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'''People's | {{stub}} | ||
'''People's war''' is a military strategy first developed by [[Mao Zedong]] and the [[Communist Party of China]] which prioritizes the mobilization and organization of the entire population for combat and support roles.<ref>{{Citation|author=[[Võ Nguyên Giáp]]|year=1971|title=[[Library:Võ_Nguyên_Giáp/National_liberation_war_in_Vietnam|National liberation war in Vietnam]]|chapter=Political forces and military forces in mass uprising and people’s war|quote=A people’s war calls for a correct line in building up forces, a line which consists in mobilizing and arming the entire people, involving them in insurrection and war in all forms, organizing the immense political forces of the masses and the popular armed forces with their three categories of troops as the core of people’s war.}}</ref> The military strategy is adopted by [[Maoism|Maoists]], who claim that the people's war is universal and can span across all nations provided that it is adapted to the material conditions. The only parties to adopt people's war in their history are the [[Communist Party of China]], [[Communist Party of Vietnam]] and Maoist Guerrilla Groups such as the [[Shining Path]], [[Communist Party of India (Maoist)]], and the [[Communist Party of the Philippines]]. | |||
== History == | |||
As early as 1849, [[Friedrich Engels]] advocated for a people's war as the only effective strategy for a nation seeking to gain independence from a larger power.<ref>{{Citation|author=[[Friedrich Engels]]|year=1849|title=[[Library:Friedrich_Engels/The_defeat_of_the_Piedmontese|The defeat of the Piedmontese]]|quote=A nation that wants to conquer its independence cannot restrict itself to the ordinary methods of warfare. Mass uprising, revolutionary war, guerilla detachments everywhere — that is the only means by which a small nation can overcome a large one, by which a less strong army can be put in a position to resist a stronger and better organised one.}}</ref> He draw direct inspiration from the French revolutionary wars of 1793.<ref>{{Citation|author=[[Friedrich Engels]]|year=1849|title=[[Library:Friedrich_Engels/The_defeat_of_the_Piedmontese|The defeat of the Piedmontese]]|quote=What ruined the Italians, therefore, was not the defeat at Novara and Vigevano; it was the cowardice and moderation that monarchy forces on them. The lost battle at Novara resulted merely in a strategic disadvantage; the Italians were cut off from Turin, whereas the way to it lay open to the Austrians. This disadvantage would have been entirely without significance if the lost battle had been followed by a real revolutionary war, if the remainder of the Italian army had forthwith proclaimed itself the nucleus of a national mass uprising, if the conventional strategic war of armies had been turned into a people's war, like that waged by the French in 1793.}}</ref> | |||
== The strategy == | |||
In its original formulation by Mao Zedong, people's war exploits the few advantages that a small revolutionary movement has—broad-based popular support can be one of them—against a state's power with a large, professional, well-equipped and well-funded army. People's war strategically avoids decisive battles, since a tiny force of a few dozen soldiers would easily be routed in an all-out confrontation with the state. Instead, it favors' a three-phase strategy of protracted warfare, with carefully chosen battles that can realistically be won. | |||
In phase one, the revolutionary force conducting people's war starts in a remote rural region with mountainous or forested terrain in which its enemy is weak. It attempts to establish a local stronghold known as a revolutionary base area. As it grows in power, it enters phase two, establishes other revolutionary base areas and spreads its influence through the surrounding countryside, where it may become the governing power and gain popular support through programmes such as land reform. Eventually in phase three, the movement has enough strength to encircle and capture small cities, then larger ones, until finally it seizes power in the entire country. | |||
=== Political Goals === | |||
The basis of a people's war, a war waged by the peasants and thus the party, necessitated political control over military operations. This was echoed by his 1938 statement:<blockquote>'''"'''Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun. Our principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the Party. Yet, having guns, we can create Party organizations, as witness the powerful Party organizations which the Eighth Route Army has created in northern China."</blockquote>In ''On Protracted War,'' Mao argues that wars waged by Communists were inherently progressive and just. All wars which had the support of the party were to be actively participated in, even if they were in coordination with reactionary factions. Mao criticized "idealists" who refused to cooperate with said reactionaries. | |||
=== In China === | |||
Mao argues that because of the creation of the Second United Front and national "perseverance" the Japanese have failed to achieve a victory through mobile warfare and that China was now engaged in a "protracted war". Mao criticizes the proponents of "China's quick victory" stating that they were underestimating the enemy. He expresses his dislike of armchair generals who assume that Guerrilla warfare holds a supplementary role to mobile warfare. Mao laments that their hopes consisted chiefly of a victory through foreign military intervention by the Soviet Union or victory through a decisive military solution. | |||
Mao stated that there had to be three prerequisites in order to achieve victory and defeat the forces of Japan<blockquote>"First, the establishment of an anti-Japanese united front in China; second, the formation of an international anti-Japanese united front; third, the rise of the revolutionary movement of the people in Japan and the Japanese colonies. From the standpoint of the Chinese people, the unity of the people of China is the most important of the three conditions."</blockquote>Mao argues that resistance against Japan must come through the form of both conventional resistance, and a rearward strike on the logistical and reinforcement capabilities of Japanese forces. He asserted that warfare through conventional means must not involve static defense of nonessential strategic objectives.<blockquote>"Our strategy should be to employ our main forces to operate over an extended and fluid front. To achieve success, Chinese forces must conduct their warfare with a high degree of mobility on extensive battlefields... This means large scale mobile warfare, and not positional warfare... It does not mean the abandonment of all the vital strategic points, which should be defended by positional warfare as long as possible... Positional warfare is necessary, but strategically it is auxiliary and secondary."</blockquote>As part of his goal to wage a people's war, Mao explained that large numbers of Guerrilla units among the peasants were necessary for such a strategy to succeed. China's ability to supply her troops depended on captured Japanese equipment stocks and foreign deliveries, allowing China to conduct positional warfare when her conventional capabilities matched the Japanese, who would be worn down using the aforementioned rearward strikes. | |||
==Further Reading== | |||
* {{Citation|mia=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-2/mswv2_09.htm|title=On Protracted War|author=Mao Zedong|year=1938}} | |||
[[Category:Mao Zedong Thought]] | |||
[[Category:Maoism]] | |||
Latest revision as of 20:40, 29 September 2024
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People's war is a military strategy first developed by Mao Zedong and the Communist Party of China which prioritizes the mobilization and organization of the entire population for combat and support roles.[1] The military strategy is adopted by Maoists, who claim that the people's war is universal and can span across all nations provided that it is adapted to the material conditions. The only parties to adopt people's war in their history are the Communist Party of China, Communist Party of Vietnam and Maoist Guerrilla Groups such as the Shining Path, Communist Party of India (Maoist), and the Communist Party of the Philippines.
History[edit | edit source]
As early as 1849, Friedrich Engels advocated for a people's war as the only effective strategy for a nation seeking to gain independence from a larger power.[2] He draw direct inspiration from the French revolutionary wars of 1793.[3]
The strategy[edit | edit source]
In its original formulation by Mao Zedong, people's war exploits the few advantages that a small revolutionary movement has—broad-based popular support can be one of them—against a state's power with a large, professional, well-equipped and well-funded army. People's war strategically avoids decisive battles, since a tiny force of a few dozen soldiers would easily be routed in an all-out confrontation with the state. Instead, it favors' a three-phase strategy of protracted warfare, with carefully chosen battles that can realistically be won.
In phase one, the revolutionary force conducting people's war starts in a remote rural region with mountainous or forested terrain in which its enemy is weak. It attempts to establish a local stronghold known as a revolutionary base area. As it grows in power, it enters phase two, establishes other revolutionary base areas and spreads its influence through the surrounding countryside, where it may become the governing power and gain popular support through programmes such as land reform. Eventually in phase three, the movement has enough strength to encircle and capture small cities, then larger ones, until finally it seizes power in the entire country.
Political Goals[edit | edit source]
The basis of a people's war, a war waged by the peasants and thus the party, necessitated political control over military operations. This was echoed by his 1938 statement:
"Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun. Our principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the Party. Yet, having guns, we can create Party organizations, as witness the powerful Party organizations which the Eighth Route Army has created in northern China."
In On Protracted War, Mao argues that wars waged by Communists were inherently progressive and just. All wars which had the support of the party were to be actively participated in, even if they were in coordination with reactionary factions. Mao criticized "idealists" who refused to cooperate with said reactionaries.
In China[edit | edit source]
Mao argues that because of the creation of the Second United Front and national "perseverance" the Japanese have failed to achieve a victory through mobile warfare and that China was now engaged in a "protracted war". Mao criticizes the proponents of "China's quick victory" stating that they were underestimating the enemy. He expresses his dislike of armchair generals who assume that Guerrilla warfare holds a supplementary role to mobile warfare. Mao laments that their hopes consisted chiefly of a victory through foreign military intervention by the Soviet Union or victory through a decisive military solution.
Mao stated that there had to be three prerequisites in order to achieve victory and defeat the forces of Japan
"First, the establishment of an anti-Japanese united front in China; second, the formation of an international anti-Japanese united front; third, the rise of the revolutionary movement of the people in Japan and the Japanese colonies. From the standpoint of the Chinese people, the unity of the people of China is the most important of the three conditions."
Mao argues that resistance against Japan must come through the form of both conventional resistance, and a rearward strike on the logistical and reinforcement capabilities of Japanese forces. He asserted that warfare through conventional means must not involve static defense of nonessential strategic objectives.
"Our strategy should be to employ our main forces to operate over an extended and fluid front. To achieve success, Chinese forces must conduct their warfare with a high degree of mobility on extensive battlefields... This means large scale mobile warfare, and not positional warfare... It does not mean the abandonment of all the vital strategic points, which should be defended by positional warfare as long as possible... Positional warfare is necessary, but strategically it is auxiliary and secondary."
As part of his goal to wage a people's war, Mao explained that large numbers of Guerrilla units among the peasants were necessary for such a strategy to succeed. China's ability to supply her troops depended on captured Japanese equipment stocks and foreign deliveries, allowing China to conduct positional warfare when her conventional capabilities matched the Japanese, who would be worn down using the aforementioned rearward strikes.
Further Reading[edit | edit source]
- Mao Zedong (1938). On Protracted War. [MIA]
- ↑ “A people’s war calls for a correct line in building up forces, a line which consists in mobilizing and arming the entire people, involving them in insurrection and war in all forms, organizing the immense political forces of the masses and the popular armed forces with their three categories of troops as the core of people’s war.”
Võ Nguyên Giáp (1971). National liberation war in Vietnam: 'Political forces and military forces in mass uprising and people’s war'. - ↑ “A nation that wants to conquer its independence cannot restrict itself to the ordinary methods of warfare. Mass uprising, revolutionary war, guerilla detachments everywhere — that is the only means by which a small nation can overcome a large one, by which a less strong army can be put in a position to resist a stronger and better organised one.”
Friedrich Engels (1849). The defeat of the Piedmontese. - ↑ “What ruined the Italians, therefore, was not the defeat at Novara and Vigevano; it was the cowardice and moderation that monarchy forces on them. The lost battle at Novara resulted merely in a strategic disadvantage; the Italians were cut off from Turin, whereas the way to it lay open to the Austrians. This disadvantage would have been entirely without significance if the lost battle had been followed by a real revolutionary war, if the remainder of the Italian army had forthwith proclaimed itself the nucleus of a national mass uprising, if the conventional strategic war of armies had been turned into a people's war, like that waged by the French in 1793.”
Friedrich Engels (1849). The defeat of the Piedmontese.