CIA Tibetan program

The CIA Tibetan program was a nearly two decades long CIA covert operation focused on Tibet which consisted of "political action, propaganda, paramilitary and intelligence operations" based on U.S. Government arrangements made with brothers of the 14th Dalai Lama, who was not initially aware of them. The goal of the program was to promote separatism to weaken the communist-led People's Republic of China, or in the CIA's own words: "to keep the political concept of an autonomous Tibet alive within Tibet and among several foreign nations".

Although it was formally assigned to the CIA, it was nevertheless closely coordinated with several other U.S. government agencies such as the State Department and the Department of Defense.

Previous operations had aimed to strengthen various isolated Tibetan resistance groups, which eventually led to the creation of a paramilitary force on the Nepalese border consisting of approximately 2,000 men. By February 1964, the projected annual cost for all CIA Tibetan operations had exceeded US$1.7 million.

The program ended after President Nixon visited China to establish closer relations in 1972. The Dalai Lama criticized this decision, saying it proved wholeheartedly that the US never did it to help the people of Tibet.

Overview

In the fields of political action and propaganda, the CIA's Tibetan program was aimed at lessening the influence, capabilities, and territorial scope of the Government of China. Particularly, the United States feared communist involvement in the region. A 1957 report on logistical issues indicated increasing trepidation that the Chinese would escalate their communist presence in Tibet. The spread of communism in the international community was a huge concern for the United States. The CIA considered China's interest in Tibet to be a threat for multiple reasons. A 1950 memorandum noted that some of the reasons stemmed from a notion of bolstered sovereignty and a motivation to forge "a bulwark against possible invasion by western powers via India." However, they also believed that China would "use [Tibet as] a base for attacks against India and the Middle East in the third world war." Therefore, intelligence officials declared action as a preventative measure should their worst-case scenario (WWIII) unfold.

The approval and subsequent endorsement of the program was carried out by the Special Group of the United States National Security Council. The program consisted of several clandestine operations bearing the following code names:

• ST CIRCUS—Cover name for the training of Tibetan guerillas on the island of Saipan, and at Camp Hale in Colorado
• ST BARNUM—Cover name for the airlifting of CIA agents, military supplies, and support equipment into Tibet.
• ST BAILEY—Cover name for a classified propaganda campaign

Chinese-Indian relations also played an important role in framing the CIA's operations. Due to Tibet's geographic location between the two countries, it was strategically important. The CIA released numerous reports assessing relations. The CIA monitored the relations between China and India in various ways, including media such as newspapers and radio broadcasts that reported on the changing relations between India and China. In October 1954, for example, a report was filed by CIA analysts concerning Indian Prime Minister Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru's visit to China. It assessed what the two countries might or might not agree to from a diplomatic standpoint. Following the month-long Sino-Indian War of 1962, the CIA developed a close relationship with Indian foreign intelligence services in both training and supplying agents in Tibet.

The CIA worked to strengthen the Tibetans against the Chinese communist efforts. To do so, the United States planned to issue asylum to the Dalai Lama and his supporters. Some resistance fighters took their own lives when captured by the Chinese to avoid torture. The Tibetan resistance was promised weaponry and resources from the West to continue their resistance against the Chinese. Knowing resistance was unlikely to succeed the resistance accepted Chinese annexation.

International lobbying

The 14th Dalai Lama was financially supported by the CIA between the late 1950s and the mid-1970s, receiving $180,000 a year. The funds were paid to him personally, although he used most of them for Tibetan government-in-exile activities such as funding foreign offices to lobby for international support.

The Dalai Lama sought asylum in India, however, the issues regarding Tibet and China received substantial attention from the press. Many protests erupted in response to the political conflicts between Tibet and China in countries including Burma, Pakistan, and Japan (and many more). Although the Dalai Lama's pleas proved to be less effective with the passing of time, his office in New York did not cease to lobby several U.N. delegations for the Tibetan cause. Also, the Dalai Lama was aided by a former U.S. delegate to the U.N.

Criticism

In his 1991 autobiography Freedom in Exile, the 14th Dalai Lama criticized the CIA for supporting the Tibetan independence movement "not because they (the CIA) cared about Tibetan independence, but as part of their worldwide efforts to destabilize all communist governments".

In 1999, the Dalai Lama suggested that the CIA Tibetan program had been harmful to Tibet because it primarily served American interests, claiming "once the American policy toward China changed, they stopped their help ... The Americans had a different agenda from the Tibetans."

During the Tibetan program's period of activity, some of its largest contributions to the CIA's interests in the region came in the form of keeping the Chinese occupied with resistance, never actually producing a mass uprising establishing independence for Tibet from Beijing. The program also produced a trove of army documents that Tibetan insurgents seized from the Chinese and turned over to the CIA in 1961 in what has been referred to as "one of the greatest intelligence successes of the Cold War".

The CIA faced criticism for breaking promises regarding declassification, including some documentation regarding the support of Tibetan guerilla fighters in the 1950s until the early 1960s.

In 2009, President Barack Obama faced criticism for postponing his meeting with the Dalai Lama, marking the first time a U.S. president had canceled a meeting with the spiritual leader in over two decades.