflinching upholder of the Senate's authority, devoted to orderly rule and the reactionary Sullan constitution. At the same time, he was to heap slander upon his opponents, Antonius and Catiline (several other candidates posed no serious challenge), defaming them as "two assassins from boyhood, both libertines, both paupers," charging Catiline with being so cunningly efficient "in his lust that he has raped children in smocks practically at their parents' knees."

At one point in the campaign, when a radical tribune denounced Cicero as unworthy of a consular post, he responded by charging the tribune with being part of a fell design that threatened the commonwealth. From then on, conspiracy and subversion would remain Cicero's theme in the electoral campaign, throughout his consulship, and for much of his life. He would stigmatise any attempt at reform, as part of a larger stratagem to subvert the Republic.

In the summer of 64, Cicero and Antonius won election as consuls to serve in 63. Catiline was defeated by a narrow margin. Through a combination of bribery and threat, the financially strapped Antonius was dissuaded from exercising a restraining veto on his co-consul, leaving Cicero with a free hand to act as he wished. In 63 Catiline waged another campaign for the consulship (to serve in 62). Cicero had the election delayed until late in the summer after many of Catiline's supporters were obliged to return to their provincial homes, thereby contributing to his second defeat. At the time Cicero informed the Senate that Catiline had planned to assassinate him. The charge was never clearly explained, and failed to convince the senators.

During his tenure in office, Cicero lifted not a finger on behalf of the people, and vigorously opposed all reform proposals. He and his Senate collaborators quashed motions designed to cancel debts, effect land distribution, and allow the offspring of those exiled by Sulla to occupy public office. As his undistinguished consulship was winding down to its final months, he escalated his vendetta against Catiline, charging him with orchestrating a revolutionary conspiracy of immense proportions. Catiline supposedly was pursuing this diabolic design throughout 63, at the very time he was energetically campaigning for the consulship. Here was a "crisis" that might serve Cicero famously. With little time left in office to mark his own greatness, the vigilant consul would leap into the fray, close the breach, and stay the perpetrator's hand. This feat, he insisted, would cause future generations to sing hosannas to his name, as indeed they have. All he needed was a prominent but not overly powerful enemy who could be identified with the lower classes. The defeated Catiline fit the bill perfectly.

The unrest in certain provinces only added to the alarmist atmosphere that Cicero was confecting. In Etruria (Tuscany) impoverished army veterans, aggrieved smallholders, and dispossessed farmers were arming themselves and rallying around their leader Manlius. As Manlius explained in his declaration to the Roman proconsul: "[O]ur object in taking up arms is not to attack our country, or to endanger others, but to protect ourselves from wrong. We are poor, needy wretches. The cruel harshness of moneylenders has robbed most of us of our homes. [...] We are not seeking dominion or riches. [...] We beseech you and the Senate to rescue your unhappy fellow citizens, to restore to us the legal protection snatched from us."

Manlius sounded more like someone petitioning for a redress of grievances than a rebel breathing insurrectionary hellfire. Still Cicero damned him for being in league with Catiline in a campaign to destroy Rome. Manlius and his supporters had backed Catiline in the previous election. But there is nothing to indicate that they were collaborating in an impending revolution.

In Rome, anonymous letters were sent to leading senators warning of a massacre. One nervous senator read a letter on the Senate floor reporting that disgruntled veterans were massing in Etruria to descend upon Rome on 27 October, at which time the city would be set aflame by revolutionary incendiaries lurking within its gates. On 1 November, other rebels would seize Palestrina (a town just east of Rome), and from there launch an attack upon the city. No one called for an investigation of the wild claims proffered in these letters—nor of the letters themselves so mysteriously distributed.

Cicero's jeremiads were having their intended effect. The Senate passed a senatus consultum ultimum suspending the constitution and giving the consul extraordinary emergency powers. Panic and gloom seized certain sectors of the city. As often happens, people saw evidence of the menace in the very precautions taken against it. Senators and other notables packed and fled. Private residencies and government buildings were left unattended. Investment values plunged. But 27 October came and went, so too the first of November, and nothing happened. No army took the field in Etruria, no insurgents seized Palestrina, Rome went unmolested.

At about this time, Catiline offered to place himself under Cicero's custody in order that he be free as possible from suspicion of promoting insurrection. Cicero refused to accommodate him. It better served his purpose to have his prey shulking about as an untrammelled menace. Catiline voluntarily took up residence at the house of Metellus Nepos, the praetor, in a display of good faith. In contrast, Cicero took to accompanying himself with a large contingent of bodyguards. He began wearing a breastplate beneath his clothes that he would purposely uncover, treating these well-advertised precautions as further evidence of Catiline's diabolic intent.

On 7 November 63, Cicero convened an extraordinary meeting of the Senate. While many senators doubted his charges, they dared not risk putting themselves under suspicion by challenging him. When Catiline entered the House, his colleagues shrank from greeting him or sitting near him, as Cicero gleefully pointed out. Their timorous reaction to the climate of fear only reinforced it. The consul launched into his speech, accusing Catiline of "actually plotting the destruction of every single one of us, and of all Rome, and of everything upon the face of the earth." Catiline was "determined to plunge the entire world into fire and slaughter." His conspiracy constituted "the most ferocious and appalling and deadly menace to our country." He and his confederates were ready to "besiege the Senate House with their swords, and mobilise their firebombs and brands to plunge the city into flames." In subsequent invectives Cicero was to repeat this charge again and again: Catiline intended "to burn down the entire city and kill you all"; his goal was "nothing less than the extermination of the Roman people."

Cicero addressed Catiline directly as a man of "evil spirit," who had launched repeated attempts upon Cicero's own life: "Although I was well aware that my death would be a disaster to our state, I employed only my unaided endeavors to frustrate your plots. [...] There are all your attempts, for example, to kill myself. [...] Many of your [dagger] thrusts were so lethal that it seemed they could not fail to hit their mark. All the same, by some sort of sideways movement or dodge, I managed to elude them." Ten years later, Cicero would again portray himself as the moving target of a popularis: "Many is the time that I [...] have narrowly managed to escape from Publius Clodius' weapons and gory hands." One can only marvel at how the fleshy orator nimbly evaded his presumably determined assailants.

During his speech in the Senate, Cicero repeatedly indulged in threats against Catiline's life, noting that he was timing Catiline's execution to coincide with the roundup of other like-minded blackguards. To convince the Senate that summary executions were not without precedent, he repeatedly and approvingly mentioned the murder of Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus and other leaders of high social rank on mere "suspicion of treason." But many senators found the charges hard to believe, which probably explains why they made no attempt to detain Catiline. Sensing that he was not carrying his audience, Cicero criticised those colleagues who refused to see "the disasters" that menaced them. And again the next day before the Assembly, he complained that "there were quite a number of people who did not believe what I was telling them."

Nevertheless, the orator's repeated accusations managed to create a witch-hunt atmosphere that Catiline's calm denials could not sufficiently dispel. The dispirited Catiline quitted Rome the night after Cicero's first invective. If we are to believe him, he departed not to organise a revolutionary opposition in Italy, but reluctantly when the consul's denunciations and threats in the Senate made his position untenable, causing him to fear for his life. Catiline dispatched letters to men of consular rank and other members of the aristocracy, describing himself as "beset by false accusations" and unable to cope with the intrigues of his enemies. He informed them that he would go into exile at Massilia (Marseilles).

Within days after his departure, Catiline must have had second thoughts about exile. Instead of going to Massilia, he joined the restive denizens led by Manlius in Etruria. That he had intended to do so all along has been the accepted opinion among most historians, beginning with Cicero. Indeed, it is possible that he lied in order to throw any pursuers off his track. It is just as likely that he changed his mind as he issued forth. He realised he could never expect to return to Rome and live unmolested, and he feared being hunted down by the consul's armed guards while abroad. In any case, a fearful barren life in exile did not fit his temperament. So he embarked upon one last desperate gambit, joining the dispossessed in northern Italy who were now taking up arms to defend themselves from foreclosures and usurious debt collectors.

This is suggested in the letter produced by the arch-conservative Quintus Catulus, which he said came from Catiline. It read in part:

"I was provoked by wrongs and insults and [...] found myself unable to maintain a position of dignity. So I openly undertook the championship of the oppressed, as I had often done before. [...] It was because I saw unworthy men promoted to honourable positions, and felt myself treated as an outcast on account of unjust suspicions. That is why I have adopted a course of action, amply justified in my present circumstances, which offers a hope of saving what is left of my honour. I intended to write at greater length, but news has come that they are preparing to use force against me."

When word of Catiline's arrival in Etruria reached Rome, the Senate declared him and Manlius public enemies. On 9 November, before the Assembly, Cicero delivered a set piece in the art of demonisation: "Imagine every type of criminality and wickedness that you can think of; [Catiline] has been behind them all. In the whole of Italy there is not a single poisoner, gladiator, robber, assassin, parricide, will-forger, cheat, glutton, adulterer, prostitute, corrupter of youth, or youth who has been corrupted, indeed any nasty individual of any kind whatever, who would not be obliged to admit he has been Catiline's intimate. Whenever, all through these years, there has been a murder, the murderer has been he." Catiline even encouraged his young male lovers to murder their parents and "personally lent a hand" in such misdeeds, Cicero assured the Assembly. The orator did not explain why the depraved patrician had never been prosecuted for any of these horrific exploits.

Cicero's strategy was enjoying some success: Demonise and isolate Catiline, push him to the wall, and goad him into an act of unlawful resistance, all the while creating a climate of alarm within the city. The orator-cum-saviour would then use the "perilous emergency" as an opportunity to restore, in the manner of Sulla, the unchallenged authority of the inner circle of aristocratic senators, thereby earning their eternal gratitude, and winning supreme glory for himself.

Still, the lurid scenario he conjured was waiting in one essential component: evidence. Not one person had been harmed, not a house torched, not an arms cache uncovered, not a hilltop or vantage point seized by the insurrectionists, not a trace of anything nefarious afoot, not a perpetrator rooted out and apprehended. The squadrons of incendiaries and armed cadres never materialised. Subversion and mass murder were nowhere to be found except in the hyperbolic screeds emanating from the overheated consul.

With Catiline now ensconced in Etruria, another month passed and still nothing materialised. Cicero easily explained why; the insurrection had been stymied by his unmatchable vigilance: "I myself am on guard. The interests of our country are in my watchful care." And "My courage, wisdom, and foresight [have] preserved the state from the gravest of perils."

A dramatic turn came on 3 December, when an excited Cicero summoned the Senate into another emergency session. He announced that he had planted informers in a secret clique of aristocrats that he had planted informers in a secret clique of aristocrats who were confederates of Catiline. Acting on tips from his undercover agents he had arrested a delegation of Allobroges (from Gaul) who were in Rome seeking redress from the extortions of Roman officials and usurers. A certain Umbrenus, a moneylender active in Gaul, and probably an agent of Cicero, approached the unsuspecting Gauls and informed them of Catiline's conspiracy to overthrow the Roman Republic. He even named the conspirators. Fearing that they were being set up by a provocateur, the Allobroges informed a senator, who regularly acted as their patron in Rome. He in turn informed Cicero, probably not realising that he was thereby drawing the Gauls into the consul's net.

The next morning Cicero had the Allobrogian envoys arrested as they were wending their way out of the city, along with someone named Titus Volturcius, a provincial Italian who supposedly had entered in league with Catiline's conspirators. The envoys were now implicated. Either they cooperated (with the promise of ample monetary reward) or risked dire retribution. The Gauls chose to cooperate fully with Cicero. Following his instructions, they managed to get introduced to the aristocratic conspirators, and asked from them "a written undertaking" under their personal seals that the Allobroges could carry to their countrymen.

Cicero then summoned the aristocrats who, acting not at all like guilty conspirators, obligingly answered his call only to find themselves under arrest. "It was to be suspected," Kahn writes, "that Umbrenus himself was in Cicero's hire, and Volturcius, the conspirator caught along with the Gauls, was almost certainly a paid informant. He had only recently joined the conspiracy and, upon capture, with inordinate alacrity offered to turn state's evidence." Volturcius corroborated the whole litany of horrors Cicero had been highlighting. He claimed that at a signal for an uprising, youths of noble families were to murder their fathers. But Cicero "did not press Volturcius to name any of the prospective patricides."

The letters of the apprehended aristocrats revealed no precise evidence of criminal intent, and probably were primarily statements of support for the Allobroges' redress of grievances. If they had contained mention of arson, massacre, or seizing state power, we certainly would have heard about it from Cicero.

Still the orator held forth about the impending apocalypse. He noted that when Catiline had "broken out of the city a few days ago" (actually Catiline had departed unimpeded nearly a month before), "he left behind him at Rome the associates of his odious designs, the ferocious leaders [...] whose madness and malignancy knew no limits." One of these maddened malignant conspirators was none other than Publius Lentulus Sura, an eminent praetor and former consul, a friend of Catiline's, and Mark Antony's stepfather. Lentulus had written a supportive letter to Catiline, which Volturcius supposedly was asked to deliver. It urged Catiline to "stand firm" and enlist the aid of all "even of the lowest classes."

That being the only portion known to us, we might expect it is the most damaging. Yet it hardly bespeaks a sinister conspiracy to destroy Rome. "Stand firm" in the face of unrelenting calumny is not exactly a call to overthrow the state and butcher all its inhabitants. Rather Lentulus seems to be calmly advising his friend to rally enough support to withstand Cicero's onslaught. And if Catiline and Lentulus had long been conspiring with armed slaves and plebs, then Lentulus' suggestion that he enlist even "the lowest classes" seems oddly redundant and out of date with what supposedly already had been brewing among the conspirators.

Appearing in the Forum later that day, Cicero announced that it was now conclusively proven that Catiline planned to invade Rome and massacre the entire citizenry; the five confederates had been plotting an insurrection from within; and Lentulus intended to make himself king of Rome. Another conspirator, Cethegus, a man of some wealth, possessed a private collection of fancy high-priced daggers and swords that Cicero eagerly confiscated and treated as the arsenal intended for Catiline's rogue army. The five were guilty, Cicero assured the assembled crowd. More conclusive than any evidence was "their pallor, the look in their eyes, the set of their features, their silence. As they stood there stupefied, gazing fixedly upon the ground or occasionally glancing furtively at one another, their guilt was quite as manifest from their own appearance as from anyone else's testimony."

A different conclusion is reached by the few dissenting historians who note that the "evidence" against the five had been proffered by informants of questionable credibility, and that the accused had not been allowed to cross-examine their accusers in any systematic fashion. "To any senator retaining a modicum of common sense it was clear that the hullabaloo was out of all proportion to the events." A coterie of sympathisers had tried to mobilise support for their friend Catiline, but were they planning arson, murder, and revolution? If so, by what means? It was not with an invisible army of plebs and slaves, nor was it with Manlius and his veterans who petitioned the Roman proconsul only for land reform and relief from taxes and debts, nor with the Allobroges who were petitioning for grievances of their own and who gave no evidence of planning a Gallic invasion of Rome.

The following day, 4 December, as Sallust tells it, a certain Lucius Tarquinius was brought before the full Senate House. He claimed to have been on his way to join Catiline when he was arrested. Why the authorities thought he was suspect Sallust does not say. Told to speak by Cicero, Tarquinius readily related a story tailor-made to support Cicero's charges and strikingly similar to the one spun by Volturcius. But Tarquinius also claimed that he had been sent by Marcus Crassus to instruct Catiline to prepare his attack with all due haste. The mention of Crassus, an aristocrat possessed of immense wealth and prestige, had an unsettling effect on the Senate. It was one thing that Crassus may have supported Catiline for consul and bailed him out in an earlier extortion case, but something else to accuse him of plotting to overthrow the Roman government. Could the commander who had ruthlessly crushed Spartacus' slave rebellion in 71 now be leading a slave rebellion of his own? Could the richest landlord in Rome now want to torch his own properties?

Some senators found Tarquinius' statement beyond belief. Others thought it best not to provoke a powerful man like Crassus, regardless of how true or untrue the allegation against him. The full House swiftly declared the charges to be false, and decreed that Tarquinius be kept in custody until he revealed the name of the person who had put him up to such testimony. Some suspected that Tarquinius had been suborned by Cicero in an attempt to undermine Crassus, who had developed the habit of working with reform-minded leaders—including the popular Pompey (who at the moment was in Asia on a military campaign). Sallust writes, "At a later date, I actually heard Crassus declare with his own lips that this infamous accusation against him had been made by Cicero."

Two leading optimates, Catulus and Piso, nursing political and personal grievances against Julius Caesar, urged Cicero to enlist informants to bear false witness against him. But Cicero, perhaps mindful of how the charge against Crassus had redounded with ill effect, refused to risk it. Catulus and Piso then took matters into their own hands, circulating falsehoods that they pretended to have heard from Volturcius or the Allobroges, provoking enough feeling against Caesar to cause armed knights—strong partisans of Cicero's—to threaten him with their swords as he exited the Senate House.

On 5 December 63, the Senate held a momentous session. Various senators now came forward with incriminating testimony against the five "Catiline conspirators." Consul-elect Silanus, a Cicero collaborator, declared that Cethegus had marked him and seven other high-ranking senators for death. Silanus offered no evidence to support this startling indictment, nor did he explain why he had waited until now to report it. Cethegus, Lentulus, and the other conspirators should suffer "the extremist fate," he demanded, a cry taken up by other senators.

With the conspirators' fate seemingly sealed, Julius Caesar took the floor. Still four years away from his first consulship, Caesar already was a leading figure in Roman politics, identified with the popular faction. Calmly he urged the senators upon a different course, reminding them of their constitutional duty. He could not countenance putting the accused to death without a trial. Instead he recommended keeping them in close custody until further investigation and adjudication. Surely, now was not the time to do something rash and irreversible—and certainly unconstitutional—something that might only generate a still graver crisis. Here Caesar was alluding to the possibility that the executions might rouse disturbances among the people, many of whom had taken to Catiline's late-blooming populism. Caesar's measured remarks, writes Plutarch, "wrought such change in the opinions of the Senate, which was in fear of the people" that even Silanus hastily announced that he too had not meant death when he called for "the extremist fate" but incarceration—which to a freedom-loving Roman was far worse than death.

Catulus took the floor and sputtered in rage against the course urged by Caesar. He was followed by another optimate leader, the younger Cato, who angrily taxed Silanus for his recantation, then assailed Caesar for using the cover of humane words while "trying to subvert the state [...] seeking to frighten the Senate in a case in which he himself had much to fear." Here Cato was accusing Caesar of being secretly in league with Catiline. Why else would he essay to rescue enemies who had brought the country to the brink of ruin and whose deaths "would free the state from great slaughter and perils?"

While Cato had the floor, it happened that a messenger delivered a note to Caesar. Seeing an opportunity to fix suspicion, Cato cried out that even now as he spoke, Caesar was communicating with enemies of the commonwealth. Cato bade him to read the missive aloud. Instead, Caesar rose and handed the sheaf to Cato who unhappily discovered it to be a billet-doux from his very own half-sister Servilia (the mother of Brutus) who long had been engaged in a notorious liaison with Caesar. Plutarch describes her as being "madly in love" with him. In a distemper Cato threw the note back at Caesar, snapping "Keep it, you drunkard," an oddly inapposite epithet since Caesar was known to be a temperate imbimber, and the note pertained to a different sort of intoxication experienced by Servilia.

Though his ploy against Caesar backfired, Cato turned the tide of opinion. The jittery senators voted to condemn the accused to death. That same evening, under Cicero's direct supervision, Lentulus, Cethegus, Statilius, Gabinius, and Caeparius were taken to a prison, one by one lowered into a dank, foul chamber, and strangled to death.[58]

Other conspirators of lesser renown were rounded up in Rome and elsewhere in Italy. Under the law, now that his consulship had expired, Cicero held court in his home. Some of the accused were put to death on the testimony of an informer; others were acquitted. Some supposed to be guilty were allowed to escape. In a polemic sometimes attributed to Sallust, an anonymous critic notes that several among the accused who offered Cicero sumptuous gifts, including a house, a Tusculan villa, and a Pompeian villa, escaped retribution. But those who could not afford such favours were charged with plotting against the Senate, and Cicero was certain of their guilt.

Some weeks later, Catiline and his poorly-armed band in Etruria, beleaguered by Roman legions closing in from north and south of them, fought valiantly in what was essentially a defensive action. Catiline was killed and the Etrurian force was crushed. No prisoners were taken.

For the next twenty years Cicero tirelessly credited himself with "having preserved the state" and having "delivered the Senate House from massacre," describing his crusade against Catiline as "the grandest deed in the history of the human race." He had to admit that the only citizen the Republic "could not do without was myself." In a letter to Lucius Lucceius, who was writing a history of Rome (lost to us), Cicero asked him to use his genius to eulogise the role that he, Cicero, had played in the city's history "with even more warmth than perhaps you feel, and in that respect to disregard the canons of history" by writing with a partiality that "enhances my merits even to exaggeration in your eyes [...] even a little more than may be allowed by truth." This would help bring "the vindication of my claims to everlasting renown." For "if a man has once transgressed the bounds of modesty, the best he can do is to be shameless out and out."

Cicero's tireless rodomontade became the accepted opinion among intellectuals through the ages. Velleius Paterculus, Plutarch, Juvenal, Lucan, Dio Cassius, Florus, and other ancient writers praise him almost as much as he praised himself for having thwarted a pestiferous conspiracy against Rome and all its upstanding citizens. Likewise, most modern-day historians accept Cicero's account of how he rescued the city from Catiline's clutches. They write of the "firm evidence" he produced, the "diligence" and "care" that "spared Rome from fire and sword," his "brilliant statecraft," "quick, decisive, and courageous" action, and "prompt countermeasures."

For those of us less enamoured with the great orator, troubling questions remain. Beginning with the more implausible charges:

• If the alleged conspirators sought to become the masters of Rome, why were they intent upon "wiping out the city and every single individual [...] menacing our country with annihilation," as Cicero claimed? Why would they want to preside over a heap of corpses and burnt rubble?
• Catiline's secret band of confederates, according to Cicero, was composed of debtors, gamblers, layabouts, parricides, assassins, debauchers, effeminate degenerates, and louche characters of every sort. How could the arch-villain hope to overthrow the Roman empire with such a raggle-taggle band of wastrels and misfits?
• Given Catiline's bloodthirsty designs, why were no murders committed? Assassination was hardly an unknown accomplishment in Roman politics, yet Catiline and his bumbling gang seemed never to get the hang of it. The two consuls-elect were supposedly targeted in the January 65 "murder plot," but nothing happened. As for the plot to kill hundreds of senators the following month, again nothing happened.
• There was the report, widely publicised by Cicero, of two Catiline conspirators who were appointed to kill him, but when denied entry into his house, they departed without a murmur and never bothered him again. Cicero claimed, "I had almost been murdered in my own home." But why did he not have them arrested for conspiracy to commit murder? Why did he not produce them and his anonymous informant for public questioning? Again, nothing developed. Commentators cannot even agree on the identity of these two lackadaisical perpetrators. Sallust is sure it was Cornelius and Vargunteius; Plutarch fingers Marcius and Cethegus; Appian accuses Lentulus and Cethegus; Dio gives no names; Suetonius and Velleius do not even mention the incident. And Cicero himself is oddly vague, saying only that it was "two Roman equestrians," which rules out most of the above.
• Cicero refers to attempts against several other individuals, and an attempt to kill Catiline's competitors on the consular comitia of 63. Again, nothing happened. And what evidence was there that Catiline repeatedly assaulted Cicero with a dagger but apparently in so ungainly a fashion as to be thwarted by the consul's sidesteps? Why didn't Cicero have Catiline arrested for these attempts upon his life?
• Catiline and his accomplices were ignominious failures also when it came to arson attacks. If you can believe Sallust, Catiline enlisted a number of debauched society ladies to agitate among the city slaves and organise incendiary assaults. Again nothing came of it. It was said that Catiline planned to seize key points throughout the city with armed men. Again, no results. The incendiaries were supposedly forestalled by Cicero's guards. This too is difficult to believe. Rome was a tinderbox; accidental fires were frequent and fierce. If bands of arsonists really intended to start a major conflagration, no number of guards could have prevented it.
• What evidence did Cicero have to support his startling charge that Catiline's friend Lentulus sought a kingship over Rome? Lentulus was doubtless mindful of how kings were abominated by the Roman people. And he was sensibly aware that he himself, albeit a fine orator, laid claim to no strong following in the Forum, the Senate, or the military. How then could he have hoped to achieve such a grandiose goal? Without an army, how would he have hoped to resist a jealous Pompey who, hastening back to Rome with his legions, would have dispensed with any self-proclaimed king or, for that matter, any self-installed consul such as Catiline.
• Why would the five accused divulge their dangerously self-incriminating secrets in letters fixed with their personal seals to foreign envoys from Gaul with whom they had no previous connection? Cicero himself was aware that this incredible scenario craved explanation. His answer delivered before the Assembly on the afternoon of 3 December was that divine forces caused them to blunder! "Lentulus and the other traitors in our midst would never have been such madmen as to entrust these vital intrigues and communications to people who were both strangers and barbarians, unless the gods themselves had denuded their outrageous scheme of every shred of discretion." Before the Senate Cicero claimed, "Gentlemen, I feel conscious that the will and guidance of the immortal gods have been directly behind every single thing I have arranged." This from a man who privately debunked the auspices and other religious beliefs.
• Given the supposedly massive dimensions of the plot, why was there no evidence other than the dubious testimony of several informants who simply reiterated the charges levelled in Cicero's invectives? Rewards were offered for information about the plot. For a slave, the prize was freedom and 100,000 sesterces (about ten years' earnings for the average labourer); for a free man, double that sum and a pardon for any share he had in the conspiracy. Sallust notes that "not a man among all the conspirators was induced by the promise of reward to betray their plans." As usual, Sallust does not question further, but we might ask, why did not one feckless turncoat issue forth with information in order to pocket the sumptuous reward and save his own skin?

Most probably the conspiracy was not betrayed because it did not exist, at least not to the phantasmal extent conjured by Cicero.

On 29 December, the last day of his consulship, Cicero attempted to make a farewell speech lauding his year in office. But the assembled crowd would not allow him to utter a word besides his oath. Instead they hooted him down for executing Roman citizens without a fair trial and without the consent of the people. In vehement protestation, the orator shouted back that the safety of the state and city "is due to my efforts alone," a boast that only succeeded in inciting still more anger from the crowd.

Cicero had hoped that his renown as Rome's deliverer would prevail throughout the ages, and so it has among many classicists. But among the sensible commoners of Rome, his self-anointed glory endured for hardly a day.

6 - The Face of Caesar

"Caesar shall forth: the things that threaten'd me

Ne'er look'd but on my back; when they shall see

The face of Caesar, they are vanished."

—JULIUS CAESAR ACT II, SCENE 2

Rome's greatest popularis was Gaius Julius Caesar, known to his contemporaries as Gaius Caesar and to history as Julius Caesar. He was born in 100 B.C.E., the scion of an old patrician family. His uncle by marriage was Gaius Marius, the famous popularis, and his father-in-law was Marius' close ally Cornelius Cinna. Being Marius' nephew and Cinna's son-in-law during Sulla's reign of repression in 82 placed young Caesar on the defeated side and slated him for proscription. Sulla announced his willingness to spare Caesar's life in the youth would pledge himself to the reactionary cause. And to demonstrate the sincerity of his conversion, Caesar was expected to discard his wife Cornelia (Cinna's daughter) and marry someone chosen by Sulla.

Had Caesar been driven primarily by unprincipled ambition and a lust for power, as Cicero claimed and many Ciceronian historians insist to this day, he would have eagerly accepted this chance to be catapulted into the highest circles as the tyrant's protégé. Instead, he spurned Sulla's offer though mindful of the ruinous consequences. Showing great displeasure, Sulla ordered his arrest and stripped him of his inheritance and his wife's dowry. Some historians report that Caesar saved himself by taking flight after bribing one of Sulla's captains with the considerable sum of two talents (approximately 100 pounds of gold or silver).[1] Others say he survived because Caesar's mother and conservative members of her family used their connections with the well-placed Sullan partisans to prevail upon the tyrant to pardon the defiant youth. To those who advised Sulla against eliminating someone so young, he is quoted as saying, "Bear in mind that the man you are so eager to save will one day deal the death blow to the aristocracy, which you have joined me in upholding; for in this Caesar there is more than one Marius."[2]

For the next few years Caesar kept a healthy distance from Rome while Sulla's proscriptions were claiming thousands of victims. In 78, news of Sulla's death brought him hastily back to the city. The popular movement was surfacing anew, even seeming to threaten social revolution. With desperate energy the Senate aristocrats regrouped the Sullan forces and granted plenary power to Pompey to repress the disturbances. At this time Caesar refrained from entering the fray.[3]

In 75 Caesar journeyed abroad, most probably to claim a legacy from his deceased friend and former lover, King Nicomedes. On his way, the story goes, he was captured by pirates and held ransom for the huge sum of fifty talents. After weeks of effort, his envoys extracted this amount from the allied coastal municipalities. Many of the pirates were drawn from these same towns. Since the inhabitants often shared in the spoils, it was established that they should be required to make restoration. Upon being released, within the space of a day Caesar armed some ships and recruited a band of irregulars, who perhaps belonged to a clan that was a rival of his erstwhile captors. His makeshift force surprised the brigands that evening and captured some of their ships. Caesar executed his former captors and pocketed the immense ransom for himself, presumably after paying off his hirelings.[4]

Even at this point there still was nothing to prevent Julius Caesar from taking the well-paved path of an optimate career. He would have been welcomed into the oligarchic camp with open arms and ready rewards. Instead, he moved in the opposite direction, exhibiting a dedication to the popular cause that captured the people's affection. In 73, he supported a measure that would allow the return of pro-Marius political exiles banished during Sulla's reign. That same year, he sided with an interesting democratic leader and tribune, Licinius Macer, in a campaign to undo the Sullan decrees that had abrogated the powers of the people's tribunate.

It was Macer who helped create a democratic mode of public speaking (utilised by Caesar himself), arming his listeners with factual evidence and precise argument rather than rolling over them with the orotund periods and histrionic locution of classical oratory. Cicero describes Macer as being of unimpressive presence. His looks and manner detracted from the effect of his intellectual prowess, yet he was effective enough. "His language was not richly abundant but neither was it meager. His voice, gestures, and delivery were entirely lacking in charm. Yet his use of original material, and his arrangement of what he had to say, were so carefully thought out, as to be unsurpassed by anyone else in these respects."[5]

All we have of Macer's words is a speech preserved in the surviving fragments of Sallust's History. Living under the Sullan constitution in the late seventies, Macer was fully cognisant of the dangerous power wielded by the oligarchs. A tribune such as himself "alone and deficient in resources and with the mere empty semblance of office" could not hope to challenge them without mass support. "What an uproar they incite against myself," he remarked. Macer chastised the plebs for their lack of organised action and their willingness to lease themselves as clientele to aristocratic patrons. "You act like a tame herd, notwithstanding your great numbers, allowing yourselves to be possessed and fleeced by the few." By obeying the lordly commands of the consuls and the decrees of the Senate, the people fortified the very authority that oppressed them. If they did not struggle to regain their rights and defend their interests, they would only be subjected to still more severe injustices, he argued.

Under the pretense of conducting war, the nobles grab control of the treasury and the army, Macer went on. They trick the people into believing they are sovereign by waging raucous but vacuous political contests in which voters are allowed to select not their defenders but their masters. The populace, he argued, should not allow itself to be bribed with a meager grain disbursement that was "not much more than prison rations." Even that paltry handout was grudgingly granted only out of fear of social unrest. Macer called upon the plebs to withdraw their empowering responses by resisting military conscription and refraining from serving the rich: "I do not recommend armed violence or a secession but only that you should refuse to shed your blood in their behalf. [...] [L]et those of us who have no share in the profits be free also from dangers and toil.[6]

Macer's career illustrates how a popular leader can be immobilised short of assassination. In 66, while serving as a provincial governor, he was targeted by the optimates and charged with extortion. Presiding over his trial was Cicero himself, who gleefully wrote to Atticus, "I gained more approval by his conviction than I would have gained from his gratitude if he had been acquitted."[7]

Fully expecting to be found not guilty, Macer greeted the news of his conviction with utter dismay, retiring to his home where he either died of a heart attack or committed suicide.[8]

In 68, Julius Caesar delivered a public eulogy for his aunt Julia, wife to Marius, at whose funeral he boldly displayed images of Marius, something nobody had dared to do since the Sullan reaction. In the ensuing years, Caesar went on to win various public offices. As aedile in 65, he used the money of rich associated to organise festivals and spectacles of unprecedented extravagance. And he won appreciation for the great care he gave to public squares and buildings and for restoring the Appian Way. He also ordered that under darkness images of Marius be placed in the Capital. The next day, as word of this spread, "Marius' party took courage, and it was incredible how numerous they were suddenly seen to be, and what a multitude of them appeared and came shouting into the capital," many extolling Caesar as the one man "who was a relation worthy of Marius."[9]

In 64, when just thirty-six years old, Caesar presented himself as a candidate for high priest (pontifex maximus), a lifelong, prestigious position he occupied without benefit of any deep religious conviction. Plutarch reports that his election, won against two eminent older senators, "excited among the Senate and nobility great alarm lest he might now urge the people to every extreme of recklessness."[10]

Later that year Caesar and others put together a land reform bill that was designed to be moderate in method but comprehensive in scope. Allotments went to benefit both the landless poor and army veterans. The holdings would be acquired only from public lands and parcels purchased from landholders willing to sell. Land-rich nobles deeply in debt were guaranteed a good price despite depressed land values. Funds for the programme would come from the sale of property and wealth confiscated from overseas dependencies, thereby costing the public treasury little, while finally providing a socially useful means for distributing war booty.[11]

On 1 January 63, the newly elected consul, Cicero, in his inaugural address before the Senate and in two subsequent orations in the Forum, threw the full weight of his office against the land reform bill, misrepresenting its moderate contents, and raising alarmist cries that the proposal was a "plot against liberty," "darkly engineered," and full of "secret purpose." Kahn notes that "Cicero was equating charge with subversion," depicting any measure to mitigate material misery as a lunge towards revolution. The bill was either withdrawn or defeated in an Assembly vote.[12]

This setback must have taught Caesar something about the difficulties of peaceful reform within the existing system. Still, his own career moved forwards. He was elected praetor in 62 and proconsul of Farther Spain in 61, where he engaged in a victorious military campaign against the Lusitani. It was during these years that he forged political friendships with Crassus and Pompey.

The ex-praetor Marcus Crassus, a former subordinate of Sulla (mentioned in the previous chapter as accused of participating in the Catiline plot), owed his celebrity to both money and military endeavor. He amassed vast amounts through investments, becoming a landowner and slumlord. His dubious claim to fame came in 71 B.C.E. when he headed the army that delivered the death blow to the great slave rebellion led by Spartacus. He hunted down and killed Spartacus and then crucified 6,000 of his men.

Pompey also had begun his military career as an ally of Sulla in 82, whom he served in outstanding fashion, winning the dictator's gratitude and admiration.[13] Summoned back from Spain to help quell Spartacus' rebellion, Pompey arrived in time to partake in the final bloodletting, which he and his associates trumpeted as a major military success eclipsing Crassus' endeavors.

Whatever clashes and feelings of rivalry they may have had, Crassus and Pompey managed to work together, getting themselves elected as consuls for 70 B.C.E. Pressured by popular agitation, they devoted their year in office to undoing some of Sulla's reactionary edicts. THey encouraged the censors to expel sixty-four senators for gross corruption, and they supported a bill reducing senatorial membership on jury panels to one-third. Most important of all, a law proposed by Pompey lifted the restrictions Sulla had imposed upon the people's tribunes. These efforts won the applause of the people and the ire of the Senate, and qualified Pompey as a popularis, at least for a spell.

Through the sixties, Crassus associated himself with the popular cause, supporting Macer when he was hounded by optimates in 66, then serving as Caesar's financial backer. By this time Pompey had won additional fame for his swift and successful campaign against the pirates who had been marauding the Mediterranean. In 60 B.C.E., Caesar invited Crassus and Pompey to join with him in what became known to modern historians as the First Triumvirate. Pompey had the prestige of a war hero and presumably the backing of his veterans, Crassus had the money, and Caesar had the support of the plebs. Together they challenged the optimates and emerged for a time as the dominant political force, able to undo some of the more reactionary features of the Sullan constitution, causing Cicero to denounce them privately as "three immoderate men."[14]

In the face of heavy optimate opposition, Caesar won the supreme office of consul, serving in 59. Early in his consulship he submitted another land reform bill, accepted by Pompey and Crassus, not unlike the one proposed in 63. Cicero was invited to serve on the land reform commission but refused. After the bill was filibustered to death in the Senate by Cato, Caesar applied the tactics of the Gracchi, dealing no further with the Senate and turning to the popular assemblies to get the law passed.[15] It was not long before Cicero was complaining that the land distribution programme was "taking away our rents in Campania."[16]

Caesar's fellow consul Bibulus, the optimates' man, opposed Caesar's reformist measures and tried to paralyse proceedings within the assemblies by forever citing bad omens. Whenever democratic sentiment gained sufficient momentum, it risked being thwarted by religious auspices (auspicia), that is, by divinations of the will of the gods. Auspices were conducted by the College of Augurs, an exclusive aristocratic preserve until the beginning of the first century B.C.E., after which notable equestrians were also inducted. By simply reporting unfavourable omens, the augurs could postpone action within the popular assemblies or invalidate the election of a pro-democratic official. It was customary to regard any sign from heaven as inauspicious and reason enough to suspend public proceedings.[17]

Divinations were issued after a ritualised study of the entrails of sacrificial animals, or after observing a sudden flight of birds, a thunderstorm, a streak of light in the celestial firmament, or some other "unusual" happening. The ruling circles appreciated the conservative veto offered by the auspices. Cicero was explicit on this point. While he privately dismissed augury as nothing more than just so much mummery, he was all for using it as a state weapon against "the frenzy of the tribunes" and "the unjust impetuosity of the people."[18]

A century before Cicero, Polybius commented on the political uses of religion: "[S]uperstition is actually the element that holds the Roman state together. [...] As the masses are always fickle, filled with lawless desires, unreasoning anger, and violent passions, they can only be restrained by mysterious terrors or other dramatisations."[19] Later on Gibbon wrote: "The various modes of worship which prevailed in the Roman world were all considered by the people as equally true; by the philosopher as equally false; and by the magistrate as equally useful.[20] One modern-day conservative historian acknowledges the religious auspices "helped to keep things going as they had always gone and to teach the lower classes to know their proper place."[21] So it came as no surprise that Bibulus, having shut himself up in his house through most of his co-consulship, would attempt to trump Caesar and the popular assemblies by repeatedly announcing inauspicious augurs, ploys that Caesar simply ignored, just as he must have disregarded Bibulus' vetoes.[22]

Whatever his popularity, Caesar still lacked the power and prestige of a military hero. Unlike Alexander, Hannibal, and Napoleon, he began his career as a politician rather than as a military leader. Originally intending, in the manner of Pericles and Gaius Gracchus, to attain his reforms without the use of force, he attended to the political arena for eighteen years. Then, at the age of forty, he became convinced that having an army at his back was a surer way when facing off against the death-dealing oligarchy.

By that time the Roman Republic ruled over a far-flung empire, extending across the entire Mediterranean basin from Spain to Asia Minor. Caesar added to its possessions and partook of its plunder and bloodletting.[23] In 58, he became proconsul (provincial governor) of Cisalpine Gaul (northern Italy) and Transalpine Gaul (France and Belgium). In a series of military campaigns that lasted for nine years, he brought all of Gaul under Roman suzerainty, along with portions of Germany. He continued as proconsul for five additional years under a law passed in 55 by Pompey and Crassus, who again were serving as consuls.

The alliance between Pompey and Caesar had been cemented by Pompey's marriage to Caesar's daughter Julia. But Julia died in 54, at a time when Pompey was becoming increasingly uneasy about Caesar's growing popularity and military strength. The following year, the Triumvirate came to an end when Crassus suffered a disastrous military defeat in his campaign against the Parthians in the east (present-day Iraq and northern Syria), and was then treacherously killed while attempting to negotiate with them. The parthians knew something about Crassus. As Florus reports, they cut off his head, and poured molten gold into his mouth that he "whose mind had burnt with desire of gold might when dead and inanimate be burnt with gold itself."[24]

The death of Crassus not only brought the collapse of the Triumvirate but spelt the beginning of civil war. According to the Roman historian Lucan: "Caesar could no longer endure a superior, nor Pompey an equal."[25] Pompey was, according to Dio, greatly displeased by the general praise bestowed upon Caesar "whereby his own exploits were being overshadowed." He attempted to persuade the consuls not to make public Caesar's letters but to downplay his victories. He "reproached the populace for paying little heed to himself and going frantic over Caesar."[26]

Sensing Pompey's discontent, the optimates sought to enlist him to their cause. They feared Caesar as the shrewder and more dedicated popularis of the two. Although he was away on his Gallic campaign through most of the fifties, Caesar still managed to keep a hand in Roman politics, acting through surrogates or himself sometimes returning to Rome during the winter months.

Pompey proved receptive to the optimates' overtures. In 52, the senators designated him sole consul of Rome—in violation of constitutional practice that required two consuls to serve and both to be elected by the assemblies. About that time they extended his command in Spain for another five years. With Julia dead, Pompey rejected an offer to marry Caesar's great-niece and instead took the daughter of Metellus Scipio, a Senate optimate. He then selected his newly acquired father-in-law to serve alongside him as fellow consul for the remaining months of 52, another unconstitutional move that was perfectly acceptable to the senatorial constitutionalists. Highly influential aristocratic families such as the Metelli were willing to truck with Pompey at least until Caesar could be scotched.

In late December of 50, while Caesar was still in Gaul, the conflict between him and the optimates came to a boil. The Senate decided that a successor should be sent to replace him. The Senate's order was vetoed by Curio, a tribune sympathetic to Caesar. Caesar's counteroffer, put before the Senate by Curio, was that both he and Pompey resign their military commands. This proposal won enthusiastic support among the common people.[27] By a vote of 370–22, the senators readily approved this plan. Here was a chance to avert civil war and disarm both Caesar and Pompey.

But this was not good enough for the ultraconservative optimates hardened as they were against Caesar. They found a tribune who vetoed the mutual disarmament proposal. If Caesar resigned his command, they must have thought, this would not end his political appeal. In any case, there would be little to prevent him from calling up his veterans or levying new recruits at some future flashpoint. The following day one of the consuls, also of the conservative faction, called on Pompey to take command of two legions.

Negotiations continued into early January 49. Acting not at all like someone lusting for kingly power, Caesar again proposed that he and Pompey resign their commands. His message was put before the Senate by a tribune and political ally, Mark Antony, who had succeeded Curio. This time the senators angrily rejected it without debate. The optimates were now firmly gripping the senatorial reins, driving towards a showdown. With Pompey as their hired sword, they believed they could isolate and vanquish Caesar once and for all. The Senate passed a senatus consultum ultimum along with "resolutions of the harshest and most severe nature" to end Caesar's command and suppress "those distinguished officials, the tribunes of the people," as Caesar wrote.[28] Fearing for themselves, Mark Antony and another tribune fled Rome, making their way north to join Caesar.

Several days later, Caesar assembled his troops and recounted all the wrongs he believed had been perpetrated against him by the Senate oligarchs. They had seduced Pompey, played on his pride, and turned him against Caesar. They had used armed force to abrogate the power of the people's tribunes. They had passed a harsh ultimum that normally was reserved for suppressing mutiny or violence—of which there had been neither. They had ordered Caesar to disband his army while Pompey continued to levy troops. Despite Caesar's overtures, Pompey would make no promise to treat with him. Caesar reiterated his offer: "We shall both disband our armies; there shall be complete demobilisation in Italy; the regime of terror shall cease; there shall be free elections and the Senate and the Roman people shall be in full control of the government. [...] By submitting our differences to mutual discussion, we shall settle them all."[29]

These proposals won the approval of his troops but were again summarily rejected by Pompey and the optimates. "Pompey," wrote Cicero approvingly, "is quite contemptuous of anything [Caesar] can do and confident in his own and the Republic's forces." For Cicero, a negotiated settlement with Caesar offered nothing more than "the dangers of a false peace."[30]

The choices Caesar now faced were attended with great danger. If he reentered Italy with his legionaries, he would spark a civil war the outcome of which loomed most uncertain. But were he to return without them, he would be powerless to pursue further reforms and risked being done in by the optimates' assassins. At the very least, he would be prosecuted for vote buying or treason or for having disregarded auspices and vetoes during his first consulship. The trial would be before a carefully selected jury, in a courtroom ringed by Pompey's soldiers, with a predictable outcome.[31]

Assured of the backing of his troops Caesar struck camp and prepared to march south. On 10 January 49 B.C.E., with only 300 cavalry and 5,000 infantry (the rest of his army was beyond the Alps), he crossed the Rubicon, a small river that separated Cisalpine Gaul from Ancient Italy.[32] (To this day, as readers might recognise, "to cross the Rubicon" means to take an irrevocable step regarding an imposing issue.) By moving troops onto Italian soil without permission of the Senate, Caesar was committing an act of treason. Civil war between Pompey and him was now inevitable.

As Caesar made his way down the Italian peninsula, the local population began to swing over to his side. Writing a century after the events, Lucan, a sympathiser of the senatorial party, describes Caesar as "frantic for war. [...] He would rather burst a city gate than find it open to admit him; he would rather ravage the land with fire and sword than overrun it without protest from the farmer."[33] This was hardly so. Caesar always preferred to make allies of former enemies. In January 49 he eagerly welcomed the allegiance of Italian towns and garrisons as they threw open their gates to him. He vowed to rule without the cruelty and repression that had marked Sulla's reign, declaring, "Let this be the new style of conquest, to make mercy and generosity our shield." He again called upon Pompey "to prefer my friendship to that of those who have always been his and my bitter enemies, by whose machinations the country has been brought to its present impasse."[34] In mid-March 49, almost three months after he had entered Italy—as Balbus reports to Cicero—Caesar was still eager to restore good relations with Pompey.[35]

Cicero himself would have none of it. He continued to wail about Caesar's fiendish campaign "to plan debt cancellations, recall [anti-Sullan] exiles, and a hundred other villainies. [...] I expect nothing but atrocities from him."[36] The flowery hypocrisy that Cicero long displayed towards Caesar came to full bloom by March 49. In a letter to Caesar he professed friendship and offered to mediate the dispute with Pompey, and the very next day he wrote to his friend Atticus of his distress regarding Caesar's impending victory. Some time later, he bragged of his cunning, telling Atticus that a missive he sent to Caesar contained no other material "except flattery," with not a word about what "I really believe."[37]

Most of the Italian countryside hailed Caesar. So too did the Roman proletariat, in a far cry from the furiously hostile reception they had accorded the troops of the reactionary Sulla decades earlier. Within weeks Caesar took Rome while Pompey and his forces retreated to Greece where they anticipated greater support. With both consuls and most of the Senate having fled, the people's Tribal Assembly judged that the Republic needed a legally constituted authority. It passed a law giving the praetor, Lepidus, the right to nominate a temporary dictator in place of the absent consuls. As was expected by the people, Lepidus appointed Caesar. Dio says that Caesar committed no act of terror while dictator. Instead he recalled the descendants of Sulla's proscription, allowing them to return to Rome with all their rights restored after over thirty years of exile. He also granted Roman citizenship to the Gauls who lived south of the Alps just beyond the Po.[38]

The rest is ancient history. Caesar resigns his dictatorship but now rules as consul. There follows more than four years of intermittent civil war, resulting in the defeat of Pompey's forces at Pharsalus (northern Greece) in 48. With Caesar in hot pursuit, a vanquished Pompey flees to Egypt. Ministers of young King Ptolemy, wanting neither Pompey as a master nor Caesar as an enemy, kill him. Caesar arrives in Egypt. When presented with Pompey's head, he turns away with sorrow and loathing. Upon receiving Pompey's seal ring, he bursts into tears. Then he puts two of Pompey's assassins to death.[39] Caesar occupies Alexandria with a small force and is besieged by the king's troops. Bolstered by reinforcements that arrive in March 47, the Romans prove victorious. Caesar installs Cleopatra and her younger brother as co-regents of Egypt, finding time to pursue a love affair with her that includes an extended cruise up the Nile. From 48 to 44, Caesar rules Rome, sometimes from afar, in a series of consulships that allows him to initiate wide-ranging reforms (discussed in Chapter Eight). After the defeat of Pompey's sons in Spain in March 45, peace is finally restored. Sometime in September or October 45, now at the height of his power, a triumphant Caesar returns where he is showered with extravagant honours including the title of imperator perpetuus. He has scarcely six months to live.

7 - "You All Did Love Him Once"

"You all did love him once, not without cause." —JULIUS CAESAR ACT III, SCENE 2

Gaius Julius Caesar was a man of outstanding qualities, a commanding figure, uncommonly intelligent, attractive, and utterly charming when he cared to be. His associate Sallust testifies that he was esteemed "for the many kind services he rendered and for his lavish generosity."[1] An inspiring military leader, he was famously liked by his troops whom he led with a mixture of eloquent exhortation, bold example, iron discipline, and the rewards of plunder. Unlike most members of his class, he disdained luxury and excessive self-indulgence, though he was something of a dandy in his dress. Also unlike many members of his class, he usually refrained from excessive alcohol consumption. Even his enemies admitted that he was a temperate imbiber. As one of them remarked, "Caesar was the only sober man who ever tried to wreck the constitution."[2]

Caesar had no need to convince himself that he possessed exceptional qualities, but he strove to make it difficult for others to deny or devalue his abilities. His military exploits demonstrated his mastery over men and situations and promoted his own dignitas (reputation, authority, distinction), adding to his popular support and his ability to effect much needed reforms.

Highly regarded for the elegance and clarity of his writing, Caesar was thought to be one of Rome's greatest prose stylists.[3] His intellectual interests were impressively polymathic. He was a patron of arts and learning and had an expert interest in astronomy. Considered a superlative public speaker, he could stir crowds and touch hearts with his words. Even a renowned orator and bitter political rival like Cicero was obliged to admit that he knew of no one more eloquent, witty, lucid, and endowed with a more varied yet precise oratorical vocabulary than Gaius Caesar.[4]

Caesar also possessed some less than perfect traits, to say the least. He was known for his extravagant expenditures of borrowed money through much of his early career. Great sums passed through his hands, enabling him to buy elections, gather political influence, and raise armies. Suetonius observes that he was not particularly honest in his auriferous pursuits, pillaging shrines and temples, and sacking towns—especially ones with rich inhabitants. He stole 3,000 pounds of gold from the Capital itself, replacing it with gilded bronze. And he extorted nearly 1.5 million gold pieces from King Ptolemy of Egypt.[5]

Far worse than that, like other military commanders of his day including many of the optimates, he was a despoiler of distant lands. It has been argued that his conquest of Gaul was a blessing in disguise. Deeply divided among themselves, the Gauls could not have withstood the impending onslaught of the Germanic tribes. In their subjugation to Rome they found peace and stability. Indeed, Gallic units did join Caesar's legions to fight against Ariovistus and other German invaders. But the "blessing" of Roman conquest offered no deliverance for the tens of thousands who were killed, bereaved, uprooted, enslaved, or otherwise made destitute during years of sanguinary contest.[6] Caesar himself owns to the worst atrocity his troops committed, in the siege of Avaricum when they slaughtered almost 40,000 inhabitants, "sparing neither those infirm with age nor women nor children."[7]

And how do we apologise for his treatment of Vercingetorix, a Gallic leader whose major crime was to wage a valiant campaign against Roman military domination in 52, in a last-ditch attempt to preserve the independence of his people?[8] When finally defeated, Vercingetorix was imprisoned by Caesar. He spent six years in chains only to be taken from his cell, marched through the streets during a triumphal procession honouring Caesar, and publicly executed.

As in every empire, the common people of the imperial nation itself also paid a price. From the dark soil of Spain to the hot sands of Egypt, the bones of Roman soldiers littered the empire. And of those who survived, what would be sufficient payment for their lost youth? Lucan has Caesar's weary legionnaires complaining to him: "What limit of warfare do you seek? What will satisfy you if Rome is not enough? [...] We have lost the enjoyment of life, we have spent all our days in fighting."[9]

Caesar's sins also included those he shared with his era and his class. He was a slaveholder like all other leading Romans. And like many of them, he used slaves and women for his personal pleasure. Like other Roman leaders, he treated women as negotiable marital objects. He gave his daughter Julia in marriage to Pompey as a step towards cementing their early political alliance, even though Julia was betrothed to Caepio. To appease Caepio's wrath, Pompey promised him his own daughter although she in turn was already engaged to the late Sulla's son.

When Julia died in childbirth in 54 B.C.E., leaving Pompey a widower, Caesar sought to reverse the growing estrangement between them by offering Pompey his great-niece Octavia, unmindful that she already had a husband whom she would have to abandon. Caesar further asked leave to marry Pompey's daughter who was betrothed to Faustus Sulla. That Pompey declined both these proposals was likewise due to considerations more political than personal.[10]

Caesar was notorious for his sexual exploits involving, among others, the wives of numerous aristocrats and several queens, including Cleopatra. The poet Catullus, who despised Caesar's politics, inveighed against his escapades in the boudoir: "And shall that wretch with haughty gait / Exulting in his lofty state / Around our marriage couches move...?" Caesar and his friend Mamurra, who was his chief of engineers in Gaul, were "Peers in adultery and greed / Rival mates among the nymphets [...] the shameless sods."[11]

Upon returning from a victorious campaign, Roman commanders were usually awarded a triumphus or "triumph." This consisted of an elaborate procession followed by feasts, entertainment, and the awarding of honourary privileges to the commander. Immediately after a triumph, it was customary for soldiers to gather before their general and subject him to scurrile jests. Such thrusts were intended to take him down a peg, thereby averting the jealousy of the gods. As Martial writes, after a triumph "no shame is it to a commander to be the subject of wit."[12] So during the celebrations of 46 B.C.E., Caesar's troops assembled before him and sang a ribald verse suggesting that he bedded women from across the social spectrum: "Home we bring our bald whoremonger / Romans lock your wives away / All the bags of gold you lent him / Went his Gallic tarts to pay."[13] These and a number of other jibes Caesar endured in good spirit.

In his younger days, Caesar served briefly as King Nicomedes' catamite. At his triumph, his troops sang a ribald verse about that too; it went in part: "Caesar conquered the Gauls, and Nicomedes conquered Caesar." He received this particular recitation with something less than good humour. And when he tried to deny it, he incurred the additional penalty of laughter.[14] Caesar's early dalliance in Nicomedes' court and several other homosexual encounters later in life left him open to taunts from political enemies including Cicero and Dolabella. Wishing to advertise Caesar's reputation for both adultery and sodomy, one opponent described him as "every woman's man and every man's woman."[15]

Contrary to the impression we might have, the Romans of the Late Republic were an odd mixture of profligacy and prudery. Many seemed to have indulged in same-sex liaisons. Caesar, Catiline, Mark Antony, Gabinius, Sallust, and Augustus are only a few of the better known. Still, homosexuality was not considered an acceptable practice. A century before Caesar, Polybius reported that any soldier in the Roman army "who in full manhood committed homosexual offenses" risked being flogged to death.[16] The lex Scantinia, a law of uncertain date, penalised homosexual acts committed with persons of free birth. To sodomise a fellow citizen was to rob him of his Roman manhood. Same-sex exploitation of slaves however carried no penalty. Since a male slave was not thought to possess a manhood, he could not be deprived of it.

A common form of political invective was to charge an opponent with effeminacy. Playing the passive role in a homosexual liaison, with either anal or oral submission, was considered the worst of perversions.[17] Cicero fixed upon this mode of attack in his vendetta against Catiline in 63. He spoke of "Catiline's praetorian guard of pansies," and charged that Catiline regularly seduced young men "in the most repulsive fashion; and he disgustingly allowed others to make love to himself." Cicero even saw homosexuality as a training ground for crime, exclaiming before the Senate, "[Catiline's] insidious seductions, that trapped one young man after another, have left them well equipped for a career of dreadful crime, or thoroughly stimulated to pursue a life of unrestrained sensuality." "These soft and pretty boys are experts at making love and having love made to them, and they know how to dance and sing; but they also learnt to wave daggers about and sprinkle poisons."[18]

The animus between the optimates and their prime adversary, Julius Caesar, could breathe a crude homophobia into their deliberations. As Suetonius tells it, a victorious Caesar once twitted a packed Senate House by announcing that he would triumphantly mount the heads of his opponents, an expression that carried double meaning, the latter implying fellatio. When someone called out that such a feat would not be easy for a woman, Caesar attempted to parry the affront by observing that Semiramis had reigned as queen in Syria and the Amazons once held sway over much of Asia.[19]

Virulent homophobia retained a currency well into the imperial era, even while some emperors undisguisedly indulged in same-sex relations. Writing early in the second century C.E., no less a man of letters than Juvenal fulminates against the decadence of many upper-class males, the effeminate perfumed lads who painted their eyebrows, donned earrings and see-through dressed, flounced about with hand on hip, and married other men. These fluttering queens, he grouses, acted like no real queen such as "Semiramis bearing the quiver" or Cleopatra "on the deck of her Actian warship."[20] In Juvenal's mind, their effeminacy stood in pathetic contrast to the upright Roman warriors of an earlier epoch, the purveyors of an untainted virtus, whose feats of manly courage and sacrifice gave Rome its supposed grandeur.

Fuller's summation is doubtless the shared opinion among many historians who reside in Cicero's camp: Caesar "was a supreme opportunist. [...] Possessed of a magnetic personality and boundless egotism he lacked both fear and scruple [...], a man who would allow nothing to stand in his way."[21] In fact, Caesar's purpose seems to have been not to destroy republican liberty but to mobilise sufficient popular power to break the stranglehold of the senatorial aristocracy, reducing it to an advisory and administrative body.[22] He himself claimed his intent to be the people's champion rather than their master. To be sure, facile democratic professions have dripped from the lips of many an artful autocrat. Still, his words ought to be given some consideration, for they were often backed by actions.

In 49, after crossing the Rubicon, he proclaimed: "I merely want to protect myself against the slanders of my enemies, to restore to their rightful position the tribunes of the people who have been expelled because of their involvement in my cause and to reclaim for myself and for the Roman people independence from the domination of a small clique." Arriving in Rome some weeks later, he summoned together those senators who had not departed with Pompey, and said: "I was insulted and outraged by the interference with the rights of the tribunes. [...] My aim is to outdo others in justice and equity, as I have previously striven to outdo them in achievement."[23]

Some of the democrats sought a far-reaching social revolution with a cancellation of all debts and a division of wealth among poor Roman citizens (excluding slaves and foreigners). Caesar found their support useful, but he took care not to tread too hard upon moneylenders and big landowners.[24] Still, as we shall see in the next chapter, his policies were redistributive enough to cause consternation among the upper class. He "went far beyond his predecessors in providing for the masses," writes Yavetz, and this was "precisely what antagonised the senatorial aristocracy."[25] It was not Caesar's personal ambition that incurred the ire of the optimates. In their world, ambition was of common currency and perfectly acceptable. They loathed his egalitarian sympathies, his long-standing concern for the interests of the people.

To be sure, the conflict between nobiles and proletarii was not so neatly placed. There were some senators, not part of the optimate inner circle, who supported Caesar, and there were plebs, freedmen, and foreigners who, because of clientele enlistments and payoffs, ran with their aristocratic patrons. Still, if not perfectly then roughly, class lines were drawn in the fight between Caesar and the Senate oligarchs.

To this day, defenders of class privilege resort to ad hominem attacks, maligning any leader who pursues policies on behalf of the common people as a self-promoting demagogue, a panderer intent upon usurping power. To be sure, no popular leader can afford to be indifferent to considerations of popular power. Mass support is needed as a countervailing leverage to challenge entrenched ruling-class interests. In other words, the pursuit of power and the pursuit of egalitarian reform are not mutually exclusive but mutually imperative.

While leaders doubtless derive personal gratification from their acquired renown, it would be a mistake to think they are motivated only by the pursuit of popularity and power, especially those who align themselves with the powerless and the downtrodden. As we have seen, in the Late Republic siding with the masses was a perilous undertaking, not a promising career choice for ambitious leaders. Few populares enjoyed being snubbed and branded as seditious agitators by their peers. None enjoyed being threatened with bodily harm. None anticipated that by courting the support of unorganised masses they would win a smooth ride to the pinnacle of power. Those like the Gracchi, Clodius, Caesar, and others who ventured forth as champions of egalitarian causes paid the supreme price for doing so, and were propelled by something more than—or in addition to And what of the demagoguery of the optimates? Seldom do scholars of the Late Republic raise any question about self-interested duplicity and aggrandisement in regard to those privileged and powerful elites who advanced their interests by any means necessary. Too many historians seem to share Cicero's glowingly lyrical depiction of his elitist colleagues as men who ruled for everyone's benefit, presiding over the helm of state "with all their skill and devotion."[26] Little is said about the misleading demagogic appeals made by Cicero and his cohorts, pretending to be protectors of the people while in fact operating as their expropriators. The optimates come down to us through the filter of gentlemen's history as men of the highest principles. Actually, they stuck only to those principles that fit their notion of the good life as they experienced it. They opposed land reform, rent control, and debt cancellation. More for the many meant less for the few. They opposed the secret ballot and all forms of popular input. Yet they were demagogic enough when running for public office to represent themselves as friends of the people.

A leading protagonist of the optimate faction was Marcus Porcius Cato (the younger), hailed throughout the ages as an unblemished keeper of republican rectitude. Plutarch lauds him for being devoted to the "rigid justice that will not bend a clemency or favour." Dio says that Cato was the only one of his generation who "partook of politics from pure motives without any individual desire of gain." Valerius refers to his "brave and unblemished life, [...] his virtue complete on all counts." Velleius says that Cato "in every particular of his conduct, seemed more like the gods than mankind." And Sallust described Cato as propelled only by righteous honesty.[27]

Modern historians are almost as effusive, extolling Cato as "the formidable high-principled conservative," "the redoubtable leader of the oligarchy," and of "high birth and character."[28] Even Theodor Mommsen, who once slipped and called Cato "a dogmatic fool," cannot on other occasions find enough good works for him: "Honourable and steadfast," "earnest in purpose and in action," "full of attachment to his country and its hereditary constitution."[29]

Little attention has been accorded Cato's imperfections. Thus while he pronounced mightily against corruption and swore to prosecute bribery, he indulged in it himself, contributing to a slush fund on behalf of the conservative Bibulus (his son-in-law) when he stood for consulship in 60, in what amounted to a spree of vote buying that elicited indignant comment even in that jaded era. The optimates were intent upon stopping Caesar, who was also spreading largesse among the voters. But when Cato indulged in vote buying it was no longer a matter of corruption but of high moral necessity, for "bribery under such circumstances was for the good of the commonwealth."[30]

In 51, Cicero was appointed governor of Cilicia (southeastern Turkey). He performed his duties competently and honestly, pocketing only the money that was regularly allotted to him, rather than plundering the province for all it was worth, as was frequently the practice. He also successfully engaged in military actions against brigands in the province. Upon his return in 50, he was awarded for his service with a public thanksgiving by the Senate. Cato voted against the thanksgiving. When asked by Cicero why he had done so, Cato explained not too clearly that, in effect, Cicero's provincial administration had been worthy of praise but not of a public thanksgiving, unless the thanksgiving be credited to the gods rather than to him. Immediately afterwards, however, Cato voted for a thanksgiving for his son-in-law Bibulus, whose accomplishments were certainly no more notable than Cicero's. It seems the rigorously upright Cato could bend his standards for favoured family members.[31]

Cato once urged that every candidate for tribune be required to deposit a huge sum of money in order to stand for office, a move that would have undermined the democratic mandate of the tribunate by turning it into a rich man's preserve.[32] In 52 B.C.E., he and Bibulus recommended that the Senate appoint Pompey to rule as sole consul, in default of elections and in violation of all constitutional practice.[33] Again in 49, even as other members of the hierarchy remained uneasy about the move, Cato urged the Senate to put the entire state command in Pompey's hands in order to suppress the people's movement mobilising around Caesar.[34] A few years later, with the clouds of civil war gathering, one senator suggested that freedom should be granted to slaves in order that they might be used for military duty, a proposal that won support among the senators. But fixed in his property-loving principles, Cato argued that it was neither lawful nor right to deprive masters of their possessions.[35]

On at least two occasions, he defended political murder. As described in Chapter Five, with a "vehemence of speech" (Plutarch's words) Cato swayed the Senate to uphold, on the basis of dubious testimony, the unlawful execution without trial of Lentulus and other political prisoners implicated in the "Catiline conspiracy" of 63. Eleven years later, when the optimates' gang leader Milo murdered the people's tribune Clodius, Cato again cast aside legal principles, urging that the murderer not only be freed but rewarded for services rendered to the state. Cato appeared in court for Milo and most probably voted for his acquittal.[36]

In a word, when popular leaders pursued policies on behalf of the people, Cato treated the obstacle-ridden procedures of the unwritten constitution as chiselled in stone. But when the optimates needed to bend or even suspend rules and basic rights—as their class interests might dictate According to one of his modern-day admirers, Cato "never confused the personal and the political realms, and remained without animus [...] towards the person of Julius Caesar."[37] In fact, he hated Caesar, seeing him as representing everything he loathed: self-aggrandisement, contempt for the Republic, and betrayal of the class.[38] As we have seen, during a senatorial debate in 63, Cato delivered a snarling personal attack upon Caesar, addressing him without warrant as "you drunkard." Although he voiced disapproval of alcohol overindulgence in others, Cato himself was known to tarry frequently in his cups until deeply inebriated.[39] Cato was capable of infinite flexibility, treating the constitution as not only elastic but expendable. The law could be suspended to save the law, even if it meant setting free a murderer like Milo. As Cato saw it, Milo was not a murderer at all but a defender of the Republic. For Cato, anything done to safeguard the fixed concerns of his entitled coterie was ipso facto constitutional, for the interests of the aristocracy were seen by him as confluent with the wellbeing of the entire polity.

Dio claims that Cato "was a lover of the people as no other" but his love did not extend to seeing them decently situated. Ergo, he led the attack against Caesar's land reform.[40] Yet even the uncompromisingly conservative Cato could compromise when popular forces marshalled enough strength to force an issue. Thus in 63, as proletarian restiveness seemed to be assuming menacing proportions, he became duly alarmed and persuaded the Senate to placate the urban multitude by including them in the grain distribution. Plutarch calls this an "act of humanity and kindness," though it appears more an act of grudging expediency designed to "successfully dissipate the threatening danger," as Plutarch himself writes.[41]

Cato was said to have been of impeccable character in his personal affairs. But even here one might raise an eyebrow. Aristocratic women were traded like so many game pieces in marriages intended to advance family fortunes or political alliances. Cato was no exception to the practice. First, he gave up his own wife, Marcia, to his very rich elderly friend Hortensius to marry. Hortensius was seeking a community of children with Cato, so he said, and Marcia was still young enough to bear offspring. Indeed, she was said to be pregnant with Cato's child when she was passed off to Hortensius. Some years later, when Hortensius died leaving Marcia an immensely wealthy widow, Cato rekindled his interest and remarried her. All this was enough for Caesar to accuse him of trafficking in marriage: "For why should Cato give up his wife if he wanted her, or why, if he did not want her, should he take her back again? Unless it was true that the woman was first set as a bait for Hortensius, and lent by Cato when she was young that he might take her back when she was rich."[42]

Cato was devoted to the public, but "the public that counted was Cato's own class, the hereditary nobility," Lilly Ross Taylor reminds us. "Cato's cure for the ills of his day was apparently much like Cicero's in the Republic and the Laws, a return to pre-Gracchian days."[43] Today, the Cato Institute, a conservative think tank, is named after the illustrious reactionary because he resisted Caesar's rule and supposedly championed liberty. Needless to say, the narrow class nature of htat liberty remains unacknowledged by Cato's admirers.

So too is Marcus Brutus hailed as acting only from the upright motives. Brutus could not hide his distaste for Caesar's reforms, showing little sympathy for destitute petitioners and much concern for the brimming purses of the rich, especially his own. He was a leading conspirator in the assassination of a great popular leader, who had pardoned him and treated him well.

Shakespeare dubs Brutus "the noblest Roman of them all," and has him saying "I can raise no money by vile means / By heaven I had rather coin my heart / And drop my blood for drachmas, than to wring / From the hands of peasants their vile trash."[44] The reality is something else. Brutus was a usurer of the worst sort and a spoliator to boot. Having lent money at 48 percent interest (instead of the usual 12 percent, which was usurious enough), the noble Brutus then demanded that the Roman military help his agents collect the debt from the hapless Cypriot town of Salamis, in 50 B.C.E. At Brutus' insistence, the town council was besieged until five of the elders starved to death. Even Cicero was horrified by the terms of a loan that brought ruination to the Cypriot community. He was also put off by Brutus' arrogant and uncivil tone when dealing with the matter.[45]

Brutus once wrote to the people of Pergamum that if they gave money to Dolabella willingly, they must confess that they had wronged Brutus. But if they gave unwillingly, they can prove it by giving willingly to Brutus. On another occasion he wrote threatening to the Samians because their contributions were "nonexistent."[46] Still, most classical historians have not an unkind word for Brutus, preferring to treat this money-grubbing assassin as a principled and unblemished defender of the Republic.

So there remains a double standard. Leaders who take up the popular standard are faulted as the power-hungry authors of their own unhappy fates, while their assassins are depicted as the disinterested stalwarts of republican virtue. As best we can tell, the Roman people themselves did not see it that way.