Editing Comrade:Wisconcom/Study notes

After the death (more particularly, assassination at the hands of the Khrushchevite-clique) of Stalin, the most powerful members of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics were soon left in a state of disorganisation, division, and impotence, likely showing the aptitude towards leadership and party leadership Stalin, and what was lost in his absence.  

=====Core idea of Chapter ll - ''"Khrushchev's Strategy & Tactics within the Soviet Union"''=====

The character and motivations of Khrushchev (and other Revisionists in the Soviet Union) was, fundamentally, highly careerist and opportunist. While during the time when Stalin was still alive, Khrushchev would attempt to obscure his Anti-marxist stance by using, for example, flattery, in order to turn away anyone who would suspect his counter-revolutionary ideas.

However, such militant attempts by Khruschev to divert suspicion away from him were no longer needed, not to such a large degree anyways, once Stalin dead and his government putsched. At that point in time, Khruschev would instead attempt to use the popularity of the past government under Stalin, which was vast among the people, in order to maintain his power, and create later opportunities to attain more. While such underhanded deeds were happening, Khruschev would focus, in a covert manner, at purging less powerful or known sections of the government, such as the NKVD and its head, Beria.

To that extent, Khruschev would slowing concoct lies and slander about non-Revisionist government functionaries, slowing removing any potential resistance, until the time would be permiting for a final wave a propaganda against Stalin himself, and thus the final attack and liquidation of Socialism and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat in the Soviet Union, and by extention in other Eastern European states, with the exception of Socialist Albania, of course.

The Revisionism and Capitalist restorationism of the Khrushchev government began to be seen in matters of foreign policy. With Socialist Albania alone, the Khrushchevites were not only failing to adhere to the foundational Marxist idea of Socialist internationalism; only giving Albania economic support in exchange for excessive exports to the Soviet Union, an economic relationship similar to that seen in Capitalism, the Khrushchevites were outright demanding that Albania cease its attempt to industrialise and become self-reliant, and instead focus its economic planning and expansion solely on a small amount of agricultural goods, and solely for the intention of selling those goods to the Soviet Union at a low price in exchange for basic machine parts and armaments.

In regards to other Eastern European nations, particularly those in Comecon, a similar policy was being suggested by the Soviet Revisionist government. Khrushchev was openly supporting "collaboration" with bourgeois ideologs and Social-fascists, and furthermore, he claimed that the Eastern European nations should "do what Hitler did" in expanding military-arms production.

As expected with Revisionists, Khrushchev would reverse the informed and principled conclusion of Stalin and the Communist Party of Soviet Union to cease support with the Titoist Revisionist traitors in Yugoslavia. Furthermore, the Revisionist government in the Soviet Union would, in their ambition to excise People's Democracy and Socialism, show a large degree of interest in recreating relations with the Communist Party of Yugoslavia as well.

As this diplomatic strategy concerning Yugoslavia was put into effect, it soon resulted in the Khrushchevite regime, in their concurrent efforts to denigrate and remove the ideology and legacy of Stalin, revise the reasons for the at-the-time recent Stalin-Tito split. The Revisionist government would attempt to remove and forget about  the (very much vaild) ideological and economic reasons for the split in the first place that happened under Stalin, particularly in regards to Tito's Anti-Marxist deviations and servile behavior to the Western Imperialists, and instead revise it and portray it to the Yugoslav leadership and other Communist parties as being somehow just a crass act by those who were in the Soviet government at the time of Stalin.

However, Tito would not be fully wooed by this act on the part of the Soviet Revisionists, and would further demand action be taken by the Soviets to further remove the economic and political legacy of the Soviet Union under Stalin - something which Khrushchev was perfectly willing to accept. Later on, Khrushchev, while being unable to fully reconcile relations with Yugoslavia, would nonetheless attempt to enforce his line of acceptence towards the Titoist ideology of bourgeois-nationalism and other Revisionist ideas onto other Communist Parties in Eastern Europe, which were all seemingly powerless to refute the Soviet Social-imperialists - with the notable exception of Enver Hoxha and the Party of Labour of course, who were able to reject this Revisionist act.