Dualism

Dualism is a philosophical worldview that posits a fundamental division between two irreducible and independent substances or realms. The most common form is Mind-Body Dualism, which asserts a strict separation between consciousness (mind, soul, spirit) and matter (the physical body, the material world).

Dialectical Materialism, the philosophical basis of Marxism-Leninism, fundamentally rejects dualism as an unscientific doctrine that misrepresents the nature of reality and consciousness. All of dualism comes under metaphysics, for Marxists, consciousness is not a separate substance but a material process, the activity of the brain, which is itself a product of natural and social evolution. Consciousness arises from and remains dependent upon material conditions; it does not exist in a separate realm.

Historical Context and Key Proponents[edit | edit source]

Plato in his theory of Forms posited an immaterial and transcendental, perfect realm of ideals (the world of Being) versus the imperfect and material world (the world of Sensation), wherein the soul in it it's supposed immortality belonged to the first realm. ^[1] Essentially Plato asserts that matter and physical forms are lower expressions of the true Being or soul, and the physical realm itself (the world of Sensation) is merely a lesser realm where the soul is imprisoned and thus seeks to escape it. ^[1]

René Descartes is perhaps the most influential modern dualist. Through Cartesian Dualism he argued for two distinct substances: Res Cogitans (thinking substance - the mind) and Res Extensa (extended substance - the body). This created the infamous "mind-body problem."

Descartes expressed the difficulty as follows. If the existence of things is determined through their extension and if the spatial, geometric forms of things are the sole objective forms of their existence outside the subject, then thinking is not disclosed simply through its description in forms of space. The spatial characteristic of thinking in general has no relation to its specific nature. The nature of thinking is disclosed through concepts that have nothing in common with the expression of any kind of spatial, geometric image. He also expressed this view in the following way: thought and extension are really two different substances, and a substance is that which exists and is defined only through itself and not through something else. There is nothing common between thought and extension that could be expressed in a special definition. In other words, in a series of definitions of thought there is not a single attribute that could be part of the definition of extension, and vice versa. But if there is no such common attribute it is also impossible to deduce being rationally from thought, and vice versa, because deduction requires a ‘mean term’, i.e. a term such as might be included in the series of definitions of the idea and of the existence of things outside consciousness, outside thought. Thought and being cannot in general come into contact with one another, since their boundary (the line or even the point of contact) would then also be exactly that which simultaneously both divides them and unites them.
In view of the absence of such a boundary, thought cannot limit the extended thing, nor the thing the mental expression. They are free, as it were, to penetrate and permeate each other, nowhere encountering a boundary. Thought as such cannot interact with the extended thing, nor the thing with thought; each revolves within itself.
Immediately a problem arises: how then are thought and bodily functions united in the human individual? That they are linked is an obvious fact. Man can consciously control his spatially determined body among other such bodies, his mental impulses are transformed into spatial movements, and the movements of bodies, causing alterations in the human organism (sensations) are transformed into mental images. That means that thought and the extended body interact in some way after all. But how? What is the nature of the interaction? How do they determine, i.e. delimit, each other?^[2]

Most religions are fundamentally dualist, positing a separation between a mortal, material body and an immortal, immaterial soul, which is subject to a divine, transcendental realm.

The fundamental flaws of dualism[edit | edit source]

It is fundamentally ahistorical and anti-dialectical. Dualism presents consciousness as a static, eternal entity separate from the material world. Dialectical materialism, in contrast, understands consciousness as a product of the material world, specifically, a product of the highly organized matter of the brain, which itself evolved through a long, historical, material process. Consciousness develops in tandem with and in response to material reality.

The unsolvable "Mind-Body Problem" also arises. If mind and matter are truly separate substances, how do they interact? How does a non-physical thought cause a physical action (like moving your arm)? Dualism cannot provide a material, scientific answer, often resorting to mystical, divine or unscientific explanations (e.g., Descartes' pineal gland theory).

The mystification of reality is another fundamental problem. By positing consciousness as transcendental, dualism obscures how ideology emerges from and serves class interests. It treats ideas as if they descend from an immaterial realm rather than understanding them as reflections of material social relations.

Dialectical materialism: The monist alternative[edit | edit source]

Dialectical materialism resolves the dualist problem through a monist framework that understands consciousness and matter as unified within a single material reality:

- Consciousness is not separate from matter but is a property of highly organized matter (the human brain)

- Consciousness is shaped by material conditions (social relations, mode of production) but also acts back upon those conditions as a material force

- There is no transcendent realm; all phenomena, including thought, exist within and are governed by the laws of material reality

Matter is primary. Sensation, thought, consciousness are the supreme product of matter organised in a particular way.^[3]

Common misunderstandings[edit | edit source]

Rejecting dualism does not mean denying distinctions between mental and physical processes. Marxists recognize that thinking and being are not identical, one is a reflection of the other. The key point is that this distinction exists within material reality, not between two separate realms.

Additionally, rejecting the primacy of consciousness does not eliminate human agency. Rather, it locates agency within the dialectical relationship between material conditions and conscious activity, avoiding both idealist voluntarism and mechanical determinism.

References[edit | edit source]

↑ ^1.0 ^1.1 Robinson, Howard (2003-08-19). ""Dualism"" The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2023 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.).
↑ “Descartes expressed the difficulty as follows. If the existence of things is determined through their extension and if the spatial, geometric forms of things are the sole objective forms of their existence outside the subject, then thinking is not disclosed simply through its description in forms of space. The spatial characteristic of thinking in general has no relation to its specific nature. The nature of thinking is disclosed through concepts that have nothing in common with the expression of any kind of spatial, geometric image. He also expressed this view in the following way: thought and extension are really two different substances, and a substance is that which exists and is defined only through itself and not through something else. There is nothing common between thought and extension that could be expressed in a special definition. In other words, in a series of definitions of thought there is not a single attribute that could be part of the definition of extension, and vice versa. But if there is no such common attribute it is also impossible to deduce being rationally from thought, and vice versa, because deduction requires a ‘mean term’, i.e. a term such as might be included in the series of definitions of the idea and of the existence of things outside consciousness, outside thought. Thought and being cannot in general come into contact with one another, since their boundary (the line or even the point of contact) would then also be exactly that which simultaneously both divides them and unites them.

In view of the absence of such a boundary, thought cannot limit the extended thing, nor the thing the mental expression. They are free, as it were, to penetrate and permeate each other, nowhere encountering a boundary. Thought as such cannot interact with the extended thing, nor the thing with thought; each revolves within itself.

Immediately a problem arises: how then are thought and bodily functions united in the human individual? That they are linked is an obvious fact. Man can consciously control his spatially determined body among other such bodies, his mental impulses are transformed into spatial movements, and the movements of bodies, causing alterations in the human organism (sensations) are transformed into mental images. That means that thought and the extended body interact in some way after all. But how? What is the nature of the interaction? How do they determine, i.e. delimit, each other?”

Evald Ilyenkov (1974). DIALECTICAL LOGIC
Part One - From the History of Dialectics 1: Descartes & Leibniz – The Problem of the Subject Matter and Sources of Logic Marxists.org.
↑ “Matter is primary. Sensation, thought, consciousness are the supreme product of matter organised in a particular way.”

V.I. Lenin. Materialism and Empirio-criticism
Critical Comments on a Reactionary Philosophy 1. The Theory of Knowledge of Empirio-Criticism and of Dialectical Materialism - I 1.2 “The Discovery of the World-Elements” Marxists.org.

[:0-1] 1.0 ^1.1 Robinson, Howard (2003-08-19). ""Dualism"" The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2023 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.).

[2] “Descartes expressed the difficulty as follows. If the existence of things is determined through their extension and if the spatial, geometric forms of things are the sole objective forms of their existence outside the subject, then thinking is not disclosed simply through its description in forms of space. The spatial characteristic of thinking in general has no relation to its specific nature. The nature of thinking is disclosed through concepts that have nothing in common with the expression of any kind of spatial, geometric image. He also expressed this view in the following way: thought and extension are really two different substances, and a substance is that which exists and is defined only through itself and not through something else. There is nothing common between thought and extension that could be expressed in a special definition. In other words, in a series of definitions of thought there is not a single attribute that could be part of the definition of extension, and vice versa. But if there is no such common attribute it is also impossible to deduce being rationally from thought, and vice versa, because deduction requires a ‘mean term’, i.e. a term such as might be included in the series of definitions of the idea and of the existence of things outside consciousness, outside thought. Thought and being cannot in general come into contact with one another, since their boundary (the line or even the point of contact) would then also be exactly that which simultaneously both divides them and unites them.

In view of the absence of such a boundary, thought cannot limit the extended thing, nor the thing the mental expression. They are free, as it were, to penetrate and permeate each other, nowhere encountering a boundary. Thought as such cannot interact with the extended thing, nor the thing with thought; each revolves within itself.

Immediately a problem arises: how then are thought and bodily functions united in the human individual? That they are linked is an obvious fact. Man can consciously control his spatially determined body among other such bodies, his mental impulses are transformed into spatial movements, and the movements of bodies, causing alterations in the human organism (sensations) are transformed into mental images. That means that thought and the extended body interact in some way after all. But how? What is the nature of the interaction? How do they determine, i.e. delimit, each other?”

Evald Ilyenkov (1974). DIALECTICAL LOGIC
Part One - From the History of Dialectics 1: Descartes & Leibniz – The Problem of the Subject Matter and Sources of Logic Marxists.org.

[3] “Matter is primary. Sensation, thought, consciousness are the supreme product of matter organised in a particular way.”

V.I. Lenin. Materialism and Empirio-criticism
Critical Comments on a Reactionary Philosophy 1. The Theory of Knowledge of Empirio-Criticism and of Dialectical Materialism - I 1.2 “The Discovery of the World-Elements” Marxists.org.

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