Soviet famine of 1931–1933

The Soviet famine of 1931–1933 was a humanitarian crisis suffered by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) which caused the deaths by hunger of about 5.7 million people distributed around the Soviet republics.^[1] The famine had been caused by both human and natural factors. The natural factors included drought, flood and pests which occurred in several grain-producing regions of the USSR, ultimately a result of the industrialization efforts which affected the climate of the regions. The human factor included the kulak^[a] sabotage against collectivization efforts, which manifested in the form of killing millions of cattle and horses and burning crops.^[2]

Background

During the years of the New Economic Policy, while the USSR was achieving outstanding economic success,^[3] it was also facing contradictions between the party policies and the peasants, especially the wealthy rural bourgeoisie, the kulaks.^[4]

Reference

↑
R.W. Davies & Stephen G. Wheatcroft (2004). The years of hunger: Soviet agriculture 1931–1933 (p. 415). ISBN 9780333311073 [LG]
↑ “Their [kulak] opposition took the initial form of slaughtering their cattle and horses in preference to having them collectivized. The result was a grievous blow to Soviet agriculture, for most of the cattle and horses were owned by the kulaks. Between 1928 and 1933 the number of horses in the USSR declined from almost 30,000,000 to less than 15,000,000; of horned cattle from 70,000,000 (including 31,000,000 cows) to 38,000,000 (including 20,000,000 cows); of sheep and goats from 147,000,000 to 50,000,000; and of hogs from 20,000,000 to 12,000,000. Soviet rural economy had not recovered from this staggering loss by 1941.
[...]
Some [kulaks] murdered officials, set the torch to the property of the collectives, and even burned their own crops and seed grain. More refused to sow or reap, perhaps on the assumption that the authorities would make concessions and would in any case feed them.

The aftermath was the Ukraine "famine" of 1932-33 ... Lurid accounts, mostly fictional, appeared in the Nazi press in Germany and in the Hearst press in the United States, often illustrated with photographs that turned out to have been taken along the Volga in 1921. ... The "famine" was not, in its later stages, a result of a food shortage, despite the sharp reduction of seed grain and harvests flowing from special requisitions in the spring of 1932 which were apparently occasioned by fear of war with Japan. Most of the victims were kulaks who had refused to sow their fields or had destroyed their crops.”

Frederick L. Schuman (1957). Russia since 1917: four decades of Soviet politics (pp. 151-152). New York.
as cited by Douglas Tottle (1987). Fraud, famine and fascism (p. 94). Progress Books. ISBN 9780919396517 [LG]
↑ “Between 1922 and 1926, the New Economic Policy, by and large, was a brilliant success. Industrial and agricultural production regained their pre-war level more rapidly than anyone had anticipated. The production of the peasant economy in 1926 was equal to that of the whole of agriculture, including the landowners' estates, before the revolution. Grain production reached approximately the pre-war level, 9 and the production of potatoes apparently exceeded that level by as much as 45 per cent. The number of livestock, which fell drastically during the world war and the Civil War, almost regained the 1914 level by 1926, and in 1928 exceeded it by 7-10 per cent in the case of cattle and pigs, and by a considerably higher percentage in the case of sheep.”

R. W. Davies (1980). The socialist offensive: the collectivisation of Soviet agriculture, 1929–1930: 'The peasant economy and the soviet system'. The industrialisation of Soviet Russia, vol.1 (p. 4). ISBN 978-0-333-26171-2 [LG]
↑ “During the years 1923–1929 an important role was played by the contradiction which opposed—more or less sharply at different times—the peasantry to the Soviet government. In 1929 this contradiction became a decisive one, owing to the way with which it was dealt. It became interwoven with other contradictions, principally that which made the peasantry a contradictory unity, divided into kulaki (rich peasants), bednyaki (poor peasants), and serednyaki (middle peasants).”

Charles Bettelheim (1978). Class struggles in the USSR, second period: 1923–1930. New York: Monthly Review Press. ISBN 085345437X [LG]

Notes

↑ The kulaks were the rural bourgeoisie that grew from the petty-bourgeois production under the Soviet NEP

[1] 
R.W. Davies & Stephen G. Wheatcroft (2004). The years of hunger: Soviet agriculture 1931–1933 (p. 415). ISBN 9780333311073 [LG]

[3] “Their [kulak] opposition took the initial form of slaughtering their cattle and horses in preference to having them collectivized. The result was a grievous blow to Soviet agriculture, for most of the cattle and horses were owned by the kulaks. Between 1928 and 1933 the number of horses in the USSR declined from almost 30,000,000 to less than 15,000,000; of horned cattle from 70,000,000 (including 31,000,000 cows) to 38,000,000 (including 20,000,000 cows); of sheep and goats from 147,000,000 to 50,000,000; and of hogs from 20,000,000 to 12,000,000. Soviet rural economy had not recovered from this staggering loss by 1941.
[...]
Some [kulaks] murdered officials, set the torch to the property of the collectives, and even burned their own crops and seed grain. More refused to sow or reap, perhaps on the assumption that the authorities would make concessions and would in any case feed them.

The aftermath was the Ukraine "famine" of 1932-33 ... Lurid accounts, mostly fictional, appeared in the Nazi press in Germany and in the Hearst press in the United States, often illustrated with photographs that turned out to have been taken along the Volga in 1921. ... The "famine" was not, in its later stages, a result of a food shortage, despite the sharp reduction of seed grain and harvests flowing from special requisitions in the spring of 1932 which were apparently occasioned by fear of war with Japan. Most of the victims were kulaks who had refused to sow their fields or had destroyed their crops.”

Frederick L. Schuman (1957). Russia since 1917: four decades of Soviet politics (pp. 151-152). New York.
as cited by Douglas Tottle (1987). Fraud, famine and fascism (p. 94). Progress Books. ISBN 9780919396517 [LG]

[4] “Between 1922 and 1926, the New Economic Policy, by and large, was a brilliant success. Industrial and agricultural production regained their pre-war level more rapidly than anyone had anticipated. The production of the peasant economy in 1926 was equal to that of the whole of agriculture, including the landowners' estates, before the revolution. Grain production reached approximately the pre-war level, 9 and the production of potatoes apparently exceeded that level by as much as 45 per cent. The number of livestock, which fell drastically during the world war and the Civil War, almost regained the 1914 level by 1926, and in 1928 exceeded it by 7-10 per cent in the case of cattle and pigs, and by a considerably higher percentage in the case of sheep.”

R. W. Davies (1980). The socialist offensive: the collectivisation of Soviet agriculture, 1929–1930: 'The peasant economy and the soviet system'. The industrialisation of Soviet Russia, vol.1 (p. 4). ISBN 978-0-333-26171-2 [LG]

[5] “During the years 1923–1929 an important role was played by the contradiction which opposed—more or less sharply at different times—the peasantry to the Soviet government. In 1929 this contradiction became a decisive one, owing to the way with which it was dealt. It became interwoven with other contradictions, principally that which made the peasantry a contradictory unity, divided into kulaki (rich peasants), bednyaki (poor peasants), and serednyaki (middle peasants).”

Charles Bettelheim (1978). Class struggles in the USSR, second period: 1923–1930. New York: Monthly Review Press. ISBN 085345437X [LG]

[2] The kulaks were the rural bourgeoisie that grew from the petty-bourgeois production under the Soviet NEP

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