Library:Dark Days in Ghana: Difference between revisions
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I say to you publicly and frankly: The burden of suffering that must be borne, impose it upon ''one'' generation! Do not, with the false kindness of the missionaries and business-men, drag out this agony for another five hundred years while your villages rot and your people's minds sink into the nicrass of a subjective darkness ... Be merciful by being stern! If I lived under your regime, I'd ask for this hardness, this coldness ... | I say to you publicly and frankly: The burden of suffering that must be borne, impose it upon ''one'' generation! Do not, with the false kindness of the missionaries and business-men, drag out this agony for another five hundred years while your villages rot and your people's minds sink into the nicrass of a subjective darkness ... Be merciful by being stern! If I lived under your regime, I'd ask for this hardness, this coldness ... | ||
Make no mistake, Kwame, they are going to come at you with words about democracy; you are going to be pinned to the wall and warned about decency; plump-faced men will mumble academic phrases about "sound" development; gentlemen of the cloth will speak unctuously of values and standards; in short, a barrage of concentrated arguments will be hurled at you to persuade you to temper the pace and drive of your movement ... | Make no mistake, Kwame, they are going to come at you with words about [[democracy]]; you are going to be pinned to the wall and warned about decency; plump-faced men will mumble academic phrases about "sound" development; gentlemen of the cloth will speak unctuously of values and standards; in short, a barrage of concentrated arguments will be hurled at you to persuade you to temper the pace and drive of your movement ... | ||
But you know as well as I do that the logic of your actions is being determined by the conditions of the lives of your people ... | But you know as well as I do that the logic of your actions is being determined by the conditions of the lives of your people ... | ||
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==1. Peking to Conakry== | ==1. Peking to Conakry== | ||
The word "coup" should not be used to describe what took place in Ghana on 24th February 1966. On that day, Ghana was captured by traitors among the army and police who were inspired and helped by [[Neocolonialism|neo-colonialists]] and certain [[reactionary]] elements among our own population. It was an act of aggression, an "invasion", planned to take place in my absence and to be maintained by force. Seldom in history has a more cowardly and criminally stupid attempt been made to destroy the independence of a nation. | The word "[[Coup d'état|coup]]" should not be used to describe what took place in Ghana on 24th February 1966. On that day, Ghana was captured by traitors among the army and police who were inspired and helped by [[Neocolonialism|neo-colonialists]] and certain [[reactionary]] elements among our own population. It was an act of aggression, an "invasion", planned to take place in my absence and to be maintained by force. Seldom in history has a more cowardly and criminally stupid attempt been made to destroy the independence of a nation. | ||
When the action took place, I was on my way to [[Hà Nội|Hanoi]], at the invitation of President [[Hồ Chí Minh|Ho Chi Minh]], with proposals for ending the [[Vietnam War|war in Vietnam]]. I had almost reached [[Beijing|Peking]], the furthest point in my journey. The cowards who seized power by force of arms behind my back, knew they did not have the support of the people of Ghana, and therefore thought it safer to wait until I was not only out of the country, but well beyond the range of a quick return. | When the action took place, I was on my way to [[Hà Nội|Hanoi]], at the invitation of President [[Hồ Chí Minh|Ho Chi Minh]], with proposals for ending the [[Vietnam War|war in Vietnam]]. I had almost reached [[Beijing|Peking]], the furthest point in my journey. The cowards who seized power by force of arms behind my back, knew they did not have the support of the people of Ghana, and therefore thought it safer to wait until I was not only out of the country, but well beyond the range of a quick return. | ||
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"A coup d'etat in Ghana." | "A coup d'etat in Ghana." | ||
"Impossible," I said. "But yes, it is possible. These things do happen. They are in the nature of the revolutionary struggle." | "Impossible," I said. "But yes, it is possible. These things do happen. They are in the nature of the [[Revolution|revolutionary]] struggle." | ||
I learned later that the Chinese welcoming party had known about events in Ghana when I stepped from the aircraft at Peking, but with characteristic courtesy had waited to break the news to me privately. | I learned later that the Chinese welcoming party had known about events in Ghana when I stepped from the aircraft at Peking, but with characteristic courtesy had waited to break the news to me privately. | ||
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The following is the text of the statement I released to the press: | The following is the text of the statement I released to the press: | ||
<blockquote>"On my arrival in Peking, my attention has been drawn to reports from press agencies which allege that some members of the Ghana armed forces supported by some members of the police have attempted to overthrow my government-the government of the Convention People's Party. | <blockquote>"On my arrival in Peking, my attention has been drawn to reports from press agencies which allege that some members of the Ghana armed forces supported by some members of the police have attempted to overthrow my government-the government of the [[Convention People's Party]]. | ||
I know that the Ghanaian people are always loyal to me, the Party and the Government, and all I expect of everyone at this hour of trial is to remain calm, but firm in determination and resistance. | I know that the Ghanaian people are always loyal to me, the Party and the Government, and all I expect of everyone at this hour of trial is to remain calm, but firm in determination and resistance. | ||
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With Alex Quaison Sackey, I will deal later. Kwesi Armah settled down in London where it appeared that he had considerable funds of money available to him. The rebel regime, on the basis of this, attempted to have him extradited on the grounds that he had stolen the money in question. His many trials before the English Courts exposed at least the falsity of the allegations which these authorities had made. I am glad that he was acquitted since I am sure that the particular charges made against him were false. Nonetheless, I believe that he brought his misfortunes on himself by failing to take a positive political stand. His various court cases however prove the nonsense contained in many of the allegations of corruption against my government. | With Alex Quaison Sackey, I will deal later. Kwesi Armah settled down in London where it appeared that he had considerable funds of money available to him. The rebel regime, on the basis of this, attempted to have him extradited on the grounds that he had stolen the money in question. His many trials before the English Courts exposed at least the falsity of the allegations which these authorities had made. I am glad that he was acquitted since I am sure that the particular charges made against him were false. Nonetheless, I believe that he brought his misfortunes on himself by failing to take a positive political stand. His various court cases however prove the nonsense contained in many of the allegations of corruption against my government. | ||
Enoch Okoh and Michael Dei-Anang were old British trained civil servants. They had made their way up through the colonial structure. They had been among my most trusted officials but they chose to return to Ghana, presumably in the hope that they would be accepted by the counterrevolutionaries. | Enoch Okoh and Michael Dei-Anang were old British trained civil servants. They had made their way up through the [[Colonialism|colonial]] structure. They had been among my most trusted officials but they chose to return to Ghana, presumably in the hope that they would be accepted by the [[Counterrevolution|counterrevolutionaries]]. | ||
Enoch Okoh, as head of the civil service and as the person who knew therefore which promotions had been made and why, was treated with leniency and was appointed to be in charge of the Housing Corporation. Since the new regime did not intend to build any houses for the people this was perhaps the appropriate punishment for his desertion. Michael Dei-Anang was not so treated and, much to his surprise, was thrown into prison. | Enoch Okoh, as head of the civil service and as the person who knew therefore which promotions had been made and why, was treated with leniency and was appointed to be in charge of the Housing Corporation. Since the new regime did not intend to build any houses for the people this was perhaps the appropriate punishment for his desertion. Michael Dei-Anang was not so treated and, much to his surprise, was thrown into prison. | ||
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We agreed that for the next day or two, while arrangements were being made. I should carry out official engagements as planned. | We agreed that for the next day or two, while arrangements were being made. I should carry out official engagements as planned. | ||
This was also the wish of the Chinese government. The Chinese made it clear that they regarded the military and police action in Ghana as no more than a temporary obstacle in the long struggle against imperialism, the kind of event to be expected, but which had no effect whatsoever on the final outcome. "You are a young man," Chou En-lai told me, "you have another forty years ahead of you!" | This was also the wish of the Chinese government. The Chinese made it clear that they regarded the military and police action in Ghana as no more than a temporary obstacle in the long struggle against [[imperialism]], the kind of event to be expected, but which had no effect whatsoever on the final outcome. "You are a young man," Chou En-lai told me, "you have another forty years ahead of you!" | ||
At the banquet held in my honour on 24th February, Liu Shao-chi spoke of Afro-Asian solidarity, and the African peoples' revolutionary struggle:<blockquote>"Most of the African countries have won independence, but the African peoples' revolutionary struggle against imperialism is by no means completed. They still have to carry on this struggle in greater depth. The imperialists headed by the United States are more active than ever in pressing forward with their policies of neo-colonialism in an attempt to subvert independent African countries and suppress the anti-imperialist revolutionary struggle of the African peoples. In his latest book, [[Library:Neo-Colonialism, the Last Stage of Imperialism|'Neo-Colonialism—The Last Stage of Imperialism']], President Nkrumah gave a detailed description of neo-colonialism and explicitly pointed out that 'foremost among the neo-colonialists' is the United States, which is 'the very citadel of neo-colonialism'. However hard the imperialists may whip up revolutionary adverse currents, the anti-imperialist revolutionary struggles of the African peoples can never be suppressed but are bound to win final victory. The Chinese people have unswervingly stood on the side of the African peoples and resolutely support their just struggles.<nowiki>''</nowiki></blockquote>He went on to condemn U.S. policy in Vietnam, and to expose the hypocrisy of American so-called peace moves. No direct mention was made of the news from Ghana, or the possibility that I might not proceed to Hanoi. | At the banquet held in my honour on 24th February, Liu Shao-chi spoke of Afro-Asian solidarity, and the African peoples' revolutionary struggle:<blockquote>"Most of the African countries have won independence, but the African peoples' revolutionary struggle against imperialism is by no means completed. They still have to carry on this struggle in greater depth. The imperialists headed by the United States are more active than ever in pressing forward with their policies of neo-colonialism in an attempt to subvert independent African countries and suppress the [[Anti-imperialism|anti-imperialist]] revolutionary struggle of the African peoples. In his latest book, [[Library:Neo-Colonialism, the Last Stage of Imperialism|'Neo-Colonialism—The Last Stage of Imperialism']], President Nkrumah gave a detailed description of neo-colonialism and explicitly pointed out that 'foremost among the neo-colonialists' is the United States, which is 'the very citadel of neo-colonialism'. However hard the imperialists may whip up revolutionary adverse currents, the anti-imperialist revolutionary struggles of the African peoples can never be suppressed but are bound to win final victory. The Chinese people have unswervingly stood on the side of the African peoples and resolutely support their just struggles.<nowiki>''</nowiki></blockquote>He went on to condemn U.S. policy in Vietnam, and to expose the hypocrisy of American so-called peace moves. No direct mention was made of the news from Ghana, or the possibility that I might not proceed to Hanoi. | ||
In my reply, I also attacked neo-colonialism, and said that final victory would rest with the common man. I went on to condemn U.S. aggression in Vietnam, and called for the complete withdrawal of all American forces from Vietnam so that peace negotiations could begin. | In my reply, I also attacked neo-colonialism, and said that final victory would rest with the common man. I went on to condemn U.S. aggression in Vietnam, and called for the complete withdrawal of all American forces from Vietnam so that peace negotiations could begin. | ||
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Meanwhile, the soldiers had been reinforced by a new element. It was part of the propaganda against Ghana abroad and internally that my government had detained thousands of individuals. There were, of course, political detainees but their number, for state security, was fortunately small. Most of these detainees under the Preventive Detention Act were the so-called "criminal" detainees. As industrialisation developed in Ghana so. as in all countries. organised crime increased and at one stage in the immediate post-independence period we were faced with a situation which, if we had not dealt with it, would have resulted in the country being terrorised by organised criminal gangs. The view of the police was that it was not possible in many cases. any more than it was in the United States at some periods of its history, to secure convictions in courts of the gang leaders or of their supporters. The Preventive Detention Act was therefore extended to cover habitual criminals suspected of gangsterism. | Meanwhile, the soldiers had been reinforced by a new element. It was part of the propaganda against Ghana abroad and internally that my government had detained thousands of individuals. There were, of course, political detainees but their number, for state security, was fortunately small. Most of these detainees under the Preventive Detention Act were the so-called "criminal" detainees. As industrialisation developed in Ghana so. as in all countries. organised crime increased and at one stage in the immediate post-independence period we were faced with a situation which, if we had not dealt with it, would have resulted in the country being terrorised by organised criminal gangs. The view of the police was that it was not possible in many cases. any more than it was in the United States at some periods of its history, to secure convictions in courts of the gang leaders or of their supporters. The Preventive Detention Act was therefore extended to cover habitual criminals suspected of gangsterism. | ||
If the rebels had only released the genuine political detainees the total would have been so small as to discredit them and in any case they required the prison accommodation occupied by the criminal detainees in order to lock up anyone suspected of being a | If the rebels had only released the genuine political detainees the total would have been so small as to discredit them and in any case they required the prison accommodation occupied by the criminal detainees in order to lock up anyone suspected of being a C.P.P. member or supporter. In the days following the 'coup' the criminal detainees were not only released but were able to represent themselves as "the heroes of the counter-revolution". By day they joined. naturally, in the demonstrations against my government and at night returned to their old activities to such an extent that even the strictly controlled "N.L.C." press demanded that they should be returned to prison. | ||
Accra was handed over to lawless elements which the rank and file police had no means of controlling. Bar owners were forced at gun point to sell free beer to soldiers and to the "heroes of the counter-revolution", the criminal detainees. These people assaulted women, thieved, and looted. It will be only after the return to legal government in Ghana that it will be possible to assess exactly the number of those who died in fighting against the rebel soldiers or were subsequently killed in the looting and robbery which followed. The casualties in the fighting were certainly heavy. The number of civilians killed, it is more difficult to estimate. Two members of Parliament certainly lost their lives and a number of people in no way connected with politics died. Among those shot dead near Flagstaff House was an air hostess on her way to the airport. In all, the total was probably around 1,600 dead and many more injured. So much for the "bloodless coup"! | Accra was handed over to lawless elements which the rank and file police had no means of controlling. Bar owners were forced at gun point to sell free beer to soldiers and to the "heroes of the counter-revolution", the criminal detainees. These people assaulted women, thieved, and looted. It will be only after the return to legal government in Ghana that it will be possible to assess exactly the number of those who died in fighting against the rebel soldiers or were subsequently killed in the looting and robbery which followed. The casualties in the fighting were certainly heavy. The number of civilians killed, it is more difficult to estimate. Two members of Parliament certainly lost their lives and a number of people in no way connected with politics died. Among those shot dead near Flagstaff House was an air hostess on her way to the airport. In all, the total was probably around 1,600 dead and many more injured. So much for the "bloodless coup"! | ||
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The sincerity of our political opponents and their connivance with the colonial government may be judged by the fact that not one of them answered the challenge. | The sincerity of our political opponents and their connivance with the colonial government may be judged by the fact that not one of them answered the challenge. | ||
A few years later, after the 1954 general election, when the Party won 72 out of the | A few years later, after the 1954 general election, when the Party won 72 out of the 104 seats in the Legislative Assembly, the largest anti-government party was the Northern People's Party which had 12 seats. The remaining 20 opposition members were mostly Independents, several of whom later attached themselves to one party or another. The anti-government members of the Assembly did not then constitute an opposition in the accepted sense of the term, since there was no group among them capable of forming an alternative government. They were therefore recognised simply as a body of critics of my government—an unofficial opposition. | ||
Before long, however, the members of the unofficial opposition decided to amalgamate and to form a single party—the National Liberation Movement (N.L.M.). The reader will note the close analogy in the name of the N.L.M. and the "N.L.C.", both of which had about as little to do with "liberation" as it is possible to imagine. | Before long, however, the members of the unofficial opposition decided to amalgamate and to form a single party—the National Liberation Movement (N.L.M.). The reader will note the close analogy in the name of the N.L.M. and the "N.L.C.", both of which had about as little to do with "liberation" as it is possible to imagine. | ||
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It has been said that the fabrication of the "[[big lie]]" is essential in the planning of any usurpation of political power. In the case of Ghana, the big lie told to the world was that Ghana needed to be rescued from "economic chaos". Various other lies were hinged to this central lie. The country was said to be hopelessly in [[debt]] and the people on the verge of starvation. Among the lies aimed against me personally was the one that I had accumulated a large private fortune; this was to form the basis for an all-out character assassination attempt. But these lies were subsidiary to the one big lie of "economic mismanagement", which was to provide an umbrella excuse for the seizure of power by neo-colonialist inspired traitors. | It has been said that the fabrication of the "[[big lie]]" is essential in the planning of any usurpation of political power. In the case of Ghana, the big lie told to the world was that Ghana needed to be rescued from "economic chaos". Various other lies were hinged to this central lie. The country was said to be hopelessly in [[debt]] and the people on the verge of starvation. Among the lies aimed against me personally was the one that I had accumulated a large private fortune; this was to form the basis for an all-out character assassination attempt. But these lies were subsidiary to the one big lie of "economic mismanagement", which was to provide an umbrella excuse for the seizure of power by neo-colonialist inspired traitors. | ||
If Ghana was in such a serious economic condition, why was there no lack of investment in her growing industries? Investors do not put their money into mismanaged enterprises and unstable economies. Why did the imperialist powers try to exert an economic squeeze on Ghana? No one in his right mind bothers to attack an already-dying concern. Who made up the figures of Ghana's supposed "debt" ? Why was only one side of the ledger shown—why no mention of assets? How can the obvious evidence of the modernisation and industrialisation of Ghana, such as the new roads, factories, schools and hospitals, the harbour and town of | If Ghana was in such a serious economic condition, why was there no lack of investment in her growing industries? Investors do not put their money into mismanaged enterprises and unstable economies. Why did the imperialist powers try to exert an economic squeeze on Ghana? No one in his right mind bothers to attack an already-dying concern. Who made up the figures of Ghana's supposed "debt" ? Why was only one side of the ledger shown—why no mention of assets? How can the obvious evidence of the modernisation and industrialisation of Ghana, such as the new roads, factories, schools and hospitals, the harbour and town of Tema, the Volta and Teffie bridges and the Volta dam be reconciled with the charge of wasted expenditure? If the Ghanaian people were starving, why no evidence of this, and why no popular participation in the "coup"? How was it that Ghana had the highest living standard in Africa per capita, the highest literacy rate, and was the nearest to achieving genuine economic independence? All these questions. and many related to them, are now being asked. An examination of our development plans and of their implementation reveals the truth—that it was their success and not their failure which spurred our enemies into action. Ghana, on the threshold of economic independence, and in the vanguard of the African revolutionary struggle to achieve continental liberation and unity, was too dangerous an example to the rest of Africa to be allowed to continue under a socialist-directed government. | ||
In the first ten years of its administration, the Ghana government drew up the First and Second Five Year Development Plans (1951-1956 and 1959-1964), and the Consolidation Plan, which covered the two-year gap between these Plans ( 1957- 1959). Under these Plans the foundations were to be laid for the modernisation and industrialisation of Ghana. A skilled labour force was to be trained and an adequate complement of [[public services]] built up such as [[transport]], [[electricity]], [[Water supply|water]] and [[telecommunications]]. | In the first ten years of its administration, the Ghana government drew up the First and Second Five Year Development Plans (1951-1956 and 1959-1964), and the Consolidation Plan, which covered the two-year gap between these Plans ( 1957- 1959). Under these Plans the foundations were to be laid for the modernisation and industrialisation of Ghana. A skilled labour force was to be trained and an adequate complement of [[public services]] built up such as [[transport]], [[electricity]], [[Water supply|water]] and [[telecommunications]]. | ||
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Failure to promote the interests of our people was due to the insatiable demands of colonial exploitation. It was not until we had grasped political power that we were in a position to challenge this, and to develop our resources for the benefit of the Ghanaian people. Those who would judge us merely by the heights we have achieved would do well to remember the depths from which we started. | Failure to promote the interests of our people was due to the insatiable demands of colonial exploitation. It was not until we had grasped political power that we were in a position to challenge this, and to develop our resources for the benefit of the Ghanaian people. Those who would judge us merely by the heights we have achieved would do well to remember the depths from which we started. | ||
The condition of Ghana in 1964 showed that our first two Development Plans had been carried out with a high degree of success. We had one of the most modern network of roads in Africa. Takoradi harbour had been extended, and the great artificial harbour at | The condition of Ghana in 1964 showed that our first two Development Plans had been carried out with a high degree of success. We had one of the most modern network of roads in Africa. Takoradi harbour had been extended, and the great artificial harbour at Tema, the largest in Africa, built from scratch. Large extensions to the supply of water and to the telecommunication network had been constructed, and further extensions were under construction. Our agriculture was being diversified and mechanised. Above all, the Volta River Project, which was designed to provide the electrical power for our great social, agricultural and industrialisation programme, was almost completed. | ||
In education, progress was equally impressive. In ten years we had achieved more than in the whole period of colonial rule. The figures below show the great increase in the numbers of children in primary and middle schools, and of students in secondary and technical schools and in colleges of higher education. | In education, progress was equally impressive. In ten years we had achieved more than in the whole period of colonial rule. The figures below show the great increase in the numbers of children in primary and middle schools, and of students in secondary and technical schools and in colleges of higher education. | ||
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| colspan="4" |'''''Transport and Communications''''' | | colspan="4" |'''''Transport and Communications''''' | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | colspan="4" |Roads (in miles)— | ||
|- | |- | ||
|Class I (Bitumen) | |Class I (Bitumen) | ||
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The task of correcting the imbalance in our food economy was regarded as the greatest challenge to the agricultural sector of the Plan. Far-reaching schemes were initiated for major improvements in irrigation and water conservation in the Northern and Upper Regions of Ghana. Peasant farmers throughout the country were informed that they would be able to make use of the agricultural machinery of state and cooperative farms. It was not the government's intention to squeeze out the peasant farmer. Far from it, we needed the maximum effort of every individual farmer if we were to achieve our agricultural targets. | The task of correcting the imbalance in our food economy was regarded as the greatest challenge to the agricultural sector of the Plan. Far-reaching schemes were initiated for major improvements in irrigation and water conservation in the Northern and Upper Regions of Ghana. Peasant farmers throughout the country were informed that they would be able to make use of the agricultural machinery of state and cooperative farms. It was not the government's intention to squeeze out the peasant farmer. Far from it, we needed the maximum effort of every individual farmer if we were to achieve our agricultural targets. | ||
During the period of the Plan, Ghana's production of raw materials was to be considerably increased. Cocoa, our main export, earned the country 1 ,680 million cedis between 1951 and 1961. Of this | During the period of the Plan, Ghana's production of raw materials was to be considerably increased. Cocoa, our main export, earned the country 1,680 million cedis between 1951 and 1961. Of this, the farmers received 1,008 million cedis and the remainder was used by the government and the Cocoa Marketing Board for maintaining public services and for the general development of the country. We increased our cocoa production from 264,000 tons in 1956-57, to 590,000 tons in 1963-64, and huge silos had been built, able to store half the cocoa crop, to enable us to restrict exports and so ensure a fair price for our cocoa in the world market. | ||
Plans were also far advanced to increase exports of timber, and to develop new species of wood for buildings. furniture and other wood products, and for use in paper factories. Efforts were being made to revive our once-flourishing export crop of palm oil. [[Rubber]] production was being increased. In the Western Region, a vast new plantation, 18 miles long, had been sown. Within two to three years Ghana was to be one of the greatest rubber producers in Africa. The production of palm oil, cotton, sugar cane and tobacco was being stepped up. By 1970, there were to be four factories in operation producing | Plans were also far advanced to increase exports of timber, and to develop new species of wood for buildings. furniture and other wood products, and for use in paper factories. Efforts were being made to revive our once-flourishing export crop of palm oil. [[Rubber]] production was being increased. In the Western Region, a vast new plantation, 18 miles long, had been sown. Within two to three years Ghana was to be one of the greatest rubber producers in Africa. The production of palm oil, cotton, sugar cane and tobacco was being stepped up. By 1970, there were to be four factories in operation producing 100,000 tons of sugar a year, more than sufficient to eliminate the item from our list of imports. | ||
Greatest of all our development projects was the Volta dam. When the Seven Year Plan was launched, the Volta Project was expected to begin to generate electrical power by September 1965. Completion of the Project would enable us to develop the full industrial potential of Ghana. It would increase by nearly 600 per cent the installed electrical capacity of the country. Nearly one-half of this new capacity would be taken up by the aluminium smelter in | Greatest of all our development projects was the Volta dam. When the Seven Year Plan was launched, the Volta Project was expected to begin to generate electrical power by September 1965. Completion of the Project would enable us to develop the full industrial potential of Ghana. It would increase by nearly 600 per cent the installed electrical capacity of the country. Nearly one-half of this new capacity would be taken up by the aluminium smelter in Tema; it is estimated that Ghana has sufficient bauxite to last for 200 years. But apart from this the Volta Project would have an ample reserve of power for other users, and Ghana would have liberated herself decisively from the possibility of a power shortage becoming a brake on the rate of economic progress. | ||
Construction targets for the various parts of the Volta River Project were achieved, some of them ahead of schedule, and the official inauguration ceremony took place on 23rd January 1966. At that time, building was about to start on a large subsidiary dam at Bui. Plans were also well advanced for the construction of an alumina plant which would have given Ghanaians control of the whole process of [[aluminium]] production. As it was, we were exporting [[bauxite]] to the United Kingdom for processing while we were importing alumina manufactured in the United States from bauxite mined in [[Jamaica]] for our aluminium smelter. | Construction targets for the various parts of the Volta River Project were achieved, some of them ahead of schedule, and the official inauguration ceremony took place on 23rd January 1966. At that time, building was about to start on a large subsidiary dam at Bui. Plans were also well advanced for the construction of an alumina plant which would have given Ghanaians control of the whole process of [[aluminium]] production. As it was, we were exporting [[bauxite]] to the United Kingdom for processing while we were importing alumina manufactured in the United States from bauxite mined in [[Jamaica]] for our aluminium smelter. | ||
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In keeping with my government's policy of linking Ghana's progress with Africa's total development, provision was made in the Plan for economic co-operation with other African states. As I said in my address to the National Assembly on 11th March 1964:<blockquote>"While we wait for the setting up of a Union Government for Africa, we must begin immediately to harmonise our plans for Africa's total development. For example, I see no reason why the independent African states should not, with advantage to each other, join together in an economic union and draw up together a joint Development Plan which will give us greater scope and flexibility to our mutual advantage. By the same token, I see no reason why the independent African states should not have common shipping and air lines in the interests of improved services and economy. With such rationalisation of our economic policies, we could have common objectives and thus eliminate unnecessary competition and frontier barriers and disputes."</blockquote>When in fact I inaugurated the completed Volta River Project on 23rd January 1966, I said: "We are ready and prepared to supply power to our neighbours in Togo, Dahomey, Ivory Coast and Upper Volta. As far as I am concerned this project is not for Ghana alone. Indeed, I have already offered to share our power resources with our sister African states." | In keeping with my government's policy of linking Ghana's progress with Africa's total development, provision was made in the Plan for economic co-operation with other African states. As I said in my address to the National Assembly on 11th March 1964:<blockquote>"While we wait for the setting up of a Union Government for Africa, we must begin immediately to harmonise our plans for Africa's total development. For example, I see no reason why the independent African states should not, with advantage to each other, join together in an economic union and draw up together a joint Development Plan which will give us greater scope and flexibility to our mutual advantage. By the same token, I see no reason why the independent African states should not have common shipping and air lines in the interests of improved services and economy. With such rationalisation of our economic policies, we could have common objectives and thus eliminate unnecessary competition and frontier barriers and disputes."</blockquote>When in fact I inaugurated the completed Volta River Project on 23rd January 1966, I said: "We are ready and prepared to supply power to our neighbours in Togo, Dahomey, Ivory Coast and Upper Volta. As far as I am concerned this project is not for Ghana alone. Indeed, I have already offered to share our power resources with our sister African states." | ||
On that day at Akosombo, some 60 miles north-east of Accra, when I switched on illuminating lights signifying the official opening of hydro-electric power from the Volta, one of my greatest dreams had come true. I had witnessed the widescale electrification of Ghana and the breakthrough into a new era of economic and social advance. The Volta Dam permitted not only a large aluminium plant at | On that day at Akosombo, some 60 miles north-east of Accra, when I switched on illuminating lights signifying the official opening of hydro-electric power from the Volta, one of my greatest dreams had come true. I had witnessed the widescale electrification of Ghana and the breakthrough into a new era of economic and social advance. The Volta Dam permitted not only a large aluminium plant at Tema processing the country's rich bauxite deposits, but a broad range of other industrial projects. The initial power output is 5 12,000 kW (588,000 kW at full load) and the ultimate power output will be 768,000 kW (882,000 kW at full load). There are 500 miles of trans· mission lines. The main grid carries 161,000 volts. | ||
The water building up behind the dam is forming the largest man-made lake in the world. It will cover an area of 3,275 square miles with a capacity of 1 20 million acre feet of water, and will be 250 miles long, with a shore-line of 4,500 miles. Approximately 80,000 people had to be moved from the area submerged by the lake. This necessitated the construction of 50 new villages and towns to accommodate them, the provision of modern housing, schools, piped water, electricity, medical facilities and new forms of employment. Thousands of acres of land had to be cleared, and people settled on farms and smallholdings with up-to-date methods of cultivation and animal husbandry. All this was achieved. | The water building up behind the dam is forming the largest man-made lake in the world. It will cover an area of 3,275 square miles with a capacity of 1 20 million acre feet of water, and will be 250 miles long, with a shore-line of 4,500 miles. Approximately 80,000 people had to be moved from the area submerged by the lake. This necessitated the construction of 50 new villages and towns to accommodate them, the provision of modern housing, schools, piped water, electricity, medical facilities and new forms of employment. Thousands of acres of land had to be cleared, and people settled on farms and smallholdings with up-to-date methods of cultivation and animal husbandry. All this was achieved. | ||
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The creation of the Volta Lake has already provided facilities for an important fresh-water fishing industry. The Volta River contained numerous excellent indigenous fish; and research has shown which fish to breed to increase the supply, and how to control weed growth. A number of ports and fishing villages being formed round the lake-side provide bases for a cheap means of transport from the north to the south of Ghana. Furthermore, the lake forms a vast reservoir, making possible the improvement of water supplies to towns and villages and the irrigation of land for agriculture. The natural seasonal fluctuation in the level of the lake will immediately affect 650 square miles of land, permitting the cultivation of rice and other crops. Lake Volta was also to be developed as a holiday and tourist attraction. | The creation of the Volta Lake has already provided facilities for an important fresh-water fishing industry. The Volta River contained numerous excellent indigenous fish; and research has shown which fish to breed to increase the supply, and how to control weed growth. A number of ports and fishing villages being formed round the lake-side provide bases for a cheap means of transport from the north to the south of Ghana. Furthermore, the lake forms a vast reservoir, making possible the improvement of water supplies to towns and villages and the irrigation of land for agriculture. The natural seasonal fluctuation in the level of the lake will immediately affect 650 square miles of land, permitting the cultivation of rice and other crops. Lake Volta was also to be developed as a holiday and tourist attraction. | ||
Ghanaians are justifiably proud that their own government provided £35,000,000, that is half of the cost of the Volta River Project as well as meeting the cost of the new port and township of | Ghanaians are justifiably proud that their own government provided £35,000,000, that is half of the cost of the Volta River Project as well as meeting the cost of the new port and township of Tema, which was an essential part of the scheme. The balance of the £70,000,000 required was to be raised by international loans as follows: | ||
{| class="wikitable" | {| class="wikitable" | ||
|+ | |+ | ||
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1 technician (laboratory, X-ray, etc.) to 5,000 patients | 1 technician (laboratory, X-ray, etc.) to 5,000 patients | ||
1 health inspector to | 1 health inspector to 15,000 people | ||
1 health auxiliary (vaccinators, dressing-room attendants, etc.) to 1,000 people. | 1 health auxiliary (vaccinators, dressing-room attendants, etc.) to 1,000 people. | ||
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No possible justification can be given for its abandonment and the sell-out of Ghana's increasing assets. The first phase of the Plan was going well, and according to schedule. During the first year, £48,900,000 was spent on development projects, and of this amount, £16 million went into the key sectors, agriculture and industry. In agriculture, the emphasis was on diversification. State farms cultivated 24,000 acres of rubber, oil palm, banana, urena, lobata, coconut and citrus. Together with the agricultural wing of the Workers Brigade, which alone had 1 2,500 acres, the two institutions cultivated large areas for cereals and vegetables. During this period also, improvements were made in the modernisation and productivity of private and co-operative farms. | No possible justification can be given for its abandonment and the sell-out of Ghana's increasing assets. The first phase of the Plan was going well, and according to schedule. During the first year, £48,900,000 was spent on development projects, and of this amount, £16 million went into the key sectors, agriculture and industry. In agriculture, the emphasis was on diversification. State farms cultivated 24,000 acres of rubber, oil palm, banana, urena, lobata, coconut and citrus. Together with the agricultural wing of the Workers Brigade, which alone had 1 2,500 acres, the two institutions cultivated large areas for cereals and vegetables. During this period also, improvements were made in the modernisation and productivity of private and co-operative farms. | ||
In the industrial sphere, during this period, nearly all the initiative was in the public sector. The construction of many new industrial plants were undertaken. These included a steelworks (30,000 tons), two cocoa processing plants, one at Takoradi (28,000 tons) and the other at | In the industrial sphere, during this period, nearly all the initiative was in the public sector. The construction of many new industrial plants were undertaken. These included a steelworks (30,000 tons), two cocoa processing plants, one at Takoradi (28,000 tons) and the other at Tema (68,600 tons), two sugar refineries, a textile printing plant, a glass factory, a chocolate factory, a meat processing plant, a radio assembly plant and a large printing works at Tema. All these factories were brought into production during the first phase of the Plan. | ||
In addition, work was well advanced on a textile mill and a complex of food industries at | In addition, work was well advanced on a textile mill and a complex of food industries at Tema, a gold refinery at Tarkwa, and asbestos, cement, shoe and rubber-tyre factories at Kumasi. The buildings for an atomic reactor at Kwabinya were almost finished. So also was a plant for the manufacture of pre-fabricated houses. In fact, the basic policy underlying the Seven Year Development Plan, to change the structure of our mainly agricultural economy into a balanced modern economy, was going ahead with great speed and efficiency. We were successfully managing to use our local raw materials for establishing industries, and were beginning to satisfy local demand for certain consumer goods. For example, we produced matches, shoes. nails, sweets. chocolate. soft drinks, whisky. beer, gin, etc., cigarettes, biscuits, paints, canned fruit, insecticides and other chemicals. An indication of the build-up of our industrial strength may be seen in the fact that at the beginning of January 1966 imports of raw materials amounted to about 9 per cent of Ghana's total imports. | ||
Before the February action, the government was investing £25 million annually in manufacturing projects, and the country's main exports: | Before the February action, the government was investing £25 million annually in manufacturing projects, and the country's main exports: | ||
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== 6. Set Back == | == 6. Set Back == | ||
The counter-revolutionary nature of the military-police regime in Ghana became obvious within hours of its establishment. Steps were taken immediately by the "N.L.C." to destroy our socialist gains and achievements, and to end Ghana's active participation in the African Revolution. In other words, we were to witness the all too familiar pattern and techniques of an imperialist and neo-colonialist attack, through a puppet government, on both socialism and the African continental struggle for liberation and unity. | |||
One of the first acts of the "N.L.C." was to announce the abandonment of the Seven Year Development Plan. Work was stopped on state enterprises and industries and they were offered for sale to private investors. Ghana was thrown wide open, as in colonial days, to all the foreign exploitation we had worked so hard to end. The imperialist press, reflecting the jubilation in government circles in Washington, London, Bonn, Salisbury and Johannesburg, displayed such headings as: "Ghana Swings to the West," "The New Ghana Moves Westwards," and "Ghana Comes to Heel." Ghana was being sold into political and economic slavery. Her image in Africa and the world was being destroyed and the drive towards an All-African Union Government set back. | |||
It is significant that Major-General Sir [[Edward Spears]], Chairman of Ashanti Goldfields, was among the first to congratulate the military and police traitors. He had accepted the hospitality of my government for the inauguration of the Volta River Project and was still in Ghana when the action took place. He at once sent a message to the "N.L.C.," requesting an interview "at 7 p.m. on Thursday, March 3rd". He was immediately given the appointment he had asked for. Spears must have been very sure of his ground. It is hardly customary for businessmen to name the precise time and date of a meeting with heads of government. But as Spears said in his report to the shareholders of the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation on 30th March 1966: "Before I had my talk with General Ankrah, there were already indications that we would find the new regime much more satisfactory to deal with than the old." As puppets of neo-colonialists, members of the "N.L.C." were right from the start committed to an economic sell-out. | |||
Businessmen from the U.S.A., from Britain, [[West Germany]], [[State of Israel|Israel]] and elsewhere, flew into Ghana like vultures to grab the richest pickings. Virtually all the state-owned industries developed by my government were allowed to pass into private ownership. These included such enterprises as The Timber Products Corporation, The Cocoa Products Corporation, the Diamond Mining Corporation, the National Steel Works, the Black Star Shipping Line, Ghana Airways, and all the stateowned hotels. | |||
As a result of the economic sell-out, the private sector would be the largest in terms of number of persons engaged and gross output. Under my government, the private sector was the smallest, and there were plans to reduce it even further. The establishment of joint private/government business enterprises, the "N.L.C." stated, would be "purely on a voluntary basis." As for the remaining sectors, active state participation would be limited to "certain basic and key projects", though no details were given; and the activities of the Co-operative movement would be "purely economic". It would "not be allowed to get itself involved in politics". As if to reassure their neo-colonialist masters even more, the "N.L.C." went on to say that it had no plans for [[Nationalization|nationalisation]]. and would work towards the eventual abolition of import controls from the economy. There was to be a two-year "review period" starting on 1st July 1966, during which there would be "proper economic stocktaking". Even "N.L.C." supporters must have marvelled at the time to be spent on "stocktaking" when the nation was supposed to be in such dire economic trouble. But, according to the "N.L.C.," this was necessary if Ghana was to be in a position to expect "help" from the "outside world". | |||
And the "N.L.C." called this miserable "For Sale" notice an "economic" plan. This was to be their substitute for the Seven Year Development Plan with its positive constructive detailed proposals for the economic emancipation of Ghana. | |||
However, it brought results in the shape of the usual handouts granted by imperialists and neo-colonialists to well-behaved puppets. Within two weeks of the ending of legal government in Ghana, the army and police traitors received an invitation to send a mission to Washington for talks with the International Monetary Fund and World Bank officials. The upshot was a £13 million stand-by credit received from the l.M.F. and eventually new loans from the U.S.A., Canada and West Germany. In addition, supplies of various foodstuffs and other consumer goods were promised to provide the necessary window dressing for the new regime. | |||
In the recent wave of coups which have taken place in Asia, Latin America and Africa, all this has come to be standard practice. Wherever progressive governments have been replaced by counter-revolutionary forces, imperialist financial organisations have rushed to bolster them up with loans and various forms of so-called "aid". It is a necessary corollary to the "big lie" usually employed to justify the overthrow of "undesirable governments"—the lie of "economic chaos" and a "starving" population. But more important, it serves to tighten the stranglehold of foreign economic control over the captive people by creating more indebtedness and a deeper penetration by foreign business interests. | |||
The Economic Committee set up by the "N.L.C." admitted in a statement on 3rd March 1966 that Ghana's economy was "basically strong", and that a mere £15 million was all that was needed to overcome immediate difficulties. Yet members of the Economic Committee went like beggars, cap in hand, for talks in Washington, London, Bonn and other capitals greedily snatching any niggardly hand-outs offered, and cravenly agreeing to all kinds of conditions attached to them. During talks in London in June 1966, it was announced that nine public corporations were to be handed over to private enterprise; and investors, both local and foreign, were to be invited to join in the running of six others. | |||
On that occasion, the Committee was discussing Ghana's economy with 13 Western creditor countries, and asking for their agreement on the re-scheduling of capital and interest payments. The Committee only managed to get their agreement to report back to their governments and the promise of a further meeting "in due course". I wonder if the Committee paused to reflect then on the different attitude of our creditors among the socialist countries. These had granted Ghana an unconditional moratorium on capital and interest payments, knowing that the slump in the price of cocoa had been the main cause of our borrowing, and that our difficulties were only temporary. My government had made certain economies, but had rejected Western demands for drastic cuts in publicly-owned industries which we regarded as vital to economic independence. | |||
Apart from handing over public corporations to private enterprise, the "N.L.C." announced drastic cuts in the routes operated by Ghana Airways, the halting of work on the new international airport at Tamale in Northern Ghana, and the cancellation of a number of orders for new ships for the state-owned Black Star Line. Both Ghana Airways and the Black Star Line were established by my government to break the monopoly of foreign transport companies. They were ultimately to become foreign currency earners. | |||
At Afienya, some 26 miles from Accra, the "N.L.C." shut down the excellent Gliding School established by Flight Captain Hanna Reitsch. The School, recognised as among the best in the world, was providing valuable initial flying training for members of the Young Pioneers, Army and Air Force cadets, and for trainees from other African countries. | |||
The excuse was made that these were all prestige projects. The same excuse was given as the reason for abandoning or selling to private ownership other important state enterprises, though everyone knows that they were surrendered because they threatened the business interests of the new masters of Ghana—the neo-colonialists and their agents. The foundation of new industries and the building up of national air and shipping lines is seen as evidence of prestige spending only by imperialists and neo-colonialists who wish to see a country revert back to the position of a colony. | |||
The Juapong Textile and Knitting factory near Akosombo in the Volta Region, was one of the many vital development projects to be abandoned during the first few months of "N.L.C." rule. This factory, half completed when the army and police traitors seized power, was to offer employment to over 800 people, and to make use of 400,000 tons of locally-produced cotton from the Abutia, Chinderi and Zongo Mancheri state farms. The factory, when completed, was expected to produce over 80,000 tons of textiles of various kinds annually, and about 3,000 tons of knitwear. It was the only industry sited by the government in the Volta Region, and suspension of work on it therefore caused bitter disappointment locally, and resulted in a great waste of time, energy and money. A writer in the ''Ghanaian Times'' visited the site towards the end of 1966 and reported "the whole area desolate, with the half-completed buildings almost overgrown with weeds". The project had been started by Chinese experts, and when these were sent home no attempt was made to continue with the work. | |||
Another example of the stupidity of sending away much-needed specialists from socialist countries may be seen in the "N.L.C.'s" decision to return the 29 Russian-built fishing trawlers which had been lying idle since the departure of the Soviet technicians. And this when the people of Ghana badly need an increase in the protein content of their diet. Later, as a result of protests, the "N.L.C." declared their intention to sell the trawlers to private interests. | |||
Some 2,500 Russian and Chinese experts were expelled from Ghana by the "N.L.C.," regardless of the invaluable services they were rendering to the economic development of the country. The "N.L.C." had stated that it was "nonaligned" yet it callously sacrificed the interests of the people by abandoning precious economic projects simply for political reasons. Even the imperialist press was moved to remark: "The new regime is pledged to pursue a policy of non-alignment while being friendly with all. But there is no mistaking the fair breeze blowing towards the Western camp at the moment" (''Daily Telegraph'', 10th March 1966). | |||
All projects or schemes developed by Soviet or Chinese experts, and also several undertaken by specialists from other socialist countries, were suspended, abandoned entirely, or sold to foreign capitalists. Small wonder William H. Beaty, Vice-President of the [[Chase Manhattan Bank]] of the U.S.A., was quick to visit Ghana and spoke of the "favourable investment conditions" owing to the "remarkable strides" which had been made since 24th February 1966. Like his counterparts in other capitalist countries, he doubtless regarded Ghana under the "N.L.C." as just another client state set up to sustain imperialism, neo-colonialism and the capitalist economies of the West. | |||
Traitors among our own people are helping in the sell-out. Seeing the opportunity to make quick money, some of them have become "market analysts" for prospective investors. Perhaps they hope the grand-sounding name may disguise the fact that they are raking in vast sums of money by acting as middle-men in the disgraceful and indiscriminate disposal of Ghana's state property to private enterprise. Their task has been made easy by the encouragement of prospective investors by advertisements of the Capital Investments Board. They have been promised generous concessions, including a ten-year tax holiday and the free transfer abroad of profits after the payment of any tax due. What a paradise for neo-colonialists—the free transfer abroad of profits and a tax holiday; and all this without any strings attached. In their wildest dreams they could not have hoped for better conditions, even from the servile "N.L.C." | |||
Under my government, there was strict control of the operations of all foreign firms in Ghana. We were constantly vigilant to see that there was no exploitation of the Ghanaian people, and that most of the profits were retained inside Ghana to be used to promote further economic and social development. | |||
In Ghana today it is as though the clock suddenly stopped on 24th February 1966, and the hands have been turned backwards. Unfinished factory buildings remain in precisely the same condition as when the builders left them after work on 23rd February 1966. The machines of other factories, said to be prestige projects or closed because of the departure of foreign technicians, lie idle while thousands of Ghanaian [[Unemployment|unemployed]] fill the streets. Work on new schools, hospitals. roads and airport buildings has stopped, the new regime making the excuse that the country is too poor to pay for them. The cars and property of Party officials have been sold; where the money has gone, only the "N.L.C." can tell. | |||
My personal Research Office, where documents of all kinds were being filed, and valuable records were being built up, was ransacked, and the painstaking work of many years destroyed. Many thousands of books in my library were senselessly torn up or burnt. | |||
Housing schemes have been abandoned. For example, work has been stopped on the manufacture of prefabricated houses which were being built to relieve the acute housing shortage. Some of the vital services have been neglected, such as water purification and insecticide spraying, both essential for the health of the people and for the keeping down of insect pests. Locusts have once again become a problem. They had not been seen in Ghana since 1933. Health facilities of all kinds have been allowed to run down, and many doctors have resigned. The "N.L.C." even deported from Ghana the distinguished United States medical expert [[Ana Livia Cordero|Dr. Anna Livia Cordero]] who had come from [[Commonwealth of Puerto Rico|Puerto Rico]] to help with our public health services. Though she held the highest medical diplomas the rebel regime would not allow her to continue work in Ghana because of her criticisms of their policy. | |||
State farms, rubber and cotton plantations, and other rural development projects have been allowed to fall into decay, and valuable crops lost due to lack of attention. Large quantities of cocoa are being smuggled out of Ghana, with disastrous effects on the economy. | |||
The only Ghanaians to benefit from the sell-out and the surrender to imperialism have been the bourgeois elements and a small number of hoarders and profiteers determined to cash-in on the free-for-all. For the ordinary men and women of Ghana it has meant a return to all the exploitation and uncertainties of colonial days. | |||
They were faced almost at once with widespread unemployment. Since 24th February 1966, many thousands have been thrown out of work. The figure given in the pro-"N.L.C." magazine ''West Africa'' (22nd April 1967) was 105,000. In relation to population and potential labour force, Ghana now has the highest unemployment rate of any country in the world. There is 30 per cent. unemployment in Accra alone. Never before has Ghana experienced anything like the mass unemployment resulting from "N.L.C." misrule and mismanagement. Apart from the men and women thrown out of work from state factories and farms, thousands more have been dismissed from the Workers Brigade and other organisations. To these have been added Party officials, T.U.C. employees, newspaper reporters and editors, employees of the Bureau of African Affairs, the African Affairs Centre and similar organisations. Hundreds have been expelled from schools and colleges because they supported socialism and the programme of African liberation and unity. | |||
Coupled with the distress caused by mass unemployment and the victimisation of supporters of the legal government, came sharp rises in the prices of certain essential foods. Prices are still rising and the standard of living is falling drastically. Some commodities have disappeared entirely from shops and markets as profiteers hoard supplies. There is a flourishing black market. Many of the police have become personally involved in the racketeering, forcing traders to sell them goods at a low price and then re-selling them at exorbitant rates. Bribery and corruption, as foreign visitors have been quick to report, have begun to penetrate every corner. | |||
In May 1967, Kofi Akyigyina, an Accra businessman, revealed to the Jiagge Commission that certain top-ranking police officers were engaged in private business. He told how four senior police officers had teamed up with a few other persons to operate a multi-lateral company in Ghana for the manufacture of milk powder, shirts, soda and furniture. The company was also to deal in industrial and commercial diamonds, diamond products, and to construct roads and bridges. Financiers from the U.S.A. were expected to assist. Akyigyina said that directors of the company actually held their meetings at Police Headquarters in Accra, and that in April 1967 two [[Italian Republic|Italian]] businessmen were interviewed by the directors of the company, again at Police Headquarters. | |||
As a result of these disclosures, and to prevent any further adverse publicity, Deputy Commissioners of Police, E. K. Levi and A. K. Biney, and Chief Superintendents G. C. Tay and G. K. Acheampong were dismissed from the Police Service. | |||
The "N.L.C.," pressing ahead with what it called "[[austerity]]" measures repeatedly urged Ghanaians to tighten their belts and to make sacrifices. But they were being asked to suffer for no apparent reason. There had been times of stringency under my government, but then they knew the reasons for it. All around they could see evidence of building and development. They knew they were helping to implement the Seven Year Development Plan which would ultimately bring economic independence and a big rise in their standard of living. After 24th February 1966, however, they saw the abandonment of development projects, the departure of foreign experts on which many of the new industries depended, and the wholesale selling of state-owned enterprises to private investors. They noted the sudden influx of British, American, Israeli and West German businessmen; and the way that the U.S. and British ambassadors practically live at the Castle, where the "N.L.C." has its administrative headquarters. They moved to the Castle from Police Headquarters for greater safety. | |||
Instead of the accent being on development there seemed to be nothing but destruction and negative policies—a pulling down process. The ordinary people of Ghana were told to tighten their belts and to make sacrifices so that foreign businessmen and their local stooges could grow fat on the exploitation of Ghana's resources and on the proceeds of Ghanaian labour. | |||
The puppet press and radio reflecting the official line poured out a steady stream of abuse against me personally and against my government. Endless commissions of enquiry were set up, manned by members of the old opposition and various other ambitious men anxious to ingratiate themselves with the new regime. Staged public hearings were given to previously-prepared witnesses, to which correspondents of the foreign and local press were invited. The testimony of these so-called witnesses was claimed to be incontrovertible proof of the "wickedness" of my government. As fast as one commission ended its work another was set up. It seemed the "N.L.C." was desperate to keep up a constant flow of invective, and often filthy abuse, for the subservient press and radio to publicise. The majority of Ghanaians became sickened by the whole process. Most of the mud stuck to the hands of the throwers. | |||
A particularly nauseating part of the smear campaign was the putting of a dead woman and child into the refrigerator at Flagstaff House, saying that this was "Kwame Nkrumah's juju", and inviting public inspection. The woman and child were among those murdered on 24th February. But the public turned the open invitation to Flagstaff House into a kind of pilgrimage and the inspection offer had to be quickly withdrawn. | |||
The attacks on me personally began as soon as it was known that I had gone to Guinea and intended returning to Ghana to restore legal government. Having declared on 24th February 1966 that "the myth of Kwame Nkrumah has been destroyed" they showed that they thought it still very much alive, by launching an all-out attack on me in the press and on the radio. I am, it seems, a [[Adolf Hitler|Hitler]], a [[Vladimir Lenin|Lenin]], a Bluebeard, a [[Mao Zedong|Mao Tse-tung]], a Tsar, a Leninist Tsar, a miser, a spendthrift, and latterly, a criminal, guilty of "murder and conspiracy", with a price of £50,000 on my head. | |||
Western newspapers and periodicals, particularly in the U.S., Britain and West Germany, also maintain a barrage of abuse. In attacks of unprecedented ferocity, I am accused of practically every character fault imaginable. The falseness of the accusations, and the personal nature of the charges, make me wonder if the writers and editors have adopted this method of attack because they are unable to challenge or refute my political ideas and philosophy or the consistency of my efforts for the attainment of African continental freedom and an All-African Union Government. | |||
In the notices of "wanted men" put up outside police stations in Ghana in January 1967, full details were given of my physical appearance and career as though I were a common criminal, and as if Ghanaians had never heard of me. The authors of the notice made themselves look even more ridiculous by saying that I had been imprisoned "for political offences" in 1950! If I hadn't seen the notices myself I would have found it hard to believe they could have made such a laughing-stock of themselves. | |||
I had, according to the "N.L.C." and their stooges, quite a record. But not, I think, the record by which I am judged by the people of Ghana and of Africa. They know me. They know the kind of life I lead, and the goals for which I strive. I make no defence. I make no apology. I do not consider myself on trial. But for the benefit of foreign critics who may have swallowed probably the most vicious lie of all-that I have built up a large personal fortune, I must add that the "N.L.C." has itself had to admit that the allegation is false and untrue. | |||
As each day has passed, unemployment, strikes, rioting and crime of all kinds have increased in Ghana. The local press began to report some of the most sensational facts and figures. But steps were soon taken by the "N.L.C." to suppress the publication of any adverse news and comment. Early in October 1966 it issued what have come to be called the "Rumours Decrees" to muzzle the press and to give the police the power to arrest and detain without warrant. Decree 92 made it an offence, punishable with up to three years imprisonment, to publish anything "likely to cause alarm and despondency . . . . disturb the public peace . . . . or cause disaffection against the N.L.C." My own government had enacted legislation to deal with rumour mongering. In a country where many people were still unfortunately illiterate, dangerous rumours can be circulated and obtain wide currency. For example, there was a rumour that because on a new bank note issued no date appeared, the notes in question were valueless and we used this legislation to deal with those who put round such stories when we knew them to be false. The "N.L.C." decrees are of quite a different sort. They were aimed at the press and at their supporters who were beginning to see through the pretensions of the military and timidly to expose them. | |||
Editors and journalists who were employed under my government were dismissed, and most of them imprisoned soon after the army and police traitors seized power. Party editors were seized, beaten up and flung into prison. But their replacements are not proving easy to control. After the arrest of the Editors-in-Chief of the ''Evening News'' and the ''Ghanaian Times'', two formerly-detained journalists were appointed to replace them—Henry Thompson and K. Y. Attoh. They began by dismissing journalists said to be orientated towards socialism and Nkrumaism, and their authority was bolstered up by daily visits of armed soldiers to the [[Guinea Press]]. But before long, Thompson and Attoh began to criticise the new regime. Thompson campaigned for an early return to civil government, and called for a halt to the raiding, looting and burning of Workers Brigade Camps. Attoh, for his part, protested against the destoolment of 194 chiefs and their replacement by "N.L.C." puppets. Jointly, they attacked profiteering and other malpractices, and exposed the tribalism and backward-sliding of the "N.L.C." The result has been the appointment of a new Chief Editor for the whole Press, Moses Danquah, though it is doubtful if he will prove any more co-operative. | |||
Bob Bannerman, who worked at the Guinea Press for 8 years, and continued working there for a further three months after the army-police insurrection, has written from the safety of London about how the "N.L.C." took over the Press in Ghana:<blockquote>"Despite the appeal of the 'N.L.C.' clique, few people turned out for work on the first day. When it was later learnt that the army bandits planned to set fire to the Press, we had no alternative but to surrender, and publish the numerous decrees of the illegal clique, including anti-Nkrumah letters manufactured by the 'N.L.C.' and purporting to come from readers."</blockquote>Bannerman describes the arrival of army units at the Press, the dismissals and threats, and the resulting apparent subservience. He continues: <blockquote>"The dismissal of professional journalists like G. T. Anim, General Manager of the Ghana News Agency, and E. Coleman, Director of Broadcasting, came later, but the replacements of the 'N.L.C.' were so bad that they threaten the entire Press, T.V., and Radio network in Ghana. In fact the entire profession has been paralysed."</blockquote>The Chairman of the Ghana Broadcasting Service, Cecil Forde, has been arrested and detained. Many journalists and workers of the External Broadcasting Department have been dismissed because they supported programmes on African unity, and because they were not Ghanaians, though they were Africans. This was in line with orders from the U.S. Embassy in Accra, to root out all possible sources of criticism of U.S. imperialism, and to chase all progressive non-Ghanaian Africans from Ghana. | |||
Foreign correspondents of [[TASS]], [[Izvestia]] and [[Pravda]] were attacked openly and their offices closed down. The correspondent of the [[Xinhua News Agency|New China News Agency]] (Hsinhua) also received rough treatment. He had published descriptions of the assaults made on foreign journalists and technicians. | |||
However, propaganda teams from Britain and the United States have full access to all Press establishments, and the U.S. Press attaché visits the Guinea Press at least twice a day. | |||
The few foreign journalists from socialist countries who have managed to continue to operate in Ghana are gradually being forced to leave as they find it impossible to refrain from writing the truth about the "N.L.C." In November 1966, Karl-Heinz Grafe, Accra correspondent of [[Allgemeiner Deutscher Nachrichtendienst|A.D.N.]], the [[German Democratic Republic (1949–1990)|East German]] News Agency, was deported from Ghana for adverse comment on the military-police dictatorship—and yet the "N.L.C." claims to have abolished censorship. So-called Press freedom clearly only extends to those willing to conceal the truth, and to write nothing but praise. | |||
An amusing example of "press freedom" as it exists under the "N.L.C." was Ankrah's address to the journalists. He was annoyed when the [[Palestinian genocide|Arab-Israeli war]] broke out that the Ghana press should have reported it so extensively. He pointed out to them that it was none of their duty and went on to say that after all the government paid them and that "he who pays the piper must call the tune". | |||
Probably one of the most criminal and stupid acts of the "N.L.C" to date has been the setting up of military tribunals "to try expeditiously certain categories of subversive offences committed by non-military personnel, conviction for any of which will carry a maximum sentence of death by a firing squad and a minimum of not less than 25 years with hard labour". | |||
This decree, known as the Armed Forces Act (1962) Amended Decree (1967) states that any person who prepared or endeavoured to produce by force any alteration of the law or the policies of the "N.L.C.," or incited, or without lawful authority had in possession, custody or control any explosives, firearms or ammunition, should be guilty of the offence of subversion. The decree also declared that any person who organised or incited any other person to go on a general strike likely to cause the overthrow of the "N.L.C." would equally be guilty of subversion. Other activities covered by the decree included the publishing of any statement or report which the person knew to be false, and which was likely to undermine the confidence of the people of Ghana in the permanency of "their newly-won freedom". The decree covered the killing or the attempt to kill, or the conspiring with any other person to kill any member of the "N.L.C.," or any Ghanaian citizen with a view to overthrowing the "N.L.C." Any person with knowledge of any of the foregoing acts who did not report it to the authorities immediately, was also to be considered guilty of subversion. A military tribunal should consist of the presiding officer, who should be an officer of the Armed Forces not below the rank of Brigadier in the Ghana Army, or its equivalent in the Ghana Navy or Air Force. It should also consist of four other members, all of whom should be officers of the Ghana Armed Forces not below the rank of Major in the Ghana Army or its equivalent in the other two services. The decree finally stipulated that the decision of the military tribunal should be final, and that no appeal should arise from such a decision. | |||
This amendment of the Armed Forces Act was published by the "N.L.C." on 30th January 1967. It reveals the depths to which the "N.L.C." had sunk and showed that they had almost reached the end of their tether. By imposing what virtually amounted to [[martial law]] it admitted for all to see that it could no longer keep in check the growing opposition to rule by the army and police clique. In giving reasons for the establishment of military tribunals, the "N.L.C" mentioned activities by a "small minority" of former Party members. The severity of the measures taken against them hardly squares with the assertion of insignificant numbers, but then the "N.L.C." has not been noted for consistency or good sense. | |||
The "N.L.C.," on assuming power, encountered immediate lack of co-operation from the judiciary. After a few months they dismissed all judges and magistrates appointed under my government, and installed others whom they thought they could count on to give favourable verdicts. It has become clear, by the resort to martial law, that even the tame judiciary cannot be relied on to act sufficiently swiftly and decisively to quell the mounting opposition. | |||
The quality of the tame judiciary may be judged from the muddled thinking displayed by Edward Akuffo-Addo, appointed Chief Justice of Ghana by the "N.L.C.", when he stated: "We do not subscribe to the sovereignty of Parliament. We subscribe to the sovereignty of law." What in fact he was saying was that sovereign power rested with the judiciary, and not with the law-making body. Making himself appear even more ridiculous, he went on to state that he saw "no biological sanction" for giving the vote at 21, and that he envisaged some kind of quality vote based on "literacy" and "intelligence"—in other words, an abandonment of the cardinal principle of true democracy: [[one man, one vote]]. | |||
Thousands of Ghanaians still remain, without trial, in prisons and detention camps. Countless others go in daily fear of arrest. But the imperialist press is silent on these matters. It has not reported the wholesale dismissal of judges and magistrates, the establishment of military tribunals, nor the strikes, boycotts, riots and other evidence of suffering and unrest. Its readers have not been told of the abolition of the free medical service, nor of the cuts in spending on education. We do not expect otherwise—it is almost war. | |||
Of course, like the leaders of all counter-revolutionary military coups, the "N.L.C." proclaimed that its intention was to hand over to civilians as soon as satisfactory arrangements could be made. And in common with their counterparts in other countries, the military and police traitors are never likely to do this. Having seized power by force they find themselves in an entirely false position. Knowing they do not represent the mass of the people, they dare not hold elections or referendums. Yet to survive they must keep up the charade of wanting a return to civilian rule by setting up constitutional commissions to prepare the way. | |||
For months, the Constitutional Commission set up by the "N.L.C." has been holding meetings, but no progress is reported. Ghanaians were invited to send suggestions for a new constitution to the Commission. The response was negligible, and the people were accused by the "N.L.C." of "apathy". On 12th January 1967, it was announced that the Constitutional Commission would divide into three working groups and would undertake an extensive tour of the Regions "to receive memoranda and oral representations from all sections of the community". There is no evidence to suggest that this venture has been any more successful. | |||
Those who overthrew the constitutional government of Ghana on 24th February 1966 cannot avoid the consequences of their treachery, or the inescapable fact that the vast majority of Ghanaians are against them. They can neither remain in power indefinitely, nor organise a return to civilian rule. | |||
It is unrealistic to imagine that a neo-colonialist military regime which seized power by force will hand over to a "civilian government" through a "general election". They may talk of "free elections" and "an early return to civilian rule", but this is simply to deceive the masses and to discourage resistance. The only effective solution lies in revolutionary action in the form of a counter-coup, that is to say, a decisive reversal of the original coup. | |||
== 7. Awakening == | == 7. Awakening == | ||
The unremitting, though ineffectual, attacks made by the military and police traitors on my government and on myself may be partly explained by the strength of the resistance they encountered. Right from the start, men and women began to meet secretly to talk about what had taken place and to discuss what should be done. Loyal members of the Party began to organise underground resistance. Soon posters and slogans began to appear on walls of buildings in Accra and elsewhere, calling on the people to rise up and overthrow the traitors. Leaflets were printed and distributed, though restrictions were placed on the sale of paper, and the police instructed sellers to take the names and addresses of anyone purchasing an unusual amount of stationery. Ghanaians had a rude awakening as they began to experience the bitter consequences of the overthrow of the constitutional government and "N.L.C." treachery. | |||
In London, two organisations went into immediate action: the Overseas Branch of the Party, and the Socialist Ghana Defence Committee. They began a campaign to inform the public of the true state of affairs in Ghana. I quote the statement issued by the Party Overseas:<blockquote>An illegal military rebellion has taken place in Ghana and is trying to seize power. | |||
The Convention People's Party Overseas regard this not only as a rebellion of leading military figures and reactionaries inside the country who have long opposed the progressive steps taken by President Nkrumah and his Government, but that it is also supported and even organised by the most reactionary forces outside Ghana. | |||
The rebellion in Ghana is occurring after similar incidents have taken place in other parts of Africa. It can therefore be seen as part of the same onslaught which has been sweeping the African continent. This offensive is directed against progressive African leaders who have been successfully resisting attempts by the imperialist powers to exploit their countries. | |||
We consider the aim of the present campaign in Ghana is to set up a typical neo-colonialist regime which will be subsidiary to foreign imperialism. It will renounce, in fact, whatever it may pretend on the surface, the independence won with such sacrifice by thousands of Ghanaians with great men like Kwame Nkrumah in the leadership. | |||
The Convention People's Party's Overseas do not recognise this so-called regime. The rebellion is regrettably being made out as a liberal democratic movement. It is not. It is an extreme right-wing movement which, if allowed to entrench itself, will turn the clock of progress many years back in Ghana. | |||
Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah remains the legal President and the constitutional head of the Republic qf Ghana. His legal government remains and will take up its authority again. We therefore call upon the British Government, and all governments for that matter, not to recognise the so-called National Liberation Council. | |||
In the meantime, the Party Overseas remains organised and at its post and calls for the continued support of all loyal Ghanaians for the legally elected leader, Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah. | |||
''Ekow Eshun'', Secretary of the Party, Overseas. (Issued in London on 24th February 1966).</blockquote>In January 1 967, another organisation, the People's Progressive Front of Ghana, was formed in London to oppose the "N.L.C." and particularly their collaborators from among the reactionary, old "opposition" elements. | |||
Reports reach me daily of mounting disorder and discontent in Ghana. Some of this is due to straightforward economic hardship caused by the abandonment of the Seven Year Development Plan, mass unemployment and rising prices, but most of it has a strong political undercurrent. This was admitted by the "N.L.C." in a broadcast to the workers in December 1966. They spoke of what they called "unreasonable strikes" and the "subversive elements" behind them. Among the innumerable strikes was one at W. Biney and Company at Tema, where some 2,000 workers were involved and armed troops had to intervene. Soon, it was found necessary to gaol strike leaders. In August 1966, more than 400 workers at the Ghana Textile Manufacturing Company went on strike and three of the leaders were sentenced to 12 months' imprisonment on charges of inciting the workers. The Ghana Trades Union Congress, then under "N.L.C." stooge control, warned workers throughout the country against what it called "a growing tendency" to strike. It is not possible to include mention here of every strike that has occurred, but hardly a week has gone by without a report of some major strike. Early in December 1966, 5,000 miners of Ashanti Goldfields Corporation in Obuasi downed tools for four days and only returned to work when their full demands had been met. Naturally, the strikers always give non-political reasons for their action, but their behaviour is clearly seen by the "N.L.C." as evidence of a nation-wide campaign of civil disobedience and sabotage. | |||
Strikes have not been confined to factories, mines and farms. Schoolchildren and students are joining in the protest against the actions of the "N.L.C." It was made plain as soon as the traitors seized power, that education was to be one of the first of the public services to be cut. Free schooling was abolished, and parents were told that they would have in future to pay for all school text-books. Building was stopped on several new schools, including two big new secondary schools in the Volta Region, and many state schools were sold to private ownership. The outcry raised by the handing over of several schools, in some cases to unqualified people, caused the "N.L.C." to stop the process, but not before much confusion had been caused. Even the docile press reported cases of schoolchildren "striking," "rioting" and indulging in "disorderly behaviour". The editorial in the Ghanaian Times of 1 5th June 1966, headed "Secondary School Riotings" began: "We are dismayed by the reports of yet another outbreak of rioting and vandalism by secondary school boys and girls . . . . First it was a school at Koforidua, next it was in Accra, and now from the noise and bustle of Accra and Koforidua the trouble has moved to the quiet hill-town of Aburi, where the boys and girls of the Adonten Secondary School rioted at midnight last Sunday." According to the report, they caused damage to school property estimated at 2,400 cedis. No explanation is given of the sudden urge of our children "to maim and destroy" as the editor of the ''Ghanaian Times'' put it, though right at the end of the editorial there is a hint that the trouble might be political since "some teachers" had been trained at the Ideological Institute in Winneba. | |||
In January 1967, I received news of the closing of the Akropong Teacher Training College due to "lack of teachers and pupils". If this was the case, it could be for only one reason---the determination of all concerned to join in the campaign of strikes and boycotts aimed at overthrowing the "N.L.C. <nowiki>''</nowiki> On 12th November 1966, about 300 students at Cape Coast University College staged a demonstration. They carried placards calling for an end to the "N.L.C." | |||
In the daily "Situation Reports" I receive has come news of the stealing of school textbooks at night from the schools. This is not surprising. Textbooks now have to be paid for, and many parents thrown out of work after 24th February 1966 have found themselves also faced with school bills for the first time. Crime of all kinds has increased rapidly. There are even reports of the theft of food, an offence previously unknown in Ghana. In June 1966, conditions in Kumasi were described as "intolerable" because of "hooliganism". Evidently the position did not improve; the deputy superintendent of police in Kumasi, M. P. Agyiri, was dismissed as a scapegoat on 24th January 1967 because it was said that he had neglected his duty and had brought the police service into disrepute. | |||
The "N.L.C." ordered the release of many convicted criminals to make room in the prisons for the thousands of political prisoners, and undoubtedly the activities of some of these men have contributed to the crime wave, but basically the trouble has been caused by genuine hardship, complete contempt for authority in the shape of stooge army and police, and by a determination to bring about the collapse of the "N.L.C." | |||
Offences such as "acts tending to disturb the peace" and other similar offences have increased sharply, and the "N.L.C." has shown an equal inability to deal with them. I remember a particularly revealing Situation Report I received on 29th August 1 966 concerning a Mr. S. R. Snyper, a locomotive foreman arrested for publicly accusing the "N.L.C." of being a "truly Notorious Liars' Council". Snyper had spoken openly against the "N.L.C." at Sekondi Railway Station. However, after several weeks, it was decided that the case should not be brought before the courts, "to avoid further publicity". | |||
The following short excerpts from Situation Reports illustrate the mounting unrest and hardship in Ghana, and are typical of the kind of information I have received regularly since arriving in Conakry. | |||
''18.8.66'' | |||
''General:'' In all Regions the trend still remains---a marked increase in cases of burglary during the night. In addition there were: | |||
1. ''Northern Region:'' 4 arrests for "Acts tending to disturb peace". | |||
2. ''Brong Ahafo:'' 8 arrests for "Acts tending to disturb the peace". | |||
''27.8.66'' | |||
''General:'' Stealing. Widespread stealing, including the stealing of foodstuffs still prevails in the Regions. | |||
''30.8.66'' | |||
''General:'' Stealing is widespread in towns and villages all over Ghana. Many cases of "Acts tending to disturb the peace". (Details followed) | |||
''1.9.66'' | |||
''Retrenchment in the Regions:'' Workers paid off in the Upper Region: | |||
Zuarangu State Farm Division . . . 306 | |||
Wa State Farm Division . . . . . . . . . 91 | |||
Bolga Young Farmers League . . . . . 8 | |||
None of the laid-off employees have been employed in other fields nor registered in any Labour Centre. Public criticism of the policy is that unemployment in the country is mounting at an alarming rate. | |||
''2.9.66'' | |||
Item 2. Further laying-off of State farm employees: | |||
According to Assistant Commissioner of Police in the Western Region, 1,281 rubber plantation workers throughout the Region were laid-off on 1st September 1966. | |||
The campaign against so-called "redundant labour" still continues. | |||
Note: This brings the number of State Farm workers affected in the Western Region to 1,380. Thus 684 more workers will be laid-off to reach the original target of 2,064 "retrenched" workers. | |||
''6.9.66'' | |||
''General:'' Widespread cases of stealing in all Regions, including stealing of school textbooks from schools during the night. | |||
''7.9.66'' | |||
''Profiteering in Volta Region:'' One Asare of the Ghana News Agency, based in Peki (Volta Region), has sent a telegram to C.I.D. headquarters in Accra reporting widespread cases of: | |||
(a) selling of essential commodities to general traders. | |||
(b) hoarding. | |||
(c) profiteering. | |||
In his telegram, Asare reported that the Volta Regional Police are aware of these malpractices but are unconcerned. | |||
''8.9.66'' | |||
''General:'' Acts tending to disturb the peace: | |||
(1) Anloga in Volta Region---1 arrest. | |||
(2) Sekondi in Western Region---2 arrests. | |||
''Other information of interest:'' | |||
''Location Workers meeting in Sekondi:'' Western Region Special Branch reports that on 8th September 1966, the Location Branch of Railway Administration and Port Workers Union held an hour's general meeting at Sekondi. Attendance is quoted as being about 1,000. A. Hagan (Branch Vice-Chairman) presided and speakers were G. K. Essien, Kofi and two others. | |||
The general themes of the speakers at the meeting were: | |||
(1) Workers were advised not to grumble over the bonuses given to Army and Police after the 24th February rebellion. | |||
(2) Workers were exhorted to stand united and fight for their rights. | |||
(3) Workers were cautioned to refrain from indulgence in politics. | |||
''Note:'' Workers at the meeting are reported to have been disappointed by B. A Bentum's failure to attend the meeting as originally planned. ''The meeting broke up in confusion.'' | |||
''26.11.66'' | |||
288 students from the Government Technical Institute, Kikam, used tree trunks to block the road leading to Axim-Essiama main road, and jeered at school instructors. The demonstration was against the newly-appointed Headmaster, whose removal they sought. | |||
''10.12.66'' | |||
Following the suspension of three students from the Presbyterian Training College, Akropong, for "misbehaviour". the other students refused to attend classes. Omanhene of Akropong/ Akwapim and elders. appealed to the students to remain cairn. Day and night police patrols arranged on the campus . Principal H. T. Dako closing school 1 0.12.66 instead of 16.12.66 to avoid disturbances. | |||
''15.12.66'' | |||
220 employees of Timber Veneer and Lumber Company, Takoradi (T.V.L.C.). went on strike in protest against the dismissal of T.V.L.C. Workers' Union Chairman. T.U.C. and Labour Office officials intervened, but employees refused to return to work. Management has warned that all workers will be dismissed if strike is not called off. All strikers left for home. (The matter was later referred to the Timber Federation and eventually work was resumed.) | |||
''29.11.66'' | |||
Diamond Mining Corporation at Takorawase closed on 28.11 .66. Entire workshop and operation will be stopped. Supervisors will be suspended on 31.12.66 and all employees affected will be laid-off. Situation is serious. Arrangements are being made to safeguard mines properties. | |||
''21.12.66'' | |||
''Police warning to all Regions.'' Information received armed robbers to attack banks in Ghana any time from now. Armed guards must be posted all banks all times. | |||
''22.12.66'' | |||
''Inspector General of Police to all Regions.'' Reliably informed, plot by "nation wreckers" to sabotage electrical installations in country. Immediately place armed guards on all electricity stations in your area, and ensure all other valuable electricity points are well protected. | |||
''7.1.67'' | |||
''Takoradi''---20 arrested for strike. | |||
''13.1.67'' | |||
''Accra to all Borders.'' Following military coup in Togo, alert all personnel and ensure that strong security measures are taken at all border guard posts and stations to prevent pro-Nkrumah travellers entering Ghana. | |||
''14.1.67'' | |||
250 workers of Prestea, Bondaye and Tuapem branches of State Gold Mining Corporation went on strike today demanding a pay rise of 6 pesewas a day. General Secretary of the Mine Workers' Union (I. N. Aikins) has left Tarkwa for Prestea to handle deteriorating situation. | |||
General Secretary met workers for four hours on 14th January. Workers agreed to call off strike on 1 6th January on condition Managing Director of Corporation met them. l\1eanwhile, Police Western Region answering a query from Accra as to action being taken against strikers have intimated that "investigations" are under way which might lead to the prosecution of strike instigators. | |||
''16.1.67'' | |||
Fire broke out at Tamale airfield extension site on 14th January. Considerable damage done buildings and other property. Cause of fire unknown. 15 watchmen have been arrested for interrogation. | |||
''General Information:'' | |||
1. Ex-Security Officers continue to be arrested in Ghana: | |||
(a) John Apeadu arrested Axim, 16th January. | |||
(b) Walter Sugget Cudjoe arrested Bibiani, 17th January. | |||
(c) George K wesi Essien arrested Western Region, 19th January. | |||
2. Sampson Sasu Baffour-Awuah, a 26-year-old storekeeper, is wanted for treason. The hunt for him is now on a national scale. Subject "is wanted urgently by police who believe he has valuable information in connection with an important investigation". | |||
3. Robbery in Ghana has now assumed gangster proportions, and often involves armed robbers in police and army uniforms. On 9th January, a large amount of store goods stolen from Makola. | |||
4. Recently, over 800 policemen of all ranks in all regions have been drastically reshuffled by widespread transfers at short notice. Some policemen openly defied threats of dismissal and opposed their short notice transfers. The move was obviously meant to curb "uniformed" robbery by moving policemen from their regions. | |||
''21.1.67'' | |||
Two cases of robbery at Kyekyewere and Jacobu villages at dawn by unknown thieves, two dressed in army uniforms. Properties involved cash 2,304.00 cedis and personal effects, value 432.00 cedis. No recovery. No arrest. | |||
''24.1.67'' | |||
''Aburi:'' Kingsley Asiam, former M.P. and member of the proscribed C.P.P., arrested at Nsawam by soldiers under command of Capt. W. T. Addy, in connection with abortive counter-revolutionary coup. Brought to Aburi station en route to Accra. Subject was said to have warned Rev. Ekuban on 8.1 .67 against attacking disbanded C.P.P. during a ceremony at funeral service of late Madam Dina Donkor, a former staunch member of disbanded C.P.P. He was arrested on orders of Major Osei Owusu. | |||
''24.1.67'' | |||
Wenchi (Brong Ahafo): | |||
(1) Poisoning of water with D.D.T. Two arrests. | |||
(2) Damage by fire to number of houses at Tanoso village. Cause of fire unknown. No arrest. | |||
''28.1.67'' | |||
''From Special Branch Headquarters to Western Region:'' Collect passports of D. K. Foevi and wife, as well as wives of five persons taken into custody, and forward them to Special Branch headquarters. | |||
(The "N.L.C." was withdrawing passports of all persons released from protective custody.) | |||
''28.1.67'' | |||
Ashanti: Robbery at Bomso village on 26th January involving cash, 1 ,320.00 cedis, and D.-B. gun, value 96.00 cedis. Six men in Mercedes Benz Car NG 1401, colour ash. alleged dressed in police inspector's uniform and army uniforms, conducted search on the premises of Yaw Baasare and made off with loot. No recovery. | |||
''2.2.67'' | |||
Northern Region: Capt. Acquah of 5th Battalion enlisted assistance of Tamale Police effect arrest of ex-Northern Secretary General of disbanded C.P.P. and three ex-D.C.'s of old regime for allegedly holding secret meetings. Accused persons taken to 5th Battalion headquarters for interrogation. | |||
''6.2.67'' | |||
''Evidence of Army and Police friction:'' Mr. K. Avorkliyah of Dormaa Ahenkro reports that he was arrested on 24th January at Nkrankwanta road by Lt. Gyasi and 7 others when he was returning from duty at Nkrankwanta, and his money (238.00 cedis) seized. Next day he was escorted by an army sergeant and a private to Army Camp, Sunyani, where he was detained. He was interrogated and later permitted to return to his station. | |||
''11.2.67'' | |||
It is directed that travel documents of Mr. Chinebuah, Principal Secretary to Ministry of Labour, be impounded. Chinebuah should be refused exit if he attempts to leave Ghana, and Director, Special Branch informed. | |||
''12.2.67'' | |||
Ashanti: Two police mobile patrolmen stopped a vehicle at New Tafo for motor offence. An army officer, one Akinka, arrived at scene and intervened on behalf of driver. Misunderstanding arose between officer and policeman. Army officer became annoyed and pulled out a pistol with a view to shooting constable. More policemen and civilians rushed to scene. Army officer entered his car and drove away. No arrest. | |||
''28.2.67'' | |||
10th Ghana Independence Day to be marked merely by Church Services on 5th March, and Muslim prayers on 3rd March. | |||
''28.2.67'' | |||
All persons released from protective custody are to report to the police from time to time. An "N.L.C." decree published today states such persons are to report themselves direct to police officer in charge of police station nearest to place they usually reside. A released person might alternatively be required to report at such a place as Inspector General of Police might direct. Any released person contravening provisions of the Decree would be guilty of an offence, and would on conviction be liable to a fine not exceeding 400 cedis or a term of imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both. | |||
''7.3.67'' | |||
''To Police all Regions:'' N.L.C. Decree 144. Open separate register at each police post, station or district. First 2 pages of register to contain full list of persons released from protective custody in such particular area. Then rule register showing name, residential address, date and time of person reporting. Also provide column for signature or thumbprint of person concerned, and signature of officer to whom reported. Report should be made once a week. Monthly return of such reports should be forwarded to C.I.D. not later than 10th of ensuing month. | |||
''7.3.67'' | |||
Shooting incident in Accra on 6.3.67, in which one Nigerian was killed. Private Kwakumey of Ghana Army arrested and placed under police custody. 15 other soldiers also involved and placed under military custody. 52 Nigerians concerned with incident being interrogated. | |||
''7.3.67'' | |||
Report from Police/Wiawso: Plot on hand to assassinate Inspector Okpattah in Bibiani District. Demanding immediate protective measures, and early transfer from the District. | |||
''8.3.67'' | |||
At 08.20 hrs. on 6.3.67, No. 6957 To/3 J.Y. Gyamfi of R. H. Koforidua arrested and brought to Koforidua charge office, one Kwame Ansah, a farmer, who was found wearing a white round neck singlet with effigy of deposed President Kwame Nkrumah and inscription "One continent one people". Suspect was reported to have stated that he is one of the subversionists supporting Kwame Nkrumah. Suspect has since been taken into custody for investigations. | |||
''20.3.67'' | |||
From Special Branch/Upper Region to Special Branch/ Headquarters. Students of Pusiga Training College reported demonstrated evening of 17.3.67 at College compound. Number of students involved and cause of demonstration not yet ascertained. No damage to property nor injury to life. Situation presently quiet. Full report will follow. | |||
''20.3.67'' | |||
From Iddrisu Seni Tamale to Prographic/Accra Water shortage. Most severe water shortage which Tamale, the capital of Northern Region has experienced for at least the past four years has hit Tamale and its surrounding villages this year. For the past five days, water has not been flowing into the pipes in some sections of the town and villages. Women and workers find it difficult to get even a bucket of water for either cooking or for washing down their bodies. Mr. Karimu Wemah, Assistant Chief Engineer of the Water and Sewerage Corporation in charge of Northern Region, told the Graphic in an interview that the shortage of water in the Region was due to lack of spare parts to service the machines. | |||
''13.4.67'' | |||
From Police/West Region to Police/ Accra Half Assini---Assault on two pump attendants at Half Assini by nine soldiers of 1st Battalion Infantry on operational duties, 5 persons admitted to Axim hospital. No arrest. | |||
RG/Tarkwa---Train derailment at Awaso level crossing involving engine No. 19 MD. 4 persons killed on the spot and 4 seriously injured, admitted B.A.C. Hospital, Awaso. Cause of derailment not yet known. | |||
== 8. Repercussions == | == 8. Repercussions == | ||
| Line 1,004: | Line 1,354: | ||
===Modibo Keita, President, Mali.=== | ===Modibo Keita, President, Mali.=== | ||
''[[Modibo Keita]], President, [[Republic of Mali|Mali]].'' <br>25.2.66<br> (Translation) | |||
===Ahmed Sékou Touré, President, Guinea.=== | ===Ahmed Sékou Touré, President, Guinea.=== | ||
''[[Ahmed Sékou Touré]], President, [[Republic of Guinea|Guinea]].''<br> (Translation) | |||
===Gamel Abdel Nasser, President, United Arab Republic.=== | ===Gamel Abdel Nasser, President, United Arab Republic.=== | ||
''[[Gamal Abdel Nasser|Gamel Abdel Nasser]], President, [[United Arab Republic (1958–1971)|United Arab Republic]].''<br> (Translation) | |||
===Kim Il Sung, Pyongyang.=== | ===Kim Il Sung, Pyongyang.=== | ||
''[[Kim Il-sung|Kim Il Sung]], [[Pyongyang]].'' <br>1.3.66 <br>(Translation) | |||
===Albert Margai, Prime Minister, Sierra Leone.=== | ===Albert Margai, Prime Minister, Sierra Leone.=== | ||
''[[Albert Margai]], Prime Minister, [[Republic of Sierra Leone|Sierra Leone]].'' <br>4.3.66 | |||
===Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister, Singapore.=== | ===Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister, Singapore.=== | ||
''[[Li Guangyao|Lee Kuan Yew]], Prime Minister, [[Republic of Singapore|Singapore]].'' <br>11.3.66 | |||
Revision as of 13:08, 12 May 2024
Dark Days in Ghana | |
|---|---|
| Author | Kwame Nkrumah |
| Publisher | Lawrence & Wishart |
| First published | 1968 London |
| Type | Book |
| Source | archive.org |
Author's note
Ghana's experience since 24th February 1966, costly but priceless, must be viewed in the context of the African Revolution as a whole.
It is with this in mind that I have written, in Conakry, about Ghana's "dark days" in the hope that publication of the facts may help to expose similar setbacks in other progressive independent African states.
24th August 1967.
Letter to Kwame Nkrumah from Richard Wright: Black Power
I say to you publicly and frankly: The burden of suffering that must be borne, impose it upon one generation! Do not, with the false kindness of the missionaries and business-men, drag out this agony for another five hundred years while your villages rot and your people's minds sink into the nicrass of a subjective darkness ... Be merciful by being stern! If I lived under your regime, I'd ask for this hardness, this coldness ...
Make no mistake, Kwame, they are going to come at you with words about democracy; you are going to be pinned to the wall and warned about decency; plump-faced men will mumble academic phrases about "sound" development; gentlemen of the cloth will speak unctuously of values and standards; in short, a barrage of concentrated arguments will be hurled at you to persuade you to temper the pace and drive of your movement ...
But you know as well as I do that the logic of your actions is being determined by the conditions of the lives of your people ...
There will be no way to avoid a degree of suffering, of trial, of tribulation; suffering comes to all people, but you have within your power the means to make this suffering of your people meaningful, to redeem whatever stresses and strains may come. None but Africans can perform this for Africa. And, as you launch your bold programmes, as you call on your people for sacrifices, you can be confident that there are free men beyond the continent of Africa who see deeply enough into life to know and understand what you must do, what you must impose ...
*This extract is reproduced by the kind permission of the author's London agents, John Farquharson Ltd., and of Harper and Row, New York.
1. Peking to Conakry
The word "coup" should not be used to describe what took place in Ghana on 24th February 1966. On that day, Ghana was captured by traitors among the army and police who were inspired and helped by neo-colonialists and certain reactionary elements among our own population. It was an act of aggression, an "invasion", planned to take place in my absence and to be maintained by force. Seldom in history has a more cowardly and criminally stupid attempt been made to destroy the independence of a nation.
When the action took place, I was on my way to Hanoi, at the invitation of President Ho Chi Minh, with proposals for ending the war in Vietnam. I had almost reached Peking, the furthest point in my journey. The cowards who seized power by force of arms behind my back, knew they did not have the support of the people of Ghana, and therefore thought it safer to wait until I was not only out of the country, but well beyond the range of a quick return.
The news was brought to me by the Chinese Ambassador in Accra who had gone on ahead to Peking to meet me, and to be with me during my visit to China. He had just accompanied Prime Minister Chou En-lai, Liu Shao-chi and other officials when they welcomed us at the airport, and he had come straight on out to the government house where I was staying. I remember his exact words:
"Mr. President. I have bad news. There has been a coup d'etat in Ghana."
I was taking a brief rest after the long flight from Rangoon, and wondered if I had heard him correctly.
"What did you say?"
"A coup d'etat in Ghana."
"Impossible," I said. "But yes, it is possible. These things do happen. They are in the nature of the revolutionary struggle."
I learned later that the Chinese welcoming party had known about events in Ghana when I stepped from the aircraft at Peking, but with characteristic courtesy had waited to break the news to me privately.
My first reaction was to return immediately to Accra. If the VC10 of Ghana Airways in which we had travelled most of the way had been at Peking I would have embarked at once. But we had left it behind in Rangoon and had continued to Peking in an aircraft sent by the Chinese government.
I knew that to avoid unnecessary bloodshed I would have to be back in Ghana within 24 hours, and this was clearly impossible. I decided, therefore, to make an immediate statement to the Ghanaian people, and to fight back on African soil just as soon as my hosts could make the necessary travel arrangements.
What had happened in Ghana was no more than a tactical set-back in the African revolutionary struggle of a type which I had often predicted. At the very first conference of the O.A.U. in Addis Ababa, I had warned my fellow Heads of State that none of us was safe if we remained disunited. For this reason, I considered that the overall strategy remained unchanged but what had happened in Ghana made it all the more necessary to press on by revolutionary means to secure a united Africa.
The following is the text of the statement I released to the press:
"On my arrival in Peking, my attention has been drawn to reports from press agencies which allege that some members of the Ghana armed forces supported by some members of the police have attempted to overthrow my government-the government of the Convention People's Party.
I know that the Ghanaian people are always loyal to me, the Party and the Government, and all I expect of everyone at this hour of trial is to remain calm, but firm in determination and resistance.
Officers and men in the Ghana armed forces who are involved in this attempt, are ordered to return to their barracks and wait for my return.
I am the constitutional head of the Republic of Ghana, and the supreme commander of the armed forces.
I am returning to Ghana soon."
I followed this up with a cable to all Ghanaian embassies:
"Be calm and remain firm at your posts. Send all messages and reports to me through the Ghana Embassy, Peking, and not, repeat not, through Accra until further notice."
As I discussed the news from Ghana with the 22 officials accompanying me, among them A. Quaison Sackey (Foreign Minister), Kwesi Armah (Minister of Trade), M. F. Dei-Anang (Ambassador Extraordinary, in charge of the African Affairs Secretariat), J. E. Bossman (Ambassador to the U.K.), F. Arkhurst (Ghana's Permanent Representative at the United Nations), I was somewhat disappointed to note their reaction. At a time like this, I would have expected them to show courage and fortitude. But most of them were frightened. Quaison Sackey, for example, developed diarrhoea, and must have visited the lavatory about twenty times that day. Their obvious dismay was in striking contrast to the calmness and courage of the 66 other personnel—the security officers and members of my personal secretariat. These were men. Compared with them, the politicians were old women.
With Alex Quaison Sackey, I will deal later. Kwesi Armah settled down in London where it appeared that he had considerable funds of money available to him. The rebel regime, on the basis of this, attempted to have him extradited on the grounds that he had stolen the money in question. His many trials before the English Courts exposed at least the falsity of the allegations which these authorities had made. I am glad that he was acquitted since I am sure that the particular charges made against him were false. Nonetheless, I believe that he brought his misfortunes on himself by failing to take a positive political stand. His various court cases however prove the nonsense contained in many of the allegations of corruption against my government.
Enoch Okoh and Michael Dei-Anang were old British trained civil servants. They had made their way up through the colonial structure. They had been among my most trusted officials but they chose to return to Ghana, presumably in the hope that they would be accepted by the counterrevolutionaries.
Enoch Okoh, as head of the civil service and as the person who knew therefore which promotions had been made and why, was treated with leniency and was appointed to be in charge of the Housing Corporation. Since the new regime did not intend to build any houses for the people this was perhaps the appropriate punishment for his desertion. Michael Dei-Anang was not so treated and, much to his surprise, was thrown into prison.
Fred Arkhurst, after his treachery, returned to his former position at the United Nations but was eventually removed by the 'N.L.C.' who could not trust someone who had, at least, ability.
Naturally, we were all of us anxious about the safety of our families in Ghana, but I suppose the official members of the party were also thinking about their bank accounts and their property. It is said that a man's heart lies where his treasure is. But even allowing for the fact that they had more to lose than the other personnel, I still find it hard to understand how they could have lost grip of themselves so easily. It was as though they had put their hands up at the first whiff of danger.
However, they did manage to pull themselves together sufficiently for me to be able to discuss the next moves with them. It was not until later, after they had left Peking, and were on their own, that the full depth of their defeatism became apparent, and they deserted.
We agreed that for the next day or two, while arrangements were being made. I should carry out official engagements as planned.
This was also the wish of the Chinese government. The Chinese made it clear that they regarded the military and police action in Ghana as no more than a temporary obstacle in the long struggle against imperialism, the kind of event to be expected, but which had no effect whatsoever on the final outcome. "You are a young man," Chou En-lai told me, "you have another forty years ahead of you!"
At the banquet held in my honour on 24th February, Liu Shao-chi spoke of Afro-Asian solidarity, and the African peoples' revolutionary struggle:
"Most of the African countries have won independence, but the African peoples' revolutionary struggle against imperialism is by no means completed. They still have to carry on this struggle in greater depth. The imperialists headed by the United States are more active than ever in pressing forward with their policies of neo-colonialism in an attempt to subvert independent African countries and suppress the anti-imperialist revolutionary struggle of the African peoples. In his latest book, 'Neo-Colonialism—The Last Stage of Imperialism', President Nkrumah gave a detailed description of neo-colonialism and explicitly pointed out that 'foremost among the neo-colonialists' is the United States, which is 'the very citadel of neo-colonialism'. However hard the imperialists may whip up revolutionary adverse currents, the anti-imperialist revolutionary struggles of the African peoples can never be suppressed but are bound to win final victory. The Chinese people have unswervingly stood on the side of the African peoples and resolutely support their just struggles.''
He went on to condemn U.S. policy in Vietnam, and to expose the hypocrisy of American so-called peace moves. No direct mention was made of the news from Ghana, or the possibility that I might not proceed to Hanoi.
In my reply, I also attacked neo-colonialism, and said that final victory would rest with the common man. I went on to condemn U.S. aggression in Vietnam, and called for the complete withdrawal of all American forces from Vietnam so that peace negotiations could begin.
I knew that I could not now go to Hanoi. My duty lay first with the people of Ghana, and I was determined to return to Africa as quickly as possible. But I was sorry to have to abandon mv mission as it was the second time that President Ho Chi Minh had asked me to go, and I wanted to do anything I could to help end the war. I was, and as far as I know, still remain the only head of state or government that the President of North Vietnam has invited to Hanoi to discuss the war since the American phase began. When I informed him of my decision, he replied that I would be welcome in Hanoi at any future date.
During the next two days, while I continued to carry out official engagements and to deal with the messages which began to pour in from abroad, the Chinese could not have shown greater care for my safety. If anyone near to me so much as put his hand in his pocket he was instantly pounced upon by security officers. They trusted no one, not even the Ghanaians who were with me.
Messages of encouragement and support continued to arrive from heads of state and governments all over the world. Many African leaders offered me immediate hospitality. Among them were President Sékou Touré of Guinea, President Nasser of Egypt, President Nyerere of Tanzania and President Modibo Keita of Mali. I was very touched that they should declare their solidarity so quickly and with such generosity, and it was only after deep thought that I decided to accept the invitation of President Sékou Touré and the Political Bureau of the Guinean Democratic Party. I sent the following note to President Sékou Touré:
Peking.
25th February 1966.My dear Brother and President,
I have been deeply touched by your message of solidarity and support I have received today. It is true, as you say, that this incident in Ghana is a plot by the imperialists, neo-colonialists and their agents in Africa. As these imperialist forces grow more militant and insidious, using traitors to the African cause against the freedom and independence of our people, we must strengthen our resolution and fight for the dignity of our people to the last man, and for the unity of Africa. It is heartening to know that in this struggle we can count on the support and understanding of Africa's well-tried leaders like yourself.
I know that our cause will triumph and that we can look forward to the day when Africa shall be really united and free from foreign interference and the intrigues of saboteurs and puppets.
I am safe and well here in Peking, and I have sent my special emissary who will deliver this message to you to let you know the plans I am making for my early return to Africa. I trust that you will give him every possible assistance for the fulfilment of his mission. I shall visit you in Guinea soon.
With sincere and brotherly affection,
Shortly afterwards, I received a further message from President Sékou Touré:
The Political Bureau and the Government after a thorough analysis of the African situation following the seizure of power by the instruments of imperialism have decided:
1. To organise a national day of solidarity with the Ghanaian people next Sunday. Throughout the length and breadth of the country there will take place popular demonstrations on the theme of anti-imperialism.
2. To call on all progressive African countries to hold a special conference and take all adequate measures.
We think that the time factor is vital here, since it is important to make a riposte without further delay, by every means. Your immediate presence would be very opportune, it seems to us, and we are therefore impatiently waiting for you.
Yours very fraternally,
Ahmed Sékou Touré.
I do not propose to publish in full all the messages I received from Heads of State and governments. But I would like to quote from the messages of two other African leaders. First, the note from President Modibo Keita of Mali:
I am happy to hear that you are well. Please thank our comrades of the People's Republic of China for this important contribution to Africa's struggle for liberty and progress.
Yesterday, the 24th of February, we learned of the serious events which took place in Ghana and which do no credit to those who have provoked them.
For us, the authors of the coup d'état have committed an act of high treason. ... This is one phase of the unremitting struggle waged by neo-colonialists and imperialists against Africa which wishes to live in freedom and dignity and in friendship with all peoples who are peace-loving and who wish to build a just society. All Africans, conscious of the grave dangers posed to our peoples and our continent, should mobilise themselves to bar the way to neo-colonialism and imperialism.
The Malian people consider themselves engaged in this struggle.
Secondly, I quote from the message from Albert Margai then Prime Minister of Sierra Leone:
Whilst we are conscious of the many and divers forces working in Africa which daily and constantly strive to foil our struggle for the final emancipation of those still subject to colonial rule and our ultimate claims to unity, I have nevertheless formed great hope and fortitude in the courage of your convictions and determined efforts to defy ill odds in refusing to accept the results of the recent revolt as a fait accompli. Please accept, my dear Brother, the assurance of my highest consideration, esteem and prayers for your personal well-being and safety.
Apart from the fact that Guinea and Ghana formed a union in 1961, and a strong bond of friendship exists between President Sékou Touré, the Political Bureau of the Guinea Democratic Party, the people of Guinea and myself, I wanted to go to a country as near to Ghana as possible.
This would leave no one in any doubt about my intention to take up the neo-colonialist challenge and to restore legal government in Ghana. Guinea is only some 300 miles from Ghana. Jet flying time between the two countries is a mere 30-40 minutes. From Guinea I knew I would be in a good position to carry on the African revolutionary struggle. I decided that we should all, with the exception of Quaison Sackey and Bossman, go to Guinea via Moscow.
Quaison Sackey as foreign minister was entrusted with a very important mission. He was to go to Addis Ababa to represent the legal government of Ghana at the O.A.U. conference of foreign ministers due to open there within a few days. Instead of rising to the occasion, and accepting this great challenge and responsibility, he went to Accra and offered his services to the neo-colonialist puppets, the so-called National Liberation Council. The latter, it seems, made little use of him. Traitors have no friends.
I heard of his betrayal when I arrived in Moscow on the first of March, and it was there that I was also told of Bossman's defection. By then, Kwesi Armah and other officials had left Moscow to deal, as they said, with "urgent private matters." They were to return to Moscow, and we were all to travel together to Conakry. Instead, they defected. I then decided to proceed at once to Guinea with my personal entourage and members of my Guard Department. I wanted no one with me who was faint-hearted or two-faced. Every member of my party knew he was free to leave at any time. The security officers and other members of my personal staff decided to remain with me.
The Russian government sent an aircraft to Peking to fetch me, and I left from an air-strip near Peking on 28th February. Before leaving, I made the following statement to the press:
I think you all know that certain members of my armed forces have attempted to usurp political power in Ghana while I was on the way to Hanoi. What they have done, in fact, is to commit an act of rebellion against the Government of the Republic. I am determined to crush it without delay, and to do this I rely upon the support of the Ghanaian people and of Ghana's friends in the world.
By the arrest, detention and assassination of ministers, the Party's civil servants, and trade unionists, and by the massacre of defenceless men and women, the authors of these insane acts of robbery, violence and anarchy have added brutality to their treason.
Never in the history of our new Ghana have citizens, men and women been assassinated in cold blood. Never have their children become orphans for political reasons. Never before have Ghanaians, our people, been shot because of their political convictions.
This is a tragedy of monstrous proportions. The excessive personal ambition and the insane acts of these military adventurers, if not stifled now, will not only destroy the political, economic and social achievements of the last few years, but will also obstruct the course of the African revolution.
All that has been achieved by the Ghanaian people with the assistance of all our friends is in jeopardy.
I am returning to Ghana; I know that the friendly nations and people of good will everywhere will support me in restoring the constitutional government of Ghana.
I take this opportunity to express my sincere condolences to all the families whose valiant sons and daughters have given their lives in the defence of Ghana.
At this moment, as I leave Peking, the capital city of the People's Republic of China, I express my profound gratitude to the Chinese people and to their leaders for their support and their kind hospitality.
We landed near Moscow at dawn on 1st March, after a brief stop at Irkutsk in Siberia, and were met by leading Soviet government officials. After a busy day of talks I re-embarked at midnight for the flight to Guinea.
We touched down briefly in Yugoslavia, and in Algeria, and reached Conakry in the afternoon of Wednesday, 2nd March. It was wonderful to be on African soil again. Guinea was agog with excitement. President Sékou Touré and members of the Political Bureau of the Democratic Party were among the huge crowd at the airport to welcome me. A twenty-one gun salute was fired.
At a mass rally in the packed sports stadium in Conakry the following day, President Sékou Touré announced that I had been made Secretarv-General of the Guinean Democratic Party and Head of State of Guinea. "The Ghanaian traitors," he said "have been mistaken in thinking that Nkrumah is simply a Ghanaian . . . . He is a universal man." It looked as though the entire population of Conakry was in the stadium that afternoon and I shall never forget the reception they gave to Sékou Touré and myself as we were driven round the arena in an open car. The crowds rcise to their feet, cheering, shouting anti-imperialist and anti-neo-colonialist slogans, and waving placards: "Long live the African Revolution," "Long live Kwame Nkrumah," "Long live Sékou Touré," "Down with neo-colonialists," etc. It was a deeply moving experience, and I found my thoughts turning to similar mass rallies held in the Polo Ground, Accra. The people of Ghana were now being made to suffer for something which was not of their own making. They had been overcome by powerful external forces, and by the plotting and deception of a few selfish and ambitious reactionaries.
President Sékou Touré made a long speech. I did not know at the time exactly what he said. He spoke in French, and my knowledge of that language was then sketchy. I understood that I had been presented to the people of Guinea, but had no idea that I had been made President. It was not until after the ceremony, when I heard the press reports, that the full realisation of my new appointment became clear to me.
Such a gesture of political solidarity must surely be without historical precedent. When our historians come to record the events of 1966 they will doubtless consider the action of the Guinean Government as a great landmark in the practical expression of Pan-Africanism.
In this way began one of the most fruitful and happiest periods of my life—the time I spent in Conakry, about which I shall write later in this book.
2. 24th February, 1966
One of the first things I did after my arrival in Guinea was to establish an efficient communications system so that I could be kept fully informed of what was happening inside Ghana. Almost at once I began to receive detailed eye-witness accounts of what actually took place on 24th February and in the dark days which followed the army and police usurpation of power. At the same time there began a steady flow of Ghanaians to visit me in Conakry, to tell me about what had happened in Ghana and to express their loyalty. Some of them had walked all the way; others had found quicker means of travel. But all came at great personal risk to themselves and their families. Letters also began to pour in, and gradually the full, terrible story of violence and bloodshed took shape, and has since been confirmed to me over and over again by innumerable people who were there at the time of the military and police action and saw what took place. Several of the eyewitnesses who came to me still bore the marks of the brutal attacks made on them.
The true account of the seizure of power in Ghana by traitors and neo-colonialists does not make pleasant reading. But the facts must be faced and put on record so that the enormity of the crime committed against the people of Ghana can be accurately assessed.
I left Accra on 21st February 1966. I was seen off at the airport by most of the leading government and Party officials, and by service chiefs. I recall the handshakes and the expressions of good wishes from Harlley, Deku, Yakubu, and others. These men, smiling and ingratiating, had all the time treason and treachery in their minds. They had even planned my assassination on that day, though they later abandoned the idea. I remember shaking hands with Major-General Barwah-to be murdered in cold blood three days later when he refused to surrender to the rebel army soldiers. I little thought then that l would never see him again, or that Zanerigu, Command1:r of the Presidential Guard Regiment, Kojo Botsio. Kofi Baako and other ministers who were there at the airport, would be shortly seized by renegade soldiers and policemen and thrown into prison.
After a week of so-called "manoeuvres," the operation began early in the morning of Wednesday, 23rd February 1966 when the garrison at Kumasi, numbering 600 men, was ordered to move southwards to Accra. On the way, the convoy of some 35 vehicles was met and halted by the two arch-traitors Colonel Emmanuel Kwesi Kotoka, Commander of the Second Infantry Brigade Group, and Major Akwasi Amankwa Afrifa of the Second Brigade. Kotoka had only recently been put in charge of the Kumasi garrison, and I had not yet confirmed his appointment.
Afrifa was left in command while Kotoka went to Accra to report progress to Commissioner of Police, John Willie Kofi Harlley and to find some soldier better known than himself to be the nominal head of the revolt. The man chosen was Major-General Ankrah even though the conspirators had thought so little of his abilities than they had not previously troubled to consult him. He was, however, one of the few officers who had held even the rank of major in colonial days and had seen service in the world war if only as a quartermaster. In the Congo he had shown some bravery and, at least, routine ability and I had decorated him for his services but essentially he was of mediocre calibre. He held the post of second in command in the armed forces after independence through seniority, not ability. He would not have been appointed even to this post but for the death shortly before of another senior officer. In 1965 I retired him. Undoubtedly, it was his lack of understanding of what was going on around him which recommended him as a figure-head to those manipulating the 'coup'.
The troops were then told that I intended sending them to fight in Vietnam and in Rhodesia, and that I had deserted Ghana taking with me £8 million. There was, they were told, no government left in Ghana, and it was their duty to assume control of the country to maintain law and order. Already, it was said, Russian planes were landing on a secret airstrip in northern Ghana. Furthermore a secret tunnel had been made from Flagstaff House, the presidential residence, to Accra airport, and for days Russians had been arriving. The only way to save Ghana, and to avoid being sent to fight in Vietnam, the troops were told, was to take Flagstaff House.
Several days after the military seizure of power, Kotoka and Afrifa appeared on Ghana TV congratulating themselves on their easy success. One remark stood out unmistakable and clear: "And you know, we didn't find any Russians at allnot one! Nor could we find any trace of that tunnel." This was followed by peals of laughter at the poor soldiers who had believed their story.
The first object of the military operation was to force the surrender of Major-General Barwah, Army Chief of Staff and Deputy Chief of Defence Staff, who was in command of the Ghana Army in the absence from the country of the Chief of Defence Staff, General Aferi. At the same time, Brigadier Hasan, Head of Military Intelligence, and Colonel Zanerigu, Commander of the Presidential Guard Regiment, and Owusu-Sekyere, former head of the C.I.D. and in charge of the Special Branch. were to be arrested.
This stage of the operation was badly bungled. Hasan was arrested, but Zanerigu, when confronted, escaped through a window of his house and drove to Flagstaff House to warn the Presidential Guard Regiment. Barwah could not be intimidated. Woken from his sleep in the early hours of the morning of the 24th by the arrival of Kotoka and some 25 men, he courageously refused either to join the traitors or to surrender. Thereupon, Kotoka shot him dead at point-black range in cold blood in the presence of his wife and children. The seven security officers who were stationed at Barwah's house were also murdered on the spot on Kotoka's orders.
Kotoka subsequently boasted of his killing of Barwah but said because he was protected by a "juju" he was able to catch the bullets which Barwah fired in his defence and to throw them back at him. When the counter coup of April 1967 took place Kotoka's "magic" could not save him. Unlike Barwah he surrendered without protest or struggle to those who had captured him at his headquarters. His "juju" did not prevent him being shot in his turn.
Barwah's murder was one of the most disgraceful and ghastly crimes ever committed in Ghana's history. In an attempt to wipe the blood from their hands the so-called "N.L.C." gave Barwah and the security officers a military burial a few days later. What a mockery, and what hypocrisy! Yet these terrible, cold-blooded murders were only the first of many which occurred on 24th February and during subsequent days. They set the tone, as it were, of the whole operation which was characterised throughout by cowardice, bloodshed and criminal stupidity.
By 6 a.m. on the 24th, the Accra police, acting on Hadley's orders, had rounded up most of the ministers and other key political figures, and fighting had broken out at Flagstaff House between members of the Presidential Guard Regiment and rebel army units. There were about thirty members of the Guard Regiment at Flagstaff House when the alarm was raised. These were soon joined by others who managed to slip in by a back entrance to reinforce their comrades. Although heavily outnumbered they successfully held up the rebel detachment sent to seize the Ghana radio station a short distance from Flagstaff House. Only eight of the 124 detailed for this operation managed to get through. These captured the radio station, apparently without incident, and at 6 a.m. Kotoka arrived to broadcast that the army and police had taken over the government of Ghana.
The announcement was premature. At 7 a.m. resistance was actually increasing at Flagstaff House, as the defenders, less than a hundred of them, fought fiercely back against some 600 rebel troops. By this time a battalion in Accra under Ocran had joined them, not knowing what the fighting was all about. Thus the rebels were able to gain control of the airport, cable office, radio station, and all the approach roads to Accra.
Kotoka had established a combined HQ. with the police at Police Headquarters, and from there the order was given for the 2nd Battalion to go into action at Flagstaff House. The Guard Regiment fought on. though their position was now hopeless. The outside walls of Flagstaff House had been blasted open, and the defenders had retreated behind the second gate. Still they refused to surrender. It was only after the rebels threatened to blow up the family residence at Flagstaff House in which my wife and three young children were sheltering that they finally gave in.
The fierce fighting at Flagstaff House at this time was in striking contrast to the failure at the time of the April I 967 counter-coup of Kotoka's body guard to defend his headquarters. He had made Flagstaff House into a strong point from which he commanded the armv. Yet when it was attacked by a small detachment of some 25 men the garrison immediately surrendered as did that of the Broadcasting Station which was also only attacked by a force of similar size. Again a small group of soldiers, not more than 50 in all, were sufficient to capture the Castle at Osu from which the "N.L.C." conducted their government. Ankrah 'the Chairman' of the "N.L.C." was the first of its defenders to run away, jumping over the Castle wall, plunging into the sea and wading down the shore.
What followed the fall of Flagstaff House on 24th February 1966, has been concealed from the world. But the people of Ghana know, and will never forget.
It may be explained in part by the fact that the soldiers who had carried out the 'coup' were frightened men. They had been told that there was a great store of arms beneath Flagstaff House and a hidden Russian army was concealed there which would suddenly emerge to attack them. They were jittery and fired on anyone on the slightest suspicion. They so frightened officials of the Japanese Embassy that they put placards on all their cars saying "We are NOT Chinese". There was also potential indiscipline. Despite the fact that Ghanaian armed forces in the Congo were regarded as the best of the African troops stationed there, the habit of drug-taking and excessive drinking which some of the soldiers had acquired there led to a mutiny in one battalion in which the Commanding Officer was so badly injured that he was left for dead, and in which the mutinous soldiers took over for two or three days complete control of the camp. In order to restore discipline it had been necessary to disband this battalion.
The officers who organised the "coup", having deceived their men, were now in no position to discipline them.
Rebel troops, many of them almost mad from the effects of Indian hemp which had been issued to them, others intoxicated with alcohol looted from ransacked houses and trigger-happy, carried out the most cruel and senseless attacks on innocent men, women and children. Thousands of pounds worth of damage was done to government property, and valuable historical documents and records were destroyed.
At Flagstaff House itself, troops dashed from one room to another, smashing windows and furniture, tearing up papers, ripping telephones from desks, and destroying anything they could lay their hands on. My own office was singled out for special treatment. The full extent of the loss of books and manuscripts I shall discover on my return. I am hoping that by some miracle the precious notes I was compiling for a history of Africa may have been spared. If not, years of work will have been wasted, and the labour of collecting and sorting material and writing it up will have to begin again from scratch.
The stupidity of this needless destruction of government property, and the failure of the rebel officers to exercise any control over their men, demonstrates the quality of their leadership.
In the six-roomed two-storey house where I lived with my family, troops were allowed to run riot, seizing clothes and other intimate personal possessions including rare old books and manuscripts. My wife and children, although not physically harmed, were not permitted to take a single thing with them when they were turned out of the house and forced to take refuge in the Egyptian Embassy.
My mother, 80 years old and almost blind, who was staying at Flagstaff House, was forcibly ejected and told to go "where you belong". I understand some friends took her to Nkroful where I was born. Later, the actual house in which I was born was burnt down on "N.L.C." orders.
My mother was forced to appear before a 'commission of enquiry' with the idea of making her admit that I was not her son and indeed was not a Ghanaian at all. I am proud to know that she resolutely refused to say anything of the sort and conducted herself with the utmost dignity.
From Flagstaff House, the troops went to Kanda Estate where many security officers have their quarters. There they hurled grenades into the compounds, broke into houses and flats, tossed furniture out of the windows, and carried off radios, refrigerators and other property. Anyone who resisted them was brutally shot. Women, children and old people were driven out into the streets. Many of the women were raped. Even young children were hit with rifle butts. A woman with a child on her back was shot, and both mother and child were thrown to the ground from a three-storey window.
The rank and file police who had taken no part in the 'coup' were horrified at what was taking place and did their best to restrain the soldiers and this led in some cases to actual fighting between the two forces.
Meanwhile, the soldiers had been reinforced by a new element. It was part of the propaganda against Ghana abroad and internally that my government had detained thousands of individuals. There were, of course, political detainees but their number, for state security, was fortunately small. Most of these detainees under the Preventive Detention Act were the so-called "criminal" detainees. As industrialisation developed in Ghana so. as in all countries. organised crime increased and at one stage in the immediate post-independence period we were faced with a situation which, if we had not dealt with it, would have resulted in the country being terrorised by organised criminal gangs. The view of the police was that it was not possible in many cases. any more than it was in the United States at some periods of its history, to secure convictions in courts of the gang leaders or of their supporters. The Preventive Detention Act was therefore extended to cover habitual criminals suspected of gangsterism.
If the rebels had only released the genuine political detainees the total would have been so small as to discredit them and in any case they required the prison accommodation occupied by the criminal detainees in order to lock up anyone suspected of being a C.P.P. member or supporter. In the days following the 'coup' the criminal detainees were not only released but were able to represent themselves as "the heroes of the counter-revolution". By day they joined. naturally, in the demonstrations against my government and at night returned to their old activities to such an extent that even the strictly controlled "N.L.C." press demanded that they should be returned to prison.
Accra was handed over to lawless elements which the rank and file police had no means of controlling. Bar owners were forced at gun point to sell free beer to soldiers and to the "heroes of the counter-revolution", the criminal detainees. These people assaulted women, thieved, and looted. It will be only after the return to legal government in Ghana that it will be possible to assess exactly the number of those who died in fighting against the rebel soldiers or were subsequently killed in the looting and robbery which followed. The casualties in the fighting were certainly heavy. The number of civilians killed, it is more difficult to estimate. Two members of Parliament certainly lost their lives and a number of people in no way connected with politics died. Among those shot dead near Flagstaff House was an air hostess on her way to the airport. In all, the total was probably around 1,600 dead and many more injured. So much for the "bloodless coup"!
One thing is clear. Never before in the cherished history of our new Ghana had citizens, defenceless men and women, been assassinated in cold blood by their own soldiers. Not a single Ghanaian life was taken during the whole fifteen years of my administration. There are few, if any, governments in the world which can say as much. Yet here was this handful of traitors at one blow spoiling our proud record, and dragging Ghana's name through the mud.
In the days which followed the insurrection, hundreds of patriotic Ghanaians were thrown into prison. All ministers. M.P.s, officials of the Party and of all its subsidiary and associate organisations including the trade unions were arrested and detained. The same applied to branch officers throughout the country. In fact, the entire leadership, except for the few who managed to escape or go into hiding, was at one swoop rounded up and thrown into prison.
The prison authorities, with some exceptions, continued to act in the humane and considerate way which we had insisted upon in the prison service, since the establishment of independence. The Director of Prisons, in particular, saw to it that no one, insofar as he could prevent it, once inside the prison, was ill-treated. It is significant that subsequently he was pronounced by the "N.L.C." to have become insane and taken to a lunatic asylum where he died, mysteriously electrocuted.
Professor Kojo Abraham, Fellow of All Souls, Oxford, and a former Governor of the School of Oriental and African Studies in London, was mercilessly beaten when soldiers arrived to arrest him. He was flung unconscious into the police van. Abraham, at the time of his arrest, was an M.P. and Acting Vice-Chancellor of the University of Ghana. His only crime was that he was a leading member of the Party. The manuscript of a new book he was writing was among the first of a pile of papers and books publicly burnt. Nazi-style, by the mutinous soldiers who arrested him.
Geoffrey Bing, Q.C., a distinguished British lawyer, and one of my legal advisers, who had come to Ghana at Government invitation to help in our legal and constitutional work, had his clothes and shoes torn off him and was made to walk up and down barefoot and to stand up and sit down in repeated succession without being able to use his hands. Bayonets were stuck into his back, and it was not until a Commander of the Ghana Navy arrived on the scene that they stopped torturing him.
Typical of the sort of thing which happened was the wounding of the Deputy Manager of one of the hotels in Accra. He was being driven by his driver on hotel business but suddenly was shot by a soldier. The explanation subsequently given was that as be was sitting at the back of the car the soldier thought he must have been a minister in my government.
These are only a few examples of the countless acts of brutality carried out within the first week or so, by the traitorous renegades and cowards who seized power in Ghana on 24th February 1966. The people of Ghana were stunned. Nobody outside Accra knew what had happened, or was happening. In some cases, particularly in the remoter districts, it was days before they realised what had taken place. Even then, the full implications of the am1y and police action dawned only slowly as they began gradually to see through the lies poured out over the radio and in the press, and saw with their own eyes the way in which the independence and progress of their beloved country was being destroyed, and its assets sold to foreign interests.
In Accra, military police and soldiers in full battle dress and armed with sub-machine guns patrolled the streets. In such circumstances, and with all the Party leadership arrested, it was not surprising that there was no immediate and open resistance. But secret, underground resistance began at once.
It grew by leaps and bounds.
While a number of the ministers hastened to ingratiate themselves with the rebels, others remained firm. Nothing for example has been heard of N. A Welbeck, Minister of Information and Party Propaganda who resolutely refused to make any cringing retraction of his past political activities. And the same is true of other ministers such as I. K. Chinebuah, Minister of Education and former Headmaster of Achimota School. The most heartening demonstration, however, came from the resolute attitude adopted by many of those in the intermediate and lower ranks of the Party.
The journalists, regional commissioners, district commissioners and party secretaries were imprisoned in the central block of Ussher Fort prison. Almost from the first day of their imprisonment onward they were singing in chorus Party songs so loudly that they could be heard well outside the prison and this despite the fact that their block was patrolled by armed soldiers.
Ghanaians are not a timid people as has been suggested in the foreign press. Far from it. They may be slow to anger, and may take time to organise and act. But once they are ready they strike, and strike hard. It pays no one to tamper with Ghanaian freedom and dignity. Ghana is out of the gambling house of colonialism, and will never return to it.
The American, British and European press has made much of the "demonstrations" which occurred in Accra in celebration of the 'coup'. It is interesting, however, that even in the Ghanaian papers there were no reports of any such demonstrations in the villages or in the country-side where one would have expected them. if the revolt had been genuinely popular. It is understandable however that certain elements, particularly in Accra, should demonstrate in favour of the new regime. The criminal detainees naturally led the celebrations but they were joined by more sober citizens. The intellectuals and the professional classes had always been against my government which they felt, quite rightly, was challenging their position of privilege. The lawyer and the clergyman thus found themselves joining in the same processions through the streets as the criminal. There was a section of the market women who had been exploiting the shortage of goods due to the measures which we had to take for the control of non-essential imports. They had been exposed by the Abraham Commission and they naturally were delighted that its Chairman should have now been thrown into jail. In addition to this there were at the start a number of people who were genuinely deceived by the revolt.
The disastrous fall in the world price of cocoa had led to inevitable import shortages of consumer goods. These people really believed that the 'coup' would change all this, and so they joined the gangs in the streets. Others joined them out of curiosity. Even so it was necessary for the army to force children from their school rooms and to dragoon demonstrators in order to make a satisfactory show. A small number of students from the university at Legon, wanting to demonstrate in favour of the new regime, asked for and were given police protection, so fearful were they of the reaction of the people of Accra. It was not until instructions were issued from police headquarters that the first street "demonstrations" took place.
Banners and posters, most of them prepared beforehand in the U.S. Embassy, were pushed into the hands of the unwilling "demonstrators". Many of the slogans and words used on them were quite foreign to the Ghanaian people, and in some cases completely incomprehensible. The same kind of thing was noticeable in the newspapers and news bulletins issued immediately after the seizure of power. Words and phrases were used which had never been seen in a Ghanaian newspaper before. The same discrepancy occurred on the radio as bulletins and news flashes were broadcast. The voice was Ghanaian, but the unfamiliar words and the glib expressions were foreign, and often caused the announcer to hesitate and falter.
Clearly, the polished editorials, news bulletins and unfamiliar slogans had been devised by experts trained in the art of overthrowing "undesirable governments'', but who had not taken the trouble to familiarise themselves with the Ghanaian way of thinking or expression.
I understand that the Uganda government in its investigations following the abortive coup which took place in Kampala on 26th February, only two days after the action in Accra, discovered prepared news bulletins, posters and newspaper editorials which were strikingly similar in style and content to those actually used in Ghana. I leave the reader to draw the obvious conclusions.
In the Makola market, a woman who had a large picture of myself above her stall was shot dead by an army officer after refusing three times to hand it over for destruction. This kind of incident, not seen by foreign journalists, who obediently and very willingly photographed and reported only the staged demonstrations and rigged press interviews, was typical 01 many other pathetic but deeply moving acts of heroism performed by the ordinary men and women of Ghana during those dark days.
Much publicity was given in the imperialist press and on T.V., to the pulling down of the statue of myself in front of the National Assembly building in Accra. It was made to appear as though angry crowds had torn the statue from its pedestal and had carried off chunks of it. But it was not for nothing that no photographs could be produced to show the actual pulling down of the statue; and the few women seen carrying away portions of the statue on their heads were photographed backview. In fact when the statue was pulled down the Parliament building where it stood had been cordoned off by the military and no unauthorised person was allowed into the area. All those who were there at the time had been those brought in by the military, who had closed to all civilians the whole of the High Street onto which the statue faced. When the statue had been pulled down about half-a-dozen terrified young children were forced to sit on it as it lay on the ground. Even the Jubilant imperialist press evidently saw nothing strange in publishing photographs of bewildered toddlers, tears running down their cheeks, sitting on a headless statue, while the same imperialist press extolled what it described as a "most popular coup". Since even the women shown carrying away pieces of it on their heads were photographed from behind, it is impossible to be certain whether they were from a group of the market women condemned by the Abraham Commission or as was widely rumoured in Accra, "soldiers dressed up as women''.
There are many other incidents which could be recorded, but sufficient has been written to show the manner in which the military and police action of 24th February 1966 was carried out.
Of course there were some who were happy at the turn of events. In any country there are always elements glad to see a change of government, and the traitors among the army and police who seized power in my absence could not even have attained the degree of success they did manage to achieve without support. The nature of this support, internal and external, I now intend to examine.
3. The "National Liberation Council"
In a proclamation published on 26th February 1966 the people of Ghana were told that the constitution had been suspended and that a "National Liberation Council" had been established which constituted the new government of Ghana. According to this proclamation, I and all my ministers were dismissed from office, the National Assembly was dissolved, and the Convention People's Party disbanded. Further, the "N.L.C." assumed full powers to make and issue decrees "which shall have the force of law in Ghana" and to appoint committees to administer their "affairs of state".
The proclamation ended, as it had begun, with the names of the eight traitors who formed the "N.L.C.":
J. A. Ankrah, Chairman (Army)
J. W. K. Harlley, Deputy Chairman (Police)
E. K. Kotoka, Member (Army)
B. A. Yakubu, Member (Police)
A. K. Ocran, Member (Army)
J. E. Nunoo, Member (Police)
A. A. Afrifa. Member (Army)
A. K. Deku, Member (Police).
It was in this way that the people of Ghana were informed of the names of their so-called liberators. Few had ever heard of them. They were nonentities. Yet here they were, four soldiers and four policemen, arrogantly claiming, without any shred of a mandate from the people, that they constituted "the new government of Ghana". Small wonder Ghanaians were at first stunned, and then became increasingly incensed as this clique of misguided and ignorant upstarts proceeded to unmask not only themselves but their neo-colonialist masters.
Very soon they became universally known not as the "National Liberation Council" but as the Notorious Liars Council, a name I gave them when I spoke to the people of Ghana on Radio Guinea's Voice of the Revolution soon after my arrival in Conakry.
In a booklet entitled "The Rebirth of Ghana" the members of the "N.L.C." found it necessary to publish photographs of themselves, selected facts about their shoddy careers, and information about their shady characters and trivial hobbies. It reads rather like excerpts from a poor imitation of the well-known British directory of notable personalities: "Who's Who." We are told that Ankrah was born in 1915, was a "keen sportsman" at school, and was trained at the Officer Cadet Training Unit in Britain. We are informed that "he is companionable, friendly and full of good humour". The authors of the booklet, gluttons for unnecessary detail, go on to say that Ankrah's hobbies are "gardening, films and an occasional swim". Not a very fitting list of interests and hobbies for the Chairman of the so-called National Liberation Council. No mention, of course, is made in the booklet of the fact that I found it necessary to dismiss Ankrah in 1965. He was becoming lazy, incompetent and unreliable. In addition to this, Ankrah and Major-General Otu revealed to me that they had, on several occasions, been written to anonymously and asked to join plots to overthrow the government. It seemed to me that, even if they had refused to join, their names had become associated with treason, and they should no longer continue to serve in the Ghana army. I retired them, gave them six months' pay, gratuities, and positions in two of the leading Accra banks.
Harlley, we are told, was born in 1919 at Akagla in the Volta Region. He enlisted in the Ghana Police service in 1940 and rose through the ranks to become inspector in 1952. He then went to the Metropolitan Police College in Hendon, England, and on his return to Ghana was step by step promoted to become head of the Special Branch. I was amused to read that he is "of a quiet disposition, considerate, kind-hearted, but very firm". And it is edifying to learn that "he enjoys the sight and sound of water, but hates to see fire or anything connecㅅed with burning". Again, not very inspiring qualifications for political leadership. Harlley, we are finally told. is married and has eight children. This is evidently considered respectable.
We are not told about Ankrah's four wives and 22 children.
Kotoka, generally credited with commanding the actual military operations on 24th February, was also trained in Britain. In fact, all members of the "N.L.C." were trained in the U.K. The four policemen were at the Metropolitan Training College in Hendon and the four soldiers at various British army training centres, though only Afrifa, the youngest, managed to get to Sandhurst.
We are informed that Kotoka "is a fine soldier, disciplined, loyal, resolute and firm". I must confess I am unimpressed by his "discipline" and "loyalty".
When his name was flashed across the headlines of the world press on 24th February, I had hardly heard of him. At the time when I reorganised the armed forces, he came to Flagstaff House to take the oath of allegiance to me as Supreme Commander of the Ghana armed forces. Kotoka was the only one late in arriving. I remember turning to Aferi, Chief of Defence Staff at that time and asking: "Who is this chap?"
As for Ocran, for a time my A.D.C., he is described as "rather reserved; shy of publicity". His interests are simply "bird watching". Yakubu, after a "brilliant career in the Inspectorate", rose gradually to the rank of Deputy Commissioner of Police. He is the only Northerner on the "N.L.C.," and his inclusion was doubtless for political reasons. Yet, like his colleagues on the "N.L.C.", he makes no claim to either political interests or experience. He is "quiet and always smiling" and likes to do farm work in his spare time.
Little space is given to Nunoo. After a brief sketch of his police career we are informed that he "has a pleasant baritone voice, and has sung in choirs and choral societies for over 15 years." He might have been more suitably employed, one would think, on Ghana radio or television.
The last two members of the "N.L.C." to be written about, Afrifa and Deku, leave the reader finally in no doubt about the quality of Ghana's so-called "new government". Afrifa, born in 1936 was one of those typical mis-fits which are produced in any developing society. As a school boy he had been expelled from Adisadel school and therefore could not obtain the university education for which he was hoping. Instead he joined the army and exploited his School Certificate education so as to be sent to Sandhurst. Indeed he was the only one among the mutinous officers who had had the conventional British army training. As he himself confesses, even when he was a senior cadet at Sandhurst he was always doing punishment drills for insubordination. It was only because we were desperately short of officers to serve in the Congo that he was commissioned at all. The fact that he had served there led to his securing rapid promotion and at the time of the 'coup' he was a major.
Anthony Deku was a typical colonial policeman. In colonial days Michael Collins, the English Commissioner of Police, in the days before my arrest and imprisonment sued me for libel as publisher of the Evening News for what I had written about the conduct of the colonial police. He persuaded Deku to be his co-plaintiff so as to make his action appear not to be exclusively European versus African. It was part of what I think now may have been a mistaken policy of letting all by-gones be by-gones that I never allowed this fact to prejudice his subsequent promotion in the Police Service.
If it were not for the great harm these traitors have done to our beloved Ghana, we could laugh at them. They appear so ridiculous. None of them makes any claim to an interest in politics; and not one of them has any political experience. How could men such as these imagine for one moment that they had any hope of successfully administering the country? Their stupidity can only be matched by their conceit. But we cannot laugh when we see what suffering and destruction they have caused in their attempt to sabotage our great struggle for economic independence, and our efforts in the African Revolution to achieve the total liberation of the continent and a Union Government of Africa. Were it not for the support of a small reactionary element inside Ghana, and the help of neocolonialists, they could not have organised and carried out the action of 24th February 1966, much less have maintained themselves in power for even a few months.
It is necessary to look more closely at the leadership of the army, police and civil service in order to understand how it became possible for these reactionary, counterrevolutionary forces, internal and external, to make use of them.
It has been said, particularly by well-wishers from outside Ghana. that if I knew of the potential disloyalty in the army why did I not deal with it? The very posing of this question discloses the fundamental misunderstanding about the Ghanaian position as it existed before the 'coup' in many friendly circles abroad.
As I then saw it, my task was two-fold. On the one hand, I had to secure a firm basis in Ghana and on the other, conduct an external policy which would lead to the liberation and unity of the whole African continent, and to the economic co-operation which was essential if any territory in Africa was to escape from neo-colonialism. In the military sense these two aims were contradictory.
I could, for example, have avoided any risk of a military revolt by maintaining the system which the British Government assumed would be maintained after independence, by which Britain would continue to supply for 10 to 15 years our key military personnel. The individual loyalties of such officers and their training, combined with the political complications for Britain which would have resulted in their joining in a revolt, would have made it unlikely that a military take-over could take place. On the other hand, if I maintained a non-African officered army, Ghana could not play a significant military part in the affairs of the continent.
Yet the tragedy of the Congo made one thing absolutely clear, that even small African forces on the spot at the right time could control the situation and prevent a neo-colonialist take-over. I therefore was not in a position to abolish the Ghanaian army, though this would have been an ideal course. It was a heavy charge on our limited resources for industrial development. On the other hand, looking at the problem from a continental point of view, if Ghana had no armed forces at all it must lose much of its influence with other African states. I have always said that for me the issue of African unity came before any other consideration. It was for this reason that I was prepared to run the risk of maintaining for the time being a traditional British-type army.
A Ghanaian army with British officers could have no influence in Africa. In the first place, while British officers were prepared to be loyal to the regime they were serving they were not prepared, as General Alexander, the last British Commander of the Ghanaian army says very frankly in his memoirs, to follow a military policy abroad which was contrary to what they conceived to be Britain's interests. Secondly, even if the British officers had been pure mercenaries, with no allegiance other than to their paymasters, they would still have been rightly distrusted by other African states. Once therefore the Congo crisis arose, irrespective of any question of internal security, it became necessary to dispense with the British officers.
Unfortunately, the "preparations" for independence had not included the training of anything like sufficient officers or even NCO's to make it possible for me to choose on political grounds who should be promoted. There were, in fact, insufficient soldiers with the necessary training or qualifications to fill even half the positions left vacant by the departing British. In order to have an army at all, I therefore had to accept what existed even though I knew the danger of this course. In fact, the most efficient of the British trained Ghanaian potential officer class were the most neo-colonialist. One or two of these I might pass over on this ground, but in general, if I was to have an army at all, I had to accept the framework bequeathed to me and an officer corps which contained a high proportion of individuals who were either actively hostile to the C.P.P. and myself and who were anti-socialist in outlook. Worse still, the fact that the bulk of the infantry came from the North, where education had been almost completely neglected in colonial times, made many of the rank and file soldiers easy prey to anyone who wished to mislead them.
In regard to the police the problem was even more complex. We were going forward rapidly with the development of the economy and industrialisation. As experience throughout the world has shown, even the movement of population this must occasion breaks down old traditional restraints and a criminal class rapidly develops in expanding towns. By independence, crime had become a real problem in Ghana where many transactions such as cocoa buying are conducted in cash and where the import of quantities of constructional material and the like provides a ready market for the thief. Further and even more important, I was faced with the problem of financial corruption and a well organised Fraud Division in the Police was essential if this was to be held in check. I could not however possibly continue with the existing British police officers. Prior to 1951 Michael Collins, the British Commissioner of Police had not only brought various personal court cases against me arising out of my political activities but was so contemptuous of the change in the political atmosphere that, even after my release from prison and my appointment as Prime Minister, he continued to demand from me, and indeed received payment, for the balance of the damages awarded him by the colonial court. The rank and file police officers who were loyal to the C.P.P. would not have tolerated the retaining in command of such persons. On the other hand, it was impossible immediately to make promotions to the higher ranks of police, men who had had training in detective work or administration. As with the army, I therefore had to accept a police force many of whose higher officers were politically hostile to the new Ghana. They, after all, had been those chosen for promotion by the colonial regime and they had thus a monopoly of the specialist training required. Further many of them were corrupt but to obtain proof of this was a difficult matter.
I tried in these circumstances to build up a new security service which would be completely independent of the police force, but to obtain its personnel I had to go to the civil service and the conduct of Eric Otoo the Civil Servant I put in charge shows how unreliable was the support I could get from this quarter.
The third element supporting the present regime is, in fact, the civil service. Again, I was faced at independence with similar problems to those that I had with the army and the police. For example, it would be impolitic for me to have appointed abroad a former colonial British civil servant as a Ghanaian Ambassador. I had to appoint Ghanaians for the diplomatic service.
The Information Services which were the most important channel in letting the people know what was taking place and the reasons for any particular government action were all manned by civil servants originally trained by the old colonial Information Department which had been set up specifically to conduct propaganda against the C.P.P. and the idea of colonial independence.
However, I was able to pick and choose among the civil service much more than I was with the army and the police and I was able, in many cases, to reform the diplomatic and the information services. Despite this, throughout the public service as a whole, there was a tradition of serving whatever government was in power. Many of the senior officials had all originally served with the old colonial regime which had opposed trade unionism and socialism in any form and was against any real representation of the people in government. After the C.C.P.'s victory in 1951 they changed over to administer the new ideas, becoming supporters of "enlightened colonialism".
When colonialism gave way to independence, these same men gave support to the new order of things. As gradually we changed social and political conditions in Ghana they accepted the changes without protest and though there may have been a degree of sabotage behind the scenes, always openly proffered their support for my policies and that of my Party.
In such circumstances it is only natural that they should have in the first place uncritically accepted the rebel government. Indeed behind the scenes the civil servants always looked back to the colonial times when their senior members were described as "political officers" and they in practice ran the country. They welcomed the military revolt because they believed that behind the facade of military power they would be the real rulers. It is only now that they are becoming disillusioned and are discovering that however incompetent in administration and politics senior military and police officers are, those who have seized power are determined to use their authority to maintain their own personal interests.
There is quite a record of police hostility towards me personally and towards my government. It dates back to pre-independence days when I was campaigning for freedom from colonial rule, and the British government founded the Special Branch in Ghana to keep an eye on me. For years, members of the Special Branch were trained to regard me as a dangerous man whose political views and activities threatened all that was stable and respectable in British eyes. Harlley, Deku and Nunoo all served in the Special Branch. Nunoo actually gave evidence against me in my trial after the declaration of Positive Action. Old habits die hard, and I regret now that I did not abolish the Special Branch in 1957, at independence. It was a typically British creation, and really had no place in our society. But it was thought at the time that it might prove useful in some areas of police work. In fact. members of the police and Special Branch have been involved in each of the six attacks made on my life, and have frequently ignored, and sometimes aided, the activities of people they knew were plotting to overthrow the government.
In 1958 the General Secretary of the Opposition Party, R. R. Amponsah, and one of its leading Members of Parliament, M. K. Apaloo, who was the Opposition spokesman on military matters, entered into a conspiracy with Major Benjamin Ahwaitey who was then the most senior of the Ghanaian officers and was Camp Commandant of Burma Camp. The plot leaked out and Amponsah was arrested at the beach where he had gone to meet Ahwaitey. A very full enquiry was held in public but undoubtedly the full facts and the extent to which the Opposition as a whole was involved did not come out.
In the enquiries conducted after the bomb attack on me at Kulungugu on 1st August 1962 in which several innocent people lost their lives, it was also discovered that leading police officers were closely involved. Before Obetsebi Lamptey, one of the ringleaders in the plot to kill me, was caught, Special Branch knew that he was going around dressed as a Moslem, and had even entered the Parliament building in Accra, yet they did not arrest him.
On a later occasion, on 1st January 1964, another attempt was made on my life. On this occasion it was a policeman who actually made the attempt. It was at 1 p.m. in the garden of Flagstaff House. I was leaving the office to go for lunch when four shots were fired at me by one of the policemen on guard duty. He was no marksman, though his fifth shot succeeded in killing Salifu Dagarti, a loyal security officer who had run towards the would-be assassin as soon as he spotted him among the trees. The policeman then rushed at me, trying to hit me with his rifle butt. I wrestled with him and managed to throw him to the ground and to hold him there on his back until help came, but not before he had bitten me on the cheek.
Investigation showed that the policeman who had made the attempt on my life did not happen to be in Flagstaff House by accident. He had been picked by senior police officers one of whom had repeatedly invited him to his home. At around the same time came the revelation of another unsuccessful plot within the police. The officer in charge of the Police Band which used to play at official functions approached two friends of his among the bandsmen and suggested to them that they should shoot me with revolvers which he would provide when I came over as I always did to congratulate them on their performance. Fortunately the two men not only would have nothing to do with the plot but reported it, as did independently the policemen who had been approached to smuggle into Flagstaff House the weapons required. In such circumstances I considered it best to make a clean sweep of the top command in the police and Madjitey, the Commissioner of Police, and his Deputy, Amaning, were arrested together with the bandmaster. In view of the events of February 1966 it was a great pity that there was not a complete reorganisation of the police service from top to bottom. However, at the time it appeared not really practical to change the whole structure of the force without evidence that the next most senior officers had not been in any way involved in this or other conspiracies.
Thus it was that Harlley and Deku who had both served in the Special Branch came to be appointed Commissioner of Police and Head of the Criminal Investigation Department respectively. What I did not know then was that although they had exposed to me various criminal and corrupt acts of their colleagues, they themselves were involved in dubious dealings.
I had asked Geoffrey Bing who had been the Attorney-General to investigate racketeering in diamonds. It appeared that there was growing smuggling of Ghana diamonds and other malpractices in regard to their sale. After making enquiries, Bing came to suspect a European diamond dealer who had been made a prohibited immigrant in colonial times. This man had managed to return to Ghana but had been again deported. When Bing saw the Special Branch records he discovered that Harlley, using my name without my authority, had revoked the deportation order. I gave orders that the man should be arrested and deported again forthwith. When his private notebook was examined by the security services, it was found to contain the private home and office telephone numbers of Harlley and records of a conversation which he had had with Deku. Bing made a full report on this whole matter to Eric Otoo who however never forwarded it to me. I believe that one of the motives of Harlley and Deku in promoting the "coup" was that they feared exposure in this matter.
Certainly the "N.L.C." made the greatest efforts to secure Bing's arrest demanding him from the Australian High Commission where he had taken refuge. When he was in their custody he was continually interrogated as to what he knew about the diamond matter and was kept in prison for a month. His secretary, an English lady who had served continuously in Ghana from colonial days, was placed under house arrest and not allowed to leave until she had found and handed over personally to Deku all the papers in Bing's wrecked office which dealt with diamond smuggling. Bing's subsequent deportation was not an act of grace by the regime but an attempt to hush up the reason for his arrest.
It was Harlley and his close associates who subverted the army and persuaded certain officers to carry out the military side of the operation. Afrifa, in the apologia which appeared in his name in November 1966, boasts that he thought of a military ''coup" as far back in 1961. Incidentally, I was amused to see that he used the final sentences from my Autobiography as the opening to the Postscript of his book, though he makes no acknowledgement, and the passage appears without quotation marks. Kotoka has also claimed credit for the "coup." In fact, immediately after the "N.L.C." was proclaimed there was a positive rush to claim entire credit for the betrayal of Ghana. In London, Daniel Amihia, calling himself the leader of the African Democratic Party, whatever that may be, appeared on B.B.C./T.V., resplendent in a new shantung suit and said that he had "master-minded the coup". He boasted that he had been trained by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.) and the Americans did not deny this. Amihia was lured back to Accra, publicly exposed as a "fraud" by the jealous "N.L.C.", and promptly thrown into prison and no one seems to know what has become of him. Kofi Busia, former opposition leader, was also interviewed by the B.B.C. in London. He was too much of a politician to say openly that he had plotted the overthrow of the constitutional government of Ghana, but obviously tried to give the impression that he had played an important part in planning the military and police action.
Doubtless, there were traitorous and disloyal thoughts in the minds of all those who carried out and supported the action of 24th February 1966. But I am convinced that it was Harlley and his close associates, inspired and aided by disgruntled former opposition party members and neo-colonialists, who were the real initiators. They alone possessed the necessary vital information needed for its success.
Much of this information they obtained from Eric Otoo, a civil servant whom I appointed chief executive officer in charge of security, and whom I left behind in Ghana in a position of great responsibility and trust when I departed for Hanoi. Otoo betrayed the trust put in him and revealed everything to the traitors. Without his co-operation they might not have succeeded. The moral wickedness of it astounds me. How a man trusted with such responsibility could assist a clique of traitors defies understanding.
For years traitors among the old colonial police had plotted the overthrow of my government. Their original idea was to kill. But having failed in several assassination attempts, and no doubt inspired by neo-colonialist aided military coups in other parts of Africa, they then decided to look for support in the army.
Police subversion of certain army officers was not difficult. Harlley knew and trusted Kotoka. They belonged to the same tribe (Ewe), both were born in the Volta Region, and even attended the same school. They met on many occasions in Kumasi and elsewhere and plotted. Kotoka then began to approach other officers, notably Afrifa, an Ashanti. There has always been a close link between the Ewes and Ashanti reactionary elements, and Kotoka judged rightly that Afrifa would be likely to respond favourably. So it went on, until a sufficient number of officers had been roped in.
Here I must make the point that only a relatively small number of officers were actually subverted. Once the rebellion had begun others offered no open resistance, for the majority were taken completely by surprise and were faced with a fait accompli.
The fact that Hadley and others found it fairly easy to get support in the army may also be explained by what has been called "the Sandhurst mentality" of certain officers. These men trained in various English military establishments prided themselves on being more "English" than Ghanaian, and tended to frown on everything in our Ghanaian way of life which did not conform with English customs and traditions. They gradually became more British than the British as they slavishly tried to imitate the traditional English army officer. Ankrah is a typical example with his enthusiasm for the Turf Club, his love of ceremonial, and his sense of caste.
Afrifa has called Sandhurst "one of the greatest institutions in the world". He looks with nostalgia on the days he spent there: "through its doors have passed famous generals, kings and rulers . . . . It is an institution that teaches that all men are equal, that the profession of men-at-arms is essential and a peaceful one." The confusion in his mind is obvious.
Like many other army officers in the developing countries who have received part of their training in imperialist establishments, he had been brainwashed into showing more devotion to his counterparts in imperialist countries than to his own countrymen. He considered himself a "gentleman", far superior to the peasants and workers of his own country. He admits that it was while he was in Britain that he first heard criticism of the Ghanaian government. He listened to people running down our efforts to achieve economic independence. He read in the British press that I was a "dictator", and that Ghana had stepped out of line in establishing a one-party state and in pursuing such revolutionary aims as the complete liberation and unity of the African continent. Instead of being proud to be Ghanaian and in the vanguard of the African revolutionary struggle, he identified himself with the critics of his own government and people.
Afrifa's case history is similar to that of many more of our army officers in the independent states of Africa. While training in imperialist countries they became imbued with ideas and traditions which made them easy game for those plotting the overthrow of progressive governments.
I sometimes wonder what the imperialists teach in their military training centres in the way of "loyalty"-surely one of the basic qualities of a good soldier. The record of treason among those who have passed through their courses of training is prodigious. Afrifa is a fair example.
Approximately one-sixth of Ghana's officer corps were trained at Sandhurst, though for some years we had been sending an increasing number to train in the Soviet Union and in other socialist countries. It is significant that not one of the officers trained in the Soviet Union took part in the February rising.
Throughout the independent states of Africa there are foreign military missions and training schemes which involve the indoctrination of our young armies with imperialist ideas and traditions. It is estimated that in 1964 nearly 3,000 French officers and men were seconded or contracted to the armed forces of the independent African states, while 1 ,500 Africans were training in France. Recently the United States has greatly increased its military expenditure and activity in Africa. In 1964-65 U.S. aid to the Congo (Kinshasa) quadrupled that of Belgium. Liberia and Ethiopia are also receiving large-scale American military "aid". Growing numbers of African officers are being sent for training in the U.S.A. and West Germany.
Over the years, links have been forged between army officers of different African states who have received training in the same or similar overseas military establishments. These links have been strengthened by organisations such as the Defence Commission of the Organisation of African Unity (0.A.U.), the Equatorial Defence Council and the Afro-Malagasy Defence Organisation. One coup could therefore tend to spark off another.
The arrogant, ambitious "élite" of imperialist-trained officers among our professional armies have already caused much suffering and confusion in Africa. They have been the willing tools of neo-colonialists and of reactionary, counter-revolutionary forces within their own countries. In a rash of army mutinies and coups between the end of 1962 and March 1967 fifteen African Heads of State have been removed and the positions of others seriously endangered.
The only way to ensure against the possibility of internal subversion carried out by the army and inspired and aided by outside forces is eventually, when an All-African Union Government has been established, to abolish professional armies altogether and to build instead a people's militia, by arming the peasants and urban workers, as in China and Cuba. Such an armed force cannot be subverted and is the best guardian of the people's interests and welfare.
We were moving towards the establishment of a people's militia in Ghana, and this is one of the reasons why there was support among certain army officers for a seizure of power. They feared competition from the militia and the Presidential Guard Regiment, thinking I was building up a "private army''. Kotoka admitted this when he visited New York to consult his masters some months after the setting up of the "N.L.C." "Nkrumah," he said, "was building a militia. Who can tolerate that?"
| Record of Military Action in Africa,
December 1962—March 1967 | ||
|---|---|---|
| 17th December 1962 | Senegal | Attempt to overthrow President Senghor. Failed. |
| 13th January 1963 | Togo | Assassination of President Olympio. |
| 12th-15th August 1963 | Brazzaville | Forced resignation of President Youlou. |
| 19th-28th October 1963 | Dahomey | President Hubert Maga deposed. |
| 3rd December 1963 | Niamey | Military mutiny. Suppressed by President Hamani Diori. |
| 20th, 23rd, 24th January 1964 | Tanzania
Uganda Kenya |
Military mutinies. Suppressed with aid of British troops. |
| 18th February 1964 | Gabon | President Leon M'ba deposed. |
| 18th June 1965 | Algeria | President Ben Bella overthrown. |
| 25th November 1965 | Congo (Leo) | Presidential powers assumed by General Mobutu. |
| 22nd December 1965 | Dahomey | Assumption of power by General Soglo. |
| lst January 1965 | Central African Republic | Forced resignation of President David Dacko. |
| 4th January 1965 | Upper Volta | President Yameogo deposed. |
| 15th January 1966 | Nigeria | Federal Prime Minister Balewa and two regional premiers killed (General Ironsi in power). |
| 24th February 1966 | Ghana | Seizure of power by neo-colonialist inspired army and police officers. |
| 29th July 1966 | Nigeria | General Ironsi killed. General Gowon in power. |
| 29th November 1966 | Burundi | King Ntare V deposed. |
| 13th January 1967 | Togo | Forced resignation of President Grunitzky. |
| 24th March 1967 | Sierra Leone | Army seizure of power. |
Nearly all these military interventions were counter-revolutionary in character and have set the clock back in the states in which they occurred. It seemed for a time as though Africa might be going the same way as Latin America. Obviously the precise course of the military action in each territory differed, but most of them had certain factors in common which give the clue to their true nature and origin. In each case where there has been counter-revolutionary armed action there has been a link-up between foreign-trained army officers, local reactionary opposition elements and imperialists and neocolonialists.
Ten of the 38 independent states of Africa now have military regimes established as a result of "coups". These military so-called governments administer some 99 million people. The neo-colonialists smile: the peoples of Africa suffer. But the African Revolution triumphs.
As I said in my sessional address to the National Assembly in Accra on 1st February 1966: "It is not the duty of the army to rule or govern, because it has no political mandate and its duty is not to seek a political mandate. The army only operates under the mandate of the civil government. If the national interest compels the armed forces to intervene. then immediately after the intervention the army must hand over to a new civil government elected by the people and enjoying the people's mandate under a constitution accepted by them. If the army does not do this then the position of the army becomes dubious and anomalous, and involves a betrayal of the people and the national interest."
For some years, imperialism has had its back to the wall in Africa. It has been faced with a growing liberation movement which it is powerless to stop but which, if it allows it to go unchecked, will before long end the exploitation on which imperialism's very existence depends. It has therefore resorted to a co-ordinated strategy in an attempt to preserve, and if possible to extend, its grip on the economic life of our continent.
An all-out offensive is being waged against the progressive, independent states. Where the more subtle methods of economic pressure and political subversion have failed to achieve the desired result, there has been resort to violence in order to promote a change of regime and prepare the way for the establishment of a puppet government.
Fragmented into so many separate states, many of them weak and economically non-viable, coup d'etats have been relatively easy to arrange in Africa. All that has been needed was a small force of disciplined men to seize the key points of the capital city and to arrest the existing political leadership. In the planning and carrying out of these coups there have always been just sufficient numbers of dissatisfied and ambitious army officers and politicians willing to co-operate to make the whole operation possible.
It has been one of the tasks of the C.l.A and other similar organisations to discover these potential quislings and traitors in our midst, and to encourage them, by bribery and the promise of political power, to destroy the constitutional government of their countries. In Ghana the embassies of the United States, Britain, and West Germany were all implicated in the plot to overthrow my government. It is alleged that the U.S. Ambassador, Franklin Williams, offered the traitors 13 million dollars to carry out a coup d'état. Afrifa, Hadley and Kotoka were to get a large share of this if they would assassinate me at Accra airport as I prepared to leave for Hanoi. I understand Afrifa said: "I think I will fail'', and declined the offer. So apparently did the others.
It is particularly disgraceful that it should have been an Afro-American ambassador who sold himself out to the imperialists and allowed himself to be used in this way. It was this same man who deliberately lied when he publicly described the coup as "bloodless." However, his treachery provides a sharp reminder of the insidious ways in which the enemies of Africa can operate. In the U.S.A. the "Uncle Tom" figure is well known. We have mercifully seen less of him in Africa.
The activities of the C.I.A. no longer surprise us. We have experienced many examples of the work of this organisation in recent years. Last May (1966) the subversive activities of the U.S. Embassy military attaché in Somalia, Colonel Rozmer, were exposed. He had been making approaches to Somali army officers and had organised the illegal importation of arms into the country with the object of carrying out a coup d'état. In July 1965 Taylor Odell, an attaché of the U.S. embassy, was expelled from Egypt after being caught red-handed receiving confidential documents from Mustafa Amin, an Egyptian C.I.A. agent. In South Sudan, the so-called Azana Liberation Front was founded with CI.A. support and funds. Its purpose was to detach South Sudan from the rest of the country and to proclaim an independent state of Azana. In the Congo (Brazzaville) the CI.A. has been involved in various attempts to sabotage the progressive government of President Massem ba-Debat. The record of CJ.A. activity in the Congo (Kinshasa) is equally disturbing and continuing.
Between 1961 and 1964, C.I.A. agents murdered a number of politicians and important public men in Burundi; the last being the Prime Minister of that country, Pierre Ngendandumwe, whose assassin, C.I.A. agent Gonzalve Muyenzi, worked as an accountant in the U.S. embassy. When his flat was searched, 3,000,000 francs were discovered which Muyenzi had received from the C.I.A. Having disposed of Ngendandumwe, pressure from the U.S. compelled the new Burundi government to refuse help to the Congolese nationalists whose victory the C.I.A. believed would obstruct U.S. activities in the Congo.
The C.I.A. was deeply implicated in the attempted coup in Tanzania in 1964. It paid lavishly for the services of a number of Tanzanian politicians.
Further examples of C.I.A. activity and the work of other foreign intelligence organisations in Africa could be given. They would provide material for a book of their own. As I write here in Conakry, I have just learned that five C.I.A. experts have arrived in Liberia to find out how I manage to communicate with my supporters inside Ghana. Doubtless they have been called in by the puppet "N.L.C." whose creation owed so much to U.S. and British Intelligence.
Dean Rusk, U.S. Secretary of State, at a meeting of 150 American top businessmen in June 1966, predicted that the "downfall' of President Ben Bella, President Sukarno and myself would be followed by the overthrow of more left-wing world leaders. He started to name them, but thought better of it, and ended his predictions with an enigmatic smile.
We know both the strength and the limitations of imperialist intelligence organisations. While being responsible for a great deal of the unrest in Africa in recent years, they have not been as successful as many would have us believe. This is partly because they have frequently been outwitted by the superior techniques and organisation of certain counter-intelligence services. It is also due to the fact that they have failed in many instances to buy the co-operation of a sufficient number of key Africans who are prepared to betray their countrymen, and on whose sell-out they depend ultimately for their success.
In Ghana, Harlley, Kotoka, Afrifa and Deku were just the kind of men they were looking for. It was when all had been arranged and the army and police seizure of power was about to take place that Ankrah was finally approached and without a thought he replied in one word: "Mafé", which in the Ga language means "I will do it."
4. "Opposition" Elements
The members of the "old opposition" with whom the "N.L.C." are closely associated, are the same people who tried to sabotage the winning of our political independence ten years ago. They struck on 24th February 1966, just as we were about to break through and win our economic independence. In January 1966, we had inaugurated the first electricity from the Volta dam; and only three days before their treachery, I had signed a new agreement to irrigate the mighty Accra plains. Ghana was all set for a tremendous march forward into a new industrial era, and a great expansion in our food growing capacity. This was the moment for which we had worked so hard. And this was the time this small group of unpatriotic selfish men, egged on by their neo-colonialist masters, chose to strike.
They shouted from the rooftops that they acted spontaneously to save Ghana from "economic chaos". But as everyone who has studied the history of Ghana over the last fifteen years or so knows, their action was only the culmination of a whole series of actions aimed against my government and against myself. They have a long record of go-slow policies, of subversive activity and of alignment with imperialists and their agents. Unable to gain victory at the polls they even resorted to assassination plots in order to impose themselves on the people of Ghana, and to avenge their political defeat.
It is these same people who became members of the political committee set up by the "N.L.C." in June 1966. Nearly all were supporters of the former United Party, an amorphous group of people who for various reasons opposed my government. The chairman of the political committee, Edward Akuffo-Addo, was a well-known member of the United Party; Kofi Busia, deputy chairman, was its leader. Like their Sandhurst counterparts, these members of the civilian political committee are deeply imbued with British traditions. Most of them received at least part of their education in Britain. They returned to their native country as if in blinkers, seeing and judging everything in Oxbridge terms. They saw the liberation struggle as a movement to be conducted slowly and "respectably" by themselves, the professional and intellectual elite, and as having nothing to do with the toiling masses whom they regarded with a mixture of fear and scorn.
It was men such as these, George Grant, J. B. Danquah, Ofori Atta, Akuffo Addo, Ako Adjei and Obetsebi Lamptey, who were the nucleus of the United Gold Coast Convention (U.G.C.C.), the organisation I launched in Saltpond on 29th December 1947 to achieve independence "by all legitimate and constitutional means." Danquah, a vice-president of the U.G.C.C., was one of the original supporters of the unpopular Burns Constitution. In fact, right from the start, the U.G.C.C. lacked popular support, and it was partly in order to make it appear a movement of the people that I was invited to become its general secretary. I had then spent ten years studying in the U.S.A., and was in England taking up further studies at the London School of Economics, and at University College, but spending a large part of my time at the West African National Secretariat and the West African Students Union (W.A.S.U.), organisations dedicated to the achievement of West African unity and the liquidation of colonialism. I also spent a lot of time helping to organise the Colonial Workers Association of Great Britain.
Danquah wrote personally to me urging me to accept the appointment. I was at first reluctant, having heard that the promoters of the U.G.C.C. were out of touch with the people, and were mainly middle-class reactionary lawyers and budding capitalists with whom, with my revolutionary background, I would be out of sympathy. But on the advice of the West African National Secretariat I agreed, and returned home on 16th December 1947 after an absence of twelve years.
Within 18 months of my return I was compelled to dissociate myself from the slow-moving and restricted U.G.C.C. and to form a new party, the Convention People's Party. This party, based on the support of the broad masses of the people and of the youth, demanded "self-government NOW", unlike the U.G.C.C. which asked for self-government "within the shortest possible time". I proclaimed the formation of the C.P.P. before a crowd of some 60,000 people in Accra stadium on 12th June 1949. The leaders of the U.G.C.C. never forgave me. They became implacable opponents of the Party, determined to obstruct its progress at every stage, and to attack me personally on all possible occasions.
They showed their hand almost immediately after the birth of the Party, when I was summoned to appear before a special meeting of the Ga State Council, the Accra traditional local authority, to explain what I meant by "Positive Action". Ex-members of the Working Committee of the U.G.C.C. were there in force at the meeting and pressed to have me banished from Accra. They blamed me for what they described as the growing "lawlessness" in the country, though what they really feared was the evidence of the political awakening of the people.
I explained to the meeting that at that particular stage of our struggle, positive action entailed non-violent methods such as press campaigns, strikes, boycotts and other forms of non-co-operation. That very night, I wrote and printed on my little cropper machine a pamphlet called "What I mean by Positive Action", so that there should be no doubt in anyone's mind about the legitimate and constitutional means by which we intended at that time to attack the forces of imperialism in the country, should the Coussey Report on constitutional reform, which was about to be published, prove unsatisfactory. It was this Cropper machine which was used to print the Accra Evening News.
But my long-standing political opponents chose to invent their own interpretation of "What I mean by Positive Action" and labelled me a dangerous rabble-rouser advocating violence.
As expected, the Coussey Report published at the end of October 1949 was completely unsatisfactory. I therefore called together the representatives of over 50 national organisations to meet in the Ghana People's Representative Assembly on 20th November, to oppose the Report and to decide on effective action. The Assembly resolved "that the Coussey Report and His Majesty's Government's statement thereto are unacceptable to the country as a whole" and declared "that the people of the Gold Coast be granted immediate self-government". With typical lack of concern for the country's progress, the executive committee of the U.G.C.C. did not attend the Assembly, and afterwards, the chiefs at Dodowah, led by Nana Ofori Atta II, stated that they did not accept the views of the Assembly.
Later, when I had launched the campaign for positive action, and it was really beginning to take effect, the Joint Provincial Council of Chiefs joined with the colonial government in attempting to suppress the campaign. At a meeting of the Joint Provincial Council of Chiefs I explained the need to continue positive action until the rank and file of the people were permitted, through the election of a constituent assembly, to express their views on constitutional reform. It was like speaking to a brick wall. Danquah's declaration, that "those who go against constitutional authority must expect to pay for it with their neck", sums up the defeatist attitude of these people, and explains how they never managed to lead a genuine and popular liberation movement.
Instead of supporting the efforts of the man in the street to express himself and to bring pressure to bear on the imperialists, these political opponents of the Party ranged themselves on the side of the British colonial government in trying to suppress the great upsurge of nationalism.
They condoned and even assisted in a wave of arrests of key supporters of the Party and leaders in the campaign of positive action. Kojo Botsio, general secretary of the Party, was arrested on 17th January 1950. My own arrest followed shortly afterwards.
I was sentenced to a total of three years' imprisonment, two years for attempting to "coerce the government of the Gold Coast" by launching the campaign of positive action, and the third year for "sedition" as publisher of the Daily Mail in which a "seditious" article had appeared. In fact, I only served 14 months. In the general election of 8th February 1951, the Party won a sweeping victory and I was elected as member of the Legislative Assembly for Accra Central. The colonial government had no choice but to release me. I left prison on 1 2th February, and on the request of the Governor of the Gold Coast, Sir Charles Arden-Clarke, formed a government and became Leader of Government Business. At once I proclaimed that our great task was to press ahead with the struggle for "self-government now". And once again, members of the Opposition went into action to try to wreck the independence movement.
Disgruntled at the success of the Party in the general election, and disappointed at not receiving positions in the new government, they proceeded to try to cause confusion and discontent among the people by announcing that now we had landed ourselves "good jobs" we had forsaken the policy of "self-government now". I challenged our political opponents to join us in a campaign of positive action in order to achieve "self-government now". I invited Danquah, Lamptey and the Executive of the U.G.C.C.; Ollenu, Bossman and the Executive of the National Democratic Party; the chiefs of the Asanteman Council; Nana Ofori Atta I, President of the Joint Provincial Council and chiefs of that Council; Kobina Sekyi, and the Executive of the Aborigines Rights Protection Society -all our critics, to notify the General Secretary of the Party in conference to plan a nation-wide campaign of positive action if the British government rejected a motion for "self-government now".
The sincerity of our political opponents and their connivance with the colonial government may be judged by the fact that not one of them answered the challenge.
A few years later, after the 1954 general election, when the Party won 72 out of the 104 seats in the Legislative Assembly, the largest anti-government party was the Northern People's Party which had 12 seats. The remaining 20 opposition members were mostly Independents, several of whom later attached themselves to one party or another. The anti-government members of the Assembly did not then constitute an opposition in the accepted sense of the term, since there was no group among them capable of forming an alternative government. They were therefore recognised simply as a body of critics of my government—an unofficial opposition.
Before long, however, the members of the unofficial opposition decided to amalgamate and to form a single party—the National Liberation Movement (N.L.M.). The reader will note the close analogy in the name of the N.L.M. and the "N.L.C.", both of which had about as little to do with "liberation" as it is possible to imagine.
The circumstances which led to the formation of the N.L.M. illustrate its reactionary nature and its negative policies. It was formed shortly after the introduction of the Cocoa Duty and Development Funds (Amendment) Bill into the Assembly in August 1954. The purpose of the Bill was to fix the price paid to cocoa farmers at 72 shillings a load (62 lb.) for four years, the duration of that Assembly.
This measure was needed to avoid inflation. Demand for cocoa in the world market had far exceeded the supply, and the price had risen to a record height. If the price paid locally to the farmers was increased proportionately, our Development Plan would be jeopardised by the inevitable rise in prices of consumer goods which would be followed by a demand for wage and salary increases. My government, therefore, under the terms of the proposed Bill guaranteed to pay the cocoa farmers 72 shillings a load irrespective of how low the world price of cocoa might fall during the ensuing four years, and to use any funds that accrued to expand the economy of the country as a whole.
The cocoa farmers in general reacted favourably to the Bill, but our political opponents seized the opportunity of fanning tribal and regional friction in order to attack us. All the remnants of various parties which had been formed at one time or another in opposition to my government joined together in the "Council for Higher Cocoa Prices". This organisation however, did not last long, and it was succeeded by the National Liberation Movement, which adopted as its raison d'etre the demand for a federal form of government. By linking the cocoa question with the idea of federation, members of the N.L.M. tried to spread discontent throughout Ashanti. They alleged that the Cocoa Bill was unjust to the cocoa farmers, and that Ashanti would be better off managing its own affairs and spending all the income from cocoa within Ashanti instead of contributing to the general development of the country. In this campaign to spread discontent and disunity, the N.L.M. were assisted by the Asanteman Council, headed by the Asantehene. For a time there was much violence in Ashanti, and hundreds of Ashanti Party members were forced to take refuge in Accra and other parts of the country.
At this time, as on former and later occasions, the imperialist press supported the opposition and gave an entirely false impression of the state of the country. The object was to spread the idea that my policies were causing widespread bloodshed, and that we were not ready for independence. Already, the opposition had become very dependent on imperialist support, and therefore deeply implicated in its policies. They had a common interest in trying to undermine my government and to prevent the successful implementation of its political, economic and social programme.
It was no mere coincidence that the first attempt to be made on my life occurred while the trouble in Ashanti, stirred up by the opposition, was at its height. It took place on the evening of 10th November 1955, while I was working at home. There were two large explosions which shattered all the windows, but no one was injured. I learned afterwards that enough gelignite was used to have destroyed the house entirely and to have killed everyone in it, but that it had been inadequately prepared and badly placed. The police made half-hearted enquiries, and no arrests were made.
During the next few months, the opposition stepped up its agitation for a federal form of government, though it is doubtful if they could sincerely have thought this suitable in a country of nearly 1 00,000 square miles, with a population then of under six million. However, full consideration was given to their demand and every effort was made to reach an understanding. The leaders of the N.L.M. were invited by four members of the Legislative Assembly, two of whom represented constituencies in Kumasi, to discuss the matter at a round-table conference. They refused on the ground that the suggestion did not come directly from the government. I therefore, sent an official government invitation. This they refused. In the hope that they might change their mind I sent yet another invitation. They again turned it down.
I introduced a Motion in the Assembly on 5th April 1955, calling for the appointment of a Select Committee to examine the whole question of the suitability of a federal system of government. Although the opposition was entitled to have only two members on the Committee, as against seven from the government benches, I agreed to allow them to nominate five. In spite of this concession, the leader of the opposition declared that they would not co-operate, and he and his 20 supporters walked out of the Assembly just after the Motion had been seconded. The excuse they gave for boycotting the Select Committee was a strange one. They said they did not consider the Committee competent to deal with national matters, and this regardless of the fact that it was composed entirely of members of the national Legislative Assembly.
The Select Committee consisting of 12 members including the Chairman, C. H. Chapman the Deputy Speaker, held 22 meetings and considered 299 written memoranda and 60 other written statements before issuing its report on 26th July, in which it advised against a federal form of government. It recommended that regional councils should be set up to which certain powers and functions of the central government should be delegated.
The opposition, still dissatisfied, determined to try to delay the independence issue indefinitely by continuing to oppose everything the government proposed. Whenever the question of the constitution was raised in the Assembly they walked out.
Undoubtedly, they gained much encouragement to persist in their obstructionist attitude by the support they obtained from the British government and press, which, although paying lip service to "democracy", has always in Africa where it suited their interests shown far more concern for minority rights than for the rights of the majority. Much publicity was given to the unrest in Ashanti and to opposition views, the subjects being discussed at length in both Houses of Parliament. But practically no publicity or sympathy was shown for the wishes of the overwhelming majority of the people of the Gold Coast who had demonstrated quite clearly that they supported the Party and a unitary form of government.
In a further effort to resolve the constitutional issue, I asked for and received a mandate from the Legislative Assembly to invite the British government to send a constitutional adviser to help formulate a suitable constitution and to advise on the devolution of certain powers to the Regions. Sir Frederick Bourne was sent. For nearly three months he travelled in every part of the country and discussed constitutional problems with every organisation and individual who wished to see him. But when he visited Kumasi to meet the leaders of the N.L.M. and their supporters, he found that they did not wish to see him. The excuse for their unwillingness to take part in any discussions on the constitution was that the government had, in November 1955, passed the State Councils (Ashanti) Amendment Bill. This Bill permitted those chiefs who had been destooled by the Asanteman Council the right to appeal to the Governor. Several chiefs had been destooled in Ashanti by the Asanteman Council for no other reason than that they were supporters of the government and against the federalist idea. Under the then existing laws they had no right of appeal. Clearly this was a matter which needed attention, and the State Councils Bill was designed to put an end to this victimisation.
Sir Frederick Bourne, in his Report, recommended the devolution of certain powers and functions to the Regional Assemblies, but that all legislation should be enacted by the central authority. I thereupon convened a conference of all the principal representative bodies and organisations in the country to meet at Achimota on 16th February 1956, to discuss Bourne's Report and other matters affecting the form of the constitution. Once again, the N.L.M. and its allies refused to participate. The conference was adjourned for a week to enable delegates from the Joint Provincial Council of Chiefs to persuade them to attend. But their mission failed. The delegates tried again later, but were still unsuccessful in getting the opposition elements to participate. The result was, that although the conference agreed almost all the recommendations of Sir Frederick Bourne its findings were not acceptable to the British Secretary of State as providing the necessary conditions for the granting of a firm date for independence, since the N.L.M. had not taken part in the discussions. Once more, the old alliance of the opposition and the imperialists had demonstrated their common interest in trying to delay independence.
I therefore drew up my own constitutional proposals for the sovereign and independent state of "Ghana," and put them before the Assembly on 15th May 1956. The motion was debated and passed on 5th June, after which the Assembly was dissolved and a general election declared, to take place in July. The British Secretary of State gave the pledge:
"If a General Election is held, Her Majesty's Government will be ready to accept a Motion calling for Independence within the Commonwealth passed by a reasonable majority in a newly elected Legislature and then to declare a firm date for attainment of their purpose."
The election was to be the final test of opinion for or against a federation. The outcome would show just how much or how little support the political opponents of the Party really had in the country.
The result was decisive. The Party won 71 seats, increased later by the support of one of the Independents, which gave a majority of 40 in the Legislative Assembly. Unlike the N.L.M., the Party won seats throughout the country as a whole, and was the only Party which could claim to speak in a national sense. Even in Ashanti, then the stronghold of the N.L.M., the Party won 8 out of the 21 seats and received 43 per cent of the votes cast, an increase on the previous election.
The reaction of Busia to the decisive election result was to call a press conference in Kumasi and to declare that the election had established the opposition case for a federation, since the Party had not won overall majorities in Ashanti and the Northern Territories. His action staggered even some of his closest colleagues. Everyone knew that the election had been fought on the federation issue and that the Party had won more than a "reasonable majority". Furthermore, during the course of the election campaign, Busia himself had declared that he would be prepared to form a government if the N.L.M. secured anything over 52 members. That is, he had accepted the fact that a single overall majority, even of one seat, constituted a democratic verdict.
When the new Assembly was formally opened, the opposition benches were empty except for two members who turned up from Togoland. Afterwards, Busia and his friends excused themselves by saying that they arrived late and could not get through the dense crowds outside the Assembly.
The Governor. in his speech at the opening ceremony, stated that the government would that week introduce a Bill declaring the Gold Coast a sovereign and independent state within the Commonwealth. The following day the opposition tabled an amendment criticising the proposal as "premature" until a further effort had been made to get "an agreed Constitution."
The amendment was defeated by a majority of 37. Whereupon, adopting their old tactics, the opposition issued a statement to the press saying they would absent themselves from the Assembly when the Independence Motion came before the House. Busia, showing where his real support lay, announced that he considered the struggle centred not in the Gold Coast but in London, and that the opposition would send a delegation to the British government.
As I recall these times, when the opposition persistently refused either to participate in national discussions or to respect the decision of the great majority of the people, I wonder how they managed to retain even the little support they had. Their actions were so unpatriotic, dishonest and undignified. They aligned themselves with those who wished to retard the country's progress towards independence. At the same time, while loudly proclaiming their belief in democracy, they were prepared to try to force the will of a small minority on the majority of the nation, and so make a farce of parliamentary government.
Busia who led the opposition delegation to London, actually appealed to the British government not to grant independence. He said the country was not ready for it: "We still need you (the British) in the Gold Coast." I imagine he would say today that the Americans were needed! He found some support among sections of the British press, but there could be no denying that the conditions laid down by the Secretary of State, that my motion for independence should be passed by "a reasonable majority in the newly elected Legislature", had been satisfied, and at long last a date for independence was fixed—the 6th of March 1957.
The long struggle to achieve our political freedom was over. But in a sense our task of building a really independent Ghana was only just beginning. Political independence was incomplete without economic independence, and as I said in the midnight pronouncement of independence in Accra on 6th March 1957, "the independence of Ghana is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent".
My government, therefore, was pledged to the twin task of achieving economic independence for Ghana, and of participating in the wider African revolution. The former implied the adoption of socialist policies, since in the African situation genuine independence is incompatible with capitalism; while the latter involved us in actively supporting the liberation and unity movements in Africa. In both these tasks, my government immediately came up against opposition from the same quarters as before, that is, from reactionary bourgeois elements inside Ghana, and from imperialist and neo-colonialist interests outside. As before, these forces had a common interest; both wished to delay economic independence and to impede the progress of the African revolution. The tactics they employed were suitably adjusted to the new situation.
After 1957, having been repeatedly rejected by the electorate, the opposition lost hope of gaining office by constitutional means, and embarked on a campaign of obstructing the work of government without making any attempt to devise an alternative programme. They asserted themselves outside the democratic framework. Their policies, always regional in concept, became purely destructive, subversive and violent. Before independence they had been prepared to sacrifice our national liberation in order to keep me and my colleagues out of government; now they were ready to sabotage our newly-born freedom and to hold up the African revolution by al lying themselves even more closely with imperialists and the insidious forces of neo-colonialism in causing a breakdown in administration so that they might get a chance to grasp the reins of office.
They employed every stratagem, from demanding the virtual secession of Ashanti, the Northern Region and Togoland from the sphere of Central Ghanaian authority, to a press campaign of abuse and lies to discredit me and the government. When this failed, they resorted to violence, assassination plots, and eventually to the subversion of army and police officers.
For a time after 1957 we tolerated the excesses of the opposition, but when their actions began to undermine the state and to jeopardise its independence we took measures, like all governments do in times of national emergency, to ensure the security of the nation. For example, we brought in the Avoidance of Discrimination Bill to deal with the control of political parties based on tribal and religious affiliations. Its effect was to cause the various opposition parties to join together into a single party, the United Party. Later, after two and a half years of putting up with a vicious opposition press campaign, certain restrictions were placed on the press; and a fifth attempt on my life made preventive detention necessary. By then, assassination attempts had resulted in the death of 30 Ghanaians, men, women and children, and the wounding of some 300 others.
We could not allow a small minority of unprincipled men to continue to stir up disunity and confusion with the object of overthrowing the government, which had the support of the overwhelming majority of the people of Ghana, support shown decisively in the general election before independence and in the 1964 referendum which established the C.P.P. as the national party of Ghana. Maximum unity and effort was vital if my government was successfully to carry out its mandate of reconstruction and development.
A distinction must be made between the loss of freedom to subvert, and the loss of freedom of expression. At no time has my government denied the right of Ghanaians to hold political meetings and to discuss the country's affairs with complete frankness. In the National Assembly, as the official reports show, debates were vigorous and unrestricted; members did not hesitate to criticise and expose social wrongs and injustices. Visitors to Ghana from non-socialist countries often spoke to me of their surprise at hearing politics discussed freely and openly throughout the country, when they had been led to believe that the one-party system stifled political differences and made any kind of criticism impossible. There were wide differences of opinion within the Party, and members were always encouraged to say what they thought on all aspects of the government's policy. It has been said by a Western observer that "within the C.P.P. there were as wide political differences and antagonisms as those existing in Britain". The point I wish to make is that under our system of democratic centralism, criticism comes from within and is constructive. The people of Ghana when they established a one-party state in the 1964 constitutional referendum were merely giving de jure recognition to an established fact.
The two party system has shown itself to be unsuitable in any African state. It has grown up in Britain to serve specific class interests. It was perhaps our fault that we did not realise this sooner and attempt earlier to build the type of one party state most suited to our needs. The Sierra Leonean army had exactly the same social background and British training as that of Ghana and yet carried out its coup d'état to suppress the two party system. Indeed, the excuse offered by the Sierra Leonean rebels was that their action was forced on them by the failure of the two party system.
The first priority in Ghana at the time of independence was to make use of our pitifully small stock of professional and technical experts. Whatever their political views they had to be utilised to the full in the interest of the newly emerged Ghana state. From the start I had to bring not only into my cabinet but had to appoint to important posts in the judiciary, the civil service and the universities, individuals who had been active opponents of the Party in colonial days.
We could not afford to do without such few qualified African doctors, accountants, architects, engineers, university teachers and professional people generally as were available immediately after independence. A formula had to be found by which they could not only be employed in state service and in development generally but brought within the Party. This in its turn meant that the Party itself could not in these conditions restrict itself to those who understood and had practised a socialist ideology. The calculated risk of admitting these persons to our organisation was one we had to take. Nevertheless, these colonial trained professional classes, with certain notable exceptions, looked on independence as a strictly national concern. In many cases, all they were concerned with was taking the places of the former colonial occupiers of their jobs and making the same money as these did in the same social and economic pattern. Insofar as they were within the Party they were a source of weakness because they sabotaged attempts to prevent corruption and, in a number of cases, actually joined in it themselves. Yet if they had been excluded from the Party, they would have joined the so-called "opposition" which had become, almost from the moment of independence, a purely conspiratorial organisation.
In the same way I had to try to accommodate within the Party the leaders of traditional society, the chiefs.
On reflection even though I trusted too much in the power of a reformed chieftaincy I was not mistaken in attempting to use popularly chosen chiefs within the framework of the government. It was then essential to have the broadest possible grouping of interests at home if we were to be sufficiently united to deal with the external issue, namely, the political unification of the African continent.
I could have dismissed many of the higher police officers about whose loyalty I had doubts. But whom could I have put in their place? So little education was done in colonial times that actual illiteracy was a major problem in the army and police. Were it not for the continued criminal conspiracy by the opposition then I might have taken the risk of abolishing the Special Branch at an earlier stage. After all, it was not even a part of the old colonial set-up and had only been instituted to deal with me and the C.P.P. in 1949. If I had done so, however, all security would have had to be entrusted to the Party and while I did use it as a major source of information as to what was taking place in the country, once again it would have been equally dangerous to have relied exclusively on it.
I had to combat not only tribalism but the African tradition that a man's first duty was to his family group and that therefore nepotism was the highest of all virtues. While I believe we had largely eliminated tribalism as an active force, its by-products and those of the family system were still with us. I could not have chosen my government without some regard to tribal origins and even, within the Party itself, there was at times a tendency to condemn or recommend some individual on the basis of his tribal or family origin. Dangerous and defective as the police investigation system was, it did at least provide me with a second opinion from individuals trained, at any rate in theory, to give objective judgments.
Further, the necessarily broad nature of the Party made some of its wealthier members quite willing to use its machinery for private ends and to discredit police officers or civil servants who were looking too closely into their affairs. Of tribal and family groups there were even those within it who might be prepared to recommend for detention individuals who took the opposite side to themselves in the election of a chief or in the running of traditional affairs.
The issues we faced at independence were so gigantic that within every sphere we had to take calculated risks. We could not, however obvious were the limitations of many of the police, the civil service and the judiciary, change them overnight. We had had no revolutionary war which would have produced and trained those who might take their place.
The problems we faced at independence were similar to those which confront most states emerging from colonialism. A once dependent territory if it is to survive in the modern world must try to accomplish in a single generation what it has taken developed nations 300 years or more to achieve. There is need for radical change in practically every department of national life. For example, after a people's revolution it is essential that the top ranks of the Armed Forces, Police and Civil Service be filled by men who believe in the ideology of the Revolution, and not by those whose loyalties remain with the old order.
In most cases, the whole economy of the country has to be reorganised, agriculture diversified, industries started from scratch, harbours, roads, airports built, and crash programmes of education inaugurated to cope with the sudden and increasing demand for skilled technicians and administrators. In this great undertaking there can be no place for slackers or saboteurs.
The one-party system of government is now the accepted pattern of government in a large part of independent Africa. But when we were evolving this form it was relatively new, and it was loudly condemned by our enemies. As I told members of the National Assembly in my Sessional Address on 1st February 1966: "A one-party system of government is an effective and safe instrument only when it operates in a socialist society. In other words, it must be a political expression of the will of the masses working for the ultimate good and welfare of the people as a whole. On the other hand, a one-party system of government in a neo-colonialist client state, subject to external pressures and control, can quickly develop into the most dangerous form of tyranny, despotism and oppression. It can become in the hands of a few privileged rascally-minded and selfish individuals in a neo-colonialist state a weapon and tool for suppressing the legitimate aspirations of the people in the interests of foreign powers and their agents. I repeat, a one-party state can only function for the good of the people within the framework of a socialist state or in a developing state with a socialist programme. The government governs through the people, and not through class cleavages and interests. In other words, the basis of government is the will of the people."
The capitalist-imperialist world is still explaining the tension in the world today in terms of a conflict between "dictatorship" and "democracy"; the first is equated with communism and tyranny, the latter with enlightenment and freedom. In this way, imperialist and neo-colonialists seek to conceal the true content of the struggle which lies in the reaction between capitalism and socialism.
We expected opposition to our development plans from the relics of the old "opposition", from the Anglophile intellectual and professional elite, and of course, from neo-colonialists who viewed the obvious signs of our approaching economic independence with growing alarm. What we did not perhaps anticipate sufficiently was the backsliding of some of our own party members, men like Gbedemah and Adamafio, who for reasons of personal ambition, and because they only paid lip-service to socialism, sought to destroy the Party.
Right from the foundation of the Party, as everyone in Ghana knows, I have waged a ceaseless war against corruption. In the "Dawn Broadcast" made on 8th April 1961, I stressed the need to eliminate it from our society: "I am aware that the evil of patronage finds a good deal of place in our society. I consider that it is entirely wrong for persons placed in positions of eminence or authority to use the influence of office in patronising others, in many cases wrong persons, for immoral favours. I am seeing to it that this evil shall be uprooted, no matter whose ox is gored. The same thing goes for nepotism, which is, so to speak, a twin brother of the evil of patronage . . . . It is most important to remember that the strength of the Convention People's Party derives from the masses of the people. These men and women include those whom I have constantly referred to as the unknown warriors -dedicated men and women who serve the Party loyally and selflessly without hoping for reward. It is therefore natural for the masses to feel some resentment when they see comrades whom they have put into power and have given the mandate to serve the country on their behalf, begin to forget themselves and indulge in ostentatious living. High Party officials, Ministers, Ministerial Secretaries, Chairmen of statutory boards and corporations must forever bear this in mind. Some of us very easily forget that we ourselves have risen from amongst the masses."
My difficulty was to get the police to enforce the principles I laid down. It was only when I personally supervised the direction of criminal investigation against ministers and prominent Party members that anything was done. For example, a former Minister of Agriculture, F. Y. Asare, was involved with one Kojo Djaba and a civil service accomplice, and was convicted. Even this case would never have come before the courts if I had not personally set up a special body independent of the police to investigate it.
It is significant that the Judge who tried this particular case was the first of those to be dismissed by the "N.L.C.", even before they got rid of the Chief Justice; and after the 'coup' Asare and his confederates had their convictions annulled by the "N.L.C." constituted Appeal Court.
Sufficient time has now elapsed to show that the "N.L.C." never seriously wished to investigate corruption. Had they done so it would have involved too many of their own members. It was a propaganda device directed against my own government, making use of the fact that there were a number of instances of corruption among ministers and Party officials. Unlike in Asare's case, these had not been dealt with because the police themselves could not furnish the evidence. The attitude of the "N.L.C." is shown by the fact that when I had mentioned in a broadcast from Guinea that Harlley and Deku were involved in diamond smuggling and challenged the "N.L.C." to set up an enquiry into diamond racketeering in Ghana the Commission which they were thus forced to establish sat in secret and no report by it was ever issued.
This purely propaganda approach is even better illustrated in my own case. I am alleged to have "stolen" millions. In fact I have no money outside Ghana except for the sums which have been paid to me after the 'coup' as royalties on my books and which are now paid into the London Branch of the National Commercial Bank of Scotland.
I never handled any money personally for any external or internal purposes and this included my own salary. All drawing both on governmental and my personal accounts was counter-signed by civil servants who were responsible to the Auditor-General for all public expenditure and who, for my own purposes, recorded my personal expenditure. Anyone of these officials could have produced a full and valid statement of how every penny was dealt with by the President's Office and exactly how my own salary was spent by me personally. If this had been done it would have been shown that I refused to accept, as a political gesture, any of the expense allowances allotted to the President by law. In the same way if my Will had been published in full it would have shown that I left nothing even to my own family but bequeathed everything I did possess to the Party and the State. Before the so-called enquiry none of these detailed accounts were produced. Yet Kojo Djaba was called to testify that I had in fact taken the money which he had been convicted of stealing.
The failure of the routine Police investigation of corruption made it necessary for me to deal with it either by setting up a special body as I did in Djaba's case or by appointing official Commissions of Enquiry to expose publicly notable members of our society and even Ministers of Government. Shortly before the army and police action on 24th February 1966, the Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Trade Malpractices in Ghana was published. It was a bold attempt to examine and to expose the activities of men and women who were sabotaging our economic development plans by indulging in various forms of trade malpractices. Some of our wealthiest and most prominent citizens were mentioned by name. There was an immediate demand that legal action should be taken against them. and this was under consideration when the military and police treachery took place.
Obviously this kind of exposure brought us new and powerful enemies. But these people, by acting in the way they did, were all the time secret enemies of the people, and it was essential to bring them to the surface.
I regard the events sparked off on 24th February 1966 as a cleansing process. All those who had for so long been working either openly or secretly against us came together and exposed themselves in their true colours for all to see. By their very actions, on 24th February and in the months of "N.L.C." rule, they have clearly shown themselves to be traitors to their country and the stooges of neo-colonialism. They have displayed their reactionary nature, their complete disregard for the common man and for the progress of the African Revolution.
It is like when you boil a pot hard; all the bits and pieces of useless stuff come to the top and you are able to skim them off easily. It is necessary to realise, that, in many ways, the so-called "coup d'état" has not been a set-back but has been merely a symptom of how neo-colonialism is breaking down.
Almost all African countries came to independence without armed struggle. This meant that it was impossible, in practice, to reconstruct these new states upon a socialist basis immediately. I was well aware of the compromises which it was necessary to make and the dangers which this entailed but Ghana's independence on any condition was the first essential in securing the freedom of Africa. Not to have seized independence when we had a chance of obtaining it, whatever the liability we inherited, would have been criminal. The circumstances under which the C.P.P. was formed resulted in it being a compromise organisation composed of some genuine revolutionaries but containing many of those who are interested in independence only so as to better themselves and to take the place of the previous colonial traders and businessmen. This meant that I had to include in any government which I formed representatives of all tendencies in the Party including businessmen on the make such as Emmanuel Ayeh-Kumi and William Halm. In the circumstances of the day there was at least a reason· able chance that such people would act honestly and would assist to build the state on a new basis.
The experiment which we tried in Ghana was essentially one of developing the country in co-operation with the world as a whole. Non-alignment meant exactly what it said. We were not hostile to the countries of the socialist world in the way in which the governments of the old colonial territories were. It should be remembered that while Britain pursued at home co-existence with the Soviet Union this was never allowed to extend to British colonial territories. Books on socialism, which were published and circulated freely in Britain, were banned in the British colonial empire, and after Ghana became independent it was assumed abroad that it would continue to follow the same restrictive ideological approach. When we behaved as did the British in their relations with the socialist countries we were accused of being pro-Russian and introducing the most dangerous ideas into Africa.
In fact, the fault was that, from the very circumstances in which we found ourselves, we were unable to introduce more "dangerous ideas" or to get them more widely understood. What went wrong in Ghana was not that we attempted to have friendly relations with the countries of the socialist world but that we maintained too friendly relations with the countries of the western bloc.
Before the military revolt the policy of Ghana was based upon an attempt to develop the country along what were essentially socialist lines. This policy could have succeeded had the western world been prepared to see coming into existence a genuinely independent African state. In fact, they were not prepared to do so and we thus gave innumerable hostages to fortune.
The "coup d'etat" on its surface was a military revolt against myself and what I stood for. If it is analysed more deeply, however, it is a mark of the breakdown of the western attempt to influence and control Africa. The western countries, having failed to control democratically supported African governments, were forced into the final extremity of substituting regimes which depended upon no other mandate than the weapons which they held in their hands. Such puppet governments cannot survive for long either in Ghana or elsewhere in Africa. They are, in the first place, based on internal contradictions. Why they are tolerated is that their initial popularity is due to a sort of sympathetic magic. The prosperity of the western world at the moment depends upon exploiting less developed countries. Each year the western world pays less for its imports and each year charges more for its exports. Those who make our "coups" believe, however, or at least pretend to believe, that if they copy, or claim to copy, the outward image of the western world, then-in some miraculous way—they will secure the advantages which the western world enjoys. The contrary is the case. The individuals who have made the counter-revolution from Saigon to Sierra Leone are dependent for their political existence upon western support. The countries over which they temporarily obtained control are therefore exploited all the more viciously. By supporting the reactionary rebellions in Africa and western countries have dug graves for imperialism and neo-colonialism and have put before the African people the clear choice which was unclear before, either to go forward with a thorough revolution or else to continue in a situation which, year by year, impoverishes and humiliates them further.
Events in Ghana since the military rebellion illustrate this admirably. Those who seized power claim they came forward to save the economy, restore prosperity, democracy, freedom of the press and the like. Instead, in order to maintain themselves in office at all they have had to impose harsher taxation, sell out state enterprises to foreign interests, murder democracy, curb the press and forcibly to suppress any type of consultation with the people. Instead, therefore, of proving that capitalism and the western way of life are the best, they demonstrate that it only brings increasing misery to all those who attempt to reproduce it in Africa. They thus, by their example, produce a genuinely revolutionary situation which did not previously exist and which was, through its absence, one of the main reasons for African disunity and for the poverty of the continent.
I had for long the gravest doubts about many of those in leading positions in my Party. Despite the establishment of the ideological institute at Winneba which I hoped might be used to teach some general understanding of what we were attempting it was clear to me that many in high positions still failed to understand the political and social purposes of the state. On Ghana's external policy, however, depended to a large extent the progressive line which Africa as a whole used to follow. I had to weigh against the desire to move fast at home the d angers of concentrating too much upon internal matters and achieving a revolution at home at the cost of temporarily withdrawing from the international field.
The conduct of many of those in the higher Party leadership has demonstrated to the people of Ghana that one can no longer trust in a broad coalition of interests. The old civil service and the Judiciary went over almost to a man to the usurping regime. By so doing they were of course serving personal interests and to this extent what they did was understandable if not excusable. The lesson, however, which their conduct provides, is that they had no loyalty to the state or understanding of the social purposes which we were attempting to achieve. It might be possible to work in the future with people who were merely dishonest through self-interest but it is absolutely impossible to utilize a machine which has shown itself so defective of understanding.
For these reasons, the "coup" has achieved something which it would have been impossible to achieve without it, namely, a complete and public exposure of the impossibility of continuing along old lines.
The slate has been wiped clean and now at least we can begin to build again upon new foundations. For the people of Ghana life under the "N.L.C." is a form of political education which they could never otherwise have had. For the C.P.P. it is an even more important lesson in that it shows that the old organisation was defective and that the old leadership in many cases which was inherited from the struggle against British imperialism was inadequate for its task and when put to the test of crisis failed.
In the old days popular opinion forced me to maintain in positions of authority individuals who were well-known in their localities through their local families and tribal influences. In the past many such people rendered important services to the Party. Now, however, a new testing time has arisen and these people, when weighed against events, have had all the defects of their characters exposed for the whole world to see.
In a larger sense the "coup d'état" has made it plain that the C.P.P. can no longer follow the path of the old line. It must develop a new and reformed revolutionary leadership which must come from the broad mass of the Party. There is now a genuinely revolutionary situation in Ghana. For this reason, while the present is dark, the future is bright. And indeed the misfortunes of Ghana in its darkest days are a necessary lesson for all African revolutionaries.
5. The Big Lie
It has been said that the fabrication of the "big lie" is essential in the planning of any usurpation of political power. In the case of Ghana, the big lie told to the world was that Ghana needed to be rescued from "economic chaos". Various other lies were hinged to this central lie. The country was said to be hopelessly in debt and the people on the verge of starvation. Among the lies aimed against me personally was the one that I had accumulated a large private fortune; this was to form the basis for an all-out character assassination attempt. But these lies were subsidiary to the one big lie of "economic mismanagement", which was to provide an umbrella excuse for the seizure of power by neo-colonialist inspired traitors.
If Ghana was in such a serious economic condition, why was there no lack of investment in her growing industries? Investors do not put their money into mismanaged enterprises and unstable economies. Why did the imperialist powers try to exert an economic squeeze on Ghana? No one in his right mind bothers to attack an already-dying concern. Who made up the figures of Ghana's supposed "debt" ? Why was only one side of the ledger shown—why no mention of assets? How can the obvious evidence of the modernisation and industrialisation of Ghana, such as the new roads, factories, schools and hospitals, the harbour and town of Tema, the Volta and Teffie bridges and the Volta dam be reconciled with the charge of wasted expenditure? If the Ghanaian people were starving, why no evidence of this, and why no popular participation in the "coup"? How was it that Ghana had the highest living standard in Africa per capita, the highest literacy rate, and was the nearest to achieving genuine economic independence? All these questions. and many related to them, are now being asked. An examination of our development plans and of their implementation reveals the truth—that it was their success and not their failure which spurred our enemies into action. Ghana, on the threshold of economic independence, and in the vanguard of the African revolutionary struggle to achieve continental liberation and unity, was too dangerous an example to the rest of Africa to be allowed to continue under a socialist-directed government.
In the first ten years of its administration, the Ghana government drew up the First and Second Five Year Development Plans (1951-1956 and 1959-1964), and the Consolidation Plan, which covered the two-year gap between these Plans ( 1957- 1959). Under these Plans the foundations were to be laid for the modernisation and industrialisation of Ghana. A skilled labour force was to be trained and an adequate complement of public services built up such as transport, electricity, water and telecommunications.
We had to work fast. Under colonial rule, foreign monopoly interests had tied up our whole economy to suit themselves. We had not a single industry. Our economy was dependent on one cash crop—cocoa. Although our output of cocoa is the largest in the world, there was not a single cocoa processing factory.
Before we took office in 1951 there was no direct railway between Accra and Takoradi, in those days our main port. Passengers and freight had to travel by way of Kumasi. This was because Kumasi was the centre of the timber and mining industries, both of which served foreign interests and were therefore well supplied with the necessary communications. There were few roads, and only a very rudimentary public transport system. For the most part, people walked from place to place. There were very few hospitals, schools or clinics. Most of our villages lacked a piped water supply. In fact, the nakedness of the land when my government began in 1951 has to have been experienced to be believed.
Failure to promote the interests of our people was due to the insatiable demands of colonial exploitation. It was not until we had grasped political power that we were in a position to challenge this, and to develop our resources for the benefit of the Ghanaian people. Those who would judge us merely by the heights we have achieved would do well to remember the depths from which we started.
The condition of Ghana in 1964 showed that our first two Development Plans had been carried out with a high degree of success. We had one of the most modern network of roads in Africa. Takoradi harbour had been extended, and the great artificial harbour at Tema, the largest in Africa, built from scratch. Large extensions to the supply of water and to the telecommunication network had been constructed, and further extensions were under construction. Our agriculture was being diversified and mechanised. Above all, the Volta River Project, which was designed to provide the electrical power for our great social, agricultural and industrialisation programme, was almost completed.
In education, progress was equally impressive. In ten years we had achieved more than in the whole period of colonial rule. The figures below show the great increase in the numbers of children in primary and middle schools, and of students in secondary and technical schools and in colleges of higher education.
| 1951 | 1961 | % Increase | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Primary Schools | 154,360 | 481,500 | 211.9 |
| Middle Schools | 66,175 | 160,000 | 141.7 |
| Secondary and Technical Schools | 3,559 | 19,143 | 437.8 |
| Teacher Training Colleges | 1,916 | 4,552 | 137.5 |
| University Students | 208 | 1,204 | 478.8 |
The building of schools and colleges was given top priority in our development plans. We took the unprecedented step in Africa of making all education free, from primary to university level. In addition, textbooks were supplied free to all pupils in primary, middle and secondary schools.
In the 1964-65 school year there were 9,988 primary and middle schools with an enrolment of 1 ,286,486. There were 89 secondary schools with 32,971 pupils; 47 teacher training colleges with an enrolment of 1 0,168; 11 technical schools and 3 universities. All this, in a population of 7,500,000 put Ghana in the lead among independent African states. At the same time, a mass literacy campaign has made Ghana the most literate country in the whole of Africa. A look at some of the other social achievements during the Party's first ten years of office reveals a similar rate of progress.
| Basic Services | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| 1951 | 1961 | % Increase | |
| Health | |||
| Number of hospital beds | 2,368 | 6,155 | 159.9 |
| Rural and urban clinics | 1 | 30 | — |
| Doctors and dentists | 156 | 500 | 220.5 |
| Transport and Communications | |||
| Roads (in miles)— | |||
| Class I (Bitumen) | 1,398 | 2,050 | 46.7 |
| Class II (Gravel) | 2,093 | 3,346 | 59.8 |
| (Since 1961 the mileage of motor roads has risen to 19,236. Feeder roads connect most villages to the trunk road network.) | |||
| Post Offices | 444 | 779 | 75.4 |
| Telephones | 7,383 | 25,488 | 245.2 |
| Electricity | |||
| Installed electrical capacity (kW) | 84,708 | 120,860 | 42.7 |
| Electrical power generated (kW'000) | 281,983 | 390,174 | 38.4 |
In 1962 the government adopted what was known as the Party's Programme of Work and Happiness. It proclaimed our fundamental objective as the building of a socialist state devoted to the welfare of the masses.
The concrete programme of action for this was worked out in the Seven Year Development Plan launched on 11th March 1964. In presenting the Plan to the National Assembly I said that its main tasks were first, to speed up the rate of growth of our national economy; secondly, to enable us to embark upon the socialist transformation of our economy through the rapid development of the state and co-operative sectors; thirdly, to eradicate completely the colonial structure of our economy.
The Plan embodied measures aimed to achieve a self-sustaining economy founded on socialist production and distribution-an economy balanced between agriculture and industry, providing sufficient food for the people and supporting secondary industries based on the products of our agriculture. Ghana was to be as soon as possible a socialist state. The people, through the state, would have an effective share in the economy of the country and an effective control over it. Thus the principles of scientific socialism would be applied to suit our own particular situation.
The Party has always proclaimed socialism as its objective. But socialism cannot be achieved without socialists, much hard work and sacrifice, and detailed economic planning to provide a vast improvement in the level of material wealth of the country, and distribution of this wealth among the population. It was decided in the Seven Year Plan that Ghana's economy would for the time being remain a mixed one, with a vigorous public and co-operative sector operating alongside the private sector. Our socialist objectives demanded, however, that the public and co-operative sectors should expand faster than the private sector, especially those strategic areas of production upon which the economy of the country essentially depended.
Various state corporations and enterprises were to be established as a means of securing our economic independence and assisting in the national control of the economy. They were, like all business undertakings, expected to maintain themselves efficiently, and to show profits which could be used for further investment and to help finance public services. A State Management Committee was set up to ensure their efficient and profitable management.
Many state enterprises were quick to show results. The Ghana National Trading Corporation (G.N.T.C.) made a net profit of £4,885,900 in 1965, and had become the largest trading concern in the country. Other state enterprises, by their very nature, took a longer time to develop, and by February 1966 were only just beginning to make a profit. A few, notably in the agricultural sector, were in their infancy and were not expected to yield significant results for some time to come. A certain period of adaptation is necessary for all young industries, particularly in developing countries where the patterns of production are still mainly agricultural and elementary.
But it is noteworthy that the traitors of February 1966 found no less than 63 state enterprises which they could put on the market.
In our Seven Year Plan we recognised the value of foreign investment in the private sector, particularly in the production of consumer goods, the local processing of Ghanaian raw materials and the utilisation of Ghana's natural resources in the areas of economic activity where a large volume of investment was required. But we welcomed foreign investors in a spirit of partnership. We did not intend to allow them to operate in such a way as to exploit our people. They were to assist in the expansion of our economy in line with our general objectives, an agreed portion of their profits being allocated to promote the welfare and happiness of the Ghanaian people.
The state retained control of the strategic branches of the economy, including public utilities, raw materials, and heavy industry. The state also participated in light and consumer goods industries in which the rates of return on capital were highest. We intended that those industries which provided the basic living needs of the people should be state-owned in order to prevent any exploitation.
It was estimated that during the seven years there would be a total expenditure of £1,016 million. Total government investment in the Plan was to be £476 million. Foreign investors, individual Ghanaians, local authorities and the co-operative sector were expected to invest about £440 million. Ghanaians, it was hoped, would contribute nearly £100 million of direct labour in the construction of buildings, in community development and in the extension of their farms.
Special attention was given to the modernising of agriculture, so that a greater yield and a diversity of crops could be produced. We needed to produce more food locally so that we could reduce our imports of foodstuffs and at the same time improve the health of the people by increasing the protein content in the average diet. Most developing countries face nutritional problems of one kind or another. In our case, the great need was for more fish and meat to provide a properly balanced diet. We planned to increase the output of fish from an estimated 70,000 tons in 1963 to 250,000 tons in 1969. Livestock production, including poultry and eggs, was to increase from 20,080 tons to 37,800 tons.
Immediate steps were taken to expand the fishing fleet and to develop fish processing and marketing facilities. We bought 29 fishing trawlers from Russia. The immense man-made lake formed as part of the Volta River Project was being stocked with fish, and this too was about to bring a big improvement in the diet of the Ghanaian people.
As for meat and poultry, the government subsidised the development of many poultry farms, and the rearing of large herds of cattle. In colonial days, fresh meat, milk and eggs were available to Europeans only. Before the setback of February 1966, however, they were becoming part of the regular diet of the Ghanaian masses.
The task of correcting the imbalance in our food economy was regarded as the greatest challenge to the agricultural sector of the Plan. Far-reaching schemes were initiated for major improvements in irrigation and water conservation in the Northern and Upper Regions of Ghana. Peasant farmers throughout the country were informed that they would be able to make use of the agricultural machinery of state and cooperative farms. It was not the government's intention to squeeze out the peasant farmer. Far from it, we needed the maximum effort of every individual farmer if we were to achieve our agricultural targets.
During the period of the Plan, Ghana's production of raw materials was to be considerably increased. Cocoa, our main export, earned the country 1,680 million cedis between 1951 and 1961. Of this, the farmers received 1,008 million cedis and the remainder was used by the government and the Cocoa Marketing Board for maintaining public services and for the general development of the country. We increased our cocoa production from 264,000 tons in 1956-57, to 590,000 tons in 1963-64, and huge silos had been built, able to store half the cocoa crop, to enable us to restrict exports and so ensure a fair price for our cocoa in the world market.
Plans were also far advanced to increase exports of timber, and to develop new species of wood for buildings. furniture and other wood products, and for use in paper factories. Efforts were being made to revive our once-flourishing export crop of palm oil. Rubber production was being increased. In the Western Region, a vast new plantation, 18 miles long, had been sown. Within two to three years Ghana was to be one of the greatest rubber producers in Africa. The production of palm oil, cotton, sugar cane and tobacco was being stepped up. By 1970, there were to be four factories in operation producing 100,000 tons of sugar a year, more than sufficient to eliminate the item from our list of imports.
Greatest of all our development projects was the Volta dam. When the Seven Year Plan was launched, the Volta Project was expected to begin to generate electrical power by September 1965. Completion of the Project would enable us to develop the full industrial potential of Ghana. It would increase by nearly 600 per cent the installed electrical capacity of the country. Nearly one-half of this new capacity would be taken up by the aluminium smelter in Tema; it is estimated that Ghana has sufficient bauxite to last for 200 years. But apart from this the Volta Project would have an ample reserve of power for other users, and Ghana would have liberated herself decisively from the possibility of a power shortage becoming a brake on the rate of economic progress.
Construction targets for the various parts of the Volta River Project were achieved, some of them ahead of schedule, and the official inauguration ceremony took place on 23rd January 1966. At that time, building was about to start on a large subsidiary dam at Bui. Plans were also well advanced for the construction of an alumina plant which would have given Ghanaians control of the whole process of aluminium production. As it was, we were exporting bauxite to the United Kingdom for processing while we were importing alumina manufactured in the United States from bauxite mined in Jamaica for our aluminium smelter.
In keeping with my government's policy of linking Ghana's progress with Africa's total development, provision was made in the Plan for economic co-operation with other African states. As I said in my address to the National Assembly on 11th March 1964:
"While we wait for the setting up of a Union Government for Africa, we must begin immediately to harmonise our plans for Africa's total development. For example, I see no reason why the independent African states should not, with advantage to each other, join together in an economic union and draw up together a joint Development Plan which will give us greater scope and flexibility to our mutual advantage. By the same token, I see no reason why the independent African states should not have common shipping and air lines in the interests of improved services and economy. With such rationalisation of our economic policies, we could have common objectives and thus eliminate unnecessary competition and frontier barriers and disputes."
When in fact I inaugurated the completed Volta River Project on 23rd January 1966, I said: "We are ready and prepared to supply power to our neighbours in Togo, Dahomey, Ivory Coast and Upper Volta. As far as I am concerned this project is not for Ghana alone. Indeed, I have already offered to share our power resources with our sister African states."
On that day at Akosombo, some 60 miles north-east of Accra, when I switched on illuminating lights signifying the official opening of hydro-electric power from the Volta, one of my greatest dreams had come true. I had witnessed the widescale electrification of Ghana and the breakthrough into a new era of economic and social advance. The Volta Dam permitted not only a large aluminium plant at Tema processing the country's rich bauxite deposits, but a broad range of other industrial projects. The initial power output is 5 12,000 kW (588,000 kW at full load) and the ultimate power output will be 768,000 kW (882,000 kW at full load). There are 500 miles of trans· mission lines. The main grid carries 161,000 volts.
The water building up behind the dam is forming the largest man-made lake in the world. It will cover an area of 3,275 square miles with a capacity of 1 20 million acre feet of water, and will be 250 miles long, with a shore-line of 4,500 miles. Approximately 80,000 people had to be moved from the area submerged by the lake. This necessitated the construction of 50 new villages and towns to accommodate them, the provision of modern housing, schools, piped water, electricity, medical facilities and new forms of employment. Thousands of acres of land had to be cleared, and people settled on farms and smallholdings with up-to-date methods of cultivation and animal husbandry. All this was achieved.
The creation of the Volta Lake has already provided facilities for an important fresh-water fishing industry. The Volta River contained numerous excellent indigenous fish; and research has shown which fish to breed to increase the supply, and how to control weed growth. A number of ports and fishing villages being formed round the lake-side provide bases for a cheap means of transport from the north to the south of Ghana. Furthermore, the lake forms a vast reservoir, making possible the improvement of water supplies to towns and villages and the irrigation of land for agriculture. The natural seasonal fluctuation in the level of the lake will immediately affect 650 square miles of land, permitting the cultivation of rice and other crops. Lake Volta was also to be developed as a holiday and tourist attraction.
Ghanaians are justifiably proud that their own government provided £35,000,000, that is half of the cost of the Volta River Project as well as meeting the cost of the new port and township of Tema, which was an essential part of the scheme. The balance of the £70,000,000 required was to be raised by international loans as follows:
| International Bank for Reconstruction and Development | £16, 790,000 |
| Agency for International Development of the United States Government | £9,640,000 |
| Export-Import Bank of the United Kingdom Government | £3,570.000 |
| United Kingdom Board of Trade acting for the Export Credits Guarantee Department | £5,000,000 |
Incidentally, at a time when our detractors talk much of bribery and corruption in the developing countries, it is noteworthy that not a single penny went astray or was misappropriated in the entire Volta undertaking, which involved countless contracts over many years.
Apart from completing the Volta River Project, the Seven Year Development Plan provided for certain further improvements in the physical services. These were mostly intended to improve upon the existing system of transport, communications, water supply and electricity services in order to make them fully capable of supporting the proposed level of industrial and agricultural development.
A considerable proportion of the increase in material wealth that was expected to accrue to the country during the seven years of the Plan's operation was to be used to promote public welfare services. Education, the health services and housing were all to benefit. As far as health services were concerned, the Plan proposed to change the main orientation which had hitherto been more curative than preventative. Rural health services were developed in such a way that the rate of infant mortality was lowered, and maternity and post-natal care improved. The main cause of poor health in Ghana is the prevalence of endemic diseases such as malaria. The Plan put emphasis on the fight against these endemic diseases.
New regional hospitals, equipped with all specialist facilities, were under construction in Tamale, Koforidua, Ho and Sunyani, and existing hospitals were being improved. Arrangements had been made to build six new district hospitals and four more urban polyclinics to assist in the decentralisation of out-patient work. In addition, five new mental hospitals with accommodation for 1 ,200 patients were designed to be ready by 1970. They were to be backed up by psychiatric units providing treatment for as many mental patients as possible.
The urgent need for more doctors was being met by sending Ghanaian medical students to study abroad, and by the setting up of our own medical school. In 1962, 51 pre-medical students were enrolled at the University of Ghana. When our own medical school is functioning fully it will be empowered to provide a screening system for all doctors trained abroad who wish to practise in Ghana. The medical programme under the Seven Year Development Plan was intended to achieve the following ratios:
1 doctor to 10,000 people
1 nurse to 5,000 patients (including patients in public health centres)
1 technician (laboratory, X-ray, etc.) to 5,000 patients
1 health inspector to 15,000 people
1 health auxiliary (vaccinators, dressing-room attendants, etc.) to 1,000 people.
A large network of health centres was being built all over Ghana to serve the rural population, and regional health officers were being provided with training and facilities to enable them to carry out their important work.
The only nursing school which existed in 1945 produced only 8 nurses a year by 1950. In 1961-62 six schools of nursing turned out 265 new nurses and midwives.
Perhaps the most outstanding contribution to public health has come from the Medical Field Unit. This unit was formed to seek out and control trypanosomiasis, and it has been successful in containing the disease. It has also carried out a massive vaccination programme, and played a leading role in the control of epidemics of cerebrospinal meningitis. It is currently actively engaged in combating malaria, leprosy and tuberculosis.
In launching the Seven Year Development Plan, with all its detailed programmes for our country's economic and social progress, I warned about the existence of Ghanaian private enterprise in our midst. It was necessary, I told members of the National Assembly, to distinguish between the two types of business which had grown up within recent years. The first was the type which it was the government's intention to encourage, that of the small businessman who employed his capital in an industry or trade with which he was familiar, and which fulfilled a public need. The second consisted of that class of Ghanaian businesses which were modelled on the old colonial pattern of exploitation. In this category were those who used their capital, not in productive endeavour, but to purchase and resell, at high prices, commodities such as salt, fish and other items of food and consumer goods which were in demand by the people. This type of business served no social purpose, and steps would be taken to see that the nation's banking resources were not used to provide credit for them.
Even more harmful to the economy was another type of enterprise in which some Ghanaians had been participating. This was the setting up of bogus agencies for foreign companies which were in fact nothing more than organisations for distributing bribes and for exerting improper pressures on behalf of foreign companies. The government intended to carry out a thorough investigation into the activities of these agencies and to suppress them.
The initiative of Ghanaian businessmen would not be cramped, but we intended to take steps to see that is was channelled towards desirable social ends and was not expended in the exploitation of the community. We would discourage anything which threatened our socialist objectives. For this reason, no Ghanaian would be allowed to take up shares in any enterprise under foreign investment. Instead, our people would be encouraged to save by investing in the state sector and in co-operative undertakings.
This, in essence, was our Seven Year Development Plan, a Plan scientifically worked out with the participation of some of the world's leading experts on economic and social planning. It was to integrate educational, industrial and agricultural programmes to bring full employment and to make possible the achievement of economic independence and a big rise in our living standards. And this was the Plan the rebel military regime scrapped as soon as it usurped power.
No possible justification can be given for its abandonment and the sell-out of Ghana's increasing assets. The first phase of the Plan was going well, and according to schedule. During the first year, £48,900,000 was spent on development projects, and of this amount, £16 million went into the key sectors, agriculture and industry. In agriculture, the emphasis was on diversification. State farms cultivated 24,000 acres of rubber, oil palm, banana, urena, lobata, coconut and citrus. Together with the agricultural wing of the Workers Brigade, which alone had 1 2,500 acres, the two institutions cultivated large areas for cereals and vegetables. During this period also, improvements were made in the modernisation and productivity of private and co-operative farms.
In the industrial sphere, during this period, nearly all the initiative was in the public sector. The construction of many new industrial plants were undertaken. These included a steelworks (30,000 tons), two cocoa processing plants, one at Takoradi (28,000 tons) and the other at Tema (68,600 tons), two sugar refineries, a textile printing plant, a glass factory, a chocolate factory, a meat processing plant, a radio assembly plant and a large printing works at Tema. All these factories were brought into production during the first phase of the Plan.
In addition, work was well advanced on a textile mill and a complex of food industries at Tema, a gold refinery at Tarkwa, and asbestos, cement, shoe and rubber-tyre factories at Kumasi. The buildings for an atomic reactor at Kwabinya were almost finished. So also was a plant for the manufacture of pre-fabricated houses. In fact, the basic policy underlying the Seven Year Development Plan, to change the structure of our mainly agricultural economy into a balanced modern economy, was going ahead with great speed and efficiency. We were successfully managing to use our local raw materials for establishing industries, and were beginning to satisfy local demand for certain consumer goods. For example, we produced matches, shoes. nails, sweets. chocolate. soft drinks, whisky. beer, gin, etc., cigarettes, biscuits, paints, canned fruit, insecticides and other chemicals. An indication of the build-up of our industrial strength may be seen in the fact that at the beginning of January 1966 imports of raw materials amounted to about 9 per cent of Ghana's total imports.
Before the February action, the government was investing £25 million annually in manufacturing projects, and the country's main exports:
Cocoa ... 680 million cedis annually
Timber ... 31.2 million cedis annually
Minerals ... 48 million cedis annually
were providing a sound basis for profitable industrial enterprise.
On an average, Ghana annually imports about 264 million cedis of semi-finished and finished products consisting mainly of food and drinks, textiles and clothing, construction materials and capital equipment. Annual exports average some 254.4 million cedis of primary produce, mainly cocoa, timber, gold. diamonds and manganese. Our growing industries were to make possible a cut in imports. particularly of consumer goods, and an increase in our exports, not only of primary produce but of our own locally-manufactured products.
A look at the orientation of Ghana's investment policy during recent years throws further light on the direction in which Ghana was moving. In 1951-1959 90 per cent (i.e. £127.8 million) of government expenditure was allocated to provide social services and to create the infrastructure of economic growth, while 10 per cent (£13.4 million) went to the productive sector. During the 1951-1962 period, an average amount of £15.5 million was allocated yearly to the public sector during the First Development Plan, and during the Consolidated Plan an average of £21 .4 million yearly. Under the Second Development Plan an average amount of £50 million yearly went to the public sector. Under the Seven Year Development Plan an average of £68 million was going to the public sector yearly, representing a total investment of £442 million for development projects belonging to the public sector. To the above-mentioned £68 million, £34 million were added for the Volta complex—in all £476 million for the public sector.
Investments during the Seven Year Development Plan period ( 1964-1970) were therefore distributed between social services and infrastructure (62%) and the directly productive sector (38%). This represented for Ghanaians an investment of £1 0 per head, per year (to be compared with the maximum investment of 8 shillings per head, per year, in countries associated with the Common Market during the 1958-1962 period). It may also be noted that Ghana has a 240 cedis per capita income, that is to say, practically the highest in independent Africa—and in real terms, the highest in Africa, since it cannot be considered that the distribution of gross national product is equitable in countries like South Africa, Rhodesia and most of the neo-colonialist states.
The qualitative aspect of Ghana's imports reveals that while consumer goods dropped from one-half of total imports in 1961 to two-fifths in 1963, industrial equipment and goods increased from 50.6 per cent of total imports in 1961 to 60.6 per cent in 1963.
On the question of ownership, it is worth noting that in 1965 the state controlled between 60 per cent and 65 per cent of the national production (this percentage was to rise in 1970), and that since 1963, the total gold and foreign exchange assets of Ghana, and total capital exports, were likewise under state financial control.
Apart from a 41 per cent control over consumer goods imports, the state was controlling in 1965 over 60 per cent of the exports in the most important sectors such as gold, diamonds, cocoa. In the case of timber, the Timber Marketing Board had increased its foreign exchange earnings from £5.7 million in 1962 to £8 million in 1964, and was able during the same period, to grant revolving loans of £2 million to Ghanaian producers organised into co-operatives.
When the Party came to power in 1951, all imported goods were in the hands of a few big foreign firms, especially the monopolist United Africa Company, part of the Unilever complex. Foreign firms dominated Ghana's trade and virtually controlled the economy. By 1965, however, the grip was being broken. The nationalised Ghana National Trading Corporation was distributing 32 per cent of all imports.
My government was also breaking through the stranglehold of the big international banking houses. In 1958, foreign banks held one-third of Ghana's foreign currency reserves; in 1965 they held none.
Our success in breaking the web of economic control which Western capitalism has imposed across the whole of the Afri· can continent, and our clear socialist policies, provoked the hostility of the imperialist powers. They knew that as long as I was alive and at the head of the Party in Ghana the process could not be halted and neo-colonialist exploitation could not be re-imposed. Ours was a system they could neither penetrate nor manipulate.
Significantly, one of the first acts of the "N.L.C." was to announce the abandonment of the Seven Year Development Plan, which would have given the Ghanaian people the only worthwhile independence-real economic independence. The "N.L.C." replaced it with a two-year "review period" during which the socialised industries would be dismantled and the door opened once more to unrestricted "private enterprise" in fact, they were establishing a neo-colonialist economic subjugation of Ghana.
The only Ghanaians to benefit from such a sell-out were the African middle-class hangers-on to neo-colonialist privilege and the neo-colonialist trading firms. For the mass of workers, peasants and farmers, the victims of the capitalist free-for-all, it meant a return to the position of "drawers of water and hewers of wood" to Western capitalism.
Of course, the Ghanaian economy was not without its problems. but is this not true of all national economies, and particularly those of developing countries in the context of the growing gap between rich and poor nations? In any event, these difficulties were not determinant. It was no mean achievement that in January 1965, after five years as a Republic, Ghana had 63 state enterprises and a budget of £200 million, including a supplementary budget, for its population of nearly eight million; while Nigeria, richer in national resources and with a population of 55 million, had a budget of £78 million.
Imperialist circles have talked much about Ghana's external debt, given as £250 million. Apart from the dubious accounting which arrived at this conveniently round sum, a figure such as this means nothing unless it is set in the context of the overall Ghanaian economic situation. To implement our various Development Plans it was necessary to borrow considerable sums of money, but it was borrowed on the basis of building capital assets such as the Volta dam, and over 1 00 industries established in Ghana since independence. The government made sure that the international agreements signed were based on economic feasibility, and that the money borrowed could create something lasting and beneficial not only for us in our lifetime but for the generations to follow. Seen in the light of Ghana's growing industries and increasing exports, her "indebtedness" is put in proper perspective-as an index of the investors' confidence in the enterprise and the management they helped to finance. In addition, it should be noted that only some £20 million was due to be paid in 1967, and this did not prevent the government from refusing the political conditions attached to a loan from the International Monetary Fund (I.M.F.).
Long faces are pulled at the drop in our foreign reserves since independence. In 1957, Ghana had a sterling balance of £200 million. This has not been "squandered" as the imperialist press would have its readers believe. It has been used to pay off succcessive balance of payments deficits due to the rise in prices of imported consumer goods, and the drastic fall in the price of our main export crop-cocoa. It should be remembered that the sterling balance was in fact a forced loan at negligible interest which Britain acquired from Ghana during and after the Second World War. Its accumulation was made possible by the Cocoa Marketing Board which prevented Ghanaian cocoa growers from receiving the bulk of the proceeds from the sale of their cocoa. The capital the growers might have amassed from cocoa profits and later might have invested in industry was locked up in London "to maintain the confidence of the foreign investor".
Our imperialist critics would be better employed examining the economic situation in their own countries, many of which are in grave financial difficulties. In Britain, for example, the £1 is devalued, there is a continuous "balance of payments crisis" and unemployment is a serious problem.
In Ghana, before 24th February 1966, unemployment was virtually unknown. All salaries were regularly paid and new jobs were constantly being created as the Seven Year Development Plan was being implemented. It was estimated that more than one million new workers would be needed to fill the new jobs which would be created, and also to replace those who left the labour force during the Plan period. More than 500,000 of them would be employed in industry and agriculture, and another 400,000 would be needed in government services, commerce and construction. The remainder were to be employed in transport, mining and the public utility services. In fact, plans were being made to import labour.
When neo-colonialist inspired traitors seized power in February 1966, we were expanding our educational system to provide the necessary numbers of qualified people to meet these new demands. Changes were made to shorten and to improve educational courses. For example, there was a reduction made in the number of school years so that University graduates would be ready for employment at the age of 21 or 22 instead of 24 or 25 as used to be the case. Under the new plan, the time spent in middle school was reduced by two years and the secondary school period by one year. Primary education took six years and was followed by two years of vocationally oriented training for those who did not intend to proceed to secondary schools. The reduction by two years of the ten-year middle school programme was designed to permit 300,000 additional young people to join the labour force during the seven-year period, and to equip them with basic training in technical and agricultural skills.
The figures below illustrate the planned growth in school enrolment 1963-1970:
| Total enrolment | ||
|---|---|---|
| 1963 | 1970 | |
| Primary—Middle | 1,200,000 | 2,200,000 |
| Secondary | 23,000 | 78,000 |
| Teacher Training | 6,000 | 21,000 |
| Technical Schools | 4,000 | 6,000 |
| Clerical Training | 100 | 5,000 |
| Universities | 2,000 | 5,000 |
The intake would be such that from 1968 nearly 250,000 children would complete primary-middle school and 20,000 others would leave secondary school each year. For the entire Plan period, the output from all educational institutions was to have been approximately as follows :
Middle and continuing schools ... 750,000
Secondary schools ... 46,000
Universities ... 9,000
Technical schools ... 14,000
Secretarial schools ... 11,000
Teacher Training ... 31,000
The tremendous rate of our educational growth created certain difficulties. We needed many more trained teachers, and more school and college buildings. We were successfully overcoming these problems. The government allocated 1 53.6 million cedis (£64 million) for the construction of post-primary school buildings to feed the new secondary and higher educational institutions. The University of Ghana, the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology, and Cape Coast University College were supplying a large number of teachers; and expatriate teachers had been recruited to fill other vacancies until our own output of teachers was sufficient to cope with the demand. The Cape Coast University College was to have become a fully-fledged University in September 1966, but the "N.L.C." has abandoned the plan.
Local authorities and individual communities were primarily responsible for the provision of elementary school facilities. though the government provided teachers, textbooks and other services for primary schools. Special subsidies were given to less favoured parts of the country to help in the development of primary education.
To assist in solving the manpower problem, the Trades Union Congress, the Ministry of Labour and employers' associations launched and rapidly expanded in-service training schemes to augment the knowledge and technical skill of all new employees. Adult education facilities were also being improved to provide part-time and evening classes for craftsmen, foremen, technicians and managers. The Institute of Public Education, the Workers' College, the Universities and other specialised institutions were redoubling their efforts to make this type of education available throughout the country.
Ghana was going ahead. The nation's economy was almost completely controlled by Ghanaians, and our educational planning was producing educated and skilled personnel to meet the demand. Likewise, thorough-going machinery had been established for the political education of the masses so that our socialist objectives, and Ghana's role in the wider African revolution, might be clearly understood. This was the purpose of the Young Pioneers, the T. U. C. educational programme, and the Ideological Institute of Winneba where cadres were being trained. It was to make possible the unfolding of the next phase of the Ghanaian revolution: the establishment of a socialist republic, the principle of which was enshrined in the 1961 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana.
This process was well on its way when in 1965, the imperialists and neo-colonialists stepped up their pressure on Ghana in the form of an economic squeeze. In that year, the price of cocoa on the world market was artificially forced down from £476 in 1954 to £87 1 0s. a ton (1965). This meant that although Ghana exported 500,000 tons of cocoa, she earned only £77 million, or less than her receipts in the mid-1950's for 250,000 tons.
When the Seven Year Development Plan was drawn up, it was assumed that the price of cocoa on the world market would be at least £200 a ton. This was not an unreasonable assumption. Between 1953 and 1963, prices fell only once below £190 a ton. In 1954 the price was £476, and in 1957-58 it was £352. But the very year the Seven Year Development Plan was launched, cocoa prices began to fall steeply. At the same time, the prices of capital and manufactured goods needed for industrial and agricultural projects under the Plan were rapidly rising. Between 1950 and 1961 they had risen by over 25 per cent.
In 1964, the imperialist powers, the principal consumers of cocoa, promised at the Geneva meeting of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (U.N-C.T.A.D.) that they would "lift barriers in the form of tariffs and duties on primary products, either raw, processed or semi-processed". This would have meant that cocoa-grindings, cocoa butter and chocolate products whose price was firm, could have been sold in the metropolitan markets to cushion the effects of the low cocoa prices. But Britain and the U.S.A. did not keep their promise to lower trade barriers against processed and semiprocessed primary products. Ghana, regarded by them as a pace-setter in Africa, could not be allowed to succeed in building socialism.
When I spoke to the Ghana cocoa farmers on 22nd September 1965, I drew attention to the breach of faith of the cocoa consumers and said that if tariff walls prevented us from selling our chocolate abroad we could still sell it in Ghana and in other African countries at a price well within the means of all. I announced that cocoa powder was being distributed to schoolchildren, and that the production of cocoa butter, in demand for the manufacture of cosmetics and pharmaceuticals, was being expanded.
We constructed silos which, when completed, would enable us to withhold more than half of our cocoa crop from the world market. This amount would be more than the combined world cocoa surplus of production over consumption. We were, in fact, breaking through the cocoa price squeeze. The U.S.A., however, was stockpiling a record quantity of cocoa to be used to keep prices down. In its 1966 Commodity Review, the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation (F.A.O.), reported that the total stocks of cocoa beans in consuming countries at the end of 1964 amounted to 500,000 tons, and that by December 1965 this total was further increased.
The U.S.A. and Britain could, if they had wanted, have fixed a reasonable price for cocoa and so have eased the economic situation in Ghana. They had no wish to do so. On the contrary, the forcing down of the price of cocoa was part of their policy of preparing the economic ground for political action in the form of a "coup" and a change of government.
Throughout 1965, and before then, the U.S. government exerted various other forms of economic pressure on Ghana.
It withheld investment and credit guarantees from potential investors, put pressure on existing providers of credit to the Ghanaian economy, and negated applications for loans made by Ghana to American-dominated financial institutions such as the l.M.F.
This pressure ended smartly after 24th February 1966 when the U.S. State Department's political objective had been achieved. The price of cocoa suddenly rose on the world market, and the I.M.F. rushed to the aid of the "N.L.C."
If further proof were needed of America's political motives it may be seen in the U.S. government's hysterical reaction to the publication of my book, Neo-Colonialism - The Last Stage of Imperialism in October 1965. In this book I exposed the economic stranglehold exercised by foreign monopolistic complexes such as the Anglo-American Corporation, and illustrated the ways in which this financial grip perpetuated the paradox of Africa: poverty in the midst of plenty. The American Government sent me a note of protest, and promptly refused Ghana $35 million of "aid".
The fact that our enemies decided finally on subversion and violence as the only effective way in which to achieve their objective of halting the Ghanaian revolution and bringing Ghana into the neo-colonialist fold, is a measure of the success of our economic policies. We had proved that we were strong enough to develop independently, not only without foreign tutelage, but also in the context of active imperialist and neocolonialist resistance.
6. Set Back
The counter-revolutionary nature of the military-police regime in Ghana became obvious within hours of its establishment. Steps were taken immediately by the "N.L.C." to destroy our socialist gains and achievements, and to end Ghana's active participation in the African Revolution. In other words, we were to witness the all too familiar pattern and techniques of an imperialist and neo-colonialist attack, through a puppet government, on both socialism and the African continental struggle for liberation and unity.
One of the first acts of the "N.L.C." was to announce the abandonment of the Seven Year Development Plan. Work was stopped on state enterprises and industries and they were offered for sale to private investors. Ghana was thrown wide open, as in colonial days, to all the foreign exploitation we had worked so hard to end. The imperialist press, reflecting the jubilation in government circles in Washington, London, Bonn, Salisbury and Johannesburg, displayed such headings as: "Ghana Swings to the West," "The New Ghana Moves Westwards," and "Ghana Comes to Heel." Ghana was being sold into political and economic slavery. Her image in Africa and the world was being destroyed and the drive towards an All-African Union Government set back.
It is significant that Major-General Sir Edward Spears, Chairman of Ashanti Goldfields, was among the first to congratulate the military and police traitors. He had accepted the hospitality of my government for the inauguration of the Volta River Project and was still in Ghana when the action took place. He at once sent a message to the "N.L.C.," requesting an interview "at 7 p.m. on Thursday, March 3rd". He was immediately given the appointment he had asked for. Spears must have been very sure of his ground. It is hardly customary for businessmen to name the precise time and date of a meeting with heads of government. But as Spears said in his report to the shareholders of the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation on 30th March 1966: "Before I had my talk with General Ankrah, there were already indications that we would find the new regime much more satisfactory to deal with than the old." As puppets of neo-colonialists, members of the "N.L.C." were right from the start committed to an economic sell-out.
Businessmen from the U.S.A., from Britain, West Germany, Israel and elsewhere, flew into Ghana like vultures to grab the richest pickings. Virtually all the state-owned industries developed by my government were allowed to pass into private ownership. These included such enterprises as The Timber Products Corporation, The Cocoa Products Corporation, the Diamond Mining Corporation, the National Steel Works, the Black Star Shipping Line, Ghana Airways, and all the stateowned hotels.
As a result of the economic sell-out, the private sector would be the largest in terms of number of persons engaged and gross output. Under my government, the private sector was the smallest, and there were plans to reduce it even further. The establishment of joint private/government business enterprises, the "N.L.C." stated, would be "purely on a voluntary basis." As for the remaining sectors, active state participation would be limited to "certain basic and key projects", though no details were given; and the activities of the Co-operative movement would be "purely economic". It would "not be allowed to get itself involved in politics". As if to reassure their neo-colonialist masters even more, the "N.L.C." went on to say that it had no plans for nationalisation. and would work towards the eventual abolition of import controls from the economy. There was to be a two-year "review period" starting on 1st July 1966, during which there would be "proper economic stocktaking". Even "N.L.C." supporters must have marvelled at the time to be spent on "stocktaking" when the nation was supposed to be in such dire economic trouble. But, according to the "N.L.C.," this was necessary if Ghana was to be in a position to expect "help" from the "outside world".
And the "N.L.C." called this miserable "For Sale" notice an "economic" plan. This was to be their substitute for the Seven Year Development Plan with its positive constructive detailed proposals for the economic emancipation of Ghana.
However, it brought results in the shape of the usual handouts granted by imperialists and neo-colonialists to well-behaved puppets. Within two weeks of the ending of legal government in Ghana, the army and police traitors received an invitation to send a mission to Washington for talks with the International Monetary Fund and World Bank officials. The upshot was a £13 million stand-by credit received from the l.M.F. and eventually new loans from the U.S.A., Canada and West Germany. In addition, supplies of various foodstuffs and other consumer goods were promised to provide the necessary window dressing for the new regime.
In the recent wave of coups which have taken place in Asia, Latin America and Africa, all this has come to be standard practice. Wherever progressive governments have been replaced by counter-revolutionary forces, imperialist financial organisations have rushed to bolster them up with loans and various forms of so-called "aid". It is a necessary corollary to the "big lie" usually employed to justify the overthrow of "undesirable governments"—the lie of "economic chaos" and a "starving" population. But more important, it serves to tighten the stranglehold of foreign economic control over the captive people by creating more indebtedness and a deeper penetration by foreign business interests.
The Economic Committee set up by the "N.L.C." admitted in a statement on 3rd March 1966 that Ghana's economy was "basically strong", and that a mere £15 million was all that was needed to overcome immediate difficulties. Yet members of the Economic Committee went like beggars, cap in hand, for talks in Washington, London, Bonn and other capitals greedily snatching any niggardly hand-outs offered, and cravenly agreeing to all kinds of conditions attached to them. During talks in London in June 1966, it was announced that nine public corporations were to be handed over to private enterprise; and investors, both local and foreign, were to be invited to join in the running of six others.
On that occasion, the Committee was discussing Ghana's economy with 13 Western creditor countries, and asking for their agreement on the re-scheduling of capital and interest payments. The Committee only managed to get their agreement to report back to their governments and the promise of a further meeting "in due course". I wonder if the Committee paused to reflect then on the different attitude of our creditors among the socialist countries. These had granted Ghana an unconditional moratorium on capital and interest payments, knowing that the slump in the price of cocoa had been the main cause of our borrowing, and that our difficulties were only temporary. My government had made certain economies, but had rejected Western demands for drastic cuts in publicly-owned industries which we regarded as vital to economic independence.
Apart from handing over public corporations to private enterprise, the "N.L.C." announced drastic cuts in the routes operated by Ghana Airways, the halting of work on the new international airport at Tamale in Northern Ghana, and the cancellation of a number of orders for new ships for the state-owned Black Star Line. Both Ghana Airways and the Black Star Line were established by my government to break the monopoly of foreign transport companies. They were ultimately to become foreign currency earners.
At Afienya, some 26 miles from Accra, the "N.L.C." shut down the excellent Gliding School established by Flight Captain Hanna Reitsch. The School, recognised as among the best in the world, was providing valuable initial flying training for members of the Young Pioneers, Army and Air Force cadets, and for trainees from other African countries.
The excuse was made that these were all prestige projects. The same excuse was given as the reason for abandoning or selling to private ownership other important state enterprises, though everyone knows that they were surrendered because they threatened the business interests of the new masters of Ghana—the neo-colonialists and their agents. The foundation of new industries and the building up of national air and shipping lines is seen as evidence of prestige spending only by imperialists and neo-colonialists who wish to see a country revert back to the position of a colony.
The Juapong Textile and Knitting factory near Akosombo in the Volta Region, was one of the many vital development projects to be abandoned during the first few months of "N.L.C." rule. This factory, half completed when the army and police traitors seized power, was to offer employment to over 800 people, and to make use of 400,000 tons of locally-produced cotton from the Abutia, Chinderi and Zongo Mancheri state farms. The factory, when completed, was expected to produce over 80,000 tons of textiles of various kinds annually, and about 3,000 tons of knitwear. It was the only industry sited by the government in the Volta Region, and suspension of work on it therefore caused bitter disappointment locally, and resulted in a great waste of time, energy and money. A writer in the Ghanaian Times visited the site towards the end of 1966 and reported "the whole area desolate, with the half-completed buildings almost overgrown with weeds". The project had been started by Chinese experts, and when these were sent home no attempt was made to continue with the work.
Another example of the stupidity of sending away much-needed specialists from socialist countries may be seen in the "N.L.C.'s" decision to return the 29 Russian-built fishing trawlers which had been lying idle since the departure of the Soviet technicians. And this when the people of Ghana badly need an increase in the protein content of their diet. Later, as a result of protests, the "N.L.C." declared their intention to sell the trawlers to private interests.
Some 2,500 Russian and Chinese experts were expelled from Ghana by the "N.L.C.," regardless of the invaluable services they were rendering to the economic development of the country. The "N.L.C." had stated that it was "nonaligned" yet it callously sacrificed the interests of the people by abandoning precious economic projects simply for political reasons. Even the imperialist press was moved to remark: "The new regime is pledged to pursue a policy of non-alignment while being friendly with all. But there is no mistaking the fair breeze blowing towards the Western camp at the moment" (Daily Telegraph, 10th March 1966).
All projects or schemes developed by Soviet or Chinese experts, and also several undertaken by specialists from other socialist countries, were suspended, abandoned entirely, or sold to foreign capitalists. Small wonder William H. Beaty, Vice-President of the Chase Manhattan Bank of the U.S.A., was quick to visit Ghana and spoke of the "favourable investment conditions" owing to the "remarkable strides" which had been made since 24th February 1966. Like his counterparts in other capitalist countries, he doubtless regarded Ghana under the "N.L.C." as just another client state set up to sustain imperialism, neo-colonialism and the capitalist economies of the West.
Traitors among our own people are helping in the sell-out. Seeing the opportunity to make quick money, some of them have become "market analysts" for prospective investors. Perhaps they hope the grand-sounding name may disguise the fact that they are raking in vast sums of money by acting as middle-men in the disgraceful and indiscriminate disposal of Ghana's state property to private enterprise. Their task has been made easy by the encouragement of prospective investors by advertisements of the Capital Investments Board. They have been promised generous concessions, including a ten-year tax holiday and the free transfer abroad of profits after the payment of any tax due. What a paradise for neo-colonialists—the free transfer abroad of profits and a tax holiday; and all this without any strings attached. In their wildest dreams they could not have hoped for better conditions, even from the servile "N.L.C."
Under my government, there was strict control of the operations of all foreign firms in Ghana. We were constantly vigilant to see that there was no exploitation of the Ghanaian people, and that most of the profits were retained inside Ghana to be used to promote further economic and social development.
In Ghana today it is as though the clock suddenly stopped on 24th February 1966, and the hands have been turned backwards. Unfinished factory buildings remain in precisely the same condition as when the builders left them after work on 23rd February 1966. The machines of other factories, said to be prestige projects or closed because of the departure of foreign technicians, lie idle while thousands of Ghanaian unemployed fill the streets. Work on new schools, hospitals. roads and airport buildings has stopped, the new regime making the excuse that the country is too poor to pay for them. The cars and property of Party officials have been sold; where the money has gone, only the "N.L.C." can tell.
My personal Research Office, where documents of all kinds were being filed, and valuable records were being built up, was ransacked, and the painstaking work of many years destroyed. Many thousands of books in my library were senselessly torn up or burnt.
Housing schemes have been abandoned. For example, work has been stopped on the manufacture of prefabricated houses which were being built to relieve the acute housing shortage. Some of the vital services have been neglected, such as water purification and insecticide spraying, both essential for the health of the people and for the keeping down of insect pests. Locusts have once again become a problem. They had not been seen in Ghana since 1933. Health facilities of all kinds have been allowed to run down, and many doctors have resigned. The "N.L.C." even deported from Ghana the distinguished United States medical expert Dr. Anna Livia Cordero who had come from Puerto Rico to help with our public health services. Though she held the highest medical diplomas the rebel regime would not allow her to continue work in Ghana because of her criticisms of their policy.
State farms, rubber and cotton plantations, and other rural development projects have been allowed to fall into decay, and valuable crops lost due to lack of attention. Large quantities of cocoa are being smuggled out of Ghana, with disastrous effects on the economy.
The only Ghanaians to benefit from the sell-out and the surrender to imperialism have been the bourgeois elements and a small number of hoarders and profiteers determined to cash-in on the free-for-all. For the ordinary men and women of Ghana it has meant a return to all the exploitation and uncertainties of colonial days.
They were faced almost at once with widespread unemployment. Since 24th February 1966, many thousands have been thrown out of work. The figure given in the pro-"N.L.C." magazine West Africa (22nd April 1967) was 105,000. In relation to population and potential labour force, Ghana now has the highest unemployment rate of any country in the world. There is 30 per cent. unemployment in Accra alone. Never before has Ghana experienced anything like the mass unemployment resulting from "N.L.C." misrule and mismanagement. Apart from the men and women thrown out of work from state factories and farms, thousands more have been dismissed from the Workers Brigade and other organisations. To these have been added Party officials, T.U.C. employees, newspaper reporters and editors, employees of the Bureau of African Affairs, the African Affairs Centre and similar organisations. Hundreds have been expelled from schools and colleges because they supported socialism and the programme of African liberation and unity.
Coupled with the distress caused by mass unemployment and the victimisation of supporters of the legal government, came sharp rises in the prices of certain essential foods. Prices are still rising and the standard of living is falling drastically. Some commodities have disappeared entirely from shops and markets as profiteers hoard supplies. There is a flourishing black market. Many of the police have become personally involved in the racketeering, forcing traders to sell them goods at a low price and then re-selling them at exorbitant rates. Bribery and corruption, as foreign visitors have been quick to report, have begun to penetrate every corner.
In May 1967, Kofi Akyigyina, an Accra businessman, revealed to the Jiagge Commission that certain top-ranking police officers were engaged in private business. He told how four senior police officers had teamed up with a few other persons to operate a multi-lateral company in Ghana for the manufacture of milk powder, shirts, soda and furniture. The company was also to deal in industrial and commercial diamonds, diamond products, and to construct roads and bridges. Financiers from the U.S.A. were expected to assist. Akyigyina said that directors of the company actually held their meetings at Police Headquarters in Accra, and that in April 1967 two Italian businessmen were interviewed by the directors of the company, again at Police Headquarters.
As a result of these disclosures, and to prevent any further adverse publicity, Deputy Commissioners of Police, E. K. Levi and A. K. Biney, and Chief Superintendents G. C. Tay and G. K. Acheampong were dismissed from the Police Service.
The "N.L.C.," pressing ahead with what it called "austerity" measures repeatedly urged Ghanaians to tighten their belts and to make sacrifices. But they were being asked to suffer for no apparent reason. There had been times of stringency under my government, but then they knew the reasons for it. All around they could see evidence of building and development. They knew they were helping to implement the Seven Year Development Plan which would ultimately bring economic independence and a big rise in their standard of living. After 24th February 1966, however, they saw the abandonment of development projects, the departure of foreign experts on which many of the new industries depended, and the wholesale selling of state-owned enterprises to private investors. They noted the sudden influx of British, American, Israeli and West German businessmen; and the way that the U.S. and British ambassadors practically live at the Castle, where the "N.L.C." has its administrative headquarters. They moved to the Castle from Police Headquarters for greater safety.
Instead of the accent being on development there seemed to be nothing but destruction and negative policies—a pulling down process. The ordinary people of Ghana were told to tighten their belts and to make sacrifices so that foreign businessmen and their local stooges could grow fat on the exploitation of Ghana's resources and on the proceeds of Ghanaian labour.
The puppet press and radio reflecting the official line poured out a steady stream of abuse against me personally and against my government. Endless commissions of enquiry were set up, manned by members of the old opposition and various other ambitious men anxious to ingratiate themselves with the new regime. Staged public hearings were given to previously-prepared witnesses, to which correspondents of the foreign and local press were invited. The testimony of these so-called witnesses was claimed to be incontrovertible proof of the "wickedness" of my government. As fast as one commission ended its work another was set up. It seemed the "N.L.C." was desperate to keep up a constant flow of invective, and often filthy abuse, for the subservient press and radio to publicise. The majority of Ghanaians became sickened by the whole process. Most of the mud stuck to the hands of the throwers.
A particularly nauseating part of the smear campaign was the putting of a dead woman and child into the refrigerator at Flagstaff House, saying that this was "Kwame Nkrumah's juju", and inviting public inspection. The woman and child were among those murdered on 24th February. But the public turned the open invitation to Flagstaff House into a kind of pilgrimage and the inspection offer had to be quickly withdrawn.
The attacks on me personally began as soon as it was known that I had gone to Guinea and intended returning to Ghana to restore legal government. Having declared on 24th February 1966 that "the myth of Kwame Nkrumah has been destroyed" they showed that they thought it still very much alive, by launching an all-out attack on me in the press and on the radio. I am, it seems, a Hitler, a Lenin, a Bluebeard, a Mao Tse-tung, a Tsar, a Leninist Tsar, a miser, a spendthrift, and latterly, a criminal, guilty of "murder and conspiracy", with a price of £50,000 on my head.
Western newspapers and periodicals, particularly in the U.S., Britain and West Germany, also maintain a barrage of abuse. In attacks of unprecedented ferocity, I am accused of practically every character fault imaginable. The falseness of the accusations, and the personal nature of the charges, make me wonder if the writers and editors have adopted this method of attack because they are unable to challenge or refute my political ideas and philosophy or the consistency of my efforts for the attainment of African continental freedom and an All-African Union Government.
In the notices of "wanted men" put up outside police stations in Ghana in January 1967, full details were given of my physical appearance and career as though I were a common criminal, and as if Ghanaians had never heard of me. The authors of the notice made themselves look even more ridiculous by saying that I had been imprisoned "for political offences" in 1950! If I hadn't seen the notices myself I would have found it hard to believe they could have made such a laughing-stock of themselves.
I had, according to the "N.L.C." and their stooges, quite a record. But not, I think, the record by which I am judged by the people of Ghana and of Africa. They know me. They know the kind of life I lead, and the goals for which I strive. I make no defence. I make no apology. I do not consider myself on trial. But for the benefit of foreign critics who may have swallowed probably the most vicious lie of all-that I have built up a large personal fortune, I must add that the "N.L.C." has itself had to admit that the allegation is false and untrue.
As each day has passed, unemployment, strikes, rioting and crime of all kinds have increased in Ghana. The local press began to report some of the most sensational facts and figures. But steps were soon taken by the "N.L.C." to suppress the publication of any adverse news and comment. Early in October 1966 it issued what have come to be called the "Rumours Decrees" to muzzle the press and to give the police the power to arrest and detain without warrant. Decree 92 made it an offence, punishable with up to three years imprisonment, to publish anything "likely to cause alarm and despondency . . . . disturb the public peace . . . . or cause disaffection against the N.L.C." My own government had enacted legislation to deal with rumour mongering. In a country where many people were still unfortunately illiterate, dangerous rumours can be circulated and obtain wide currency. For example, there was a rumour that because on a new bank note issued no date appeared, the notes in question were valueless and we used this legislation to deal with those who put round such stories when we knew them to be false. The "N.L.C." decrees are of quite a different sort. They were aimed at the press and at their supporters who were beginning to see through the pretensions of the military and timidly to expose them.
Editors and journalists who were employed under my government were dismissed, and most of them imprisoned soon after the army and police traitors seized power. Party editors were seized, beaten up and flung into prison. But their replacements are not proving easy to control. After the arrest of the Editors-in-Chief of the Evening News and the Ghanaian Times, two formerly-detained journalists were appointed to replace them—Henry Thompson and K. Y. Attoh. They began by dismissing journalists said to be orientated towards socialism and Nkrumaism, and their authority was bolstered up by daily visits of armed soldiers to the Guinea Press. But before long, Thompson and Attoh began to criticise the new regime. Thompson campaigned for an early return to civil government, and called for a halt to the raiding, looting and burning of Workers Brigade Camps. Attoh, for his part, protested against the destoolment of 194 chiefs and their replacement by "N.L.C." puppets. Jointly, they attacked profiteering and other malpractices, and exposed the tribalism and backward-sliding of the "N.L.C." The result has been the appointment of a new Chief Editor for the whole Press, Moses Danquah, though it is doubtful if he will prove any more co-operative.
Bob Bannerman, who worked at the Guinea Press for 8 years, and continued working there for a further three months after the army-police insurrection, has written from the safety of London about how the "N.L.C." took over the Press in Ghana:
"Despite the appeal of the 'N.L.C.' clique, few people turned out for work on the first day. When it was later learnt that the army bandits planned to set fire to the Press, we had no alternative but to surrender, and publish the numerous decrees of the illegal clique, including anti-Nkrumah letters manufactured by the 'N.L.C.' and purporting to come from readers."
Bannerman describes the arrival of army units at the Press, the dismissals and threats, and the resulting apparent subservience. He continues:
"The dismissal of professional journalists like G. T. Anim, General Manager of the Ghana News Agency, and E. Coleman, Director of Broadcasting, came later, but the replacements of the 'N.L.C.' were so bad that they threaten the entire Press, T.V., and Radio network in Ghana. In fact the entire profession has been paralysed."
The Chairman of the Ghana Broadcasting Service, Cecil Forde, has been arrested and detained. Many journalists and workers of the External Broadcasting Department have been dismissed because they supported programmes on African unity, and because they were not Ghanaians, though they were Africans. This was in line with orders from the U.S. Embassy in Accra, to root out all possible sources of criticism of U.S. imperialism, and to chase all progressive non-Ghanaian Africans from Ghana.
Foreign correspondents of TASS, Izvestia and Pravda were attacked openly and their offices closed down. The correspondent of the New China News Agency (Hsinhua) also received rough treatment. He had published descriptions of the assaults made on foreign journalists and technicians.
However, propaganda teams from Britain and the United States have full access to all Press establishments, and the U.S. Press attaché visits the Guinea Press at least twice a day.
The few foreign journalists from socialist countries who have managed to continue to operate in Ghana are gradually being forced to leave as they find it impossible to refrain from writing the truth about the "N.L.C." In November 1966, Karl-Heinz Grafe, Accra correspondent of A.D.N., the East German News Agency, was deported from Ghana for adverse comment on the military-police dictatorship—and yet the "N.L.C." claims to have abolished censorship. So-called Press freedom clearly only extends to those willing to conceal the truth, and to write nothing but praise.
An amusing example of "press freedom" as it exists under the "N.L.C." was Ankrah's address to the journalists. He was annoyed when the Arab-Israeli war broke out that the Ghana press should have reported it so extensively. He pointed out to them that it was none of their duty and went on to say that after all the government paid them and that "he who pays the piper must call the tune".
Probably one of the most criminal and stupid acts of the "N.L.C" to date has been the setting up of military tribunals "to try expeditiously certain categories of subversive offences committed by non-military personnel, conviction for any of which will carry a maximum sentence of death by a firing squad and a minimum of not less than 25 years with hard labour".
This decree, known as the Armed Forces Act (1962) Amended Decree (1967) states that any person who prepared or endeavoured to produce by force any alteration of the law or the policies of the "N.L.C.," or incited, or without lawful authority had in possession, custody or control any explosives, firearms or ammunition, should be guilty of the offence of subversion. The decree also declared that any person who organised or incited any other person to go on a general strike likely to cause the overthrow of the "N.L.C." would equally be guilty of subversion. Other activities covered by the decree included the publishing of any statement or report which the person knew to be false, and which was likely to undermine the confidence of the people of Ghana in the permanency of "their newly-won freedom". The decree covered the killing or the attempt to kill, or the conspiring with any other person to kill any member of the "N.L.C.," or any Ghanaian citizen with a view to overthrowing the "N.L.C." Any person with knowledge of any of the foregoing acts who did not report it to the authorities immediately, was also to be considered guilty of subversion. A military tribunal should consist of the presiding officer, who should be an officer of the Armed Forces not below the rank of Brigadier in the Ghana Army, or its equivalent in the Ghana Navy or Air Force. It should also consist of four other members, all of whom should be officers of the Ghana Armed Forces not below the rank of Major in the Ghana Army or its equivalent in the other two services. The decree finally stipulated that the decision of the military tribunal should be final, and that no appeal should arise from such a decision.
This amendment of the Armed Forces Act was published by the "N.L.C." on 30th January 1967. It reveals the depths to which the "N.L.C." had sunk and showed that they had almost reached the end of their tether. By imposing what virtually amounted to martial law it admitted for all to see that it could no longer keep in check the growing opposition to rule by the army and police clique. In giving reasons for the establishment of military tribunals, the "N.L.C" mentioned activities by a "small minority" of former Party members. The severity of the measures taken against them hardly squares with the assertion of insignificant numbers, but then the "N.L.C." has not been noted for consistency or good sense.
The "N.L.C.," on assuming power, encountered immediate lack of co-operation from the judiciary. After a few months they dismissed all judges and magistrates appointed under my government, and installed others whom they thought they could count on to give favourable verdicts. It has become clear, by the resort to martial law, that even the tame judiciary cannot be relied on to act sufficiently swiftly and decisively to quell the mounting opposition.
The quality of the tame judiciary may be judged from the muddled thinking displayed by Edward Akuffo-Addo, appointed Chief Justice of Ghana by the "N.L.C.", when he stated: "We do not subscribe to the sovereignty of Parliament. We subscribe to the sovereignty of law." What in fact he was saying was that sovereign power rested with the judiciary, and not with the law-making body. Making himself appear even more ridiculous, he went on to state that he saw "no biological sanction" for giving the vote at 21, and that he envisaged some kind of quality vote based on "literacy" and "intelligence"—in other words, an abandonment of the cardinal principle of true democracy: one man, one vote.
Thousands of Ghanaians still remain, without trial, in prisons and detention camps. Countless others go in daily fear of arrest. But the imperialist press is silent on these matters. It has not reported the wholesale dismissal of judges and magistrates, the establishment of military tribunals, nor the strikes, boycotts, riots and other evidence of suffering and unrest. Its readers have not been told of the abolition of the free medical service, nor of the cuts in spending on education. We do not expect otherwise—it is almost war.
Of course, like the leaders of all counter-revolutionary military coups, the "N.L.C." proclaimed that its intention was to hand over to civilians as soon as satisfactory arrangements could be made. And in common with their counterparts in other countries, the military and police traitors are never likely to do this. Having seized power by force they find themselves in an entirely false position. Knowing they do not represent the mass of the people, they dare not hold elections or referendums. Yet to survive they must keep up the charade of wanting a return to civilian rule by setting up constitutional commissions to prepare the way.
For months, the Constitutional Commission set up by the "N.L.C." has been holding meetings, but no progress is reported. Ghanaians were invited to send suggestions for a new constitution to the Commission. The response was negligible, and the people were accused by the "N.L.C." of "apathy". On 12th January 1967, it was announced that the Constitutional Commission would divide into three working groups and would undertake an extensive tour of the Regions "to receive memoranda and oral representations from all sections of the community". There is no evidence to suggest that this venture has been any more successful.
Those who overthrew the constitutional government of Ghana on 24th February 1966 cannot avoid the consequences of their treachery, or the inescapable fact that the vast majority of Ghanaians are against them. They can neither remain in power indefinitely, nor organise a return to civilian rule.
It is unrealistic to imagine that a neo-colonialist military regime which seized power by force will hand over to a "civilian government" through a "general election". They may talk of "free elections" and "an early return to civilian rule", but this is simply to deceive the masses and to discourage resistance. The only effective solution lies in revolutionary action in the form of a counter-coup, that is to say, a decisive reversal of the original coup.
7. Awakening
The unremitting, though ineffectual, attacks made by the military and police traitors on my government and on myself may be partly explained by the strength of the resistance they encountered. Right from the start, men and women began to meet secretly to talk about what had taken place and to discuss what should be done. Loyal members of the Party began to organise underground resistance. Soon posters and slogans began to appear on walls of buildings in Accra and elsewhere, calling on the people to rise up and overthrow the traitors. Leaflets were printed and distributed, though restrictions were placed on the sale of paper, and the police instructed sellers to take the names and addresses of anyone purchasing an unusual amount of stationery. Ghanaians had a rude awakening as they began to experience the bitter consequences of the overthrow of the constitutional government and "N.L.C." treachery.
In London, two organisations went into immediate action: the Overseas Branch of the Party, and the Socialist Ghana Defence Committee. They began a campaign to inform the public of the true state of affairs in Ghana. I quote the statement issued by the Party Overseas:
An illegal military rebellion has taken place in Ghana and is trying to seize power.
The Convention People's Party Overseas regard this not only as a rebellion of leading military figures and reactionaries inside the country who have long opposed the progressive steps taken by President Nkrumah and his Government, but that it is also supported and even organised by the most reactionary forces outside Ghana.
The rebellion in Ghana is occurring after similar incidents have taken place in other parts of Africa. It can therefore be seen as part of the same onslaught which has been sweeping the African continent. This offensive is directed against progressive African leaders who have been successfully resisting attempts by the imperialist powers to exploit their countries.
We consider the aim of the present campaign in Ghana is to set up a typical neo-colonialist regime which will be subsidiary to foreign imperialism. It will renounce, in fact, whatever it may pretend on the surface, the independence won with such sacrifice by thousands of Ghanaians with great men like Kwame Nkrumah in the leadership.
The Convention People's Party's Overseas do not recognise this so-called regime. The rebellion is regrettably being made out as a liberal democratic movement. It is not. It is an extreme right-wing movement which, if allowed to entrench itself, will turn the clock of progress many years back in Ghana.
Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah remains the legal President and the constitutional head of the Republic qf Ghana. His legal government remains and will take up its authority again. We therefore call upon the British Government, and all governments for that matter, not to recognise the so-called National Liberation Council.
In the meantime, the Party Overseas remains organised and at its post and calls for the continued support of all loyal Ghanaians for the legally elected leader, Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah.
Ekow Eshun, Secretary of the Party, Overseas. (Issued in London on 24th February 1966).
In January 1 967, another organisation, the People's Progressive Front of Ghana, was formed in London to oppose the "N.L.C." and particularly their collaborators from among the reactionary, old "opposition" elements.
Reports reach me daily of mounting disorder and discontent in Ghana. Some of this is due to straightforward economic hardship caused by the abandonment of the Seven Year Development Plan, mass unemployment and rising prices, but most of it has a strong political undercurrent. This was admitted by the "N.L.C." in a broadcast to the workers in December 1966. They spoke of what they called "unreasonable strikes" and the "subversive elements" behind them. Among the innumerable strikes was one at W. Biney and Company at Tema, where some 2,000 workers were involved and armed troops had to intervene. Soon, it was found necessary to gaol strike leaders. In August 1966, more than 400 workers at the Ghana Textile Manufacturing Company went on strike and three of the leaders were sentenced to 12 months' imprisonment on charges of inciting the workers. The Ghana Trades Union Congress, then under "N.L.C." stooge control, warned workers throughout the country against what it called "a growing tendency" to strike. It is not possible to include mention here of every strike that has occurred, but hardly a week has gone by without a report of some major strike. Early in December 1966, 5,000 miners of Ashanti Goldfields Corporation in Obuasi downed tools for four days and only returned to work when their full demands had been met. Naturally, the strikers always give non-political reasons for their action, but their behaviour is clearly seen by the "N.L.C." as evidence of a nation-wide campaign of civil disobedience and sabotage.
Strikes have not been confined to factories, mines and farms. Schoolchildren and students are joining in the protest against the actions of the "N.L.C." It was made plain as soon as the traitors seized power, that education was to be one of the first of the public services to be cut. Free schooling was abolished, and parents were told that they would have in future to pay for all school text-books. Building was stopped on several new schools, including two big new secondary schools in the Volta Region, and many state schools were sold to private ownership. The outcry raised by the handing over of several schools, in some cases to unqualified people, caused the "N.L.C." to stop the process, but not before much confusion had been caused. Even the docile press reported cases of schoolchildren "striking," "rioting" and indulging in "disorderly behaviour". The editorial in the Ghanaian Times of 1 5th June 1966, headed "Secondary School Riotings" began: "We are dismayed by the reports of yet another outbreak of rioting and vandalism by secondary school boys and girls . . . . First it was a school at Koforidua, next it was in Accra, and now from the noise and bustle of Accra and Koforidua the trouble has moved to the quiet hill-town of Aburi, where the boys and girls of the Adonten Secondary School rioted at midnight last Sunday." According to the report, they caused damage to school property estimated at 2,400 cedis. No explanation is given of the sudden urge of our children "to maim and destroy" as the editor of the Ghanaian Times put it, though right at the end of the editorial there is a hint that the trouble might be political since "some teachers" had been trained at the Ideological Institute in Winneba.
In January 1967, I received news of the closing of the Akropong Teacher Training College due to "lack of teachers and pupils". If this was the case, it could be for only one reason---the determination of all concerned to join in the campaign of strikes and boycotts aimed at overthrowing the "N.L.C. '' On 12th November 1966, about 300 students at Cape Coast University College staged a demonstration. They carried placards calling for an end to the "N.L.C."
In the daily "Situation Reports" I receive has come news of the stealing of school textbooks at night from the schools. This is not surprising. Textbooks now have to be paid for, and many parents thrown out of work after 24th February 1966 have found themselves also faced with school bills for the first time. Crime of all kinds has increased rapidly. There are even reports of the theft of food, an offence previously unknown in Ghana. In June 1966, conditions in Kumasi were described as "intolerable" because of "hooliganism". Evidently the position did not improve; the deputy superintendent of police in Kumasi, M. P. Agyiri, was dismissed as a scapegoat on 24th January 1967 because it was said that he had neglected his duty and had brought the police service into disrepute.
The "N.L.C." ordered the release of many convicted criminals to make room in the prisons for the thousands of political prisoners, and undoubtedly the activities of some of these men have contributed to the crime wave, but basically the trouble has been caused by genuine hardship, complete contempt for authority in the shape of stooge army and police, and by a determination to bring about the collapse of the "N.L.C."
Offences such as "acts tending to disturb the peace" and other similar offences have increased sharply, and the "N.L.C." has shown an equal inability to deal with them. I remember a particularly revealing Situation Report I received on 29th August 1 966 concerning a Mr. S. R. Snyper, a locomotive foreman arrested for publicly accusing the "N.L.C." of being a "truly Notorious Liars' Council". Snyper had spoken openly against the "N.L.C." at Sekondi Railway Station. However, after several weeks, it was decided that the case should not be brought before the courts, "to avoid further publicity".
The following short excerpts from Situation Reports illustrate the mounting unrest and hardship in Ghana, and are typical of the kind of information I have received regularly since arriving in Conakry.
18.8.66
General: In all Regions the trend still remains---a marked increase in cases of burglary during the night. In addition there were:
1. Northern Region: 4 arrests for "Acts tending to disturb peace".
2. Brong Ahafo: 8 arrests for "Acts tending to disturb the peace".
27.8.66
General: Stealing. Widespread stealing, including the stealing of foodstuffs still prevails in the Regions.
30.8.66
General: Stealing is widespread in towns and villages all over Ghana. Many cases of "Acts tending to disturb the peace". (Details followed)
1.9.66
Retrenchment in the Regions: Workers paid off in the Upper Region:
Zuarangu State Farm Division . . . 306
Wa State Farm Division . . . . . . . . . 91
Bolga Young Farmers League . . . . . 8
None of the laid-off employees have been employed in other fields nor registered in any Labour Centre. Public criticism of the policy is that unemployment in the country is mounting at an alarming rate.
2.9.66
Item 2. Further laying-off of State farm employees:
According to Assistant Commissioner of Police in the Western Region, 1,281 rubber plantation workers throughout the Region were laid-off on 1st September 1966.
The campaign against so-called "redundant labour" still continues.
Note: This brings the number of State Farm workers affected in the Western Region to 1,380. Thus 684 more workers will be laid-off to reach the original target of 2,064 "retrenched" workers.
6.9.66
General: Widespread cases of stealing in all Regions, including stealing of school textbooks from schools during the night.
7.9.66
Profiteering in Volta Region: One Asare of the Ghana News Agency, based in Peki (Volta Region), has sent a telegram to C.I.D. headquarters in Accra reporting widespread cases of:
(a) selling of essential commodities to general traders.
(b) hoarding.
(c) profiteering.
In his telegram, Asare reported that the Volta Regional Police are aware of these malpractices but are unconcerned.
8.9.66
General: Acts tending to disturb the peace:
(1) Anloga in Volta Region---1 arrest.
(2) Sekondi in Western Region---2 arrests.
Other information of interest:
Location Workers meeting in Sekondi: Western Region Special Branch reports that on 8th September 1966, the Location Branch of Railway Administration and Port Workers Union held an hour's general meeting at Sekondi. Attendance is quoted as being about 1,000. A. Hagan (Branch Vice-Chairman) presided and speakers were G. K. Essien, Kofi and two others.
The general themes of the speakers at the meeting were:
(1) Workers were advised not to grumble over the bonuses given to Army and Police after the 24th February rebellion.
(2) Workers were exhorted to stand united and fight for their rights.
(3) Workers were cautioned to refrain from indulgence in politics.
Note: Workers at the meeting are reported to have been disappointed by B. A Bentum's failure to attend the meeting as originally planned. The meeting broke up in confusion.
26.11.66
288 students from the Government Technical Institute, Kikam, used tree trunks to block the road leading to Axim-Essiama main road, and jeered at school instructors. The demonstration was against the newly-appointed Headmaster, whose removal they sought.
10.12.66
Following the suspension of three students from the Presbyterian Training College, Akropong, for "misbehaviour". the other students refused to attend classes. Omanhene of Akropong/ Akwapim and elders. appealed to the students to remain cairn. Day and night police patrols arranged on the campus . Principal H. T. Dako closing school 1 0.12.66 instead of 16.12.66 to avoid disturbances.
15.12.66
220 employees of Timber Veneer and Lumber Company, Takoradi (T.V.L.C.). went on strike in protest against the dismissal of T.V.L.C. Workers' Union Chairman. T.U.C. and Labour Office officials intervened, but employees refused to return to work. Management has warned that all workers will be dismissed if strike is not called off. All strikers left for home. (The matter was later referred to the Timber Federation and eventually work was resumed.)
29.11.66
Diamond Mining Corporation at Takorawase closed on 28.11 .66. Entire workshop and operation will be stopped. Supervisors will be suspended on 31.12.66 and all employees affected will be laid-off. Situation is serious. Arrangements are being made to safeguard mines properties.
21.12.66
Police warning to all Regions. Information received armed robbers to attack banks in Ghana any time from now. Armed guards must be posted all banks all times.
22.12.66
Inspector General of Police to all Regions. Reliably informed, plot by "nation wreckers" to sabotage electrical installations in country. Immediately place armed guards on all electricity stations in your area, and ensure all other valuable electricity points are well protected.
7.1.67
Takoradi---20 arrested for strike.
13.1.67
Accra to all Borders. Following military coup in Togo, alert all personnel and ensure that strong security measures are taken at all border guard posts and stations to prevent pro-Nkrumah travellers entering Ghana.
14.1.67
250 workers of Prestea, Bondaye and Tuapem branches of State Gold Mining Corporation went on strike today demanding a pay rise of 6 pesewas a day. General Secretary of the Mine Workers' Union (I. N. Aikins) has left Tarkwa for Prestea to handle deteriorating situation.
General Secretary met workers for four hours on 14th January. Workers agreed to call off strike on 1 6th January on condition Managing Director of Corporation met them. l\1eanwhile, Police Western Region answering a query from Accra as to action being taken against strikers have intimated that "investigations" are under way which might lead to the prosecution of strike instigators.
16.1.67
Fire broke out at Tamale airfield extension site on 14th January. Considerable damage done buildings and other property. Cause of fire unknown. 15 watchmen have been arrested for interrogation.
General Information:
1. Ex-Security Officers continue to be arrested in Ghana:
(a) John Apeadu arrested Axim, 16th January.
(b) Walter Sugget Cudjoe arrested Bibiani, 17th January.
(c) George K wesi Essien arrested Western Region, 19th January.
2. Sampson Sasu Baffour-Awuah, a 26-year-old storekeeper, is wanted for treason. The hunt for him is now on a national scale. Subject "is wanted urgently by police who believe he has valuable information in connection with an important investigation".
3. Robbery in Ghana has now assumed gangster proportions, and often involves armed robbers in police and army uniforms. On 9th January, a large amount of store goods stolen from Makola.
4. Recently, over 800 policemen of all ranks in all regions have been drastically reshuffled by widespread transfers at short notice. Some policemen openly defied threats of dismissal and opposed their short notice transfers. The move was obviously meant to curb "uniformed" robbery by moving policemen from their regions.
21.1.67
Two cases of robbery at Kyekyewere and Jacobu villages at dawn by unknown thieves, two dressed in army uniforms. Properties involved cash 2,304.00 cedis and personal effects, value 432.00 cedis. No recovery. No arrest.
24.1.67
Aburi: Kingsley Asiam, former M.P. and member of the proscribed C.P.P., arrested at Nsawam by soldiers under command of Capt. W. T. Addy, in connection with abortive counter-revolutionary coup. Brought to Aburi station en route to Accra. Subject was said to have warned Rev. Ekuban on 8.1 .67 against attacking disbanded C.P.P. during a ceremony at funeral service of late Madam Dina Donkor, a former staunch member of disbanded C.P.P. He was arrested on orders of Major Osei Owusu.
24.1.67
Wenchi (Brong Ahafo):
(1) Poisoning of water with D.D.T. Two arrests.
(2) Damage by fire to number of houses at Tanoso village. Cause of fire unknown. No arrest.
28.1.67
From Special Branch Headquarters to Western Region: Collect passports of D. K. Foevi and wife, as well as wives of five persons taken into custody, and forward them to Special Branch headquarters.
(The "N.L.C." was withdrawing passports of all persons released from protective custody.)
28.1.67
Ashanti: Robbery at Bomso village on 26th January involving cash, 1 ,320.00 cedis, and D.-B. gun, value 96.00 cedis. Six men in Mercedes Benz Car NG 1401, colour ash. alleged dressed in police inspector's uniform and army uniforms, conducted search on the premises of Yaw Baasare and made off with loot. No recovery.
2.2.67
Northern Region: Capt. Acquah of 5th Battalion enlisted assistance of Tamale Police effect arrest of ex-Northern Secretary General of disbanded C.P.P. and three ex-D.C.'s of old regime for allegedly holding secret meetings. Accused persons taken to 5th Battalion headquarters for interrogation.
6.2.67
Evidence of Army and Police friction: Mr. K. Avorkliyah of Dormaa Ahenkro reports that he was arrested on 24th January at Nkrankwanta road by Lt. Gyasi and 7 others when he was returning from duty at Nkrankwanta, and his money (238.00 cedis) seized. Next day he was escorted by an army sergeant and a private to Army Camp, Sunyani, where he was detained. He was interrogated and later permitted to return to his station.
11.2.67
It is directed that travel documents of Mr. Chinebuah, Principal Secretary to Ministry of Labour, be impounded. Chinebuah should be refused exit if he attempts to leave Ghana, and Director, Special Branch informed.
12.2.67
Ashanti: Two police mobile patrolmen stopped a vehicle at New Tafo for motor offence. An army officer, one Akinka, arrived at scene and intervened on behalf of driver. Misunderstanding arose between officer and policeman. Army officer became annoyed and pulled out a pistol with a view to shooting constable. More policemen and civilians rushed to scene. Army officer entered his car and drove away. No arrest.
28.2.67
10th Ghana Independence Day to be marked merely by Church Services on 5th March, and Muslim prayers on 3rd March.
28.2.67
All persons released from protective custody are to report to the police from time to time. An "N.L.C." decree published today states such persons are to report themselves direct to police officer in charge of police station nearest to place they usually reside. A released person might alternatively be required to report at such a place as Inspector General of Police might direct. Any released person contravening provisions of the Decree would be guilty of an offence, and would on conviction be liable to a fine not exceeding 400 cedis or a term of imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both.
7.3.67
To Police all Regions: N.L.C. Decree 144. Open separate register at each police post, station or district. First 2 pages of register to contain full list of persons released from protective custody in such particular area. Then rule register showing name, residential address, date and time of person reporting. Also provide column for signature or thumbprint of person concerned, and signature of officer to whom reported. Report should be made once a week. Monthly return of such reports should be forwarded to C.I.D. not later than 10th of ensuing month.
7.3.67
Shooting incident in Accra on 6.3.67, in which one Nigerian was killed. Private Kwakumey of Ghana Army arrested and placed under police custody. 15 other soldiers also involved and placed under military custody. 52 Nigerians concerned with incident being interrogated.
7.3.67
Report from Police/Wiawso: Plot on hand to assassinate Inspector Okpattah in Bibiani District. Demanding immediate protective measures, and early transfer from the District.
8.3.67
At 08.20 hrs. on 6.3.67, No. 6957 To/3 J.Y. Gyamfi of R. H. Koforidua arrested and brought to Koforidua charge office, one Kwame Ansah, a farmer, who was found wearing a white round neck singlet with effigy of deposed President Kwame Nkrumah and inscription "One continent one people". Suspect was reported to have stated that he is one of the subversionists supporting Kwame Nkrumah. Suspect has since been taken into custody for investigations.
20.3.67
From Special Branch/Upper Region to Special Branch/ Headquarters. Students of Pusiga Training College reported demonstrated evening of 17.3.67 at College compound. Number of students involved and cause of demonstration not yet ascertained. No damage to property nor injury to life. Situation presently quiet. Full report will follow.
20.3.67
From Iddrisu Seni Tamale to Prographic/Accra Water shortage. Most severe water shortage which Tamale, the capital of Northern Region has experienced for at least the past four years has hit Tamale and its surrounding villages this year. For the past five days, water has not been flowing into the pipes in some sections of the town and villages. Women and workers find it difficult to get even a bucket of water for either cooking or for washing down their bodies. Mr. Karimu Wemah, Assistant Chief Engineer of the Water and Sewerage Corporation in charge of Northern Region, told the Graphic in an interview that the shortage of water in the Region was due to lack of spare parts to service the machines.
13.4.67
From Police/West Region to Police/ Accra Half Assini---Assault on two pump attendants at Half Assini by nine soldiers of 1st Battalion Infantry on operational duties, 5 persons admitted to Axim hospital. No arrest.
RG/Tarkwa---Train derailment at Awaso level crossing involving engine No. 19 MD. 4 persons killed on the spot and 4 seriously injured, admitted B.A.C. Hospital, Awaso. Cause of derailment not yet known.
8. Repercussions
9. In Conakry
10. Conclusion
Appendix: Messages Received from Heads of State
Modibo Keita, President, Mali.
Modibo Keita, President, Mali.
25.2.66
(Translation)
Ahmed Sékou Touré, President, Guinea.
Ahmed Sékou Touré, President, Guinea.
(Translation)
Gamel Abdel Nasser, President, United Arab Republic.
Gamel Abdel Nasser, President, United Arab Republic.
(Translation)
Kim Il Sung, Pyongyang.
Kim Il Sung, Pyongyang.
1.3.66
(Translation)
Albert Margai, Prime Minister, Sierra Leone.
Albert Margai, Prime Minister, Sierra Leone.
4.3.66
Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister, Singapore.
Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister, Singapore.
11.3.66