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The '''CIA Tibetan program''' was a nearly two decades long [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] covert operation focused on [[Tibet]] which consisted of "political action, [[propaganda]], paramilitary and intelligence operations" based on U.S. Government arrangements made with brothers of the 14th Dalai Lama, who was not initially aware of them. The goal of the program was to promote separatism to weaken the [[Communist Party of China|communist-led]] [[People's Republic of China]], or in the CIA's own words: "to keep the political concept of an autonomous Tibet alive within Tibet and among several foreign nations".<ref name="lat">{{Web citation|date=1998-09-15|title=CIA gave aid to Tibetan Exiles in '60s, files show|url=http://articles.latimes.com/1998/sep/15/news/mn-22993|newspaper=Los Angeles Times|author=Jim Mann}}</ref> | |||
The '''CIA Tibetan program''' was a nearly two decades long [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] covert operation focused on [[Tibet]] which consisted of "political action, [[propaganda]], paramilitary and intelligence operations" based on U.S. Government arrangements made with brothers of the 14th Dalai Lama, who was not initially aware of them. The goal of the program was to promote separatism to weaken the [[Communist Party of China|communist-led]] [[People's Republic of China]], or in the CIA's own words: "to keep the political concept of an autonomous Tibet alive within Tibet and among several foreign nations".<ref name="lat">{{ | |||
Although it was formally assigned to the CIA, it was nevertheless closely coordinated with several other U.S. government agencies such as the [[United States Department of State|State Department]] and the [[United States Department of Defense|Department of Defense]].<ref name="jan26cia">{{ | Although it was formally assigned to the CIA, it was nevertheless closely coordinated with several other U.S. government agencies such as the [[United States Department of State|State Department]] and the [[United States Department of Defense|Department of Defense]].<ref name="jan26cia">{{Citation|year=1968-01-09|title=Status Report on Tibetan Operations|title-url=https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v30/d337|publisher=Office of the Historian}}</ref> | ||
Previous operations had aimed to strengthen various isolated Tibetan resistance groups, which eventually led to the creation of a paramilitary force on the [[Nepal|Nepalese]] border consisting of approximately 2,000 men. By February 1964, the projected annual cost for all CIA Tibetan operations had exceeded US$1.7 million.<ref name="jan26cia" /> | Previous operations had aimed to strengthen various isolated Tibetan resistance groups, which eventually led to the creation of a paramilitary force on the [[Nepal|Nepalese]] border consisting of approximately 2,000 men. By February 1964, the projected annual cost for all CIA Tibetan operations had exceeded US$1.7 million.<ref name="jan26cia" /> | ||
The program ended after [[1972 Nixon visit to China|President Nixon visited China]] to establish closer relations in 1972.<ref name="nyrtibet2">{{ | The program ended after [[1972 Nixon visit to China|President Nixon visited China]] to establish closer relations in 1972.<ref name="nyrtibet2">{{Citation|author=Jonathan Mirsky|year=2013-04-09|title=Tibet: the CIA's cancelled war|title-url=http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2013/apr/09/cias-cancelled-war-tibet/|publisher=The New York Review of Books}}</ref> The Dalai Lama criticized this decision, saying it proved wholeheartedly that the US never did it to help the people of Tibet.<ref name="lat" /> | ||
== Overview == | ==Overview== | ||
In the fields of political action and propaganda, the CIA's Tibetan program was aimed at lessening the influence, capabilities, and territorial scope of the [[Government of China]].<ref name=" | In the fields of political action and propaganda, the CIA's Tibetan program was aimed at lessening the influence, capabilities, and territorial scope of the [[Government of China]].<ref name="jan26cia" /> Particularly, the United States feared communist involvement in the region. A 1957 report on logistical issues indicated increasing trepidation that the Chinese would escalate their communist presence in Tibet.<ref>{{Web citation|title=Logistical Problems of the Tibetan Campaign|url=https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79T01049A001900130001-6.pdf|newspaper=CIA website}}</ref> The spread of communism in the international community was a huge concern for the United States. The CIA considered China's interest in Tibet to be a threat for multiple reasons. A 1950 memorandum noted that some of the reasons stemmed from a notion of bolstered sovereignty and a motivation to forge "a bulwark against possible invasion by western powers via India." However, they also believed that China would "use [Tibet as] a base for attacks against India and the Middle East in the third world war." Therefore, intelligence officials declared action as a preventative measure should their worst-case scenario (WWIII) unfold.<ref>{{citation|title=Chinese Communist Motives in Invasion of Tibet|url=|website=|access-date=9 February 2017|title-url=https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp82-00457r006300270010-6|publisher=CIA Reading Room}}</ref> | ||
The approval and subsequent endorsement of the program was carried out by the [[Oversight of United States covert operations|Special Group]] of the [[United States National Security Council]]. The program consisted of several clandestine operations bearing the following [[Code name|code names]]: | The approval and subsequent endorsement of the program was carried out by the [[Oversight of United States covert operations|Special Group]] of the [[United States National Security Council]]. The program consisted of several clandestine operations bearing the following [[Code name|code names]]: | ||
* '''ST CIRCUS'''—Cover name for the training of Tibetan guerillas on the island of [[Saipan]], and at [[Camp Hale]] in [[Colorado]]<ref>{{ | *'''ST CIRCUS'''—Cover name for the training of Tibetan guerillas on the island of [[Saipan]], and at [[Camp Hale]] in [[Colorado]]<ref>{{Web citation|date=2003-12-01|title=Tibet's Gamble|url=http://inthesetimes.com/article/656/tibets_gamble|newspaper=In These Times|quote=The operation, code-named ST CIRCUS, was one of the CIA's longest-running projects in existence from 1957 until 1969.|author=Jehangir Pocha}}</ref><ref>{{Citation|author=Dinesh Lal|year=2008|title=Indo-Tibet-China conflict|page=152|isbn=978-8178357140|city=Delhi|publisher=Kalpaz Publications}}</ref><ref>{{Citation|author=Tim Johnson|year=2011|title=Tragedy in crimson how the Dalai Lama conquered the world but lost the battle with China|page=114|isbn=978-1-56858-649-6|city=New York|publisher=Nation Books}}</ref> | ||
* '''ST BARNUM'''—Cover name for the [[Airlift|airlifting]] of CIA agents, military supplies, and support equipment into Tibet.<ref name="ftamacon">{{ | *'''ST BARNUM'''—Cover name for the [[Airlift|airlifting]] of CIA agents, military supplies, and support equipment into Tibet.<ref name="ftamacon">{{Citation|author=John B. Roberts II, Elizabeth A.|year=2009|title=Freeing Tibet 50 years of struggle, resilience, and hope|page=82|isbn=978-0-8144-1375-3|city=New York|publisher=AMACOM}}</ref> | ||
* '''ST BAILEY'''—Cover name for a classified propaganda campaign<ref name="ftamacon" /> | *'''ST BAILEY'''—Cover name for a classified propaganda campaign<ref name="ftamacon" /> | ||
Chinese-Indian relations also played an important role in framing the CIA's operations. Due to Tibet's geographic location between the two countries, it was strategically important. The CIA released numerous reports assessing relations. The CIA monitored the relations between China and India in various ways, including media such as newspapers and radio broadcasts that reported on the changing relations between India and China.<ref name="cia.gov">{{ | Chinese-Indian relations also played an important role in framing the CIA's operations. Due to Tibet's geographic location between the two countries, it was strategically important. The CIA released numerous reports assessing relations. The CIA monitored the relations between China and India in various ways, including media such as newspapers and radio broadcasts that reported on the changing relations between India and China.<ref name="cia.gov">{{Web citation|title=POLITICAL - DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS|url=https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80-00809A000700210056-2.pdf|newspaper=CIA website}}</ref> In October 1954, for example, a report was filed by CIA analysts concerning Indian Prime Minister Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru's visit to China. It assessed what the two countries might or might not agree to from a diplomatic standpoint.<ref>{{Web citation|title=Sino-Indian Relations|url=https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80R01443R000300080002-0.pdf|newspaper=CIA website}}</ref> Following the month-long Sino-Indian War of 1962, the CIA developed a close relationship with Indian foreign intelligence services in both training and supplying agents in Tibet. | ||
The CIA worked to strengthen the Tibetans against the Chinese communist efforts. To do so, the United States planned to issue asylum to the Dalai Lama and his supporters. Some resistance fighters took their own lives when captured by the Chinese to avoid torture. The Tibetan resistance was promised weaponry and resources from the West to continue their resistance against the Chinese. Knowing resistance was unlikely to succeed the resistance accepted Chinese annexation.<ref>{{Citation|last= | The CIA worked to strengthen the Tibetans against the Chinese communist efforts. To do so, the United States planned to issue asylum to the Dalai Lama and his supporters. Some resistance fighters took their own lives when captured by the Chinese to avoid torture. The Tibetan resistance was promised weaponry and resources from the West to continue their resistance against the Chinese. Knowing resistance was unlikely to succeed the resistance accepted Chinese annexation.<ref>{{Citation|last=|title=The Shadow Circus: The CIA in Tibet|date=|url=|access-date=|author=Jonathan Smith|year=2015-06-30|title-url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R_5LOPYzddY}}</ref> | ||
== International lobbying == | ==International lobbying== | ||
The [[14th Dalai Lama]] was financially supported by the CIA between the late 1950s and the mid-1970s, receiving $180,000 a year. The funds were paid to him personally, although he used most of them for Tibetan government-in-exile activities such as funding foreign offices to lobby for international support.<ref>{{ | The [[14th Dalai Lama]] was financially supported by the CIA between the late 1950s and the mid-1970s, receiving $180,000 a year. The funds were paid to him personally, although he used most of them for Tibetan government-in-exile activities such as funding foreign offices to lobby for international support.<ref>{{Web citation|title=Behind Dalai Lama's holy cloak|url=http://www.theage.com.au/news/business/behind-dalai-lamas-holy-cloak/2007/05/22/1179601410290.html|newspaper=The Age|author=Michael Backman}}</ref> | ||
The Dalai Lama sought asylum in India, however, the issues regarding Tibet and China received substantial attention from the press. Many protests erupted in response to the political conflicts between Tibet and China in countries including Burma, Pakistan, and Japan (and many more).<ref name=":2">{{ | The Dalai Lama sought asylum in India, however, the issues regarding Tibet and China received substantial attention from the press. Many protests erupted in response to the political conflicts between Tibet and China in countries including Burma, Pakistan, and Japan (and many more).<ref name=":2">{{Web citation|title=TIBET AND CHINA (BACKGROUND PAPER)|url=https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP82R00025R000100060022-5.pdf|newspaper=CIA website}}</ref> Although the Dalai Lama's pleas proved to be less effective with the passing of time, his office in New York did not cease to lobby several U.N. delegations for the Tibetan cause. Also, the Dalai Lama was aided by a former U.S. delegate to the U.N.<ref name="jan26cia" /> | ||
== Criticism == | ==Criticism== | ||
In his 1991 autobiography ''[[Freedom in Exile]]'', the [[14th Dalai Lama]] criticized the CIA for supporting the [[Tibetan independence movement]] "not because they (the CIA) cared about Tibetan independence, but as part of their worldwide efforts to destabilize all [[Socialist state|communist governments]]".<ref>{{ | In his 1991 autobiography ''[[Freedom in Exile]]'', the [[14th Dalai Lama]] criticized the CIA for supporting the [[Tibetan independence movement]] "not because they (the CIA) cared about Tibetan independence, but as part of their worldwide efforts to destabilize all [[Socialist state|communist governments]]".<ref>{{Web citation|title=|url=|newspaper=|access-date=8 September 2013|quote=}}{{Web citation|title=CIA gave aid to Tibetan Exiles in the 1960s, files show|url=http://articles.latimes.com/1998/sep/15/news/mn-22993|newspaper=Los Angeles Times|quote=In his 1990 autobiography, "Freedom in Exile," the Dalai Lama explained that his two brothers made contact with the CIA during a trip to India in 1956. The CIA agreed to help, "not because they cared about Tibetan independence, but as part of their worldwide efforts to destabilize all Communist governments," the Dalai Lama wrote.}}</ref> | ||
In 1999, the Dalai Lama suggested that the CIA Tibetan program had been harmful to Tibet because it primarily served American interests, claiming "once the [[Foreign policy of the United States|American policy]] toward China changed, they stopped their help ... The Americans had a different agenda from the Tibetans." | In 1999, the Dalai Lama suggested that the CIA Tibetan program had been harmful to Tibet because it primarily served American interests, claiming "once the [[Foreign policy of the United States|American policy]] toward China changed, they stopped their help ... The Americans had a different agenda from the Tibetans." | ||
During the Tibetan program's period of activity, some of its largest contributions to the CIA's interests in the region came in the form of keeping the Chinese occupied with resistance, never actually producing a mass uprising establishing independence for Tibet from Beijing. The program also produced a trove of army documents that Tibetan insurgents seized from the Chinese and turned over to the CIA in 1961 in what has been referred to as "one of the greatest intelligence successes of the Cold War".<ref name=" | During the Tibetan program's period of activity, some of its largest contributions to the CIA's interests in the region came in the form of keeping the Chinese occupied with resistance, never actually producing a mass uprising establishing independence for Tibet from Beijing. The program also produced a trove of army documents that Tibetan insurgents seized from the Chinese and turned over to the CIA in 1961 in what has been referred to as "one of the greatest intelligence successes of the Cold War".<ref name="nyrtibet2" /> | ||
The CIA faced criticism for breaking promises regarding declassification, including some documentation regarding the support of Tibetan guerilla fighters in the 1950s until the early 1960s.<ref>{{ | The CIA faced criticism for breaking promises regarding declassification, including some documentation regarding the support of Tibetan guerilla fighters in the 1950s until the early 1960s.<ref>{{Web citation|title=19990513|url=http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/news/19990513/19990513.htm|newspaper=National Security Archive}}</ref> | ||
In 2009, President [[Barack Obama]] faced criticism for postponing his meeting with the Dalai Lama, marking the first time a U.S. president had canceled a meeting with the spiritual leader in over two decades.<ref>{{ | In 2009, President [[Barack Obama]] faced criticism for postponing his meeting with the Dalai Lama, marking the first time a U.S. president had canceled a meeting with the spiritual leader in over two decades.<ref>{{Web citation|date=2009-11-16|title=Still Orphans of the Cold War? President Obama's Decision to Postpone Meeting with the Dalai Lama in Historical Context|url=https://nsarchive.wordpress.com/2009/11/16/still-orphans-of-the-cold-war/|author=Bob Wampler}}</ref><ref>{{Web citation|date=2009-10-06|title=Barack Obama accused of bowing to Beijing with Dalai Lama 'snub'|url=http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/oct/06/dalai-lama-barack-obama-washington|newspaper=The Guardian}}</ref> | ||
== References == | ==References== | ||
[[Category:CIA operations]] | [[Category:CIA operations]] | ||
<references /> | |||
Latest revision as of 13:01, 21 October 2024
The CIA Tibetan program was a nearly two decades long CIA covert operation focused on Tibet which consisted of "political action, propaganda, paramilitary and intelligence operations" based on U.S. Government arrangements made with brothers of the 14th Dalai Lama, who was not initially aware of them. The goal of the program was to promote separatism to weaken the communist-led People's Republic of China, or in the CIA's own words: "to keep the political concept of an autonomous Tibet alive within Tibet and among several foreign nations".[1]
Although it was formally assigned to the CIA, it was nevertheless closely coordinated with several other U.S. government agencies such as the State Department and the Department of Defense.[2]
Previous operations had aimed to strengthen various isolated Tibetan resistance groups, which eventually led to the creation of a paramilitary force on the Nepalese border consisting of approximately 2,000 men. By February 1964, the projected annual cost for all CIA Tibetan operations had exceeded US$1.7 million.[2]
The program ended after President Nixon visited China to establish closer relations in 1972.[3] The Dalai Lama criticized this decision, saying it proved wholeheartedly that the US never did it to help the people of Tibet.[1]
Overview[edit | edit source]
In the fields of political action and propaganda, the CIA's Tibetan program was aimed at lessening the influence, capabilities, and territorial scope of the Government of China.[2] Particularly, the United States feared communist involvement in the region. A 1957 report on logistical issues indicated increasing trepidation that the Chinese would escalate their communist presence in Tibet.[4] The spread of communism in the international community was a huge concern for the United States. The CIA considered China's interest in Tibet to be a threat for multiple reasons. A 1950 memorandum noted that some of the reasons stemmed from a notion of bolstered sovereignty and a motivation to forge "a bulwark against possible invasion by western powers via India." However, they also believed that China would "use [Tibet as] a base for attacks against India and the Middle East in the third world war." Therefore, intelligence officials declared action as a preventative measure should their worst-case scenario (WWIII) unfold.[5]
The approval and subsequent endorsement of the program was carried out by the Special Group of the United States National Security Council. The program consisted of several clandestine operations bearing the following code names:
- ST CIRCUS—Cover name for the training of Tibetan guerillas on the island of Saipan, and at Camp Hale in Colorado[6][7][8]
- ST BARNUM—Cover name for the airlifting of CIA agents, military supplies, and support equipment into Tibet.[9]
- ST BAILEY—Cover name for a classified propaganda campaign[9]
Chinese-Indian relations also played an important role in framing the CIA's operations. Due to Tibet's geographic location between the two countries, it was strategically important. The CIA released numerous reports assessing relations. The CIA monitored the relations between China and India in various ways, including media such as newspapers and radio broadcasts that reported on the changing relations between India and China.[10] In October 1954, for example, a report was filed by CIA analysts concerning Indian Prime Minister Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru's visit to China. It assessed what the two countries might or might not agree to from a diplomatic standpoint.[11] Following the month-long Sino-Indian War of 1962, the CIA developed a close relationship with Indian foreign intelligence services in both training and supplying agents in Tibet.
The CIA worked to strengthen the Tibetans against the Chinese communist efforts. To do so, the United States planned to issue asylum to the Dalai Lama and his supporters. Some resistance fighters took their own lives when captured by the Chinese to avoid torture. The Tibetan resistance was promised weaponry and resources from the West to continue their resistance against the Chinese. Knowing resistance was unlikely to succeed the resistance accepted Chinese annexation.[12]
International lobbying[edit | edit source]
The 14th Dalai Lama was financially supported by the CIA between the late 1950s and the mid-1970s, receiving $180,000 a year. The funds were paid to him personally, although he used most of them for Tibetan government-in-exile activities such as funding foreign offices to lobby for international support.[13]
The Dalai Lama sought asylum in India, however, the issues regarding Tibet and China received substantial attention from the press. Many protests erupted in response to the political conflicts between Tibet and China in countries including Burma, Pakistan, and Japan (and many more).[14] Although the Dalai Lama's pleas proved to be less effective with the passing of time, his office in New York did not cease to lobby several U.N. delegations for the Tibetan cause. Also, the Dalai Lama was aided by a former U.S. delegate to the U.N.[2]
Criticism[edit | edit source]
In his 1991 autobiography Freedom in Exile, the 14th Dalai Lama criticized the CIA for supporting the Tibetan independence movement "not because they (the CIA) cared about Tibetan independence, but as part of their worldwide efforts to destabilize all communist governments".[15]
In 1999, the Dalai Lama suggested that the CIA Tibetan program had been harmful to Tibet because it primarily served American interests, claiming "once the American policy toward China changed, they stopped their help ... The Americans had a different agenda from the Tibetans."
During the Tibetan program's period of activity, some of its largest contributions to the CIA's interests in the region came in the form of keeping the Chinese occupied with resistance, never actually producing a mass uprising establishing independence for Tibet from Beijing. The program also produced a trove of army documents that Tibetan insurgents seized from the Chinese and turned over to the CIA in 1961 in what has been referred to as "one of the greatest intelligence successes of the Cold War".[3]
The CIA faced criticism for breaking promises regarding declassification, including some documentation regarding the support of Tibetan guerilla fighters in the 1950s until the early 1960s.[16]
In 2009, President Barack Obama faced criticism for postponing his meeting with the Dalai Lama, marking the first time a U.S. president had canceled a meeting with the spiritual leader in over two decades.[17][18]
References[edit | edit source]
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 Jim Mann (1998-09-15). "CIA gave aid to Tibetan Exiles in '60s, files show" Los Angeles Times.
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 Status Report on Tibetan Operations (1968-01-09). Office of the Historian.
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 Jonathan Mirsky (2013-04-09). Tibet: the CIA's cancelled war. The New York Review of Books.
- ↑ "Logistical Problems of the Tibetan Campaign". CIA website.
- ↑ Chinese Communist Motives in Invasion of Tibet. CIA Reading Room.
- ↑ “The operation, code-named ST CIRCUS, was one of the CIA's longest-running projects in existence from 1957 until 1969.”
Jehangir Pocha (2003-12-01). "Tibet's Gamble" In These Times. - ↑ Dinesh Lal (2008). Indo-Tibet-China conflict (p. 152). Delhi: Kalpaz Publications. ISBN 978-8178357140
- ↑ Tim Johnson (2011). Tragedy in crimson how the Dalai Lama conquered the world but lost the battle with China (p. 114). New York: Nation Books. ISBN 978-1-56858-649-6
- ↑ 9.0 9.1 John B. Roberts II, Elizabeth A. (2009). Freeing Tibet 50 years of struggle, resilience, and hope (p. 82). New York: AMACOM. ISBN 978-0-8144-1375-3
- ↑ "POLITICAL - DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS". CIA website.
- ↑ "Sino-Indian Relations". CIA website.
- ↑ Jonathan Smith (2015-06-30). The Shadow Circus: The CIA in Tibet.
- ↑ Michael Backman. "Behind Dalai Lama's holy cloak" The Age.
- ↑ "TIBET AND CHINA (BACKGROUND PAPER)". CIA website.
- ↑ “In his 1990 autobiography, "Freedom in Exile," the Dalai Lama explained that his two brothers made contact with the CIA during a trip to India in 1956. The CIA agreed to help, "not because they cared about Tibetan independence, but as part of their worldwide efforts to destabilize all Communist governments," the Dalai Lama wrote.”
"CIA gave aid to Tibetan Exiles in the 1960s, files show". Los Angeles Times. - ↑ "19990513". National Security Archive.
- ↑ Bob Wampler (2009-11-16). "Still Orphans of the Cold War? President Obama's Decision to Postpone Meeting with the Dalai Lama in Historical Context"
- ↑ "Barack Obama accused of bowing to Beijing with Dalai Lama 'snub'" (2009-10-06). The Guardian.