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Mechanical materialism (also called vulgar materialism or crude materialism) is a form of materialism that reduces all phenomena to simple mechanical causes, denying the existence of qualitative differences, development, and dialectical relationships between things. It represents an underdeveloped, non-dialectical form of materialist philosophy.
Characteristics of mechanical materialism[edit | edit source]
Mechanical materialism emerged from 17th-18th century physics and the success of Newtonian mechanics. It applies mechanical principles universally, treating all processes, including biological, social, and mental phenomena, as if they operate like machines with simple cause-and-effect relationships. Key features of mechanical materialism include:
- Reductionism: All complex phenomena are reduced to simpler mechanical processes. Consciousness is "nothing but" brain chemistry; society is "nothing but" the sum of individuals; humans are "nothing but" machines.
- Denial of qualitative change: Mechanical materialism recognizes only quantitative changes and denies that quantitative accumulation can produce qualitative leaps (a key dialectical principle).
- Metaphysical thinking: It treats things as fixed, isolated, and unchanging rather than as processes in constant development and interconnection.
- Passive reflection theory: Mechanical materialism views consciousness as merely a passive reflection of external reality, like a mirror, denying the active role of practice and human transformation of nature.
- Mechanical causation: Every effect has a simple, direct mechanical cause. This denies the role of internal contradictions, feedback loops, and emergent properties.
Historical examples[edit | edit source]
18th century French materialism: Philosophers like Julien Offray de La Mettrie ("Man a Machine," 1747) and Baron d'Holbach developed mechanical materialist systems that explained all phenomena, including human thought and behavior, through mechanical principles alone.[1][2]
19th century vulgar materialism: Figures like Ludwig Buchner, Karl Vogt, and Jacob Moleschott popularized crude materialist views such as "the brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile", a purely mechanical, reductionist view of consciousness.[3][4]
Economism and mechanical historical materialism: Some interpretations of Marxism fell into mechanical materialism by treating the economic base as mechanically determining the superstructure in a one-directional, non-dialectical way, denying the relative autonomy and reciprocal influence of ideology, politics, and culture on economic relations.
Distinction from Dialectical Materialism[edit | edit source]
Marx and Engels developed dialectical materialism specifically to overcome the limitations of mechanical materialism while maintaining a materialist foundation.
Dialectical materialism differs from mechanical materialism in that it[5]:
- Recognizes qualitative leaps: Quantitative changes accumulate and produce qualitative transformations (water becomes ice; feudalism becomes capitalism; the proletariat becomes a revolutionary class).
- Acknowledges internal contradictions: Things develop through internal contradictions, not just external mechanical causes. Class struggle, for instance, is internal to capitalist society.
- Emphasizes interconnection and totality: Phenomena exist in complex relationships and must be understood as parts of larger totalities, not as isolated mechanisms.
- Recognizes the active role of consciousness: While consciousness arises from material conditions, it can react back upon and transform those conditions through practice and struggle.
- Applies historical specificity: Different levels of organization (physical, biological, social) have their own specific laws that cannot be mechanically reduced to lower levels.
Critique from a dialectical materialist lens[edit | edit source]
Engels' critique[edit | edit source]
Engels criticized mechanical materialism for failing to account for development, emergence, and dialectical change. He argued that while 18th century mechanical materialism was progressive in its time, overthrowing religious idealism, it became reactionary when it denied the dialectical nature of reality discovered by 19th century science (thermodynamics, evolution, chemistry).[6]
Lenin's critique[edit | edit source]
Lenin defended materialism against idealist attacks but also distinguished dialectical materialism from crude, mechanical forms. He emphasized that matter is not inert and static but is in constant motion and development, and that human practice (not passive observation) is the criterion of truth. [7]
Political relevance of opposition to mechanical materialism[edit | edit source]
Mechanical materialism is inadequate for revolutionary practice because:
- It cannot account for the emergence of revolutionary consciousness from material conditions
- It denies the active role of organized struggle in transforming society
- It leads to fatalism (the belief that socialism will come automatically from economic development) or economism (reducing all political questions to economic ones)
- It cannot grasp the dialectical relationship between base and superstructure, or between objective conditions and subjective factors
Historical materialism is dialectical precisely because it recognizes that while material conditions are primary and set the parameters for historical development, conscious human agency, class struggle, and organized political action are necessary to realize revolutionary transformation. The revolution is neither automatic (mechanical determinism) nor purely willed into being (voluntarism), but emerges from the dialectical interaction of objective conditions and subjective intervention.
References[edit | edit source]
- ↑ Karl Marx and Fredrick engels (Fall 1845 to mid-1846). [https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch03m.htm "The German Ideology Chapter Three: Saint Max 6. Religion and Philosophy of the Union C. Morality, Intercourse, Theory of Exploitation"] Marxists.org.
- ↑ Julien Offray de La Mettrie (1748). "Man a Machine" Marxists.org.
- ↑ Karl Marx (1845). "Theses On Feuerbach" Marxists.org.
- ↑ “The identity theory as I understand it here goes back to U.T. Place and Herbert Feigl in the 1950s. Historically philosophers and scientists, for example Leucippus, Hobbes, La Mettrie, and d'Holbach, as well as Karl Vogt who, following Pierre-Jean-Georges Cabanis, made the preposterous remark (perhaps not meant to be taken too seriously) that the brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile, have embraced materialism. However, here I shall date interest in the identity theory from the pioneering papers ‘Is Consciousness a Brain Process?’ by U.T. Place (Place 1956) and H. Feigl ‘The "Mental" and the "Physical"’ (Feigl 1958). Nevertheless mention should be made of suggestions by Rudolf Carnap (1932, p. 127), H. Reichenbach (1938) and M. Schlick (1935). Reichenbach said that mental events can be identified by the corresponding stimuli and responses much as the (possibly unknown) internal state of a photo-electric cell can be identified by the stimulus (light falling on it) and response (electric current flowing) from it. In both cases the internal states can be physical states. However Carnap did regard the identity as a linguistic recommendation rather than as asserting a question of fact. See his ‘Herbert Feigl on Physicalism’ in Schilpp (1963), especially p. 886. The psychologist E.G. Boring (1933) may well have been the first to use the term ‘identity theory’. See Place (1990).”
Smart, J. J. C. (2000-01-12). "The Mind/Brain Identity Theory" The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.). - ↑ Joseph V. Stalin (1938-09). "Dialectical and historical materialism" Marxists.org.
- ↑ Frederick Engels (1886). [https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1886/ludwig-feuerbach/ch03.htm "Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy Feuerbach"] Marxists.org.
- ↑ V.I. Lenin (1915). "On the Question of Dialectics" Marxists.org.